AN

EXPLICATION

OF THE

DECALOGUE

OR

Ten Commandments,

WITH REFERENCE TO THE

CATECHISM

OF THE

CHURCH of *ENGLAND.*

To which are premiſed by way of Introduction

Several GENERAL DISCOURSES concerning GOD's both NATURAL and POSITIVE *LAWS.*

By *Gabriel Towerſon*, ſometimes Fellow of *All-Souls* College in *Oxford*, and now Rector of *Wellwyn* in *Hertfordſhire.*

Philo in Præfat. ad Librum de Decalogo.

Εἰπὼν δὲ ἃ ἥρμοττε περὶ τούτων, ἐξῆς ἀκολούθως τὰς νόμους, ἐκεῖνο χρὴ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον παρομνύσας, ὅτι μὴ νόμων ἕις μὲν αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς, ἃ προσχρησάμενος ἄλλῳ, δι' αὐτῦ μόνε θεσπίζειν ἠξίωσεν, ἕις δὲ διὰ προφήτε Μωσέως, ὃν ἀειςίνδην ἐξ ἁπάντων, ὡς ὀπτημάτατον ἱερωφαντῶν ἄλλο. Τὰς μὲν ἓν αὐτοπροσώπως θεσπισθέντας ΔΙ' ΑΥΤΟΥ ΜΟΝΟΥ συμβέβηκε καὶ ΝΟΜΟΥΣ εἶναι, καὶ ΝΟΜΩΝ ἢν ἐν μέρει ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΑ, τὰς δὲ ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΟΦΗΤΟΥ πάντας ΕΠ' ΕΚΕΙΝΟΥΣ ἀναφερομένας.

LONDON,

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TO

The Most Reverend *FATHER* in God

GILBERT

By Divine Providence

LORD ARCHBISHOP

OF

CANTERBURY,

Primate of all *England*, and Metropolitan,

AND

One of His Majesties most Honourable Privy-Council, *&c.*

May it please Your Grace,

I Have here attempted an Explication of that part of our *Church-Catechism* which respects the *Decalogue* or *Ten Commandments*: Not out of any great opinion of mine own Abilities for such an undertaking, of which they, who know me, know me to be sufficiently diffident; but out of a due sense of the want of a just Discourse upon this Argument, which by no Man that I know of hath been handled according to its worth.

It was once in my thoughts to have suppressed it, till I could have finished an Explication of the

whole *Catechiſm*, as conceiving that that would have been more compleat, and more acceptable to the World. But conſidering with my ſelf that it would require ſome time to reviſe what I have already done, and much more to add to and perfect it; and ſince what is now offered to Your Grace, and, with Your Graces Leave, to the Publick view alſo, is entire enough, if I have acquitted my ſelf in it as I ought: I thought I ſhould no way diſoblige my Readers, if I ſent this part of it before the reſt to try the Judgment of the World. Eſpecially ſince it is not impoſſible, but that I may entertain a better opinion of my own Labours, than they ſhall be found by more competent Judges to deſerve.

If any thing may ſeem with Reaſon to make ſuch a procedure improper, it is, that I have referr'd my ſelf to thoſe Parts that are not yet publiſhed, for the proof of ſome things aſſerted here. But as it is only for ſuch things as have been abundantly proved by others, and which therefore, eſpecially *in loco non ſuo*, I might the better wave the confirmation of; ſo they are for the moſt part, if not only, ſuch, as by the Laws of Diſcourſe are to be ſuppoſed by all that will entreat of this Argument. However, if what is now tendred find acceptance, that blot ſhall not long lye upon it; and if not, the imperfectneſs thereof will be the moſt pardonable quality of my Diſcourſe, or at leaſt will be more excuſable than my troubling the World with more.

In this Treatiſe I have endeavoured, out of that heap which ſo copious a ſubject preſents, to ſelect ſuch matter as is moſt conſiderable and pertinent; to deliver my ſenſe concerning it in proper and intelligible expreſſions; and laſtly, to confirm that by ſolid Reaſons.

Reaſons. For other things I have not been much ſollicitous, and much leſs, as *Solomon* ſpeaks, *to find out acceptable words*, as conceiving ſuch more proper to perſwade than inform, which is or ought to be the Deſign of an Explication.

If any taking occaſion from this rude Diſcourſe of mine ſhall oblige the World with a more perfect one, he ſhall find me among the foremoſt to return him thanks for it: Both becauſe of the benefit I ſhall reap in common with others from it, and alſo becauſe I ſhall have the ſatisfaction of conſidering, that, if I have not been my ſelf ſo fortunate in *Explaining* the *Ten Commandments*, yet I have *ſtirred* up thoſe that are, and thereby have *fulfilled* a *Commandment*, the *obſervation* whereof is of more advantage than the moſt accurate *Explication* of them all.

In the mean time as I hope theſe my Labours will not be altogether unuſeful, ſo I lay them at Your Grace's feet, as a Recognition of thoſe many favours You have been pleaſed to confer upon me, and of that Duty I owe to the Church of *England*; for the ſafe-guard whereof, as Your Grace hath with great prudence and conduct happily preſided, in an Age wherein You have met with more than ordinary Diſcouragements; ſo that God will ſtill preſerve Your Grace for the farther benefit thereof, is the hearty Prayer of

Your Grace's in all bounden

Duty and Service

GABRIEL TOWERSON.

THE
DECALOGUE
OR
TEN COMMANDMENTS,

As they are deſcribed and explained by the Catechiſm of the Church of *ENGLAND*.

Queſt. YOU ſaid that your Godfathers and Godmothers did promiſe for you, that you ſhould keep Gods Commandments. Tell me how many there be.

Anſw. Ten.

Queſt. Which be they.

Anſw. The ſame Which God ſpake in the Twentieth Chapter of Exodus, ſaying, I am the Lord thy God Who brought thee out of the Land of Egypt, out of the Houſe of Bondage.

I. Thou ſhalt have none other Gods but me.

II. Thou ſhalt not make to thy ſelf any Graven Image, nor the likeneſs of any thing that is in Heaven above, or in the Earth beneath, or in the Water under the Earth. Thou ſhalt not bow down to them, nor Worſhip them. For I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, and viſit the ſins of the Fathers upon the Children unto the third and fourth Generation of them that hate me, and ſhew mercy unto thouſands in them that love me, and keep my Commandments.

III. Thou ſhalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain: for the Lord will not hold him guiltleſs that taketh his Name in vain.

IV. Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day. Six days ſhalt thou labour, and do all that thou haſt to do; but the ſeventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God. In it thou ſhalt do no manner of Work, thou, and thy Son, and thy Daughter, thy Man-ſervant, and thy Maid-ſervant, thy Cattel, and the Stranger that is within thy Gates. For in ſix days the Lord made Heaven and Earth, the Sea, and all that in them is, and reſted

rested the seventh day; Wherefore the Lord blessed seventh day and hallowed it.

V. Honour thy Father and thy Mother, that thy days may be long in the Land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.

VI Thou shalt do no murther.

VII. Thou shalt not commit adultery.

VIII. Thou shalt not steal.

IX. Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy Neighbour.

X. Thou shalt not covet thy Neighbours House, thou shalt not covet thy Neighbours Wife, nor his Servant, nor his Maid, nor his Ox, nor his Ass, nor any thing that is his.

Quest. What dost thou chiefly learn by these Commandments?

Answ. I learn two things: my duty towards God, and my duty towards my Neighbour.

Quest. What is thy duty towards God?

Answ. My duty towards God is to believe in him, to fear him, and to love him with all my heart, with all my mind, with all my soul, and with all my strength; to worship him, to give him thanks, to put my whole trust in him, to call upon him, to honour his holy Name and his Word; and to serve him truly all the days of my life.

Quest. What is thy duty towards thy Neighbour?

Answ. My duty towards my Neighbour, is to love him as my self, and to do to all men, as I would they should do unto me. To love, honour and succour my Father and Mother. To honour and obey the King, and all that are put in authority under him. To submit my self to all my Governours, Teachers, Spiritual Pastors and Masters. To order my self lowly and reverently to all my betters. To hurt no body by word or deed. To be true and just in all my dealings. To bear no malice nor hatred in my heart. To keep my hands from picking and stealing, and my tongue from evil speaking, lying, and slandering. To keep my body in temperance, soberness, and chastity. Not to covet nor desire other mens goods; but to learn and labour truly to get mine own living, and to do my duty in that state of life, unto which it shall please God to call me.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EXPLICATION OF THE DECALOGUE.

DISCOURSE I.

Of the Law of *NATURE*.

How it doth appear that there is such a Law, What the general Contents of that Law are, And of what continuance its obligation is. A digression concerning mens misapprehensions in the matter of Nature's Law, and from whence those misapprehensions do proceed. Of what use the knowledge of Nature's Law is, after the superinducing the Laws of Moses *and of Christ.*

PRoposing to my self to entreat of the Decalogue, or Ten Commandments, according as the Catechism of the Church of *England* hath understood them, I foresee it necessary to premise somewhat concerning the Divine Laws in general, and then of the Ten Commandments in particular. For as that Catechism, though it restrains *Gods holy will* to the Ten Commandments, yet doth it upon supposition of their containing in them all other his Laws and Commandments; so before we descend to the Explication of those Ten, it will be necessary to enquire, By what Authority they stand, how they come to oblige us, and what measures we are to proceed by in the Interpretation of them?

Now the Laws of God are of two sorts, to wit, either Natural or Positive; by the former whereof I understand such a Law or Laws as are founded upon natural principles, and investigable by them; by the latter, such as have no other visible foundation, at least, than the meer good pleasure of God, and are therefore to be known only by revelation from himself.

The Law of Nature again hath these four things to be enquired into,

to, which accordingly ſhall be the boundaries of my diſcourſe concerning it.

1. How it doth appear that there is ſuch a Law.
2. What the general Contents of that Law are.
3. Of what continuance the obligation thereof is.
4. Of what uſe the knowledge thereof is, after the ſuperinducing the Laws of *Moſes* and *Chriſt*.

I. It is very well obſerved by the judicious *Hooker*, and will be evident to any man that ſhall conſult his own underſtanding, that all knowledge is at length reſolved into ſuch things as are clear and evident of themſelves; for all knowledge of things obſcure being made by ſuch things as are more known than the things we ſeek after, either it muſt terminate in ſuch things as are clear and evident of themſelves, or we can have no certain knowledge of any thing: That by which we endeavour to know any thing, requiring ſtill ſomething to manifeſt it, and ſo on *in infinitum*. Now though a reſolution into things clear and evident of themſelves be not always actually made, nor indeed neceſſary to be ſo, the intermediate principles of any Science coming by diſcourſe to be as well known, as thoſe things which are clear and evident of themſelves; yet being now to penetrate, as it were, into the very bottom of all Moral Truths, it will be requiſite for us to dig ſo much the deeper, and deduce the being of the Law of Nature, if not from ſuch principles as are the loweſt in their kind, yet from ſuch as are neareſt to them. I have * elſewhere ſhewn, and ſhall therefore now take it for granted, that there is ſuch a thing as an Alwiſe and good God, that that God is the Creator and Suſtainer of the world, and all things in it; which being granted, it will follow, that there is a right in God to give Laws to his Creatures, in ſuch things as are in their power, and ſuitable to their nature to execute. For what can be more rational, than that every one ſhould have the diſpoſal of thoſe things which he is the Author of, and conſequently, if God be the Author of all things, that he himſelf ſhould have the command of them? All therefore that will be requiſite for us to enquire into, is, whether as God hath the power of giving Laws to his Creatures, and to man in particular, ſo he hath actually done it, and conſigned him to the obedience of them? Now for this we ſhall need no other proof, than that freedom of will, which God hath given to humane nature; for being man is not carried by any inevitable neceſſity as other Creatures are, but left to the guidance of his own reaſon and will, either he muſt have a Rule ſet him to proceed by, or it ſhall be in his power, even by the conſent of the Almighty, to diſturb the order of Nature. Now foraſmuch as it can be no way ſuitable to the wiſdom of any one to put Creatures into a power, that I ſay not into a kind of neceſſity, to diſturb his own orders and deſigns, therefore God being Alwiſe muſt neceſſarily have prevented this inconvenience, and given him a Rule to direct his will and operations. Again, being it appears not, that man at the firſt had any other revealed Law of God than that of not eating the forbidden Fruit, and many Nations of the World have no opportunity to know thoſe Revelations he hath ſince made, it follows, that God hath implanted in the ſoul of each particular man a Law by which he is to act, or at leaſt ſuch principles from which he may deduce it. Laſtly, foraſmuch as there is in all men a conſcience, excuſing or commending them when they have done any thing they apprehend to be good, but diſ-

approving

* Explic. of the Apoſtles Creed.

approving and condemning them if they have done any thing which they believe to be evil; it follows undeniably that there is a Rule, whereby our actions are to be guided. For if mankind were left at large, what ground could there be of his either applauding or condemning himself, for any ſuppoſed either virtuous or vitious actions? Neither is it any prejudice to this inference, that mens conſciences do oftentimes condemn them for thoſe things that are no parts of the Law of Nature, or any other. For as we pretend not to infer the goodneſs or evil of any action in it ſelf, from the conſciences either acquitting or condemning the perſon that doth it, but only, that there is ſuch a thing as good or evil: ſo cannot any reaſon be aſſigned of our conſciences either accuſing or condemning us, if the notion of good and evil were not planted in the ſoul of man by that God who formed it. For though tradition and education may perſwade us to believe many things to be evil, which are in themſelves not ſo, and conſequently incline the conſcience of him that committeth them, to condemn or diſquiet him for ſo doing; yet could they not (unleſs they could build without a foundation) incline the man to be troubled for it, but upon ſuppoſition that there is ſuch a thing as evil. Again, when the main trouble of conſcience proceeds from hence, even from the doing of thoſe things which that aſſures us to be evil, what reaſon can be aſſigned of that trouble, if it were not a truth implanted in our hearts that we ought not to do thoſe things which our conſcience aſſureth us to be bad? For as it is evident, no man could be troubled for acting againſt his conſcience, but upon ſuppoſition of his being bound to follow the dictates of it: ſo is it not to be imagined, that that ſuppoſition could have any other root than Nature. For as for all frightful ſtories of Hell, and the like (which men, who would be thought wiſe, would have the ground of all Religion) even thoſe themſelves, if it be duly conſidered, will be found to receive their force and efficacy from the conſcience's foreperſwaſion of good and evil, and particularly of its own obligation. For ſetting aſide the nature of good and evil as meer fancies, and my conſcience ſhall not ſo much be affrighted at the ſtories of vengeance, as at the ſhaking of a reed, becauſe conſcious of nothing that may deſerve it. I conclude therefore with S. *Paul* in that excellent diſcourſe of his upon this argument, *Rom.* 2. 14. *That though the Gentiles have not the Law*, that is to ſay no revealed one, *yet they are a Law unto themſelves, which ſhew the work of the Law written in their hearts, their conſciences alſo bearing witneſs, and their thoughts in the mean while accuſing or elſe excuſing one another.*

II. The being of the Law of Nature being thus demonſtrated, enquire we in the ſecond place, what the Precepts thereof are; I do not mean to give account of every particular one (for that were both an infinite and needleſs task) but of the more general ones, from which the other may be eaſily deduced. Now there are two ways of inveſtigating any truths, as the foremention'd *Hooker* hath well obſerved; the one by the cauſes which conſtitute it, the other by the ſigns and tokens which attend it. The latter of theſe is without doubt the moſt eaſie, but withall the moſt fallible, and therefore quitting that at preſent, I ſhall chuſe rather to pitch upon the former, and exemplifie the Precepts of this Law by it. Now there are three things wherein our duty is comprehended, according to thoſe ſeveral relations we ſtand

in; our duty to God, our Neighbour, and our ſelves. I begin with the laſt of theſe becauſe neareſt to us, and therefore in all probability moſt eaſie to be diſcerned by us, where the firſt capital Precept, that preſents it ſelf to us, is the preſervation of our ſelves. Now that this is a Precept of that Law, which we call the Law of Nature, beſide our own natural propenſion to it, will appear from God's giving us a being, and means to ſupport it. For as the deſtruction of our being is a direct contradiction to that order which he hath ſet in Nature; ſo our neglect to preſerve it, is, though not a direct, yet a conſequential contradiction to that proviſion which he hath made for us in the world. For what deſign can we ſuppoſe God to have had, principally and chiefly I mean, in thoſe good things he hath given us, but the ſupport of our being by them? If then it were the deſign of the Almighty, in the good things of this world, that we ſhould receive ſupport and comfort by them, if this deſign of his appear from the nature of the things themſelves; the preſervation of our ſelves is a branch of that Law, and we conſequently tranſgreſſors of it if we neglect it. But from hence we may collect, what we are to think of all ſelf-murthers, exceſſes, or neglects: for if the preſervation of our ſelves be a duty incumbent on us by the Law of our Creation, then muſt that be a ſin which either deſtroys, or impairs, or neglects it, and conſequently, all laying violent hands upon our ſelves, all intemperance, and ſloth, and idleneſs. From the duty we owe to our ſelves, aſcend we to that which is terminated in God, and ſee whether there be any footſteps of ſuch a one in that Law whereof we are ſpeaking. Now there are two things wherein our duty to God may be comprehended, our honouring him and obeying him. The former of theſe is evident from that excellency, which the ſoul, aſſiſted with the bare light of reaſon, may diſcern in God. For being it is a clear dictate of the light of reaſon, that whatſoever is excellent is to be honoured; God as being the moſt excellent eſſence, yea the fountain of all others excellencies, muſt be much more ſo, by how much he tranſcends all others. But from hence it is evident what we are to think, not only of all manifeſt contempts of him, but of adopting any thing elſe into equal honour with him; for being God is not only to be honoured, but to be honoured alſo above all other beings, becauſe ſo far ſurpaſſing them; the adopting of any other into the like honour, muſt be a diminution of his, and conſequently a breach of this fundamental Law, as well as of that which ſaith, *Thou ſhalt have no other Gods beſide me.* The ſame is no leſs evident concerning that other branch of our duty to God, even our yielding obedience to all his commands; for being (as was before ſhown) God is our maker and ſuſtainer, he has a right to our obedience, and conſequently, we a neceſſity of obeying him. But from hence will follow, not only our yielding obedience to all other the Laws of Nature, but to all poſitive and revealed ones; for being the command of God is that which challenges our obedience, and not the manner whereby it is made known to us, whatſoever appears to be ſuch muſt be equally our duty, whether engraven in Tables of ſtone, as that of *Moſes* was, or in the more noble Tables of our heart, as this of Nature. The only thing now remaining to be proved, is what we commonly call our duty to our Neighbour, and may be compriſed in theſe two generals, the giving to every man that which is his own, and where that is requiſite, the miniſtring to them of ours. The former

mer whereof as it is ſo plain, that it hardly admits of any proof, ſo both the one and the other receive ſufficient confirmation from our natural deſire of receiving the like charity and juſtice from others; for being (as the forementioned *Hooker* well obſerveth) thoſe things which are equal, muſt needs all have one meaſure, if I cannot but wiſh to receive all juſtice aud requiſite charity from the hands of others, I cannot but think it reaſonable to afford it; and I muſt either condemn my own deſires, and that nature from whence they flow, or think other mens as neceſſary to be complyed with.

III. From what hath been ſaid concerning the Law of Nature, it is evident, thirdly, that this Law is unchangeable, or at leaſt muſt continue of force ſo long as our nature doth; for being (as was before ſaid) rooted in Nature, and flowing from natural cauſes, it muſt conſequently have the ſame continuance with thoſe cauſes from whence it flows. Thus, for example, to give every man that which is his own, is ſo a duty that it can never ceaſe to be ſo; as in like manner, to offer violence to no man, not to take away any mans life or ſubſtance. Indeed it ſometimes happens, that there ſeems to be a change in this Law, as in thoſe known inſtances of the *Iſraelites* ſpoiling the *Ægyptians*, and *Abrahams* ſacrificing his innocent Son. But if it be well conſidered, it will be found that there is not ſo much a change made in the Law, as in the matter about which it is converſant; for God having a paramount power over the Creatures, and never ſo parting with it, as not to reſerve to himſelf a liberty to withdraw it at pleaſure, whatſoever he commands to be taken away, doth thereby ceaſe to be that perſons whoſe it was before, and conſequently it is no violation of that Law, which commands the giving every man his own, to diſrobe ſuch a perſon of it. The like is to be ſaid concerning *Abrahams* ſacrificing his Son, or the Magiſtrates putting a Malefactor to death; for it being not ſimply murther to take away a mans life, but to take it away either without commiſſion from God, or without any juſt motive; *Abrahams* ſacrificing his Son, and the Magiſtrates putting a man to death, is no breach of that Law which forbids murther: Becauſe the former did what he did by commiſſion from God, who is abſolute Lord of the Creatures; and the Magiſtrate puts Malefactors to death, by virtue of that general Commiſſion, which impowers thoſe that are in Authority, to execute vengeance upon all that do evil. By which ſolution all pretence is taken away, of drawing thoſe actions into example, and particularly that of ſpoiling the *Ægyptians*. For it being evident from the Scripture, that whatſoever any man, how wicked ſoever, acquires by the ordinary courſe of Gods providence, is truly and properly his, and no diminution of that appearing but by an expreſs command from God, as the *Iſraelites* had to ſpoil the *Ægyptians*; to take any thing away from ſuch a perſon, without that command, is truly and properly to take away that which is anothers, and conſequently eternally ſinful, becauſe that Law, of which it is a tranſgreſſion, is eternal.

But here a queſtion may not impertinently be made, and I ſhall the rather intend it, becauſe the reſolution thereof may confer ſomewhat to the clearing of that which follows; to wit, how it comes to paſs that this Law of Nature hath not only been ſo much diſobeyed, but ſo much miſunderſtood by thoſe who were under the obligation of it; for flowing (as I have before ſaid) from natural principles, the truth whereof is evident to all, and being alſo (as was now ſhewn) eternal-

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ly obligatory to all mankind, it may ſeem a wonder how this Law ſhould be ſo ſtrangely miſunderſtood, as experience tells us it hath been: The *Romans*, a polite and civilized people, accounting it no injury to invade the Territories of their Neighbours, as the whole Heathen world ſtrangely offending againſt that fundamental Law, which forbids the adopting of any Creature into equal honour with the Almighty. In anſwer to which, we are firſt to know, that though the firſt principles of natural knowledge carry ſufficient evidence in themſelves, and accordingly have been with great conſent acknowledged by all (whence it is, that no Nation almoſt hath been ſo barbarous as not to own a God, and that God is to be worſhipped) yet the deductions from thoſe principles, which are no leſs a part of that Law, require ſome care and intention in thoſe that make them; which the world, generally ſlothful, not being over forward to uſe, it is no wonder if men have many times erred in ſeveral particulars thereof; for let the truth, we are to know, be built upon never ſo certain and evident principles, yea upon ſuch as are no leſs evident, than that the whole is greater than the part, yet, if we attend not to the conſequences of thoſe principles, we may erre in our apprehenſions about them, even as he who hath a light to guide him, may either ſtumble or wander out of his way, if he do not advert to thoſe bright rays that ſtream from it. 2. But there is yet a more weighty cauſe of mens miſapprehenſions in thoſe things which are the Precepts of this great Law; and that is the depravedneſs of their wills and affections, and their earneſt purſuit of ſuch things as promiſe them any preſent pleaſure or advantage; for finding ſin to miniſter to theſe, and themſelves ſtrongly enclined to obtain them, the deſire of ſo doing makes them firſt willing to believe that, which leads to them, to be no impiety, and then actually to believe it none; for as *Minutius Felix* ſpeaks, *facilè credimus quæ volumus*, we eaſily believe that which we deſire to be, our paſſion for any preſent enjoyment either wholly ſtifling or ſuppreſſing the dictates of right reaſon, which ſhould keep us from the purſuing of it. 3. Laſtly, (which S. *Paul* expreſly affirms, * and is in truth the beſt account of this difficulty) the Heathen world liking not to retain God in their knowledge, nor thoſe Precepts of his which this great Law contain'd, it is no wonder if he gave them over, not only to vile affections, but alſo to a reprobate and brutiſh mind; for how can it be but extremely juſt, to withdraw the light from thoſe who ſhut their eyes againſt it when they have it, and to make that their puniſhment, which was their own choice?

* Rom. 1. 28.

IV. The fourth and laſt thing comes now to be diſcuſſed, to wit, What is the uſefulneſs of this Law? A queſtion which may ſeem the more neceſſary to be asked after the ſuperinducing of the Law of *Moſes*, and that of Chriſt. In anſwer to which I ſay,

1. That though theſe later Laws ſhould acquaint us with every thing, that the Law of Nature contains, yet would not that Law be unneceſſary to be looked into; for being given by God, as the others were, and continuing in full force and virtue, the ſame reaſon and piety, which obligeth us to the conſideration of thoſe, will put us upon the conſideration of this.
2. Again, though the Laws of *Moſes* and of Chriſt ſhould contain all the ſame Precepts, which the Law of Nature doth, yet the

the reasonableness of those Precepts appearing mostly, if not only, from this, the consideration thereof cannot but be exceeding useful; as well for the commendation of the equity of him that gave them, as for the more vigorous stirring up our selves to yield obedience to them; for when Law comes assisted with reason, it doth not only convince but perswade, and makes us embrace as well as bear our Fetters.

3. There is yet another reason, and a much more forcible one, of our study of Natures Law; for beside that no reason obligeth us to think all things set down so clearly in the other, as not to stand in need of some assistance from this light, in the explication of moral duties; the Law of *Moses* and Christ both presuppose some things known from this great fundamental Law: for urging the several Precepts therein contained, not so much from the reasonableness of the things themselves, as the authority of God that gave them, and the mighty works whereby he gave witness to those that published them; they must consequently suppose it known from Natures Law, that there is a God and Providence, and that that God is to be believed and obeyed. Whilst others therefore, with no less danger to themselves, than with folly and unreasonableness, despise this Candle of the Lord, let us on the contrary contemplate and adore it, as being assured, that though it be not the Sun, yet it is the *Phosphorus* to it, and both foretells and points at it.

DISC. II.

Of the positive Laws of God, and particularly of the Law of *Moses*.

The positive Laws of God are either such as were given to man in the state of Innocency, or such as were given to him since his fall. That the Law concerning the not eating of the Tree of Knowledge, is of the former number, What the reason of the giving of it was, and of what concernment it is to us. The like enquired concerning the Law of Eve's *becoming subject to her Husband, and of his being obliged to labour; both which are shewn to be of universal and perpetual Obligation. Of the Laws given to* Noah, *and particularly concerning that of not eating Blood, which is shewn not to be of present Obligation. A digression concerning the reason and use of Positive Laws, and particularly of such, the matter whereof is moral. Of the Authority and Obligation of the Law of* Moses, *and from whence our primary Obligation thereto ariseth. In what instances, and in what measure the Law of* Moses *doth now oblige.*

I Said in the beginning of my last, that the Laws of God were of two sorts, to wit, either Natural or Positive: By the former whereof I told you, you were to understand such Laws as were founded upon natural principles, and knowable by them; by the latter, such as are

are founded upon the meer good pleasure of God, and consequently to be known only by revelation from himself; for though the matter of some Positive Laws be the same with that of the Law of Nature, and consequently those at least may seem to have the same foundation and deduction with it; yet as that matter is a part of those Precepts which we call Positive, so it is founded upon his meer good pleasure that gave them, and consequently knowable to us, not by their own inward light, but by such outward means as he shall be pleased to manifest them by. Thus for example, Though I may know from the light of Nature, that I ought not to have any other gods besides the true, nor adopt any other person into equal honour with him; yet, as this was part of the Law given in Mount *Sinai*, so it depended upon his alone good will and pleasure, and consequently could not be known, but by his own publick Declaration, and those Writings which have transmitted it unto us.

Now the Positive Laws of God, we are now in order to entreat of, may be reduced to two heads,

1. The former whereof were given to man in the state of innocency,
2. The latter, since his fall from it.

I. If we look upon man in the state of innocency, so we shall find he had a Positive Law imposed upon him; the Scripture telling us of an express Command of God, Not to eat of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, which he had placed in the midst of the Garden of *Eden*, *Gen.* 2. 17. Now there are two things which will be requisite to be enquired into concerning this Law, and which therefore I shall endeavour the resolution of. 1. What necessity or expedience there was of giving such a Law? And, 2. How this Law concerns us? The ground of the former Query, is that perfection which seems to be in the Law of Nature before given. For if (as I have before shewn) this gives direction to us in all cases relating either to God, our Neighbour, or our selves, if this Law was at that time clear and manifest to him to whom it was given, what need was there of adding to it another Law? and such as had nothing to commend it to our first Parents, but the authority and pleasure of him that gave it? But to this the answer is easie; and that is, That God therefore gave it, not as a supplement of Natures Law, which needed it not, but that he might thereby have a firmer proof of mans obedience to himself. For the Law of Nature containing such things, as ought in reason to be done, though there were no Command of God prescribing them, our Obedience thereto might proceed rather from compliance with our own reason, than with his Command who gave it. But giving a Law, the matter whereof had nothing to commend it, but the authority of him who gave it, obedience thereto could proceed from no other consideration, and consequently must be the surest proof of our obedience. The same is to be said, in some measure, of Gods making Positive Laws concerning those things which were prescribed by that of Nature; for Gods Positive or Revealed Laws exacting our obedience, upon the score of his authority that gave them, we cannot satisfie those Laws, but by having a principal regard to his Command who imposed them on us. Having thus shewn the expediency of Gods giving that Positive Law concerning the not eating of the Tree of Knowledge, proceed we in the next place to shew how this Law concern us; which is a Query no less

leſs neceſſary than the former; for if this Law concern not us, the conſideration thereof in this place muſt be very impertinent, becauſe enquiring into our own obligation and duty. In anſwer therefore to this I ſay, 1. That this Law being given to *Adam*, not only in his perſonal capacity, but as he was the repreſentative of all mankind, (as appears from the Scriptures charging the guilt of it upon all that deſcended from his loins) this Law muſt be conſequently ſuppoſed to have been obligatory to us, as well as to him to whom it was immediately given. 2. Again being it is a dictate of Natures Law, not only that we ſhould yield obedience to his commands, but alſo, where we fail, repent of the breach of them; the *Law of abſtaining from the Tree of Knowledge*, as being a Law of Gods to us, muſt conſequently ſo far concern us, as to oblige us to repent of the breach of it.

II. From ſuch Law, or *Laws*, as were given to man *in the ſtate of innocency*, paſs we to thoſe which were given to him *after his fall*. Where

1. The firſt that preſents it ſelf, is that command of God concerning the Womans being ſubject to her Husband, *Gen.* 3. 16. *Unto the Woman he ſaid, I will greatly multiply thy ſorrows and conception. In ſorrow ſhalt thou bring forth children, and thy deſire ſhall be to thy Husband, and he ſhall rule over thee.* For though it be true, that this was ſpoken more particularly to *Eve*, upon occaſion of her tranſgreſſing Gods Command: yet as the Curſe wherewith this Command is accompanied, was manifeſtly intended for all of the Female Sex; ſo it is no leſs evident, as for that reaſon, ſo for the capacity the Woman was in, that the Command was likewiſe intended. For being *Eve* was the repreſentative of all Woman-kind, as well as the Wife of *Adam*, whatſoever Command was given to her, muſt be ſuppoſed to belong to all of her Sex and condition. And accordingly S. *Paul* doth not only urge this obedience upon the *Corinthian* Women in reference to the Law, 1 *Cor.* 14. 34. but yet more particularly, 1 *Tim.* 1. 14. upon the account of this Command, that was given to *Eve*; for having before ſaid, *that he ſuffered not a Woman to teach, nor to uſurp authority over the man, but to be in ſilence*, he adds, as a reaſon of it, *becauſe* Adam *was not deceived, but the Woman being deceived was in the tranſgreſſion.* Which being the very reaſon why God gave the forementioned Command to *Eve*, of being ſubject to her Husband, it is evident that, when in the Epiſtle to the *Corinthians* he ſaith, *that they are commanded to be under obedience, as alſo ſaith the Law*, his meaning was of that Law which was given to *Eve*, and conſequently that that Law is obligatory to all. The ſame is to be ſaid of the other poſitive Law.

2. The ſecond is that which was given to *Adam*, upon the account of his diſobedience, *Gen.* 3. 19. *In the ſweat of thy brow ſhalt thou eat bread, until thou return unto the ground*; for that that was a Command, as well as a Curſe, is evident from the 23. verſe, where we find God ſending forth the man from the Garden of *Eden*, to till the ground from whence he was taken. Now foraſmuch as *Adam* was the repreſentative of mankind, as of whoſe blood all Nations were made, foraſmuch as he is here conſidered, not under the relation of a Husband, but a man, nor is there any thing in the Precept to determine it to him, whatſoever is given in command to him, muſt be ſuppoſed to be intended to all perſons according to their capacities and degrees. And

indeed, as in the Laws of men, ſuch are preſumed to oblige the Generations following, which have nothing in them to reſtrain them to the preſent; ſo there is the ſame reaſon to believe that Law of God, which was given to him from whom we are deſcended, to oblige us alſo, if there be nothing in it to determine it to him alone; for it being neither ſuitable to the majeſty, nor agreeable to the cuſtom of Law-givers, to renew their Laws, as often as the perſons change that are under them, that which is directed to one Generation, muſt be preſumed to concern the next, and ſo on to ſucceeding Ages. Laſtly, for there is ſomething particular to the former Laws, which is not common to all others, the ſubjection of the Woman, and the laborioufneſs of the Man, being founded upon the tranſgreſſion of our firſt Parents, which the Scripture affirms to be imputed unto us, thoſe duties themſelves muſt conſequently appertain to us, as well as thoſe tranſgreſſions do.

3. From theſe *Precepts given to our firſt Parents*, paſs we to thoſe which were given to *Noah and his Sons*, who after the Flood were under the ſame capacity; that is to ſay, the Repreſentatives of all mankind, becauſe all mankind was then in them. Now there are *two poſitive, or revealed Laws*, which the Scripture informs us to have been *given to Noah, a prohibition of murther*, with a command to put him to death that ſhould be guilty of it, and a like *prohibition of eating fleſh with the life or blood*, *Gen.* 9.4. and ſo on. Of the former of theſe being obligatory to us, there can be no doubt, as becauſe they to whom it was given were the Repreſentatives of mankind, ſo becauſe the ſubſtance of that Law is natural; the Precepts of the Law of Nature both forbidding murther, and ſetling a Magiſtracy to puniſh it. The greateſt queſtion will be concerning the latter, even that of *not eating blood*. For though the Precept be ceremonial, yet it doth not follow, becauſe the ceremonial Law of *Moſes* is abrogated, that therefore that alſo muſt be: for (as S. *Paul* ſpeaks concerning Circumciſion) this being not of *Moſes* but of the Fathers, yea of thoſe Fathers which were the Repreſentatives of all mankind, the aboliſhing of that doth not neceſſarily draw with it the aboliſhing of the other. Again it is manifeſt, that as many Nations of the poſterity of *Noah* did carefully abſtain from blood, ſo the *Jews* admitted none even to the priviledge of being Proſelytes of the Gates, (which was the loweſt form of their Religion) without an obligation from them to obſerve it. Which is no more than what we find preſcribed by God himſelf, *Lev.* 17.10. It is evident, 3. That though the Apoſtles and Elders of *Jeruſalem* eaſed the Gentile Chriſtians of Circumciſion, yet they laid this Precept upon them of *abſtaining from blood*, *Acts* 15.20. And accordingly, the Latine Church for above a thouſand years, and the Greek Church unto this day do religiouſly abſtain from it. To return now an anſwer to this difficulty: Where firſt, I ſhall readily confeſs, that this being a *Law given to Noah and his Sons*, the then Repreſentatives of mankind, it was conſequently to oblige all mankind, till it ſhould be repealed. I ſhall make no difficulty, 2. To grant, that the abolition of the Ceremonial Law of *Moſes*, doth not neceſſarily draw with it the aboliſhing of the other, becauſe in time before it. But then 3. I ſay, that it is manifeſt enough that the Precept was repealed by Chriſt; and I alledge for my ſaying to that of S. *Paul* to the *Romans* c. 14.14. and a like paſſage 1 *Tim.* 4.4. In the former whereof, ſpeaking of meats, it is ſaid, *that he*

he both knows and is perſwaded by the Lord Jeſus, that there is nothing unclean of it ſelf; but to him that thinketh any thing to be unclean, to him it is unclean. In the latter, *That every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refuſed, if it be received with thanksgiving.* I know what hath been ſaid, and therefore I am willing to obviate it, that, when it is affirmed by S. *Paul* that *nothing is unclean of it ſelf*, as in like manner, that *every creature of God is good*, we are to underſtand both of things in their own nature, and abſtracting from any poſitive Law. But how weak this evaſion is, it is no hard matter for him to diſcern, who reads on but to the laſt clauſe of each of the forequoted Texts; For when, in the former, the phraſe *unclean of it ſelf* is not oppoſed to that which is ſo by poſitive prohibition, but to that only which becomes ſo by a mans erroneous thinking it to be ſo; *For I know* (ſaith he) *and am perſwaded by the Lord Jeſus that nothing is unclean of it ſelf, but* (or rather *unleſs) *to him that thinketh it to be unclean, to him it is unclean*; And in the other, after he had ſaid *that every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refuſed, if it be received with thanksgiving*, what doubt can remain, but that it is lawful to partake of any, as to any poſitive Precept of God to the contrary? For if nothing be unclean, but by the erroneous conſcience of him that takes it, or ſome ſuch accident; and again *every creature of God is ſo good as not to be refuſed*, provided it be *received with thanksgiving*; either there is no poſitive Law againſt the partaking of it, or it ſhall be lawful for us to partake of it though there be. If it be farther remanded, Why, if this Precept of *Noah* be abrogated, the Apoſtles ſhould notwithſtanding preſs the obſervation of it upon the Gentile Chriſtians? I anſwer, Not becauſe the Precept continued to oblige, but in reſpect to ſuch of the *Jews* as had embraced the Chriſtian Religion, who, in thoſe firſt times of Chriſtianity, were ſo addicted to the Rites in which they had been brought up, that unleſs the Gentile Chriſtians had complyed with them in ſome things (thoſe eſpecially which were contained in the Precepts of *Noah*, which they had all along thought of abſolute neceſſity) they would have gone near to have fallen off from the Chriſtian Faith. Neither is this ſaid without proof, even from that Council it ſelf; S. *James*, whoſe advice the Council followed in their Decree, giving this as the reaſon why he would have the Apoſtles write to the Gentile Chriſtians to abſtain from things ſtrangled and from blood, even becauſe *Moſes hath of old time them that preach him, being read in the Synagogue every Sabbath day*, *Acts* 15. 21. that is to ſay, becauſe ſuch of the *Jews*, as had embraced Chriſtianity, knew by the weekly reading of the Books of *Moſes*, that thoſe things were there forbidden even to *Noah* and his Sons, and could not therefore but be much ſtartled at the neglect of them. The reſult of the premiſes is this, that *whatſoever Laws were given either to our firſt Parents, or* Noah, *the Repreſentatives of mankind, do oblige all that deſcend from them, unleſs peculiar to their perſons, or abrogated by a latter Law.*

* εἰ μή.

4. Having conſidered the *Precepts given to* Adam *and* Noah, and ſhewn their obligatorineſs to us, the order of the Scripture leads us to the *Law of Moſes*, and particularly to that part of it which is contained in the *Ten Commandments*. But becauſe it may be demanded (as before concerning that Law given to *Adam* in the ſtate of inno-

cency) what expediency there was of giving theſe and other revealed Laws? and no place can be ſo proper for the reſolution of that queſtion as this, becauſe lying as it were in the confines of thoſe primitive Laws, and that of *Moſes*, to each of which it is to be applyed; I will, before I proceed to ſay any thing of the Law of *Moſes* in particular, return an anſwer to that demand. Two things I have before obſerved to be the matter of thoſe Laws which God hath ſuperadded to the *Law of Nature*; either 1. ſuch as are *Ritual and Ceremonial*, or 2. *Moral and Natural*. As to the former of theſe, there may ſeem to be a double reaſon of Gods ſuperadding them to the Law of Nature; 1. The firſt whereof is, that they might be a *memento* to us of the more ſubſtantial Precepts of God; for being, through the depravedneſs of Nature, not only apt to forget our duty, but to immerſe our ſelves in the things of ſenſe, it ſeemed but requiſite, that even thoſe ſenſible things ſhould be ſo fitted, as to bring the other to our remembrance. And hence no doubt the forbidding of blood to *Noah* and his poſterity, the many purifications and waſhings enjoined the *Jews*; in which, as in ſo many Emblems or Pictures, the world that then was, might plainly behold the abhorrency they were to have for the ſin of murther, and that purity of ſoul wherewith they ought to approach their Maker. 2. The ſecond reaſon of Gods ſuperadding poſitive ceremonious Precepts to the Law of Nature and Reaſon, was that they might be not only as a *memento* of, but as a fence to thoſe ſubſtantial Precepts which he had before given. A thing which thoſe ceremonial Precepts did no doubt ſerve moſt excellently for, among thoſe perſons to whom they were given: For when men were taught to have blood in ſo great an abhorrency, as to abſtain even from the blood of Beaſts, they could not but be thereby kept in a greater apprehenſion of ſhedding the blood of man, in whom the image of God reſides. But becauſe (as I have before ſaid) this ceremonial Precept ceaſeth to oblige us, as in like manner thoſe of *Moſes*; Chriſt, as he has introduced a different diſpenſation as to the main, ſo he has ſupplyed the want of thoſe helps, by the more liberal effuſion of his Spirit. I will therefore proceed to ſuch poſitive Laws of the Old Teſtament, the matter whereof is Moral and Natural. Now the reaſon of Gods ſuperadding theſe Laws to that of Nature, and forbidding thoſe things by poſitive Laws, which were before forbidden by the other, may appear from what hath been heretofore ſaid, concerning the difficulty of diſcovering the Precepts of Natures Law, and the depravedneſs of humane nature; for being the Precepts of the Law of Nature are not eaſily to be diſcerned, and man, partly through evil principles, partly through the corruptneſs of his will and affections, is become unable to diſcern them, it ſeemed but neceſſary, that thoſe Laws ſhould be propoſed anew to him, and he taught that by revelation from Heaven, which his own reaſon either could not at all, or not ſo eaſily diſcover. Thus when *Moſes* had broken the two Tables of ſtone, wherein God had written the Ten Commandments, and thereby defaced the characters thereof, the ſame reaſon, which prompted him to write them at the firſt, prompted him to write them a ſecond time, and renew that which *Moſes* had defaced. Which as it was, no doubt, a juſt obligation to the *Jews*, to be doubly thankful to the Almighty; ſo ought it to be no leſs to us that God hath written that Law in his Word, which he had before

before graven in the Tables of our hearts; theſe Tables being defaced, not by an angry *Moſes*, but by our ſelves, and by our own either neglect or perverſneſs.

The reaſon of poſitive Laws being thus diſcovered, paſs we now on in the inveſtigation of the Law of *Moſes*, and particularly of the Ten Commandments; concerning which you may remember I propoſed to enquire into theſe three things,

1. *By what Authority that Law ſtands.*
2. *How it comes to oblige us; and*
3. *What meaſures we are to proced by in finding out the full importance of it.*

1. To the firſt of theſe, or at leaſt ſo far as the Decalogue is concerned, the Preface to it is a direct anſwer, telling us that *God ſpake all theſe words*; and indeed, if any Law can pretend to be of *divine Authority*, this of the Ten Commandments certainly may. For firſt of all, when *Moſes* had by the commandment of God aſſembled all the people of *Iſrael* near *Mount Sinai*, God by a voice from Heaven publiſhed all theſe Commandments in their ears, and with all the ſigns and demonſtrations of his Majeſty. Again, when the ſame people, terrified by the dreadful appearance of his Majeſty, deſired to have this Law delivered to them by *Moſes*, God, in compliance with their deſires, wrote the ſame words in two Tables of ſtone, and tranſmitted them by him unto the people, *Exod.* 31. 8. Laſtly, when *Moſes* had broken thoſe two Tables, and thereby put God upon a neceſſity of tranſcribing them anew, he wrote upon other two Tables the ſame Ten Commandments, as you may ſee *Deut.* 10. 4. So that if the publiſhing of Commandments from Heaven, or writing them with his own finger, can entitle them to a divine Authority, the Law of the Ten Commandments certainly may, as being notified by both.

2. But becauſe it is not enough to make a Law obligatory to us, that it hath God for its Author and Promulger, unleſs it do alſo appear to have been intended for our direction and obedience; therefore before we proceed to infer our own obligation by it, we muſt enquire how it comes to do ſo, and what appearance there is of Gods intending it for our direction and obedience. And here in the *firſt place*, it is manifeſt enough, that what was before ſaid concerning the Laws given to *Adam* and *Noah*, cannot have place in thoſe given to *Moſes* and the *Iſraelites*; thoſe being not Repreſentatives of mankind, as *Adam* and *Noah* were, but only of the *Jewiſh* ſtate. Now being the Gentiles were no part of that body, nor deſcended from the Authors of it, therefore what was given to them cannot be ſuppoſed to oblige us for that reaſon, and conſequently ſome other ground muſt be looked out for our obligation to it. It is manifeſt, *ſecondly*, that as there is nothing in the perſons, to whom this Law was given, to perſwade our obligation to it, ſo is there much in the Law it ſelf to perſwade Gods deſigning it for the *Jews* alone; for preſſing, as he doth, obedience to this Law, upon the account of his delivering them out of *Ægypt*, he doth conſequently reſtrain the Law it ſelf to thoſe who were benefited by it, which none but the *Iſraelites* were. And indeed, beſide the Preface of the Almighty, and that of *Moſes* before the ſame Commandments, *Deut.* 5. 1. *Hear (O Iſrael) the ſtatutes and judgments, which I ſpeak in your ears this day*; it is the known exultation

exultation of that People, and of the moſt holy perſons of it, that theſe Conſtitutions were peculiarly theirs; for *What Nation is there ſo great*, (ſaith *Moſes*) *which hath ſtatutes and judgments ſo righteous, as all this Law which I ſet before you this day*, *Deut.* 4. 8? And *He ſheweth* (ſaith the *Pſalmiſt*) *his word unto Jacob, and his ſtatutes and judgments unto Iſrael, he hath not dealt ſo with any Nation, and as for his judgments they have not known them*, *Pſal.* 147. 19, 20. And truly thus much muſt be yielded to the fore-quoted Texts, that the Law was intended for the *Jews* alone, whilſt the Church was confined to *Paleſtine*; but as there was to be a time, even by the Predictions of their own Prophets, when *all Nations ſhould flow unto it*, *Iſa.* 2. 2. So it is apparent, *thirdly*, from the ſame Prophet, That the Law was then proportionably to extend its dominion, and comprehend thoſe new comers, as well as its ancient ſubjects; the deſign of their thus flowing into the Houſe of the God of *Jacob* being, that he might *teach them of his ways, and they walk in his paths*, as you may ſee *v.* 3. of that Chapter. And accordingly, as before this Law was thus to take effect, it was in reaſon to have a new promulgation ſuitable to the extent of its dominion; ſo, if we conſult the ſtories of thoſe times, we ſhall find God was not wanting in making it known to the Gentile world; partly by the diſperſing of the *Jews* among them, but more eſpecially by that ſignal act of his Providence in cauſing it to be tranſlated by the *Septuagint* into *Greek*, which was then the moſt known Language of the Gentile World. By which means that Law, which was before ſhewn only unto *Jacob*, came unto the knowledge of the Heathen, from whom it had been ſo long concealed. Now though what hath been alledged from the Prophet *Iſay*, and this univerſal Promulgation, be enough to eſtabliſh what we have deduced from it: yet becauſe it may conduce much to our ſatisfaction, to evidence it from the *New Teſtament*, which is the immediate rule of our belief and practice; I will therefore, to remove all ſcruples, endeavour to ſhew from thence, that (whatever it was, whilſt the Church was confined to *Jewry*) yet, after the coming in of the Gentiles, the Law was intended to take in them alſo, and oblige them to the ſeveral Precepts of it. To begin with the *Ceremonial Law*, becauſe the moſt unlikely to concern us, and therefore, if well proved, of more force to conclude the like of others: Concerning which it may ſuffice to repreſent the uſe S. *Paul* makes of it, 1 *Cor.* 9. 8. *Say I theſe things as a man, or ſaith not the Law the ſame alſo? For it is written in the Law of Moſes, thou ſhalt not muzzle the mouth of the Oxe that treadeth out the Corn. Doth God take care for Oxen? Or ſaith he it altogether for our ſakes? for our ſakes no doubt this is written: that he that ploweth ſhould plow in hope, and that he that threſheth in hope ſhould be partaker of his hope.* For not only arguing (as S. *Paul* there doth) from a Ceremonial Precept to a Chriſtian duty, but affirming expreſly concerning that Precept, that it was written for the times of the Goſpel, he thereby plainly ſhews, that though the force thereof were evacuated as to the Ceremony, yet it is obligatory as to the Moral, which it was chiefly deſigned to conſign, and intended by God ſo to do. And therefore, if I were to prove in like manner the neceſſity of purifying our ſouls, before we betake our ſelves to the ſolemn Worſhip of God, as it is evident from this of S. *Paul*, that it were enough to alledge a Precept

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out of the Law, becauſe written for us as well as for the *Jews*, ſo particularly from Gods frequent enjoining the *Jews* to waſh themſelves and their clothes, before they appeared before him; for doth God take care of clean attire, or a ſmooth skin, any more than he doth of Oxen? and if not, may not I as well conclude, that for our ſakes no doubt this was written, that he that preſents himſelf before the Lord ſhould appear with a clean heart, with a ſoul no way ſtained by any unrepented ſin? Now if even Ceremonial Precepts were ſome way intended for us, much more thoſe of a higher rank, the ſecond thing to be demonſtrated. For the further evidencing whereof, the firſt thing that I ſhall alledge is that of the ſame S. *Paul*, *Eph.* 6. 1. and ſo on. *Children obey your Parents in the Lord, for this is right. Honour thy Father and thy Mother (which is the firſt Commandment with promiſe) that it may be well with thee, and thou mayeſt live long on the earth.* For preſſing upon the *Epheſians* not only the duty of honouring Parents, but alſo upon the account of the fifth Commandment, he thereby plainly ſheweth, that it was intended to oblige them alſo, and in them, becauſe they were Gentiles, all other Chriſtians. In like manner, the ſame Apoſtle dehorting the *Romans* from the avenging of themſelves, inforceth that dehortation from the Law of *Moſes Deut.* 32. 35. for it is written (ſaith he) *Vengeance is mine, I will repay, ſaith the Lord.* And not contented with that, he backs it with another out of the *Proverbs*, *c.* 25. 21. where it is written in like manner, *If thine enemy hunger feed him, if he thirſt give him drink; for in ſo doing thou ſhalt heap coals of fire upon his head, and the Lord ſhall reward thee.* To all which if we add the ſame Apoſtles affirming, *that whatſoever was written aforetime by way of comfort, was written for our learning, that we through patience and comfort of the Scriptures might have hope*, *Rom.* 15. 4. as in like manner, that what is ſtoried of Gods judgments upon the *Iſraelites* was written for our admonition, to the intent we ſhould not offend as they alſo did; ſo we ſhall not need to doubt but that the Precepts of their Law were intended for our direction and obedience: For if Gods mercies and judgments upon them were written for our learning, no doubt but his Precepts were, as which the other were deſigned to inforce. *Fourthly and laſtly*, though the Law of *Moſes* did not oblige us by being given to the *Iſraelites*; though in the primary intention thereof it were deſigned for the *Iſraelites* only, and conſequently could not ſo induce an obligation upon any other: yet, as it was ſecondarily intended for the Gentile world, ſo ſoon as God ſhould bring it into the Church, ſo (which excludes all doubt of our obligation to it) it was adopted by our Saviour into his Law, and by him both *confirmed* and *fulfilled*. But becauſe that is too copious as well as too important an argument to find a room here, I will reſpite the handling thereof to the following *Diſcourſes*, where I will fully and diſtinctly conſider it.

Theſe two things only would be added here, to prevent all miſtakes, concerning our obligation to the Law of *Moſes*, 1. That when I ſay it was intended to oblige us, and accordingly adopted by our Saviour into his Law, we underſtand it ſo far as it had no peculiar reference to Gods diſpenſation under the Law, or the Polity of the *Jewiſh* ſtate: For as, upon the account of the former, I have diſcarded all ceremonial Rites, as which were intended only to ſerve to the adminiſtration

ministration of the Law, so I must also, upon the account of the latter, discard all those Precepts, which concerned the regulation of their State. 2. Again, when I say the Law of *Moses* was, though secondarily, intended to oblige us, and as such adopted by our Saviour; my meaning is not to affirm an obligation to a perfect obedience, but to a sincere and earnest endeavonr, and, where we fail, a due repentance and amendment. For though the first Covenant left no place for repentance and pardon, yet the Gospel doth, and hath accordingly (as hath been elsewhere * shewn) made forgiveness of sins one of the capital Articles of our Belief.

* Explication of the Apostles Creed.

DISC. III.

That Christ came not to destroy, but to confirm the Law of *Moses*.

This evidenced in part in the Ceremonial Law, from Christs confirming of that which was the main intendment of it, and from his retaining some of its usances, and transferring them into his own Religion. The like in the Moral Law, from Christs Sermon upon the Mount, and from the evidence there is both there and elsewhere of Christs establishing and inculcating the great Precepts of Piety, Sobriety, and Justice.

WHat may seem to have been our Saviours fear concerning himself and Doctrine, where he so studiously averts * any design of destroying the Law and the Prophets, in process of time came to be fulfilled: The *Jews* representing the Author of it as a friend of Publicans and Sinners, as the Heathen did the Religion it self, as a Sanctuary of all impious persons. For whereas (saith *Celsus* *, that great Enemy of Christianity) all other Religions were wont to use such addresses as these, when they invited men to initiate themselves in their respective Rites, *Whosoever is pure in hands, and wise in tongue*; and again, *Whosoever is pure from all impiety, that hath a soul conscious to it self of no evil, and hath lived well and justly, let him come and initiate himself in these mysteries*; but ---*procul ô procul este profani*: Christianity on the contrary bespeaks the world after this manner, *Whosoever is a sinner or a fool, childish or any way unhappy, let him come, for the Kingdom of God stands open to receive him; the unjust and the thief, the breaker up of Houses and the Wizzard, the sacrilegious and the defacer of the monuments of the dead.* Indeed these are the men, whom our Saviour came chiefly to call, *For I came not* (saith he) *to call the righteous, but sinners, Mat.* 9. 13. But it was, as he himself there telleth us, *because those had more need of a Physician*, and to invite them, not to continue in their impieties, but *to repent*; to become as righteous as those others were, whom he there stiles so, to make their righteousness exceed those others as he doth elsewhere * insinuate; to be chaste above their measure, to abstain from anger as well as murder; lastly, to suffer injuries as well as do none, and be contented

* *Mat.* 5. 17.

* *Vid. Orig. contr. Celsum. l.* 3. *p.* 147.

* See the Sermon on the Mount.

contented not only with that which was their own, but with the parting with it: It being not his intention to deſtroy the Law and the Prophets, thoſe great meaſures of piety and juſtice, but rather to confirm and add to them.

But not to ſtay any longer in the entrance to this diſcourſe, when there are ſo many weighty things which call for our regard and proof, I ſhall without more ado proceed to ſhew,

I. That our Saviour came not to deſtroy, but to confirm the Law of *Moſes*, and particularly that of the Decalogue or Ten Commandments.

II. That he came not to deſtroy that Law, but to fulfill and add to it.

I. For the evidencing the former whereof, I will begin with ſuch precepts of it as were ceremonial, and which, becauſe ſuch, have the leaſt appearance of having been confirmed by him.

And here not to inſiſt upon the agreeableneſs of our Saviours life to them, becauſe the queſtion is not, concerning his life, but doctrine; nor yet to ſtand to ſhew, that that law did rather die of it ſelf than was deſtroy'd by him, becauſe the queſtion is, whether or no, and in what meaſure he confirm'd it; I ſhall obſerve *firſt of all*, that that which was mainly deſign'd in the ſeveral precepts of that law, even the pure and pious veneration of God, was confirm'd and eſtabliſh'd by our Saviour. As will appear paſt all contradiction, from the Sermon on the Mount and other our Saviours diſcourſes. I ſay, that which was mainly deſigned in them; for that the pure and pious veneration of God was principally intended in them, is acknowledg'd by one of the greateſt Authority among the *Jews*, even *Maimonides*, * and is evident from the words of the Prophet *Jeremy c. 7.* 21, 22, 23. For *thus ſaith the Lord of Hoſts the God Iſrael, Put your burnt offerings unto your ſacrifices and eat fleſh, for I ſpake not unto your Fathers, nor commanded them, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt offerings and ſacrifices. But this thing commanded I them, ſaying, Obey my voice, and I will be your God and ye ſhall be my people.* The meaning of which words is not that God gave the Jews no commandment at all concerning burnt offerings and ſacrifices (for he injoin'd that of the Paſchal Lamb the very night they went out of *Egypt*, and many other ſuch like afterwards) but that the principal thing requir'd by him was their piety and obedience, and that he injoyn'd ſacrifices and ſuch like, only as inſtances of obedience, and figures of ſubſtantial and real piety. And hence Gods inſiſting ſo much upon the circumciſion of the heart, even where the circumciſion of the fleſh was not wanting; upon the purity of the Soul as well as the cleanneſs of the body; his preferring a broken heart before all burnt offerings and ſacrifices, his accounting of it as the only acceptable one, for *thou deſireſt not ſacrifice, elſe would I give it; thou delighteſt not in burnt offering. The ſacrifices of God are a broken ſpirit; a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not deſpiſe*, Pſa. 51. 16, 17 I obſerve *ſecondly*, that as our Saviour did confirm that which was principally deſign'd by God, even in the law of a carnal commandment; ſo he did alſo retain many of its ceremonies and uſances, and accommodated them to his own purpoſe. I inſtance in both the *Sacraments*, and *Impoſition*

* *Maim. Mor. Nev. part 3. c. 32. pag. 435.*

of hands: The latter whereof, as it was us'd by the Apostles in their Ordinations, who, no doubt, did what they did, by commission or approbation from Christ; so was it borrowed from the *Jews*, whose Leader *Moses* consecrated to succeed him by this ceremony of Laying on of hands. For thus we are told *Num.* 27. 23. that, after God had given *Moses* order for the consecrating of his successour, *he laid his hands on Joshua, and gave him a charge, as the Lord commanded by the hands of Moses.* The case is the same in both the Sacraments, as we learn from the Jewish writers; the Jewish women and their proselytes of both sexes being enter'd into covenant with God by the same rite of *Baptism* with us, * and having also a ceremony of distributing bread and wine upon their solemn feasts, || agreeably to that of ours in the *Lords Supper.* For thus, (saith *Paulus Fagius*) the father of the family among the *Jews* taking a cup of wine in his right hand, and praying over it this prayer, *Blessed be thou O Lord our God, King of the world, who createst the fruit of the vine,* tastes of it himself, and then gives it to all the guests. And in like manner afterwards bread, over which when he hath us'd this prayer, *Blessed be thou O Lord our God, who bringest bread out of the earth,* he first eats a little of it himself, and then gives a piece of it to each of the guests. Indeed the foresaid Author relates this latter as the custom of the modern *Jews*; but that it was also of the more Ancient, is probable from our Saviours blessing and distributing a cup of wine among his disciples, before that of the holy Sacrament; adding thereto, that *he would not drink of the fruit of the vine* (which is the phrase that is us'd in the forementioned prayer of the *Jews*) *till the Kingdom of God should come, Luke* 22. 17, 18. I have one thing more to add in confirmation of the former ceremony, which we learn from * *Irenæus* and other the ancient Fathers; To wit, that the bread and wine, which was consecrated into the Sacrament of our Saviours passion, was also offer'd to God, agreeably to our Saviours precept and example, by way of thanksgiving for those creatures themselves. Which makes it more than probable, that the forementioned custome was both of ancient date among the *Jews*, and transcribed by our Saviour in the institution of his holy Supper. If then he did not only confirm that which was principally design'd, but retain'd many of the usances of the Jewish law, he ought in reason not to be look'd upon as an enemy to it, but rather (as he himself saith of himself) as one *who came not to destroy but to fulfil it.*

* *Selden. de Jure Nat. & Gent. &c. li. 2. c. 2.*
|| *Paulus Fagius comment. in Deut. 8.*
* *Iren. adv. hæres. li. 4. c. 32. sect. 4. Justin Mart. in Dial. cum Tryph. p. 260. edit. Paris.*

From the *Ceremonial Law* pass we to the *Moral*, the principal thing intended by our Saviour, as will appear if we consider what he both premiseth and subjoineth to his assurance of confirming the Law, and the several precepts he chooseth to insist on. Look upon the words he immediately premiseth, and you will easily acknowledge he meant the *Moral Law* when he said *he came not to destroy, but to fulfil it,* the purport of those being to recommend good works to them, even the works of piety and charity. For *let your light* (saith he) *so shine before men that they may see your good works, and glorifie your father which is in heaven,* that is to say, the works of humility and meekness, the works of purity and peace, these and such like being the only things recommended to them in the beginning of that Sermon of his upon the mount. The same is no less evident, from the words immediately

diately following this declaration of his intention, concerning the Law and the Prophets; for, *Verily I ſay unto you till heaven and earth paſs, one jot or one tittle ſhall in no wiſe paſs from the law, till all be fulfill'd*: This being not to be affirmed of the Ceremonial Law, which was to receive its period at our Saviours death. Laſtly, the precepts he chooſes afterwards to inſiſt on ſhew manifeſtly, that he meant principally the *Moral law*; thoſe being precepts againſt murther and adultery, againſt perjury and revenging of injuries, and not againſt plowing with an oxe and aſs, or wearing linſey-woolſey garments. Whatſoever elſe therefore may be thought to be included under the name of the Law or the Prophets, the principal thing intended was no doubt the *Moral law*, or the law of the Ten Commandments. But not to content my ſelf with this only proof, when both the nature of this Law, and the particular precepts of Chriſtianity, give a farther atteſtation to it, I ſhall in the next place remind you of what hath been before at large confirm'd, that this law is unalterable; for being ſo, it is unreaſonable to think our Saviour would go about to deſtroy it, or free us from the obligation of it. And indeed ſo far was he from going about to do it, whatſoever ſome weak or evil diſpoſed minds may fancy, that we ſhall find him expreſly to confirm it, in the matters of piety, ſobriety, juſtice and charity, into which it is uſually divided. Though it were a ſtrange Religion which ſhould not teach men to worſhip God, which is the thing here meant by piety, God being both the Author of religion, and the principal object of it; yet, becauſe we have undertaken to ſhew, that Chriſt came not to deſtroy the *Moral law* in any part of it, I ſhall begin with that, and ſhew how far our Saviour was from abrogating it. And here not to inſiſt (becauſe that would be endleſs) upon the ſeveral precepts in the new Teſtament to fear and love God, to believe in him and to obey him, I ſhall content my ſelf with that, which he return'd to a certain Lawyer, that demanded of him what he ſhould do to inherit eternal life, *Luke* 10. 26. &c. For *what* (ſaith he) *is written in the law, how readeſt thou?* To which when the other had made anſwer, *Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy ſoul, and with all thy ſtrength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thy ſelf*; Our Saviour ſubjoin'd immediately, *This do and thou ſhalt live*: thereby plainly ſhewing, that he taught no other way to eternal happineſs than by a ſtrict piety, and veneration of the Divine majeſty. Neither will it ſuffice to ſay, as I think it is ſaid by ſome, that our Saviour in that anſwer of his doth rather ſhew what the Law preſcribes us toward the attaining eternal life, than what he himſelf did; for beſide that that would make our Saviours anſwer impertinent, the queſtion being not what the Law, but what he himſelf preſcrib'd, beſides this I ſay, it is manifeſt from S. *Matthew c.* 19. 16. that our Saviour gave the like anſwer, where he cannot but be thought to ſpeak his own ſenſe, and the conditions upon which he came to offer it: for when a certain young man there demanded of him, *What good thing he ſhould do to inherit eternal life?* his anſwer was, *that if he would enter into life he ſhould keep the commandments*: And again, after he had told him, *that he had kept all theſe from his youth*, and was importunate to know *whether he lack'd any thing yet*; that *if he would be perfect he ſhould go and ſell all that he had, and give to the poor, and then come*

and follow him. From which words it is evident, that he, as well as *Moſes*, did require the obſervation of Gods Commandments in order to the attainment of everlaſting life, and that the young man could not be his follower without it. But it may be, piety would not be ſo much ſtood upon amongſt the preſent profeſſors of Chriſtianity; there being not a few of thoſe (who yet are none of the greateſt ornaments of it) that can make long prayers, and liſten to thoſe that do. That which galls them moſt is, that they muſt renounce their luſts and animoſities, that they muſt be ſober and juſt and charitable, which is to them a yoke far more grievous than the Ceremonial law, and from which therefore they are willing to believe, that Chriſt came to ſet them free. But how little ground there is for ſuch a ſurmiſe, we may ſoon inform our ſelves, if we reflect upon the doctrine of our Saviour in theſe particulars. For hath not he in the Sermon ſo often referr'd to forbidden the adultery, even of the heart and eye? Hath he not told us that the not plucking out of ſuch an offending eye, will endanger the caſting the whole body into eternal fire? Hath not one of his Apoſtles ſaid, that *without holineſs or purity no man ſhall ſee the Lord?* and another, that *pure religion and undefiled before God and the father, is to keep our ſelves unſpotted from the world?* Again, hath our Saviour deliver'd ought in prejudice of what is ſpoken by the Law and the Prophets concerning Intemperance or the promoters of it? any thing in prejudice of that wo, which is denounced againſt *thoſe that riſe up early in the morning that they may follow ſtrong drink, that continue until night till wine inflame them, Iſa.* 5. 11? Or of that other, which is level'd at *thoſe that are mighty to drink wine, and men of ſtrength to mingle ſtrong drink*, v. 22. of that chapter? Nay hath not one of his Apoſtles told us that *the grace, which bringeth ſalvation, teacheth to deny all ungodly and worldly luſts, and to live godlily, righteouſly, and ſoberly in it, Tit.* 2. 12? That *neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abuſers of themſelves with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, ſhall inherit the kingdom of God*, 1 *Cor.* 6. 10? Laſtly (for it ſhall ſuffice rather to hint at theſe things, than to give you a juſt diſcourſe concerning them) hath our bleſſed Saviour deliver'd ought in favour of that covetouſneſs, which the Law and the Prophets do ſo vehemently decry? Nay hath not he himſelf forewarn'd us to take heed of it, *Luke* 12. 15. and his Apoſtle to content our ſelves with food and rayment, 1 *Tim.* 6. 8? So that in this particular it is evident, Chriſt had no deſign to thwart the dictates of Nature or *Moſes*, the precepts of the Law or the wholſome advices of the Prophets. The only thing remaining to be enquir'd into is, whether he came to deſtroy the precepts of juſtice and charity, the two laſt branches of the Moral Law. Concerning the latter hereof I ſhall ſay nothing at preſent, both becauſe I may have occaſion to reſume it, when I come to intreat of our Saviours fulfilling the Law, and becauſe the Evangeliſts and Apoſtles, as well as the Law and the Prophets, are full fraught with Precepts concerning it. That which I ſhall beſtow the remainder of my diſcourſe upon, is the Precepts of juſtice, even that juſtice which commands us to give *Cæſar* and all other our Superiours their due. Which I ſhall the rather do, becauſe this hath been too often accounted a part of that bondage from which our Saviour came to ſet us free. I begin with Fathers, becauſe their authority

as

as it was the firſt, ſo the foundation even of Regal power. Concerning whom if the Law be expreſs that we ſhould give them honour and obedience, the Goſpel of our Saviour is no leſs; Witneſs his faulting the Scribes and Phariſees for evacuating that Royal Law by a fooliſh tradition of their own, *Mat.* 15. 4. His Apoſtle S. *Paul*'s preſſing the *Epheſians* with the letter of it, *Eph.* 6. 2. His calling upon children in the verſe before to be obedient to their parents, his commanding the children of the *Coloſſians* to be *obedient to them in all things*, *Col.* 3. 20. His inſtructing the children of widows to requite their parents, 1 *Tim.* 5. 4. His reckoning diſobedience to parents amongſt the fouleſt crimes of the Gentiles, *Rom.* 1. 30. Than which what more could be ſaid, to ſhew our Saviour's deteſtation of that crime, and his concurrence with the Law and the Prophets in the contrary vertue? From the Authority of a Father proceed we to that of a Maſter, and compare the doctrine of the Goſpel with the Law of Nature and that of *Moſes*. And here indeed is a manifeſt difference, but which is to the advantage of the Goſpel; for whereas the Law of *Moſes* doth rather ſuppoſe obedience to Maſters, than go about to enjoin it, the Goſpel is full of precepts to this purpoſe. *Servants be obedient to them that are your maſters according to the fleſh*; ſo S. *Paul*, *Eph.* 6. 5. *Servants obey in all things your maſters according to the fleſh*; ſo the ſame Apoſtle, *Col.* 3. 22. *Let as many ſervants, as are under the yoke, count their own maſters worthy of all honour*, 1 *Tim.* 6. 1. And *exhort ſervants* (ſaith the ſame perſon to *Titus*) *to be obedient unto their own maſters, and to pleaſe them well in all things*, *Tit.* 2. 9. To the froward as well as the gentle, to the believing maſter and the infidel, with all chearfulneſs, with all ſimplicity, out of a regard to Chriſt, whoſe will it was they ſhould obey, to his Goſpel, which would be otherwiſe blaſphem'd. Laſtly, if the Law and the Prophets call'd upon the *Jews* to honour the Fathers of their Countrey, as well as the Fathers of Families, to *fear the Lord and the King, to ſpeak no evil of the Ruler of the people, to curſe him no not in their heart*; the holy *Jeſus* on the other hand reminds his of *giving unto Cæſar that which is Cæſar's*, *Mat.* 22. 21. His Apoſtle S. *Peter*, *of fearing God, and honouring the King*, 1 Pet. 2. 17. *Submitting themſelves to every ordinance of man*, or as the Greek reads it, *to every humane creature, whether ſupreme or ſubordinate, and not making uſe of that liberty*, which Chriſt hath purchaſed, *for a cloak of diſobedience*. Thus in every particular doth our bleſſed Saviour rather confirm than deſtroy thoſe Moral Precepts, which are deliver'd by *Moſes* and the Prophets. And therefore, let men pretend what they will upon the account of their faith and Baptiſm, *He is no Chriſtian, who is not a devout adorer of the Divine Majeſty, chaſt, and temperate in his converſe, a dutiful child, an obedient ſervant, and a faithful ſubject to his Prince.*

DISC.

DISC. IV.

That Chriſt came not to deſtroy, but to fulfil and add to the Law of *Moſes*.

General proofs hereof from the Sermon upon the Mount; where moreover is ſhewn that the oppoſition there made by Chriſt is between his Law and that of Moſes. *The Law of* Moſes *conſidered as the Common Law of their Nation, and in what reſpects Chriſt added to it. A diſcourſe concerning the ſame Law as intended for a rule of life; where is ſhewn wherein Chriſt either did not, or did add unto it. That the additions Chriſt made to the Law in that latter notion of it do not entrench upon the eſteem either of it or of its Author. The allegation of the imperfection of* Moſes's *Law both anſwered and diſproved.*

LET the Libertine and the Antinomian be from henceforth for ever ſilent; they whoſe Life, or Doctrine, or both proclaim the ever bleſſed *Jeſus* to have abrogated the Law and Prophets: for beſide that, inſtead of juſtifying that wiſdom whoſe children they pretend to be, they ſhew themſelves as forward as any in condemning her, giving countenance to that calumny which was ſometime faſtend on our Saviour by the *Jews*, *behold a man gluttonous, and a wine-bibber, a friend of Publicans and ſinners*; they do directly oppoſe his own vehement aſſeveration, and doctrine, as well as the Law of *Moſes*, unleſs to deſtroy, and not to deſtroy be one and the ſame thing, or to abrogate the Law and the Prophets, and to fulfil. But ſo *Hercules* in the Fable added to the Serpent *Hydra*'s monſtrous heads, by going about to take them off; each wound he gave it becoming ſtrangely prolifical, and two heads ſtarting up, where there was one lopt off. For ſetting aſide the Ceremonial, that ſhadow of good things to come, and which therefore was to vaniſh at the appearance of the Son of Righteouſneſs; all the Law and the Prophets beſide have rather received an increaſe, than any diminution by his Doctrine. Can any one pretend that he hath abrogated the Law concerning adultery, who hath ſubſtituted two in its room, which are no leſs dreadful than the former? The one forbidding all outward uncleanneſs, the other the adultery of the heart. If the Law concerning murther be alledged as deſtroyed by him, he hath forbidden calumnies as well as that, the wounds of a malicious Tongue, as well as the piercing of a Spear.

II. Having ſhewn in the foregoing diſcourſe, that our Saviour came not to deſtroy the Law and the Prophets but on the contrary to confirm and eſtabliſh them, it remains that we ſhew it to have been his deſign to fulfil, or add to them, according as the word πληρῶσαι in the place ſo often referr'd to is generally underſtood by the Antient Fathers; the Law, in their opinion, being like a picture rudely drawn, which our Saviour afterwards finiſhed, and gave life and colour to. Wherein how far they were from erring, and much more from ſpeaking impiouſly, I come now to ſhew, and that both in the lump and the retail.

1. My

1. My general proof ſhall be taken from the oppoſition that our Saviour makes in the fifth Chapter of S. *Matthew* between his own Doctrine and the Precepts of *Moſes*. For if the oppoſition be between *Moſes* Precepts and *Chriſts*, then can there be no doubt at all of *Chriſts* adding to them; becauſe it is certain, he requires ſomething more, than thoſe Precepts to which he does oppoſe them. As will appear by conſidering either the Precepts themſelves, or the oppoſition that is made. I inſtance for the former in that which we meet with v. 43. of that Chapter. For *ye have heard* (ſaith he) *that it hath been ſaid, Thou ſhalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy; But I ſay unto you, Love your enemies, bleſs them that curſe you*, &c. For is it not more to love an enemy as well as a neighbour, than to love our neighbour only? nay is it not a point of greater perfection? And if it be, doth not Chriſt add to the former Precept, by enjoining us ſo to do, when the other requires only the love of a neighbour? Again, what oppoſition can there be between what was ſaid to them of old, and that which *Chriſt* ſaith, if *Chriſt* did not add unto the former? eſpecially, when in his intrance upon this argument, he diſclaims the publiſhing of any thing, that might tend to the deſtruction of it. If therefore there be any oppoſition, it muſt be, that the one enjoins ſomewhat more than the other will be found to do. The only thing therefore remaining to ſhow is, that *Chriſt* makes the oppoſition between his own Doctrine and that of *Moſes*, which accordingly I come now to prove. To begin with that which is firſt in order, *Ye have heard* (ſaith our Saviour) *that it hath been ſaid to them of old time*, (for ſo indeed it ſhould be rendred, and not as we *by them of old*, the *Syriack* and other verſions ſo rendring it; ſecondly, the verb ἐρρήθη with a dative caſe annex'd to it being ‖ ever us'd in this ſenſe in the New Teſtament; and thirdly and laſtly, the word ἀρχαίοις, which we render *them of old time*, ſignifying as much * and referring uſually to the times of *Moſes* and the Prophets; but no where in the New Teſtament ſet to ſignifie Elders, Scribes and Phariſees, whom ſome are willing to underſtand here.) *Ye have heard*, I ſay, ſaith our Saviour, *that it hath been ſaid to them of old time, Thou ſhalt not kill, and whoſoever ſhall kill ſhall be in danger of the judgment: But I ſay unto you*, &c. For is not the former part of theſe words, Thou ſhalt not kill, the very letter of the ſixth Commandment, and the latter, though not the ſame *in terminis*, yet in ſenſe with that of *Moſes Lev.* 24. 21. where, inſtead of what we read here, *he that kills ſhall be in danger of the judgment*, it is there, *he that killeth a man ſhall be put to death.* Again, whoſe words are thoſe which our Saviour uſhers in with the former preface v. 27. of the forequoted Chapter, *Thou ſhalt not commit adultery*, are they not the very letter of the ſeventh Commandment, as the words before recited of the ſixth? If therefore the oppoſition here made be between *Moſes*'s Law and *Chriſt*'s, if that oppoſition conſiſts in this that *Chriſt* requires more than *Moſes*, it is certain that *Chriſt* added to the Law of *Moſes*, which I ſhall now prove more particularly.

‖ *Vid. Rom.* 9. 12. ἐρρήθη αὐτῇ. v. 26. ἐρρήθη αὐτοῖς. *Gal.* 3. 16. τῷ δὲ Ἀβραὰμ ἐρρήθησαν αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι. *Apoc.* 6. 11. ἐρρήθη αὐτοῖς. 9. 4. ἐρρήθη αὐτοῖς.

* *Vid. Luc.* 9. 8. 19. *Act.* 15. 21. 2 *Pet.* 2. 5. *Rev.* 12. 9. 20. 2.

2. In order to which, I will firſt premiſe a diſtinction * concerning the Law of *Moſes*, which I have borrowed from the Moſt Excellent *Grotius*. For it may be either conſidered,

* *Vid. Grot. de Jure bell. &c. lib.* 1. *c.* 2. *ſect.* 6.

1. As

1. As to that part of it, which was the Common Law of their Nation (if you will give me leave ſo to expreſs it) and by which their Judges were to proceed; or
2. As a Rule of Manners, and a meaſure of Religion.

I. In the former of theſe ſenſes the word Law is taken *Heb.* 2. 2. where it is ſaid that *every tranſgreſſion and diſobedience to it receiv'd a juſt recompence of reward*; that is to ſay, was puniſh'd by the Judge, as the Law it ſelf preſcrib'd. For in aſmuch as many offences againſt the Law, particularly the hating our Brother in our heart, and the like, were not cognoſcible by the Judge, and conſequently could not receive a juſt recompence from him; it follows, that by the Law there ſpoken of muſt be meant that part of it which was their Common Law, and that by which their Judges were to proceed. In like manner, when our Saviour ſaith, *Ye have heard that it was ſaid to them of old time, Thou ſhalt not kill*, and *whoſoever ſhall kill ſhall be in danger of the judgment*; it is manifeſt from theſe laſt words, that by the Law, of which this is made a part, was meant their Common Law, and that by which their Judges were to be directed. Now in this ſenſe there is nothing more manifeſt, than that *Chriſt* added to it, and requir'd a greater piety than the Law of *Moſes* did. For

1. *Firſt*, whereas the Law of *Moſes*, that part I mean by which their Judges were to proceed, looked only at the outward action, commanding, or forbidding it as it did agree with, or ſwerve from it; the Law of *Chriſt*, that much more Noble one, requir'd the obedience of the heart and forbad all impiety there. Thus to keep cloſe to the former inſtances, It was ſaid to, or by them of old time, even by one who was as old as *Moſes*, *Thou ſhalt not kill*, and *whoſoever ſhall kill ſhall be in danger of the judgment*, that is to ſay, he ſhall be liable to be brought before the Judge, and by his ſentence to receive a juſt recompence of reward: *But I ſay unto you, That whoſoever is angry with his brother without a cauſe, ſhall be in danger of the judgment*, even that wherewith I ſhall one day judge the world. If there be any boyling of malice in the heart, if there be a murtherous thought in it, or diſpoſition to it, at my Tribunal it ſhall be taken notice of and puniſhed, as the act of killing is at yours. Again, ye have heard that it hath been ſaid by the ſame Ancient and the Giver of your Law, *Thou ſhalt not commit adultery*, and *the man that committeth adultery with another mans wife, even he that committeth adultery with his neighbours wife, the adulterer and the adultereſs ſhall ſurely be put to death*, *Lev.* 20. 10. *But I ſay unto you, That whoſoever looketh upon a woman to luſt after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart*; and that my Law forbids as well as the outward act, and ſhall be both tried and ſentenced at my Tribunal. If your Law judges no man before it hears him and knows from ſufficient witneſſes what he hath done, which ſhews that it hath reſpect to the outward action only; if it be made not for the righteous, but for the lawleſs and diſobedient, for murtherers of fathers, and murtherers of mothers, for manſlayers, for whoremongers, for them that defile themſelves with mankind, for men-ſtealers, liars and perjur'd perſons, that is to ſay, for manifeſt and open ſinners; my Law, as being a diſcerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart, reaches to the impieties thereof, and cenſures thoſe ſeeds of murther and adultery which are there.

But

But by this means we may eaſily avoid the imputation of charging the Law of *Moſes* with imperfection, as forbidding only ſinful actions and not ſinful purpoſes; it being no imperfection at all in the Common Law of the Jewiſh Nation whereof we now ſpeak, to forbid ſinful actions only, becauſe thoſe who were to give ſentence by it could not take cognizance of any other. Again

2. Whereas that part of the Law, which was the Common Law of the Jewiſh Nation, took notice only of groſſer offences, ſuch as that of adultery, and murther, in the mean time permitting others of a lower rank, leſt too ſevere a reſtraint upon them ſhould make them throw the yoke from off their neck; the Goſpel of our Saviour, the Chriſtian Law, forbids all deviations whatſoever, the ſmaller aſwell as the greater offences. They are Chriſts own words in the 19. verſe of the forequoted Chapter. For *whoſoever* (ſaith he) *ſhall break one of the leaſt of theſe Commandments, he ſhall be called leaſt in the kingdom of heaven*; They are his ſenſe and meaning, in what he oppoſes to the forementioned inſtances. Our Saviour to that crime of Murther oppoſing the calling of our Brother *Raka* or Fool; as to that other of Adultery, a wanton look or an immodeſt dalliance, which are certainly far inferiour to the other.

II. I have conſidered the Law of *Moſes* as to that part of it which was the Common Law of the Jewiſh Nation, and ſhewn you how our Saviour added to it; I come now to ſpeak of the ſame Law, as intended for a rule of manners, and as a guide to the *Jews* in walking with God. In which ſenſe it is taken, when it is ſtiled a Law converting the Soul, or repreſented as a means to inherit eternal life. Now in this ſenſe it is chiefly that queſtion is made concerning it, whether Chriſt added thereto, and wherein that addition conſiſts. And *firſt* of all,

1. Negatively, we are not to think that Chriſt added to it by exacting the obedience of the heart, as well as the outward man; for, that this Law of *Moſes* did, no leſs than the Precepts of our Bleſſed Saviour. And hence (as was before intimated) it is by the Pſalmiſt ſaid to be *a law converting the Soul*, Pſal. 19. 7. and by S. *Paul* affirmed to be ſpiritual, *Rom.* 7. 14. yea that if *there had been a Law, which could have given life*, the Law of *Moſes* had been it, *Gal.* 3. 21. Neither do the Precepts of this Law enforce any thing leſs, than thoſe Elogies which are given of it by *David* and S. *Paul*. Not the Precepts of Piety, or thoſe which taught the *Jews* their duty toward God; For *hear O Iſrael* (ſaith the Law) *the Lord our God is one Lord, and thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart and with all thy ſoul and with all thy might*, *Deut.* 6. 5. As in like manner, *Deut.* 10. 12. *And now Iſrael, what doth the Lord require of thee, but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in his ways, and to love and ſerve him with all thy heart, and with all thy ſoul?* Not the Precepts of Charity; for as our Saviour doth here forbid the malice of the heart as well as killing, ſo did this Law alſo, for *thou ſhalt not* (ſaith the Law) *hate thy brother in thy heart, nor bear a grudge againſt the children of thy people*, *Lev.* 19. 17, 18. Laſtly, not the Precepts of Chaſtity, and Juſtice, as they are couched in the Law and the Prophets. For as our Saviour forbids here the adultery of the heart, as elſewhere the deſire of that which is anothers; ſo do alſo the Law and the Prophets. The words of the *Proverbs* of *Solomon* being, *Thou*

ſhalt not luſt after the beauty of a ſtrange woman in thy heart, Pro. 6. 25. Of the Law, *Thou ſhalt not covet thy neighbours wife, ſervant, cattel or any thing that is his*, Exod. 20. 17. But as our Saviour added nothing to this Law by calling for the piety of the heart, becauſe that did ſo as well as he; ſo neither, *Secondly*, by forbidding leſſer as well as greater ſins, becauſe this Law did no leſs. For thus, as our Saviour forbad a wanton look as well as the act of Adultery, a ſlanderous tongue as well as a killing hand, ſo did alſo the Law and the Prophets. For *what man is he* (ſaith the Pſalmiſt, *Pſal.* 34. 12.) *that deſireth life and loveth many days, that he may ſee good? let him keep his tongue from evil.* And yet more particularly, *Pſal.* 15. 1. 3. *Lord who ſhall abide in thy tabernacle? who ſhall dwell in thy holy hill? He that backbiteth not with his tongue*, as well as *he that doth no evil to his neighbour, he that taketh not up a reproach againſt him.* The like ſeverity we may obſerve in the *Proverbs* of *Solomon*, againſt that luſtful eye of which our Saviour forewarns us, *Prov.* 6. 25. Where to the former caution of not luſting after the ſtrange womans beauty in the heart, he adds, *neither let her take thee with her eye-lids*, which implies a watchfulneſs over our own. But neither, *Thirdly*, doth our Saviour require any new vertue of us, which the Law and the Prophets did not before him, for the kind. I inſtance in the love of enemies, becauſe that ſeems of all others moſt peculiar to the Goſpel, and moſt oppoſite to the Precepts of *Moſes*. Concerning which, for the kind I mean, the Law is as expreſs, as the Goſpel can be ſuppoſed to be. Thus *Exod.* 23. 4, 5. *If* (ſaith *Moſes*) *thou meet thine enemies ox or aſs going aſtray, thou ſhalt ſurely bring it back to him again. And if thou ſee the aſs of him that hateth thee lying under his burthen, and wouldſt forbear to help him, thou ſhalt ſurely help with him.* For as the Apoſtle ſpake in another caſe, Doth God take care for Oxen or Aſſes? or ſaid he it not rather for this, even to enjoin them to lay aſide their animoſities and ſhew their enemies all acts of benevolence? And accordingly *Vatablus* renders thoſe words in the 5. verſe, *Thou ſhalt ſurely help with him*, by *exonerabis aſinum cum eo qui te odio habet*; and the *Chaldee Paraphraſt* in like manner, *When thou ſhalt ſee the aſs of him that hateth thee lying under his burthen, and wouldſt forbear to help him, thou ſhalt let go the hatred which is in thy heart againſt him, and ſhalt lend him thy aſſiſtance in the raiſing him up*; referring not ſo much to the kindneſs which he was to ſhew to the poor beaſt (though that alſo was a duty) as to that which he was to ſhew to the owner of it, and his own enemy. But that of *Solomon* will put this buſineſs out of queſtion, becauſe ſo fully expreſſive of the love of an enemy, that S. *Paul* himſelf thought fit to repreſent it to the Chriſtian *Romans*, when he was intreating of the ſame argument. 'Tis in the 25. of the *Proverbs*, verſes 21, and 22. *If thine enemy hunger give him bread to eat, and if he be thirſty give him water to drink. For thou ſhalt heap coals of fire upon his head, and the Lord ſhall reward thee.*

2. Having thus ſhewn wherein the Goſpel and the Law agree, and conſequently wherein we are not to look for any additions; let us in the next place enquire what the Goſpel hath added to the Law and Prophets, wherein it hath fulfilled the Law and them. And here

1. I obſerve *firſt*, that though our Saviour hath required no new vertues,

vertues, which the Law and the Prophets did not before enjoin; yet he hath enjoined us ſome new inſtances which under the Law were left free. We have one in that Sermon of our Saviour to which I have ſo often referred, and therefore I ſhall begin with that. 'Tis in the 5. Chapter of S. *Matthew*, and the 31. verſe; where he tells us, that *it hath been ſaid, Whoſoever ſhall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement: But I ſay unto you, That whoſoever ſhall put away his wife ſaving for the cauſe of fornication cauſeth her to commit adultery, and whoſoever ſhall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery.* Wherewith agreeth that of the ſame *Jeſus*, *Mat.* 19. 8, 9. where when the Phariſees demanded of him, why, if God had made the bond ſo cloſe between man and wife at the firſt, as he had then affirmed, *Moſes* did command to give a writing of divorcement and to put her away, his anſwer was, that *Moſes for the hardneſs of their hearts ſuffered them to put away their wives, but from the beginning it was not ſo*, neither ſhould be from that time forward, for whoſoever ſhall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and ſhall marry another committeth Adultery, and whoſo marrieth her which is put away committeth Adultery. From which paſſages compared together it is manifeſt, that *Moſes* permitted divorces for leſſer cauſes than fornication; but that Chriſt would not allow of any upon a lower cauſe. But not to inſiſt upon this, becauſe there is ſome ground to believe that *Moſes* his permiſſion of divorce was rather ſuch as freed them from puniſhment in this world than from guilt before God, inaſmuch as it is only ſaid that *Moſes* ſuffered them ſo to do becauſe of the hardneſs of their hearts (though on the other ſide it may ſeem ſtrange that God ſhould give ſo uncontrouled a permiſſion to that which he himſelf then held as ſinful, and treaſured up againſt them againſt the day of wrath) But not (I ſay) however to inſiſt upon that, I ſhall proceed to the matter of Polygamy, or the having of more wives than one, which it is certain the *Jews* were not only permitted, but ſo far diſpenſed withal alſo, that they might do it without the imputation of a ſin, the Scripture reckoning multitude of wives to *David* as a bleſſing and a gift of God, even to that *David*, who was a man after Gods own heart, 2 *Sam.* 12. 8. Thus you ſee it was under the Law, even with the allowance of God himſelf; but Chriſt hath now determined otherwiſe, as is manifeſt (to go no farther) from that forequoted text of S. *Matthew* c. 19. 9. where our Saviour tells us, that whoſoever ſhall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and ſhall marry another, committeth Adultery. For if it were lawful to have more wives than one, his marrying another could not be imputed to him for a ſin, and much leſs for Adultery as it is in the text now quoted. Let it remain therefore for an undoubted truth, That though our Saviour hath required no now vertues, yet he hath enjoyned us ſome new inſtances, and conſequently ſo far added to the Law.

2. But beſide the enjoining of new inſtances (which yet alone would have juſtified our Saviours aſſertion) he hath alſo exacted thoſe vertues in a greater latitude, than they will be found to have been under the Law. For the evidencing whereof I will inſtance in the love of enemies, as being one of the moſt eminent vertues of the Goſpel. And here not to content my ſelf with that of our Saviour *Mat.* 5. 43, 44.

where, having premised after his manner, that they had heard it had been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy, he adds by way of opposition, *But I say unto you, Love your enemies*; not, I say, to content my self with that, I shall set before you the extent of this Precept under the Gospel, and then shew how much the Law falls short of it in its injunctions. I begin with the former of these, even the extent of this Precept under the Gospel; Which I shall not doubt to affirm, first, to comprehend such enemies as are of a different Religion from us, as well as those who are of the same Religion with our selves, that is to say, the Infidel as well as the Believer, the Schismatick as well as the Orthodox professor. That the Schismatick is not to be excluded from this Love, we have a clear evidence from our Saviour, in his behaviour toward the *Samaritans*, and in his explication of that question, which was put to him by a Lawyer, concerning the importance of the word Neighbour. For first, when his Disciples would have had him call for fire from Heaven, to consume the *Samaritans* for refusing to give entertainment to them, *Luke* 9. 54. he both sharply reproved them for that their suggestion, and told them that *the Son of man was not come to destroy mens lives, but to save them*, even of those that were Separatists from the true Church, the *Samaritans* as well as the *Jews*; for otherwise those words of his had not touched them at all, whose present zeal was against such persons only. Now if Christ came not to destroy even such mens lives but to save them, we cannot deem it any way acceptable to him for us to pray against them, and make them the objects of our hatred. The same is much more evident from our Saviours answer to that question, who is the neighbour we are to love as our selves, *Luke* 10. 29. For there he doth both insinuate a *Samaritan* to be a neighbour, and enjoin the *Jew* to imitate him by shewing mercy to those of a different profession; the scope of our Saviours answer (as appears from the question proposed) being not to declare the necessity of shewing mercy, but the persons to whom we are to do it. But as Schismaticks and *Samaritans*, by the Discipline of our Saviour, are to have a share of that love, which we are to shew to enemies, so also Pagans and Infidels, men who are not only Separatists from, but perfect strangers to, the Commonwealth of *Israel*; Witness one for all, that known place of S. *Paul*, 1 *Tim.* 2. 1. where he exhorts that *first of all supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving of thanks be made for all men, for Kings and for all that are in Authority, that we may lead a peaceable and quiet life in all godliness and honesty*. For as it is evident from the stories of those times, as well as from the words that follow, that the Powers that then were, had not attained the knowledge of the truth; so it is no less, that they were the Christians enemies, and made use of that authority, which God put into their hands for the repressing of evil doers, to discountenance and extirpate them. In the love therefore of enemies it is manifest that Christ includes the Heathen and the *Samaritan*, as well as the Christian and the Orthodox professor. But though such as these are to be lov'd, whatsoever their enmity may be to us, yet certainly, not when enemies to us upon the account of Christianity, and thereby to the Authour of it? Indeed, the present practice of Christians would so perswade a man, that were not studied in the doctrine of our Saviour, there being generally no

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hatred accounted too great to ſhew to thoſe that are the enemies of our Religion. But what the will of our Saviour was, his behaviour toward the *Samaritans*, when they denyed him entertainment, ſhews plainly enough, and his own words in his Sermon upon the Mount; for it was not upon any particular grudge to his perſon that they denied him entertainment, that they refuſed him that civility which ſeems due to all ſtrangers; the text it ſelf tells us, *Luke* 9. 53. that the reaſon of their not receiving him was, *becauſe his face was as though he would go to Jeruſalem*, thereby profeſſing that he looked upon that City as the place appointed for Gods publick worſhip, which was the chief controverſie between the *Jews* and the *Samaritans*. And yet notwithſtanding this their rudeneſs to our Saviour upon the account of the true Religion, our Saviour would by no means hear of calling for fire from Heaven upon them, and checked his Diſciples for the motion, intimating withall that they were to be of a different temper from him whoſe fiery zeal they commended to him. But let us view our Saviour's own words in his Sermon upon the Mount, and ſee whether our love be not to take in ſuch perſons, as are enemies to us for his name ſake. But I ſay unto you, *Love your enemies, bleſs them that curſe your, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that deſpitefully uſe you and perſecute you*; even to thoſe eſpecially which *perſecute you for righteouſneſs ſake, which ſpeak all manner of evil againſt you for mine.* For beſide that theſe are the perſecutors and revilers ſpoken of in the former verſes, and therefore in all probability to be underſtood here; S. *Luke* hath ſubjoined the Precept of loving enemies, immediately after that beatitude, which pronounces a bleſſing upon thoſe that are perſecuted for Chriſts ſake, and the woe that is oppoſed to it, thereby plainly ſhewing that they who perſecute us for Chriſts ſake are in the number of thoſe enemies whom he obliges us to love and pray for. For after he had ſaid, c. 6. 22. *Bleſſed are ye when men ſhall hate you, and when they ſhall ſeparate you from their company, and ſhall reproach you and caſt out your name as evil for the ſon of mans ſake*; as on the other ſide, *Wo unto you when all men ſhall ſpeak well of you, for ſo did their fathers to the falſe prophets, verſ.* 26. he adds in the very next verſe, to wit the 27. *But I ſay unto you, Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that deſpitefully uſe you*, by which enemies what other can be meant than thoſe who were ſo becauſe they were Chriſtians, and hated them not for their own ſake but the Son of man's? We have ſeen the intent of this Precept under the Goſpel, let us now look upon it as preſcribed by the Law and the Prophets; which if we do, we ſhall ſoon diſcern that the Precepts thereof fall ſhort of thoſe of our bleſſed Saviour. For firſt of all whereas Chriſtianity makes no difference between a ſound Chriſtian and a Schiſmatick, or an Infidel, the Law though enjoining the ſame love of enemies, yet reſtrains it to ſuch as were of the Jewiſh Nation or Religion. If he who oppoſeth thee be of thy own blood or profeſſion, if he be a natural ſon of *Abraham*, or one adopted into his family, then thou oughteſt to look upon him as thy neighbour, and ſhew thy ſelf benevolent to him. Say I this of my ſelf, or ſaith not the Law the ſame? For is not neighbour and children of thy people made ſynonymous, even where this very argument is intreated of? for *thou ſhalt not* (ſaith *Moſes*, *Lev.*

Lev. 19. 18.) *avenge or bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self.* Nay doth not our Saviour intimate this to have been the meaning of the Law, when in pursuance of this most excellent Precept he adds, *Mat.* 5. 47. *If ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others?* Again (to resume that place which we before made use of, to shew the *Jews* obligation to this Precept at all) doth not the book of *Deuteronomy* sufficiently declare the enemy whom they were there obliged to assist, to be one of their own Nation or profession? If you take the pains to compare them together, you will easily discern that that is the due meaning of it. *If* (saith *Moses*) in the book of *Exodus*) *thou meet thine enemies oxe or ass going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again. If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lying under his burthen, and wouldst forbear to help him, thou shalt surely help with him, Exod.* 23. 4,5. But in *Deut.* c. 22. 1. *Thou shalt not see thy brothers oxe or his sheep going astray, and hide thy self from them, thou shalt in any case bring them again unto thy brother*; and v. 4. *Thou shalt not see thy brothers ass or his oxe fall down by the way, and hide thy self from them, thou shalt surely help with him to lift them up*; plainly shewing that the enemy they were forbidden to hide themselves from, was such an one as was also a brother, which in the *Hebrew* phrase was an Israelite by Nation or Religion. I observe, secondly, that as the love the *Jews* were obliged to have for Enemies was restrained to those of their own Nation or Religion, so there were some whole Nations whom they were obliged to hate, nor have any commiseration of. For thus saith God concerning the *Amorite* and the *Canaanite*, the *Hittite* and the *Perizzite*, the *Hivite* and the *Jebusite*, *Take heed to thy self, lest thou make a covenant with the inhabitants of the land, whither thou goest, Exod.* 34. 12. As in like manner of the same Nations and the *Girgashites*, that when *the Lord their God should deliver them before Israel, that he should smite them, and utterly destroy them, that he should make no covenant with them, nor shew mercy unto them, Deut.* 7. 1. and so on. Which what is it less, than to hate those Nations, to account of them, and deal with them as enemies? Indeed (as in both those places is insinuated) the reason of Gods commanding them so to do was for fear the people of *Israel* should be ensnared by them, and enticed to the worship of their Gods. For we are not to think there is any imperfection in Gods commands, or that hatred and enmity is acceptable of it self. But in the mean time here is an enemy which the Israelites were obliged to hate, and such a command for it as the new Testament affords not any. Add hereunto the aversation which the *Jews* generally did think themselves obliged to have for the *Samaritans* and the Heathen, a thing taken notice of both by sacred and prophane Authours. For the Scriptures first, they observe to us that the *Jews* had no dealing with the *Samaritans*, *Joh.* 4. 9. That thereupon a woman of *Samaria* wondred extremely at our Saviours asking water of her; that S. *Peter* himself had taken up so hard an opinion concerning the Heathen, that, even after our Saviours Ascension, he looked upon them as unclean persons, and such as it was not lawful for him to converse with; that our Saviour, when he would represent to the *Jews* the aversation they ought to have for those who would not hear the Church, bad them

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to account of them as Heathens and Publicans; laſtly, that the ſame Holy *Jeſus*, when a woman of *Canaan* came and ſued to him in the behalf of her ſick daughter, would not at firſt vouchſafe her an anſwer, and when her importunity and the Diſciples together had extorted one from him, called her and all her Nation by the name of Dogs; For *it is not meet*, ſaith he, *Mat.* 15.26. *to take the childrens bread and caſt it unto dogs.* And yet (as that wittily believing *Canaanite* replied upon him) it was but ſome crums ſhe begged of him, and ſuch a mercy as the meaneſt are allowed to partake of. If you conſult the Heathen you will find them to have had the ſame opinion of the *Jews*, to have experimented the ſame averſeneſs in them. For thus *Juvenal* concerning them,

Non monſtrare vias eadem niſi ſacra colenti,
Quæſitum ad fontem ſolos deducere verpos;

That is to ſay, that a *Jew* would not tell a Heathen the way to any place he ſhould ask after, nor lead any but ſuch as were circumciſed to what fountain he ſhould enquire for. As in like manner *Tacitus*, * that among themſelves they were ſtrict in keeping of their faith, and extremely inclinable to pity, but had a perfect hatred for all others. For though it may be thoſe Authours might ſomething over-laſh, or (which is as probable) the *Jews* go farther in this particular than they were either obliged or allowed; yet manifeſt enough it is from their general practice, and our Saviours ſevere language to the Canaanitiſh woman, that they were not permitted to have any great commerce with them, and much leſs commanded to ſhew any great kindneſs to them. *Laſtly*, they were allowed, even by God himſelf, to take uſury of a ſtranger, though he did moſt ſeverely forbid it among thoſe of their own Nation. If therefore the Law of *Moſes* reſtrained the title of Neighbour to thoſe of the Jewiſh Nation or Religion; if that Love, which they were required to ſhew to an enemy, were, even in the ſenſe of *Moſes*, to be underſtood of ſuch an enemy as was alſo a Brother; If they were commanded to ſhew no mercy at all to ſome whole Nations, and to avoid the converſe of all in general but themſelves; *Laſtly*, if they might lend upon uſury to a ſtranger, when God had ſo ſeverely forbidden it among themſelves; then certainly that better Law-giver *Chriſt Jeſus* hath added to their Law, becauſe requiring us to hold all men whatſoever as Neighbours, yea though they are as far removed from us in the profeſſion of Religion, as many of them are in their habitation.

* *Apud ipſos fides obſtinata, miſericordia in promptu, adverſus omnes alios hoſtile odium.*

3. Having thus ſhewn that our Saviour hath not only added new inſtances to the Law, but exacted the old vertues in a greater latitude, I come in the *third place* to ſhew that he hath required them in a higher degree, which I ſhall evidence *firſt* of all in the forementioned inſtance, and then in the whole Encyclopedie of Chriſtian vertues. For, to begin with the forementioned inſtance, What more frequent even with Gods Servants than the breathing out of curſes againſt their own enemies, or thoſe of God? nay what more frequent with *David* in the book of *Pſalms* it ſelf, which is of all others the moſt perfect rule of Life and Manners? The whole 109. *Pſalm* is upon the matter nothing elſe; and hardly ſhall you meet with any mention of his enemies,

enemies, without very ſevere prayers againſt them. Thus *Pſal.* 59. 11. where he ſpeaks of ſeeing his deſire upon his enemies, his words are, *Slay them not leſt my people forget, ſcatter them by thy power and bring them down, O Lord our ſhield, for the ſin of their mouth, and for the words of their lips; let them be taken in their pride. Conſume them in wrath, conſume them, that they may not be----* and *at evening let them return, and let them make a noiſe like a dog, and run about thorough the City.* As in like manner, *Pſal.* 35. 4. *Let them be confounded and put to ſhame that ſeek after my ſoul, let them be turned back and brought to confuſion that deviſe my hurt. Let them be as chaff before the wind, and let the Angel of the Lord chaſe them. Let their way be dark and ſlippery, and let the Angel of the Lord perſecute them.* Again ſaith the ſame Pſalmiſt, after he had mentioned the reproaches and injuries he ſuſtained by them, *Let their table become a ſnare before them, and that which ſhould have been for their welfare, let it become a trap. Let their eyes be darkened that they ſee not, and make their loyns continually to ſhake,* *Pſal.* 69. 22, 23. And a little after, *Let their habitation be deſolate, and none to dwell in their tents, for they perſecute him whom thou haſt ſmitten, and they talk to the grief of thoſe whom thou haſt wounded.* Neither will it ſuffice to ſay, as perhaps it may be, that many of thoſe execrations relate to the enemies of Chriſt, particularly thoſe laſt mentioned; For beſide that it is evident enough from the Pſalms themſelves, that they were alſo deſigned againſt *Davids* enemies; the ſtory of the Goſpel ſhews, that our bleſſed Saviour, who ought rather to be our pattern, prayed even for thoſe very enemies, for thoſe that gave him gall to eat and vinegar to drink; His own words, as S. *Luke* tells us, being, *Father forgive them for they know not what they do, Luke* 23. 34. In conformity to which example as no doubt we ought to proceed, who are ſo often required to ſet it before our eyes; ſo if we take a view of his Precepts, we ſhall find them to injoin us the ſame tenderneſs, wherein he went before us by his example. Thus *Mat.* 5. 44. we have his own expreſs command *to bleſs thoſe that curſe us*; his Apoſtle S. *Paul's*, *Rom.* 12. 14. *that we ſhould bleſs and curſe not.* Laſtly, thus we find him himſelf checking his Diſciples, for having a deſire to imitate *Elias* his zeal in calling for fire from Heaven upon the *Samaritans*, and moreover inſinuating to them that the Spirit of a Diſciple ought to be far different from that of *Elias*, *Luke* 9. 55. And accordingly, ſaving that Prayer of S. *Paul* concerning *Alexander* the Copperſmith, *The Lord reward him according to his works*, 2 *Tim.* 4. 14. and that other of S. *Peter's* concerning *Simon Magus*, *That his money might periſh with him*, *Act.* 8. 20. which yet he ſeems afterwards to recal, when he admoniſhes him *to repent, and pray to God, if perhaps that thought of his heart might be forgiven him*; ſaving I ſay thoſe prayers, the former whereof was againſt one who had greatly withſtood S. *Paul's* preaching, the later againſt him who offer'd the Apoſtles money for the Holy Ghoſt, I think we ſhall hardly meet with any of that nature throughout the whole New Teſtament. Which is to me an evident argument, that the loving of enemies, and praying for them that curſe, is at leaſt required of us, in a greater degree, than it was under the Law. But not to confine my ſelf to this ſingle vertue, when there is appearance enough that the like is required in all, I ſhall deſire any

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man that doubts of it, to conſider with me theſe 3. things. 1. That the Precepts of Chriſt are much more clear and explicit than thoſe of *Moſes*. 2. That the promiſes are more clearly propoſed, and 3. and laſtly, That God hath eaſed us of the yoke of the Ceremonial Law. Of the *firſt* of theſe as there cannot well be made a doubt by any that ſhall compare the Law and the Goſpel together, ſo neither hath it I think been actually done by any; and therefore inſtead of inſiſting upon the proof of it, I ſhall make this inference from it, that God exacts of us a more perfect conformity, than he required of thoſe under the Old Teſtament. For as the publication of a Law makes it obligatory to thoſe to whom that publication is made; ſo conſequently the more clear the publication is, the greater the obligation muſt be. Of the *ſecond* particular there can yet leſs doubt be made, even of the promiſes of the Goſpel being more clearly propoſed by it; it being harder to find that there were any ſuch then, than any ſo clear and expreſs. And therefore as the *Socinians* do now generally deny it, ſo we find the like to have been done by the *Sadducees* of old, wherein though it is true they have erred and that groſly, yet ſome of the texts they alledge do ſufficiently prove that there is a clearer manifeſtation of them than before; Witneſs that known affirmation of S. *Paul*, 2 *Tim.* 1. 10. where ſpeaking of the Goſpel he tells us that it *is now made manifeſt by the appearing of our Saviour Jeſus Chriſt, who hath aboliſhed death, and brought life and immortality to light* by it. In fine, the ſame S. *Paul* tells us, 2 *Cor.* 3. that there was a veil upon *Moſes* writings, as well as there ſometime was upon his face, but that that veil is done away in Chriſt, and we may now with open face behold the Glory of the Lord and that Glory which he hath laid up for us. Now if the promiſes of the Goſpel, as well as the Precepts thereof, were more clear than thoſe of *Moſes*, the motives to obedience as well as the rule of it, our conformity thereto is in reaſon to be proportionably greater, than that to which the *Jews* were tyed. To all which if we add, that God hath now eaſed us of the yoke of the Ceremonial Law, which the *Jews*, though they were not able to bear, yet were forced to ſtand under, ſo no doubt can remain of a ſtricter obligation upon us to thoſe moſt excellent Precepts of the Moral; gratitude it ſelf requiring, that we, who are eaſed of a heavy yoke, ſhould the more quietly ſubmit our necks to a light and gracious one.

Now though what hath been ſaid doth ſufficiently evidence that Chriſt came not to deſtroy but fulfil the Law and the Prophets in the moſt proper notion of the word; yet becauſe it hath been thought by ſome that the granting of that would inferr the Law of *Moſes* to have been imperfect, before I put a period to this diſcourſe, I will free my doctrine from that imputation, and ſo much the rather becauſe the charge of imperfection would in fine fall upon the Author of it. In order whereunto the firſt thing that I ſhall offer is, that it is no crime at all to affirm it to have been imperfect if compared with the doctrine of our Saviour; that which is leſs perfect being ſometimes as ſeaſonable, as at other times a more perfect one. But 2. I ſay, that Law is not preſently to be thought imperfect, which doth not enjoyn the higheſt pitch of vertue. It is enough, if it be ſuited to the ability and temper of thoſe, for the regulation of whom it was deviſed. And

therefore as one made anſwer, when it was demanded of him whether he had given ſuch Laws as were abſolutely the beſt, that he had given the beſt Laws he could find out for thoſe who were to be governed by them; ſo ſhall I ſay concerning the Laws of God by *Moſes*, If they were the very beſt that people was capable of to whom they were given, if they were the beſt for that time and State, they were as perfect as any Law need to be, becauſe wanting nothing that was required. But doth any thing that I have ſaid charge the Law of *Moſes* with not being the beſt that people was capable of? nay have I not already ſhown, that in regard to the hardneſs of their hearts, God was fain to remit ſomething in the matter of divorce? For whereas at the firſt God tyed man and wife by a bond, which nothing but Adultery could diſſolve, for the hardneſs of the *Jews* hearts (as our Saviour tells us) he was forced to remit of that ſeverity, and ſuffer them to put away their wives for a leſſer cauſe, *Mat.* 19.8 In fine, the *Jews* were then but in the ſtate of children, as S. *Paul* tells us, *Gal.* 4. 2. they had the weakneſs and peeviſhneſs of children, and being ſuch God (as was but requiſite) dealt with them as with children; keeping them, as that Apoſtle goes on, under the elements of the world, and permitting them to think, and ſpeak, and act as ſuch. But now that the world is grown man, now that our Bleſſed Saviour hath brought abundance of Grace and Truth into it, giving men more wiſe and underſtanding heads, more pliant hearts, or at leaſt more grace to make them ſo; as it was but reaſonable he ſhould raiſe the ſtandards of obedience, and fulfil both the Law and the Prophets, ſo it will be but neceſſary for us to make our piety anſwer them, and fulfil that Law and the Prophets over again in our converſation.

DISC. V.

Of the meaſures by which we are to proceed in the interpretation of the Decalogue or Ten Commandments.

That the Ten Commandments comprehend more in them than is expreſſed, and how we may come to inveſtigate the full importance of them. Several rules laid down to direct us in that affair. What tyes we have upon us to yield obedience to them, above what the Jews, *to whom they were firſt given, had. A compariſon between the Iſraelites deliverance out of* Egypt, *by which their obedience is enforced, and our far better deliverance from the bondage of the Ceremonial Law, and Sin, and Death.*

HAving, by way of preparation to our main deſign, entreated of the nature, and obligations of the Laws of God, and particularly of that Law which we are now about to explain, ſhewing the authority by which it ſtands, the means whereby it comes to oblige us, and the pitch to which our Saviour hath raiſed it; it remains only that we enquire *what meaſures we are to proceed by in giving the*

the full importance of the ſeveral precepts of it. For as when *Solomon*'s Temple was to be built, all things were ſo fitted, and prepared beforehand, that there was neither hammer, nor axe, nor any tool of iron heard in the building of it; ſo, in every methodical diſcourſe, care ought to be taken that the materials be firſt ſquared and fitted, before we proceed to the rearing of it, leſt the deferring it till then do not only prove a retarding of it, but the noiſes of axes and hammers diſturb and confound us in it.

Now there are two things, within the explication of which, the reſolution of this queſtion will be comprehended.

1. Whether the Ten Commandments comprehend no more in them, than is expreſſed. And
2. If they do, what thoſe things are which they comprehend.

I. It is commonly ſuppoſed both by Jewiſh and Chriſtian writers that the *Decalogue* or Ten Commandments is a ſummary or abſtract of the whole Duty of Man. I will not at the firſt either take ſo much for granted, or attempt the probation of it; whatſoever is to be ſaid concerning this particular, being beſt to be learned by a leiſurely and gradual procedure. It ſhall ſuffice now in the entrance of my diſcourſe to affirm, that more is comprehended in the *Decalogue* or Ten Commandments, than is expreſſed in the letter of it. For, *firſt*, all that muſt be ſuppoſed to be comprehended in it, which is either implyed in it, or neceſſarily deducible from it. Thus though the letter of the firſt Commandment doth directly import no more than the rejecting of falſe Gods, yet inaſmuch as God prefaces this prohibition with *I am the Lord thy God*, and the prohibition it ſelf manifeſtly implies the having of him for our God, it is evident that when God ſayes, *Thou ſhalt have no other Gods before me*, his meaning is as well that we ſhould have him for our God, as that we ſhould not have any other God beſides. Again, when the having of any one for our God implies the fearing and loving and honouring him that is ſo, according to his ſeveral attributes, at the ſame time he commands us to have him and no other for our God, he muſt be ſuppoſed to command alſo, that we ſhould fear, and love, and honour him and him alone, though neither of theſe be expreſſed in it. But then if the Law be conſidered not only as propoſed by *Moſes*, but as illuſtrated and enlarged by our Saviour in the Sermon on the Mount, in which capacity there is no doubt we ought to look upon it, becauſe as ſuch a part of the Chriſtian Law; ſo there is no doubt but many things are comprehended in it, which are not expreſſed in the letter of it. But becauſe when I ſhew what things are comprehended in the Ten Commandments, beſide what is expreſſed in the letter, I ſhall at the ſame time ſhew that ſomething elſe is, therefore ſuperſeding any farther proof of that as altogether unneceſſary, I will proceed to the reſolution of the other.

II. It is commonly ſuppoſed, and not without reaſon, though that reaſon be not often made appear, that when our Saviour reduceth the Law to thoſe two great Commandments, *Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*, and *Thou ſhalt love thy neighbour as thy ſelf*, he means that principally of the Law of *Moſes* contained in the Ten Commandments. Which if true, it will follow,

1. That the negative in every Commandment doth include the affirmative, and that when God ſaith Thou ſhalt not kill, thou ſhalt not

ſteal, and the like, his meaning is not only that we ſhould do no injury to our neighbours perſon or eſtate, but that we ſhould love and do him good in both. Now that our Saviour intended thoſe great Commandments, Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and Thy neighbour as thy ſelf, as an abſtract of the Ten Commandments, and conſequently that what is contained in them is alſo compriſed in the Ten Commandments, will appear from *Rom.* 13. 8, 9. where S. *Paul* doth not only affirm *love to be the fulfilling of the Law*, according as his Maſter had done, but particularly of the Ten Commandments. For *this* (ſaith he) *Thou ſhalt not commit adultery, Thou ſhalt not kill, Thou ſhalt not ſteal, Thou ſhalt not bear falſe witneſs, Thou ſhalt not covet, and if there be any other Commandment, it is* * *briefly comprehended in this ſaying, namely, Thou ſhalt love thy neighbour as thy ſelf.* Now foraſmuch as Love is the fulfilling of this Law, foraſmuch as the ſeveral Precepts of it are comprehended in it, as in a recapitulation * or ſummary; that Law, of which it is a ſummary, muſt comprehend love in it, and conſequently, not only forbid the doing of any injury to our neighbour, but the doing him all good offices and ſervices. There is but one thing of moment to be oppoſed to this arguing, and that is what followes in the 10. verſe, *Love worketh no ill to his neighbour, therefore love is the fulfilling of the Law*; for if love be the fulfilling of the Law, in that it works no ill, then may the whole tenour of the Law ſeem to be comprehended in the not doing of any harm to our neighbour. But to this I anſwer firſt, that when the Apoſtle ſaith, Love worketh no ill to his neighbour, therefore love is the fulfilling of the Law, his meaning may be, not that love is the fulfilling of the Law meerly becauſe it doth no harm, but becauſe of its oppoſition to all thoſe evils and harms, ſuch as Adultery, Theft and the like, whereby our neighbour is incommodated. Love is a ſtranger to Murther, Adultery, and Theft, and to whatſoever elſe whereby our neighbour is incommodated; and being a ſtranger to all ſuch practiſes, it doth not only extend it ſelf to this or that Commandment, but to all the Commandments of the ſecond Table. I ſay, ſecondly, with *Eſthius*, that though the Apoſtle ſay leſs, yet it was his intention to have more underſtood, even not only that love worketh no ill, but that it worketh all good to its neighbour. Which (beſide the uſual forms of Speech in Scripture, and other books, where under negative expreſſions, ſuch as *I am not aſhamed*, great boaſting is often ſignified) is evident from the verſe before. For being it is there ſaid, not only that the Precepts, Thou ſhalt not kill, and the like, but if there be any other Commandment, it is briefly comprehended in that ſaying, namely, Thou ſhalt love thy Neighbour as thy ſelf, and conſequently, that the command of honouring our Parents is, becauſe that is a Precept of the ſame Decalogue; the Law cannot be fulfilled by abſtaining meerly from evil, becauſe that of Honouring our Parents is more than ſo. When therefore it is here ſaid, that love worketh no ill to his Neighbour and therefore is the fulfilling of the Law, we are not only to underſtand that it worketh no ill, but that it procureth all the good that can be. In the mean time, if any deem the poſitive love of our Neighbour to be the fulfilling of the Law, in the ſame ſenſe in which I have ſhewn the word *fulfil* is to be underſtood in the 5. Chapter of S. *Matthew*, that is to ſay, as an addition made by Chriſt

* *Verba ſunt* ἐν τούτῳ πᾷ

* λόγῳ ἀνακεφαλαίωσις. *Significat propriè variarum ſummarum in unam collectionem, per tranſlationem, antè dictorum repetitionem per capita.* Hammond *in* Eph. 1. 10.

Chriſt to it, to make up its former wants, it will come all to one as to our preſent purpoſe. For being the ſubjects of that Chriſt, who hath fulfilled it, we are neceſſarily to look upon the Law in that latitude wherein it is propoſed by him, and conſequently to believe the Commandments of the *Decalogue*, not only to require us to abſtain from doing evil, but to purſue the contrary good. The argument is much more ſtrong from the affirmative to the negative, that is to ſay, from the command of any poſitive duty to the forbidding of the contrary vice. For though, for inſtance, I may abſtain from diſhonouring my Parents, and yet never give them honour; yet I cannot honour and diſhonour them at once: and therefore that Commandment, which enjoins me honour, muſt conſequently be thought to forbid all diſhonour and contempt. Thus far therefore we have already attained toward the importance of the *Ten Commandments*, that, though ſome of them, and thoſe the moſt, ſeem ſatisfied with abſtaining from evil, and others with the ſole purſuing of good; yet both the one and the other are to be underſtood as obliging to both, to eſchew that which is evil, and to follow after that which is good and vertuous.

2. The *ſecond* thing obſervable concerning the *Ten Commandments*, is, that though the groſſer ſort of ſins only be there expreſly forbidden, ſuch as Adultery, Murther, and the like, yet under them are contained alſo all the leſſer ones of the ſame ſpecies. Thus for example, Though the *Decalogue* take notice only of Murther, and Adultery in the ſins of Malice and Unchaſtity, yet conſidering thoſe Precepts as propoſed by Chriſt, in which capacity there is no doubt all Chriſtians are to look upon them, ſo we are to underſtand all ſins of the ſame kind to be included, how much ſoever inferiour to the other. For *I ſay unto you* (ſaith our Saviour) *that whoſoever looketh upon a woman to luſt after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart*, *Mat.* 5. 28. And again, not only that he who kills his Brother, but that *whoſoever is angry without a cauſe*, eſpecially if he proceed to reproachful language, *ſhall be in danger of the ſame judgment*, to which the murtherer is obnoxious, v. 22. of the ſame Chapter. And indeed, though there appear not any clear indications in the Commandments themſelves of their deſcending to thoſe leſſer ſins, yet foraſmuch as we find the Tenth Commandment deſcending ſo low as to forbid the very coveting that which is another man's, and again the other parts of the Law and the Prophets forbidding the lower degrees of unchaſtity and malice, as hath been before ſhewn; there is reaſon enough to believe, thoſe lower degrees were intended to be forbidden by it, as well as the higher ones. For the other parts of the Law and the Prophets being but as Comments upon the *Decalogue*, as appears by Gods laying that as the foundation of all the reſt, and its own containing in it the general heads of our obedience; whatſoever is forbidden by the other parts of the Law and the Prophets, muſt be ſuppoſed to be included in thoſe groſſer ſins of the ſame kind, which the *Decalogue* takes notice of.

3. The *third* thing obſervable concerning the *Ten Commandments*, is, that though all of them, except the laſt, take no notice of any other than the outward actions; yet the actions of the inward man, or the heart are no leſs compriſed in the ſeveral Precepts and Prohibitions of it. For beſide that (as was before ſaid) the Law of God is by the

the Pſalmiſt ſaid to be *a law converting the ſoul*, *Pſal.* 17. 9. and by S. *Paul* term'd ſpiritual, *Rom.* 7. 14. That firſt and great Commandment, in which all our duty to God is comprehended, is expreſſed by our loving God with all our heart and ſoul, as well as with all our might and ſtrength, *Mat.* 22. 38. And though the ſecond be not expreſſed in like manner, to wit, that of loving our Neighbours as our ſelves, yet as the affection of the heart is manifeſtly included in the word *love*, which is the proper act of it, ſo the Law is expreſs, *that we ſhould not hate our brother in our heart, nor bear a grudge againſt the children of our people.* But becauſe this argument hath been ſufficiently exemplified in the ſeveral Precepts of the *Decalogue*, I will proceed to my

4. Rule which is, That not only the ſins here mentioned are forbidden, but all thoſe things that lead to them; as on the other ſide, not only that the duties there expreſſed are under command, but all thoſe means that naturally tend to them: for being the end doth depend upon the means, and either follows, or follows not, according as they are made uſe of, or omitted; he that commands any end muſt neceſſarily be thought to command the means, as on the other ſide he that forbids the end to forbid the other. Thus foraſmuch as drunkenneſs leads to luſt, and immoderate anger to murther, were there no other Precepts to make them unlawful, thoſe of Murther and Adultery would, becauſe intemperance and immoderate anger naturally lead to them.

5. (For to enumerate more particulars, would perhaps ſerve rather to foreſtall the enſuing diſcourſe, than to clear our way to it) Whatſoever either the Old, or New Teſtament, propoſeth concerning piety and vertue, as it may fairly enough be reduced to ſome Precept or other of the *Decalogue*, as will appear when we come to diſcuſs them; ſo conſidering it, as our *Catechiſm* doth, as an abſtract of all moral duties, it will be neceſſary to take that courſe in the explication of it.

6. *Laſtly*, for though matter of duty be the principal thing here intended, yet that duty hath promiſes annexed to it; Whatſoever is here annexed by way of promiſe, though more peculiarly concerning the *Jews*, doth yet appertain to us alſo. For being *whatſoever was written aforetime was written for our learning, that we through patience and comfort of the Scriptures might have hope*, *Rom.* 15. 4. being the Author to the *Hebrews* applies that promiſe to all Chriſtians, which was ſpoken particularly to *Joſhua*, and upon a particular occaſion, *Heb.* 13. 5. it is much more reaſonable to believe thoſe promiſes to belong to us, which are annexed to the *Ten Commandments*, becauſe they are no leſs our duty, than thoſe to whom they were firſt given. And therefore, as S. *Paul*, when to ſhew the equity of Chriſtian children's obedience to parents, alledged the words of the fifth Commandment, *Ephe.* 6. 2. ſo he forgot not to add the promiſe annexed of its being well with us, and living long upon the earth; all which had been very impertinent, if the promiſe as well as duty had not been our concernment as well as the *Jews*. Allowance only would be made for the difference there is between the Law and the Goſpel as to temporal promiſes, but what that difference is, and what allowance ought to be made for it, will fall in more ſeaſonably, when I come to intreat of

of the fifth Commandment, to which therefore I ſhall reſerve the diſtinct handling of it.

Having thus prepared my way to the explication of the *Ten Commandments*, by ſhewing the nature and obligation of the divine Laws, and particularly of this, with the meaſure whereby we are to proceed in the explication of them; it remains that we deſcend to the Commandments themſelves, and conſider the ſeveral duties that are wrapped up in them. But becauſe the Law-giver himſelf, before he proceeds to the ſeveral Precepts of the *Decalogue*, labours to ſtir up the *Iſraelites* to yield obedience to them by the conſideration of that great mercy of Gods toward them in bringing them out of the Land of *Egypt*, I will, for a concluſion of this diſcourſe, ſhew what like tyes he hath upon us to the performance of the ſame duties. And here in the *firſt place*, it is not to be forgotten, becauſe that is the firſt root and foundation of all our obligation to him, that he, who exacts our obedience, is he that made us, he from whom we receive our life, and breath, and all things conducing to the ſupport of it. For as it is but reaſonable in it ſelf, that God ſhould exact the obedience of thoſe, who are made and ſuſtained by him, ſo it is no leſs reaſonable, that we ſhould pay him that obedience, who receive ſo great a favour from him. But not to inſiſt upon ſo remote an obligation, who have ſo many that are much more near and preſſing to us Chriſtians, conſider we in the *ſecond place*, that he, who immediately bound this Law upon us, hath bought us with his moſt precious blood. An argument I the rather inſiſt upon, becauſe it carries with it, an exact correſpondency to that mercy, which God made uſe of to perſwade his own people to obedience. For as the deliverance of the *Jews* out of *Egypt* was a deliverance from a cruel bondage, and ſuch as neither before nor ſince any Nation groaned under, ſo our redemption by Chriſt was a deliverance from a more cruel bondage, becauſe from a ſpiritual one. We were in bondage to our own hearts luſts, we were in bondage to Satan and his inſtruments, a Maſter, who after all our toil would have paid us no other wages than death, and an eternal ſeparation from God. Again, whereas the Jewiſh Law-giver delivered them from their bondage, by the bloud of the Paſchal Lamb, and of their enemies, he who bound the ſame Law upon us purchaſed us, not indeed by the bloud of Lambs, or of other men, but (which is much more conſiderable) by his own. Now if a deliverance out of *Egypt* were ſo ſtrong an obligation to obedience, that God himſelf ſhould lay the ſtreſs of the whole Law of *Moſes* on it, how great a one may we ſuppoſe it to be to be delivered from ſin, and Satan, and death, and that too by the bloud of him by whom that Law was impoſed on us? Certainly if any redemption be a juſt incentive to obedience, a redemption from ſuch a ſervitude, and in ſuch a manner muſt be, and we who are ſo bought, obliged to glorifie God both in our bodies, and in our ſpirits which are his. We are not as yet at an end of the obligations the divine goodneſs hath laid upon us to yield obedience to theſe his Laws. For whereas God, though he delivered the *Jews* from their *Egyptian* bondage, yet brought them into another, from a ſervitude in making bricks to a ſervitude in obſerving many unprofitable Rites and Ceremonies, our Law-giver on the contrary hath delivered us from the bondage of corruption to the glorious liberty of the Sons of God;

God; that is to ſay (for what Son is there, that is not under obedience?) to the obedience of Sons, to a ſervice which is both eaſy and ingenuous. We are not now, as they, under a yoke of ceremonial rites and ordinances, we are not treated as ſlaves, nor indeed as ſervants; what becomes a Son to do and a Father to exact, what is juſt, and equitable, and ingenuous, that and that alone is the rule of our obedience. Which yet neither doth he ſo exact, as to caſt us off for every tranſgreſſion of it, for every weak or indeed wilful deviation from it; but, after the manner of tender Fathers, paſſeth by our leſſer errours, and upon our repentance, and amendment, receives us into favour after groſſer ones. Laſtly, as our Law-giver admits us to an ingenuous and eaſy ſervice, as he is moreover gracious and merciful in the exacting of it; ſo he furniſheth us with ability to perform all thoſe things which he doth ſo mercifully exact. For *of his fulneſs* (ſaith S. *John*) *have we all received, and grace for grace*, *Joh.* 1. 16. Now as the aſſiſtance of the divine grace removes all pretexts of our inability to perform what he requires, and conſequently leaves thoſe inexcuſable who come ſhort in the doing of it; ſo can it not but be a powerful inducement to yield obedience to his Laws from whom that aſſiſtance is derived. For when he who is the giver of the Law is alſo aſſiſting to the doing of it, when he doth (as the Apoſtle ſpeaks) συναντιλαμβάνεσθαι ταῖς ἀσθενείαις ἡμῶν, and bear a part of that burthen which he hath laid upon us, what ingratitude muſt it be to withdraw our ſhoulders from it, and refuſe to obey him, who doth not only impoſe a light burthen upon us, but contributes alſo to the ſuſtaining of it? Thus though the deliverance from *Egypt* cannot be preſſed upon us, as an inducement to yield obedience to this Royal Law, yet there want not others of the like nature, but of far greater force, to endear its obedience to us; and then I hope it will be no diminution to it, if inſtead of *I am the Lord thy God who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the houſe of bondage*, we ſubſtitute, I am the Lord thy God who, beſide the common benefit of thy creation, have delivered thee from ſin and hell, and both given thee a more ingenuous and eaſy ſervice, and ability to undergo it.

THE

THE FIRST COMMANDMENT.

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THE FIRST COMMANDMENT.

*Thou ſhalt have no other Gods *but me.*

* or before me.

PART I.

The Contents.

The Commandment divided into three Capital Precepts. I. *That we have the one true God for our God.* II. *That we look upon the God of* Iſrael *as ſuch.* III. *That we have no other Gods beſide him. Of the firſt Capital Precept, and what is meant by the having the One true God for our God, which is ſhewn in the General to be no other, than our owning him as ſuch. An addreſs to a more Particular Explication of it, where is premiſed a brief account of the Nature and Attributes of God, how the knowledge thereof is to be attained, and of what neceſſity ſuch a knowledge is.*

IT is eaſy to obſerve, upon a Superficial view of this firſt Commandment, that the whole of it may be compriſed in theſe three Capital Precepts. 1. That we have the one true God for our God, 2. That we look upon the God of *Iſrael* as ſuch, and 3. and laſtly that we have no other Gods beſides him. For as the laſt of theſe is the very letter of the Commandment, and therefore not at all to be doubted of; ſo the two former, though not expreſſed, yet are manifeſtly implied, in the Commandment, and the preamble to it. For inaſmuch as *The God of Iſrael* prefaceth it with the declaration of *his being the Lord our God*, and in the body thereof forbids *the having of any other before*, or *beſides himſelf*, he manifeſtly ſuppoſeth the having of himſelf, and the true, as well as the not having any other. In the mean time, if that alone be not ſufficient to perſwade, the rule before laid down, and the abſtract which Chriſt hath given of the duties of the firſt Table will. For if every negative in the Decalogue do include the affirmative, if *the loving the Lord our God*, which is no other than the God of *Iſrael, with all our heart, and mind, and ſtrength*, be the abſtract or ſummary of the Commandments of the firſt Table; either that, which

is an abſtract, or ſummary, muſt contain more in it, than that of which it is one, or we muſt be ſuppoſed to be obliged to the having the one true God, and the God of *Iſrael*, as well as to the not having of any other.

I. I begin with the firſt of theſe, even *The having the one true God for our God*, preſcinding from the conſideration of the God of *Iſrael*'s being he. Where not to inſiſt upon the difference that ſeems to be between the *Hebrew* and our *Engliſh*, becauſe the difference is meerly verbal, it being all one in ſenſe, *There ſhall not be to thee any other Gods*, and *Thou ſhalt not have any other Gods before me*, I will proceed to enquire both in the general and in particular, what is meant by *the having of a God.*

1. Now the force of that expreſſion (which will furniſh us with a general explication) will ſoon appear, if theſe two things be conſidered, 1. That that which is required of us, muſt be ſomewhat, that depends upon our will, and 2. That the authority of God depends no farther upon that, than as to our owning or acknowledging it. Foraſmuch as nothing can be the matter of a command, but what is in the power of our will, either to embrace or refuſe, and the authority of God depends no farther upon our will, than as to our owning or acknowledging it; it follows that when we are commanded *to have the one true God for our God*, according as the affirmative part of this Precept imports, the meaning thereof can be no other, than that we own him as ſuch: as, on the other ſide, that when we are required *not to have any other Gods beſide*, that we own no other in that relation. Neither is the expreſſion here made uſe of any whit diſagreeing from what we have ſaid to be intended by it. For as in the language of S. *Paul* men are ſaid *to be the ſervants of him to whom they yield obedience*, ſo by the ſame proportion of ſpeech *to have him for their God*, whom they own and revere as ſuch. And indeed, though in a ſenſe we may be all ſaid *to have one and the ſame God*, becauſe we are all ſubject to the ſame, yet in ſtrictneſs of ſpeech no man can be ſaid *to have any one for his God*, whom he doth not ſome way revere as ſuch. For the word *have* ſuppoſing our admittance of that which we are ſaid *to have*, if we do not admit of him and his authority, neither can we be ſaid *to have him*, and conſequently neither to perform that which this Precept requireth of us. Add hereunto, which will farther confirm this notion, what our Saviour hath affirmed to be the ſum and ſubſtance of the firſt table of the Decalogue; for if the duties of the firſt table be compriſed in that Precept, *Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and ſoul, and ſtrength*, according as our Saviour hath affirmed, then muſt *the having him for our God*, which is the firſt and chiefeſt Precept of it, be our owning him as ſuch, our having that affection and eſteem for him which is due unto a God.

2. Having thus ſhewn in the general what it is *to have the Lord for our God*, even to own and revere him as ſuch, we are in the next place to enquire more particularly, how that is to be done; and what reſpect is due unto him as a God. But becauſe that is not to be known, and much leſs to be performed without the knowledge of the nature and attributes of God, and I have before ſaid, that what is prerequired to any thing enjoined, is to be ſuppoſed to be enjoined by the ſame Commandment; therefore before I proceed to ſhew what reſpect is due unto him, I muſt ſhew, 1. What

1. What the nature and attributes of God are.
2. How the knowledge thereof is to be attained, and
3. And laſtly the neceſſity thereof.

1. I begin with the laſt of theſe, becauſe the firſt in order to be known, even the neceſſity of our knowledge of God, which will appear from what was before intimated concerning the impoſſibility of our giving him that honour which is due, without it. For all honour being founded in the apprehenſion of thoſe excellencies which we behold in another, if the excellencies of the divine nature be either not at all, or but ſuperficially known, our honour of it muſt be accordingly, and conſequently no way ſuitable to the Divine Majeſty. And hence *Joh.* 17. 3. the knowledge of God and Chriſt is ſet to denote all that which is neceſſary to eternal life. For *this* (ſaith that Evangeliſt) *is life eternal, to know thee the only true God, and Jeſus Chriſt whom thou haſt ſent.* Not that this alone is ſufficient to qualifie us for Heaven (for Faith, and Love, and all other Graces of the Spirit are neceſſary to the attaining of it) but that this is the baſis and foundation of all the reſt, neither can we either love, or truſt in him, or adore him, if we have not a due knowledg of him.

2. The neceſſity of the knowledge of God being thus evinced, paſs we in the ſecond place to the means whereby that knowledge is to be attained; which is either, 1. the light of Reaſon and Nature, or 2. of Revelation and Scripture. That God may be known by the former of theſe ways S. *Paul* evidently declares, *Rom.* 1. 19, 20. *For that* (ſaith he) *which may be known of God is manifeſt in them, for God hath ſhewed it unto them; for the inviſible things of him from the Creation of the World are clearly ſeen, being underſtood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead.* It is true indeed, what through the preſent weakneſs of humane nature, and Gods juſt deſertion of it, becauſe of our many provocations, we cannot ſo eaſily, or ſo perfectly attain to the knowledge of him by the light of reaſon and nature: But as this hinders not, but that God may be knowable by it, becauſe the eyes of our underſtandings are become leſs apt to diſcern it; ſo he, that ſhall ſeriouſly ſet himſelf to contemplate the works of nature, will find no contemptible footſteps of the Deity upon them. But becauſe I have * elſewhere given a ſpecimen of what is knowable by this light, in my diſcourſe upon that Article of the Creed concerning God the Father, and becauſe it is moſt certain that whatever may be knowable by it, the beſt of us find it difficult enough to deduce the nature of God from it; therefore conſider we in the ſecond place that more certain one, even the light of Revelation and Scripture. For as no one can be ſuppoſed to give us a more perfect account of the nature of God than he himſelf can, and conſequently, that which comes immediately from him muſt be preferred before all other ways of knowing him, ſo cannot that account but be thought the moſt eaſy and intelligible, becauſe added in conſideration of our inability to diſcern it by the help of our own reaſon. *For after that* * *in the wiſdom of God, the world by wiſdom knew not God, it pleaſed God by the fooliſhneſs of preaching to ſave them that believe.* Beſides, when that which may be known of God from the works of the Creation cannot be deduced but by a long train of conſequences, the Scriptures give us direct and manifeſt notices of it, they preſent him

* Explication of the Apoſtles Creed.

* 1 Cor. 1. 21.

him to us, not *as in a glaſs*, that is to ſay, by reflexion and obſcurely, but, as I may ſo ſpeak, *face to face*. And therefore, being now to ſet before you the nature and attributes of God, ſo far forth as ſhall be neceſſary to let us know what regard we ought to have for him, I will borrow my deſcription of it from the Scripture, which is more exact and intelligible, rather than from the light of nature, which is both more imperfect and obſcure. This only would be premiſed as well to ſet bounds to our own enquiries, as to enhance that reſpect which we ought to have for the Divine Majeſty, that being infinite in his nature and attributes, according as hath been elſewhere *ſhewn, and ſhall be farther in the concluſion of this diſcourſe, whatſoever knowledge we or any other creature may have of him, yet we cannot hope to comprehend him; in which ſenſe ſome have with great probability underſtood that of S. *Paul*, that *he dwelleth in that light to which no man can approach*, and *that no man either hath ſeen him or can*, 1 *Tim.* 6. 16. Now if it ſhould be demanded (which ought to be the end of all our enquiries in this matter) what this incomprehenſibility of God exacts of us, and by what means we may own him as ſuch; I anſwer, by an humble and ſilent admiration of this his unintelligible perfection. For as that Painter, who drew a veil over the face of a ſad Mother, did thereby better expreſs the paſſion he was to repreſent, than he could have done by the ſaddeſt aſpect he could have delineated, becauſe that veil, which he drew over it, did tacitly inſinuate, that the grief was not capable of being expreſſed; ſo cannot we give a greater evidence of our owning the immenſity of the Divine Nature than by our ſilent admiration of it. For this ſhews the Divine Nature to be ſuch as we can never hope to conceive, and much leſs be able to expreſs.

* Explication of the Apoſtles Creed.

3. Having premiſed thus much as a limit to our own enquiries, and as a ſupplement to thoſe imperfect diſcoveries we ſhall be able to make of the Divine Majeſty, proceed we according to our propoſed method to the obſervation of ſo much as is knowable from the Scriptures concerning the Nature and Attributes of God. And

1. Firſt of all for the Nature of God the Scripture is expreſs, that it is ſpiritual, for ſo our Saviour, *Joh.* 4. 24. *God is a ſpirit, and they that worſhip him, muſt worſhip him in ſpirit and in truth*; that is to ſay, (for this is the beſt deſcription we can give of a ſpirutal nature) he is ſuch a ſubſtance as is exempt from the Laws and affections of bodies, he is not capable of being divided or circumſcribed. Neither doth it make ought againſt this aſſertion, that we find God frequently deſcribed with Eyes, and Ears, and Hands, and other the parts of a body. For as he, who would explain any thing to a child or other weak perſon, muſt ſuit his diſcourſe to the capacity of him, whom he hath taken upon him to inſtruct; ſo God being to inſtruct mankind, and particularly the common ſort of it who underſtand nothing beyond what they ſee and feel, was neceſſarily to make known his own Nature and Attributes, not by ſuch diſcoveries as were moſt proper to declare it, but by ſuch things as the capacity of them, whom he was to inſtruct, was beſt able to apprehend. Now as no man would inferr from the explication that is made of any thing to a child, that the thing it ſelf is altogether ſuch as it is deſcribed to him, becauſe ſuch a one is rather to be inſtructed by ſuch things as are moſt obvious

to

to him, than by the proper notices thereof; ſo neither can any from the bodily repreſentation that is made of God, that God hath indeed ſuch parts and members, as he is there deſcribed withal; becauſe the weakneſs of the common ſort requires that the nature of God be repreſented by the things of ſenſe, which alone they have any knowledge of. Beſides, as there was a neceſſity of Gods deſcribing his power and providence by Hands and Eyes, as in like manner, other Attributes of his by ſuch parts of humane bodies, which hold moſt correſpondence with them, and conſequently nothing of corporeity to be attributed to him becauſe of it; ſo God himſelf hath given us ſufficiently to underſtand that he would have thoſe deſcriptions interpreted rather as Emblems and Pictures, than as rigid definitions of his nature. For beſide the expreſs affirmation of his *being a ſpirit*, with which the affections of bodies are not conſiſtent, he frequently asks the makers of Images, *To whom they will liken God, or what likeneſs they will compare unto him*; and this too, as you may ſee, *Iſa.* 40. 17. upon the account of that vaſt diſtance, that is between him and all the Nations of the World. Which kind of queſtions being tantamount to a negation, it follows that however God be ſometime deſcribed as a humane body, yet he hath no affinity with them, nor with any other how glorious ſoever.

2. From the nature of God, paſs we to his Attributes, which for our more orderly proceeding, may be reduced to theſe two heads, to wit,

1. Either ſuch as are radicated in his nature, or
2. As reſult from his operations.

1. The former of theſe are again double, commonly called *Incommunicable or Communicable*, that is to ſay, ſuch of which there is no reſemblance in the creatures, or ſuch of which there is. Of the former of theſe ſorts are theſe four, his independency, his unchangeableneſs, his omnipreſence, and eternity, each of which hath the aſtipulation of the Scripture, and therefore to be conſidered by us. That God is independent of any other, either as to his being or ſubſiſtance, S. *Paul* evidently declares, *Act.* 17. 25. for inaſmuch *as he giveth to all life and breath and all things*, he himſelf cannot depend upon them for his own, and conſequently is independent of any other. There is the ſame evidence from Scripture concerning Gods unchangeableneſs, either in his nature, or reſolutions. *For they* (ſaith the Pſalmiſt) *ſhall periſh, but thou ſhalt endure, yea all of them ſhall wax old as doth a garment, but thou art the ſame and thy years ſhall have no end.* *Pſal.* 102. 26, 27. And again, *with him is no variableneſs, neither ſhadow of turning*, ſaith S. *James*, c. 1. 17. Laſtly, as God is independent and unchangeable, ſo is he omnipreſent and eternal; witneſs for the former that known place of the Pſalmiſt, *Pſal.* 139. 7. and ſo on; *Whither ſhall I go from thy ſpirit, or whither ſhall I flee from thy preſence? If I aſcend up into heaven, thou art there. If I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermoſt part of the ſea, Even there alſo ſhall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand ſhall hold me.* For the latter, the ſame Pſalmiſt, *Pſal.* 90. 2. *For from everlaſting to everlaſting thou art God.*

Next to his incommunicable Attributes, conſider we his Communicable ones, that is to ſay, ſuch of which there is ſome image in the creatures;

creatures; in each of which we shall find the same consent of Scripture, as we found before in his incommunicable ones. To begin with his Mercy and Goodness, because the Scripture it self tells us *that that is above all his works*; how did he himself triumph in it when he proclaimed his own Glory? For thus, *Exod.* 34. 6. when he passed before *Moses*, he proclaimed himself *to be the Lord, even the Lord merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth; Keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and sin.* Next to his mercy consider we his Justice, because proclaimed in the same breath, he himself there adding, that *he was one that would by no means clear the guilty, but visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the childrens children*, v. 7. of that chapter. As in like manner, though more fully elsewhere; *for all his ways are judgment, a God of truth, and without iniquity, just and right is he, Deut.* 32. 4. Where we have not only a declaration of his Justice in the largest acception of the word, but a declaration also of his Truth, another Attribute of his, and therefore to be considered by us. But because this as others of them are so frequently mentioned in Scripture, that no man can be supposed to be ignorant of it, I will add only for a confirmation of it, that he is so much a God of truth, that he is by S. *Paul* said to be, *The God that cannot lye, Tit.* 1. 2. Lastly (for these things are so notorious from the Scripture, that it will be but lost labour to go about to prove them) as he is a God of Mercy, and Justice, and Truth, so he is a God of Glory, and Power, and Wisdom. And more than this I shall not need to add concerning such Attributes, as are radicated in the Divine Nature, unless it be, that whereas in created beings they are finite and limited, in God they are infinite and unlimited. But so that they are, the Scripture gives us to understand, either in express terms, or such as do necessarily inferr it; that affirming in one place * that *his understanding is infinite*, as in another || that *all nations and their several excellencies are before him as nothing, yea less than nothing and vanity*, which is in effect to say, that God himself is infinite: They being not to be said to be *as nothing yea less than nothing* in comparison of him, who hold any proportion to him, as they must be said to do, if God himself were finite.

* *Psal.* 147. 5.
|| *Isai.* 40. 17.

2. One only Attribute remains, even that which we have said to flow from his operations, I mean his Sovereignty and Dominion. Concerning which, to omit others, that of S. *Paul* may suffice, *Act.* 17. 24. where we have not only *the world, and all things therein*, affirmed to be *made by him*, but he himself for that reason styled *the Lord of heaven and earth*, that is to say (for so both the term *of heaven and earth*, and the procedure of that argument shew) the Lord of all the world, and of all things therein contained.

PART

PART II.

That to have the One true God for our God is to owne him as ſuch both in Soul and Body, and in all the faculties and powers of each. An account of what acknowledgment is due to God from the Soul, and particularly from that great faculty thereof the Underſtanding: Which is ſhewn to conſiſt, firſt in a right apprehenſion of his Nature and Attributes, ſecondly in a ſerious and frequent reflection on them, and thirdly in a firm belief of what he affirmeth. An enquiry thereupon into the juſt object of Faith, the Congruity or rather eſſentiality thereof to the Oeconomy of the Goſpel, and how we owne God for our God by it.

HAving given you an account in the foregoing diſcourſe of the Nature and Attributes of God, together with the infiniteneſs thereof, as alſo ſhewn that to have him for our God is no other than to owne him as ſuch, it remains only that we enquire, how that is to be done, and what reſpect is due unto him as a God. For the reſolution whereof

1. The firſt thing I ſhall return is, that we are to owne him both in the inward and outward man. For beſide that Soul and Body are equally his, by right of creation, preſervation and redemption, and conſequently, an acknowledgement to be made by each, we are expreſly required by S. *Paul* to *glorifie God in our body, and in our ſpirit, which are his*, 1 *Cor.* 6. 20. But from hence it will follow,
2. That we are to owne him for our God in all the faculties and powers both of the one and the other. Which is farther confirmed, as to the Soul eſpecially, by Gods requiring us *to love him with all our heart, and ſoul and might*, *Deut.* 6. 5. Neither let any man ſay, that this concerns only the paſſion of love, and therefore not to be extended to other expreſſes of it. For as we are elſewhere required to fear and truſt in the ſame God, which ſhews that the other are not excluded; our Saviour aſſuring us (as he doth *) that *upon that great Commandment hangs all the Law and the Prophets* as to our duty to our Maker, it is evident it was intended to comprehend all other ways and means, whereby we are in a capacity to honour him. The only remaining difficulty is, what acknowledgment each faculty is to make, which accordingly I come now to conſider.

* *Mat.* 22. 27, &c.

1. To begin with *the Soul*, becauſe the chief ſeat of piety and all other vertues, and becauſe God profeſſeth eſpecially to require it. Where following the uſual diviſion of its faculties I will enquire,
   1. What is due to God *from our underſtanding*?
   2. What is due unto him *from our wills*, and
   3. And laſtly, what is due unto him *from our affections*.

1. Now to owne God in our *Underſtandings*, which is the firſt of

the faculties before remembred, implieth in it these three thing. 1. A right apprehension of his Nature and Attributes. 2. A serious and frequent reflection on them, and 3. And lastly a firm belief of what he affirms.

1. Of the first of these there cannot be the least doubt, that it is required of us towards the owning him for our God. For beside that that is one of the prime acts of our Understanding, and therefore to pay God its acknowledgment, the neglect thereof casts us unavoidably upon that errour, against which this first Commandment was principally intended; to fail in our apprehension of God being not to own the nature of God, but a fancy and imagination of our own. And accordingly, as S. *Paul* stuck not to tell the *Athenians*, that *they ought not to think the Godhead was like unto Gold, or Silver, or stone graven by art, and mans device*, *Act.* 17. 29. So he charges upon the heathen in general *the vanity of their imaginations* concerning him, and which is more, makes that the ground of Gods giving them over to those abominable crimes into which they fell, *Rom.* 1. 29. Taking it therefore for granted, as we very well may, that we ought to have a right apprehension of Gods nature and Attributes, nothing remains to be enquired into, but what that apprehension is, from what measures it is to be taken, and what is to be done by us toward the attaining and preserving of it. Of the two former of these I have discoursed already in the foregoing discourse, and must therefore remand you thither for your satisfaction; it shall content me, and may you, to insist upon the last, and shew what is to be done by us toward the attaining or preserving it. And here very opportunely comes in that which is generally recommended by the Pythagoreans toward the attaining of Philosophical knowledge, even the purifying our minds from all those earthly and sensual affections, to which we are so fatally inclined. For our understandings being apt to judge of things, not according as they are in themselves, but as they best suit with our corrupt affections, till the mind be well purged from these, it is impossible we should entertain any apprehensions of God, which are not some way or other vitiated by them. And accordingly as some of the Heathen (because led thereto by their own necessities and appetites) have been so stupid as to think the immortal Gods did eat and drink like us, so others so depraved in their conceptions, as to believe them tainted with the lusts of humane nature, to have the same sinful passions and affections with themselves. Witness their reporting them to descend from heaven to enjoy female beauties, to maintain animosities among themselves, and espouse those of men, their making some of them the Patrons of fraud and cousenage, and others again of intemperance and debauchery, their appointing a third sort to preside over the Amours of men, and both to kindle and maintain their loose and sometimes unnatural flames. Of all which misapprehensions the great, if not only cause was, the passion they themselves had for them, and that esteem and value they were wont to set upon them; the Heathen no less fondly, than impiously, conceiting, because these things gratifyed their own corrupt inclinations, that they afforded the same gusto to the powers above, and were the object of their affections and desires. Forasmuch therefore as the minds of men are so apt to be debauched by their corrupt affections, it is but necessary towards

wards a right apprehenſion of God that our hearts ſhould be firſt purged from them, and we become if not wholly ſpiritual, yet leſs ſenſual in our deſires. Now though that may ſeem a hard task to effect (as I doubt not it may prove ſo at the firſt, to thoſe who have been accuſtomed to indulge them) yet the difficulty will be much diminiſhed, and in fine wholly removed, by conſidering both how unworthy they are of rational creatures, and with what evil conſequences they are uſually attended. For as the pleaſures before ſpoken of are more the pleaſures of beaſts than men, and by them more fully and exquiſitely enjoyed; ſo the effect of them is no other than to produce in us low and abject minds, crazy, diſeaſed, and at length putrid bodies. The heart being thus purged from all earthly and ſenſual affections, towards which I have over and above repreſented the moſt effectual expedients, we are in the next place, to lift up our minds or thoughts from the contemplation of corporeal beings to the conſideration of ſpiritual ones. For as it is not to be expected, that they who accuſtom themſelves to look no farther than their ſenſes, ſhould ever conceive rightly of a ſpiritual object; it being impoſſible for mens apprehenſions to riſe higher than the fountain from which they proceed: ſo that depraved cuſtom was no doubt the firſt original of the Heathens believing God to have a body like themſelves, with the infirmities and accidents thereof. They inured themſelves to conſider of nothing, but what they ſaw and felt, they chained their thoughts to the things and occurrences of the world, and, having no knowledge of God, but from the Traditions of their fathers, they were thereby tempted to conceive of him as corporeal alſo, and that he was only a more glorious one. After the ſame manner, as one hath happily compared it, that people always bred in Country Towns and Villages, judge of thoſe Cities they never ſaw, by proportion to the Market-Town to which they reſort, or of the Palaces of Princes by the houſes of their Landlords. Now as to undeceive ſuch people, the only way would be to lead them from their own homes, and ſhew them ſome more glorious Town or Houſe, than any they had formerly been acquainted with; ſo I know not a more proper expedient to regulate mens apprehenſions concerning God, than by inuring them to the conſideration of ſpiritual things: ſuch as are for example, the nature of our own Underſtanding and Will, the Sciences which perfect the one, and the Moral excellencies of the other. For as theſe are the things by which we moſt reſemble him whom we are commanded to own for our God, ſo by the ſerious conſideration thereof we ſhould at length diſentangle our ſelves from the things of ſenſe, by which we are faſtned to the earth, and make both a more free and proſperous flight to Heaven. Laſtly, as it is neceſſary to have our thoughts lifted up from the contemplation of corporeal beings to the conſideration of more refined ones; ſo alſo, if we would attain a right apprehenſion of God, to apply our ſelves to a ſerious and deliberate conſideration of his immenſe nature and perfections. For as few things are rightly apprehended, when either ſuperficially conſidered, or looked upon with a tranſient eye; ſo much leſs may we think the nature of God will, which cannot be comprehended by us, though we ſhould employ our whole life in the conſideration of it.

2. Having thus diſpatched what we have ſaid to be firſt im-

plied in the owning of God in our *Understandings*, even a right apprehension of his nature and perfections, I proceed unto a second, which is the recalling of those perfections to our mind, and both seriously and frequently contemplating them. Which duty I do the rather inculcate, as because it is a tribute which God has expressly exacted, * and concerning which therefore there cannot be the least doubt but that we are thus to own him in our *Understandings*; so because the neglect of it seems to me to be the great cause of that irreligion, which is in the Christian world. For as what through the translation of the Scripture into our own tongue, and the constant explication of it, it is hardly possible for us to avoid a competent knowledge of our duty; so we cannot but in our own thoughts assent to the practice of it, and adjudge it both reasonable and profitable to be performed. But to what then can we attribute our neglect of what we are so perswaded of, but to our own want of consideration? For the will naturally and almost necessarily following the dictates of our understanding, what should hinder men from doing that which they know to be both reasonable and useful, if they kept their eye upon it, and contemplated what they could not choose but know? And accordingly S. *Peter* in the first Chapter of his second Epistle doth not only affirm, that *he would not be negligent to put those he wrote to in remembrance of some things though they knew them, and were established in the present truth*, *v.* 12. of that chapter, but in the 13. verse again, that *he thought it meet as long as he was in this tabernacle to stir them up by putting them in remembrance*, and yet a third time v. 15. *that he would endeavour that they might be able after his decease to have the same things always in remembrance*; plainly implying by his so frequent inculcating of the duty of remembrance, that it was through the want of that, that men apostatized from their duty, and neglected those things they were not only perswaded to be just, but necessary to their own eternal welfare. And indeed, as men may learn many things from their own practise, no less than from the proper rule of truth, the Scriptures, wherefore do the profane ones of the world so carefully avoid the conversing with their own thoughts, or listning to the advices of religious persons, but that they find the revolving them in their minds would even constrain them to their duty, and make them abandon those lusts that are inconsistent with it? Thus whether we do reflect upon our own practice, or Scripture, or reason, we shall find the great cause of mens irreligion to be the want of such a consideration, and consequently that it is no more than necessary to call the things of Religion to our mind, and particularly him who is both the object and the Author of it. These two things only seem necessary to be added, for our more advantageous performing of it. 1. That though all the Attributes of God call for our remembrance, and accordingly are to have it in their turn, yet we are especially to call those to our mind by which our affections are most likely to be influenced, and our hearts incited to embrace him. For though God do also require to be owned by us in our *Understandings*, yet more especially in our hearts, and consequently those Attributes to have the greatest share in our thoughts, by which our hearts and affections are most apt to be inflamed. 2. Again, though all the Attributes of God are to have a share in our remembrance, and particularly those which are most operative upon our

* Eccl. 12. 1. *Remember now thy Creatour*, &c.

our affections, ſo ſuch of them eſpecially, as are moſt ſutable to our preſent neceſſities and temper, becauſe thoſe are the moſt likely to advantage us. Thus though the honeſt but deſponding perſon ſuffer his thoughts to be taken up eſpecially with the conſideration of Gods infinite Love and Mercy to ſinful man, yet it will be more proper for the preſumptuous and diſobedient to reflect upon the Majeſty and Juſtice of the Almighty, as by which he may be moſt effectually drawn to the owning him for his God.

3. The third act of the *Underſtanding* follows, even the believing what God affirms, concerning which I will ſhew theſe three things.

1. Firſt of all, its juſt extent and latitude.
2. The congruity of this vertue of Faith to our preſent ſtate, and,
3. And laſtly how we own God for our God by it.

1. To begin with the firſt of theſe, even the extent of Faith, concerning which I ſhall firſt of all obſerve, that it is to reach to every thing which ſhall be found to be affirmed by the Almighty: Whether it be delivered by way of narration, or prediction, as a thing that either is or was, or ſhall hereafter come to paſs. Thus for example, if God declare to me that he is merciful and juſt, and that it is his pleaſure we ſhould be ſo alſo, that he hath in ancient times given inſtances of both thoſe Attributes in the redemption of mankind and the rejection of the Angels, and that he will give more ſignal ones hereafter at the great judgment day; I am equally to receive each of theſe into my aſſent, and believe that they are, and have, and ſhall be, according as he himſelf hath declared. For being alike the ſubject of Gods affirmation, I am in reaſon to give up my aſſent to each of them in what manner ſoever they be delivered. Which obſervation I do the rather ſet before you, becauſe, how trivial ſoever it may ſeem to be in its ſelf, yet the weakneſs ſhall I ſay, or rather impiety of the preſent age hath made it neceſſary to be repreſented; men commonly conceiving of faith, as an aſſent only to thoſe gracious promiſes, which it hath pleaſed God to make to ſinful man. By which means as they have been induced to have little regard to the other Articles of our belief, ſo much leſs to the Commandments of the Almighty, which yet, as they are equally the object of our faith, ſo the practice thereof is the means whereby thoſe promiſes are to be attained, upon which that Faith of theirs is founded. I obſerve ſecondly, that our Faith is not only to extend it ſelf to all Gods affirmations, in what manner ſoever delivered, but alſo to all of them, whatſoever the ſubject matter thereof be, and how contrary ſoever in appearance to the dictates of our own reaſon. For if Gods affirmation be the ground of our belief, whereſoever that ground is, it is equally to be afforded, whatſoever be the ſubject matter of it. Thus for example, if the doctrine of the Trinity how unintelligible ſoever to us, do appear to be a revelation of God's, it may and ought to challenge our aſſent no leſs than his affirmation of thoſe things, which we have not only no prejudice againſt, but the dictates of our own reaſon to confirm us in. Laſtly (for this is no leſs neceſſary to be obſerved than the former, becauſe we have now no immediate revelations from God) we are to yield up our aſſent, not only to what God affirms to us with his own mouth, but alſo to what he declares

clares by men inſpired by him, and witneſſed to by miracles from himſelf; that is to ſay, by his ſervants the Prophets and Apoſtles, and particularly that great Prophet and Apoſtle the ever Bleſſed Jeſus: What any one affirmeth by another, being equally his affirmation, with that which he affirms by himſelf. But from hence it will follow, that we are to give up our belief to the Scriptures of the Old and New Teſtament, and to all things therein contained. For theſe having been * elſewhere ſhewn to have been written by men divinely inſpired, and witneſſed to by God himſelf, they are equally the word of God with that which he himſelf delivers, and conſequently claim an equal ſhare in our belief.

* Explication of the Apoſtles Creed.

2. Of the extent of our belief I have ſpoken hitherto, and ſhewn what is the juſt object of it; proceed we therefore in the ſecond place to evince its congruity, or eſſentiality rather to the œconomy of the Goſpel, and our preſent ſtate under it. For the evidencing whereof not to tell you, which yet I very well might, that the doctrine of the Goſpel is every where ſtiled the *Faith of Chriſt*, nor yet that the Heathens * objected nothing more againſt Chriſtianity, than its calling upon men *ſimply to believe it*, I will remit you to that moſt full and pertinent ſaying of S. *Paul*, 1 *Cor.* 1. 21. Where he tells us, that after that in the wiſdom of God the world by wiſdom knew not God, it pleaſed God by the fooliſhneſs of preaching to ſave them that believe; plainly intimating, that whereas before God led men to Salvation by wiſdom and knowledge, now his intention was they ſhould go to it by Faith, that is to ſay, by believing what was preached to them, by thoſe whom he commiſſionated, and witneſſed to by miracles. But from hence it will follow, 1. That they do in effect renounce Chriſtianity, who receive not the doctrines of it upon the Authority of him that revealed them, as well as upon the grounds of reaſon. For that is in truth to diſown that Faith we are to walk by, and to yield up our aſſent, not to Chriſt whoſe the doctrines are, but to our own only reaſon and judgment: Which though it do in fine terminate in God, whoſe candle that reaſon of ours is, and conſequently doth ſo far glorifie him, yet hath not the leaſt aſpect upon the veracity of God in Chriſt, upon which they are propoſed to the world. The ſame is much more to be ſaid 2. Of thoſe who will walk no farther with their Faith, than the light of their own reaſon will accompany them. For this is manifeſtly to ſubject the Faith to it, and to walk rather *by ſight* than *by faith*. And hence, when any thing is propoſed to them which carries any ſeeming oppoſition to it, we find it preſently diſcarded, as is notorious in the inſtances of the Trinity and of the Incarnation of the ſecond Perſon in it, doctrines which yet have as clear a foundation in the Scripture, as any other doctrines of it. Hence alſo (which yet, if duly conſidered, is not ſo diſſonant to our apprehenſions) the reſurrection of the dead hath lately run the ſame fate; men having been taught to believe, that to ſalve that it is reaſon enough that ſome body or other ſhall be united to the Soul, which how it agrees with the nature of a reſurrection and the doctrine of the Goſpel concerning it, I ſhall leave all ſober men to judge. But who ſees not, that by this means the faith of Chriſt is manifeſtly diſcarded, and they deny that in their opinions and aſſertions, which in words they profeſs to believe? For if my faith ſhall not carry me any farther than my own judgment doth,

* *Vid. Orig. contra Celſum lib. 6. pag.* 282.

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it is a ſign that is the thing that moveth me, and that I walk rather *by ſight*, or, to ſpeak more properly, *by an over-weening conceit*, than by the conduct of a ſolid faith. Either therefore let men bid defiance to Chriſtianity, as that honeſt Heathen did, becauſe they would believe nothing but what they could underſtand, or let them give up their belief to the doctrines of it, I do not ſay irrationally, but without any immediate aſſent of their reaſon to the doctrines themſelves. For though the forementioned doctrines have not ſufficient evidence to make them known, yet they have reaſon enough to make them be believed, it being the higheſt reaſon in the world to believe God, eſpecially concerning his own nature, as who neither can deceive nor be deceived.

3. Having thus given you an account of the extent of faith in God, and moreover ſhewn how congruous or rather how eſſential it is to the oeconomy of the Goſpel, it remains only that I explain how we own God for ours by it. For the evidencing whereof the firſt thing I ſhall alledge, is our owning the truth of God by it. For inaſmuch as we neither do nor can give up our belief, but where we are in ſome meaſure aſſured of the veracity of him whom we believe, by believing whatſoever God affirms, we apparently acknowledge him to be true, and as it were *ſet our ſeal* to it. But this is eſpecially viſible, when we give up our aſſent to things unlikely, and ſuch which it may be have a greater appearance of falſhood than truth, becauſe then there is nothing in the thing it ſelf to engage our aſſent, but on the contrary very much to ſtagger or ſupplant it. Which notwithſtanding therefore, if our belief be firm and unſhaken, it is a ſign that it hath a juſt apprehenſion of the veracity of the Almighty, and receives it with an aſſent commenſurate to its greatneſs, ſo far as humane nature is able to proportion it. Now though this be the only direct acknowledgment of the divine Majeſty, which the believing what he affirms preſents him withall, yet becauſe what he affirms doth ſometime require other Attributes to eſtabliſh it, hence it comes to paſs that indirectly and by conſequence we acknowledge thoſe Attributes alſo. For thus we acknowledge Gods power, when like *Abraham* and the Virgin *Mary*, we believe God in ſuch things as are above the power of nature to produce; ſuch as are the making a barren woman to conceive by one who was equally unapt, or a Virgin to conceive and bring forth a Son. In like manner, when we believe God aſſuring us, that, notwithſtanding our many errours, he will for the ſake of his Son both pardon and accept us, becauſe that cannot have place without an exceſs of mercy in him that promiſeth it, we do by our belief give a teſtimony to that mercy of his, upon which our pardon and acceptance doth depend. Such are the wayes whereby our *Underſtanding* gives proof of our owning the Lord for our God, and therefore if we would have ours thought to do ſo, we our ſelves muſt take the ſame courſe, and not only endeavour *to have a right apprehenſion of God*, but *have him often in our thoughts*, and *ſtedfaſtly believe whatſoever he affirms.*

PART

PART III.

What it is to owne God in our Wills, and in the proper or Elicite acts thereof. This performed either by making Gods Glory the ultimate end of all our actions, and acquiescing in it when obtained; or making his will ours both in our Actions and Sufferings: The former whereof imports our chusing to act agreeably to his will, our making that will of his the ground of our choice, and our delighting in it; The latter, our submitting to, and embracing whatsoever he is pleased to lay upon us. All the other powers of Soul and Body in some measure under the Empire of the Will, for which cause it cannot be thought to discharge its own duty, unless it incline them to own God for their God. A discourse in the close concerning Trust in God, wherein is shewn, in what faculties it is seated, what the nature thereof is, and how we owne God for our God by it.

BY what ways, and after what manner we are to owne God in our *Understandings*, you have seen already, let us in the next place enquire,

2. What is due unto him from our *Wills*, and how they ought to be constituted to owne him as our God. For the resolution whereof we are to consider of the diverse acts of the Will, which are either,

1. Elicite, or,
2. Imperate, that is to say, such as proceed immediately from the Will, or such as proceed immediately from some other power, but are excited by the command of it.

The Elicite acts of the *Will* are again double, according to the different objects, about which they are employed. For, 1. Either they respect the end and are called volition or fruition, or, 2. The means, as election and consent. Now concerning each of these I shall enquire, how they ought to be constituted, so as that we may thereby owne the Lord for our God. This only would be premised in the general, that to owne God in our Wills, is to conform them unto his, that is to say, to that which he Wills in himself, or is the result of his Will concerning us. For as the greatest testimony we can give of our subjection to another, is the conforming our Wills to his, the Will being of all the faculties the most free from the command of others, and the most difficult to be brought to a compliance with them; so nothing less than the greatest testimony of our subjection can be supposed to be due to God, to whom we have so many reasons to submit our selves, and particularly, because our Wills are no less his than any other faculty. All therefore that will be requisite for us to do, will be to resume each of the acts before remembred, and to shew both what Gods own volitions are, and what he wills concerning us.

1. I begin with the first of these, even that of Volition, whereby we will that which is the end, which in the present case can be no other than the Glory of God, and accordingly is the first thing we are taught to ask of God in the prayer of our Saviour. For as God who is the supremest good, cannot be thought to have any higher end than

than that of ſhewing forth his own glory, whence it is that the Wiſe man affirms *he hath made all things for himſelf, Pro.* 16. 4. So being (as was before obſerved) to conform our Wills to that of God, we are accordingly to make that glory of his the ultimate end of all our actions, and be carried towards it with the utmoſt of our deſires. But ſo that it was Gods Will alſo concerning us, the Apoſtle doth more than intimate, *Rom.* 11. 36. For not contented to ſay that as *of him*, ſo *to him are all things*, he ſubjoyns in the cloſe of it, *to him be glory for ever and ever, Amen.* The ſame is to be ſaid of that other act of the Will, fruition, or a complacency in the end when it is obtained. For the glory of God being, by the former argumentation, to be the ultimate object of our deſires, it is in reaſon, when obtained, to become the great object of our delight, and we not only to acquieſce, but to pleaſe our ſelves chiefly in it. But ſo we find the will of the Pſalmiſt to have been diſpoſed, *Pſal.* 73. 25. Witneſs that moſt paſſionate expoſtulation of his, *Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that I deſire beſides, or in compariſon of thee.* The only thing remaining to be enquired into on this head is what the conſequences of, ſuch a deſire, and delight are, which are in ſhort theſe two, 1. To preferr the glory of God before all deſirable objects, when they come in competition with it; and, 2. and chiefly, to ſubordinate all other our deſires and delights to thoſe of the Glory of God. Thus for example, though it be lawful for us to deſire health and ſtrength, with other the conveniences of life, and the means of obtaining them; yet the laſt and chief reaſon of our deſiring them ought to be, not that we our ſelves may be thereby made happy, but that we may thereby be enabled to glorifie our maker, which is the Supreme end of our creation. Otherwiſe we make not God, but our own intereſts, and luſts, the ultimate object of our deſires, and conſequently make them our God, and not him whom we profeſs to own.

From the willing of the end, paſs we to the willing of the means the ſecond thing required of us towards the owning the Lord for our God; which as I have already told you, we ſhall then effectually do, when we make his will ours; ſo I intend now to ſhew, what it is to make his will ours, and that both in our Actions and Sufferings.

1. To begin with our Actions, as which are moſt apparently conducing to the great end of our creation, the Glory of God, concerning which I ſhall firſt of all obſerve, that we are to chuſe to regulate them, agreeably to the preſcript of Gods will. For otherwiſe we make not his will ours at all, but follow wholly the inclinations of our own. But beſide that we are to chuſe to order our actions agreeably to the preſcript of Gods *will*, we are alſo, if we will make Gods will ours, to chuſe ſo to order them, becauſe it is his will to have it ſo. The reaſonableneſs of which obſervation will appear if we look into the world, and conſider by what motives men are often guided in their ſeveral choices. There is a ſort of men who weighing the reaſonableneſs of vertue, and the neceſſity there is of it toward the procuring their both private and publick welfare, do upon that ſcore alone apply themſelves to it, and give many notable proofs of their proficiency in it. Now though this be by all means to be cheriſhed and encouraged, as being a good ſtep to that perfection which Religion requires, yet if it riſe no higher, it is in truth but *a more ſplendid ſin*, or as a learned

* *Hieroc. in Χρυσ. ἐπ. v. 49. p. 234.*

* Heathen ſpake in another caſe, *an Atheiſtical vertue.* For ſo long as the things that are done, how agreeable ſoever to Gods *will*, yet are not performed in obedience thereto, but out of the ſenſe we have of the comelineſs thereof, or its neceſſity to humane life, ſo long we cannot be ſaid to regulate our own Wills by Gods; but by our own conveniencies, as by which alone we are induced to practiſe them. Thus for example, if, as it often happens, men ſhould chuſe to abſtain from intemperance, not ſo much out of compliance with the divine will, as becauſe of its prejudicialneſs to their health, or other ſuch collateral conſiderations; in this caſe I ſay, they ſhould not only not ſerve the *will of God*, to which they are required to conform, but ſubſtitute *themſelves* in the place of God, which is the thing here expreſly forbidden; becauſe regulating their *wills* by their own conveniencies, and ſacrificing not to God, but to their own appetites and deſires. Whence it was that *Socrates* ſpeaking of ſuch kind of temperances, calls it the being temperate with a kind of intemperance, becauſe abſtaining from ſome pleaſures out of a deſire of enjoying others, by which they were no leſs maſtered than intemperate men by theirs. [*Vid. Plat. Phæd. Sect.* 12. *edit. Cantab.*] Laſtly, as if we would make Gods will ours, we muſt not only chuſe to act according to it, but make that the chief motive of our choice; ſo we are (as the Apoſtle ſpeaks) *to delight in it after the inward man*, and not only to chuſe it but do it with complacency. Which caution I the rather add, becauſe there is oftentimes a failure there; it not ſeldom hapning that men content themſelves with a bare ſubmiſſion of their *wills* to God, and rather bear than imbrace their yoke, as thoſe perſons do who chuſe the leſſer of two evils propoſed, and preferr the throwing their goods over-board before the hazarding of their lives. The which as it is an imperfect choice, and by the Philoſopher therefore reckoned among ſuch actions, as are mixed of *voluntary* and *involuntary*, ſo can much leſs be ſuppoſed to diſcharge that debt, which is owing from our Wills to that of God; that man making Gods will but imperfectly his, who conſents to it with ſome kind of reluctancy, or at leaſt doth not afford it the utmoſt of his delight. And accordingly, as the man after Gods own heart profeſſeth to have a more than ordinary deſire for God, yea *to pant after him, as the hart doth after the water-brooks*, *Pſal.* 42. 1. So elſewhere, to have the ſame paſſion for his Will, and not only to ſubmit to it but embrace it: Witneſs his affirming the ſtatutes of the Lord to be his *delight*, *Pſal.* 119. 24. that *his ſoul even broke for the longing it had unto them*, *v.* 21. of the ſame, that they were *better unto him than thouſands of gold and ſilver, and ſweeter than the hony to his mouth*, verſes 72, and 103. All which expreſſions make it manifeſt, what ought to be the temper of our *Wills* in relation to that of God, and that we are not only to conſent to it, but with the utmoſt delight and ſatisfaction.

2. From the actions of men paſs we to their ſufferings, which is another means, eſpecially under Chriſtianity, of Glorifying our Maker. Concerning which I ſhall obſerve, firſt, that we are to ſubmit our Wills to them, and receive them without any regret or diſcontent. For as otherwiſe there can be nothing at all of vertue in them, as being bound upon us by an inevitable neceſſity; ſo being the *will of God*, no leſs than his precepts, they are at leaſt to have the ſufferance of ours, and be conſented

conſented to as well as undergone. But ſo we find that old *Eli*, how blameworthy ſoever as to the doing of Gods will, yet thought himſelf obliged to ſubmit to the ſufferance of it, 1 *Sam.* 3. 18. For though the meſſage that was brought him was no other than the utter extirpation of his houſe, and, which is more, delivered in the moſt heart-breaking terms, yet he made no other reply, than *It is the Lord, let him do what ſeemeth him good.* Now though this, to ſome perſons at leaſt, may ſeem a harder task, than fleſh and bloud can readily undergo, yet it is not all which the making Gods *Will* ours importeth, and conſequently neither all that is required of us towards the owning of God in them. For (as *Seneca* words it) if we will do that, we muſt *non tantum deo parere, ſed & aſſentiri*; embracing, as well as ſubmitting to, whatſoever it layes upon us, and receiving it, how ſad ſoever, with alacrity and cheerfulneſs. For otherwiſe (as was before obſerved) we give God but a part of our *Wills*, and chooſe it, not becauſe we *will* it, but becauſe we cannot avoid it. Neither let any man ſay, that this is above the proportion of humane ſtrength, and therefore not to be thought to be any part of our duty to the Almighty. For as I readily grant it to be above the proportion of humane ſtrength, when conſidered without the aſſiſtance of the Divine Grace, ſo that it is not ſo, when accompanied with it, is manifeſt enough from the practice of *Job*, *c.* 1. 21. That holy man, notwithſtanding all the ſad tidings that were brought him, bleſſing God for the loſs of his Cattel, Servants, and Children, as well as for his former beſtowing of them. In the mean time, as it is not to be denied to be a very hard task, and ſuch to which we had need have ſome other incentive beſide that of our own duty, ſo I ſhall not be unmindful of ſupplying you when I come to entreat of that petition of the Lords prayer, *Thy will be done in earth, as it is in heaven.*

2. Having thus entreated of *the elicite acts of the Will*, that is to ſay, of ſuch as proceed immediately from it, and withal ſhewn what tribute is due from each of them to him, whom we are commanded to owne for our God, it remains we deſcend to thoſe which are called *imperate* ones, or rather to the Empire of the Will over them. For though the acts before remembred are the only immediate acts of the Will, yet all the acts of the body and mind are under its controul, and move by the guidance of it. Thus for inſtance, it is from our Wills that our underſtandings apply themſelves to the conſideration of Heaven, and Heavenly things, from the ſame Wills that our affections are ſtirred up to tend to their proper objects. Laſtly, from the ſame Wills it is that we perform all outward actions, whether of Religion or Civility. In conſideration whereof, as it is but neceſſary they themſelves ſhould be rightly diſpoſed, and pay the Almighty that tribute which is due from each act of them; ſo to the compleatly owning of God for their God, that they make uſe of that Empire of theirs, to bring our other faculties to pay God that Homage and Obedience which he requires. For the Will being, as it were, the Vicegerent of God over this little world of man, how can it diſcharge that truſt which is repoſed in it, if it do not lay its commands upon thoſe ſubjects of its own, and Gods to give him that Honour and Obedience that he requires? But from hence it will follow, that the Will is to incite the underſtanding to meditate upon God, and the affections to

embrace and revere him, that it is to lay its commands upon the tongue to chaunt forth his praiſes, and upon the knee to bow down to him and adore him. In fine (as its Empire extends to the whole man) to ſee that each of them perform their ſeveral duties, and particularly thoſe of Piety and Devotion. In the mean time you may ſee, how much they are deceived, who, upon a ſurmiſe of their hearts being right with God, take occaſion either wholly to neglect, or but perfunctorily perform the outward actions of Religion. For if the Heart or Will be Gods Vicegerent over all our other faculties and powers, it cannot be right with him, if it do not ſtir them up, to pay God that ſervice which he requires of each of them. I have but one thing more to add concerning this Empire of the Will, but it is ſuch, as (if attended to) may be of excellent uſe in the conduct of our lives; and that is, that as this Empire of the Will is very great, ſo it will prove very effectual, if it be reſolute in what it doth propoſe: Nothing almoſt being too hard for a mind ſo reſolved, eſpecially when accompanied with the divine aſſiſtance. By vertue of this reſolution it is that men overcome many and great difficulties, by the ſame that they put themſelves upon matters of the greateſt hazard; by this that they encounter with enemies that are ſuperiour to them, both in number and ſtrength, by the ſame that they oftentimes get the victory of them; that reſolution of theirs not only making them to exert their own ſtrength to the uttermoſt, but damping the courage of their opponents. But ſo that it fareth with our Spiritual enemies, the Scripture hath given us plainly enough to underſtand, becauſe aſſuring us that, however the Devil may preſs upon the weak and irreſolute, yet he will flie from us, if we have the courage to reſiſt him.

Being now to paſs from the *Underſtanding* and *Will* to the *Affections*, and to ſhew what tribute each of them is to pay to the Almighty, I have been ſomewhat retarded by the conſideration of a duty, which the Scriptures often call for, I mean, *Truſt in God.* For beſide that it is generally expreſſed in Metaphorical terms (ſuch as *depending*, *reſting*, or *ſtaying* our ſelves upon God) which though they may ſometime illuſtrate that, to which they are applied, yet do no leſs often ſerve to obſcure it, it may ſeem ſomewhat difficult, to thoſe who do more intimately conſider it, to what power of the Soul to referr it, or rather, whether it do not ſome way appertain to each of them. And indeed, upon a ſerious conſideration of the whole matter, I am apt to believe it doth, which is the reaſon I have choſen this place for it. That the *Underſtanding* hath a ſhare in it, is evident to me from that belief which it manifeſtly implies, and by which it is oftentimes expreſſed; he that *truſts* to, or upon any perſon, doing it upon the account of that credit, which he gives to the affirmation of him upon whom he doth ſo rely. But neither can the *Will* be debarred its ſhare in it, if yet it have not the principal one. For what elſe mean thoſe expreſſions of *ſtaying*, *leaning*, or *reſting* upon God, but that the heart or Will, though it do not preſently attain what it truſts upon God for, yet, having Gods promiſe for its warrant, acquieſceth in it, and hath thereby a kind of antepaſt of it. Laſtly, foraſmuch as this truſt of ours doth imply a deſire of that which we truſt upon another for, hence it comes to paſs, that it may not unfitly be referred to the affections, and particularly to that of hope, which is commonly and truly enough defined

defined to be a paſſion of the Soul, by which it is diſpoſed to believe that ſhall happen to it which it deſires. From all which put together we may give this account of it, that it is an acquieſcence of the Soul upon the promiſe of God for the obtaining of what it doth deſire. If there be any thing wanting toward the explication of it, it will be what the nature of thoſe promiſes are, upon which that truſt of ours is built. Foraſmuch as the foundation of our truſt is no other than the promiſe of the Almighty, that truſt, or acquieſcence, is in reaſon to bear a proportion to that promiſe upon which it is built. Laying aſide therefore all other conſiderations, I will make it my buſineſs to ſhew what the nature of Gods promiſes are, I mean as to the generality of mankind, which I ſhall not doubt to affirm to be upon condition of their cooperating with God toward the attaining of them.

For the evidencing whereof, I ſhall firſt conſider the promiſes of God that relate to the Soul, and then thoſe which relate to the outward man or body. I begin with thoſe which relate to the Soul, which are of two ſorts, to wit, ſuch as tend to ſecure it from ſin, or ſuch as propoſe to it an eternal happineſs in the other world. Of the former ſort we have an illuſtrious one, 1 *Cor.* 10. 13. where the Apoſtle tells us that God will not *ſuffer us to be tempted above what we are able, but will with the temptation alſo make a way to eſcape, that we may be able to bear it.* Now though it be true that this promiſe of the Almighty have no clear and explicite condition annexed to it, yet it manifeſtly enough implies ſomewhat on our part toward the obtaining the effect of it. For affirming, as the Apoſtle doth, not that God will not ſuffer us *to be tempted at all*, nor yet, when he doth, *that he will take the whole work upon himſelf*; but *that he will not ſuffer us to be tempted above what we are able, and that he will with the temptation make a way to eſcape that we may be able to bear it*, he plainly implies, that, in order to our deliverance from the taint of them, we are to exert the uttermoſt of our ability, and take that way which God ſhall lay open for our eſcape. And indeed, wherefore elſe ſhould God furniſh us with natural and ſpiritual ſtrength, wherefore ſhould he ſupply us with the whole armature of his graces, and call upon us ſo earneſtly to put it on? For if the whole of our deliverance were to be accompliſhed by God, all thoſe would be uſeleſs, and we might as well be without them as put them on. The ſame is to be ſaid of thoſe promiſes of God, which enſtate both Soul and Body in eternal happineſs. For as the buſineſs of our Salvation is generally propoſed upon the condition of *faith*, and *repentance*, and *turning unto God*, ſo the Authour to the *Hebrews* * hath removed all ſuſpicion of the contrary, by affirming in expreſs terms that *without holineſs no man ſhall ſee the Lord.* From thoſe promiſes which relate to the Soul, or rather to the eternal welfare both of Soul and Body, paſs we to ſuch as concern its temporal one, concerning which if we conſult the Pſalmiſt, we ſhall find they all pertain to thoſe that fear and adore the Lord. For as *Pſal.* 34. 7. he reſtraineth the watchfulneſs of the Angels to them that *fear him*, and thereupon calleth upon *Gods Saints* to do ſo, adding, that *there is no want to them that fear him*, *v.* 9. of that *Pſalm*; as in like manner, v. 15. *that the eyes of the Lord are upon the righteous*, and v. 17. 19. that they are the perſons whom he *delivereth out of all their troubles* and afflictions: So he tells us, *v.* 21. that *evil ſhall ſlay the wicked, and*

* c. 12. 14.

and that they that hate the righteous ſhall be deſolate. Which ſhews, that even temporal promiſes are upon condition of our fearing God, and yielding him that obedience which he requireth. Now foraſmuch as the promiſes of God are not abſolute but conditional, that is to ſay, upon the condition of our Repentance and Piety, our *Truſt* in him doth conſequently imply not only the embracing of the bleſſing promiſed, but alſo of the conditions upon which it is. Which ſaid, I will now proceed to ſhew, how we owne the Lord for our God by it, accordingly as this Commandment doth require.

Now this we do, firſt, by bearing witneſs to his truth, as was obſerved in the matter of our belief. For the promiſes of God being the ground of our *Truſt*, and his truth the ſtrength of his promiſes, by *truſting* in him we muſt conſequently bear witneſs to his truth, and ſo far therefore owne him for our God. But it is not Gods truth alone which we thus acknowledge, by placing our *Truſt* and confidence in him. For though that be the immediate ground of our *Truſt*, yet it preſuppoſeth ſufficient wiſdom in him to project for our welfare, and power enough to put thoſe promiſes in execution. Laſtly, it preſuppoſeth goodneſs enough in him to apply himſelf to the doing of it, and perform thoſe gracious promiſes he hath made. If therefore we *Truſt* in God, theſe Attributes alſo will have their due acknowledgment, and in ſo much the greater meaſure, by how much the more improbable, or difficult, it may ſeem to bring about our deliverance, or we our ſelves unworthy to obtain it. And though I make no queſtion, men will be very unwilling to acknowledge their ſuſpicion of the want of any of theſe Attributes in God, which are the proper grounds of our belief, yet, if they examine their own hearts more narrowly they will find it no difficult matter to diſcern a ſuſpicion concerning ſome one or other of them. For wherefore ſhould any man in a ſtrait ſeek to deliver himſelf by a ſin, but that he thinketh God hath not kindneſs enough to deliver him without? Or ſuffer his doubts, in any great exigency, to riſe up to a deſpair, but that the caſe ſeemeth to be ſuch, as that God cannot deliver him out of it? It is true indeed, this is not often ſpoken out, yea it may perhaps be ſo ſoftly whiſpered, as not to be underſtood by that heart that formeth it. But as we do rightly collect that to be the cauſe of a thing, from other than which it may be evidenced not to proceed, ſo there are ſome kind of *diſtruſts*, which cannot be thought to proceed from any thing elſe, than a ſuſpicion of ſome defect in the Almighty. But ſuch in particular are thoſe fears of ours which put us upon the commiſſion of a ſin to free us from them. For if we ſuppoſed God to be infinite in power, why ſhould we not be as much afraid of the ſad effects of it that are denounced againſt evil men, as we are of that danger which hangeth over our heads. This however is evident, that he, who *truſts* not in the Almighty, pays not thoſe acknowledgments which are due to the former Attributes, and conſequently, offends againſt this Firſt Commandment, which requireth the owning of God in them all. Laſtly, foraſmuch as our *Truſt* in God implies the embracing of thoſe conditions which are required on our part towards the obtaining of the promiſes, by *truſting* in him we declare our acknowledgment of the Juſtice of them, and our readineſs to put them in execution.

PART

PART IV.

Concerning the owning of God in our Affections, and how that is to be done: Which is either by conforming them to those of God, or suiting them to those Divine perfections which are the proper objects of them. This last exemplified in the Passions of Fear and Love. Touching the former whereof is shewn, what it is, how God is the object of it, the consistency thereof with the dispensation of the Gospel, and its usefulness to the purposes of Religion. A digression concerning superstition, and Carnal Security.

3. HOW we are to owne God in our *Understandings* and *Wills*, hath been already declared, it remains only that we enquire how we are to owne him in our *Affections*, which is, 1. First by placing them on the same objects, which we find those of God to be set upon; there being no greater testimony of our Subjection than the conforming to the inclinations of those, for whom we pretend that deference. And accordingly as there is nothing more usual with flatterers, (who are the most exquisite patterns of obsequiousness) than to imitate the passions and inclinations of their several Patrons, laughing (as * *Juvenal* speaks) when they are disposed to be merry, and weeping if they behold them in a melancholy humour; so God himself, who certainly best knows how we ought to owne him, calls upon us oft to imitate him, and to be holy, and merciful, and benign as he also is. As if, in order to the ends of Religion, we had nothing else to do, than to write after his Copy, and frame our selves after his most blessed example. And indeed as he is the great Exemplar of Vertue, so we should need no other to contemplate, were it not that the perfection of his nature admits not of some vertues, which in us are both laudable and necessary. (For what is there in God (upon whom all things depend) analogous to those fears which we are commanded to entertain?) But as setting aside that, and other such instances of imperfection, we shall find somewhat in God to answer our own *passions and affections*, with the vertues that are conversant about them; so we cannot give a greater testimony of their and our subjection to him, than by loving what he loves and hating what he hates, by rejoycing in that wherewith he shews himself well pleased, and mourning for those things by which he professes himself to be grieved, lastly, than by shewing the same compassion and tenderness towards the objects of his pitty, as, on the other side, the same zeal and indignation against the implacable enemies of his Religion. But because, beside the conforming of our *Affections* unto his, there may be something in God which may prove a fit object of them, we are also, toward the owning of God in them, to excite those *Affections*, according as their respective objects shall invite us. For the exemplifying whereof I shall instance in the passions of *Fear*, and *Love*, as by which the other may be guessed at.

* —— *Rides? majore cachinno Concutitur; flet, si lachrymas adspexit amici.* Sat. 3.

To begin with *Fear*, because the first (saith the Atheist) that gave being

being to the powers above, but to be ſure both the firſt and moſt potent incentives to the worſhip of them, concerning which I ſhall ſhew,

1. What it is.
2. How God is the object of it.
3. The conſiſtency thereof with the diſpenſation of the Goſpel, and
4. And laſtly, the uſefulneſs of that paſſion.

1. Now though the nature of *Fear* be more evident to each mans inward ſenſe, than is likely to be made out by diſcourſe, yet to ſhew how God becomes the object of it, it will at leaſt be expedient to give ſome definition of it. And accordingly, I ſhall define it to be *a paſſion of the Soul, whereby it is diſpoſed to flie from that which may be hurtful to it, and ſuch as is not eaſily avoided.* For though we find it uſually added, that it is from ſuch an evil *as is alſo near*; yet is that rather a motive to the greatneſs of mens fear than neceſſary to the exciting of it. Experience ſhewing us, that men do ſometimes fear a great way off, and particularly thoſe evils which are not to commence till the other world. This only may be ſaid in its defence, that, when things ſo far off are feared, they are made near to us by our own apprehenſion, and (as our life hangs upon a ſlender thread) repreſented to our fancies, under a poſſibility of falling upon us every moment.

2. From the general nature of fear paſs we to ſhew God to be the object of it, the ſecond thing propoſed to be diſcourſed of; a thing in appearance of more than ordinary difficulty, eſpecially when conſidered as a duty: Becauſe it may ſeem hard to look upon God as *hurtful*, but much more to conceive of it as a duty to *flie from* him. But as it is no way prejudicial to the goodneſs of God to be *hurtful to the evil*, but on the contrary a commendation of it, as being not able to endure them; ſo to *flie from*, or draw back, is ſometimes ſo far from a crime, that it may be looked upon as a teſtimony of our reſpect. For thus to draw back from a more powerful adverſary is a confeſſion of his greatneſs, and of our own inability to withſtand him. The only thing therefore remaining to be enquired into is, what there is in God to oblige us thus to draw back, which are in ſhort the power and juſtice of the Almighty. For how can we chuſe but tremble at him, who is not only able to deſtroy Soul and Body in Hell, but hath moreover declared himſelf to be juſt, and conſequently one, that without a ſatisfaction and repentance at leaſt, will by no means clear the guilty; To all which if we add his many and ſevere threats againſt thoſe that disbelieve or diſobey him, ſo we ſhall think it not only no crime at all to fear him, but on the contrary an acknowledgment of his Divinity: Our fear, becauſe ariſing from the conſideration of them, being a confeſſion not only of his great power and juſtice, but alſo, that what he hath ſo threatned he will certainly perform, and conſequently of the truth and unchangeableneſs of his decrees. Then and then only doth our fear become criminal, when it looks upon God as no other than *a Tyrant*, or as one that will call us to an account *for every trifle*. For that inſtead of acknowledging him for our God, attributeth to him peeviſhneſs, or cruelty, and makes us not ſo much adorers as diſhonourers of him. And accordingly, as whereever Religion hath had any place, this fear hath been branded under the

the name of *Superſtition*, ſo it has betrayed its own rottenneſs by the pittiful ſhifts it hath put the timourous man upon; the devotion of ſuch perſons uſually ſpending it ſelf in Rites, and Ceremonies, and preſenting the Deity not with a rational and ſober worſhip, but a crazy and trifling one. I will conclude this particular with that excellent diſtinction which *Maximus Tyrius* *makes between a *truly Religious man* and a *Superſtitious* one. *The pious man* (ſaith he) *is Gods friend, the ſuperſtitious is a flatterer of God: and indeed happy and bleſt is the condition of the pious man Gods friend, but right miſerable and ſad is the ſtate of the ſuperſtitious. The pious man, emboldned by a good conſcience and encouraged by the ſenſe of his integrity, comes to God without fear and dread; but the ſuperſtitious, being ſunk and depreſſed through the ſenſe of his own wickedneſs, cometh not without much fear, being void of all hope and confidence, and dreading the Gods as ſo many Tyrants.* From which as it is evident what the true nature of *Superſtition* is, even the fearing of God as *a tyrant*, or *peeviſh Lord*, ſo alſo that it may have place as well in the *rejection of religious rites*, as in an *overcurious intention* of them. For as the obſervation of theſe becomes *Superſtitious*, by our looking upon God *as a rigid exacter* of them, ſo the rejection of them may become equally ſuch, when we think him *as much concerned to forbid* them, as we are to *avoid the uſe* of them. But other fear than this, as it is ſo far from being criminal that it is on the contrary an acknowledgement of Gods power, and juſtice, and truth; ſo though it make us draw back from him as a judge, yet it puts us upon ſeeking to him as a father, and endeavouring by all means to obtain his favour. Which ſaid, I will now deſcend to ſhew

* Diſſert. 4.

3. The conſiſtency of this fear with the diſpenſation of the Goſpel, the third thing propoſed to be diſcourſed of. For though it may ſeem but congruous to the law (which was a ſtate of darkneſs and horrours) to be attended with that fear which is the uſual product or concomitant of them; yet it may ſeem no leſs congruous on the other hand, that, when the bright ſunſhine of the Goſpel appeared, that gloomineſs ſhould diſappear, and together with it, its congenial fears. For the ſolution of which difficulty, the firſt thing that I ſhall offer is thoſe clear and expreſs words of our Saviour, *Luke* 12. 5. Where having before dehorted his Diſciples from being *afraid of them that kill the body, but after that have no more that they can do*, leſt any ſhould think that paſſion to be uſeleſs, he adds, *But I will forewarn you whom you ſhall fear. Fear him which after he hath killed hath power to caſt into hell, yea I ſay unto you fear him.* Which teſtimony is ſo much the more conſiderable, not only becauſe he doth twice repeat it, but (which ſhews yet farther the importance of his exhortation) whom he doth ſo exhort, call alſo by the name of *friends*. *For I ſay unto you my friends, be not afraid of them that kill the body, but fear him which hath power to caſt into hell.* Which appellation ſhews evidently, that this precept of fear is not only for ſervants or aliens, but for thoſe who are moſt intimately united unto himſelf. But ſo, that I may not dwell too long upon a thing ſo evident, do the Apoſtles of that Lord adviſe, as well as the Lord himſelf; S. *Paul, Phil.* 2. 12. exhorting men to *work out their Salvation with fear and trembling*, and the Authour to the *Hebrews*, c. 12. 28. *to have grace whereby to ſerve God acceptably with reverence and godly fear, becauſe God is a conſuming fire:* In which latter place, we have it over and above repreſented as an effect of *grace*, and a requiſite to make our ſer-

vice *acceptable*. Now though from what hath been ſaid it be ſufficiently evident what we are to think in this particular, and conſequently rather to believe, that ſomething elſe muſt be meant by thoſe ſayings which ſeem to contradict it, than that this fear is inconſiſtent with the temper of the Goſpel; yet for the better explication of this fear, as well as for the ſolution of thoſe difficulties, I will now propoſe them, or at leaſt that which is moſt conſiderable.

If you pleaſe to peruſe the firſt Epiſtle of S. *John*, the fourth chapter, and the eighteenth verſe, you will there find that Apoſtle affirming that *there is no fear in love, but that perfect love caſteth out fear, becauſe fear hath torment*; as moreover, that *he that feareth is not made perfect in love*. For the anſwering of which difficulty, not to ſay (as ſome have done) that by fear in that place we are to underſtand the *fear of men*, and of the evils which they may bring upon us; becauſe *the perfect love*, to which fear is here oppoſed, is referred to our *having boldneſs to ſtand in the day of judgment*, to which therefore in all reaſon the oppoſite fear ought to relate: I anſwer firſt, that it is true *perfect love caſteth out fear*: but I ſay withall that in this world there is no ſuch thing as *perfect love*, and therefore fear not to be ejected till there is. A thing which this very Apoſtle may ſeem to referr to, when, in the words before theſe, he affirms, that *herein is our love made perfect that we may have boldneſs in the day of judgment*, making that *perfect love* to appertain not to the preſent times, but *to the day of judgment*, wherein indeed, thoſe that love God ſhall neither *fear*, nor have *any cauſe* for it. But let us ſuppoſe, as there is ſome preſumption for it, that the *perfect love* here ſpoken of is not that love, which is the peculiar portion of the next world, but which is attainable in this; yet even ſo it may well be ſaid that there is no neceſſity of caſting out that fear for which we are now pleading. For (as was before obſerved) there is a fear of God *as of a tyrant*, or at leaſt *a very hard maſter*, and another of a *father*, and a *king*, but withall a *good* and *gracious* one. If we take the word fear in the former ſenſe, that is to ſay, for the fear *of God as of a tyrant*, or a hard maſter, ſo there is no doubt that *love caſts* it out, eſpecially an Evangelical one; it being impoſſible that any man ſhould love God, or willingly keep his Commandments, who hath ſuch an opinion of him. But there is no ſuch thing to be affirmed of him who looks upon God, as a Lord and a father, but withall a good and gracious one. For beſide that ſuch a fear is enjoyned us by him, who doth alſo lay upon us the command of *love*, and therefore not to be thought (unleſs we will make the ſpirit of God contradict it ſelf) to be caſt out by that love which he requires; there is nothing of *torment*, which is the reaſon here aſſigned, if in our fear we look upon God, but as a good and gracious one. For though that may make us careful and wary, yet not diſtreſſed and deſperate; the conſideration of his goodneſs buoying us up, when we are ſurrounded with his judgments, and making us, at the ſame time we have an apprehenſion of them, to look up to his mercies, and to love and truſt in him for them. The ſame anſwer, with a very little variation, may be applied to that difference, which is objected between the diſpenſation of the Goſpel and the Law. For though the Goſpel reckons us not in the place of *ſervants* and *vaſſals*, and conſequently exacts not *their* fear of us; yet it reckons us in the place of *ſons*,

ſons, who are not only to have a love, but a *fear* alſo for him that is their parent. Which anſwer is the more reaſonable, becauſe the Scripture it ſelf repreſents thoſe that were under the firſt covenant, as the *children of the Bondwoman*, and ſuch as were therefore ſlaves themſelves; but thoſe under the ſecond as the *children of the free*. To whom therefore though it do no way appertain to entertain *a ſpirit of bondage*, and thoſe fears wherewith it is accompanied, yet to preſerve ſuch *a reverential regard* for the Almighty, as is due unto every father, and much more to their heavenly one.

4. The fourth particular follows, even the uſefulneſs of that fear of which we are now entreating, which I ſhall endeavour to evince,

1. Firſt as to the bringing us to God and Chriſt, and
2. As to our continuance in that ſtate.

1. Now that the fear of God and of his judgments are of very great uſe to bring us unto God and unto Chriſt, may appear from that great contrariety that is between the ſtate of Nature and the purity and holineſs of God. For that being ſuppoſed, as it muſt, it is not eaſy to conceive men ſhould be drawn with the cords of love, and affect him who is ſo contrary to their inclinations. And though it be true that the promiſes of God may be of more force to draw us to his love, thoſe having not all of them ſo manifeſt a contrariety to our corrupt nature, as the Purity and Holineſs of God hath; yet as many of them are of a ſpiritual nature, and ſo not very likely to be acceptable, ſo (which is more) they are not to be beſtowed, or at leaſt not with any certainty or perfection, till we come to the other world. And who then, naturally ſpeaking, would quit preſent and ſenſual enjoyments for them, and leave a love, which he is ſure of, for ſo uncertain and remote a miſtreſs? To induce men therefore to quit their ſo much beloved tranſgreſſions it is neceſſary to ſtir up their *fears*, and make them ſee that what they purſue will rob them of what they love, and make them miſerable as well in their bodies as their ſouls. And indeed, as it rarely happens that men are reclaimed from their evil courſes but by ſome ſuch diſguſtful means, ſo (which is of much more force) we find the Apoſtles taking this courſe in converting the unbelieving world; repreſenting to them firſt, the guilt of their own ſins, and the wrath they had incurred, and then the tenders of Gods goodneſs: By that means not only abating of their heat toward their former extravagancies, but even conſtraining them to take a view of the beauties of Religion, which otherwiſe they would never have conſidered.

2. But beſide that the fear of God is of ſingular uſe in bringing men to Chriſt and to God, it is alſo ſuch after our converſion to him, yea throughout the whole courſe of our lives. And here not to inſiſt upon the Apoſtles *perſwading* even ſuch *by the terrours of the Lord*, their exhorting them *to work out their ſalvation with fear and trembling*, and *to ſerve God acceptably with reverence and godly fear*; I ſhall content my ſelf to propoſe to your conſideration the remains of that evil nature, which is in the very beſt of us, and how much more then in the generality of believers? For theſe will ſhew it to be as neceſſary to keep us in the way, as it was to bring us into it. It is true indeed if grace did at once purifie the heart from all extravagancies, if it took away both our ſins and our affections to them, laſtly, if it put us into the condition we were in, when we were created, and made us

intirely and perfectly new creatures, so it is not impossible, but we might follow the conduct of our leader, when only drawn by the cords of love. And yet I cannot but observe by the way, that God thought not that enough to preserve *Adam* in his innocency, but added moreover the terrour of *dying the death* if he persisted not in it. But when it is certain, that, though sin be wounded, yet it is not perfectly mortified, when there are remains of corruption in the very best of us, who can think even the regenerate man to be so good natured, as not to stand in need of terrours to nip those buds, and hinder them from bringing forth fruit unto unrighteousness? For beside that, under such circumstances, all the methods of God are little enough to restrain us, experience sheweth that of fear to be often needful; carelessness, and wantonness, being apt to make us forget the obligations of goodness, and not only to forget but to despise them. But when beside the obligations of Gods goodness, men have always before their eyes the strictness of his justice; when they consider as well what vengeance will pursue them if they go astray, as how great encouragements they have to walk in that way which God hath mark'd out to them; then, I say, even flesh and bloud will startle at the evil that presents it self, and avoid it lest it become miserable by it.

Having thus shown both what the passion of *fear* is, and how God is the object of it; together with the consistency of that fear with the dispensation of the Gospel, and the usefulness thereof both in our conversion to, and walking with God; I may seem to have said enough not only to excite that passion in you, but to discover to you the malignity of the contrary vices. But because men are not overforward to apply the rule of truth to their own obliquities, and by that means oftentimes miss of the knowledge of them; and because too I have already given you a character of *Superstition* which is one of the *extremes* of *a religious fear*; I will for a conclusion of my discourse set before you the malignity of *carnal security*, which is *the extreme in defect*. For so far are some men from trembling at the Almighty, that they go on in their sins without the least regret, and neither concern themselves for the judgments they behold on others, nor for those which are denounced against themselves. *As if*, according to the Prophet *Isay*, * *they had made a covenant with death, and were at an agreement with hell; so that, though the overflowing scourge should pass thorough the Land, it should not come nigh them, nor disturb their peace and prosperity.* And here not to tell you, because that is sufficiently evident, that this is in effect to deny Gods Power, and Justice, and Truth, because having himself threatned to arm his Power and Justice against them; I shall propose to your consideration the great danger it betrays you to, as to your spiritual or temporal estate. For, to begin with the former of these, he that is thus fearless of Gods displeasure is not only at present in a reprobate estate, but likely to be so for ever. For what should move him to return, who is not moved with the threats of the Almighty, nor regards in the least the power of his displeasure? Should the expresses of Gods love constrain him? Those indeed are very forcible motives. But how should they prevail with such a one, when even those, who have a veneration for the Almighty, find it so hard to yield to them, without having an eye to the terrours of the Almighty? Add hereunto what

* 28. 15.

what the Scripture ſo often affirmeth, that *The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wiſdom.* For what other interpretation can we make of that, than that heavenly wiſdom muſt enter by that paſſion, and men be brought to a ſenſe of Gods Juſtice and Severity, before they be affected with his love? But it may be ſuch mens eſtate in ſpirituals will not much move them, and therefore I ſhall proceed to the conſideration of their temporal one. Concerning which I ſhall not doubt to affirm, that he who is thus regardleſs of Gods diſpleaſure, is the moſt likely to fall under the ſtroak of it. For not to tell ſuch perſons, what the Pſalmiſt hath told us, that *according to our fear ſo is Gods diſpleaſure*, that is to ſay, more or leſs according to our awe of him; I ſhall deſire them to conſider the affront they offer to the Divine Majeſty by this their diſregard of him. For what is it but even to dare him to exert that Power and Juſtice, by which he would commend himſelf to the world. He doth indeed ſpeak glorioufly of his own power and Majeſty, he looks big and threatens ſeverely all thoſe that ſhall but dare to oppoſe; but as ſuch big looks and bugbear words do not much ſtartle the carnally ſecure, ſo he will put it to the tryal, whether the effects will anſwer them, and God be as tremendous in his puniſhments, as he ſeems to be in the denunciations of them. Than which as there cannot be a greater affront to the Almighty, who is by this means neglected and contemned, ſo I ſhall leave you to judge, what effect it is likely to have upon him, who, beſides his own natural averſation of all impiety, is moreover extremely jealous of his Honour.

PART V.

Of the Paſſion of Love, its nature and objects, what the immediate expreſſes thereof are, and what its oppoſite extremes; all which are applied to the Love of God. Among other things is cenſured the being over familiar with God, the pretences for it detected and removed. A neceſſary admonition concerning the proportioning of our affections to the infiniteneſs of thoſe perfections upon which they are ſet, and how that is to be done.

IF the paſſion of *fear* can find ſomething in God to excite it, even under the diſpenſation of the Goſpel, to be ſure that of *Love* cannot want matter to provoke it, and entertain it with complacency and delight; there being in God, either formally, or eminently, whatſoever is the object of our love. For the evidencing whereof I will enquire,

1. Firſt of all, into the nature of it.
2. Shew what are the objects of that paſſion: from thence proceed,
3. To conſider the immediate expreſſes of it, and

4. And

4. And lastly, mark out the extreams on either hand. Applying all as I go to the *Love of God*, which is that we are especially to consider.

1. Now though (as was observed concerning fear) the nature of *Love* be more evident to our inward sense, than can be made out by discourse, yet I think it not amiss for the better explication of the present argument, to give you some definition of it: Which is, *that love is a passion, whereby the Soul is disposed to joyn it self to those objects, which appear to it to be grateful and pleasant.* Which definition I do the rather give you, to take away that usual distinction of love into that of *Benevolence* and *Concupiscency*; Benevolence, in proper speech, being rather an effect of our love to that which is the object of it, than any real part of it.

2. The nature of love being thus explained in the general, proceed we in the next place to the objects of it, which in general are such, as are either good in themselves, or such as are good to us. Of the former sort is that love, which we have for all vertuous and excellent persons, how little soever we our selves may be profited by them: Such as are perhaps those that live in remote parts, and with whom we our selves have no commerce. For though we are not likely to be benefited by them in our own persons, yet because of the excellencies we hear of in them we conceive a love for them, and never think of them without complacency and delight. The same love we have for all beautiful objects of natures make, and for all such like products of art, these to whomsoever they appertain yet drawing our Soul after them, and obliging it to receive them into her embraces. Now concerning this love there can be no doubt but that God is the just object of it, yea that he may challenge it in the highest degree imaginable; as will appear, if we consider, either the excellencies of the divine nature, or the measure wherein he is possessed of them. Look upon the former, and you will find them to be such, as are the excellencies of the most sublime essence; such as are freedom, from the feculencies of matter, and much more from the infirmities thereof, a discerning understanding, and a rightly ordered will; a being which does nothing that is not becoming its own greatness, which descends not to any lower abject thoughts; which hates nothing without either cause or measure, which loves things lovely, and according to the proportion of it; in fine, which makes things lovely that they may become the object of it, and be worthy to be received into its embraces. And though it be true, that there are some excellencies in the creature (such as beauty and the like) which are not to be found in God, yet as the reason thereof is, because they are much below him, and argue something of imperfection where they are, so he is the Fountain even of those inferiour excellencies, and must therefore be much more excellent in himself. From the excellencies of the divine nature, pass we to the measure wherein they are possessed, which will shew it yet more to be the object of our *Love*. For beside that they are all in him without any thing of imperfection, which hardly falls upon any created beings; they are also infinite, as that nature is, to which they have the honour to belong. If God be wise, he is so without measure, and knoweth whatsoever is to be known; if good, he is so without bounds, and proportionably to his own infinite essence. In fine,

fine, whatsover he is, he is so after the rate of a God, and knows no other bounds than what he prescribes unto himself. If therefore that which is excellent be a just ground of love, God is much more so, as not only comprehending all excellencies whatsoever, but also in the utmost perfection and degree. How great reason we have to love God, when considered only as he is in himself, I have discoursed hitherto, proceed we in the next place to consider him as good to us. Under which notion if we look upon him, so we shall not only find that, which may attract our loves, but even constrain us to affect him. For not to tell you, that by him the Authours of mankind were first created, that we our selves were conceived in the womb, maintained there, and brought forth into the world through his benign influence, that we depended upon him when we hung upon our Mothers Breasts, that we did so no less when we might seem much more able to have made provision for our selves, that we are indebted to him for all the good things we enjoy, that we are so for the ability of enjoying them, that we are not less nourished by the *word* of his providence than by the bread we eat, that we owe the very nourishment of that to his blessing on us and it, that by him we are delivered from those evils we escape, that by him we are born up, or carried thorough those evils that do at any time befall us; To say nothing at all (I say) of these, how considerable soever, and how just incentives to our love, I shall desire you only to consider his benevolence to our better part, and the wayes he hath taken to express it. For not contented to say * *he delights not in the death of a sinner, but that he should repent and live*, which may seem to be rather a negative than a positive kindness, or if the latter, an imperfect velleity only; he hath been from all eternity contriving the Redemption of sinful man, he hath from the beginning of time been declaring his gracious purposes concerning it; he sent his Son in the fulness of time to accomplish that most excellent work for us, he hath laid upon him the iniquities and punishments of us all; he hath sent his ever blessed Spirit to fit us for pardon by it, he hath sent his Servants the Prophets to publish the tidings of it, and the means whereby it is to be obtained; he hath called us out of darkness into the glorious light of it, he hath moreover given us eyes to behold the brightness of it; he hath given us grace to abandon our natural corruptions, he hath furnished us with grace to serve him acceptably, and with godly fear and love; he hath reclaimed us by his Spirit when we have been wandring out of the way, he hath upholden us by the same Spirit, when we have been ready to faint or fall down in it; in fine he continueth to do so till we turn our backs upon him, and loveth us till we do in a manner refuse to be beloved. All which whosoever shall duly consider, will not only conclude him worthy of our *Love*, but of the utmost degree and the most immediate expressions of it, the third thing proposed to be discoursed of.

* *Isa.* 33. 11.

3. And here in the first place, I shall not doubt to reckon the desire of enjoying his presence whom we love; this being the most natural and immediate expression of our *Love*, that I say not of the very essence of it. For as *Love* is nothing else than a passion of the Soul by which it is disposed to unite it self to what it loves; so there is no one thing that is more impatient of the absence, or more passionately desirous of its proper object's presence. It sets the understanding upon contriving

triving how it may attain it, it puts the Will upon a resolution of putting those contrivances in execution; it vigorously endeavoureth the removing of all obstacles to the enjoyment of it, it greedily layeth hold of all opportunities for the compassing of it; in fine, it neither giveth it self nor us any rest, till it attain what it so panteth after, and becometh rather more eager, than any way discouraged by the opposition it receives. But such ought to be, nay such are the effects of our love to God, where that love is implanted in the Soul; witness the Prophet *David*'s impatience when driven from the house of God, his longing desire to appear before him in it. And certainly, if we had the same love for God, that the Prophet had, or it may be think our selves possessed of, there is no doubt we should be as willing to be found, where he promiseth to present himself, and both desire to hear him speaking to us as he doth by his servants the Prophets, and present our own supplications before him; these being the most natural expresses of our love, and such which I had almost said we can no more be without, than we can hate him whom we cordially affect. The same is to be said, 2. Of our enjoying of God in Heaven, where he doth not only most gloriously, but most intimately present himself. For as it is impossible for a Soul duly affected with the love of God, not to desire the most immediate enjoyment of his presence, so we find S. *Paul* not to have been without this desire, though he knew he could not attain it, without putting off his earthly Tabernacle; he affirming of himself that he was desirous to be dissolved, that so he might be admitted into the presence of God and of his Son. Which by the way may shew, how cold our love generally is, even when it carrieth us only to the enjoyment of what we love. For how hardly are we brought to pant after that presence of his, though we find little on earth to make us desirous of continuance in it, and it may be a long and irksome sickness? As if this life, with all the misfortunes that attend it, were preferrable to his presence where there is fulness of joy, and at whose right hand there are pleasures for evermore. Of the first and most immediate expression of our love I have discoursed hitherto, and shewn withall how far we are from having that testimony of our own; proceed we now to another, which though not so immediate, yet is as certain a consequent thereof, and that is a desire, so far as in us lieth, to procure the content of him we love. For so far is this from being separable from love, that it is oftentimes defined by it; *Aristotle*, in that most excellent piece of his Rhetoricks * defining *Love* to be a passion *whereby we wish to any one those things which we think good for him.* Now though it be true that in strict speaking this expression can have no place here because God is infinitely happy, yet inasmuch as God declareth himself to be well pleased with the glorifying of his name, which he hath put in our power either to do or not, therefore, to express our love to him, it is requisite we desire that so it may be, by all those to whom his glorious name shall be made known. And accordingly our Saviour makes it the first request we are to ask when we address our selves to the Divine Majesty, placing *Hallowed be thy name* with other such like petitions, before the begging of *our dayly bread*, or what is more, *the forgiveness of our sins.* 2. Again, though God be infinitely happy in himself, and accordingly leaves no place for our wishing well to him, or putting those desires in execution,

* li. 2. c. 4.

tion; yet is there place for ſuch deſires, and more, toward thoſe who are his Friends, and whoſe Good, God ſome way tenders as his own: he who hath told us that *our goodneſs extendeth not to God*, yet forgetting not to add, that it reacheth *to the Saints that are in the Earth, and to the excellent, in whom is God's delight*, as well *as ours*. To whom therefore if we wiſh all proſperity imaginable, and, ſo far as in us lieth, endeavour to procure, we do in a manner lay the ſame Obligations upon the Almighty; *every Friend* (as *Ariſtotle* * obſerves) *reckoning what is done to his Friend, as a kindneſs extended to himſelf.* Laſtly, As Love prompts Men to wiſh well to thoſe they love; or, where they themſelves ſtand in no need of them, to their Friends and Relations: ſo it prompts them to endeavour to walk well-pleaſing to them, eſpecially where they have over and above an Authority to command it; no Slave being more obſequious than a Lover is, where his Love is hearty and intenſe. And accordingly, As our Saviour hath not ſtuck to affirm, That *he who hath and keepeth his Commandments, he it is that loveth him*, Joh. 14. 21. ſo that Diſciple of his, 1 *Ep.* 5. 3. That *this is the Love of God, that we keep his Commandments*, and perform whatſoever he requireth. As if this were not onely a certain, but the onely Conſequent of our *Love*; or rather, as if it had been all one with it. And indeed, as no Lover finds any difficulty in obeying thoſe Commands which are laid upon him by the Party he affects; ſo the neglect of that Obedience towards God, muſt argue a greater coldneſs in us than it could do in any other pretended *Lover:* becauſe whilſt they have nothing but the Tie of *Love* to engage their Obedience, we have moreover the Obligation of Service, and have God's *Authority*, as well as *Love*, to conſtrain us to it.

* *Rhet.* l. 2. c. 4.

4. Having thus mark'd out the Love we ought to have for the Almighty, together with the moſt immediate Expreſſes of it, I have ſaid enough to caution Men againſt the oppoſite Extremes, whether in the exceſs, or defect. But becauſe the Rule of Right ſignifies nothing, where it is not apply'd; and we do not find thoſe, who are moſt concern'd, in any great forwardneſs to do it; I think it not amiſs, as I did before in the Paſſion of Fear, to point out the Rocks on either Hand.

To begin with that which is the Extreme in defect, or the want of Love to him who hath ſo much in him to deſerve it; the unreaſonableneſs whereof will appear, if we reſume thoſe things which we have ſaid to the Object of Love: For is not Good, that is to ſay, that which is ſo in it ſelf, the Object of our Love? nay, are we not in a manner conſtrain'd to affect it? And can we then be cold in our Love to him, in whom all Goodneſs is contain'd; to him who is infinitely good in himſelf, and the Fountain of whatſoever is ſo? Neither will it ſuffice to ſay, That no other can be expected, when there is ſo great an oppoſition between us and God: For beſide that ſuch is the luſtre of God's Goodneſs, that whoſoever ſhall duly conſider it, cannot but be ſome way affected with it; we cannot but know, that it is our own Viciouſneſs which makes the oppoſition, and which conſequently occaſions the alienations of our Hearts from him. Which therefore, as it is but reaſon we ſhould depoſite; ſo there is no doubt, but if we do, we ſhall find our ſelves as much enamour'd of him, as we are of thoſe Pleaſures which are at preſent moſt connatural to us. But then

if we consider not onely the Excellencies of the Divine Nature in it self, but also its communicativeness of those Excellencies to us, how much he hath oblig'd us with Temporal Favours, how much more he hath done for us to promote our Spiritual and Eternal Welfare; so certainly we cannot chuse but censure our own want of Love to him, by whom we have been so much oblig'd; he that doth so much to gain our Love, as it were laying down a Price for it, and making it Injustice, as well as Ingratitude, not to return it. Such is the unreasonableness even of our want of love to so good and gracious an Object; how much more unreasonable must it then be, when this want of Love or Coldness passeth into an Antipathy, and we do not onely not affect, but hate and abhor so lovely an Object? Which notwithstanding, we find even such in that black Catalogue of Sinners which St. *Paul* gives, *Rom.* 1. 30. And indeed, it is not much to be wonder'd that there should, when there are so many in the World, who have so much reason to apprehend his displeasure. But as there is much more reason for them to turn their hatred upon their own Vices, which is that that exposeth them to God's displeasure; so, if they would entertain a less love for them, they would find nothing in God which should give any just occasion to their hatred: For though he be an Avenger of those that do evil, yet it is of such onely as continue in it; and as he delights not in their death, so he invites them to live, and makes a tender both of his own Grace, and the Merits of his Son, to instate them in it.

From the extreme in defect, pass we to the extreme in excess, which is an *over-familiarity* with our Maker: For as Love among Men doth either find the Parties equal, or make them such, according to that known Saying of *Minutius Fœlix*, *Amicitia pares semper aut accipit aut facit*; so unwary Men, not considering the distance that is between them and God, have copied out this mode of *Love* in themselves, and made it pass into an *indecent familiarity*; being thereto farther tempted, by God's giving his Children the name of *Friends*, and by his *speaking with Abraham as a Man speaketh with his friend*. But, as it followeth not from God's speaking to us as Friends, that therefore we are to use the same Modes of Speech; so we shall find those to whom God hath shewn the greatest condescention, to have proceeded always with the greatest reverence and respect: for thus that Friend and Favourite of God, *Abraham*, still observ'd his distance towards him, and address'd himself to God as his Superiour and Maker; in the 23d Verse of the 18th Chapter of *Genesis*, where he seems most to expostulate with him, stiling him *the Judge of all the earth*; and himself, *vers.* 27. but *dust and ashes* in comparison of him: and in the 30th Verse of the same Chapter, beseeching God *not to be angry with him, though he spake*; and in Verse 31. confessing it a kind of presumption *that he had taken upon him to speak unto God*; in the 32d again, begging of him *not to be angry, and he would speak but once more* for the sinful *Sodomites*. Which demeanour of his shews evidently, that our Friendship must be mix'd with Reverence, and we look upon God as our Superiour, as well as our Friend. In like manner, though it be said of *Moses*, That *God spake to him face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend*; yet even then we find *Moses* demeaning himself as a Subject, and speaking to him in the Language of

of one: for what elſe means his ſo often inſerting, *If I have found grace in thy ſight*; as you may ſee in the ſequel of that Chapter? It is true indeed (for I am willing to obviate any thing that can with any ſhew of reaſon be objected) it is true, I ſay, there is ſome difference between their caſe and ours; I mean in reſpect of God, as well as us; that God who ſpake to *Abraham* and *Moſes* in his own likeneſs, or at leaſt in that of an Angel, having ſince aſſum'd our Nature, to become more equal to us, and diſpenſing all his Graces through it. But as he who aſſum'd our Nature, doth not therefore ceaſe to be God, and conſequently neither our Lord and Maſter; ſo by becoming Man, he became our Lord after a more peculiar manner, and thereby gain'd a new Title to our Obedience; which, as there is therefore juſt cauſe for us to own, ſo our Saviour himſelf inculcates it, as the onely means to attain his Friendſhip, telling us, *Joh.* 15.14. That *we are his friends, if we do whatſoever he commands us.* This onely would be added, for the preſervation of this Friendſhip on our part, That we look upon the Commands God lays upon us, as the Commands of a Friend, as well as of our Lord and Maſter; of one who loveth us, as well as of one that hath Authority to command us: So ſhall we at the ſame time preſerve both our Friendſhip and Obedience; be Confidents, and yet Servants of the Almighty. For it is not our yielding Obedience to God, which makes our Works ſervile; but our looking upon him as a Tyrant, or at leaſt as one who is not our Friend, as well as our Lord. For, as the Text before-quoted inſinuateth, that we cannot be *Friends*, without having reſpect to our Superiours *Commands*; ſo if we have reſpect to them, for the kindneſs of the Party that enjoyns them, we do rather the part of Friends, than of ſuch as are either Servants or Vaſſals. But neither is this all which our Friendſhip with God privilegeth; yea, though an *over-familiarity* be diſcarded: For it alſo licenceth us to come with aſſurance before the Throne of Grace, and both lay open our wants before him, and beg a proportionable ſupply; God himſelf having not onely permitted, but call'd upon us to do it, and that too with earneſtneſs and importunity, giving us farther to underſtand, that this violence is grateful to him, and that the more importunate we are, provided it be mix'd with Reverence, the more ready he will be to receive us. In fine, ſuch as is the behaviour of a Favourite toward his Prince, ſuch ought to be the behaviour of a Friend of God, toward the Monarch of the World; ſo tempering our Reſpect and Confidence, as neither to forget our diſtance, on the one hand; nor, on the other, that Intereſt which he hath given us in his Love. But if our Love be ſo qualified, the more intenſe it is, the more acceptable, and the more likely to advance us to a more intimate Communion with himſelf.

Being now to put a period to my Diſcourſe concerning the *Paſſions of the Soul*, and that Acknowledgment which is due from each of them to him whom we are to own for our God; it remains onely, that I admoniſh you, That to own him for your God in them, is not onely to have your *Affections* ſuited to his ſeveral Attributes, but alſo to the *infiniteneſs* thereof; this being in truth to own him for a God, and pay him that Acknowledgment which is due unto him, as ſuch. But from hence it will follow,

1. That we are to fear and love him with all our might; that we

are to ſeparate all coldneſs from the one, all ſecurity and preſumption from the other: For beſide that the Almighty requires ſo to be lov'd, even where that Love (as was before obſerv'd) is ſet to denote the whole Adoration of the Soul, it is no more than his own immenſe Nature, as well as our Obligations to him, call for; the greateſt Lovelineſs and Majeſty (ſuch as thoſe of God's undoubtedly are) requiring the greateſt Fear and Love. It is no leſs evident,

2. That we are to fear and love him above all things, how much ſoever in themſelves the juſt Objects of them both; becauſe God, whom we are required to own in them, tranſcends all other Beings in Majeſty and Goodneſs, or whatſoever elſe is the proper Object of our ſeveral Affections. Whence it is, that our Bleſſed Saviour, ſpeaking of the Paſſion of Fear, doth not onely forbid the exerting of it toward *thoſe that can kill the Body*, but in a manner confine it to him who *after he hath kill'd, hath power to caſt into Hell.*

3. Laſtly, Foraſmuch as God doth not onely tranſcend all other Beings, but is the Fountain of whatſoever is either dreadful or lovely in them; hence it comes to paſs, that, to own him for our God, we are conſequently to fear and love all other things with reſpect to the Divine Majeſty, from whom they derive their ſeveral Excellencies; at the ſame time we fear or love them, looking up to the Almighty; and regarding them not ſo much for themſelves, as for that Majeſty and Goodneſs which it pleas'd the Almighty to imprint upon them.

PART VI.

How we may and ought to own God in our Bodies. This done, firſt, by yielding Obedience to his Commands, and particularly to ſuch as have a more immediate aſpect upon him; Of which number are thoſe concerning Invocation, Praiſe, Swearing by, or Vowing to him. The like effected by preſenting God with external Notes of our Submiſſion, whether they be ſuch as are performed within the Body, as Bowing, Kneeling, and the like; or ſuch as though the Body be inſtrumental to, yet paſs from thence to other things: Such as are the Building or Adorning of Temples, and the ſetting apart certain Times for God's Worſhip and Service; the Conſecrating of certain Perſons to preſide in it, and reſpecting them when they are ſo.

HAving ſhewn in the foregoing Diſcourſes, what Tribute is due to God from our Souls, and particularly from our *Underſtandings*, *Wills*, and *Affections*, which are the ſeveral Faculties thereof; it remains that we inquire,

2. What Tribute is due to him from our *Bodies*, and how we are to own him for our God in them: Which is either,

1. By yielding Obedience to his Commands, and particularly to ſuch as have a more immediate aſpect upon him; or,

2. By

2. By preſenting him with ſome external Note or Sign of our Submiſſion. The former whereof is by ſome call'd the Honour of the *Deed*; the latter, the Honour of the *Sign*.

I. Of the former of theſe, there cannot be the leaſt doubt that it is requir'd of us toward the owning him for our God: For beſide that the Name of God is a Name of Authority, as well as Eminency, and conſequently implieth a neceſſity of Obedience in thoſe to whom he hath that Relation; God himſelf doth here make uſe of it, as an Obligation to all thoſe Commandments which we are now upon the conſideration of; he requiring our *having no other Gods beſides himſelf*, with other the Duties that follow, upon the ſcore of his being *the Lord our God*, according as was before obſerv'd, in his Preface to the Impoſition of them. But ſo (that I may not ſtand upon a thing ſo plain) doth that Lord of ours expreſly require us to own him; our Saviour putting by the Temptations of Satan to fall down before himſelf, by ſaying, *It is written, Thou ſhalt worſhip the Lord thy God, and him, yea him onely ſhalt thou ſerve*, Matth. 4. 10. Now though what hath been ſaid, extend to all God's Commands, becauſe they all bear the ſtamp of his Authority; yet is it eſpecially to be underſtood of yielding Obedience to ſuch Commands as have a more immediate aſpect upon God, theſe more immediately implying the owning of that Authority he hath over the Sons of Men. For the fuller declaration therefore of our own Duty in this behalf, I will now ſet thoſe Commands before you, and ſhew how we own him for our God, by yielding Obedience to them.

1. To begin with *Invocation*, or *Prayer*, one of the prime Acts of God's Worſhip, and which therefore is of all others the moſt frequently and earneſtly inculcated; concerning which, it is eaſie to ſhew, how neceſſary it is to pay him the acknowledgment of a God: For, inaſmuch as all Men deſire the Preſervation of their own Being; inaſmuch as that deſire neceſſarily prompts them to look abroad for it, if they think not themſelves able to procure it; in caſe any Man do not thus ſeek it of God, it muſt be becauſe he doth not believe it to come from him, but either from himſelf, or from meer Natural Cauſes. But what other is this, than to deny that God *from whom every good and perfect gift cometh*, and to make a God either of ones ſelf, or Nature? There being nothing more eſſential to the Divine Nature, than the being the Author of all thoſe Bleſſings, by which the whole Creation is either maintain'd or adorn'd. The ſame is to be ſaid of that which is ſometime reckon'd as a part of *Prayer*, becauſe a neceſſary attendant of it; that is to ſay, of *giving Thanks* to him for thoſe Bleſſings by which we are at any time made happy: He who refuſeth thus to honour God, in effect denying the coming of them from him; becauſe Nature it ſelf hath taught us to make this return, whereſoever we have been oblig'd. If there be any thing farther to be obſerv'd concerning theſe two Acknowledgments, it will fall in more pertinently when we come to entreat of *The Prayer of our Lord*, to which therefore I ſhall reſerve the conſideration of it.

2. From *Prayer* and *Thanksgiving* therefore, paſs we to *Praiſe*, another Act of Adoration, and no leſs frequently enjoyn'd: And no wonder, if we conſider either the end for which the Tongue was given, or its aptneſs to ſet forth the Excellencies of the Almighty: For as,

as, if we consider the practice of Holy Men, it may seem to have been given for nothing more, than for commemorating the Excellencies of the Divine Nature; so, by the variety of its Expressions, it is fitted to set forth all those Excellencies of which the Divine Nature is compos'd; as neither wanting Words to express his Justice, and Mercy, and the like; nor yet that which makes them more Divine, the Infiniteness thereof.

3. To *Praising* the Divine Majesty, subjoyn we *Swearing by* him, another Act of Adoration, and no less expressly requir'd; for so we find the Prophet *Moses* distinctly commanding, and that too in the same Period where he prescribes his Fear and Service: for, *thou shalt fear the Lord thy God* (saith he) *and serve him, and swear by his Name*, Deut. 6. 13. And indeed, if we consider the nature of an Oath, we shall not in the least doubt of the manner of our owning him for our God by it. For an Oath being nothing else than the calling God to witness to the Truth of what we affirm, he that *swears* by him, doth not onely acknowledge God to be superior to himself, but also to be a Witness of infallible Truth, a Searcher of our Hearts, and a most just and powerful Avenger of all Perjury and Falshood; no one appealing to a Witness that is not of greater Authority than himself; and with much less reason, for the sincerity of his own Affirmations, but where that sincerity may be known, or any deviation from it be punish'd, if he transgress it. For, what satisfaction could an Oath be to any Man, if Men did not presume God to be an Avenger of Perjury and Falshood, as well as a Discerner of the Truth? And accordingly, as for the most part such Clauses as this are generally subjoyn'd, as *So help me God, according as what I affirm is true*; so where it is not express'd, it is always understood to be meant, and God call'd upon not onely as a Witness, but an Avenger. By *swearing* therefore by the Name of God, we give an evident Testimony of our acknowledging him for such, and particularly, that he is True, and Wise, and Powerful. This onely would be added, what is evident from the nature of the thing it self, That though an Oath be an Acknowledgment of those glorious Attributes before-mentioned, yet it is not to be made, but where the thing in controversie is not otherwise to be made out, and the Knot is worthy of his untying. And more than this I shall not need to say concerning *Swearing* by the Name of God, because I must afterwards resume it, when I come to entreat of the Third Commandment.

4. Lastly, As we acknowledge the Divine Majesty by *Swearing* by his Name; so also by *Vowing* to him, in whatsoever may be the proper Matter of it; such as is the yielding Obedience to all his Commands in general, or the performing of any particular one: For as by so doing we acknowledge God to be conscious to our Resolutions, and (because *Vows* are always made upon condition of God's giving us some Boon) that he is conscious also to our Wants; so, for the same Reason, that he is able to supply them, and deliver us either from our Fears, or from our Dangers. Which acknowledgment is so much the more valuable, because *Vows* are seldom made, but when Men are encompassed with the greatest Dangers, and there is little hopes of escaping, but by some signal Providence: for he that in such cases *vows* any thing to God for his deliverance, sheweth he looks upon him to be

be of an Almighty Power, and that he can act not onely in concurrence with Natural Causes, but without and against them. But because the nature of *Vows* will also fall in more fitly afterwards, when I come to entreat of the Third Commandment, it shall suffice me to have observ'd, That this is one way of acknowledging him, whom we are requir'd to own for our God.

II. Of acknowledging God by yielding Obedience to his Commands, I have spoken hitherto; and particularly, by yielding Obedience to such Commands as have a more immediate aspect upon himself: It remains that we entreat of our presenting him with some outward Note or Sign of our Submission, which is the second way of owning him with our Bodies. For inasmuch as God hath commanded us to *glorifie him with our Bodies*, as well as with *our Souls*; inasmuch as external Reverence is the most immediate expression of it; it follows, that to own him for our God, we are to add external Reverence to our Obedience, and present him with our Respects, as well as Submission to his Commands. Now there are two sorts of Notes or Signs, whereby we are to express our Reverence to the Divine Majesty.

1. The former whereof are perform'd within the Body.
2. The latter reaches to things without it.

1. Of the former sort are all those humble postures of Body wherewith we find devout Men to have honour'd their Maker; such as are, in particular, *Kneeling*, or *Falling down* before him, *Bowing down the Head*, or *uncovering it*; in fine, *the standing at a distance* from the Place of his more especial Presence, as we read the penitent Publican did; or *casting our* pensive *Eyes* upon the ground: All which, as we find to have been us'd by Holy Men, so, if we consult the Scriptures, not to have been without the Command of God, for the use of some or other of them: For thus, when the Devil would have woo'd our Saviour, by the proffer of the *Kingdoms of the World*, so to *fall down and worship him*, our Saviour not onely rejected the Motion, but made him answer out of the Scriptures, *Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him onely shalt thou serve.* In which place we do not onely find God claiming the Homage of our Service and Obedience, but the paying also of our Respects, in *falling down* and *worshipping* our Creator. Neither let any Man say (as there are those who are like enough to do it, how little ground soever there be for such an Answer) let not any Man, I say, make answer, That by Worship in that place, we are to understand an inward one: For as that was not it the Devil ask'd, but the *falling down* before him, and consequently no way agreeable to such an Interpretation; so the Greek word προσκυνήσις signifies External Adoration, and is accordingly, by *Hesychius*, explain'd by προσπίπτειν, or falling at ones Feet. And though it be true, that in the Original of the Old Testament, from whence this Text is borrowed, it be not *Thou shalt worship*, but *Thou shalt fear* the Lord thy God, which is an Act of inward Adoration; yet inasmuch as what the Devil ask'd was the outward one, and our Saviour himself, in his citation of it, apply'd it to that kind of Worship, it is manifest we are to understand both the one and other Adoration, our inward Fear, and the outward Expressions of it. But so that I may put this past all doubt, God hath given us yet more clearly to understand, in the Words of the next Commandment: For, forbidding

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in that the *bowing down* before an Image, becauſe he is a *jealous God*, he thereby plainly ſheweth, that he challeng'd that Honour to himſelf, the Worſhip of the outward, as well as of the inward Man. And indeed, provided that this Reverence do not degenerate into a Theatrical one, nor ſwallow up that inward regard which we ought eſpecially to intend, I know not how we can more approve our ſelves to him, whom we pretend to adore, than by making every Member ſome way contribute thereto. For how grateful muſt our Service needs be, when all that is within and without conſpires to it; and, whilſt the Tongue is doing its Devotions, the Knee is bowing to the Divine Majeſty, or (which was the Cuſtom of the *Jews*, and is ſtill of all the Eaſtern Nations) the whole Body, in token of its and the Souls ſubjection, lies proſtrate upon the Ground? Again, What is there which may be thought to engage the Soul's Obedience, that doth not in like manner concur to the Adoration of the other? Is the Soul of God's creation? So is the Body, as being not onely formed by him in its Protoplaſt *Adam*, but curiouſly wrought by God in that Womb that immediately conceiv'd it. Is the Soul redeem'd by the Holy *Jeſus*? So alſo is the Body, and ſhall be hereafter to much better purpoſes: *For ye are bought with a price* (ſaith the Apoſtle) *therefore glorifie God in your body, and in your ſpirit, which are ſo his.* Laſtly, Hath the Soul a ſhare in the Graces of the Spirit? So alſo hath the Body; as is evident from the Prayer of the fore-nam'd Apoſtle, where he not onely *beſeecheth God to ſanctifie them wholly*, but prayeth more particularly, *that their whole ſpirit, and ſoul, and body, might be preſerved blameleſs unto the coming of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt.* I conclude therefore (and I think too with much greater force than the *Pſalmiſt* does) *O come let us worſhip and bow down, let us kneel before the Lord our Maker*: For not onely is he our Maker, as that holy Man ſuggeſts; but our Redeemer and Sanctifier; and that too of thoſe very Bodies whoſe Reverence he requires.

2. Of ſuch outward Notes or Signs of Reſpect as terminate in the Body, I have ſpoken hitherto, and ſhewn our Obligation to them: It remains only, that we conſider thoſe to which though the Body is inſtrumental, yet paſs from thence to other things. Such as is,

1. The Building of Temples, or Places of Worſhip, to him whom we own for our God. For though (as St. *Paul* ſpeaks) *God that made the world, and all things therein, ſeeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands, neither is worſhipped with mens hands, as though he needed any thing*: yet, as the Cuſtom of the World, with the Approbation of God himſelf, hath in all times led Men to erect ſuch publick Places to him; ſo it was no more than decency, and a reſpect to the Divine Majeſty, prompted them to the doing of. For though (under the Goſpel eſpecially) any Place be proper for Divine Worſhip, becauſe by the Tenor of it we are oblig'd to have a greater regard to the Thing it ſelf, than to the Circumſtances thereof; yet inaſmuch as a Set place was requiſite to the performance of it, that ſo all the Worſhippers of the Divine Majeſty might know whither to reſort; inaſmuch as it was but ſuitable to the Greatneſs of God, that that Place which was appointed for his Publick Worſhip, ſhould be ſet apart from all common Uſes; laſtly, inaſmuch as the appropriating of that Place to it, was

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apt to imprint a Reverence of the Divine Majesty in those that resorted thither: for these Reasons, I say, it seemed but requisite that he should have a Temple erected to him, apart from the Places of more Common Uses. And accordingly, as before the Law they had their Altars; and under the Law, the Tabernacle, that famous Temple at *Jerusalem*, with Synagogues in their several Towns and Villages: so it will be no hard matter to discern the like Places of Divine Worship in the first beginnings of Christianity. As is evident from that known Passage of St. *Paul* to the *Corinthians*, 1 *Cor.* 11. 22. *What have you not houses to eat and to drink in? or despise ye the Church of God, and shame them that have not?* For not onely speaking before of their *coming together into one place*; but opposing *the Church of God*, not to other Assemblies, but to their own *Houses* and Places of abode, he plainly sheweth his meaning to be, not of the Assemblies themselves, but of the Places wherein they conven'd. And accordingly, as Mr. *Mede* hath shewn *that there were such Places in the following Ages, and before the Emperours were Christians; so he hath return'd a very satisfactory Answer to what is objected out of some ancient Writers, concerning the Christians not having any Temples, to wit, That they meant Temples in the Heathen sense, that is to say, wherein the Deity was enclos'd; as the Heathens, to whom they thus answer'd, suppos'd their own to be. However it be, there is reason enough in Nature for setting apart a certain Place for the Solemn Worship of God. And accordingly, when the Church had rest from Persecutions, such Places were every where erected to him, and the Christians declar'd their owning of the Lord for their God by it. All that I shall add concerning this Head, is that of Sir *Edwin Sandys*, in his most excellent Piece, entituled, *Europæ Speculum*; That *though the Ornaments of such places ought to be rather grave than pompous*, yet *it could never sink into his heart that the Allowance for furnishing them out should be measur'd by the scant Rule of meer Necessity (a proportion so low, that Nature it self hath gone beyond it, even in the most ignoble Creatures) or that God had enrich'd this lower World with such wonderful variety of things, beautiful and glorious, that they might serve onely to the pampering of mortal Man in his Pride; and that to the Service of the High Creator, Lord, and Giver (the outward Glory of whose higher Palace may appear by the very Lamps which we see so far off burning so gloriously in it) onely the simpler, baser, cheaper, less noble, less beautiful, and less glorious things, should be employ'd; especially seeing, even as in Princes Courts, so in the Service of God also, this outward State and Glory being well dispos'd, doth engender, quicken, encrease, and nourish the inward Reverence and respectful Devotion, which is due unto so Sovereign a Majesty; which those whom the use thereof cannot perswade, would easily by the want of it be forc'd to confess.* Neither will it suffice to say (as perhaps it may be by some Persons) That that Cost might with much more advantage be employ'd upon the Poor, those Living Temples of the Holy Ghost: for though it be not to be deny'd, that those ought more especially to be considered; yet, as it would be inquir'd, Whether, for the purposes of Charity, a deduction might not be made from the Ornaments of our own Houses, if our Estates cannot reach to the supplying of them both; so also, Whether the House of God ought not in this case to

* *Churches*, that is, *Appropriate Places for Christian Worship.*

have the precedence of our own; especially when God himself did sometime ask, *Whether it were time for the Israelites to dwell in cieled houses, when his lay waste*, Hag. 1. 4.

2. But beside the Dedicating of Temples to his Honour, whom we are commanded to own for our God; it is no less requisite to that purpose, that Solemn Times be set apart for the Publick Worship of God; and that, when they are so, they should be as Religiously observ'd: For, as it may seem but a just Tribute, to allot him a Portion of our Time, from whom we have the Grant of the Whole; so being so set apart, it is but reasonable it should be appropriated to his Service, and not, as it too often is, profaned by our own: he that honoureth any Person, naturally paying a Regard to whatsoever hath a relation to him. But because this will fall in more seasonably when we come to entreat of the Fourth Commandment, I will quit the prosecution of it at present, and descend to a

3. Third Note of Respect, which is, the setting apart a sort of Men to wait at his Altar, and perform the Publick Exercises of Religion; nothing making any Person or Thing more cheap and vile, than laying open the Offices that relate to it, to the will of every Man that shall have the hardiness to invade them. And accordingly, as before the Law, *the Elder* of the Family was Priest, as well as Prince; as under the Law, the *Tribe of Levi* was in their stead set apart for that Office; so our Saviour, to observe the same Method, chose the Twelve out of his Disciples, and Commission'd them, and them onely, to *go and teach all Nations, and baptize them* into his most excellent Religion; adding, in the close of it, That *he would be with them to the end of the world:* Which being not to be understood of them in their own Persons, because they are long since fallen asleep, it remains we understand it of Persons Commissionated by them, and so on to the present Age: For *all power* (as our Saviour affirms) *being given unto him*, and he Delegating the Ministerial one to those his Apostles; whatsoever Power of that nature can be pretended to, must derive it self from them, unless in case of extreme necessity, or an immediate Commission from Heaven. And accordingly, as the Apostles *ordain'd Elders in every City*, and transferr'd that their Power upon others; so the Chain of Succession hath been maintain'd by the same means, without any considerable interruption, till of late some have dared to invade it: Which is so much the more to be wondred at, because, as *no man* among the *Jews took that honour to himself, but he that was called of God, as was Aaron*; so the Author to the *Hebrews* (who tells us so much) adds, That *even Christ glorified not himself to be made an High Priest; but he that said unto him, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee.* Again,

Cap. 5. 4,5.

4. Fourthly, As to own the Lord for our God, it is requisite to set apart some Men to Minister before the Lord in the Congregation; so is it much more, when set apart, to respect them highly for their Work sake, and minister to them of the good things we enjoy. For, as next to the immediate dishonour of the Divine Majesty, there cannot be a greater affront to him, than to throw contempt upon those Persons whom he hath taken so nearly to himself; so God himself calls the defrauding them of their Maintenance, the

the *robbing of himself*; and, moreover, represents it as a Crime, which even the Heathen did abhor; as you may see *Mal.* 3. 8. Neither let any Man say, That this is to be understood onely of the *Jewish* Priests, whose Maintenance, as well as Function, was immediately appointed by himself: For, as there is no doubt the Evangelical Priesthood is much dearer to him than the Legal, and therefore what was said concerning the former, to be *à fortiori* applicable to the latter; so St. *Paul* tells us, in his first Epistle to the *Corinthians*, That like *as they which waited at the Altar were by the command of God to be partakers with the Altar; even so hath the Lord ordain'd, that they which preach the Gospel, should live of the Gospel*, 1 Cor. 9. 14. 1 Cor. 9. 14

5. Lastly, (which may comprehend many of the former Acknowledgments, and hath therefore this place assign'd it) Toward the owning the Lord for our God, it is requisite we should own him by the Liberality of our Hand, or, as the Book of *Proverbs* expresseth it, *Honour him with our Substance*, in token of having receiv'd it from him. For, this being grounded upon a natural Reason, and beside that, not onely an usual Testimony of Respect to Kings, but a Respect that was sometime paid our Saviour, by the Wise-men that came to worship him; it may seem but reasonable to think, that we are under the same Obligation: especially when we find also the Bread and Wine of the Sacrament to have been tender'd as an Acknowledgment of God's Sovereignty over the World, as well as of the Redemption of it by his Son. The onely Question that can be made, is, To whom these Offerings do belong, now Sacrifices are banish'd out of the Church. But as that will not be difficult for him to resolve, who shall reflect upon the fore-going Discourse; so, if we cannot find any other, we have the Poor always at hand, to whom, *whatsoever is this way done*, our Saviour tells us, is as *done unto himself*; and therefore also, in some measure, to the Divine Majesty. Such is the having the Lord for our God, as is here enjoyn'd; such the Tribute that is due to him from our Souls, and Bodies, and Substance: And happy they that shall so own him, because they are assur'd of a reciprocal Acknowledgment; and they shall be own'd as his People, who have this Sovereign Lord for their God.

PART VII.

That we ought to own the God of Israel both as the True God, and ours; which is the Second Capital Precept: *and how that is to be performed. The like inquir'd concerning the* Third, *even* The having no other Gods beside him: *Which is shewn to exclude, first, the substituting of any other in his room; where the Heathens worshipping of the Host of Heaven, Dead Men, Beasts, or Inanimate Creatures, is noted, and censured: Secondly, The receiving other Gods into Copartnership with him; where the Papists Practice, in Worshipping* Saints *and* Angels, *is considered, and reproved.*

THAT we ought *to have the One True God for our God,* hath been the Design of several Discourses to shew; together with the Ways and Means by which we are to acknowledge him. My proposed Method now leadeth me to evince,

II. II. *That we are to look upon the God of Israel as such,* and to pay him the Acknowledgments before remembred. But so that we are (to go no further for a proof) the Preamble to the Ten Commandments shews; he who requireth us to have *no other gods* before him, declaring himself, in that Preamble, to be that *Lord which brought them out of the Land of Egypt.* The onely thing whereof there can be any doubt, is, What Grounds there are so to own the God of the Israelites; and how those Acknowledgments ought to be circumstantiated, to refer them unto him: Neither the one nor the other whereof, will be hard for him to resolve, who doth but attentively consider them. For as the Scriptures of the Old Testament furnish us with Arguments enough to believe the God of *Israel* to be the True; witness those stupendious Miracles it declareth him to have effected, and those holy and equitable Laws which he promulg'd: so it is easie to see we shall then refer all our Acknowledgments to him, when we pay them in obedience to those Scriptures by which he hath declar'd himself to the World: For this will shew us not to worship an unknown and uncertain Deity, as we find the *Athenians,* and many other Heathens did; but him, who manifested himself to the *Israelites* in *Egypt,* by many Signs and Wonders, as afterwards by bringing them out with an high hand, and by those Wonders which he shew'd upon Mount *Sinai.* And having said thus much concerning the owning *the One True God,* and *the God of Israel,* I shall now proceed to,

III. III. The third and last thing contained in this Commandment, even *The not having any other gods but him.*

Now there are three things which are either imply'd, or expresly contain'd in the not having any other gods beside the True.

1. That we should not substitute any other in his room.
2. That we should not receive any other gods into copartnership with him: And,
3. Thirdly and lastly, That we should not attribute to any thing else, any part of that Honour which is due unto him.

1. The first of these is rather imply'd, than express'd; but so strongly

ſtrongly imply'd, that there cannot be any the leaſt doubt of it: For, beſide that the One True God doth here declare himſelf to be ſo, and not onely ſo, but call upon us to yield Obedience to all thoſe Commands which we are now upon the conſideration of; the very Words wherein this Commandment is expreſs'd, do *à fortiori* imply the not ſubſtituting any other in his room. For, if we may not have any other *before* or *beſide* him, much leſs may we admit of any to the utter excluſion of him, and build their Honour upon the Ruines of the other's. But ſuch Tranſgreſſors were the Heathen, or at leaſt a great part of them, after God had for their ſins given them over to vain imaginations; as worſhipping, in ſtead of him, all the Hoſt of Heaven, ſuch Men by whom their ſeveral Nations had receiv'd any great advantage, particularly, Kings and Princes; and in fine, the brute Beaſts, yea Inanimate Creatures. But how much they acted againſt the light of their own Reaſon, as well as the Precepts of this great Lawgiver, will eaſily appear, if we ſurvey the ſeveral Objects of their Worſhip.

To begin with the *Hoſt of Heaven*, even the Sun, Moon, and Stars, becauſe thought by Learned Men* to be the firſt Inſtances of Idolatry in the World: Concerning which, it is eaſie to ſhew, how unreaſonable it was to ſubſtitute them in the place of God. For though it be not to be doubted, but that great Benefits come from thence, particularly, from the Sun, by whoſe Influence this lower World is actuated; yet is there nothing in that glorious Body, which can tempt a conſidering Man to pay Divine Honours to it; it being evident to our ſenſe, that it moves and acts neceſſarily, neither can do any other than it doth. Which one thing, duly weigh'd, will, to all impartial Underſtandings, evince it not to have the Nature, or deſerve the Honour of a God. For, beſide that the Nature of God implieth the moſt Perfect One, and conſequently ſuch as is not ty'd up to Rules, but is free in its Motions and Operations; all the Honour of God (as the Author to the *Hebrews* obſerves) is built upon this great Principle, That *he is a rewarder of ſuch as diligently ſeek him:* Which Principle can have no place, where there is no freedom in acting; and the ſuppoſed Deity is oblig'd not onely to ſhine alike upon the evil and the good, but either to afford or withhold its ſhining, as the Laws of its Creation admoniſh, yea, as it pleaſeth thoſe Clouds that are below it.

* *Vid. Grot. Explic. Decal. & Job* 31.26.

From *the Hoſt of Heaven*, paſs we to *Men*, ſuch as many of thoſe were whom the Heathen worſhipp'd: Where again we ſhall ſee how little reaſon there was to ſubſtitute them in the place of God. For as even theſe could not ſave themſelves from death, but were fain to paſs through that, to their ſuppos'd Divinity; ſo, many of them were ſuch as may be ſuppos'd rather to have fallen into the ſtate of Devils, to whoſe nature they bear ſo great a reſemblance, than to be advanc'd to the Honour of Gods. To ſay nothing at all, that it appeareth not they had any knowledge of things below, and much leſs any Power either to reward or puniſh.

As little, yea, far leſs reaſon was there for the Worſhip of *Beaſts*, and *Inanimate Creatures*, which was the particular Error of the *Egyptians*, and the loweſt to which Humane Nature could fall; theſe having not ſo much as the Reaſon of a Man, and much leſs the Underſtanding

ſtanding to know the Neceſſities of thoſe that pray'd to them, or the Power to relieve and redreſs them.

2. But becauſe the not ſubſtituting Falſe Gods in the place of the True, is rather ſuppos'd by, than directly contain'd in the preſent Prohibition; proceed we to that which the Words do clearly and plainly import, even the not receiving any other into Copartnerſhip with him. Which, as it probably was the Error of the wiſer Heathen, ſo to be ſure is that which this Commandment doth more immediately ſtrike at; he that requireth the *not having any other gods before* or *beſide himſelf*, both ſuppoſing *the having of himſelf*, and forbidding the *ſuperinducing* any other. And in this notion it was that the *Samaritans* became Offenders againſt it, as you may ſee 2 *Kings* 17. 33. it being there remark'd concerning them, That *they feared the Lord, and ſerved their own Gods, after the manner of the Nations whom God carried away from thence.* From which Paſſage, compar'd with the preſent Prohibition, it is manifeſt, That to admit any Being into a Copartnerſhip with the True God, is enough to make a Man a Tranſgreſſor; the Law, at the ſame time it forbids the having of other Gods, ſuppoſing, in ſome meaſure, the having of the True. Which ſaid, I ſhall now inquire, Whether thoſe of the Church of *Rome* are not juſtly chargeable with the breach of it, in that Honour which they give both to *Saints* and *Angels.*

To begin with the Honour of *Saints departed*, becauſe moſt ſtood upon by them, and which indeed makes up a great part of their Religion: Concerning which, I ſhall propoſe to conſideration, Whether the *Prayers* they make to them, be not, in effect, to ſet up other Gods? For, is not Prayer a great part of Religious Worſhip? nay, is it not ſo conſiderable, as to give a denomination to the Place of God's Worſhip; yea, to be an Ingredient in his Titles? He himſelf calling *his Houſe the Houſe of Prayer*; and the Pſalmiſt, *him* that inhabiteth it, *the God that heareth it.* And is it then any other than the ſetting up other Gods, to make Saints departed the Objects of it? But it will be ſaid, it may be, That they do not pray to them, or at leaſt not in that manner they do to God; only imploring their Interceſſion with our Maker, and theirs; but begging no Bleſſing from themſelves. But firſt of all, *Quid verba audio, facta cum videam?* What will Words avail, when their Practice is oftentimes ſo contrary? Neither is there any real difference between their Prayers to them, and thoſe to God. I inſtance in that which the *Roſary* of the Virgin *Mary* preſents us with, where we have this very Prayer to the Mother of our Lord:

Vid. Jackſ of the Original of Unbelief, *&c. cap.* 28.

Virgo ſingularis,
Intra omnes mitis,
Nos culpis ſolutos,
Mites fac & caſtos;
Vitam præſta puram,
Iter para tutum.

That is to ſay, *O thou who art the chief of Virgins, and the meekeſt of all, after thou haſt freed us from our guilt, make us meek and chaſt; make our Life pure, and our Journey ſafe.* Which, what is it, but a Prayer to her, to grant us thoſe Bleſſings her ſelf, and not to intercede

cede with God for the granting of them? Neither will it ſuffice to ſay, That their meaning is onely that ſhe ſhould procure it to them by their Prayers, and that accordingly they do oftentimes ſo expreſs it: For, as it were eaſie for them to do it always, if they meant not to abuſe the World with their Diſtinctions; ſo I cannot forbear to ſay, that they ought to make uſe of more fit Terms, to expreſs their meaning, if they would free themſelves from the imputation of Idolatry. For, inaſmuch as God requires to be honour'd by the outward as well as the inward Man, how doth that Man ſatisfie his Duty, who makes not ſome diſtinction between the outward Worſhip he gives to God, and that which he preſents to the Saints departed? Our inward Worſhip being confeſſedly to be above that we have for others; and our outward Worſhip, but an Expreſſion of our inward. And indeed, however they may ſatisfie themſelves with ſuch Mental Reſervations, in a thing that ſtands in need of them, I doubt the humbleſt of them all would not be well pleas'd, if a Man ſhould beg thoſe things of their Servants, which are wholly theirs; and when he had done ſo, pretend he meant onely they ſhould procure them by their Interceſſion: Such an Allegation (as the Lawyers ſpeak) being *Proteſtatio contra factum*, and ſuch as agreeth not at all with that which they would defend. The Caſe would be yet more convincing, if we ſhould inſtance in a Malefactor, that ſhould petition a *Romiſh* Princes Servant for his Pardon: For if they are jealous of their Honour, as well as other Princes, there is no doubt they would ill reſent it, both from the Petitioner, and the Party that ſhould receive him; yea, though it ſhould be alledg'd in his excuſe, That his meaning was onely that he ſhould intercede with his Maſter for it, and that meaning of his were ſome way knowable to the Prince. For if Words were intended to expreſs Mens Conceits, they ought in reaſon to hold ſome reſemblance with them, eſpecially in a matter of ſo great importance.

But let us ſuppoſe, ſecondly, That they who pray to Saints, neither intended, nor expreſſed any other, than the begging of their Interceſſion with the Common Father of us all; yet even ſo, they cannot eſcape the imputation of taking them into a Copartnerſhip with the Almighty, becauſe thereby aſcribing to them a kind of Omniſcience, in ſuppoſing them able at that diſtance to hear the ſeveral Prayers that are put up to them in ſeveral Places; eſpecially when it appeareth not, that God makes any Revelations to them of the ſeveral things that are tranſacted here below: For as for that *ſpeculum Trinitatis* which they ſo much ſpeak of, and their ſeeing all things in God, it is a groundleſs and ridiculous Fancy; becauſe it is certain they cannot ſee the time of the Day of Judgment in it, and therefore neither any thing elſe, any farther than it ſhall pleaſe God to diſcover it.

But be it, thirdly, not only that their Interceſſion was all that were deſir'd, and that God reveal'd to them both their Prayers, and other Tranſactions here below; yet will there lie a juſt Exception againſt their addreſſing their Petitions as often, if not oftner, to the Saints, than to God himſelf; eſpecially when that is done in Places dedicated to God's Worſhip, and in the Times ſet apart for his Worſhip and Service. For, as this is a Practice too apparent to be deny'd; ſo it is, in that reſpect, not onely *the having of other Gods*, but (which is much worſe) *the preferring them* before the True: a greater Honour being

being thereby done to them to whom they do so often address themselves, than to him whose Altars are so little frequented. The onely thing that can with any shew of reason be reply'd, is, That it is in reverence to the Divine Majesty, that they address themselves rather to his Servants, than to him: For, observing that it is not the manner of Princes to admit every Man to present his Petitions himself, partly for avoiding of Trouble, which would otherwise be infinite; and partly for the preserving of their State; they conclude from thence, That the like or a greater Reverence to God must needs prompt us to take the same course, and present our Petitions rather by the Saints, than by our selves. But beside that we are not destitute of such a Mediatour, if we will acknowledge our Saviour to be so, God himself hath both allow'd and enjoyn'd us to come unto him, and promis'd to accept us if we do. And then certainly it is rather a contempt of him (because against his express Command) to take another course, than any true Reverence to the Divine Majesty.

From *Invocation* or *Prayer* to Saints, pass we to *Swearing by them*; which is another thing both practis'd and defended by the Church of *Rome*. Where, who is there beside themselves, that sees not how it intrenches upon the Divine Honour, yea adopts them into the place of God? For Swearing, as was before observ'd, being a calling one to witness to the sincerity of our Affirmations, and to punish us if we prevaricate in what we affirm; he that Swears by any Person, makes him the Knower of our Hearts, and an Avenger of those that do prevaricate. Which, what is it but to rob God of two of the fairest Flowers of his Diadem, and to place them in that of the Saints departed? What should I tell you of their *consecrating Temples and Altars to them*; of their *burning Incense before them*, and *dedicating Festivals to them*; of *using the same lowly Prostrations before their Images*, and of *making Vows to them* in their distress? For inasmuch as these, and other such like, are the onely ways Men have to express their inward Regard to the Divine Majesty, what is it, but (as far as the outward Man is capable of doing it) to admit him into a Copartnership; or, as the Commandment expresseth it, *to have other Gods* beside the True? It being enough to ground that Charge, to make them Sharers of those Honours, which are the onely ones we have to express our Reverence to the Almighty. And though I know this also is not without its Excuse, they pretending not so much to honour the Saints departed, as God, in and through them; yet as there ought in reason to be a difference between the Honour of a Supreme, and of those who are but his Servants and Dependents; so (as * *Philo* well observeth) *to give equal Things to unequal Persons, is not so much for the honour of the Inferiour, as it is to the dishonour of him that is above them.* To all which, if we add, That God is a jealous God, and hath declar'd himself to be so, especially in the matter of his Worship; so we shall not need to doubt of the importance of that Prohibition, *Thou shalt have no other Gods before me*: Jealousie naturally arising not from manifest espousing of other Loves, but from warping toward them, and entertaining them with the same shew of kindness and familiarity, wherewith they are wont to receive the legitimate Object of it.

* *De decalog. in explicat. prac.* 1.

From *Saints departed*, pass we to *Angels*; concerning whom, the same

ſame may be ſaid that was of the other; with this onely difference, that there is a greater reaſon to preſume ſome of them to be acquainted with our Prayers, becauſe they are ſent forth by God to miniſter to us, and appointed to be our Watch and Defence. But as it follows not from thence, that we may pray to them as we do to God, nor entertain them with the ſame Honours and Adorations; ſo the Scripture hath particularly caution'd us againſt making them our Mediators, or giving them the outward Worſhip of God. For thus, *Col.* 2. 18, 19. we are bidden to take heed *leſt any man beguile us of our reward, in a voluntary humility, and worſhipping of angels, intruding into thoſe things which he hath not ſeen, vainly puft up by his fleſhly mind: And not holding the head, from which all the body by joynts and bands having nouriſhment miniſtred, and knit together, increaſeth with the increaſe of God.* For, as it is manifeſt, from the *voluntary humility* upon which it is grounded, that the Apoſtles meaning is not to decry the making them equal with God, (that having not any the leaſt ſhadow of Humility) but the making uſe of them as Mediators to him; ſo it is much more, becauſe he affirmeth thoſe that do ſo, *not to hold the head*, even Chriſt Jeſus, *from whom all the body by joynts and bands having nouriſhment miniſtred and knit together, increaſeth with the increaſe of God.* He thereby plainly deſtroying the making uſe of any other Mediator between us and God, to procure that ſpiritual Nouriſhment which we want. There is the ſame or a greater evidence againſt entertaining them with ſuch Honours as either the Conſent of ſome Nations hath appropriated unto God, or ſome particular Age or Place hath devoted to his Service: For thus, for the former; When *Manoah* would have detain'd the Angel of the Lord, whilſt he made ready a Kid; ſuppoſing there might be ſome deſign of Sacrificing in it, he made anſwer, That *if he ſhould detain him, he would not eat of it*; and, if his meaning was *to offer a burnt-offering, he muſt offer it to the Lord*: thereby plainly removing all Attempts of that nature toward himſelf, and confining ſuch kind of Services unto God, *Judg.* 13. 16. In like manner, when St. *John* would have *fallen down at the feet of an Angel, to worſhip him* (which I am apt to think, both from this place, and St. *Peter*'s refuſing the like Geſture from *Cornelius*, to have been more particularly devoted by that Age or Place to the Worſhip of God) when, I ſay, *St. John would have thus fallen down at the feet of the Angel, to worſhip him*, the Angel made anſwer, *See thou do it not; for I am thy fellow-ſervant, and of thy brethren which have the teſtimony of Jeſus: worſhip God.* Which Paſſage doth not onely deſtroy the giving of ſuch Worſhip to Angels, but alſo remove that Anſwer which is given by *Grotius* and others to it; to wit, That the Angel forbad it, not becauſe of any unlawfulneſs in it, but onely for its unſuitableneſs from an Apoſtle to an Angel, who was but his Brother and Fellow-ſervant: For, as he there affirms himſelf to be a Brother and Fellow-ſervant alſo of thoſe that had the Teſtimony of *Jeſus*, which more beſide the Apoſtles had; ſo adding in the cloſe of it, *Worſhip God*, he plainly ſhews he had a further reaſon in forbidding it, even becauſe of its propriety to the Divine Majeſty. For though ſuch a Geſture was indifferent in it ſelf, and accordingly had been frequently us'd even by good Men, toward thoſe of the ſame make with themſelves; yet either that Age had in a man-

Vid. Grot. in explicat. Decalog. ubi hunc locum ad Coloſſenſes egregiè explicat.

ner appropriated it to the Worship of God, or the Angel thought that Reverence might have been liable to misconstruction, in those who should afterwards hear of it: Either of which will tie us up from giving them such outward Adoration, as may but seem to intrench upon the Divine: For, if the fear of the latter, made an Angel refuse it, yea, lay a strict charge upon St. *John* not to do it; we may be sure God is extremely jealous in this particular, and forbids the very semblances thereof. For, as for those who would have St. *John* faulted here, for bowing down to the Angel, as to God; it is absurd, yea, impious, to conceive of so great an Apostle, especially after he had been once admonish'd of it: but much more absurd to believe so of *Cornelius* (who yet was in like manner chid for falling down at *Peter*'s Feet) because he had no reason to take him for other than a Man, though designed by God for his Instructer. From all which, put together, it is manifest, That to give either *Saints* or *Angels* the same outward Worship with their Maker, is a thing which he abhors, and looks upon as the taking other Gods into a Copartnership with him.

See *Jackson* of the Original of Unbelief, &c. *chap.* 26.

But leaving the *Papists*, against whose Errours yet it was but necessary to caution you, especially in a matter of so great importance; let us inquire a little whether some of us are not as guilty of having other Gods before the True: For, do not some Men (as the Apostle speaketh) *make their Belly their God*, and devote the main of their Endeavours to the satisfaction of it? Do not other Men make a God of their Palate, and make it their chief Business to gratifie it? Do not a third sort (as the Prophet *Habakkuk* * speaks) *sacrifice to their net*, and *burn incense to their drag?* that is to say, to their own either Parts, or Endeavours, whilst they ascribe their Success and Wealth to them? Again, Do we not fear some Men equally with, yea, more than God? Do not those Fears oftentimes put us upon transgressing his Commands? Do we not love other Persons, or Things, as much or more than our Maker? Do we not love them, as God wills us to do himself, with all our heart, and mind, and strength? In fine, Do we not often trust in the Arm of Flesh, and say unto it, *Thou art our confidence?* But what is this less than the having other Gods before, that I say not to the exclusion of the True? For, if to Fear, and Love, and Trust, be Acts of inward Devotion, especially when rais'd above the pitch of Created Excellencies; he that so either loves, or fears, or trusts, turneth the *Monarchy* of Heaven into a *Commonwealth*, and makes as many Gods, as there are Persons or Things which he doth so adore.

* 1. 15.

PART

PART VIII.

Concerning the attributing to a Creature any part of the Honour that is due to God; which is the laſt thing excluded by the Third Capital Precept *of this Commandment. That done either directly and expreſly, as by giving to it the Name of God, without any diminiſhing Explication; or indirectly, and by conſequence: Of which ſort is the attributing to Natural Agents the Succeſs even of Natural Force, or aſcribing to them Supernatural one. Upon occaſion of which laſt, inquiry is made into the Lawfulneſs of* Aſtrological Predictions; *of attempting to diſcover Secrets, whether paſt or preſent, by Means equally unapt; or remove Evils by Charmes and Amulets. A Concluſion of the whole, with a brief Account of Mens tranſacting with the* Devil; *where is ſhewn, That we have little reaſon to queſtion the truth of ſuch Tranſactions, and far leſs to allow them.*

3. THAT we ought not to ſubſtitute any other Gods in the room of the True, or receive any other into Copartnerſhip with him, enough hath been ſaid to ſhew, where I had thoſe for the Subject of my Diſcourſe. Nothing remains toward a full Explication of the Commandment, but to ſhew in like manner, that we ought not to attribute to any thing elſe any part of that Honour which is due unto him. A thing which the Words of the Prophet *Iſaiah* * (*And my glory will I not give unto another*) as well as the importance of this Commandment, will warrant us to affirm: He who attributeth to any thing elſe, any part of that Honour which is due unto him, ſo far as he doth ſo, both making that his God, and giving the Glory of God to it. The onely thing therefore that it will concern us to inquire into, is, By what ways that is, or may be done; which accordingly I come now to inveſtigate. * 42. 8.

Now there are two ways whereby that may be done, and which therefore are to be ſuppos'd to be alike forbidden by this Commandment; the giving of God's Glory directly and expreſly, or indirectly and by conſequence. In the former of theſe I place, firſt, the giving to any Created Being the Name of God, without any diminiſhing Explication. A thing which hath not been unuſual with fawning Perſons, in their Addreſſes to Princes, and other ſuch Great Perſonages: For thus, when *Herod*, arrayed in his Royal Apparel, made an Oration to thoſe of his Juriſdiction, the Text tells us, that, at the concluſion of it, *they gave a ſhout, ſaying, It is the voice of a God, and not of a Man*, Act. 12. 22. By which means, as they did directly and expreſly give the Honour of God to a mortal Man, and conſequently became Tranſgreſſors of this Commandment; ſo God ſhew'd ſo much diſpleaſure at the thing, that he aveng'd himſelf upon *Herod*, for not averting that Blaſphemous Appellation from himſelf. And though the like cannot lightly be thought to happen under the Goſpel, eſpecially after ſo plain a declaration of the diſpleaſure of God againſt it; yet it is ſufficiently known, that ſome of the Church of *Rome* have proceeded to ſo great a degree of Flattery and Blaſphemy, as to ſtile the

Pope of *Rome*, *Our Lord God the Pope.* I place in the ſame rank, what was no leſs uſual an Extravagancy in former days, *the Building of Temples, or offering Sacrifices to mortal Men*: Of which kind of Honours the Apoſtles of our Lord were ſo apprehenſive, that *when the Prieſt of Lyſtra brought Oxen and Garlands to their Gates, and would have done Sacrifice* to *Paul* and *Barnabas*, for recovering an impotent Cripple; both the one and the other of them *rent their clothes* at the mention of it, and labour'd by all means poſſible to divert them from their purpoſe. But becauſe ſuch kind of Extravagancies are not ſo uſual in our days, unleſs it be to *Departed Saints*, for which I have ſufficiently accounted already; I will leave both that, and the preſent Head, when I have advertis'd you, That it is alike offenſive to bear a Man's ſelf as a God, whether by commanding ſuch kind of Honours from other Men, or receiving them when offer'd by them; he that doth ſo, making a Deity of himſelf, and conſequently bringing himſelf within the compaſs of the Commandment.

How the Glory of God may be given to another directly and expreſly, you have ſeen already, and might, with a little advertency, have diſcover'd without my help, becauſe it ſufficiently betrayeth it ſelf: Proceed we therefore to inquire, how it may be done indirectly, and by conſequence; becauſe that is not ſo obvious and apparent. Where, firſt, I ſhall reckon as an inſtance of it, the attributing the Succeſs of any Enterpriſe whatſoever, to thoſe Natural Agents which are made uſe of to compaſs it: For, it appearing both from the Scriptures, and our own Experience, that whatſoever aptitude there is in the Force we make uſe of, yet the Succeſs of it depends upon the Bleſſing of the Divine Providence (it being equally true in other Caſes, what St. *Paul* ſpoke in a particular one, *That Paul may plant, and Apollo may water; but it is God that muſt give the increaſe*) whoſoever ſhall go about to attribute the Succeſs of any Enterpriſe to his own or others Endeavors, muſt conſequently be thought to give the Glory of God to another, and therefore ſo far alſo makes a God of it. But from hence it will follow, That he giveth the Glory of God unto another, who either before the Event, depends upon Natural Cauſes for the producing of it; or aſcribes it to their Force and Vertue, after it is accompliſhed. Which latter is ſo plain and obvious, that
* *Chap.* 1. 16. when the Prophet *Habakkuk* * would repreſent the criminalneſs thereof unto the *Jews*, he expreſſeth it *by ſacrificing to their nets, and burning incenſe to their drags*; Ceremonies which are ſufficiently known to have been made uſe of by all Nations, to expreſs their Reverence to their Gods.

From the attributing the Succeſs of any thing to Natural Agents, paſs we to the attributing to them Supernatural Force, and ſuch as is proper to God onely. In the number of which, I reckon, Foreknowledge of contingent Events; the Diſcovery of other Secrets, whether paſt or preſent, by Means which have no natural aptitude to diſcloſe them; and the making uſe of the like unapt Means, to prevent or remove Evils. For, though it be not to be doubted, that theſe may belong to Men, yea, did actually concur in the Prophets and Apoſtles; for which cauſe it may ſeem no immediate intrenchment upon God's Glory, to attribute them to mortal Men: yet as thoſe who were Partakers of them, became ſo by the Grace of God, to whom alone they

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do primarily belong; ſo he who attributes them to any Creature, as ſuch, and without conſideration of the Divine Majeſty's imparting them, muſt conſequently be thought to give the Honour of God to them, becauſe implying thoſe Qualities to be inherent in their Nature, which are ſo onely in the Divine, and by whom alone they can be imparted. For the more particular evidencing whereof, I will reſume each of the Particulars before-remembred; and firſt, the Foreknowledge of contingent Events.

Now there are two things manifeſtly implied in that Foreknowledge whereof we ſpeak; and which therefore are to be carefully heeded, when we affirm it to be peculiar to the Divine Majeſty: Firſt, that it be *certain*, and not *conjectural onely*; and ſecondly, That it be of ſuch Events as are *purely contingent*, that is to ſay, of thoſe that are altogether uncertain, and particularly ſuch as depend upon the variable Will of Man, or the meer Will and Pleaſure of the Almighty. Thus to inſtance in the former of theſe, though it cannot certainly be known before-hand, by Natural Force, what ſhall be the Event of any Battel, becauſe the Event of that, and other ſuch like weighty Actions, depend upon an infinity of Circumſtances, which it is impoſſible for the Wit of Man to foreſee; yet may it oftentimes be conjectur'd, by thoſe who have conſidered of the Preparations of the one and the other Party, their uſual manner of, or Courage in Fighting, and the Advantages or Diſadvantages of either: For though the *Victory* be not always *to the ſtrongeſt* and the *wiſeſt*, God Almighty, in his Providence, ſometime caſting it upon the weakeſt, by the interpoſition of ſome unlook'd-for Accident; yet inaſmuch as God for the moſt part works by ordinary Means, and gives Succeſs to thoſe Agents which are moſt apt to produce it, it may not improbably be conjectur'd, by him who hath conſider'd the Advantages or Diſadvantages on either hand, on which Side the Victory ſhall fall, though he pretend to no other Skill than what Humane Reaſon furniſheth. In like manner, becauſe thoſe great Lights the Stars have an unqueſtionable Influence upon Humane Bodies, as the Temperament of the Body upon that Soul which is joyned with it; poſſibly a Conjecture may be made, by thoſe who are well vers'd in either, what Courſes Men ſhall take who are born under ſuch or ſuch Conſtellations; becauſe Men do, for the moſt part, or at leaſt where they are not over-ruled by the Divine Providence, follow the conduct of their natural Temperament, as that doth the ſway of the Celeſtial Influences. But, as it is one thing to ſay, That thoſe things may be conjectur'd; and another, That they may be certainly foreknown, by the Poſition of the Heavenly Bodies, or other Means: ſo, that they cannot be ſo foreknown, needs no other proof, than that Liberty of Will which God hath given a Man, as to his own Actions, and the alterations that are made in Men by Education and Grace, and infinite external Impediments; by means of which, Men naturally ill diſpoſed may become good, or better, as the Divine Goodneſs ſhall miniſter opportunity. Again, As that Foreknowledge, which we affirm to be peculiar to the Divine Majeſty, muſt be ſuppos'd to be *certain*, and ſuch as may deſerve the Name of Knowledge, and not onely of Conjecture, or Gueſs; ſo a Foreknowledge of ſuch things as are *purely contingent* and *uncertain*: For of ſuch Effects as are neceſſary, no doubt there may be a Foreknowledge, yea, ſuch a

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Foreknowledge, as, the ordinary course of Things considered, is as certain in it self, as the knowledge of those things that are present to us. Thus, for instance, though there be no Foreknowledge of Mens Actions, and the Events of them, because the Dispositions of Men are alterable by Custom and Education, and much more by the Divine Providence; yet there may be a Foreknowledge of the Eclipses of the Sun and Moon, and other such the Affections of Heavenly Bodies; because the Courses and the Causes of them are constant and uniform, and may therefore, where those Causes and Courses are consider'd and understood, be not onely preconjectur'd by us, but certainly and infallibly foreknown. But, as it is one thing to say, That *necessary* Effects may be foreknown; and another, That *purely contingent* ones may: so, that the latter cannot be foreknown by Humane Understandings, is evident from the manner of their procedure. For Humane Knowledge proceeding by the consideration of the Causes; where those Causes are uncertain, our Knowledge also must be, and either none at all, or conjectural. And indeed, however the Wit of Man hath arrogated to it self the Foreknowledge of Future Contingents, yet is that not onely above the reach of Humane Understandings, but the peculiar Prerogative of the Divine; as is evident from *Isa.* 41.21. and *Isa.* 42. 8. For arguing, in the former place, the nothingness of the Heathen Deities, from their utter inability *to declare the things that shall be hereafter*; as, in the latter, asserting the Truth of his own Godhead, from *his ability to declare them*: he thereby plainly sheweth, that the Foreknowledge of future Things is the Prerogative of the Divine Nature, and of those to whom he shall be pleas'd to impart it. Where therefore that Foreknowledge is pretended to, without a peculiar Revelation from God, he who doth so, must consequently arrogate to himself the Glory of the Divine Majesty; and he who attributeth it to him, so far forth make a God of him. Neither will it avail to say, That that Foreknowledge which we appropriate unto God, hath evidenc'd it self in Men, by the falling out of several of those Events which they have foretold: For, as it is not at all to be wondred, that they should sometime hit the Mark, who throw so many Darts at it; so they whose both Religion and Education dispos'd them to an approbation of such kind of Arts, saw the vanity of them, and stuck not to discover it to the World: *Tully* * in particular affirming, *That the far greater part of those things which the Soothsayers foretold, fell out otherwise than they were predicted*; and so often, that (as the same *Tully* informs us) *Cato was wont to say, That he wondred very much how such kind of Persons could forbear laughing when they saw one another*: That *even the Responses of their Oracles were partly false, and partly casually true*; That *they were many times modell'd by the Humour and Bribes of those who did consult them*; That *they were express'd at some times in such Terms as were not easie to be understood*; *and at other times, in such equivocal ones as might be adapted to contrary Events*: In fine, That *the whole Art of Divination was but Conjecture, and subject to more uncertainty than those Events it pretended to foretell.* All which things whosoever shall seriously consider, will find the Foreknowledge of Men, not inspir'd by the Almighty, to be rather overthrown than confirm'd by their Predictions; there being little fear of its receiving any countenance

* *De Divinat. lib.* 2.

nance from those Divinations, which they, who were highly concern'd to propugn as true, did not yet stick to affirm to be fallacious and vain.

Having thus shewn Foreknowledge of Things contingent to be the Prerogative of the Divine Nature, and consequently not to be attributed to any Creature, to which he hath not been pleas'd to impart it, without giving the Glory of God to another; it remains that we also shew the same of the discovery of other Secrets, whether past, or present, by Means which have no natural aptitude to disclose them. Who they are that arrogate such a Power unto themselves, or others, need not be told you, when the generality of the Common sort, to discover any thing lost, or stollen, make use of Magical Arts, or resort to those that do; things which have no natural tendency to the discovery of that which they are made use of to disclose. The onely thing worth our while to shew, is, That so to do, is to intrench upon the Divine Prerogative, and give the Glory of God unto another. A Charge which it will be impossible for those whom they call *Cunningmen* to avoid, though we should absolve them from any express or tacite Stipulation with the Devil. For that which hath no natural aptitude for that purpose for which it is made use of, requiring the creating of one; as that again, the Work of an Almighty Power; he who pretends an Ability in himself, or others, to make it successful to that purpose for which it hath no natural aptitude, must consequently suppose himself, or those others, to have a Power to give it one; which is a manifest Usurpation upon the Almighty. But then, if we consider such Arts as are either tacite or express Applications to the Devil, under which Notion it is reasonable enough to look upon them (for as the Things such Persons make use of, have no natural aptitude for such a Discovery; so they have no reason at all to expect it from God, especially after the prohibition * of such Courses, and must therefore expect it from the Devil) so, I say, we shall be less to seek for a proof of *their giving the Glory of God unto another*, who make use of such unlawful Arts to compass their Designs: He who applieth himself to the Devil for the discovery of any Secret, both supposing him not to be without an ability to do it, and depending and trusting in him for it. Which, what is it, but to exalt the Devil into the place of God, and make him, whom the Scripture stiles *The God of this World*, to be no less *our own?* For though many things which are secret to us, may yet be known to him, as having possibly tempted the Party inquir'd after to the committing of them; yet we cannot well suppose, that this or that particular one is, unless we suppose that all Secrets of Men are: Which, though it do not amount to an Omniscience, yet seems too great a Knowledge for any Created Being to be Master of; partly, because we find God, *Deut.* 29. 29. *challenging the knowledge of secret things to himself:* but more especially, because in one of the Places before-quoted out of the Prophet *Isaiah*, he argueth the nothingness of the Heathen Deities, as well as the reality of his own, *from their being unable to declare the former things what they be, as well as to declare things that are to come*, both which *he challengeth to himself.* Which way of Reasoning would have been fallacious, if *to declare the former things what they be*, were not the Privilege of the Divine Nature, as well as *the declaring of things to come.*

* See *Lev.* 19. 31. *Deut.* 18. 9, 10, *&c.*

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The Caſe will be yet more clear, concerning Mens exalting the Devil into the place of God, if thoſe Applications which they make to him, be attended with a Compact of giving up themſelves unto his Service: for, ſo doing, they ſhall not onely renounce their Allegiance to their Maker, with which the Service of the Devil is inconſiſtent; but manifeſtly ſeat him in God's Throne, and give him that Honour which belongs to him.

To the diſcovery of Things ſecret by ſuch Means as are no way apt to diſcloſe them, ſubjoyn we, as of near affinity with it, the making uſe of Means equally unapt to procure freedom from thoſe Evils which we either fear or feel. In which number I reckon, not onely thoſe *Charmes*, or *Spells*, or *Amulets*, which are made uſe of by the Ordinary ſort, to avert any Evils from themſelves, or Cattel; but ſuch as are made uſe of, with more ſhew of Devotion, by the *Papiſts*, to avert any Evils either from themſelves, or Fruit, or other Subſtance. That ſuch things as theſe have no natural aptitude for thoſe Effects which they are deſign'd to produce, is too apparent to be deny'd; and will, I ſuppoſe, not be affirm'd by thoſe who make uſe of them, if it were but for the credit of their own Art or Superſtition. It remaineth therefore, if we ſuppoſe them to have any Force, (as ſurely thoſe who make uſe of them, would not otherwiſe employ them) that they receive that Force either from God, or the Uſer, or the Devil. To ſuppoſe they receive it from God, is highly unreaſonable, unleſs we had the Authority of ſome immediate Revelation for it: Becauſe thoſe miraculous Effects which the Apoſtles themſelves produc'd, were the Reſults of their Faith, which ſuppoſeth a Divine Revelation to found it ſelf upon. If therefore the Means before-ſpoken of receive that Force which we expect from them, it muſt be either from our ſelves, or the Devil: Both the one and the other of which, will involve the Party that uſeth them, in giving the Glory of God unto another. For inaſmuch as the Means we make uſe of, hath no natural aptitude for that Effect which is deſign'd to be produc'd by it, it remaineth, that if it receive any from us, it muſt be created therein by us; which is to attribute to our ſelves, or thoſe we apply our ſelves to, one of the principal Prerogatives of the Almighty. All therefore that remains to be ſaid, in excuſe of ſuch Practices, is, That we expect it from the Devil; which yet is (God knoweth) one of the greateſt aggravations of their Guilt: For, beſide that God hath declar'd himſelf an irreconcileable Enemy to the Devil, and cannot therefore but look upon any Application to him, as an Act of Oppoſition to himſelf; he who applieth himſelf to the Devil, for the prevention or removal of any Evil, muſt conſequently be ſuppoſed to deſire it, both againſt the Will, and without the help of the Almighty. The former, becauſe there is no Evil which doth or can befal us, but by his Providence: The latter, becauſe God, *from whom every good and perfect gift cometh*, cannot be ſuppos'd to communicate it by his hands, to whom he profeſſeth himſelf an Enemy; eſpecially when the Boon we expect is ask'd not of God, to whom we are requir'd to addreſs our ſelves, but of him who is no leſs God's Enemy than ours. Now, who ſeeth not, that ſuch Applications as theſe, involve thoſe that make them, in giving the Glory of God to another, if not in ſetting him far above Him? He who deſireth any Boon of another, without the help of God, ſuppoſing

posing that other to be self-sufficient; as he who desires and expects it against the will of God, that he is able to controul Him. Neither will it avail to say, which yet is commonly pretended, That all who make use of such Arts, have not any intention or suspicion of making any Application to the Devil: For though I am willing enough to believe, that many of them have not; and cannot therefore but acquit them from the purpose of it: yet it is past either my skill, or theirs, to acquit them from the thing it self, or from being look'd upon as chargeable with it: Men being justly chargeable with making Applications to the Devil, who make use of such Means for the attaining of their Purpose, the Success whereof cannot rationally be expected from any other; especially when God himself hath caution'd Men against the use of them, and represented them as detestable and abominable, yea, to such a Degree, as to occasion the *casting out those Nations* who possess'd the Land of *Canaan* before the *Israelites*. Which how they should be thought to do, if they were rather vain Curiosities, than secret or open Transactions with the Devil, will, I think, be very difficult to determine. And indeed, as some of those Persons have the Title of *Dealers with Familiar Spirits*, and all of them are represented under the same Guilt, and obnoxious to the same Penalties; so it is strange to observe, that some Men should be so highly unreasonable, as to question that Diabolical Commerce, after so many *Authentick Stories* which have been publish'd to the World concerning it, the *free Confession of the accused Parties*, and *the Sentences of grave and sober Judges*; but especially after what the Scriptures of the New Testament have declar'd concerning the Devil and his Angels: They representing the Devil and his Ministers as *encompassing the earth to procure mischief*, as *the God of this world*, and *ruling in the children of disobedience*, as *entring*, through the Divine Permission, *into men*, and *speaking in and by them*; in fine (for so we read, *Acts* 16. 16.) *divining*, as well as using other Speeches by them, and suggesting those Soothsayings for which such kind of Persons are resorted to. After all which, to question either the possibility or truth of a Diabolical Commerce, is not onely to be unreasonably scrupulous, but to be impudently unbelieving; because contradicting the general Sense and Experience of the World, and the clear Declarations of the Scriptures. I will conclude this Affair with a Passage in *Leviticus**, because both expressing God's detestation of all Magical Practises, and his accounting of them as Idolatry, or the giving of his Glory unto another: *And the Soul that turneth after such as have familiar spirits, and after wizards, to go a whoring after them, I will even set my face against that man, and will cut him off from among his people.* For representing such Addresses under the term of *going a whoring*, which, in the Language of the Old Testament, is no other than the espousing of other Deities; he thereby giveth us to understand, that they are in effect an Abrenunciation of himself, and an espousing of other Deities in stead of him.

* *Chap.* 20. 6.

O THE

THE SECOND
COMMANDMENT.

COMMANDMENTS

THE SECOND COMMANDMENT.

Thou ſhalt not make to thy ſelf any graven image, nor the likeneſs of any thing that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the water under the earth. Thou ſhalt not bow down to them, nor worſhip * them: For I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, and viſit the ſins † of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me, and ſhew mercy unto thouſands in them that love me, and keep my commandments.

* or ſerve. † or iniquity.

PART I.

The Contents.

That what we reckon as the Second Commandment, is really ſuch, and not an Appendix of the Firſt. This evidenc'd by ſeveral Reaſons; as alſo that it reſpects the Manner, and not the Object of our Worſhip. The Commandment divided into a Precept, and a Sanction; as that again into an Affirmative, and Negative one. The Affirmative, That we worſhip God after a due manner; which alſo is there ſpecified: and particularly, That we worſhip God in Spirit *and* Truth, *the purport whereof is at large declar'd. Among other things, the Queſtions concerning* Will-worſhip, *and worſhipping God with* Ceremonies, *diſcuſſed and ſtated.*

I Am now arriv'd at the *Second Commandment*; for ſo I hope I may have leave to call it, after the Travels of our Divines upon that Argument: For though the *Papiſts* repreſent it as an Appendix onely to the Firſt, and, which is much worſe, have, upon that pretence, raz'd it quite out of their *Catechiſms*; yet is there ſo little reaſon for their way of Reckoning, and ſo much for ours, that I doubt not all impartial Men will caſt it on their ſides who look upon it as diſtinct from the former Precept. For beſide that all Antiquity

tiquity * generally have ſo accounted of it, or at leaſt have united it to the Firſt upon different grounds; beſide, that it ſeem'd but requiſite that proviſion ſhould be made for the *manner* of our Worſhip, as well as for the *Object* of it; beſide, laſtly, that the worſhipping of the True God by an Image, is elſewhere as expreſly forbidden, as the ſubſtituting of Falſe Gods in his room: beſide all theſe things, I ſay, which yet are very material Conſiderations; the very words of the Commandment, to a diligent Obſerver, ſhew the Manner of our Worſhip to be the thing aimed at in them: For, forbidding to make or worſhip the *likeneſs* of any thing, either in the upper or lower World, he thereby plainly declared his meaning to be, not to caution them againſt an undue Object, but againſt that kind of Adoration; he who worſhippeth the *likeneſs* of any thing, making not that his God before which he ſo falls down, but that which it was deſigned to repreſent. Which is ſo true, that the *Papiſts* themſelves are forc'd to alledge it in behalf of their own Idololatrical Worſhip. Neither will it ſuffice to ſay (as I find it is by them) That what we call the *Second Commandment* did therefore deſcend to inſtance in Images, becauſe thoſe were the chief Gods among the Heathen: For as the generality of the Heathen were undoubtedly too wiſe to terminate their Worſhip there, the very Name of an Image directing Men to that of which it is ſo an Image; ſo it is not eaſie to conceive, ſave *of the very Beaſts of the People*, that they ſhould believe a Stone, or a piece of Wood, to be a God. From our own Account, paſs we to that of our Adverſaries, which we ſhall find to be more groundleſs than the former: For, as without any cogent Reaſon, or indeed onely probable one, they annex this *Second Commandment* to the Firſt; ſo, againſt all Senſe and Reaſon, they divide that into two, which ſaith, *Thou ſhalt not covet thy neighbours houſe, wife, &c.* making the Ninth to be, *Thou ſhalt not covet thy neighbours wife*; as the Tenth, *Thou ſhalt not covet other the poſſeſſions of thy neighbour.* But beſide that our Saviour himſelf referr'd the looking upon a Woman to luſt after her, to that of, *Thou ſhalt not commit adultery*; it is to be obſerv'd, That in the Twentieth Chapter of *Exodus*, which was the Copy of the *Decalogue* as it was given, *Moſes* reckons *the coveting of the houſe* firſt, and then *that of our neighbours wife*: So that, by their Account, the Ninth Commandment ſhould lie in the Body of the Tenth, and the Tenth lie part of it before the Ninth, and part of it after; which (as a Learned Man hath well obſerv'd *) is a Prejudice againſt it, far greater than can be out-weigh'd by any or all the Pretences that can be made for it: Eſpecially when the laſt Clauſe of the Commandment, *nor any thing that is his*, ſhews the Coveting there forbidden to refer, in every Article of it, to the coveting of another Mans Poſſeſſions, which is not the Sin of Intemperance, but Injuſtice. But becauſe, when I come to entreat of the Matter of the *Tenth Commandment*, I may have occaſion to ſpeak farther of it, I will quit the proſecution of that Particular, to apply my ſelf to the Commandment now before me; wherein you may obſerve with me theſe two Parts.

1. The

* *Joſeph. Antiqu. Judaic. lib. 3. cap. 4:* Διδάσκει μὲν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρῶτος λόγος ὅτι θεὸς ὅστιν εἷς, καὶ τοῦτον σέβεσθαι μόνον. Ὁ δὲ δεύτερος κελεύει μηδενὸς εἰκόνα ζῴου ποιήσασθαι προσκυνεῖν. *Sulpit. Sever. Sacra hiſt. li. 1. Non erunt tibi dei alieni præter me. Non facies tibi Idolum. Non ſumes nomen Dei tui in vanum, &c.* See more upon this Head in D. *Taylor's Duct. Dubit.* Book 2. Chap. 2. Rule 6.

D. *Taylor Duct. Dubit. ubi ſupr.*

1. The Precept it ſelf, *Thou ſhalt not make or worſhip a graven image.*
2. The Sanction of that Precept; God will avenge the Tranſgreſſion of it *upon the children of the tranſgreſſors, to the third and fourth generation*; as, on the other ſide, reward the Obſervance of it to a far greater tract of time and number, in the Poſterity of thoſe that ſhall obſerve it.

I. Among the ſeveral Rules before laid down, for the Explication of the Ten Commandments, you may remember I aſſign'd this for one, That in every Negative Precept, we were to look out for an Affirmative one, anſwerable thereto: By which Rule if we proceed here, ſo

1. The *Affirmative* Precept will be, That we worſhip God after *a due manner*, and particularly (becauſe the preſent Prohibition ſtrikes eſpecially at that groſs way of Worſhip, by a Bodily Repreſentation) That we worſhip him *in ſpirit and in truth.* The onely difficulty is, what that *due manner* is; which accordingly I come now to explain. For the reſolution whereof, not to deſcend to Particulars, both becauſe I have in part prevented my ſelf in the foregoing Diſcourſe, and becauſe the labour would be infinite, I ſhall obſerve,

1. Firſt, That to worſhip God *after a due manner*, is to ſquare it by his Nature and Attributes. For Worſhip being nothing elſe than an Acknowledgment of his Excellencies whom we pretend to worſhip, it is in reaſon to be ſuited to thoſe ſeveral Excellencies which are diſcernable in the Divine Majeſty. But from hence it will follow, That to worſhip God *after a due manner*, is to fear, and love, and truſt in him; becauſe thoſe Affections are ſuitable to that Majeſty, and Goodneſs, and Fidelity, which are eminent in the Divine Nature. I obſerve,

2. That to worſhip God *after a due manner*, is to worſhip him according to his own direction and appointment; that is to ſay, That we worſhip him as he hath commanded us to do, and that we worſhip him after no other manner. Of the former of theſe, there cannot be the leaſt doubt, to wit, That we are to worſhip God according as he himſelf hath enjoyn'd; he that omits ſo to do, or acts contrary to his will and pleaſure, denying that Authority which is inherent in the Divine Nature. The onely difficulty is, Whether, provided we worſhip him according as he himſelf hath appointed, we may not alſo worſhip him according as we our ſelves ſhall judge farther expedient? For the reſolution whereof, we muſt diſtinguiſh of the *Subſtantials* of Religious Worſhip, and of thoſe things which are but *Circumſtances* thereof. If the Queſtion be concerning the former, there is no doubt but the Will of God ought not onely to be our Rule, but the onely Rule whereby we are to proceed. For God having not onely given us the Light of Nature to direct us in his Worſhip, but the more clear Declarations of his Word; to add any thing to his Worſhip, as a *Subſtantial* Part thereof, would be a blemiſh to thoſe Declarations, becauſe ſuppoſing God to have made imperfect ones. The Caſe is far otherwiſe as to the *Circumſtances* of Time, or Place, or the Geſtures by which it is to be perform'd: For, it being neceſſary on the one hand, that ſome Time, and Place, and Geſture be made uſe of, for the performance of his Worſhip; and it being evident, on the other hand, that

that God either hath not preſcrib'd at all concerning them, or at leaſt not done it with that fulneſs that is requiſite; either the Worſhip of God muſt be wholly omitted, or it muſt be left to the Reaſon of Private Men, to order their own private Worſhip, as to the *Circumſtances* thereof; and to the Reaſon of the Governours of the Church, to order the Publick ones. Care onely would be taken,

1. That what is order'd by Private or Publick Perſons, be agreeable to thoſe General Rules which the Light of Nature teacheth, or the Doctrine of the Scriptures preſent us withal. Otherwiſe we do not onely ſet up our own Inventions, but oppoſe them to the Commands of God. Care would be taken,
2. That what is ſo ordered, be not either repreſented, or enjoyn'd, as the Command of God: For that is literally *to teach for doctrines the commandments of men*, which our Saviour hath expreſly forbidden us.
3. Laſtly, Care would be taken, That what is ſo order'd in the Worſhip of God, be not repreſented as things pleaſing to God in themſelves; but onely as they ſerve for Order and Decency, and as they are Inſtances of our Obedience to thoſe whom God hath plac'd in Authority over us. For, by inculcating them as things pleaſing to God in themſelves, we fall under the Charge of *Will-worſhip*, becauſe not onely adding our own Inventions to the Worſhip of God, but placing them in the ſame rank with it.

But theſe Cautions being obſerv'd, there is not any the leaſt doubt to be made, either of the neceſſity of our Obedience to them, or of our freedom from that Will-worſhip which the Apoſtle condemns. For, as the Commandment is expreſs for our yielding *obedience to thoſe that have the rule over us*, and particularly to ſuch as *watch for our ſouls* (which cannot but be ſuppos'd to take in all thoſe things which require a determination, in order to the more decent performance of God's Publick Worſhip;) ſo there is not any juſt fear of falling into that Will-worſhip which St. *Paul* cautioneth his *Coloſſians* againſt. For, beſide that he cannot in any Propriety of Speech be ſaid to add to the Worſhip of God, who repreſents not what he ſo adds, in the ſame condition with it, but onely as ſubſervient to it; ſo (which ſhews it yet farther to be no Will-worſhip) he doth what he doth by vertue of the Divine Command, even of that, and other ſuch like, which preſcribe, That in the Worſhip of God all things be done decently and in order. If therefore what is ſo added, be grounded upon a Divine Command, it is no longer the reſult of the Wills of Men, at leaſt as diſtinct from that of God; but a juſt compliance with his: which is a Will-worſhip which I hope none of us but will think our ſelves obliged to perform.

Having thus ſhewn at large, not onely that our Worſhip ought to be ſuited to the Nature of God, but alſo agreeable to his Commands; it remains onely, for the compleating of our Deſign, that we inſtance in one or two Commandments, by which our Worſhip is eſpecially to be regulated: Whereof the firſt that I ſhall aſſign, and let that paſs for

3. My third Rule, is, The Worſhipping of God in Chriſt: For, that ſo we are to do, God hath expreſly declared by that Son of his, in whom he hath commanded us to adore him. Is Faith or Truſt a

part

part of Divine Worſhip? Our Saviour's Merits are to be the ground of it, *there being no other Name* (as the Apoſtle ſpeaks) *whereby we can be ſaved.* Is Hope a part of Divine Worſhip? The ſame *Jeſus* is to be the ground of that alſo, as by whom alone we are obliged to expect the Object of it. Is Prayer a part of Divine Worſhip? That alſo is to paſs by him, as being *to ask* what we do *in his name*, and for his ſake. Is Thankſgiving a part of Divine Worſhip? *We are to give thanks unto God and the Father by him*, Col. 3. 17. In fine, Whatſoever we do in relation to God, or even our ſelves, is to be done with reference to him, as God's Inſtrument both in Governing and Redeeming us: For, wherefore elſe ſhould God no leſs than twice declare from Heaven, That he was the Perſon *in whom he was well pleaſed*; and once of that twice, moreover, oblige his Diſciples upon that account *to hear him*? but to let us know (as St. *Paul* ſpeaks) *that whatſoever we do in word or deed, we ſhould do all in the Name of the Lord Jeſus*? That we ſhould do what we do in obedience to his Commands, and with reſpect to that Authority which God veſted in him; That we ſhould do what we do with reſpect to his Example, and have an eye to his moſt holy Life, as well as moſt excellent Precepts; That we ſhould do what we do with reſpect to the great Obligations he hath laid upon us, by *humbling himſelf to the death, even the death of the croſs*, for us; That we ſhould do what we do in confidence of his Aſſiſtance, and not relie upon the ſtrength of Nature, or any Moral Acquiſitions; laſtly, That we ſhould do what we do in confidence of Acceptance in and through the Merits of his Paſſion? For, as each of theſe is ſometime or other the meaning of acting *in his Name*, and therefore not lightly to be excluded; ſo we have great reaſon to believe them all included in that fore-mentioned Text, becauſe all tending to his Honour, and elſewhere expreſly requir'd of us, to make our Worſhip acceptable.

4. That to Worſhip *after a due manner*, we are to worſhip him in *Chriſt*, hath been already declar'd; together with the full Importance of ſuch a Worſhip. The next, and indeed onely thing that I ſhall need to ſubjoyn, is, That we worſhip him *in Spirit and in Truth*, according as was before inſinuated. For the evidencing whereof, though it might ſuffice to tell you, That this, if any, is the *Affirmative* part of the Precept, becauſe the *Negative* ſtrikes at the worſhipping of him by a corporeal and ſenſible Repreſentation; yet becauſe it is a matter of importance, and indeed one of the great Duties of the Goſpel, I ſhall allot it a more full Probation. In order whereunto, I ſhall lay for my Ground-work that known Saying of our Saviour, which eſtabliſheth ſuch a Worſhip, with the proper Ground of it: *God is a Spirit, and they that worſhip him muſt worſhip him in ſpirit and truth*, Joh. 4. 24.

Now there are two Senſes wherein thoſe Words are to be conſider'd, and which therefore are to be diſtinctly handled:

1. A Natural or Moral Senſe: And,
2. An Evangelical one. The former, becauſe grounded upon a Natural and Eternal Reaſon: The latter, becauſe (as I ſhall afterwards ſhew) the Precept of Worſhipping God *in Spirit*, is oppos'd to that Worſhip which was in uſe under the Law.

1. To begin with the former Senſe, even that which I call the Natural, becauſe grounded upon a Natural Reaſon; where again I ſhall conſider the Reaſon upon which it ſtands, and then the due Importance of it.

For the Reaſon upon which it ſtands, it will coſt us little pains to evidence it to be a juſt Foundation of ſuch a Worſhip. For, inaſmuch as all things naturally are moſt affected with ſuch Things and Operations as come neareſt to their own Nature, it muſt needs be, that if God be *a Spirit*, they who would ſerve him acceptably, muſt preſent him with ſuch a Worſhip as approacheth neareſt to his own *ſpiritual* Nature. The onely thing worthy our inquiry, is, What the Importance of ſuch a Worſhip is; which therefore I come now to reſolve.

In order whereunto, the firſt thing that I ſhall offer, is, That it is not meant to exclude wholly the Service of *the Body*: For, beſide that That is God's by right of Creation, and Preſervation, yea, by all other ways by which the Soul is, and conſequently to pay God an Acknowledgment of its own Subjection and Obedience; it is the diſtinct Affirmation of St. *Paul*, *That we are to glorifie God with our Bodies, and with our Spirits that are his.* I obſerve, ſecondly, That as the Worſhipping God *in Spirit* is not to be underſtood to exclude wholly the Worſhipping him with our *Bodies*; ſo neither to exclude all Worſhipping him by *Rites* and *Ceremonies*. For, as the Chriſtian Religion it ſelf is not without ſuch Rites, even of God's own appointment (witneſs the Sacrament of our Initiation into it, and that other of our Continuance in it) ſo it is much more evident, that under the Law a great part of the Worſhip of God conſiſted in ſuch Rites and Ceremonies: But ſo it could not have done, had a *ſpiritual* Worſhip excluded all worſhipping him by Rites and Ceremonies; becauſe God was no leſs a Spirit under the Law, than under the Goſpel; and therefore no leſs ſo to be ador'd. It remaineth therefore, That by worſhipping God *in Spirit*, we underſtand, firſt of all, the worſhipping him with our *Spirits*; and that too in an *eſpecial* manner. For as it is but requiſite, that he who is a Spirit, ſhould have the worſhip of ours, becauſe moſt agreeable to his own Nature; ſo alſo, that we ſhould for that reaſon intend that Worſhip eſpecially, and make it the chief of our Study and Deſign. And accordingly, though under the Law, for the groſneſs of the *Jews*, God appointed them a Worſhip which conſiſted much in Rites and Ceremonies; yet he gave them ſufficiently to underſtand, that the *ſpiritual* Worſhip, or the Worſhip of the Soul, was that which he principally requir'd. Witneſs one for all, that of the Prophet *David*, Pſal. 51. 16, 17. *For thou deſireſt not Sacrifice, elſe would I give it thee: thou delighteſt not in burnt-offering. The Sacrifices of God are a broken ſpirit; a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou ſhalt not deſpiſe.* The reſult of the Premiſes is this, That to worſhip God *in Spirit*, and conſequently to worſhip him after a due manner, is eſpecially to intend the worſhipping him with *ours*; that is to ſay, by entertaining honourable thoughts of him, by endeavouring to conform our Wills to his moſt holy one, and laſtly, by ſuiting our Affections to his ſeveral Attributes, by fearing, and loving, and truſting in him. But, beſide the Worſhipping of God *with our Spirits*, and that too in a more *eſpecial* manner; to worſhip God *in Spirit* doth alſo imply the worſhipping him without an Image, or any Corporeal Repreſentation:

ſentation: For, beſide that this is the very thing here forbidden, and therefore in reaſon to be ſuppos'd to be excluded, by worſhipping God *in ſpirit and in truth*; to worſhip God by an Image, is ſo far from being conſiſtent with a *ſpiritual* Worſhip, that it is but a diſhonouring of him, becauſe reſembling him to things to which he is no way like, and which indeed are infinitely below the Excellencies of his Nature.

2. Of the Natural or Moral Senſe of Worſhipping God *in Spirit*, I have ſpoken hitherto, and ſhewn both the Ground and Importance of it: Let us now conſider the Evangelical one, according as was before inſinuated. For, that ſuch a one was alſo intended, is evident from that Story to which this Paſſage is ſubjoyn'd. If you pleaſe to conſult the Verſe preceding that which I have choſen for the Ground-work of this Argument, you will there find a Woman of *Samaria* demanding of our Saviour, whether *Mount Gerizim*, by *Sichem*, where the *Samaritans* ſacrific'd, or *Jeruſalem*, were the true Place of Worſhip. In anſwer to which, after our Saviour had told her, That that Queſtion was not now of much moment, becauſe ere long they ſhould *neither worſhip in the one or the other*; for a farther proof of that his Aſſertion, he adds, *that the time was coming, and even then was, that the true worſhippers ſhould worſhip the Father in ſpirit and in truth.* Which being compar'd with the foregoing Words, and the State of the Controverſie to which they do relate, will ſhew, that by worſhipping *in ſpirit and in truth*, is meant no other, than the worſhipping of God with a *ſpiritual* Worſhip, as that is oppos'd to the *Sacrifices* and *Ceremonies of the Law.* For, the Queſtion being not, whether Mount *Gerizim* or *Jeruſalem* were the place of Publick Prayer (becauſe both *Jews* and *Samaritans* had particular Places for them) but, which of the two was the proper Place to ſend their Sacrifices to; and our Saviour making anſwer, That in a little time neither of them ſhould be, becauſe *the Father ſought ſuch to worſhip him, as ſhould worſhip him in ſpirit and in truth*; he thereby plainly ſhews his meaning to be, That to worſhip God *in ſpirit and in truth*, was not to worſhip him with Sacrifices, and other ſuch Figures; but in ſpiritual and ſubſtantial Worſhip, ſuch as are the Sacrifices of Prayer and Praiſe, with other the like Natural Expreſſions of our Devotion. But, from hence it will follow, not onely that we are to worſhip God without thoſe Legal Rites wherewith it was before ſufficiently clogg'd; but alſo, that we are not to clog it with other Rites than Decency and Order ſhall require. For our Saviour not onely excluding the Rites and Sacrifices of the Law, but affirming the Worſhip which his Father ſought, to be a *ſpiritual* one; he doth thereby cut off the affixing of *all other Rites* (as being alike contrary thereto) ſave what *Decency* and *Order* ſhall require. But ſo the Church of *England* hath declar'd it ſelf to underſtand the Worſhipping of God *in ſpirit and in truth*; telling us, in one of its Prefaces to our Liturgy, That *Chriſt's Goſpel is not a Ceremonial Law, as much of* Moſes *Law was; but it is a Religion to ſerve God, not in bondage of the Figure or Shadow, but in the freedom of the Spirit; contenting it ſelf onely with thoſe Ceremonies which do ſerve to a decent Order and comely Diſcipline, and ſuch as be apt to ſtir up the dull mind of Man to the remembrance of his Duty to God, by ſome notable and ſpecial ſignification whereby he might be edified.* In conformity whereto, as ſhe her ſelf hath proceeded, injoyning neither

Mr. *Mede* on *Joh.* 4. 23.

many nor trifling ones; ſo, what ſhe hath done, is ſufficiently warranted, not onely by that Solemnity which Experience ſhews Things of that nature to add to all Matters of Importance, but (which is of more avail) from the Inſtitution of our Saviour, and the Practice of the Church in the Apoſtles days. For, if *all Rites* are to be excluded, what ſhall become of the *Sacraments* themſelves? But how ſhall we any way excuſe the Apoſtolical Church, for that *holy Kiſs* wherewith they were wont to conclude their Prayers, *the laying on of hands* in admitting Miniſters to the Church, or *ſhaking off the duſt of their feet* againſt thoſe that ſhould not receive them, in teſtimony of their rejection of them? For that all thoſe things were then in uſe, even with the allowance of the Apoſtles themſelves, the Scripture is our Witneſs; to which therefore, if Men will exclude all things of that nature, they muſt firſt oppoſe themſelves. Such is the Practice of that Church to which we relate; ſuch the Grounds upon which ſhe proceeds: but, as farther than that, ſhe neither goes, nor pretends to do; ſo, if ſhe did, there is no doubt ſhe would offend againſt that Precept which requires the worſhipping of God *in ſpirit and in truth.* For, how can they be ſaid to do ſo, whoſe Devotion ſpends it ſelf in *outward Ceremonies?* Which, as they are of no value in themſelves, ſo have this ill property of the Ivy, that where they are ſuffer'd to grow too luxuriant, they eat out the Heart of that Religion about which they twine.

PART II.

A Tranſition to the Negative part of the Precept; and therein, firſt, to that part of it which forbids the making any Graven Image, or other Corporeal Repreſentation. That all Images are not forbidden; but ſuch onely as are made with a deſign to repreſent the Divine Majeſty, or to bow down to and worſhip. The unlawfulneſs of making an Image of God, evidenc'd from the diſproportion that is between an Image and the Divine Nature. The Objections againſt that way of Reaſoning, propos'd, and anſwered. The ſame unlawfulneſs manifeſted from St. Paul's *charging the Heathen with the making of them, and from the Opinions of the wiſer Heathen. An Anſwer to certain Diſtinctions which are offered by the Papiſts, and others, to elude the Force of the Commandment in this Affair.*

WHAT the *Affirmative* part of this Precept is, you have ſeen already: Paſs we now to the conſideration of,

2. The *Negative*; wherein there are theſe two things forbidden.
   1. The making of a Graven Image, or any other Corporeal Repreſentation: And,
   2. The bowing down and worſhipping them.

1. I begin with the former of theſe, the Prohibition of *making a graven Image*, or any other Corporeal Repreſentation: *Thou ſhalt not make*

make unto thee any graven Image, &c. Where, 1. I ſhall ſhew what is not to be accounted the Senſe of it; and then, what really is.

It was the Opinion of *Tertullian*, and hath ſince been taken up by ſome Modern Writers, That God in this Commandment forbade all Images whatſoever; particularly, all protuberant ones. The ground of that Opinion was, partly the Letter of the Commandment, and partly the *Jews* abhorrency of all. But as the latter of theſe ought not to have any great ſtreſs laid upon it, if we conſider the nature of Superſtitious Minds, which being once throughly touched with the ſenſe of any Errour, do not ſeldom run into the contrary Extreme; ſo the former, even the Letter of the Commandment, will as little affect thoſe who conſider its Poſition in the *Decalogue*. For, being plac'd as it is, among ſuch Precepts as reſpect the Almighty, and that Honour and Eſteem which we ought to have for him; and being moreover immediately follow'd with the Prohibition of *bowing down to them, and ſerving them*; as that is with the *jealouſie* of God concerning his own Honour: it is in reaſon to be extended no farther, than the forbidding of ſuch Images as are made with a deſign to repreſent the Divine Nature, or to beſtow upon them that Honour which is due unto it. And indeed, beſide that Nature teacheth, there is no unlawfulneſs in making an Image, yea, that that Art, as well as others, is one of the Gifts of God; which is farther confirm'd by *Moſes*, where he attributeth the Skill of *Bezaleel*, in working the Work of the Engraver, to his *being filled with the Spirit of God, in wiſdom and underſtanding*, Exod. 35. 31. Beſide that, ſecondly, they who teach all Images to be forbidden the *Jews*, are forc'd to confeſs their admitting of ſome, and particularly, of Images in their Coins; what ſhall we ſay (that may be ſatisfactory, I mean) to God's giving order for the *Cherubims* over the *Mercy-ſeat*, and for the making of the *Brazen Serpent* in the Wilderneſs? for his admitting into the Ark the Five Golden Mice, and Five Golden *Hemorrhoides* of the *Philiſtines?* for the Pomegranates, and twelve Brazen Bulls upon which the Laver in the Temple was plac'd? For though it be true, that God might diſpenſe with his own Command, eſpecially a poſitive one; yet as there is no evidence of thoſe Orders of his being a Diſpenſation, ſo it is not eaſie to believe, that, having made ſo ſtrict a Law againſt Image-making, he would not onely diſpenſe ſo ſoon with it, as we ſee he did in the *Cherubims* and *Brazen Serpent*; but diſpenſe with it in a manner for ever, by placing thoſe *Cherubims* and *Bulls* for perpetuity. For what were this, but to tempt Men to think he had abrogated the Command, and not onely diſpens'd with it, but taken it away? Neither will it ſuffice to ſay, That the Words of the Commandment do onely forbid *the making them to our ſelves*, that is to ſay, of our own heads, and not when commanded thereto by God: For, as it is not unuſual, either in the *Hebrew*, or other Languages, to expreſs that in more words, which might have been expreſs'd in fewer (which, by the way, may ſerve to ſhew the triflingneſs of thoſe Obſervations, that have no other Foundation than the out-ſide of an Expreſſion) ſo, granting that Addition of *to thy ſelf*, to have any peculiar force, the meaning thereof would be no other, than thou ſhalt not make them *for thy uſe*; which will afford no ground at all to the former Interpretation. Let it remain therefore for an undoubted Truth, That the

the making of Images is not univerſally forbidden; but either,

1. As was before inſinuated, The making of Images with a deſign to repreſent the Divine Majeſty: or,
2. To fall down and ſerve them.

1. For the evidencing the former whereof, within which I intend to confine the preſent Diſcourſe, I ſhall firſt of all ſhew this to have been the Deſign of this Commandment: In order whereunto, I ſhall firſt produce the Words of the Prophet *Moſes*, *Deut.* 4. 15, 16, and ſo on: *Take heed therefore unto your ſelves; for ye ſaw no manner of ſimilitude in the day that the Lord ſpake unto you in Horeb, out of the midſt of the fire; leſt ye corrupt your ſelves, and make you a graven image, the ſimilitude of any figure, the likeneſs of male or female.* For, eſtabliſhing the Prohibition of Images, upon their *not beholding any ſimilitude*, that is to ſay, of God, but *onely the hearing of a voice*; he thereby plainly ſhews the Deſign of that Commandment to be the forbidding of ſuch Images as were made with a deſign to repreſent the Divine Majeſty. To which, if we add that of the Prophet *Iſaiah*, chap. 40. 18. *To whom then will ye liken God, or what likeneſs will ye compare to him?* ſo the Proof will be complete and perfect. For, the Writings of the Prophets being but Comments upon the Law of *Moſes*, it is but reaſonable to believe what we find there expreſly forbidden, as the making an Image of God is, to be alſo forbidden by the Law. But becauſe it may be ſaid, That this Prohibition is onely poſitive, and conſequently not to be extended beyond the *Jews* (though how impertinent that Diſtinction is, I have before ſhewn, where I evidenc'd it to be the Deſign of our Saviour to confirm the Law and the Prophets) yet to take away all Cavils in this particular, I will evidence, in the ſecond place, the Prohibition of making Images, to be a part of the Law of Reaſon and Nature. Now this I ſhall endeavour,

1. From the diſproportion that is between an Image, and the Divine Nature.
2. From St. *Paul*'s charging the Heathen with the making of them. And,
3. And laſtly, From the Opinions of the wiſer Heathen.

1. For the firſt of theſe, we ſhall not need to ſtand long to prove it, or indeed to be a juſt Ground of the unlawfulneſs of making them. For, as it cannot but be confeſs'd, that there is a great diſproportion between God, who is not onely a Spirit, but an Infinite and Incorruptible one, and an Image, which is both Corporeal and Corruptible; ſo that diſproportion cannot but be thought to make it utterly unlawful to make ſuch a Repreſentation of him; becauſe, in effect, denying the Spirituality and Incorruptibility of his Nature, which we ſo take upon us to repreſent. For, an Image, or other ſuch Corporeal Repreſentation, being Repreſentations onely of Corporeal and Corruptible Beings, he that makes ſuch a one of God, muſt conſequently ſuppoſe him to be ſuch, and therefore alſo in effect deſtroy the Spirituality and Incorruptibility of his Nature.

Three things onely there are which may be *objected* againſt this way of Reaſoning; to which therefore, before I go on, I will ſhape an *Anſwer*.

1. That this way of Reaſoning would conclude againſt the making an

an Image of an Angel, and conſequently againſt the *Cherubims*, which are look'd upon as ſuch.

2. That it would conclude alike againſt the Repreſentation of God to our Underſtandings, under the ſhape of a Man; which yet we find in Scripture commonly done, and cannot well be avoided, becauſe of the dulneſs of Mens Apprehenſions, eſpecially thoſe of the Common ſort.

3. Thirdly and laſtly, That God himſelf hath ſometime aſſum'd thoſe Shapes which we affirm to be ſo diſproportionate to the Divine Nature.

In anſwer to the former whereof, I ſay, 1. That as the Angels, though they are Spirits, yet are Created and Finite ones, and conſequently both vaſtly diſtant from the Nature of God, and more near to other Finite Beings; as they are moreover Fellow-ſervants to us, and no other Honour therefore due from us, than what is proper unto ſuch: ſo, by the Command of God, they have oftentimes aſſum'd Corporeal Shapes, and appear'd in them both to Mens Fancies and Eyes. In which reſpect, nothing hinders, but they may be repreſented in thoſe Shapes, eſpecially when the Command of God is added to it. But, as it follows not from thence, that God may, becauſe God hath carefully avoided the appearing in any ſuch; ſo neither doth it deſtroy the Inference we have made, from the diſproportion there is between the Infinite Nature of God, and a Corporeal Image. For, though there be a great diſproportion between the Spiritual Nature of Angels, and a Bodily Repreſentation; yet they agree in this with them, that they are equally Creatures, and Finite, and conſequently more allowable to make a Repreſentation of them. The Caſe is not the ſame, as to that diſproportion we have ſaid to be between the Nature of God, and a Corporeal Repreſentation; becauſe God, by reaſon of the Eminency of his Nature, hath nothing common with them, as being Infinite in all his Attributes. Which Anſwer is the more to be ſtood upon, becauſe the Prophet *Iſaiah*, in the place before-quoted, lays the ground of his Reaſoning againſt the making an Image of God, upon the Infiniteneſs of the Divine Nature: For as his asking, *To whom then will ye liken God?* is manifeſtly drawn from the former Verſe, where it is ſaid of God, that *all nations are before him as nothing*, and that *they are counted to him leſs than nothing, and vanity*; ſo he purſues that Argument, by ſaying further of him, that he *ſitteth upon the circle of the earth*, and that *the inhabitants thereof are as graſhoppers*; which, with thoſe that follow, are popular Deſcriptions of his Infinite Greatneſs, and of that infinite diſtance that is between him and us. However it be, *To whom will ye liken God?* is the Argument of God himſelf againſt Images, as well as the Argument of Reaſon and Nature: and if ſo, we may be ſure it is of force to conclude what he affirms, though we ſhould not be able to anſwer all that may be objected againſt it.

As little do I find my ſelf incommoded by thoſe Repreſentations the Scripture makes of God under the ſhape of a Man; its comparing his Providence to Eyes, his Power to Arms, with other ſuch like Repreſentations of his Perfections. For, as it is confeſs'd on all hands, that what the Scripture doth in this particular, is meerly out of compliance with our Infirmities, or rather out of the conſideration of our utter inability

inability to understand him, without the help of such Resemblances; so, that alone is enough to shew, that the Argument we have alledg'd, from the disproportion between God and an Image, doth not fight equally against the other. For as, though we cannot apprehend God without the help of the foregoing Resemblances, yet we may without making an Image of him; so, that inability of ours excuseth those Apprehensions from any way offending against the Divine Nature: Because, though it be a Sin to entertain any Apprehensions of God which are not proportionable to his Divine Nature, yet must it be understood with this limitation, so far as it is possible for us to avoid them: For otherwise, all our Conceptions of God must needs be sinful, because it is impossible we should conceive of him as the Excellency of his Nature doth require. The Case is not the same as to the matter of Images, because we may conceive God without them; which is so true, that (as a * Learned Heathen hath observ'd) the bringing them into use hath made Men think the Deity less tremendous than either his Authority over the World doth, or his future Judgment will shew him to be. There is yet more to be said, upon the account of God's Condescension to us, in thus representing himself to our Understandings, with the Parts and Affections of Humane Bodies; because that is so far from being an Argument for Images, that it is, on the contrary, a great Argument against them: For, by how much the more God is pleas'd to humble himself, so much the less reason is there for us to humble him; and we may well forbear to set up an Image of him in our Temples, because he hath allow'd us to serve our selves of such in our Understandings, when even that could not be done without derogating from the Divine Nature, but that we cannot apprehend him without. Lastly, Whereas Images are apt to lead Men to believe God to be of a Corporeal Nature, and attended with the Imperfections of it; those Representations which the Scripture makes of God to our Understandings, as they are generally borrow'd from the chiefest Excellencies, and therefore so much the less likely to debase him in our Imaginations; so being mixed with more spiritual Conceptions, they serve onely to lead us to a more just apprehension of his Nature and Perfections.

* *Varro*, quoted afterwards more at large.

There remaineth one Objection more, against our arguing from the disproportion that is between God and a Corporeal Representation; and that is, That sometimes God himself hath assum'd those Likenesses which we affirm to be so derogatory to him, and appear'd in them to the Sons of Men. And if so, what should hinder us from following his Example, and depicting at least those Corporeal Shapes in which he appear'd? Especially when it is elsewhere alledg'd, as a Reason of God's forbidding Images, That they *saw no similitude* to make them by: For that may seem to import, That if God should vouchsafe any such, it might be lawful to copy it out in an Image. For answer to which, I say,

1. That if that were the onely or principal Reason of forbidding Images, the taking thereof away, would take away the Prohibition it self. But that so it is not, is evident from the Prophet *Isaiah*, who grounds it upon the unlikeness that is between God's Nature, and Corporeal ones: Which Reason continuing still, and always likely to do so, the Prohibition must be still of force, notwithstanding

notwithſtanding any ſuch Appearances of the Divine Nature. I anſwer,

2. That though it ſhould be granted, that God aſſum'd thoſe Corporeal Shapes, which it is pretended that he did; yet will not that invalidate our arguing from the diſproportion there is between the Divine Nature, and an Image. For, though thoſe Shapes were equally diſproportionate to his Divine Nature, yet being of his own aſſuming, they neither imply any Irregularity in God, nor liberty to us to follow him; there being no doubt but God may humble himſelf, and as little, that it becometh not us to do ſo. I anſwer,

3. That what is alledg'd concerning God's aſſuming Corporeal Shapes, is either not true, or impertinent to the preſent Buſineſs. For, though we read in St. *Luke*, *chap.* 3. and 22. That the Holy Ghoſt deſcended in a Bodily Shape, like a Dove, upon our Saviour; and in St. *Matthew*, That *John Baptiſt* ſaw him ſo deſcending on him: yet are we not to underſtand that of the *Perſon* of the Holy Ghoſt, but of his *Gifts and Graces*, of which thoſe Repreſentations were intended as Symbols. For, as the Gifts of the Holy Ghoſt are frequently deſcrib'd by that name; ſo, that the Gifts of the Holy Ghoſt are to be underſtood there, is to me abundantly evident, from that Prophecie that went before concerning it, *Iſa.* 11. 2. *And the ſpirit of the Lord ſhall reſt upon him, the ſpirit of wiſdom and underſtanding, the ſpirit of counſel and might, the ſpirit of knowledge, and of the fear of the Lord.* In which place, as we have ſeveral diſtinct Spirits reckon'd up, and each of them made a part of the Spirit of the Lord, which ſhews them to be the Gifts, and not the Perſon of the Holy Ghoſt, who is but One: ſo one of thoſe Spirits, entitled *the ſpirit of wiſdom, and of the fear of the Lord*; which latter Epithet, though it may well ſuit a Gift of the Holy Ghoſt, yet agreeth not in the leaſt with his Perſon. If there remain any doubt, it muſt be concerning this of *Iſaiah*'s being a Prophecie of that Deſcent whereof we are now entreating: But that doubt will ſoon vaniſh, if we compare it with that of St. *John*, *chap.* 1. 32. For who can chuſe but look upon this Deſcent as the impletion of that Prophecie, when it is not onely certain from the Prophecie it ſelf, that it was intended of the *Meſſiah*; but *John Baptiſt* had it given to him, for a Mark to know the *Meſſiah* by, That *he ſhould ſee the ſpirit of God deſcending and remaining on him*, which is the ſame in ſenſe with *the ſpirit of the Lord reſting on him.* And though the ſame is not to be ſaid of God's appearing to *Daniel* in the Habit of an *Ancient* Perſon, with the *hair of his head like pure wooll*; yet as that was onely in a Viſion, and therefore rather to his Fancy, than his Eye; ſo it had not that effect upon the *Jews*, or Primitive *Chriſtians*, as to encourage them to make ſuch an Image of the Almighty.

2. Having thus ſhewn at large the diſproportion there is between God and an Image, and thereupon eſtabliſh'd the unlawfulneſs of making any ſuch; we ſhall the leſs need to add any thing thereto, to evince it to be a breach of Natures Law. But becauſe I have before promis'd to add, by way of confirmation, St. *Paul*'s charging the Hea-

then with it, who had no other Law to guide them, and the Opinions of the Wiſeſt of them; I will, for a concluſion of this Particular, deſcend to each of them: and firſt of all, to St. *Paul*'s charging it upon the Heathen. But ſo that he doth, we have a Proof paſt all contradiction, *Rom.* 1. 23. where having premis'd, that *when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, but became vain in their imaginations*; as an inſtance both of the one and the other, he ſubjoyns *their changing the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beaſts, and creeping things*; adding moreover, which ſhews the greatneſs of their Crime, That *for this cauſe alſo God gave them up to uncleanneſs, through the luſts of their own hearts, to diſhonour their own bodies between themſelves*: And, leſt that ſhould not be enough, repeats the ſame Charge again, and the ſame dreadful delivering them over to *vile* affections for it, *verſ.* 25, 26. The ſame is no leſs evident from that Speech of his to the *Athenians*, *Acts* 17. 29. and ſo on; where having premis'd, that *foraſmuch as we are the off-ſpring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold or ſilver, or ſtone graven by art and mans device*; to ſhew this to have been both the Practice and Crime of the Heathen, he ſubjoyns, *And the times of this ignorance God winked at, but now commandeth all men every where to repent.* Now, foraſmuch as *repentance* ſuppoſes a preceding Sin, foraſmuch as the making of Images is one of the things the Heathen are commanded to *repent* of; it follows, That the making an Image of God was a Sin in the Heathen, and conſequently, becauſe they had no other Law to guide them, a Sin againſt the Law of Nature. And indeed, though this Law of Nature was ſtrangely clouded by the contrary Practice amongſt them, and the Traditions of their Fathers; yet, if we deſcend, in the

3. Third place, to take a view of the Opinions of the wiſer Heathen, we ſhall find them, in their lucid Intervals, to aſſert the ſame Prohibition with this Commandment. For thus *Seneca*, in his Eighth Book, and Thirtieth Natural Queſtion, tells us of God, * That *he falls not under our Eyes, but is to be ſeen by our Thought.* And elſewhere exhorting *Lucilius* to make himſelf worthy of God †, *But thou ſhalt make thy ſelf ſuch* (ſaith he) *not with Gold or Silver; for ſuch Materials cannot be made an Image like unto God.* But of all other Teſtimonies in this matter, that of *Varro* is certainly the moſt full, as it is remembred by St. *Auguſtine*, in his Fourth Book *De Civitate Dei*, *chap.* 31. Where having premis'd out of him, ‖ That *the Ancient Romans did more than an hundred and ſeventy years worſhip their Gods without Images*; he adds, as from the ſame *Varro*, * That *if it had ſo continued, the Gods would have been more chaſtly obſerv'd: They who firſt ſet up Images of their Gods, for the Peoples uſe, having taken away from their Cities that fear which they ought to have of them, and involv'd them in erroneous Conceits concerning the Divine Nature: Prudently judging* (as St. *Auguſtine* there tells us) *that the Gods might eaſily come to be deſpis'd in the fooliſhneſs of Images.* Foraſmuch therefore as the Light

* *Effugit oculos, cogitatione viſendus eſt.*

† *Finges autem non auro, non argento: Non poteſt ex hâc materiâ imago Dei fingi ſimilis.* Ep. 31.

‖ *Dicit etiam antiquos Romanos pluſquàm annos centum & ſeptuaginta deos ſine ſimulachro coluiſſe.*

* *Quod ſi adhuc, inquit, manſiſſet, caſtiùs dii obſervarentur. Cujus ſententiæ ſuæ teſtem adhibet inter cætera etiam gentem Judæam: nec dubitat eum locum ita concludere ut dicat, qui primi ſimulachra deorum populis poſuerunt, eos civitatibus ſuis & metum dempſiſſe & errorem addidiſſe: prudenter exiſtimans deos facile poſſe in ſimulachrorum ſtoliditate contemni.*

Light of Reaſon furniſheth us with Arguments againſt the making an Image of God; foraſmuch as the Scripture chargeth it upon the Heathen as a Sin, and the wiſer Heathen conſent with them in the diſallowance of it; we may very well look upon the Prohibition now before us, as a part of the Law of Nature; and therefore alſo, becauſe the Law of Nature is ſuch, of eternal obligation.

Now, though what hath been ſaid, might, to Minds not prepoſſeſs'd, ſufficiently evidence the unlawfulneſs of ſuch Images; yet becauſe thoſe Prejudices have taught Men to frame certain nice Diſtinctions, to evade the force of the former Arguments, I will, for a concluſion of this Diſcourſe, oppoſe to them ſome more particular Aſſertions, anſwerable to their ſeveral Diſtinctions: Whereof the firſt ſhall be,

1. That *painted* Images, and ſuch as are *deſcrib'd upon a Plane*, are unlawful, as well as *engraven* and *protuberant ones*: Contrary to the Opinions of the *Greek* and *Moſcovitiſh* Church, and ſome of our own Weſtern Writers. For the evidencing whereof, I ſhall alledge, firſt, the Words of that Commandment we are now upon. For, forbidding, as it doth, not onely *any graven Image*, but *any likeneſs of any thing that is in heaven or earth*, it thereby makes other Repreſentations alike unlawful with *carved* or *protuberant* ones. The ſame is no leſs evident from the Reaſon of the Prohibition in *Deuteronomy*, even becauſe *they ſaw no ſimilitude:* For a Picture being no leſs *a ſimilitude*, than a Carved Image, that muſt be ſuppoſed to be equally unlawful, when it is deſign'd to repreſent the Divine Nature. Laſtly, Foraſmuch as there is the ſame or a greater diſproportion between the Divine Nature, and a Picture; if Carved Images be unlawful, theſe alſo muſt be ſuppos'd to be ſo, when they are intended to repreſent the Deity. This onely would be added, That the making of Graven Images, or other ſuch protuberant ones, are moſt frequently forbidden in the Scripture: Not that others were not unlawful, as well as they (for the general Reaſon of the Prohibition, even the likening him to any thing, doth equally ſtrike at all other ways of Repreſentation) but becauſe thoſe Images were moſt in uſe among the Heathen, and becauſe by their Figure they were moſt apt to make the Simple believe that they were thoſe very things they were deſign'd to repreſent, or at leaſt that they were impregnated with a Divine Spirit.

2. I obſerve, ſecondly, That as *Pictures*, as well as *graven Images*, were forbidden; ſo the Pictures or Images of *any Being whatſoever*. For what other can we rationally deem to be the ſenſe of thoſe Words, *or the likeneſs of any thing that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth?* Which caution I the rather add, to confront an Opinion of *Grotius*, and the *Jews*, who would have the Figures of *Living Creatures* onely forbidden: For though the Images of Living Creatures were moſtly in uſe, and moſt dangerous, and therefore probably no other enumerated in the Fourth of *Deuteronomy*, where this matter of Images is entreated of; yet, as the Expreſſion in the Commandment is too general to admit of ſuch a limitation, ſo, if we admit of it, we muſt exclude the Images of the *Stars*, which are certainly no Living Creatures, but are notwithſtanding faulted by God, *Amos* 5. 26. But I have yet another Reaſon of making the preſent Obſervation, and without which indeed I ſhould not have troubled you or my ſelf with it: And that is, the aſſerting

further, againſt the *Greeks*, and thoſe that follow them in this Particular, the unlawfulneſs of Painted, as well as Graven Images. For whereas it had been urged (as it hath been before by us) That not onely all Graven Images, but all other Likeneſſes were forbidden, according as the Letter of the Commandment imports; it is anſwered by * *Grotius*, That though the Particle we render [*or*] be in the *Hebrew* Text of this place, yet it is not in the parallel place in *Deuteronomy*, nor in the *Chaldee* Paraphraſe here: Whence (ſaith he) it hath happened, that the *Hebrews* generally thought that of *any likeneſs* to be no new Prohibition, but to be added by way of explication, that we ſhould underſtand, not *all graven images* to be forbidden, ſuch as was that of the Golden Vine in the Temple, but ſuch as reſembled *Living Creatures*. But to this I have many things to ſay, and ſuch as I think will make it appear to be very vain. For, firſt, It is not true, however *Grotius* came to ſay ſo, that the Particle we render [*or*] is not in the * *Chaldee* Paraphraſe upon this place, as may appear to any that ſhall conſult it. That which I ſuppoſe occaſion'd his miſtake, was, that it is not there in *Deuteronomy*, as neither in the *Hebrew* Text. I ſay, ſecondly, That the Reading in this place ought in reaſon to be look'd upon as more entire than that of *Deuteronomy*, and conſequently, where there is occaſion, to give Law to it: Becauſe the Twentieth Chapter of *Exodus* is an Account of the Law, as deliver'd by God; whereas that in the Book of *Deuteronomy* is onely a Repetition of it, which therefore needed not to be exact, as having been before ſet down. I ſay, thirdly, That if after the Word *likeneſs*, there had been onely an enumeration of the Living Creatures of Heaven and Earth, and the Waters under the Earth, ſo there might have been ſome pretence to make the *Temunah* or *likeneſs* not comprehenſive of all Similitudes, but onely a determination of the general Word of Carved Images, to ſuch as repreſented Living Creatures. But the Words are general, of *all things in heaven and earth, &c.* and ſo no doubt ought to be underſtood. I obſerve, fourthly, that as it is not unuſual for ſuch a Particle as the *Hebrew* ו to be underſtood, even where it is not expreſs'd; ſo the * *Septuagint* have repreſented the force of it in that place of *Deuteronomy*, as well as *Exodus*. All which put together, will make the Obſervation of *Grotius* to be a meer Nicety, and conſequently, that all kind of Images, as well as of all ſorts of Things, are forbidden by this Commandment.

3. From that firſt and ſecond Aſſertion therefore, paſs we to a third, anſwerable to a nice diſtinction deviſed by the *Papiſts*; to wit, That we are to underſtand ſuch Images forbidden as pretend to repreſent *the Eſſence or Perſon*, not the *Properties* of the Divine Nature. But beſide that the *Eſſence* of any thing cannot be depicted, becauſe it cannot be ſeen but by ſome proper Repreſentment, which makes that Diſtinction perfectly groundleſs; beſide that, ſecondly, it cannot be thought they intend any other than the Repreſentation of the *Perſons* of the Godhead, who deſcribe the Father in the ſhape of an Old Man, and have a peculiar Picture to repreſent the Trinity: there is as great a diſproportion between the *Properties* of God, and an Image, as there is between that and the Divine Nature: For, as the *Properties* of God are not different at all from his *Eſſence*, but onely in our manner of conception; ſo all thoſe *Properties* of his are Spiritual and Infinite, and

* *Explic. Decal. prac. 2.*

* *Chald. Paraphraſ. verba* וכל־דמות *in Bibl. Polygl.*

* *Sept. Deut. 5. 8.* Οὐδὲ παντὸς ὁμοίωμα.

and therefore not to be debas'd by Material and Finite Repreſentations.

4. Laſtly, Whereas it is ſaid by the *Papiſts*, That they intend not thoſe Images they make of God, as *perfect*, *immediate*, *and proper* Repreſentations of the Divine Nature; but *imperfect*, *mediate*, *and metaphorical* ones; upon which account they hope to avoid the Charge of offending againſt this Commandment: I ſhall oppoſe, in the fourth place, That ſuch *imperfect* Images are as well forbidden, as any other. For, beſide that the Law makes no ſuch Diſtinction, but forbids all Images, and all Similitudes, and muſt therefore be thought to proſcribe thoſe *imperfect* ones, unleſs the Law had otherwiſe provided; its deſcending to forbid not onely the making the Images of *any thing in heaven or earth*, but particularly, in *Deuteronomy*, the making the Images of *beaſts*, *and fowls*, *and creeping things*, ſheweth the former Diſtinction to be perfectly vain and groundleſs. For, though it may be thought, that ſome of the Heathen deem'd a Humane Shape to be no improper Repreſentation of the Divine Majeſty; yet who can think them ſo vain, as to conceive a Beaſt, or a Creeping thing, to be a perfect Reſemblance of their Gods? However it be, moſt certain it is, the *Jews* could not be ſo fooliſh as to think the God that brought them out of the Land of *Egypt*, to be like unto *a calf that eateth hay*; which notwithſtanding, we find they not onely repreſented God under ſuch an Image, but were charg'd by the *Pſalmiſt* with changing the Glory of God into ſuch a Similitude; and by St. *Paul*, with *Idolatry*, for holding a Feaſt to it. So vain are the Imaginations of the Defenders of Images, as well as of the Makers of them; and will prove alike deceitful, when the Judge of all the World ſhall call both the one and the other to an account.

I have done with that part of the Prohibition which concerneth the making an Image of God, and aſſerted the unlawfulneſs thereof: It remains onely (to make it ſo much the more advantageous) that I addreſs this following Exhortation to the *Proteſtant*, wherein he will find himſelf more immediately concern'd; That inaſmuch as the Prohibition of Images is grounded upon the diſproportion that is between God and all Corporeal Beings, he who pretendeth for that reaſon to diſapprove of all Corporeal Repreſentations, would in like manner remove from his thoughts all Corporeal Conceptions of him; That he would not think God like Bodies, to be confin'd to a certain Place, and neither to know nor act any thing beyond his own Heaven; That he would not think *his arm* like that of ours, to be *ſhortned that it cannot ſave*, nor *his ear ſo dull of hearing*, *that he cannot hear* the ſofteſt whiſpers; That he would not think his Eyes like thoſe of ours, to be blinded by the darkneſs of the Night, or impos'd upon by thoſe ſpecious Outſides by which his own are apt to be deceiv'd; in fine, That when, for the help of his dull Apprehenſions, he conceiveth of Him under Bodily Repreſentations, he remember, that He is above them, and ſeparate thoſe Corporeal Phantaſms again, by thinking him to be a Spirit of infinite Purity and Perfection: Otherwiſe, though in another way, he falleth into that Crime which he condemneth, and ſets up the ſame Images of God in his Imagination, which the Heathen heretofore, and the Idolatrous Chriſtians now, ſet up to him in their Temples.

PART III.

Of the unlawfulneſs of making an Image, with a deſign to worſhip it; where, moreover, is ſhewn out of Tertullian, *the unlawfulneſs of making any ſuch, to be worſhipped by others. The ſecond Part of the Negative Precept propos'd, wherein is ſhewn the unlawfulneſs of worſhipping an Image, whether of God, or of Chriſt, or of his Saints. The Allegation of the* Romaniſts, *That they worſhip not the Image of God, but God in and by it, ſhewn to be both untrue and inſufficient: The former, becauſe there are not a few who defend the Worſhipping of the Image it ſelf, yea, with a Divine Worſhip; and becauſe the Common ſort terminate their Worſhip there: The latter, becauſe, firſt, the Heathen themſelves generally were not guilty of any other Idolatry; where another Objection of the* Papiſts *is propos'd and anſwered. The like evidenc'd, ſecondly, from the Idolatry of the* Iſraelites *in* Aaron's *and* Jeroboam's *Calves; which is ſhewn to have been no other than the Worſhipping of the True God in and by them. The Objections againſt the foregoing Argument, conſidered and Anſwered. A farther Argument againſt the Worſhipping of God by an Image, drawn from Natures Law; where again ſome Objections are propos'd and anſwered. Of the Images of Chriſt, and his Saints: Whether or no, and in what caſes they may be tolerated, as alſo what Honour may be given to them. That all Divine Adoration of them is unlawful; yea, that all ſuch is ſo, which onely bordereth on it.*

HAVING ſhewn, in the foregoing Diſcourſe, that we are not to make an Image with *a deſign to repreſent the Divine Majeſty*; proceed we now to ſhew,

2. That neither are we to make *any Image at all, with a deſign to bow down to it, or ſerve it*; which I have ſaid to be the ſecond Part of the firſt Prohibition in this Commandment. Now, that ſo we are not, is competently evident from the Commandment it ſelf, but much more abundantly from an Explication of it in *Leviticus*: For, as after the Prohibition of making any graven Image, *&c.* it is immediately added, *Thou ſhalt not bow down to them, nor ſerve them*; ſo the Prophet *Moſes*, who was certainly the beſt Interpreter of his own Law, doth more plainly and expreſly declare it, *Lev.* 26. 1. For *ye ſhall not* (ſaith he) *make you any idol, or graven image, neither rear you up a ſtanding image, neither ſhall ye ſet up any image of ſtone in your land, to bow down unto it: for I am the Lord your God.* And indeed, if the Worſhipping of Images be a Sin, according as the ſecond Prohibition imports, it will be no leſs to make them for that end, becauſe in effect a Worſhipping of them. Excellent to this purpoſe is that of *Tertullian*, where he addreſſeth himſelf to ſome *Chriſtians*, who thought to excuſe themſelves from Idolatry, in that they onely made thoſe Images which were worſhipp'd by others. 'Tis in the ſixth Chapter of his Book *de Idololatriâ*. *Imo tu colis qui facis ut coli poſſint. Colis autem non ſpiritu viliſſimi nidoris alicujus, ſed tuo proprio: nec animâ pecudis impenſâ, ſed animâ tuâ. Illis ingenium tuum immolas, illis ſudorem*

dorem tuum libas, illis prudentiam tuam accendis. Plus es illis quam ſacerdos, cùm per te habeant ſacerdotem. Thou pretendeſt that thou doſt not worſhip them; but thou doſt worſhip them, who makeſt them that they may be worſhipped: And thou worſhippeſt them not with the breath of ſome moſt vile Steam, but with thy own; neither with a Soul of a Beaſt, but thine. To them thou ſacrificeſt thy Wit and Parts; to them thou offereſt up thy Sweat, as a kind of Drink-offering; to them thou lighteſt thy Prudence as a Taper. Thou art more to them than a Prieſt, becauſe it is by thy means they have one. But becauſe at the ſame time I ſhew it unlawful to worſhip an Image, I ſhall alſo ſhew it to be unlawful to make an Image for that end; therefore proceed we to evince,

2. The unlawfulneſs of *worſhipping any image*; which is the ſecond general Prohibition in this Commandment.

When we charge the *Papiſts* with the Breach of this Commandment, and particularly of that part of it we are now upon, their uſual defence is, That, as they worſhip *not the Image* of God, but *God in and through it*; ſo they worſhip not the Image of Saints *with a Divine Worſhip*, but with ſuch as is *ſuitable onely to the Images of glorified Creatures.* My Deſign is at preſent to ſhew both the untruth and inſufficiency of each of theſe Anſwers; and firſt, of their alledging their *not worſhipping the Image of God*, but, on the other ſide, *worſhipping God in and by them.*

And firſt of all, though ſome of the Church of *Rome* are ſo wary, as not to undertake the Defence of Worſhipping the Image it ſelf, or at leaſt not with that Worſhip that is proper unto God; yet there are a conſiderable number of them, and thoſe too of the moſt eminent, who roundly aſſert the giving the ſame Honour to the Image, which is due to him it repreſents. Of this ſort are *Aquinas*, *Azorius*, *Cajetan*, *Lactantius*, and *Andradius*, as Dr. *Crackenthorp* * hath evidenc'd out of their own Writings. But be it, that what they ſuggeſt were really true, as to the wiſer and better ſort of them, and neither defended nor practis'd by them; yet (as the ſame Learned Man hath obſerv'd ||) many of the Common ſort terminate their Worſhip in the very Images themſelves; which whilſt thoſe in Authority go not about either to cenſure or remove, they muſt not take it ill if we charge them with the imputation of ſo downright and ſtupid an Idolatry; Men being juſtly chargeable with thoſe foul Abominations which, though they ſee, they endeavour not to amend. But be it, thirdly, that what they alledge were true, both in the better and worſer ſort; and that they worſhip not the Images themſelves, but God in and by them: yet even ſo they will not eſcape the imputation of Idolatry, according as I come now to ſhew.

* *Defenſ. Eccl. Anglic. contra Archiep. Spalat. cap.* 63.

|| *Ibid.*

For the evidencing whereof, the firſt thing I ſhall alledge, is, That *the Heathen* were not guilty of *any other Idolatry*, than that of worſhipping their *Gods in and by them.* For thus *Celſus* (as I find him quoted by *Origen*, in the ſeventh of thoſe Books he wrote againſt him.) *Now they* (ſaith he*, ſpeaking of the *Chriſtians*) *do openly ſhew their contempt of Images: If for this reaſon, becauſe a Stone, or a piece of Wood, or Braſs, or Gold, which ſuch or ſuch a one hath fram'd, is not God, their Wiſdom is ridiculous: For what*

* Ὅτι γὰρ ἀνῃρήκασι τὰ ἀγάλματα ἀτιμάζουσι, εἰ μὴ ὅτι λίθος ἢ ξύλον ἢ χαλκὸς ἢ χρυσὸς, ὃν ὁ δεῖνα ἢ ὁ δεῖνα εἰργάσατο, οὐκ ἂν εἴη θεὸς, γελοῖα ἡ σοφία. Τίς γὰρ ἄλλος, εἰ μὴ παίζῃ νήπιος, ταῦτα ἡγήσεται θεὸς, ἀλλὰ θεῶν ἀναθήματα καὶ ἀγάλματα;

other

other Perſon, that is not perfectly a Fool, looketh upon thoſe things as Gods, and not rather as Things dedicated to, and Images of the Gods? To the ſame purpoſe doth *Maimonides* diſcourſe, in his *More Nevochim*, chap. 36. *Moreover* (ſaith he) *as to what concerns Idolaters, you know that none of them worſhip the Idol with this Opinion, as if they thought there were no other God but that: Nay, there never was any Man, nor will there ever be, who can fancy to himſelf, that the Figure which he hath made of Metals, Wood, or Stones, created the Heavens and Earth, and governs them. But they worſhip them, inaſmuch as they look upon them as Things intermediate between them and God.* And indeed, generally ſpeaking, it is morally impoſſible for any but the ſottiſh and beaſtly Multitude, to be guilty of ſuch an Idolatry, as terminateth in the Image it ſelf; an Image, in the very nature of it, referring the Party that uſeth it to him whom it is deſign'd to repreſent. If the Heathens, as there is no doubt they often did, worſhipp'd thoſe for Gods, in them, that were really none, that is a Crime of another nature, and ſubjects them not for that reaſon to the Crime of Idolatry, or Worſhipping an Image; but of having other Gods beſide the True. Foraſmuch then as the Heathen were not guilty of any other Idolatry, than of *worſhipping* God *in and by an Image*, either there never was any ſuch thing as Idolatry in the World, unleſs amongſt the very Dregs of the People; or it muſt be ſuch, to *worſhip God in and by them.* There is but one thing, that I know of, which is with any ſhew of Reaſon objected, as to the difference between the Heathen and Chriſtian Idolaters in this particular; and that is, That the Heathen imagin'd the Image not onely to repreſent, but to have the Deity *inhabiting in*, or rather *united to it*, as the Soul is united unto the Body. But beſide that the *Papiſts* ſeem ſometimes of the ſame Perſwaſion, witneſs* their attributing to their Images the Power of Speaking, with the Working of ſeveral Miracles; a || Learned Man of our own Nation hath demonſtrated, That the Heathens had not that opinion of their Images, unleſs of ſome few, that were conſecrated by Magick Art: So that ſtill there will remain the ſame Conſent between the Heathens and Idolatrous Chriſtians, and either both be abſolv'd from Idolatry, or neither. It is true indeed, ſome Paſſages of the Ancient Fathers * give occaſion to think, that under thoſe Images ſome Evil Spirits did ſometime lurk, or at leaſt were believ'd ſo to do by their Heathen Worſhippers: But as it follows not from thence, That the Heathen thought their Images to be animated by them, and like Soul and Body in Man to make up one Perſon; ſo the meer lurking of Evil Spirits in the Idols they ador'd, will make no material difference between the Idolatry of the Heathen and the Chriſtian; the Heathen, as well as the Chriſtian Idolater, paſſing his Worſhip through the Image, to that Deity he believ'd to lurk in it.

* *Vid. Crack. Def. Eccleſiæ Angl. contr. Archiep. Spalat. cap. 66.*
|| *Reinold. de Rom. Eccleſ. Idololatr. l. 2. c. 3. par. 77.*
* *Vid. Grot. Explic. Dec. Præc. 2.*

My ſecond Argument againſt the Worſhipping of God by an Image, ſhall be taken from the Crime of the *Iſraelites* in the matter of the *Calves*, as well that which *Aaron* made in the abſence of *Moſes*, as *thoſe which Jeroboam ſet up* in *Dan* and *Bethel.* For if each of theſe were Idolatry, as there is no doubt they were, then is it ſuch to worſhip the True God in an Image, becauſe they worſhipp'd the True God in them. That the Worſhip of the Calf which *Aaron* made was Idolatry, is evident both from St. *Stephen*, and St. *Paul*; the former not onely

onely terming it an *Idol*, but affirming the *Jews* to have *ſacrific'd* to it, which is a known part of the Worſhip of the Almighty; the latter calling it *Idolatry* in expreſs terms, 1 *Cor.* 10. 7. for exhorting (as he doth) *Neither be ye idolaters, as were ſome of them, as it is written, The people ſate down to eat and to drink, and roſe up to play*; he thereby plainly declares their feaſting before the Calf (for that was it he refers to, as you may ſee *Exod.* 32.6.) to be pure and perfect Idolatry. Which place is ſo much the more to be remark'd, becauſe it doth not onely brand the *Jews* for it, but caution us *Chriſtians* againſt it, and that too under the fear of the like diſpleaſure; leſt any ſhould ſay (as ſome have done) That this Precept concern'd the *Jews* onely, and thereby leave us at liberty to tranſgreſs it: For if (as St. *Paul* afterwards infers) that, and other the Crimes there remembred, were aveng'd upon the *Iſraelites*, to deter us from the like Practices, we may be ſure it will be no leſs Sin in us, than it was in them, to commit the ſame Practices, and particularly to pay the ſame Adoration to an Idol. The onely difficulty therefore remaining is, whether the *Jews* worſhip'd the true God in it; which accordingly I come now to prove. And here I ſhall alledge, firſt, that Saying of the *Pſalmiſt*, *Pſal.* 106.20. where ſpeaking concerning this particular Calf, and their worſhipping of him, he ſubjoyns, *Thus they changed their glory into the ſimilitude of an ox that eateth graſs.* For if their deſign in that Calf was to repreſent their Glory by it, that is to ſay, the God of *Iſrael*, then was it their deſign alſo to do honour to the God of *Iſrael*, and not either to the Image it ſelf, or ſome other Deity. But let us come to the Story it ſelf, as it is delivered in *Exodus*, and ſee whether it is poſſible to be any other? Where, the firſt thing that preſents it ſelf, is that Speech of the *Iſraelites* immediately upon the making of it; *Theſe be thy gods which brought thee out of the land of Egypt*, Exod. 32.4. For as it was impoſſible for the *Jews* to think the Calf it ſelf brought them up, which was fram'd after their deliverance out of it; ſo it would be equally hard to think they meant ſome of the Gods of *Egypt*, to which Place they are ſaid in their heart to return. For how could they think the Gods of *Egypt* would ſo much favour thoſe who had deſpis'd them, and drown thoſe that ſacrificed to them? Beſides, though it be true, that it is expreſs'd in the Plural Number, which may ſomewhat favour the interpreting their Words of other Gods; yet as that is not much to be wondred at, becauſe the Word *Elohim* is Plural; ſo, that it is to be underſtood of the One True God, *Nehemiah* ſhews, *chap.* 9. 18. where repeating that Paſſage concerning the Calf, he bringeth them in ſaying, not *Theſe be thy gods*, but *This is thy God that brought thee out of the Land of Egypt.* As for their ſtiling the Calf their God or Gods, 'tis but an uſual *Metonymie*, whereby the Name of the Thing ſignified is given to the Sign; as the Images of the *Cherubim* over the Mercy-ſeat, are call'd the *Cherubim*; and in like manner, thoſe of the Oxen and Lions in the Temple, by theirs. The ſame is yet more evident from that which followeth after in the Story, when *Aaron* had built an Altar before the Calf: For the Text tells us, that he immediately made Proclamation, *To morrow is a feaſt to the Lord*, that is to ſay, to the True God of *Iſrael*; what we render *Lord*, being the moſt peculiar Name of God, and to which the *Jews* bear ſuch a reverence, that they will hardly venture to pronounce it.

Neither will it ſuffice to object (as I find it is by ſome) That the *Pſalmiſt*, where he ſpeaks concerning this very Argument, affirms, That *they forgat God their Saviour, which had done great things in Egypt, wondrous works in the land of Ham, and terrible things by the Red-ſea.* For, as that is not of ſufficient force againſt ſo many Arguments for their meaning the True God, eſpecially when the ſame *Pſalmiſt* affirms, That *they changed their glory into the ſimilitude of an ox that eateth graſs*; ſo they might very well be ſaid to forget God, without altogether caſting him off, becauſe forgetting, or at leaſt not remembring to obſerve that Commandment we are now upon, and to the obſervation of which they had ſo many Obligations from his Goodneſs. For thus, *Deut.* 8. 11. we find God bidding them *beware that they forgat not the Lord, in not keeping his commandments, and his judgments, and his ſtatutes*, which he had ſo often enjoyn'd them to obſerve.

Having thus ſhewn *the Calf which Aaron made* to have been intended for a Repreſentation of the True God, and conſequently (becauſe their Worſhip of God in it was reputed Idolatry) that therefore it is ſuch to worſhip even the True God in an Image; I come now to ſhew the ſame of the *Calves ſet up by Jeroboam*; that is to ſay, That they worſhipp'd the True God in them, and that that their Worſhip was Idolatry. That they worſhipp'd the True God in them, is evident from the Proclamation *Jeroboam* made, when he ſet up thoſe his Golden Calves: For, *it is* (ſaith he) *too much for you to go up to Jeruſalem; behold thy gods, O Iſrael, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt*, 1 *Kings* 12. 28. For, as it would have been a vain attempt in *Jeroboam*, to take them off altogether from the Service of that God, to whom they had been ſo long devoted; ſo his Words ſhew very apparently, that his Deſign was rather to change the Place and Manner, than the Object of their Worſhip; becauſe aſſigning for the Reaſon of his Fact, onely the tediouſneſs of the Journey to *Jeruſalem*, and moreover repreſenting his Calves as *the gods that brought them out of the land of Egypt*, which was a known *Periphraſis* of the God of *Iſrael*. And accordingly, though *Jehu*, who was one of his Succeſſors, *departed not from the ſin of Jeroboam*, as the Scripture obſerves of him, 2 *Kings* 10. 29. yet is *his zeal* in the deſtruction of *Baal*'s Prieſts ſtil'd by himſelf *a zeal for the Lord*, ver. 16. and which is of much more conſideration, he himſelf intimated by the Scripture to have *walked in the law of the Lord God of Iſrael, ſave onely in the matter of the calves*, ver. 31. of the ſame: Which could in no wiſe be affirm'd, if he and thoſe of his Sect had renounc'd the God of *Iſrael*, and worſhipp'd either the Calves themſelves, or ſome Foreign Deity in them. To all which, if we add, That *Ahab* is ſaid *to have offended more heinouſly than all that went before him, becauſe ſerving Baal, and worſhipping him*, 1 *Kings* 16. 31. ſo we ſhall not in the leaſt doubt, but that the ſetting up of the Calf was intended onely to worſhip the True God in it. For wherein had the great aggravation of *Ahab*'s ſin been, if they that were before him had worſhipp'd either the Calf it ſelf, or ſome of the Heathen Gods in it? The onely thing remaining to be ſhewn, is, That their Worſhip of the Calves was Idolatry; which will be no very hard Task to evince. For though their Worſhip is no where expreſly ſtil'd ſo, yet are they call'd *Idols*, which is enough to make the Worſhip

of

of them *Idolatry*. But ſo that they are, that of *Hoſea* is an abundant Teſtimony, *chap.* 13.4. For having premis'd the *Iſraelites* making them *molten images of their ſilver, and idols according to their own underſtanding, all of them the work of the craftſmen*, to let us know what Idols he means, he ſubjoyns, *They ſay of them, Let the men that ſacrifice kiſs the calves.* Foraſmuch therefore as the Calves were no other than Idols; foraſmuch as one Egg cannot be more like unto another, than the Calves of *Jeroboam* were to that of *Aaron*; it muſt needs be, becauſe they were ſuch, and the Worſhipping that of *Aaron* reputed Idolatry, that that of *Jeroboam*'s was ſo alſo; and conſequently, that it is Idolatry to worſhip even the True God in an Image.

Two things there are which are commonly alledg'd againſt the foregoing Arguments, to prove the Idolatry of the *Iſraelites* not to have had the True God for its Object. 1. That what they ſacrific'd to their Idols, they are ſaid to ſacrifice *to devils*, and *not to God*: And, 2. That the Prophets are frequent in inculcating, That *the Gods they worſhipp'd were gold and ſilver, that they could neither ſee, nor hear, nor underſtand*; which may ſeem to import their looking upon the Images themſelves as Gods. And indeed, if onely one of theſe things had been objected, poſſibly it might have ſerv'd in ſome meaſure to ſhroud an evil Cauſe; but urging them both, they do but help to deſtroy it: becauſe urging ſuch things as, taken in the ſtrictneſs of the Letter, are inconſiſtent with each other. For if the *Iſraelites* worſhipp'd Evil Spirits in all their Images then did they not worſhip the Images themſelves; and if they held the Images themſelves for Gods, then did they not worſhip Evil Spirits in them. The onely thing remaining to be ſaid, is, That ſome Images they look'd upon as Gods themſelves, and others as Repreſentations of Evil Spirits; both of which being granted, will contribute little to the proving any thing againſt us. For, nothing hinders all this while, but they might look upon ſome Images, and particularly upon the Calves, as Repreſentations of the God of *Iſrael*. But let us a little more particularly conſider both the one and the other Allegation, and ſee how little force there is in either. It is alledg'd out of *Deuteronomy*, chap. 32. 17. That *they ſacrific'd unto devils, and not to God*: But, doth it follow from thence, that they did ſo in ſacrificing to *Aaron*'s Calf? when there is not onely no particular mention of it, but it is alſo ſufficiently known, that they worſhipp'd many of the Heathen Deities beſides. But be it, that the Calf of *Aaron* were there included, as well as their other Idols: Yet, will it follow from thence, that they directly and intentionally worſhipp'd an Evil Spirit in them? For may not a Man ſerve the Devil, unleſs, after the Cuſtom of the *Indians*, he fall down and worſhip him? But how then could the Widows that forſook the Faith, be ſaid *to be turned after Satan*, for onely breaking that Faith they had plighted unto God? Beſide, when the Devil is confeſſedly the Author and Promoter of all falſe Worſhip, what impropriety is there in affirming thoſe who comply with his Suggeſtions in it, to ſacrifice rather to him, than to God, whom they deſign to honour? Otherwiſe, what ſhall we ſay to reconcile what the Scripture in ſeveral places affirmeth concerning the Idols of the Heathen, to wit, That *what the Gentiles ſacrifice to Idols, they ſacrifice to Devils, and not to God* (for ſo St. *Paul* tells us); and again, That *the gods of the heathen*

are ſilver and gold, the work of mens hands, as the *Pſalmiſt?* It being impoſſible that both ſhould be true in the Letter, and therefore a Qualification to be admitted. The onely thing therefore to be accounted for, is, the Scriptures ſo often inculcating, That their Idols were but Silver and Gold; that they could not either ſee, or hear, or underſtand: which may ſeem to import that the *Hebrews* look'd upon the Images themſelves as Gods. But neither will this ſerve their turn, or enervate the Concluſion before laid down; becauſe it is certain, 1. They worſhipp'd the Hoſt of Heaven, and erected Images to them. It is no leſs certain, 2. That the Heathen, who are in like manner charg'd with the ſame ſottiſh Worſhip, look'd upon, not their Images, but ſeveral Dead Men, as Gods, whom they repreſented by them. From both which put together, it is manifeſt, That when we find both the one and the other faulted for making Gold and Silver their Gods; as thoſe Gold and Silver Gods again decry'd, for not being able to ſee, or hear, or underſtand: we are to underſtand thereby, that they dealt fooliſhly, not in looking upon their Images as Gods (for this few or none were ſo ſottiſh as to believe) but for thinking ſuch Repreſentations as thoſe to be either proper Repreſentations of the Divine Nature, or fit Paſſports of his Worſhip, which could neither ſee, nor hear, nor underſtand. What remains then, eſpecially ſince God hath both licenc'd and commanded us ſo to do, but that we go immediately to himſelf, but that we fall down and kneel, not before his Image, but before the Lord our Maker? or, if we will needs worſhip him *in an Image*, but that we worſhip him *in his Son*, who is *the brightneſs of his glory, and the expreſs image of his perſon?* So doing, we ſhall be ſo far from diſhonouring the Great God of Heaven, that we ſhall, on the other ſide, do him actual Honour in it; becauſe he is not onely the perfect Image of the Father, but of the ſame Divine Nature with himſelf.

Having thus ſhewn, from the Scriptures, the unlawfulneſs of *worſhipping* the True God *by an Image*; and that too, as well from thoſe of the New Teſtament, as of the Old: I ſhould now, according as the Superſtitions of the Church of *Rome* lead me, proceed to conſider the Worſhip of the *Images of Chriſt*, as alſo of the *Images of his Saints*. Onely to ſhew the Worſhip of God by an Image, to be as much a breach of the Law of Nature, as of that of Scripture, and the better to plain my way to that which follows, I ſhall ſubjoyn a Reaſon drawn from Natures Law, concerning the Worſhip of God by an Image.

It is commonly ſuggeſted by the *Papiſts*, when they know not what elſe to ſay, That though they paſs their Worſhip through the Image, yet they terminate it not there; and do what they do to the Image, not for it ſelf, but in Honour of him whoſe Image it is. I will not now ſay, becauſe I have ſaid it often enough already, That ſuch Images of God are unlawful in themſelves, and a diſhonour to the Divine Majeſty, which they are intended to repreſent: From whence it will follow, not onely that they ought not to have any Reſpect whatſoever, for his ſake whom they repreſent; but that, for his ſake, they ought to be rejected and condemn'd. That which I ſhall inſiſt upon, is, That * *the Worſhip which is given to the Image, is either different from, and ſo leſs than it; or the ſame numerical Worſhip with that of him it repreſents. If the Worſhipper gives a different, and conſequently a leſs Worſhip,*

* See Dr. Taylor's Ductor Dubit. *ubi ſupra.*

Worſhip, he doth not worſhip God in the Image; but his Worſhip, ſuch as it is, is terminated in the Image, and then cometh not into this Inquiry, as being no more than loving a Picture for Lesbia's *ſake, or valuing a Pendant for her ſake that gave it me; and muſt be eſtimated according to its exceſs, or temper, and according to the Will of the Perſon it relates to.* For, as if the Perſon I reſpect, ſhould ſignifie her diſlike of that which I ſet a value upon, and particularly of ſome Picture, wherein it may be ſhe hath little right done her; as, I ſay, in that caſe I ſhould ſhew but little reſpect to her, by prizing that which ſhe profeſſeth to diſlike; ſo muſt they be thought to ſhew little regard of God, who ſet any value upon his Image, both becauſe all Images do but diſhonour his moſt excellent Nature, and becauſe he hath declar'd his own deteſtation of them. But, if by the Image a Man means to worſhip God, as the *Papiſts* both profeſs and practiſe, and paſs his Worſhip through that, to what it repreſents; then he gives to both the ſame Worſhip, and conſequently is guilty of Idolatry, becauſe giving that Worſhip to an Image of God, which is truly and properly Divine. Neither will it ſuffice to ſay (as I find it is by the *Papiſts*) That what is done to the Image, is for the ſake of him it repreſents, and conſequently doth ſtill ſet God above them, according to that known Maxim in Logick, *Propter quod unumquodq; eſt tale, illud eſt magis tale.* For, firſt of all, ſtill it will remain for certain, that Divine Worſhip is given to the Image; which is downright Idolatry, and expreſly forbidden by the Almighty, where he ſaith, *That he will not give his honour to another, neither his praiſe to graven images.* I ſay, ſecondly, That though, by giving worſhip to the Image for the ſake of him it repreſents, they may ſeem to ſet him above the Image; yet they do as much debaſe him another way, becauſe giving that Honour which he challengeth to himſelf alone, to that which is confeſſedly but an Image of him. I ſay, thirdly, That when it is affirm'd *Propter quod unumquodq; eſt tale, illud eſt magis tale,* it is to be ſuppos'd to hold onely where there is a *magis & minus,* which is not in the preſent Caſe; the Divine Nature, and conſequently the Divine Worſhip, which is but a juſt eſteem of it, and expreſſion of that eſteem, admitting of no Degrees: for, if it be leſs than the Higheſt, it is not Divine. Either therefore let them ſay, or rather ſhew by their Practice, that they give not Divine Honour to an Image; or let them confeſs withal, that they are guilty of downright Idolatry, which is that we are endeavouring to prove. For, as for their aſſigning their doing of it to be for the ſake of him it repreſents, it makes nothing at all for the clearing of them. For, *as he who thus anſwers, confeſſeth he gives Divine Honour to an Image, and onely tells us in what manner he doth it: ſo either that Manner doth deſtroy the Thing, and then it is not Divine Worſhip that is given; or it doth not deſtroy the Thing, and then, for all the diſtinctions, it is idolatry.* Laſtly, If (as they ſay) there be but one Motion of the Soul to the Image, and that of which it is one; it muſt conſequently be granted, That more cannot be given to the one than the other by it, becauſe one Act cannot be ſuſceptible of both; and therefore alſo, either that God muſt have leſs Honour than he ſhould, or the Image have the ſame Divine Honour with the Almighty. But concerning this matter, as I think I ſhall not need to add more, to prove the Worſhipping of God by an Image to be Idolatry;

latry; ſo, if any deſire further ſatisfaction, I ſhall refer them to Dr. *Taylor*'s Caſes of Conſcience, where this Queſtion is ſo fully and accurately handled, that no Man unprejudic'd can go away in the leaſt unſatisfied.

To go on now, according to our propoſed Method, to entreat of the Worſhip of other Images; and, firſt of all, (becauſe he ſtands between both, or rather is both God and Man) of the *Images of Chriſt*. Concerning which, I ſhall no way doubt to affirm,

1. That ſuch Images may be lawfully enough made, becauſe he aſſum'd a Nature into the Unity of the Divine Perſon, which is capable of being depicted or engrav'd.
2. I ſhall not ſtick to grant, ſecondly, That an Image of *Chriſt*, eſpecially as hanging upon the Croſs, may ſerve to excite in us a juſt apprehenſion of his bitter Sufferings, and, by that means, of his immenſe Love, who ſtoop'd ſo low as to undergo them: Nor yet,
3. But that they may be ſo far regarded for his ſake whom they repreſent, as not onely not to be defac'd, where they are not abus'd by Idolatry; but have a place, where they are admitted, among our choiceſt things of that nature. All theſe things, I ſay, no ſober Man ever did, or can deny to be free from offending againſt this Law of God, or any other. The onely Queſtion is,
4. In what Place, or at what Times, they may be expedient, or inexpedient; which muſt be left to Prudence and Authority to determine: conſideration being had of the Perſons to whom they are permitted, or of thoſe with whom they converſe. For thus, if Men be inclinable to Idolatry (as they were extremely in the beginning of *Chriſtianity*) or are mix'd among thoſe that are; in ſuch Caſes there is no doubt it would be but neceſſary either to reſtrain, or remove ſuch and other Images, eſpecially from the Places of our Aſſemblies. Whence it was, that when *Adrian* the Emperour ſought to ſet up Temples for *Chriſt*, he dedicated them without Images: And the Council of *Eliberis*, in regard of the multitude of Idolaters with whom they convers'd, decreed, That no Pictures ſhould be had in theirs, leſt that which is worſhipp'd ſhould be painted upon the Walls. But as, I ſay, ſetting aſide where there may be a juſt fear of falling into Idolatry, there can be no doubt in the leaſt of the making, or having ſuch and other Images, which pretend not to repreſent the Divine Nature. So the main Queſtion between us and the *Papiſts* is,
5. Concerning the Worſhipping of them; which accordingly I come now to aſſoil. For the doing whereof, I will proceed in this method.
   1. I ſhall ſhew, That all *Divine* Adoration of them is unlawful: And,
   2. That all Adoration is unlawful, that *onely borders* upon it.

1. That our Saviour is to be worſhipp'd with Divine Adoration, we, as well as the *Papiſts*, hold; becauſe we do equally hold him to be God: But, that Divine Honour ought to be done to his Image, we do conſtantly deny; becauſe his Image is not his Perſon. If it be ſaid (as it may) That their intention is not to do Honour to his Image, but to *Chriſt*, as God, in it; they who remember the precedent

Diſcourſe,

Diſcourſe, will ſoon diſcern the inſufficiency of that Anſwer, as to the freeing the Worſhippers thereof from Idolatry; becauſe I have before ſhewn it to be ſuch, from the example of the *Iſraelites*, to worſhip the True God in an Image. The onely Queſtion therefore that can be made, is,

2. Whether it be lawful to fall down or kneel before them (which borders upon Divine Adoration) which therefore I come now to reſolve. In order whereunto, the firſt thing I ſhall obſerve is, That whereas the Reaſon of forbidding the having of any other Gods before the True, is, *becauſe he is the Lord our God*; when he comes to forbid the Worſhipping of Images, he ſubjoyns another Reaſon, to wit, *becauſe he is a jealous God.* Of which procedure, what other account can be given, but that his intention was to cut off not onely the giving of Divine Honours to them, but of any thing that might be thought to be like them? For, if the former onely had been his intention, it would have been ſufficiently foreſtall'd by his declaring himſelf to be *the Lord our God*: That, without any other Reaſon, being a ſufficient Argument, not to pay Divine Honour to another. The ſame is no leſs evident, ſecondly, from the nature of *jealouſie*, upon which Quality of his, God grounds his Prohibition of Image-Worſhip. For, would it ſatisfie any jealous Perſon, think you, to tell him, that ſhe of whom he is jealous did not go ſo far as to commit Adultery with her Paramour; or, if ſhe did, that ſhe did it onely for his ſake, and becauſe of his likeneſs to him? Nay, doth not jealouſie naturally ariſe from an over-familiarity with other Men, and the making frequent uſe even of the uſual Teſtimonies of Civility and Friendlineſs? But how then (eſpecially when God is pleas'd to aſſume the Perſon of one) can we make any other Interpretation of his being jealous concerning thoſe Perſons whom he hath eſpous'd, yea married to himſelf? For be it, that they keep their Hearts from wandring after other Deities; that they do not entertain the ſame reſpectful Thoughts of, nor have the ſame inward Love and Affection for them: Yet *if* (as the Prophet ſpeaks) *their eyes are after their Idols*; if they bow down to them upon every approach to the Place of God's Worſhip; if *they kiſs the calves*, as often almoſt as they do behold them; who can think a jealous God will brook ſuch Teſtimonies of Kindneſs and Reſpect, any more than a jealous Man would ſuch a deportment in his Wife?

Dr. *Taylor's Ductor Dubit. ubi ſupra.*

The ſame is much more true, concerning the Images of God's Creatures, and our Fellow-ſervants, the *Saints* and *Angels*, together with all other things any way relating to them; as the Reliques of the one, or thoſe things which are dedicated to Gods Service. For when ſuch things as theſe have (not as with us the Bible, in the Adminiſtration of an Oath before a Magiſtrate, but) upon every occaſion that is offer'd, our Kiſſes and our Cringes; when Temples are dedicated, and Altars erected to Saints and Angels; when we bow before them, as often, if not oftner, than before God and *Chriſt*; when we do it in the Places and upon the Times appointed for Divine Worſhip; what Deity, that were in the leaſt jealous of his own Honour, and of the Affections of his Servants, would not be impatient of ſuch Affronts, and revenge them upon the Heads of the Authors of them?

PART

PART IV.

Of the Sanction of the Precept, by a Threat, and a Promiſe. What is meant by God's threatning to viſit the Sins of the Fathers upon the Children. That God neither will nor can make one Man bear the Puniſhment of anothers Sin. From which, and other Reaſons, it is made evident, That God's intention in that Threat is either, firſt, That he will puniſh the Fathers in the Children, as he doth ſometimes in their Perſons and Eſtates; or, That, to ſhew his diſpleaſure againſt Sin, he will lay ſome Affliction upon the Child, but which yet (if that Child be innocent) ſhall turn to his Spiritual good; or, thirdly and laſtly, That he will take occaſion from the Parents Sins, to puniſh the Children for their own. What appearance there is of God's thus viſiting the Iniquity of the Parents upon the Children, and particularly upon thoſe of Idolatrous ones. The Explication concludes with that part of the Sanction which containeth a Declaration of God's ſhewing mercy unto thouſands in them that love him: Where the exuberance of God's Mercy, above the ſeverity of his Vindictive Juſtice, is noted and exemplified.

II. OF the Precept now before us, what hath been ſaid may ſuffice: Proceed we therefore to the *Sanction* of it, which is made by a Threat and a Promiſe: Whereof the former imports, That God will avenge the Tranſgreſſion of the Precept upon *the children* of the Tranſgreſſors, *to the third and fourth generation*: The latter, That he will reward the Obſervance of it to a far greater tract of Time and Number, in the Poſterity of thoſe that ſhall obſerve it. For though the Iniquity God here threatens to viſit, be expreſs'd under the Name of *hatred*, which comprehends other Sins beſide thoſe which are here forbidden; as, on the other ſide, that Piety which he promiſeth to reward, by the *love* of God, and *the keeping of his commandments*, which is no leſs comprehenſive than the former: Yet as it is but reaſonable to underſtand both the Promiſe and the Threat with a more particular relation to the obſerving or not obſerving of that Commandment to which they are affix'd; ſo there was reaſon enough to expreſs that Obſervance, or Nonobſervance, by the loving, or hating of the Almighty. For God aſſuming to himſelf the Perſon of an Huſband to his People (as the ſtiling of himſelf a jealous God ſhews) it was but agreeable to that Married Eſtate to which he alludeth, that he ſhould expreſs the Fidelity of his Spouſe to him by that Love which is the ground of it; as, on the other ſide, her going a whoring after Images, by the hatred of himſelf: becauſe it is from the loathing thoſe Companions which they have aſſum'd, that adulterous Women ſeek out to themſelves new and forbidden Loves. Foraſmuch therefore as both the Threat and the Promiſe, though in appearance of a greater extent, do yet, if not onely, yet in a more peculiar manner, belong to the Violators or Obſervers of this Commandment; I ſhall not onely deem this to be the moſt proper place of handling them, but conſider

ſider them more particularly with reference to this Commandment, to which they are affixed by the Almighty.

Having given an account in my laſt of the Jealouſie of the Almighty, ſo far as that is uſeful to ſhew the nature of the Crime here forbidden; we are now to conſider it with reference to that Penalty which it prompted the Lawgiver to denounce. For my more orderly explication whereof, I will inquire,

1. What is here meant by viſiting the Sins or Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children: And,
2. What appearance there is of God's executing this Threat upon the Children of evil Parents, and particularly upon thoſe of Idolatrous ones.

1. Now leſt any ſhould imagine, that when God threatens to *viſit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children*, his intention is to make one Man ſuffer the Puniſhment of anothers Sin; I think it not amiſs to admoniſh, in the firſt place, That that is ſo far from being any part of his intention, that it is perfectly inconſiſtent with his own Declaration elſewhere, and indeed with the Juſtice of his Nature; as having not onely declar'd his diſlike of that peeviſh Proverb, That *the fathers have eaten ſour grapes, and the childrens teeth are ſet on edge*; but moreover affirm'd, in expreſs terms, *Ezek.* 18. 20. That *the ſoul that ſinneth, it ſhall die*; that *the ſon ſhall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither ſhall the father bear the iniquity of the ſon*; in fine, that *the righteouſneſs of the righteous ſhall be upon him, and the wickedneſs of the wicked upon him.* Than which, what could be ſaid with greater evidence and conviction, to remove all ſuſpicion of God's making one Man to bear the Puniſhment of anothers Sins? Though ſetting aſide that Declaration, the ſole Juſtice of God would oblige us to an abhorrence of all ſuch Surmiſes: For, what, I beſeech you, makes any Puniſhment juſt, that is inflicted either by God or Man? Is it any other than a Right in the Judge to puniſh, and an Obligation in the Criminal to ſuffer? And if ſo, is it not alike evident, that it can be no way conſiſtent with God's Juſtice to make one Man bear the Puniſhment of anothers Sin? For, as no one can have a Right to puniſh, where a Fault did not precede; and therefore neither to extend it, where that Fault doth not; becauſe, as to any other, it is as if there had been no Fault at all: ſo neither can any Man be under an obligation to Puniſhment, who was not ſome way or other Partaker of the Sin that caus'd it; becauſe that Obligation ariſeth from demerit, which we have already ſuppos'd to be the peculiar of another. And indeed, however ſome Actions of God ſeem to proclaim the contrary, and particularly his imputing to us the Sins of our firſt Parents, and laying on *Chriſt* the Iniquities of us all; yet neither do the one nor the other contradict it in the leaſt, if they be ſeriouſly and warily conſidered. Not the former, becauſe the ſame Scriptures which affirm that God imputeth to us the Iniquities of our Firſt Parents, do alſo aſſure us (as I ſhall ſhew more largely hereafter *) that we all offended in him, and conſequently, that God doth not ſo much impute to us their Sin, as our own: As neither the latter, becauſe *Chriſt* voluntarily undertook the ſuffering of that Puniſhment, which our Sins had deſerved from the Almighty. After which, to lay upon *Chriſt* the Iniquities of us all, was not ſo much to

* Explication of the Doctrine of the Sacraments, and particularly of that of Baptiſm.

make him ſuffer for others Sins, as for thoſe which he made his own, by taking the burthen of them upon himſelf. Whence it is, that
2 Cor. 5. 21. St. *Paul* tells us, That *God made him ſin for us, who knew no ſin, that we might be made the righteouſneſs of God in him.*

It being thus evident, That God neither doth, nor can make one Man bear the Puniſhment of anothers Sin; and conſequently, that that cannot be thought to be the importance of the Threat here us'd: it remains that we pitch upon ſuch a ſenſe of God's *viſiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children*, as doth not imply any thing of that nature. In order whereunto, it will not a little conduce to affirm (what I ſhall by and by ſhew hath ſufficient warrant in the Commination) That when God either threatens, or actually viſits the Sins of the Fathers upon the Children, it is not ſo much his intention to make them bear the Iniquity of their Fathers, as to puniſh their Fathers in them, as he ſometimes doth in their Houſes or Eſtates, or whatſoever elſe they place their Happineſs in. By which means God doth not ſo much make the Children ſuffer the Puniſhment of their Fathers Sins, as make the Fathers ſuffer for their own, through the ſides of thoſe Children whom he afflicts. Now, that this is the intention of the Almighty, in ſuch kind of Comminations, and particularly in that which is the Subject of my Diſcourſe, is evident from the end of all ſuch Comminations, and a particular Paſſage in this: For, the deſign of them being manifeſtly to deter Men from thoſe Crimes to which theſe Comminations are affix'd; to make thoſe Comminations of any force, they muſt conſequently be thought to bring ſome Evil to that Criminal againſt whom they ſhall be found to be denounc'd: No Man, and much leſs a ſinful one, being like to be reclaim'd by thoſe Evils, in which he himſelf ſhall not have the greateſt ſhare. From whence, as it will follow, That the principal Deſign of the Almighty was to let thoſe Idolatrous Perſons know, that he meant to puniſh them in their Children; ſo it may not obſcurely be collected from God's extending this Threat of his no further than to the third and fourth Generation, thoſe being Generations which the Parents may live to ſee, and therein their own *Bowels* (as the Apoſtle calls thoſe that deſcend from our Loyns) tortur'd for their Impiety againſt their Maker. Though, ſuppoſing that they ſhould not; yet if they have any thing of natural Affection in them, the very thoughts that ſo it ſhall be with their Poſterity, cannot but ſtagger them in their Impiety, how ſtrongly ſoever they may be tempted to it; it being not a little Evil, to die with an apprehenſion of our Poſterities becoming miſerable through our procurement.

Now though this be true, and in part alſo ſatisfactory, becauſe the Puniſhment is properly the Parents, the Calamity of the Child being made uſe of onely to puniſh the Parent by; yet, becauſe it is evident that ſuch Inflictions cannot happen but by the Calamity of the Child, as it is no leſs from the phraſe of God's *viſiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children*, that the Calamity of the Child muſt happen by the procurement of the Parent; therefore, to ſhew the full importance of this Commination of the Almighty, as well as its freedom from involving the Child in the Puniſhment of the Parents Sin, it will be requiſite to affirm, in the ſecond place, That when he threatens to viſit the Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children, his meaning is,

not

not onely that God will puniſh the Fathers in them; but that, in order to that end, he will make the Children miſerable, and that too for the ſake of the Fathers Impieties: But yet ſo, that if thoſe Children tread not in their Fathers ſteps, they ſhall be free from the Effects of it; of which there is a ſufficient preſumption from *Ezek.* 18. 14. and ſo on: or, that that Calamity of the Children ſhall turn to their ſpiritual and eternal advantage (for ſo St. *Paul* tells us, *that all things ſhall, to them that love God, Rom.* 8. 28.) or, that if the Children tread in their Fathers ſteps, or be any other way Irreligious, yet they ſhall not be puniſh'd, even by occaſion of their Fathers Sins, but for their own, and according to the demerit of them: Which will at the ſame time both ſhew how God viſits the Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children, and how far that Viſitation of his is from making the Child bear the Puniſhment of the Fathers Sin. A familiar Inſtance will clear my Senſe in the ſecond of the Particulars before-mention'd, and together with it, the uprightneſs of God's Proceedings. For, let us ſuppoſe, as we very well may, having oftentimes obſerv'd it; let us ſuppoſe, I ſay, a fond Mother puniſh'd in the Sicklineſs of that Son toward whom ſhe hath ſhew'd an immoderate affection, her love to him tranſporting her into the neglect of her other Children, or any other ſinful action. Here, I ſay, it is manifeſt, ſuppoſing the Child alſo to be pious, and no way to deſire or approve of ſuch an unreaſonable fondneſs, that the Child becometh miſerable by the procurement of the Mother; or, if you had rather I ſhould ſpeak in the Language of *Moſes* here, that *her iniquity is viſited upon him*: But yet ſo, that that Calamity of the Childs is, in reſpect of him, no Puniſhment, but, on the contrary, a ſignal advantage; God Almighty having promis'd, that *all things ſhall work together for good to them that love him*; and if ſo, this Calamity alſo. By means of which, at the ſame time he puniſheth the Mother, yet he onely afflicts the Child, or rather out of her Puniſhment procures a great Advantage to him; which is ſo far from being an act of Injuſtice, that it is an act of Grace and Mercy to him. But let us ſuppoſe, as in the third Inſtance, that the Child whoſe Calamity God maketh uſe of for the puniſhment of the Parents, treads in their ſteps, or at leaſt is irreligious another way; in which caſe, the Calamity inflicted cannot but be look'd upon as a Puniſhment, yea even to that Child on whom it is ſo; yet even ſo, a way may be found out to verifie God's Threat of *viſiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children*, without granting them to ſuffer the Puniſhment of their Parents Sins: For, as that Threat can no way be verified, without affirming the Puniſhment of the Child to befal it by the Iniquity of the Parents; ſo, that may well enough be affirm'd, without granting the Child to bear the Puniſhment of his Parents Sins; it being enough to the verifying of the former, and indeed as much as is conſiſtent with Juſtice, that the Rebellious Son, by occaſion of his Fathers Sins, is puniſh'd for his own; for which, but for his Fathers Sins, he had either eſcap'd unpuniſh'd, or not been puniſh'd after that manner wherein he is: For it is in this Particular (as * one hath happily compar'd it) as it is with a Man, who having contracted many vicious and malignant Humors, happens to ride abroad in wet Weather, and taketh cold, falleth thereby into a ſhaking firſt, and anon into a dangerous and laſting Fever. For, as there the Parties malignant

* *Sand.* third Sermon on 3 *King.* 21. 25. *fect.* 24.

malignant Humors were the true Cauſe and Root of his Diſtemper, and his taking cold the Occaſion onely of its breaking out; ſo the Perſonal Sins of the Son are the Cauſe of his Puniſhment, the Fathers the Occaſion onely of the inflicting it: which is far from inferring God's making one Man to bear the Puniſhment of another Man's Tranſgreſſion: This importing no more, than that by occaſion of the Fathers Sins, the Son may be ſometime puniſh'd according to the demerit of his own. In the mean time, we may ſee with how little reaſon ſome have condemn'd that Prayer of our Church, which, agreeably to the Doctrine of this Commandment, teacheth us to beg of God *not to remember the offences of our forefathers*: For though thoſe Offences ſhall never be charg'd upon us, yet they may be a Motive to God to puniſh us for ſmaller ones of our own, which is that which is here meant by *viſiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, to the third and fourth generation.*

2. What is meant by viſiting the Sins or Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children, hath been at large declar'd, together with the Juſtice of God's Proceedings in it: Enquire we now (as our propoſed Method obligeth us) what appearance there is of God's executing this Threat upon the Children of evil Parents, and particularly upon thoſe of Idolatrous ones. For the reſolution whereof, I will take this Threat of the Almighty aſunder, and ſhew the Completion of it in every Particular thereof. Now, that God doth often viſit the Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children, which is the firſt of thoſe things which are affirm'd, the Scripture will afford many ſignal inſtances; whereof the firſt that I ſhall alledge, is that of *Samuel*, 2 *Sam.* 12. 18. In which place we do not onely find God threatning, but actually viſiting *David*'s Adultery upon that Child which was the Off-ſpring of it; and that too, notwithſtanding the Father's deep Humiliation, and earneſt Supplication for his Life. For well may we conclude, that God will not ordinarily be wanting in viſiting the Iniquity of a Parent upon a Child, when ſo pious a Man as *David* could not avert it, though he ſought it carefully with tears. But ſo that it is alſo with a Father of a Country, no leſs than with a Natural one, the ſame *David*, how eminent ſoever for his Piety otherwiſe, will afford us a no leſs convincing Proof: the Scripture giving us to underſtand, that *for his numbring of the people, God ſlew in one day no leſs than ſeventy thouſand of them*, 2 *Sam.* 24. 15. For though there be appearance enough that the Subjects of King *David* contributed not a little to the procuring of this their Deſtruction, the ſame Book of *Samuel* informing us, in the firſt Verſe of that Chapter, That *becauſe the anger of the Lord was kindled againſt Iſrael, he permitted Satan to move David* to do that Act which procur'd it; though it be alſo probable, becauſe there is no mention of their doing it, that the People of *Iſrael*, when numbred, omitted to give *each of them half a ſhekel for the ranſom of his ſoul*, the neglect whereof God had long before told them he would puniſh with a Plague, *Exod.* 30. 1. and ſo on; by which means the Deſtruction of that People will appear yet more particularly to have been drawn upon them by themſelves: Yet inaſmuch as *David* taketh the guilt of it upon *himſelf*, and deſires of God that he would rather *turn his hand againſt him and his fathers houſe, than againſt thoſe ſheep of his*, as he calleth them, who had no hand in the procuring

curing the numbring of themſelves; inaſmuch as the Book of *Chronicles* gives us to underſtand, that the numbring of the People, which was *David*'s own Act, was the thing which diſpleaſed God, and for which he ſmote *Iſrael*, (for the Text tells us in expreſs terms, *that God was diſpleaſed with this thing*, even with the Word and Command of *David* for the numbring of the People, *and therefore he ſmote Iſrael*, 1 *Chron.* 21. 7.) it is plain, that though the *Iſraelites* were not without their guilt, and ſuch as might provoke God to the ſending of that Peſtilence among them; yet the chief occaſion of their Calamity was the Sin of *David*: and though they were puniſh'd for their own Sins onely, yet it was by his means that they came to be ſo, who might otherwiſe have been reſpited at leaſt from it. Add hereunto God's involving the innocent Children of the *Sodomites* in the ſame Calamity with their Parents; and in fine, all National Calamities, wherein Experience ſheweth good Men have no leſs ſuffered, than thoſe who were the Procurers of them. But becauſe it is not onely affirm'd, that God will *viſit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children*, but that he will alſo viſit it *to the third and fourth generation*; therefore inquire we, in the next place, what appearance there is of God's extending it either to the one or the other. Now though this be not ſo eaſie to be made appear, nor indeed abſolutely neceſſary to be, partly becauſe God never ſo threatens to viſit, but he leaveth himſelf a liberty to ſuſpend the execution of it, as the Repentance of the Children, or ſome other Purpoſe of his Divine Providence ſhall require; and partly becauſe in this Commandment he doth rather inſinuate his own likelihood of taking that Revenge, than abſolutely aſſure them that he will: yet that it was not without example, eſpecially as to the Children of Idolatrous Parents, the many Evils which God laid upon the *Jews*, and their being carried Captive into *Babylon*, may ſerve for an abundant evidence. For as there is nothing more evident from the Sacred Writers, than that Idolatry was the chief cauſe of that and other their Calamities; ſo, that the Idolatry of their Forefathers had not a little hand in the procuring of their Captivity, is evident in part from that *Lamentation* of *Jeremy*, which was written after, and upon occaſion of it; he expreſly affirming there, *That their fathers had ſinned, and were not, and they had born their iniquities*, *Lam.* 5. 7. If there be any thing of defect as to that particular proof, it is, that there is mention onely of the Sins of their Fathers, without ſpecifying whether he meant their immediate Fathers, or other their preceding Anceſtors. But beſide that it is not eaſie to confine this Speech of his to the Sins of their immediate Predeceſſors, when it is apparent thoſe that went before them yielded not to them in Idolatry; it is evident enough from other places, that God look'd farther back than the immediately foregoing Generation; yea, that this very Prophet did ſo; the Author of the Books of *Kings* * aſſuring us, that God had a reſpect to the Sins of *Manaſſeh*, who was four removes from thoſe of the Captivity, as the Prophet *Jeremy* || reproaching them with his ſending, and their refuſing to hear all his Prophets; which muſt conſequently, becauſe all his Prophets liv'd not within that or a few foregoing Ages, ſhew him to have intended the Sins of more ancient Times, and of thoſe their Forefathers that lived in them. And indeed, well may we reckon the Fathers of more than four Generations backward,

* 2 *Kings* 24. 3.

|| *Jer.* 25. 4.

backward, as the occaſioners of their Captivity, when the preſent *Jews* impute much of their preſent Diſtreſs to *Aaron*'s Calf; it being a Proverbial Saying among them, That *there is no bitter* * *Cup they drink, which hath not ſome of the Aſhes of that Calf mixed with it.* If God doth not at all times proceed to the execution of ſo ſevere a Threat, that is imputable to his alone Will and Pleaſure, which is uncertain as to us, and therefore not to be depended upon by us, eſpecially as to the Iniquities of our immediate Forefathers: There being not a few Inſtances of the Miſeries of thoſe Children who have had the ill fortune to be deſcended of Irreligious Parents.

* Fagius in Exod. 32. 2. ex Moſe Gerundenſi. *Non accidit tibi, ô Iſrael, ultio aliqua in quâ non ſit vel uncia de iniquitate vituli.*

Having thus given an Account of that part of the *Sanction* which concerneth the Violators of this Commandment, it remains that we deſcend to that which reſpects the Obſervers of it: Concerning which (becauſe it contains nothing of difficulty in it) it ſhall ſuffice me to obſerve, That as God is not wanting to encourage our Obedience to, as well as to diſcountenance the Tranſgreſſion of this Commandment; ſo, that thoſe gracious Expreſſes by which he endeavours it, tranſcend thoſe of his Juſtice, and particularly of his Vindictive one: For, whereas God threatens to viſit the Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children *to the third and fourth generation onely*, he promiſeth *to ſhew mercy unto thouſands of them that love him, and keep his commandments.* But ſo that God proceeded, as well as promiſed, the Scriptures do abundantly declare, they giving us to underſtand, that for the ſake of *David*, and other ſuch pious Perſons, God was often entreated both for his Succeſſors, and the Land of *Iſrael*; and averted from them thoſe Judgments which they had abundantly deſerv'd, and which he himſelf was otherwiſe in a diſpoſition to inflict. For thus, when *Solomon* had by his Sins, and particularly by his Idolatry, given occaſion to the Almighty to rend the Kingdom from him and his Son; yet in reſpect to *David*, who had been more faithful in keeping of his Commandments and his Statutes, he preſerv'd the Kingdom entire to him all the days of his Life, and left his Son, for the ſame *David*'s ſake, the Tribe of *Judah*, and thoſe that follow'd it, 1 *Kings* 11. 34, and ſo on. In like manner, though in the time of *Jehoram*, both *Judah*, and he himſelf, had made themſelves ripe for deſtruction, by treading in the Idolatries of *Ahab*, yet the Text gives us to underſtand, that for *David*'s ſake, as well as for his own Covenant, God would not then deſtroy them, nor give them over to thoſe Calamities which they had deſerv'd, 2 *Kings* 8. 19. Which, as it is a ſufficient Proof of the reality of God's Intentions, in that Promiſe which he hath here made to the Obſervers of this Commandment; ſo cannot but, if attended to, prove a potent Inducement to the Obſervation of this, and all other the Commandments of the Almighty: as by means of which, not onely we our ſelves may be made happy, but a Bleſſing be thereby entail'd upon many ſucceeding Generations.

THE

THE THIRD
COMMANDMENT.

THE THIRD COMMANDMENT.

Thou ſhalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain: for the Lord will not hold him guiltleſs that taketh his Name in vain.

PART I.

The Contents.

The Affirmative Part of the Commandment, the Hallowing of God's Name; *for which cauſe the handling thereof is reſerv'd for that Petition of the Lords Prayer which prompts us to deſire it: Onely the Negative Part thereof, with its appendent Sanction, conſidered here. The thing principally forbidden in it, Swearing, and Swearing falſly. Other Profanations of God's Name, and particularly in Oaths, reducible thereto, eſpecially in the Chriſtian ſenſe of it. An Inquiry what Oaths are to be look'd upon as forbidden by our Saviour: Where is ſhewn, firſt, againſt the* Anabaptiſts, *That all Oaths are not forbidden; as, in like manner, againſt the* Libertines, *That other Oaths are, beſide what are made by a Creature; particularly, all Oaths in common Converſation, yea, for which there is not a great neceſſity. The Grounds of that Determination, and of the unlawfulneſs of ſuch Oaths.*

HAVING in the Preamble to my Diſcourſe upon the *Decalogue* laid it for a Ground, That *every Negative in it includes an Affirmative*, Reaſon would that I ſhould take notice of the *Affirmative* of this Precept, which can be no other than the *Hallowing of that Name* which we are forbid by it to take in vain. But becauſe I ſhall ſay enough concerning the *Hallowing of God's Name*, in that Petition of the *Lord's Prayer* which hath that for the Object of it, I will proceed without more ado to ſhew,

1. The meaning of the Prohibition: Together with,
2. That ſevere Sanction wherewith it is bound upon us.

I. I begin with the Prohibition, *Thou ſhalt not take the Name of the Lord thy God in vain*: Where again theſe two things are to be inquir'd into.

1. Whether Swearing be the thing here forbidden, at leaſt principally: And,
2. If it be, What kind of Swearing is.

1. That *Swearing* is the thing forbidden, at leaſt principally and chiefly, beſide the Conſent both of *Jewiſh** and *Chriſtian* Interpreters, we have the Phraſe that is here made uſe of, to atteſt; to *take*, or rather *lift up* the Name of God: becauſe they who ſwore by it, were wont to lift up their Hands to Heaven, being no other than to ſwear by it. And accordingly, as the *Chaldee* Paraphraſe, together with the *Syriack* and *Arabick* Verſions, render thoſe Words, Thou ſhalt not take the Name of God, *Swear not by it*; ſo the Phraſe of *liſting up* is ſo peculiar to the buſineſs of an Oath, that it is ſometime ſet by it ſelf to ſignifie it, and elſewhere with the addition of *Soul*. For thus, *Iſa.* 3. 7. what is in the *Hebrew*, *In that day ſhall he lift up, ſaying*, is in our Tranſlation, and indeed cannot be well otherwiſe rendred, *In that day he ſhall ſwear*; and the *Pſalmiſt*, after he had ſaid, *Who hath not lift up his Soul to vanity*, to let us know what he means, adds by way of explication, *nor ſworn deceitfully*, *Pſal.* 24. 4. In the mean time, as it is not to be deny'd, that the taking the Name of God may alſo ſignifie the making mention of it (after the ſame manner that it is, where God asks of the Wicked what he had *to do to declare his ſtatutes, or take his covenant into his mouth*, *Pſal.* 50. 16.) ſo the Rule before laid down, That *under the groſſer Sins, the leſſer alſo are forbidden*, will warrant our Underſtanding the Prohibition to extend to the irreverent uſe of the Name of God, as well *out of* an Oath, as *in it*. But becauſe I ſhall ſay enough concerning thus taking the Name of God, when I come to entreat of that Petition which prays for the Hallowing of it, I will confine my ſelf at preſent to the matter of taking God's Name in an Oath; and, becauſe that is the next thing to be diſcours'd of, inquire what kind of Swearing is here forbidden.

* *Joſeph. Ant. Jud. li. 3. c. 4. ubi ſic exprimit tertium mandatum.* Ὁ τρίτος ὃς μηδενὶ φαύλῳ τὸν θεὸν ὀμνύναι. *Philo de ſpecial legibus.*

2. And here, in the firſt place, if we look upon the Commandment onely as a part of *Moſes* Law, it is not in the leaſt to be doubted, that *all kind* of Swearing is not forbidden. For, as the Prohibition reſtrains it ſelf to the taking of God's Name *in vain*; ſo, that Reſtriction is ſo far from proſcribing all ſorts of Oaths, that it doth on the contrary eſtabliſh thoſe that are not ſo qualified: according to that known Axiom of the Lawyers, That *exceptio firmat regulam in non exceptis*. It is not to be doubted, ſecondly, if we regard the Commandment under the former notion, that the principal deſign of it was to forbid the taking of God's Name *unto a lie*: For as that is frequently the meaning of the Word *ſhave* or *vain*, eſpecially in the matter of Oaths, as you may ſee in *Grotius* upon the *Decalogue*; ſo, I think, we cannot otherwiſe give a ſatisfactory Account of the oppoſition our Saviour makes between his own Doctrine, and that of the Law; he repreſenting the purport of the latter to be, *Thou ſhalt not forſwear thy ſelf*, but of his own, *Thou ſhalt not ſwear at all*. For, wherein lies the oppoſition between them, if the principal Deſign, at leaſt, of the Commandment were not to forbid the taking of God's Name

Name *unto a lie?* In the mean time, though I affirm the Swearing falſely to be the principal thing ſtruck at; my meaning is not to deny, but that *vain* Oaths may alſo be condemned with them; partly becauſe that is the prime importance of the Word *ſhave*, and partly becauſe I have before laid it for a Ground, That *under the greater Sins, the leſs alſo of the ſame ſpecies are forbid.* But then, thirdly, if we look upon the Commandment as all *Chriſtians* ought to do, as either explain'd or enlarg'd by our Saviour, ſo no doubt can remain of the unlawfulneſs of other Oaths beſide falſe ones; our Saviour's Words, after his rehearſal of the Doctrine of the Law, being, *But I ſay unto you, Swear not at all.* For the elucidation of which Doctrine, and together therewith, of our own Obligation from this Commandment, I will proceed in this method.

1. I ſhall inquire what Oaths are ſimply and abſolutely forbidden.
2. Whether it be lawful in any caſe to ſwear by a Creature.
3. Whether the Magiſtrate hath power to exact an Oath.
4. Whether, and how far, he may exact one of the Accuſed Party.
5. What is the Obligation of Oaths.
6. And laſtly, (becauſe that is of kin to them, and therefore in reaſon to have a place here) entreat of the Nature and Obligation of Vows.

I. There are a ſort of Men who minding more the Letter, than the meaning of the Scripture, have profeſs'd to believe themſelves, and endeavour'd to perſwade others, that all Oaths are now forbidden. What the ground of their Scrupuloſity is, ſhall by and by be declar'd. This onely would be obſerv'd in paſſing, That they who in this matter are ſo tenacious of the Letter, are in other things as regardleſs both of the Letter and the Senſe. For what hath moré the aſtipulation both of the one and the other, than *Obedience to Magiſtrates*, which yet theſe *ſcrupulous* Perſons do as irreligiouſly caſt off? But becauſe it matters not much what the Perſons are that propugn the Opinion, if it have any Foundation in Scripture; leaving the Perſons of the Objectors, we will deſcend to the Texts on which they relie, which are eſpecially that of our Saviour, and of St. *James*: The purport of the former whereof is, *That they ſhould not ſwear at all; but that their communication ſhould be yea, yea; nay, nay*: the latter, *That they ſhould not ſwear, neither by heaven, nor earth, nor any other Oath; but ſimply affirm or deny whatſoever fell into diſcourſe.* For the clearing of which Texts, or rather of the former thereof, (for every body may ſee that that of St. *James* is borrowed from the other) I ſhall firſt of all propoſe the contrary Example of St. *Paul*, in thoſe Scriptures which God handed to the Church by him: For, who can think it our Saviour's intention to forbid all Swearing whatſoever, when we find ſuch a one as St. *Paul* doing ſo, in thoſe Writings wherein he was Divinely inſpir'd? Now, for the Practice of St. *Paul* in this particular, we have ſeveral Inſtances in thoſe Epiſtles that bear his Name. Thus, *Rom.* 1. 9. we find him vouching God for a *Witneſs* (which is the very Formality of an Oath) *that he did without ceaſing make mention of them always in his prayers: For God* (ſaith he) *is my witneſs, whom I ſerve with my ſpirit in the Goſpel of his Son, that without ceaſing I*

make mention of you in my prayers: as, in like manner, *Gal.* 1. 20. where he gives an account of his Converſion, and calling to be an Apoſtle: *Now the things which I write unto you, behold, before God, I lie not.* Laſtly, Where he ſpeaks of the ſeveral Perſecutions and Troubles which he ſuffer'd for the Goſpels ſake, he doth appeal to the ſame God for the truth of what he ſaid; *For the God and Father of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt* (ſaith he) *which is bleſſed for evermore, knoweth that I lie not*, 2 *Cor.* 11. 31. Which Texts are plain and evident Proofs of St. *Paul*'s ſwearing; and conſequently, that our Bleſſed Saviour hath not univerſally forbidden it. Let it remain therefore for a certain truth, That all Swearing whatſoever is not forbidden by our Saviour, which is the firſt thing propoſed to be proved. But as, on the one ſide, we are not to think all Oaths whatſoever forbidden; ſo neither onely ſuch (which may perhaps be the Refuge of ſome Men) that are made rather by Creatures, than by God; the oppoſition in that fore-alledged place being not between ſwearing by a Creature, and by God; but between Swearing, and a naked Affirmation and Denial: For, *I ſay unto you* (ſaith our Saviour) *ſwear not at all, neither by heaven, for it is God's throne; nor by the earth, for it is his footſtool, &c. But let your communication be yea, yea; nay, nay: for whatſoever is more than theſe, cometh of evil.* And accordingly, as St. *James*, where he enforceth the ſame Prohibition, to the mention of *ſwearing neither by heaven nor by earth*, adds, *neither by any other Oath*; ſo it is eaſie to aſſign a Reaſon of our Saviour's inſtancing in ſuch kind of Oaths, without reſtraining the Prohibition to them; even becauſe ſuch kind of Aſſeverations were leſs ſcrupled by the *Jews*, as may appear from a Tract * of *Philo*: Where dehorting Men from ſwearing at all, he yet adds, That *in caſe they did, they ſhould not ſwear by the Name of God, but by the Health or Memory of their Parents, the Sun, the Earth, and the like*; theſe being, in his Opinion, much more excuſable than ſwearing by the Name of God. Whatſoever therefore is the meaning of thoſe Words, *Swear not at all*, ſomething more is meant than that we ſhould not ſwear by the Creatures; which what that is, I come now more directly to ſhew.

* *Lib. de ſpecialibus legibus.*

1. And here, in the firſt place, I ſhall not doubt to reckon (becauſe the thing principally forbidden) all Oaths in our common Converſation: For what leſs can we think meant thereby, unleſs we would have our Saviour's Words ſignifie juſt nothing? Eſpecially when he himſelf adds, by way of explication, *Let your communication be yea, yea; nay, nay: for whatſoever is more than theſe, cometh of evil.* And here give me leave to take up a Lamentation, eſpecially in an Age which ſeems to bid defiance to our Saviour's Precept, and that Auguſt Name which it would preſerve inviolate. For, as if, I do not ſay, *Chriſt* had given no Command concerning it, but *our lips were our own*, and we had no Superior to controul us, every Man almoſt, from the oldeſt to the youngeſt, calls God to witneſs in the moſt trivial and impertinent Affairs; at a Game at Tables, at a Deal of Cards, when a Health is paſſing about, and it may be Intemperance together with it: For, let the leaſt queſtion be made of any thing that is then acting, and an Oath ſhall preſently be brought to confirm it, and God be call'd to witneſs that we threw twice Six, or that we have been as intemperate as any that have kept the Round. Nay, to ſo great an intemperance

temperance are the Tongues of Men now come, that God muſt be call'd to witneſs, even where there is no queſtion at all made of any thing, nor it may be likely to be, unleſs it be whether the Party be a brave reſolute Sinner, and have as little fear of God as Man. For what other Interpretation can any Man make of ſuch Mens ſwearing, but that they are afraid of being thought Religious, or rather of not being thought to have bid defiance to it? But as all Oaths in common Converſe are forbidden to us *Chriſtians*, and Yea or Nay ſubſtituted in their room; ſo, if the wiſeſt of the *Heathen* or *Chriſtians* may be credited,

2. All Oaths whatſoever, for which there is not a great neceſſity. And accordingly, we find the Fathers * of the Church condemning Swearing, as a thing generally unlawful; and the Eccleſiaſtical Stories || telling us of one, of whom when his Fellow-ſoldier demanded an Oath, his Anſwer was, That it was not lawful for him to ſwear, becauſe he was a *Chriſtian*. But, which is admirable to obſerve, ſome of the *Heathen* ſweetly conſenting with them, and with him whoſe Religion they propugned: For thus *Epictetus* † in particular adviſeth, Ὅρκον παραιτῆσαι εἰ μὲν ὅλον· εἰς ἅπαν, εἰδὲ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνόντων· that is to ſay, *to avoid ſwearing, if it were poſſible, wholly; but if not, at leaſt as far as they might:* And *Hierocles* *, upon the Golden Verſes of *Pythagoras*, That *the beſt way to preſerve the Reverence due to an Oath, was not to uſe it frequently, or upon trifling occaſions, to fill up the vacunities of our Diſcourſe, or procure credit to a Tale; but, as far as they might, to uſe it onely in things neceſſary, and when there was no other way to ſecure them but by the help of an Oath.* And, to the ſhame of us *Chriſtians* be it ſpoken, (for this Divinity was not onely in their Books, but in their Practice) there is mention of one *Clinias* ||, a *Pythagorean*, who, when he might have avoided a Mulct of three Talents, by onely taking an Oath, yet choſe rather to ſuffer the loſs of thoſe, than take the other. Such was the one and the others Opinion of the Sacredneſs of an Oath, and of the unlawfulneſs of making uſe of it, unleſs where there was a great neceſſity: Which, that it was not without ground, I ſhall ſhew immediately, when I make thoſe the matter of my Inquiry. In the mean time, it is evident, that all Oaths in common Converſe are unlawful to *Chriſtians*, and much more the intermingling of Oaths with every Sentence we utter, which is ſo frequent both with the Baſe and Honourable. And God grant, that, as the *Land hath mourn'd* becauſe of them, ſo it may *mourn for* them, and we propitiate that Name by our Humiliation and Reverence, which others and our ſelves hitherto have onely diſhonour'd and blaſphem'd.

To go on now to ſhew the Grounds of the Prohibition of unneceſſary Oaths, and to eſtabliſh it by Reaſon, as well as by Authority: Where, firſt, I ſhall alledge the providing that every Man ſpeak truth with his Neighbour, and be punctual in the performance of their Words and Promiſes: For, as our Saviour is thought to intimate by thoſe Words of his, *Whatſoever is more than theſe, cometh of evil*, the uſe of Oaths had undoubtedly its original from Mens falſeneſs and perfidiouſneſs in their Words and Promiſes; neither would any Man be deſirous of an Oath, if he thought the Party he addreſs'd himſelf to would ſpeak truth without. And accordingly, our Law doth not generally

* *Tertul. de Idol. c. 11, & 23.*

|| *Euſeb. Eccl. Hiſt. l. 6. c. 5. Loquitur de Baſilide Martyre in Alexandria.*

† *Enchir. c. 44.*

* *Hierocles in illam clauſulam.* Καὶ σέβου ὅρκον— μελέτην δὲ ἀείσεως τοῦ τηρεῖν τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν σέβας, τὸ μὲν πυκνῶς, μηδὲ ὡς ἔτυχε, χρῆσθαι τῷ ὅρκῳ, &c.

|| *Vid. Grot. in Mat. 5. 34.*

generally exact an Oath of thoſe of the Nobler ſort, becauſe ſuppoſing their Birth and Education to ſet them above any untruth and perfi-
* *De ſpec. leg.* diouſneſs; and the Word of an honeſt Man (as *Philo* * ſpeaks) ὅρκῳ ἐϛὶ βέβαιος, ἀκλινὴς, ἀψευδέϛατος, ἐρρωμένος ἀληθείᾳ· that is to ſay, *It hath among thoſe who deem him ſo, the nature of an Oath, it is free from the ſuſpicion of any falſity or change*: Whilſt he who is put to an
‖ *De Decalog.* Oath (as the ſame *Philo* ‖ ſpeaks) ἤδη εἰς ἀπιϛίαν ὑπονοεῖται, *lies under the ſuſpicion of unfaithfulneſs.* Now foraſmuch as it was manifeſtly our Saviour's Deſign to implant Faithfulneſs and Truth in the World, at leaſt in that part of it which embrac'd his Religion; and the uſe of Oaths (as hath been already ſhewn) is a ſign of the want of that, and onely occaſion'd by it; it is eaſie to ſuppoſe, that the recovery of Truth and Faithfulneſs, was the Reaſon of his forbidding them in common Converſe; yea, that he meant to forbid all that were not ſtrictly neceſſary; all Oaths that are not ſuch, being a ſign of want of Truth in them of whom they are exacted. The ſecond Reaſon which I ſuppoſe induc'd our Saviour to forbid Swearing generally, was to keep Men from ſwearing falſely; it being an hard matter for a Man to allow himſelf in the one, and not be guilty of the other. We learn thus much from the forementioned *Philo*; φύεται γὰρ ἐκ πολυορκίας ψευδορκία καὶ ἀσέβεια· for *from much ſwearing* (ſaith he) *ariſeth perjury and*
* *Loco prius citato.* *impiety*: But much more clearly from *Hierocles* *, whoſe Words I ſhall now ſubjoyn: Τὸ δὲ σέβας ὅρκου, &c. *Now the words* Reverence an Oath, *do not onely enjoyn ſwearing truly, but the avoiding of ſwearing, as much as may be; for ſo ſhall we beſt obſerve the Precept of ſwearing truly, if we ſeldom allow our ſelves to ſwear at all: For by ſwearing frequently and lightly, a Man may eaſily fall into Perjury; whereas he that ſwears ſeldom, never. For, either ſuch an one will not ſwear at all; or, if he doth, he will ſwear truly, and neither through an evil Cuſtom ſuffer his Tongue to run before his Underſtanding, nor his Underſtanding to be hurried away by the intemperance of his Paſſions.* And truly, what elſe can be expected from a common Swearer, than that he ſhould ſometime ſwear falſely, and as well violate, as profane the Oaths of God? For beſide that ſuch Mens frequent ſwearing is a certain Argument that they do not eſteem an Oath as Sacred (for then certainly they would reſerve them for Matters of importance, and where (as the Poet ſpeaketh) *there is a knot worthy God's untying*) beſide that, I ſay, the heat of Paſſion or Inconſiderateneſs may make ſuch Perſons, ere they are aware, ſet an Oath to that, of the falſeneſs whereof they themſelves are convinc'd; which is to call the God of Truth to witneſs to a Lie, which of all other things he profeſſeth to abhor. And if this be the conſequent of cuſtomary ſwearing, no wonder if our Saviour have generally forbidden it, and enjoyn'd Men as much as may be not to ſwear at all. But beſide the Perjury which unneceſſary Swearing doth naturally draw after it, and for which cauſe therefore, if there were no other, it were in reaſon to be avoided; it offers an affront both to God, and to his Name, which we do thus *take in vain*. For, can it be other than an affront to the Divine Majeſty, to call him to witneſs to every Trifle, to interpoſe his Teſtimony in every ſlight and impertinent Affair? That is to ſay, in ſuch wherein it would ſcarcely be decent to call in a Man of any Repute to witneſs? Beſide, when we call God to witneſs to the truth

truth of what we affirm, our meaning is, becauſe there is no other way of witneſſing it, that he would either witneſs to the truth of what we ſay, by ſome extraordinary Accident; or to our falſeneſs, by ſome remarkable Judgment upon our ſelves. Now can any Man think it other than an affront, thus unneceſſarily to call upon God to ſhew Miracles, and alter the common Courſe of his Providence; when even God himſelf makes not any ſuch alteration, but in Matters of importance, and to evidence the truth of a Revelation, or other ſuch like Affair? If a *Heathen* could affirm of his Deity, That he was *not at leiſure to intend ſmall matters*, we may very well think that the True will not be well pleas'd to be call'd to witneſs, in Matters that are neither ſerious nor important. It is true indeed, where the Matter is weighty and important, and the Glory of God ſome way concern'd in the clearing of it, ſuch as is the doing Right between Man and Man, or the procuring Credit to that Doctrine which he himſelf hath commanded us to promulge; in thoſe, I ſay, and ſuch like Caſes, eſpecially when we have the Warrant both of his Word and Apoſtles Practice, we may well preſume it not unacceptable to God, to call him to bear witneſs to them. But to do it, as is commonly done, upon every ſlight and trifling occaſion, when the queſtion is onely, Whether we have thrown ſo much at Dice, or which of the Bowls lie neareſt to the Jack; in ſuch Caſes, I ſay, to call in God to Umpire the Difference, muſt argue a mean Opinion of him, and may ſeem more proper for thoſe Dice we ſport withal, and for thoſe Reeds we are wont to meaſure the difference that is between the other. But be it, that there were nothing of all this in an Oath (which yet is the very Formality of it); yet, is it not ſome affront to the Divine Majeſty, thus unneceſſarily to make mention of the Name of God, and to interlard every Sentence we ſpeak, with it? For though his Name be not his Perſon, yet (as ſhall be elſewhere * obſerv'd) there is ſome Reſpect due to it, for the relation it hath to him; and accordingly, not either ſlightly, or regardleſly to be mentioned. But becauſe, where I ſhall make this Obſervation, I ſhall ſay enough to confirm it, and the unlawfulneſs of unneceſſary and trifling mention of the Divine Names; in ſtead of proſecuting it, or the matter of Swearing any further, I will ſee if I can provoke your Emulation, by what I find obſerv'd by *Philo* *, concerning ſome of the more ſober *Jews*: Which is, *That in caſe neceſſity prompted Men to it, they ſhould not preſently have recourſe to the Firſt Cauſe, and ſwear by the Name of God, but rather by Heaven, or Earth, or ſome other Creature; That in caſe they ſwore by God, they ſhould rather do it tacitely, than expreſly; as* νὴ τὸν, *or* μὰ τὸν, that is to ſay, *By the*, leaving the Name of *God*, by whom they ſwore, to be underſtood: *That they ſhould ſhew ſome kind of backwardneſs and averſation to it, even where there ſeem'd to be ſome neceſſity for an Oath: That they ſhould conſider well, before they made Oath of any thing, whether it were a matter of importance, whether it were true, and ſuch as they had ſufficient knowledge of; whether they themſelves were pure in Soul, in Body, and in Tongue; it being a great Impiety to let any thing of filthineſs paſs through that mouth which made mention of the Name of God.* Laſtly, *That they ſhould take care not to ſwear in any profane and impure Places, in which it ſeem'd hardly decent to make mention of our earthly Parents.* For, is it poſſible,

* On that Petition of the Lord's Prayer, *Hallowed be thy Name.*

* *De Decalog. & de ſpecialibus legibus.*

ſible, after all this, for *Chriſtians*, who have been ſo much more oblig'd, and better inſtructed by God, to have leſs regard to it; nay, to profane and blaſpheme that holy Name, to call him to witneſs to every Impertinence, to vouch his Authority for a Throw or a Card? If it be, it is a ſign we have as little of Emulation as Religion, and are equally regardleſs of our own Honour, and that of God. Laſtly, (which is a Conſideration by no means to be forgotten, becauſe made uſe of by God himſelf to dehort us from it) As there is little of Honour or Religion in thus taking the Name of God in vain; ſo there is all the reaſon in the World to believe, though we had not the Scripture to aſſure us, that God *will not hold him guiltleſs* that doth it. For, who can think, but that he who hath been ſo often ſummon'd to come down among us, and witneſs to our Extravagances and Impertinencies, will at length come down, though to a quite different purpoſe, and make us feel the dreadfulneſs of that Name, which we do either trifle with, or blaſpheme.

PART II.

Concerning falſe Oaths, and the Impiety thereof, which is evidenced from the affront they offer to the Divine Majeſty, and the prejudice they bring to Humane Society. This laſt evidenced at large, both in Aſſertory and Promiſſory Oaths. Of Swearing by a Creature; and whether or no, and in what ſenſe it may be lawful. That it is unlawful to make a Creature the Term of our Oath, or the Thing we ſwear by; but not ſo, to make mention of them in an Oath (though in the common Form of one) when intended onely as relating to the Divine Majeſty, or devoted unto him as Pledges of our Fidelity. That it is lawful for the Magiſtrate to exact an Oath of his Subjects. This evidenced in part from the nature of an Oath, which becometh ſo much the more lawful for being extorted; from the Practice of Holy Men in Scripture, who have requir'd an Oath from their Children and Servants; and, in fine, from the neceſſity there is oftentimes of it, for the ſecuring both the Magiſtrate and the Commonwealth.

3. THAT all Oaths in common Converſe are unlawful, that all vain and unneceſſary ones are ſo, you have ſeen already: Proceed we now to the conſideration of *Falſe* ones, or ſuch as are applied to a Lie. For that theſe alſo are unlawful, the Letter of the Commandment ſhews, and may *à fortiori* be concluded from our Saviour's Prohibition of the other. The former of theſe I ſhall now take for granted, as having ſufficiently eſtabliſh'd it in the foregoing Diſcourſe: It remains therefore that I evidence the truth of the latter, which will not coſt me much time or pains to manifeſt. For, if we are to have an Oath in ſuch veneration, as not to uſe it in common Converſe, nor indeed where there is not a great neceſſity; how cautious ought we to be in ſetting it to a Lie, which this very *Deca-*

logue

logue hath forbidden, and which, beſide that, God doth elſewhere profeſs to have a great abhorrence of. To all which, if we add that of St. *Paul* to *Timothy*, 1 *Tim.* 1. 9, 10. ſo there will not remain any the leaſt doubt, I do not ſay of the unlawfulneſs, but of the great enormity of ſetting the Oath of God unto a Lie; becauſe not onely affirming *the Law to have been made for perjur'd Perſons*, but reckoning them among Parricides, and other ſuch Monſters in Nature, as their Crime, together with thoſe of their Aſſociates, among the things that are *contrary to ſound doctrine.*

Now though this might ſuffice, at leaſt amongſt reaſonable Men, to evince the unlawfulneſs of ſetting the Oath of God unto a Lie: yet becauſe, as was but now intimated, it is a Crime of a very high nature, and yet by many Men as little ſcrupled as vain and unneceſſary ones, I think it not amiſs a little to explain the Nature of it, and the fatal Conſequences wherewith it is attended.

I have before ſhewn, and ſhall therefore now take it for granted, that an Oath is *a Religious Affirmation, wherein God is invok'd as a Witneſs, and by conſequence alſo as a Revenger, if we be found to falſifie in it.* From whence it will follow, That whoſoever ſwears falſly, calls God to witneſs to a Lie. Now, that no Man can do, without believing God to have no regard at all to Humane Affairs, or that he is falſe, and a Patron of thoſe that are ſo; neither the one, nor the other of which, can be entertain'd into our thoughts, without the higheſt Impiety in the World. Not the *former*, becauſe not onely denying an Article of our Faith, but ſtriking at the Root of all Religion; *He that cometh unto God* (as the Author to the *Hebrews* * inſtructs us) *being not onely to believe that he is, but that he is a rewarder of ſuch as diligently ſeek him*; which implies a more than ordinary Regard. But let us ſuppoſe him that ſwears falſely, to believe God to have a regard to Humane Affairs; though I am ſure he that doth ſo, will in the end give us no thanks for the Suppoſition; yet can it not be deny'd, but that he muſt believe God to be ſuch as himſelf, even a Liar, and a Patron of thoſe that are ſo. For will any Man call thoſe to witneſs to a Lie, of whom he hath not a ſtrong preſumption that they are falſe themſelves? Nay, will he be ſo unmindful of his own Intereſt, or rather take ſo much pains to ruine it? For, if the Party whom he invites to give Teſtimony, be no falſe or deceitful Perſon, he will undoubtedly give Teſtimony rather againſt than for him, and diſcover his falſhood to the World. Now foraſmuch as it cannot be ſuppos'd any Man will be ſo far an Enemy to himſelf, as to ſeek a Teſtimony which ſhall onely make againſt him; he who thus calls God to witneſs, muſt be preſum'd to believe that God will witneſs for him; and conſequently, becauſe a Lie is that he is call'd to witneſs to, that God is falſe, and a Patron of thoſe that are ſo. But what Impiety can be greater than ſuch a Belief, or more diſhonourable to the Divine Majeſty; who hath every where repreſented himſelf as True and Faithful; who hath, in ſeveral places, affirm'd Lying to be one of thoſe things to which his Power, though Almighty, cannot reach; laſtly, whoſe Veracity is the ſtay of all thoſe that truſt in him, of all that come unto *Chriſt* by him? For, let God's Veracity be deſtroy'd, and all Truſt in him muſt periſh with it, and he be accounted as vain a Confidence, as any which himſelf decries.

* 11. 6.

From the Affront which falſe ſwearing offers to the Divine Majeſty, paſs we to the Conſequences thereof, and the harm it doth to Humane Society; which will appear, if we reflect upon the ſeveral ſorts of Oaths, which are either *Aſſertory*, or *Promiſſory*. For *Aſſertory* Oaths, ſuch I mean as are brought to witneſs the Truth of any thing that is paſt or preſent, the Author to the *Hebrews* tells us (and we may learn it from our own Experience) that *they are an end of ſtrifes* between Parties at variance; this being that by which all Controverſies are voided, and without which it is impoſſible they ſhould ever be. For, as it is not to be preſum'd, they who judge between Man and Man, ſhould have cogniſance of their reſpective Intereſts, but from the report of others; ſo the bare Affirmations of Men are generally too fallacious to ground a ſound Deciſion on; there being nothing more uſual, even for thoſe who make ſome conſcience of ſpeaking Truth, than to ſtretch it beyond its bounds, to ſerve the Neceſſity or Intereſt of their Friends. Either therefore Differences muſt never have an end, which Religion, as well as the Intereſt of the World, forbids; or they muſt be ended by that, which the Scripture hath repreſented as the proper way to terminate, and which all the World hath made uſe of to compoſe them. Now foraſmuch as the Welfare of Mankind depends upon the Compoſure of Differences, as that again upon the Religion of an Oath; he muſt needs be a great Enemy to Humane Society, who ſhall ſubvert this ſureſt Prop of it, and call God to witneſs to a Lie. For what were this but to bring a ſcandal upon thoſe ſo neceſſary means of deciding Controverſies; and conſequently, to leave Men either to differ without hopes of accord, or (what was ſometime in uſe in our Forefathers days) to decide their Differences by the Sword. Which, as it is in it ſelf a very unequal Umpire of Differences, ſo ſerves onely to create greater, and precipitate Men into that confuſion which they ſought to avoid by it. The like is to be ſaid of *Promiſſory* Oaths; ſuch, I mean, as are brought to aſſure Men, that they who make them, will perform what they promiſe. For, let theſe once be vitiated and diſgrac'd, and there can be no aſſurance to any Man, of any thing that is yet to come. For, if an Oath will not hold a Man, much leſs will a bare promiſe, becauſe that contains a Promiſe in it, and beſide that, an Appeal to the Judge of Heaven and Earth. If it be ſaid, as it may, That the Laws and the Puniſhments annex'd, may make them perform their Oaths, whom the Religion of an Oath cannot; I anſwer, firſt, That there were ſuch Oaths made, muſt be confirm'd by another, to thoſe to whom the execution of the Laws is committed. If therefore Oaths do once become cheap and vile, that alſo may be ſuſpected of falſhood, and conſequently render the Proceedings of all Courts of Judicature ſuſpected, becauſe directed by them. Again, What ſecurity can we have that Judgment ſhall be rightly adminiſtred, if Oaths have not their due regard? For, inaſmuch as Judges are ſubject to the ſame Infirmities and Paſſions with our ſelves; and the Laws, by which they proceed, neither are nor can be ſo made, but they may, notwithſtanding them, injure ſome Perſons in their Cauſe: what ſecurity can there be of their not actually doing ſo, if that Oath reſtrain them not, which they gave to him whoſe Vicegerents they are? Sure I am, nothing elſe can reſtrain the Prince himſelf, becauſe he is obnoxious to no Tribunal, but that of God.

God. And therefore the condition of the World muſt needs be bad, if thoſe Oaths become contemptible, by which alone their Exorbitances can be bounded. So pernicious to Humane Society, is the ſetting an Oath to a Lie; ſo deſtructive to the Honour of God, and the Being of Religion. And having ſaid and evinc'd ſo much, I ſhall not need to ſay any thing more to aggravate the Criminalneſs thereof; becauſe transforming the perjur'd Perſon into the Cruelty of a Wild Beaſt, and the groſs Irreligion of an Atheiſt.

II. Having thus ſhewn what Oaths are ſimply and abſolutely unlawful, that is to ſay, all Oaths in common Converſe, all unneceſſary, and falſe ones; I come now to inquire, Whether it be in any caſe lawful *to ſwear by a Creature*; the ſecond thing propos'd to be diſcours'd of. For the reſolution whereof,

1. The firſt thing I ſhall propoſe, is, That it is not lawful in the leaſt to make them *the Term* of our Oath, or the *things which we ſwear by*, in ſtrict and proper ſpeech; that being to give them the Honour which is due to God, and conſequently to look upon them as ſuch. For inaſmuch as the Scripture requires the *ſwearing by his Name*, *Deut.* 6. 13. and, which is more, imputes to the *Iſraelites* for a Crime, their ſwearing by *them that were no gods*, *Jer.* 5. 7. inaſmuch as an Oath is in its own nature the calling him to witneſs who is of infallible Truth, a Searcher of Hearts, and a moſt juſt and powerful Avenger of Falſhood (which cannot be affirm'd of any but God); he that in ſtrictneſs of ſpeech ſwears by any Creature, muſt conſequently be ſuppos'd to give it the Honour that is due to God, or rather look upon it as ſuch: A thing which it is manifeſt many of the *Heathen* did, and accordingly ſwore by them. Thus *Euripides* brings in *Ægeus* ſwearing after *Medea*, in theſe following Words.

Ὄμνυμι γαῖαν, λαμπρὸν ἥλιόν τε φῶς,
Θεούς τε πάντας ἐμμένειν ἃ σε κλύω.

That is to ſay, *I ſwear by the Earth, and the bright Light of the Sun, and all the Gods whatſoever, that I will be conſtant to what you enjoyn me.* And an *Aſſyrian* Aſtrologer (as a Learned Man *of our own Nation informs us) binds his Readers not to proſtitute the Secrets of it, under this following Oath. *I adjure all thoſe that light upon this Book, by the holy Circle of the Sun, and the irregular Courſes of the Moon; by the Vertues of the other Stars, and the Zodiack; to keep theſe things ſecret, and not either impart them to the unlearned, and ſuch as have not been entred into them; or be unmindful of paying Reſpect to the Memory of me their Inſtructer. Let the forenamed Gods be propitious to thoſe that keep this Oath; but contrary to them that break it.* From both which Paſſages it is manifeſt, that many of the *Heathen* look'd upon the Powers of Heaven and Earth as Gods, and accordingly ſwore by them. And therefore, as ſome pious Men have, through the fear of ſuch like Idolatry, adviſ'd wholly to forbear the uſe of ſuch Oaths, wherein there is mention of Created Beings; ſo I ſhall ſo far concur with them, as to adviſe the ſame, where there is any danger of our own falling, or drawing others into the like

* *Joh. Selden. Prolegom. ad Synt. De* DIS *Syris, cap.* 3. Ἐνευχάνοισι ὁρκίζω ἥλιον μὲ ἱερὸν κύκλον καὶ σελήνης ἀνωμάλους δρόμους, καὶ τε λοιπῶν ἀστέρων δυνάμεις καὶ κύκλον δυοκαίδεκα ζωδίων, ὃν ἀποκρύφοις ταῦτα ἔχειν καὶ τοῖς ἀπαιδεύτοις ἢ ἀμυήτοις μὴ μεταδιδόναι, τιμὰν τε καὶ μνήμην τῷ ὑπογεγραμμένῳ ἀπονέμειν. Εὖ ὁρκοῦσι μὲ εὖ εἶη καὶ καλαδύμιοι· οἱ παρεκβαίνοι δὲ θεοὶ, ἀποροκοῦσι δὲ τὰ ἐναντία.

Crime; it being one of the higheſt Impieties, to give Divine Honour to the Creatures, and ſwear by them, as if they were Gods themſelves. But from hence we may gueſs what is to be thought of the Practice of the *Papiſts*, who, beſide the erecting of Temples, making Prayers, and other ſuch Acts of Adoration, do not infrequently ſwear by the Saints alſo. For, what other is this, than to give them that Honour which, in all other Mens opinion, and even in their own, is proper to the Almighty? Neither will it ſuffice to ſay, That they do it not for themſelves, but with reſpect to him to whom they do belong: For ſtill it will follow, becauſe Swearing is a part of it, that they give them that Adoration which the Almighty hath challeng'd to himſelf, and which, unleſs they were Searchers of Hearts, can in no wiſe belong to them. As little is to be ſaid in its defence, from thoſe common Oaths by Heaven, our own Life, and the like: For though theſe (as we learn from our Saviour) have the Nature of Oaths; though the Expreſſions themſelves may ſeem to perſwade thoſe Things to be the Things we ſwear by: yet, as they are not in the leaſt invok'd as Witneſſes, but God to whom they do belong, or are devoted by us; ſo they are made uſe of onely to expreſs either ſome Attribute of God's, or our own readineſs to reſign them up to his Vindictive Juſtice, if we be found to falſifie in them.

2. For the evidencing whereof (and together with it, in what ſenſe it may be ſaid to be lawful to ſwear by a Creature) I ſhall inſtance, firſt of all, in thoſe forms of Oaths which have in them the force of an Execration, as *By our Health*, *Upon our Salvation*, and the like. The meaning whereof, in the general eſtimate of the World, is no other than this; *So let God grant me Health and Salvation, as I ſpeak what I think, or mean to perform what I promiſe*; and conſequently is but an abbreviation of that Oath of St. *Paul*, 2 Cor. 1. 23. *Moreover I call God for a record upon my ſoul, that to ſpare you I came not as yet unto Corinth*: Which doth manifeſtly make God the Term of our Oath, and not either our Soul, or any thing elſe that appertains to it. The ſame is to be ſaid of thoſe Forms of Oaths which are made by our *Hand*, *Hands*, or any other Part of the Body; the intention thereof being onely to devote them unto God, as Pledges of the Truth of what we ſwear. In like manner, ſecondly, for thoſe Oaths that are made by *Heaven*, or any other Thing wherein the Power or Truth of God is conſpicuous; the meaning thereof, in the intendment of *Chriſtians*, can be no other, than to call him to witneſs, whoſe Glory ſhines forth in them; as may appear both from Reaſon and Practice. For, can any Man be ſo ſenſeleſs, as to call thoſe Creatures to witneſs to the ſincerity of his Intentions, which he himſelf is perſwaded of not to have the leaſt ſenſe of any thing? Nay, would not the ſo doing give Men cauſe to ſuſpect, that he himſelf was as ſtupid as they? It is true indeed, we read in *Geneſis*, of *Jacob* and *Laban*'s rearing a Pillar and heap of Stones, for a Witneſs of the League between them, *Gen.* 31. 48. Nay, we read further, (which is of more conſideration) of *Laban*'s addreſſing himſelf to them after this manner; *This heap be witneſs, and this pillar be witneſs, that I will not paſs over this heap to thee, and that thou ſhalt not paſs over this heap, and this pillar, to me, for harm*, verſ 52. of that Chapter. But, as the meaning thereof can be no other, than that they ſhould ſerve for a Memorial of the

the League then made, which is quite different from the buſineſs of an Oath; ſo, that *Laban* had no other intention, may appear from his own Words immediately before it: For, *if* (ſaith he, verſ. 50.) *thou ſhalt afflict my daughters, or if thou ſhalt take other wives beſide my daughters, no man is with us, ſee, God is witneſs betwixt me and thee.* Which Words do not onely ſhew him to refer the Matter to the Teſtimony of God; but ſo, as to exclude all other Witneſſes; becauſe profeſſing to refer it unto God, for that there was no other to atteſt it. I conclude therefore, That where there is mention of a Creature in an Oath, the deſign thereof is not in the leaſt to call that Creature to witneſs, but God, to whom it doth belong. Which, as it is no way like the ſwearing by the *Saints departed*, who are preſum'd by the *Papiſts* to have knowledge of what we ſwear; ſo ſhews the ſwearing by *Heaven*, or the like, according as was before underſtood, to have nothing at all of unlawfulneſs in it, becauſe not ſo much the *Term* of our Oaths, or *That we ſwear by*, as the Adjuncts of it, and onely inſerted in it, to repreſent the more ſtrongly to our minds the Majeſty of that God by whom we ſwear, or our own extreme danger, in caſe we falſifie in them. And accordingly, as in the Old Teſtament we find *Jacob* * ſwearing by the *fear* of his Father *Iſaac*, and *Eliſha* † by *the life of his maſter*; ſo || *Tertullian* tells us of the *Chriſtians* of his time, and ſuch too as would rather die than ſwear by the *Genius* of the Emperour, becauſe apprehended by them to be an Heatheniſh Deity, that they would not refuſe to ſwear by the *ſafety* of their Lord, which was more Auguſt than all *Genii*. The reſult of the Premiſes is this, That as it is not lawful to make a Creature the Term of our Oath, becauſe ſo giving Divine Honour to them; ſo it is not unlawful to make mention of them in our Oath, when they are repreſented as Adjuncts of the Deity, or devoted unto God as Pledges of the Truth of what we affirm.

* *Gen.* 31.53.
† 2 *Kings* 2.2.
|| *Apol. cap* 32. *Sed & juramus ſicut non per Genios Cæſarum, ita per ſalutem eorum, quæ eſt auguſtior omnibus Geniis.*

III. The Order of my Diſcourſe now leads me to inquire, Whether the Magiſtrate may not exact an Oath of his Subjects? A Queſtion to be wondred at, if it had not been alſo made a Queſtion, Whether there ought to be any Magiſtrates, or thoſe Magiſtrates ought to be obey'd? For,

1. Firſt, Whereas other Acts of Adoration, by how much the more voluntary they are, the more acceptable they are to the Divine Majeſty; an Oath, on the contrary, requires ſomething of a neceſſity, to make it onely lawful; and how much more then, to make it acceptable to the Divine Majeſty? And accordingly, as it is a Proverb * among the *Greeks*, That *Oaths and War are evil, when ſpontaneous; and onely good, when they are extorted from us*; ſo that Proverb of theirs ſtands confirm'd as to an Oath, by the Veneration we ought to have for it, and the end for which it is given. For, Scripture and Reaſon requiring that Oaths ſhould not be lightly us'd, and the end thereof being for the ſatisfaction of thoſe to whom it is given; it follows, that they become good onely when they are extorted from us by the hardneſs of thoſe Mens belief whoſe ſatisfaction is intended in them. If therefore an Oath become ſo much the more legitimate by being extorted; if it may be extorted from us by the incredulity of the Party to whom we give it; how much more, when there is juſt cauſe for it, by the Command of the Magiſtrate, to whom God hath commanded every Soul to ſubmit it ſelf?

* *Andrew's Determin Theolog. de jure-jurando* ἐπιεικτές.

2. My

2. My ſecond Argument for the lawfulneſs of the Magiſtrates exacting an Oath, ſhall be taken from the Practice of Holy Men, toward thoſe who were ſubject to their Commands, and that too where there was leſs Authority to conſtrain. For thus *Abraham* made his Servant ſwear, that he would not *take a wife unto his ſon of the daughters of the Canaanites*, but of his own Kindred and Country, *Gen.* 24. 3, 4. and *Jacob* made his Son *Joſeph* ſwear that he would *carry his body out of Egypt*, and bury him in the Burying-place of his Fathers, *Gen.* 47. 29. and ſo on. In fine, thus *Jacob* made *Eſau* ſwear to *part with his birthright*, *Gen.* 25. 33. Now, if (as Biſhop *Andrews* * well argues) it were lawful for the Maſter to put his Servant to an Oath, as it was to *Abraham*; if to a Father toward his Son, as in the caſe of *Jacob* and *Joſeph*; if to a Brother over a Brother, as to the ſame *Jacob* over *Eſau*; how much more ſhall it be lawful for him to require an Oath of his Subjects, whoſe Empire is more excellent than all other Empires? To all which, if we add,

* *Determinat. Theolog. ſupra citat.*

3. In the third place, the neceſſity there is of his ſo doing, in order to the Security of himſelf, and the Commonwealth, ſo no doubt can remain of the Power of the Magiſtrate to exact, and conſequently of the Subjects Duty to comply with his Commands. For, is it any thing leſs than neceſſary to the Security of the Magiſtrate, to require an Oath of Allegiance to himſelf, when Men through the pride and perverſeneſs of their Nature, are ſo hardly brought to afford it? Eſpecially when in his Honour and Security, the Security of the Commonwealth is bound up; neither can that be ſafe, unleſs his Perſon and Authority be preſerv'd inviolate? The ſame is to be ſaid of that other ſort of Oaths which the Magiſtrate tenders to decide Controverſies between Man and Man. For, being it is for the Intereſt, yea Being of the Commonwealth, that Controverſies be determin'd; being (as I have before ſhewn) thoſe are not to be determin'd without an Oath; it remains, That either the Magiſtrate is not furniſh'd with full Power to determine Controverſies between Man and Man (which would make the Inſtitution of Magiſtracy vain) or it ſhall be lawful for him to exact an Oath to determine them by. And indeed (as the fore-named Biſhop well argues) well may they exact the Oath of God, who have both his Name, and his Authority; who, as they repreſent his Perſon, ſo do alſo judge for him; and, which is more (for ſo the *Pſalmiſt* tells us) who have him *ſtanding in their congregation*, and *judging* in their Tribunal.

Ibid.

PART

PART III.

Whether it be lawful to require an Oath of the Accuſed Party. This evidenced in part from what God directed among the Jews *in ſeveral Caſes, which is ſhewn to have been conformable thereto. An Objection from the ſuppos'd unreaſonableneſs of a Mans accuſing himſelf, propos'd, and anſwered. The reaſonableneſs of exacting an Oath of the Accuſed Party, evidenced from ſeveral Topicks, and particularly from the impoſſibility there ſometimes is of the Magiſtrates doing Juſtice without it. The Caſes of Life and Limb to be excepted, and why. Of the Obligation of Oaths, and what that Obligation is, both in Aſſertory and Promiſſory ones. That an Oath obligeth even where drawn from Men by falſe and deceitful Stories, where it is to the Swearers diſadvantage, or extorted by Threats and Violence. If an Oath oblige not, it is for the moſt part from the inhability of the Swearer, or the unduneſs of the Matter; that is to ſay, when it is either impoſſible, or unlawful to be perform'd.*

HAVING ſhewn it to be lawful for the Magiſtrate to exact an Oath; and moreover, that in many Caſes it is neceſſary for him to do it: Inquire we, in the next place,

IV. Whether he may require an Oath of the Accuſed Party? which may ſeem to have more of difficulty in it; becauſe, by means of that, a Man may be oblig'd to be his own Accuſer; which may ſeem contrary to each Man's Natural Liberty. For the reſolution whereof, I will proceed in this Method.

1. I will ſhew what God himſelf directed among the *Jews*.
2. Examine the Grounds upon which the Negative is founded.
3. Produce the Reaſons of exacting an Oath of the Accuſed Party. And,
4. And laſtly, Declare in what Caſes it may be done.

1. If Men were always as willing to be regulated by the Scriptures, as they do for the moſt part profeſs themſelves to be, there would not long be any doubt, whether it were lawful for the Magiſtrate to exact an Oath that may condemn the Party that gives it: For there are two Inſtances wherein God expreſly requires the giving of an Oath to the Accuſed Party; the firſt whereof is, where the Accuſed Party hath any Goods committed to his Cuſtody; the ſecond, where there is a ſuſpicion of Falſhood in a Wife. For thus, *Exod.* 22. 10, 11. *If a man deliver unto his neighbour an aſs, or an ox, or a ſheep, or any beaſt to keep, and it die, or be hurt, or driven away, no man ſeeing it; then* (ſaith the Text) *ſhall an Oath of the Lord be between them both, that he hath not put his hands unto his neighbours goods, and the owner thereof ſhall accept of it, and he ſhall not make it good.* In like manner, *Numb.* 5. 18, 19. if a Man had a ſuſpicion of his Wives diſhoneſty, and accordingly brought her before the Prieſt for Judgment, it is commanded, that *the Prieſt* ſhall charge her with *an Oath* concerning that whereof ſhe is ſuſpected. And though there be not the like Evidence concerning any other Crimes, wherein the Oath of the

the Accuſed Party might be requiſite; yet, as it is apparent enough from *Levit.* 6. 2, 3. that an Oath might be exacted alſo, where there was a ſuſpicion of dealing deceitfully in Fellowſhip, or of violent taking away, or deceit, or concealing what a Man had found, all theſe being there joyn'd with a Man's lying unto his Neighbour in that which is deliver'd him to keep, and an Oath ſuppos'd to have paſs'd concerning them: ſo it appears highly probable, from 1 *Kings* 8. 31. That it was lawful to exact an Oath of the Accuſed Party, in any Difference between Man and Man; that place not onely ſuppoſing the laying of an Oath upon the Accuſed Party, but ſuppoſing alſo (becauſe expreſſing it in thoſe indefinite Terms, *If any man treſpaſs againſt his brother*) in any Crime whatſoever. However it be, moſt certain it is, from the fore-quoted places in *Leviticus*, that an Oath might be laid upon a ſuſpected Party in Matters of Eſtate; which is as much, I think, as is ordinarily claimed by any Magiſtrate: and if ſo, ſo far at leaſt it may be lawful to lay an Oath upon the Accuſed Party, whatever Pretence there is from Mens Natural Liberty. For, though (as was before obſerv'd) the Judicial Law, of which that was a part, be not of preſent Obligation; yet being a Law of Gods making, it cannot be ſuppos'd to contain any thing in it, that is contrary to the Law of Reaſon and Nature.

2. From what God directed among the *Jews* in this Affair, paſs we to the Grounds whereupon it is pretended to be unlawful to exact an Oath of the Accuſed Party; which (as was before inſinuated) is its ſeeming contrariety to each Man's Natural Liberty, to be oblig'd to accuſe himſelf. In anſwer to which, I ſay, 1. That though, as it may happen, a Man may by ſuch an Oath be obliged to accuſe himſelf; yet if he be innocent, he may have an opportunity thereby to clear his own Innocency to the World, and ſo advantage, in ſtead of condemning himſelf. I ſay, 2. That whatſoever is pretended concerning Mens Natural Liberty, yet is it not to be underſtood to reach any further than is conſiſtent with the Rules of Government. For, as no Man can be born any other than a Subject, becauſe by his very Birth oblig'd to be ſo to thoſe from whom he receiv'd his Being; ſo God himſelf, to whom we are certainly Subjects, hath appointed Governours over us, and commanded us to be ſubject to them. Whatſoever Liberty therefore we have, it muſt be ſuppos'd to be limited by the neceſſary Ends of that Government to which he hath commanded us to be ſubject. If then the Ends of Government do ſometime require the adminiſtring of ſuch an Oath, the Pretence of Natural Liberty can be no Plea againſt it, becauſe by the Command of God ſubjected to the other. And this Particular will miniſter to me a fair entrance into

3. The reaſonableneſs of exacting an Oath of the Accuſed Party; which is the third thing propos'd to be inquir'd into. Which I ſhall ground upon the impoſſibility of the Magiſtrates doing Juſtice ſometimes, where ſuch an Oath as we are now ſpeaking of, is not adminiſtred. For it often hapning, through the cunning of thoſe we deal with, that proof cannot be made of their deceitful dealing with us; either it ſhall be lawful for them to keep that which they have deceitfully gotten, which is againſt the Rules of Juſtice and Equity; or, the Magiſtrate muſt have a Power to adminiſter an Oath to the ſuſpected Party, concerning that which he is ſuppos'd to have unjuſtly got-

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ten. Which whoſoever ſhall ſeriouſly conſider, will not be very forward to think it unreaſonable to put a Man ſometimes upon the accuſing of himſelf. For as hard as it may be, and contrary to his ſuppoſed Liberty; it may ſeem much more hard, and more contrary to the Liberties of us all, that Men, for the cloſe carriage of their Injuſtice, ſhould go away with the Properties of other Men, and there be no Judiciary Courſe to retrive it from them. The Pretence of Natural Liberty will appear yet more vain, if we conſider, that all Men are liable to have the ſame Oaths exacted of them: For, inaſmuch as I have the privilege of laying an Oath upon other Men, as they have upon me in any thing I am ſuſpected of; though ſuch an Oath be prejudicial to me, yet it may be compenſated to me upon other Men, with whom I have occaſion to deal. Add hereunto (which is of great conſideration, unleſs *a liberty to ſin* may be reckon'd among our Natural Liberties) That as through the fear of ſuch an Oath I may be reſtrain'd from unjuſt dealing, leſt I be afterwards oblig'd to make my own Mouth witneſs againſt me; ſo I may be oblig'd, by the taking of it, to make confeſſion of my Sin, and make ſatisfaction for it to my Neighbour and the World; which, without the obligation of ſuch an Oath, it is probable I ſhould never have done, and thereby have ſhut my ſelf out from the Pardon of the Almighty.

4. It having been thus demonſtrated, That it is not unlawful for a Magiſtrate to take an Oath of the Accuſed Party, concerning that of which he is ſo accus'd; it remains onely that I inquire, in what Caſes it may be done; which is the fourth thing propos'd to be diſcours'd of. Now, for that, nothing, I think, can be ſaid with more Reaſon and Judgment, than is by the Reverend Perſon before-mentioned: and that is, That it be adminiſtred onely in ſuch Caſes where the Crime which it is deſign'd to detect, do not lay a Man open to Death, or loſs of Limb. Not perhaps becauſe it is utterly unlawful in ſuch Caſes (for what ſhall we then ſay of the Oath wherewith the Woman ſuſpected of Adultery was charg'd, together with the Water of Jealouſie ſhe was made to drink?) but, 1. For the Oath of God's ſake, which by being adminſtred in ſuch Caſes, is in great danger of being violated. For, ſince Life and Limb, but Life eſpecially, is ſo dear to us, that, as the Devil told the Almighty, a Man will part with all to preſerve it; there is juſt reaſon to ſuſpect, if Men were put to their Oaths in ſuch Caſes, they would forſwear themſelves, and thereby offer an affront to the Oath of God, which ought as much as may be to be preſerv'd inviolate. There is as much reaſon, ſecondly, for the not adminiſtring it in the forementioned Caſes, becauſe of its ineffectualneſs to attain the End which is deſign'd by it. For the End of ſuch an Oath being the diſcovery of that Crime, which he to whom it is tendred is ſuſpected to be guilty of, it can hardly eſcape the imputation of a Sin, to tender it there, where in all probability he to whom it is ſo tendred will forſwear himſelf, rather than expoſe himſelf to ſo great a ſeverity. But as (ſetting aſide theſe Caſes, where there is danger of Life or Limb, or if there be any other of equal conſideration with it) there appears not the leaſt reaſon why an Oath ſhould not be adminiſtred to the ſuſpected Party; ſo there is leſs exception againſt our Courts of Judicature, where ſuch Oaths are in uſe: becauſe as the Complainant has the liberty of laying an Oath upon the Defendant, ſo the De-

fendant has Power to interrogate the other upon the ſame Sacred Tie.

V. I am now arriv'd at my laſt Particular concerning Oaths, to wit, the *Obligation* of them; where, firſt of all, I ſhall ſhew, that they induce an Obligation; and then, what that Obligation is. That they induce an Obligation or Tie to the performance of ſomething, the Prophet *Moſes* ſhews, in the thirtieth Chapter of *Numbers*; where we have not onely an Oath frequently ſtil'd by the Name of *a bond*, but the deſign thereof, *verſ.* 3. ſaid to be *to bind the ſoul with a bond.* The onely difficulty is, to what they do oblige or bind us; which is different according to the different ſorts of Oaths, which (as hath been before inſinuated) are either Aſſertory, or Promiſſory. *Aſſertory* Oaths are ſuch as are given to atteſt the Truth of any thing, that is either paſt or preſent. Now the Obligation which thoſe induce, is, That what is ſo ſworn to, be agreeable to the mind of him that utters them; by vertue whereof, not onely all falſe Oaths are proſcrib'd, but all Oaths which pretend to aſſert that which we ſwear to, with any greater degree of certainty than we our ſelves are perſwaded of. Thus, for example, if a Man ſhould ſwear peremptorily to the truth of any thing which he is onely probably perſwaded of, in this caſe his Oath would be ſinful, becauſe his Words carry a greater certainty in them, than is in the Conſcience of him that ſwears to it. When therefore we give an Oath of this nature, care would be taken, not onely that the thing we ſwear to, appear to us to be true; but that it appear to us in that degree of aſſurance, with which it is affirm'd by us: For otherwiſe our Affirmation muſt be concluded to be falſe, and conſequently (which is evidence enough of the criminalneſs thereof) that God Almighty is call'd to witneſs to a Lie. And though, as I ſhall afterward ſhew, thoſe Oaths which we call *Promiſſory* ones, by reaſon of the Matter about which they are converſant, have a particular obligation; yet they alſo have this common with *Aſſertory* Oaths, that they oblige thoſe who ſwear, to take care that their Words be agreeable to their Thoughts, that is to ſay, that they do not ſwear to do any thing, but what they have at that time an intention to perform. For, though the thing they ſwear to perform be ſomewhat future, yet the immediate Object of their Oath is their preſent Reſolution to perform it; and conſequently, if they will free their Oath from Falſhood, at that inſtant to reſolve upon, what they ſwear in due time to perform.

To go on now to ſhew the Obligation that is peculiar to *Promiſſory* Oaths, or ſuch Oaths as are affixed to a Promiſe; which, if Reaſon it ſelf did not teach us, we might learn from the Scripture, to be no other than the performing of what we ſo ſwear to. For thus, *Num.* 30. 3. it is the expreſs Commandment of the Almighty, That *if any man vow a vow unto the Lord, or ſwear an oath to bind his ſoul with a bond, he ſhall not break his word, he ſhall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.* Which is ſo true, that it holds even where the Oath was drawn from us by *falſe or deceitful* Stories; where the thing ſworn to, is to the *diſadvantage of him* that ſwears; or laſtly, where the Oath is extort'd by *Threats and violence.* For thus,

1. When *Joſhua* and the *Iſraelites* had given their Oath to the *Gibeonites*, That they ſhould be ſuffer'd to live among them; notwithſtanding

ſtanding they who induc'd them to take it, drew it from them by falſe and crafty Pretences, yet the Sentence of the Princes of the Congregation was, That they might *not touch them, becauſe they had ſworn to let them live*, *Joſh.* 9. 19. Neither was this a cauſleſs Scruple of *Joſhua*, and other the Princes of the Congregation, (though who can eaſily think thoſe Men guilty of any ſuch, who were the moſt eminent for Knowledge and Authority among them?) for when, many years after, *Saul* ſlew the Race of thoſe *Gibeonites*, with whom the Oath of the Lord had paſs'd, God was ſo diſpleas'd with the whole Nation for it, that he viſited it with a three years Famine; neither would he be entreated for the Land, till *David* had deliver'd up ſeven of *Saul*'s Sons to the *Gibeonites*, to be by them hang'd up unto the Lord, 2 *Sam.* 12. *ver.* 1. and ſo on. This onely would be added, That what we have ſaid of an Oath drawn from us by Craft, be underſtood to hold onely, where that in which we are impos'd upon, is not expreſs'd as the Ground of our Oath: For, if that in which we are impos'd upon be expreſſed as the Ground of our Oath, there is no doubt that an Oath ſo drawn from us doth not oblige. Thus, to inſtance in the former Example, though the *Iſraelites* were bound by their Oath to the *Gibeonites*, although they were no *Foreigners* as they pretended, becauſe the ſuppoſition of their being ſuch, was not expreſs'd as the Ground of their League; but the thing, hand over head, taken for granted: yet, if the ſame *Iſraelites* had made a League with them *under the Name of Foreigners*, in that caſe there is no doubt (becauſe that was expreſly the Ground of their League) that the Oath given by them had not oblig'd them: For the Oath being given to them *as Foreigners*, could not in reaſon be conſtrued to relate to any but *Foreigners*, and conſequently, not to advantage the *Gibeonites*, when it appear'd they liv'd among them. For the further evidencing whereof, I will inſtance in a Caſe which is produc'd by a Learned Caſuiſt * of our own, though by him ſomewhat otherwiſe explain'd. For ſuppoſe (ſaith he) that a Man ſhould ſwear to a certain Perſon, under the Name of *Titia*, that he would marry her, ſuppoſing her to be *Titia*, when indeed ſhe was not: In this Caſe the Oath would not oblige him, becauſe the ſuppoſition of her being *Titia* was expreſly the Ground of what he ſwore. Which Reſolution will appear yet more clear, if we do farther ſuppoſe, that the true *Titia* ſhould upon that Oath of his claim him for her Husband. For, as the Laws of God and Man forbid him the marrying of them both; ſo there is more reaſon ſhe ſhould have the Benefit of his Oath, who was the Perſon expreſs'd in it, than ſhe who had no other concernment in it, than as ſuppos'd to be the Perſon. In this caſe therefore, that is, where that wherein we are impos'd upon is expreſly the Ground of our Oath, an Oath drawn from us by deceit obliges not: but otherwiſe, as the Inſtance of the *Gibeonites* ſhews, it ought to be held as Sacred, and we *to do whatſoever proceedeth out of our mouth.*

* *Sanderſ. de Juram. obligat. Prælect.* 4. *Sect.* 13.

2. Again, As an Oath obligeth, unleſs in the former Caſe, where it is drawn from us by the Craft of him we ſwear to; ſo it obligeth alſo, though the Matter thereof ſhould prove prejudicial to him that taketh it: the Prophet *David* reckoning it among the Characters of him that ſhall abide in God's Tabernacle, That *he ſweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not*, *Pſal.* 50. 4.

3. Laſtly, As neither the Craft of him we deal with can generally reſcind an Oath, nor yet the Diſadvantage that comes to our ſelves by it; ſo neither, thirdly, the Violence of thoſe Perſons that forc'd it from us: as for example, the Threats of *Thieves or Pirats*, who have, it may be, compell'd us to make Oath of paying them ſuch a Sum of Money for our Ranſom. For, as it is evident from the *Pſalmiſt*, That it is the Office of a Good Man *not to change, though he ſwear to his own hurt*; and conſequently, an Oath given to a Thief or Pirate not to be reſcinded upon that account: ſo there is no reaſon it ſhould be upon the account of the Swearers unvoluntarineſs, which is that which is moſt ſtood upon in this Caſe: For though we would not have ſo ſworn, if we could have help'd it; and conſequently, our Oath was not perfectly voluntary: yet being under a fear of Death or Bondage from them, we choſe to oblige our ſelves, and therefore ſo far willed to be oblig'd. Now, having willed our own Obligation, what ſhould hinder us from performing it, and doing that which we not onely promis'd, but call'd God to witneſs we meant, and would perform? And indeed, though ſome Men, conſulting more their own Profit, than the Sacredneſs of an Oath, have made light of thoſe Oaths, when they have delivered themſelves; yet if they would more attentively conſider it, they would not be very forward to excuſe themſelves, for not performing even ſuch an extorted Oath. For, I demand of any ſuch, Whether, to deliver himſelf from Thieves or Pirats, he doth not think it lawful to make Oath of paying ſuch a Sum of Money for his Ranſom? If he ſaith he doth, (as I know not any that thinks or ſays otherwiſe) he ſaith that which will conclude him guilty of Perjury, if he violate it: For, whatſoever it is lawful to ſwear, *rebus ſic ſtantibus*, it is neceſſary to perform; becauſe an Oath, in the nature of it, is a Tie to that to which it is affix'd. Generally ſpeaking therefore, as it is in the Place of *Numbers* before-quoted, *If a man ſwear an Oath to bind his ſoul with a bond, he ought not to break his word, but to do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.* If an Oath at any time oblige not, it is for the moſt part through

Sanderſ. de Juram. oblig. Prælect. 4. ſect. 16.

1. The inhability of the Taker: or,
2. The unduneſs of the Matter.

1. Thus, to inſtance in the firſt; If the Perſon ſwearing be under the Power of another, the Law is expreſs, That it ſhall be in the Power of thoſe to whom they are ſubject, to reſcind that Oath which they have made. For, *if* (ſaith the Scripture, *Numb.* 30. 3. and ſo on) *a daughter ſhall vow a vow, and bind her ſelf by a bond, being in her fathers houſe in her youth; if her father diſallow her in the day that he heareth it, none of her vows or bonds ſhall ſtand.* The ſame is afterward affirm'd, *if a husband diſallow that of his wife:* And how much more then, if a Prince (whoſe Authority is certainly far greater than that of a Father or a Husband) ſhall diſallow the Oath of his Subjects, eſpecially in Matters relating to the Publick. Which makes it ſtrange, that the *Solemn League and Covenant* ſhould be pretended to oblige, which was ſo early and ſo heartily diſallowed by the late King, that moſt indulgent Father and Husband of his Country.

2. From the Inhability of the Taker, paſs we to the Unduneſs of the Matter: Where again there are theſe two things to take off the Obligation of an Oath.

1. The

1. The Impoſſibility: And,
2. The Unlawfulneſs thereof.

1. Thus, for example, in the former Inſtance; If a Man ſhould ſwear to pay a certain Sum of Money at a time appointed; if he neither have, nor can procure ſuch a Sum, there is no doubt his Oath obligeth not thereto, ſo long as that Impoſſiblity continueth: It being an undoubted Principle of Reaſon, That there can be no Obligation to that which it is impoſſible to perform. Care onely would be taken, that as we make not Oath of ſuch things as appear then impoſſible (for ſo we ſhould be found to take God's Name in vain in the ſtrict and literal ſenſe) ſo alſo that the thing ſworn to, prove not impoſſible through our neglect (for then it will oblige to Puniſhment) and that if it be not utterly impoſſible, we perform ſo much of it as is poſſible to us. For, ſince the onely Reaſon of the Obligations ceaſing, is the Impoſſibility of the Thing; it muſt conſequently ceaſe onely ſo far as the Thing ſworn to is impoſſible, and therefore alſo continue in full force, as to what is poſſible to be done. Again,

Impoſſibilium nulla obligatio eſt. Leg. 185. *tit. de Reg. Juris.*

Sanderſon. de Juramenti Oblig. Prælect. 2. *ſect.* 12.

2. In the ſecond Inſtance, If a Man ſhould ſwear to do a thing which is unlawful, either by God's Law or Man's, ſuch as was that Oath of *David*, that *before the morning light he would cut off from Nabal every one that piſs'd againſt the wall*: In that Caſe, I ſay, there is no doubt that the Oath obligeth not, ſave to a due Repentance for it. And accordingly we find *David* not onely not performing it, but *bleſſing God for diverting him* from it, 1 *Sam.* 25. 32. Now the reaſon why ſuch Oaths are not binding, is, becauſe the Party, at ſuch time as he ſwore, lay under a former Obligation to the contrary: By which means the Party ſwearing was diveſted of all Power to it; and conſequently, till freed from the former, could not by any Oaths whatſoever bind himſelf to the performance of it. He might indeed (as we ſee Men too often do) ſwear to act contrary to it; he might lay all the Curſes of God upon himſelf, for the performance of what he ſwore: but as ſuch Oaths are unlawful to be taken, ſo they bind not where they are, becauſe prevented by a contrary and far greater Bond. Beſides, it being impoſſible to be at the ſame time bound to contrary things; if he who ſwore the performance of any thing ſinful, ſhould be obliged to it, he muſt conſequently be ſuppos'd to be freed from his former Tie to thoſe Laws which he ſwore to act contrary to. But by this means we might caſſate all our Obligations to the Almighty, and, provided we would ſo ſwear, be at liberty, or rather oblig'd, to follow our own Luſts and ſinful Inclinations as our God. But becauſe the late Reverend Biſhop *Sanderſon* hath ſaid all that is neceſſary to be ſaid upon the matter of a Promiſſory Oath, in his Book of the *Obligation of Oaths*, I will remit thoſe who ſhall deſire further ſatisfaction, to his learned and accurate Labours. It ſhall ſuffice me to admoniſh you, That the Non-performance of your Oaths is moſt properly *to take Gods Name in vain*.

See *Sanderſons* Caſe of a Raſh Vow deliberately iterated. p. 65, &c.

PART

PART IV.

The affinity of a Vow with an Oath. What a Vow is, and what the proper Matter of it. Things under Command the Matter of a Vow, as well as thoſe which are left free. That the Thing Vowed ought to be ſomething morally good, or conducing to it; and not either trifling, or ſinful, or what expoſeth to it. That it is at leaſt behoveful that the Thing Vowed have ſome cognation with that Bleſſing in conſideration whereof it is made. That Vows are not onely lawful, but ſometime neceſſary to be made; both becauſe a Part of Natural and Evangelical Worſhip, and becauſe we ſtand in need of them. That the Perſons who Vow be of Years of Diſcretion; that they come to it with due deliberation; and that God's Glory, and not the gratifying of a diſcontented Humor, be the Motive which draweth them to it. Of the Obligation of Vows, and particularly to a Single Life.

VI. AS a *Vow*, whereof we are in the next place to entreat, is near of kin to an Oath, in reſpect of the Obligation which it induceth; ſo it ſerves equally to hallow or profane that Name of God, which here we are forbidden to take in vain. Reaſon would therefore, before we leave this Third Commandment, that we ſhould afford it a place in our Diſcourſe, and, if not allow it a juſt handling, (which my deſigned brevity will hardly permit) yet ſhew ſo much concerning it, as is generally neceſſary to be known. In order whereunto, I will proceed in this method.

1. I will ſhew in the general, what a Vow is.
2. Inquire into the proper Matter of it.
3. Demonſtrate our own Obligation ſometime to make Vows.
4. Deſcribe the due Qualifications of the Maker.
5. The Obligation they induce, when made. And,
6. Laſtly, Shew what Vows are here forbidden.

1. Now a *Vow* (as was before inſinuated) is, in the general, nothing elſe than *a Promiſe to God of the performance of ſomething on our part, either to obtain ſome Bleſſing of him* (which is for the moſt part the ground of it) *or in acknowledgment of ſome already receiv'd.* I call it *a Promiſe*, for ſo indeed it is properly, and in the common acception of the Word; though ſometimes, abuſively, the Word Vow ſignifies no other than a ſtrong Aſſeveration of what we affirm: And, *a Promiſe to God*, wherein indeed the very Formality of it conſiſts, and by which it is diſtinguiſh'd both from a Promiſe to Man, and from an Oath; the former, unleſs improperly, having onely the Title of a Promiſe; the latter, even an Oath, citing God onely as a Witneſs to what is tranſacted between us and other Men: whereas in a Vow we tranſact with God as with a Party. The onely thing remaining to be explain'd, is the End of a Vow, ſaid before *to be moſt commonly to obtain ſome Bleſſing of the Almighty, or in acknowledgment of ſome we have receiv'd.* Of the former of theſe, we have not onely the Word ωχὴ for a Witneſs, which ſignifies equally a Prayer and a Vow; but alſo the moſt, if not all thoſe Vows which we meet with in the Old Teſtament.

Teſtament. For thus, *Gen.* 28. 20. we find *Jacob* vowing a Vow, and ſaying, *If God will be with me, and will keep me in the way that I go, and will give me bread to eat, and raiment to put on, ſo that I come again in peace; Then ſhall the Lord be my God, and this ſtone which I have ſet up for a pillar, ſhall be Gods houſe; and of all that thou ſhalt give me, I will ſurely give the tenth unto thee.* Of the ſame nature is that Vow of the *Iſraelites*, concerning the deſtruction of the *Canaanites*, *Numb.* 21. 2. as, in like manner, that of *Hannah*, concerning the dedicating unto the Lord that Child which ſhould be born to her, 1 *Sam.* 1. 11. the former being upon condition of God's delivering the *Canaanites* into their hands; the other, upon God's giving her a Man-child. Again, As a Vow may be made *to obtain ſome Bleſſing of the Lord*; ſo alſo, *in acknowledgment of ſome already receiv'd*; to wit, when it is not in the power of him who makes it, to make that return of Gratitude to God, which it is no leſs his deſire than duty to perform: For otherwiſe, no doubt the receipt of a Bleſſing is a more proper ground of paying our Vows, than of making any ſuch unto the Lord.

2. The Nature of a Vow being thus explain'd in the general, paſs we to a more particular Explication; which will beſt be perform'd by inquiring into the *Matter* of it, the ſecond thing propos'd to be diſcours'd of. For the reſolution whereof,

1. The firſt thing I ſhall offer, is, That things *under command*, no leſs than thoſe that are not, are a proper matter for our Vows. For though thoſe things which are under command, do oblige us by being ſo, and conſequently may ſeem no way proper to be the matter of a Vow: yet as nothing hinders, but one Bond may be added to another, whence it is that we ſee Poſitive Laws every day made for the obſervation of that which was before commanded by the Law of Nature; ſo the ſuperinducing of a Vow binds it ſo much the faſter upon our Conſciences, and therefore a thing under Command no way improper for the matter of a Vow. Again, though a Command oblige to the performance of what it doth ſo; yet inaſmuch as it takes not away our Natural Liberty of acting contrary to it, it may ſeem but reaſonable, the more to oblige us to Obedience, to add to it the Bond of a Vow, and tie our ſelves by Promiſe to what we are otherwiſe oblig'd to perform.

Now the Matter of ſuch a Vow is again double, that is to ſay, General or Particular; or (to ſpeak yet more plainly) Obedience to the whole Law of God, or onely to ſome Particular one. Of the former ſort is, firſt, the Vow of *Baptiſm*, whereby we oblige our ſelves to the whole Duty of Man: For, as this is actually done by all that are initiated into *Chriſtianity*, at leaſt where Baptiſm is rightly adminiſtred; ſo, that it is the Deſign of Baptiſm it ſelf, is evident from St. *Peter*, who entitles it the *Anſwer**, or rather *Stipulation* of a good Conſcience toward God. Of the ſame nature is, ſecondly, (as I ſhall afterward ſhew more largely) that other Sacrament of the *Supper of our Lord*. And accordingly, as for this Reaſon both the one and the other have the name of a *Sacrament*, which in the proper acception of the Word is no other than a Military Oath, whereby Soldiers bound themſelves to their General; ſo, that it was really look'd upon as ſuch, or rather as a Vow to God, to whom they ſo oblig'd themſelves, is evident

* 1 *Pet.* 3. 21.

* *Li.*10.*ep* 97. evident from that Account which *Pliny* * gave to *Trajan*, of what was done in the Meetings of the *Chriſtians*: Where, among other things, he tells him, That he had been inform'd by ſome of them, that when they met together, *they oblig'd themſelves by a Sacrament, not to perpetrate any Villany; but, that they would not commit Thefts, Robberies, or Adultery; that they would not falſifie their Truſt, nor, when examin'd, deny any thing that had been depoſited with them.* Which Paſſage, as it is a manifeſt evidence of their making ſuch general Vows; ſo alſo, that it was their Deſign in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper: the Word *Sacrament* not onely ſo perſwading, but the Celebration of the Lord's Supper being always an Attendant of their Publick Service, and the no mention there is in Eccleſiaſtical Story, of any other ſuch general Vow in it. Again, As a Vow may have the whole Law of God for its Object, ſo alſo ſome particular one: And is not unuſual with good Men, when they find themſelves preſs'd with the Conſcience of ſome particular Sin committed by them; in order to the appeaſing of God's wrath, and the ſecurity of their own Souls, binding themſelves with a Vow to the avoiding of it, and practiſing the contrary Vertues.

2. Having thus ſhewn a thing under Command to be no leſs the Matter of a Vow, than that which is not enjoyn'd by any; for the further explication thereof, I ſhall add, ſecondly, That it ought to be ſomething *morally good*, or *conducing* to it. For, the Deſign of a Vow being to pleaſe God, to whom all Vows are directed, that can be no proper Matter of a Vow, which is not morally good, or conducing to the promoting of it. But from hence it will follow, firſt, That we ought not to make Vows of any thing ſinful, ſuch as was that of *Jeptha*, who bound himſelf by a Vow to offer up to God whatſoever came forth of the Doors of his Houſe to meet him, *Judg.* 11.31. This being in effect to promiſe we will break his Laws, which is certainly a very improper way to pleaſe him, or obtain any Bleſſing at his Hand. It will follow, ſecondly, That we ought not to make a Vow of any thing that may expoſe us to the Commiſſion of a Sin: Of which nature, in particular, is the *Vow of Single Life*, eſpecially in younger Perſons: For ſo doing, they vow that which may expoſe them to the danger of Fornication without remedy, which is certainly no proper way to pleaſe God, when he himſelf hath appointed Marriage for it, and oblig'd thoſe that cannot contain, to enter into it. Laſtly, it will follow, That we ought not to make Vows of any thing light or trifling, ſuch as are * the Vows of *not eating the Heads of any Animal, in honour of John the Baptiſt*; or, *of abſtaining from broyled Fleſh, in reſpect to St. Laurence, who was ſo uſed.* For beſide that ſuch things as theſe are not much conducing to Piety, they are too light to become the Matter of a Vow, and involve the Maker of them in the taking God's Name in vain, which is the very thing forbidden in this Commandment.

* See *Balduin. de Caſib Conſc. lib.* 2.*c.*8.*caſ.*4.

3. Thirdly and laſtly, As the Matter of a Vow ought to be ſomething good, or conducing to it; ſo it is highly expedient at leaſt, that it ſhould have ſome *relation to that Bleſſing*, in conſideration whereof we make it. For thus we find *Hannah* vowing, That if God would give her a Man-child, ſhe would dedicate, not ſome of her Poſſeſſions, or it may be of her Servants, but that very *Child*, unto the Lord: as,

in

in like manner, *Jacob*, That *if God would be with him, and give him bread to eat, and raiment to put on, and in fine bring him back to his fathers houſe in peace and proſperity*, he would, out of the Plenty which God ſhould afford, build a Temple to his Honour, and moreover *give the tenth of all to him.* Both which Vows, as they had very eminent Perſons for their Authors, and ſuch whoſe Example alone might invite us to the imitation of them; ſo they have this farther to commend them, that they are more clearly expreſſive of our intended Gratitude to the Almighty, becauſe obliging the Parties vowing to make that very Bleſſing, in conſideration whereof they are made, to become a Teſtimony of their Thankfulneſs unto God.

3. But leſt all that hath or ſhall be ſaid concerning Vows, ſhould fall under the cenſure of Impertinence, as there is no doubt it would juſtly, if *Chriſtians* had no concernment in them; I will now, according to my propoſed Method, demonſtrate our own Obligation to the making of them. In Order whereunto, I ſhall ſhew them,

1. To be a Part of Natural Worſhip; and,
2. Of the Evangelical one.

That they are a part of *Natural* Worſhip, is evident, firſt, from the Nature of a Vow, according as before deſcrib'd. For it being but reaſonable we ſhould do what in us lies toward the pleaſing of him from whom we either expect, or have receiv'd any ſignal Favour; it is no leſs reaſonable, if we are not at preſent in a capacity to do it, that we ſhould go ſo far towards it, as to oblige our ſelves by Promiſe to the performance of it; he that cannot do all he would, being to do what he can, or at leaſt expreſs a readineſs to perform it. Which as it is beſt done by a Vow or Promiſe, becauſe that leaves no place for the omiſſion of it; ſo that Vow or Promiſe goes a great way toward the pleaſing of the Almighty, becauſe conſigning the Will of the Vower, which is that God looks chiefly after, to the Will and Pleaſure of him to whom it is made. Again, Foraſmuch as a Vow ſuppoſeth him to whom it is made, to be conſcious to our Wants, and the Author of thoſe Bleſſings in conſideration whereof we make them; what ſhould hinder us, or rather how can we excuſe our ſelves from giving God this Teſtimony of our Adoration, and vowing what may be acceptable to him? The ſame is no leſs evident from the Scripture, which not onely joyns it with Prayer and Praiſe, but oppoſeth it to Ceremonial Worſhip, as you may ſee *Pſalm* 50. 8. and ſo on; where having at large decry'd the Offerings of the Law, in the fourteenth Verſe of that Pſalm, the *Pſalmiſt* calls upon Men, inſtead of that, *to offer unto God thankſgiving, and pay their vows unto the moſt High.* Which Paſſage is ſo much the more to be remarqu'd, becauſe it affords us a Proof not onely of Vows being a part of Natural Worſhip, but alſo of the Evangelical one. For if (as Mr. *Mede* ſhews) that Pſalm be alſo a Prophecy of the Times of the Goſpel, and the Service which ſhould be offer'd up in them, the making of Vows is properly and ſtrictly Evangelical, and the *firſt Service* (as St. *Paul* ſpeaks in a like Caſe) *taken away*, that the *ſecond* might be the more firmly eſtabliſhed. Neither will it avail ought to ſay, That that is not to be thought Evangelical, of which there is not the leaſt mention in the Goſpel: For as the great Deſign of the Goſpel was to re-eſtabliſh Natural Worſhip, and free it from thoſe Incumbrances wherewith the Ceremonial Law

Mede Serm. on Pſal. 50. 14.

had clogg'd it; ſo the Nature of Vows was ſo well known, both from Reaſon, and the Scriptures of the Old Teſtament, as not to need to be inſiſted on by the New: Upon which account alſo it is, that we find ſo little therein concerning Oaths, unleſs it be as to the ſparing uſe of them. Beſide, when (as was before inſinuated) the Sacraments *of Baptiſm and the Lords Supper* are on our part Vows of Obedience unto God; when we are initiated into, and confirm'd in our Religion by them; when the Law and the Prophets ſpeak much and often concerning Vows, and our Religion profeſſeth to eſtabliſh all that is not Ceremonial in them; laſtly, when we our ſelves ſtand in need of Vows to confirm our wavering Minds, and eſtabliſh us in that Courſe of Life we have undertaken; what can be more apparent, than that we ſhould vow Obedience to God's Commands, and the uſe or forbearance of all ſuch Means as are apt either to promote or hinder it? And who knows whether the omiſſion of this be not one principal Cauſe why oftentimes we ſpeed no better in our Requeſts? For though we are importunate enough in asking, we are more than cold enough in promiſing any Returns of Gratitude, if ever it ſhould pleaſe God to grant the Petitions we ask of him.

4. Having thus ſhewn our own Obligation to the making of Vows, proceed we, according to our propoſed Method, to the Qualification of thoſe that make them, the next thing propos'd to be diſcours'd of. Where firſt I ſhall reckon as a neceſſary Qualification in thoſe that make them, That they be of *years of diſcretion.* For a Vow being a matter of importance, and ſo much the more, becauſe it is tranſacted between us and God; they are in reaſon to abſtain from the making of them, who, by reaſon of their want of Diſcretion, underſtand not the Nature of it, nor the Obligation which it induceth; leſt haply, in ſtead of honouring God thereby, they diſhonour his Sacred Name, by vowing ſuch things as are either no fit Matter for them, or ſuch as afterwards they will not care to perform. The ſame Reaſon will infer, That as the Perſons that vow ſhould be of Years of Diſcretion, ſo thoſe that are, ſhould come to the making of them *with all requiſite conſideration*; it being all one, as to the purpoſes of Religion, to be without Diſcretion, and not to make uſe of it. Laſtly, A Vow (as hath been before ſhewn) being an Act of Religion, and a part of God's Worſhip and Service; they that vow, are to take care that *God's Glory be their End* in making them, and not, as it too often happens, *the gratifying of their own peeviſhneſs and diſcontent:* A thing not unuſual with the *Papiſts*, whom the loſs of a Miſtreſs, the diſappointment of a Place, or other ſuch like Cauſe, is the chief, and ſometimes onely Motive, to vow a Religious Life. Which ſaid, I ſhould now

5. Proceed to the Obligation of them, as I did before in the matter of Oaths. But becauſe the Prophet *Moſes* hath delivered the ſame Rules concerning the Obligation of them both; and becauſe what I have before ſaid, concerning the Obligation of Oaths, may without any the leaſt violence be accommodated to the Obligation of the other; I will content my ſelf with the propoſing one onely Caſe concerning Vows, which will find no Reſolution from what was there ſaid: And that is, Whether or no a Man having made *a Vow of Single Life*, be not oblig'd to the keeping of it? For though (as was before

fore ſaid) the making of ſuch Vows be generally unlawful; yet it follows not from thence, that they may be broke when made; becauſe many things which ought not to be done, are yet of force when they are. For the reſolution whereof, the firſt thing I ſhall offer is, That there is no doubt ſuch a Vow obligeth thoſe to the keeping of it, *who* (as the Apoſtle ſpeaks) *have power over their own Bodies.* For a Single Life being not onely lawful in it ſelf, but, where it is preſerv'd inviolate, a great opportunity of Religion; there is no doubt, a Vow concerning it is ſo far from being null, that in that Caſe it ought to be Religiouſly obſerv'd. But from hence it will follow, ſecondly, That he who hath ſo vowed, ought to uſe all means poſſible to keep to that State which he hath ſo vowed. For if (as the Prophet *Moſes* inſtructs us) *we are* generally *to do whatſoever proceedeth out of our mouth*, we are in reaſon to make uſe of all requiſite Means to enable us to the performance of it; he that is oblig'd to the End, being *ipſo facto* oblig'd to the Means, becauſe there is no attaining the End without them. Neither will it ſuffice to ſay (as perhaps it may be) That a Single Life hath Temptations attending it, and therefore rather to be diſcarded, than continued in: For inaſmuch as there is no State or Thing which is without them, if for that reaſon our Vow might be reſcinded, no Vow at all could oblige, becauſe there is nothing in the World which may not expoſe us to Temptations. If there be any thing which may reſcind ſuch a Vow, it muſt be ſome *imminent danger* of falling into Sin, notwithſtanding all our Endeavours to the contrary: And in this Caſe, there is no doubt a Vow ſo made ought to be broken, with how much deliberation ſoever made: he that forbids us a Sin, conſequently forbidding all thoſe things which fatally incline us to the commiſſion of it. Care onely would be taken, that Men pretend not imminent danger, when in truth that is not the thing that moves them, but the gratifying of their own Carnal Appetites: For, generally ſpeaking, *Whoſoever vows a vow, to bind his ſoul with a bond, ought*, for his Vows ſake, and the Honour of him to whom it is made, *to do whatſoever proceedeth out of his mouth.*

6. Having thus ſhewn all that concerns the *Affirmative* part of the Precept, as to the Making and Obſervation of Vows, nothing remains to the compleating of my Diſcourſe concerning them, but that I deſcend to the Negative, and point out thoſe Vows that are forbidden. A Task which as I have in part already diſcharg'd, ſo I am now qualified to compleat, becauſe having before ſhewn what is requiſite to make them lawful. For if (as was ſhewn in my ſecond Inquiry) the Matter of a Vow ought to be good, or conducing to the promoting of it; thoſe Vows muſt be unlawful, the Matter whereof is neither: ſuch as are the greateſt part of the Vows now made. For what more ordinary, than to vow that we will not come into ſuch a Houſe, or uſe any Communication with ſuch or ſuch a Perſon? Things which whether a Man do or no, it matters not as to the Buſineſs of Religion, and therefore not to be made the Subject of ſo Sacred a Tie as a Vow. The ſame is much more to be ſaid of ſuch a Vow, or Vows, which have ſomething ſinful for the Matter of them: that which is ſinful, being not onely different from the proper Matter of a Vow, but directly contrary to it. Laſtly, If (as was obſerv'd upon the ſame Head) the Matter of Vows ought to be weighty and important, thoſe

Vows muſt be concluded to be unlawful, which are made in trifling Inſtances, and ſuch as for the levity thereof are hardly worthy to be made the matter of a Promiſe. As if a Man ſhould vow to pare his Nails upon a certain day, or not to take up a Straw that lay in his way. Again, If (as was obſerv'd upon the fourth Head) they who vow any thing to God, ought to be of Years of Diſcretion, and actually employ it when they have; thoſe Vows muſt be look'd upon as unlawful, which are made by Perſons before they arrive at it; or raſhly, and without conſideration, by thoſe that are. Which makes it ſtrange, that the *Church of Rome* ſhould admit to Vows of Single Life thoſe that have attain'd to ſixteen Years of Age: As if that Age, though not without the uſe of Reaſon, were fit to judge what State of Life were profitable for them, and what is poſſible for them to obſerve. Laſtly, If (as was inſinuated in my ſixth Head) a Vow be of the ſame Obligation with an Oath, if it oblige to all that is not impoſſible or ſinful, it muſt be look'd upon as in like manner unlawful to break thoſe Vows we have made, and diſhonourable to the Divine Majeſty to whom they are: he that thus breaks his Faith to God, ſuppoſing him either to have no knowledge of his Perfidiouſneſs, or to be a tame Spectator of the Affronts that are done unto him. The contrary of which, as we are aſſur'd of by him, who commands us not to do diſhonour to his Name; ſo it will be much better for us to believe upon his Affirmation, than venture the trial of: For, if God be but juſt to himſelf, to be ſure *he will not hold him guiltleſs that* any way *taketh his Name in vain.*

PART V.

Concerning the Sanction of the preſent Precept. What the importance of God's not holding a Man guiltleſs is; and that it implieth not onely the puniſhing him, but puniſhing him with ſeverity. What appearance there is, both from Reaſon and Hiſtory, of God's executing what he hath here denounced; particularly, upon Blaſphemers, Common Swearers, Perjur'd Perſons, and the Violators of their Vows. The Concluſion.

II. IT being certain, that though Laws oblige, yet they prevail little upon the Conſcience, where they have nothing but the Authority of the Lawgiver to enforce them; it hath pleaſed God not onely to fortifie the *Body* of his with Threats and Promiſes, but ſometimes alſo to annex them to *particular Precepts*; leſt haply whilſt they are divided among ſo many, they ſhould prove languid and ineffectual, and rather give a weak force to all, than a conſiderable energy to any one. And accordingly, (to go no further than the *Decalogue*) as the Second Commandment hath both a Promiſe and a Threat, and the Fifth a Promiſe to enforce it; ſo, that we are now upon, is ſtrengthned with the Threat of God's *not holding them guiltleſs who ſhall preſume to take his Name in vain.*

In

In the handling whereof, I will proceed in this Method:

1. I will ſhew what it is not to hold one guiltleſs: And,
2. Prove, That God will not hold them ſuch, who any way take his Name in vain.

1. If the Phraſe wherein this *Sanction* is expreſs'd, were the ſame in the *Original Hebrew*, as it is in our own *Engliſh Tranſlation*, our Account of the meaning of it would be then much ſhorter, than it is now likely to prove. But becauſe though the *Hebrew* be the ſame in ſenſe, yet it is ſomewhat different in Expreſſion from that we have made uſe of to explain it; it will be requiſite, in the firſt place, to give an account of the Expreſſion there, if it were onely to eſtabliſh the Propriety of our own.

Now the *Hebrew* phraſe לֹא יְנַקֶּה יְהוָה or, *The Lord will not make him clean*, is capable of a double Explication: For it may either refer to that Cleanneſs which is oppos'd to the Filth of Sin, or to that Purification which came by the Blood of Sacrifices. And in which ſenſe ſoever we take it, we ſhall find it to be much the ſame with that by which we have choſen to expreſs it. For though our *Tranſlation* determine it to that Purity or Cleanneſs which imports a freedom from Guilt; yet, as to hold one for clean, or innocent, is the ſame in ſenſe, becauſe thoſe that are ſo, are free from the imputation of the other; ſo, though the Letter of the *Hebrew* be, The Lord *ſhall not make* him clean, yet it may ſignifie no more than the not accounting of him as ſuch; after the ſame manner that the Word *juſtificare* in the *Latin*, though literally it ſignifie to make righteous, yet in the forinſick and moſt uſual ſenſe, denotes the abſolving one from Guilt, and not ſo much the making him righteous, as ſo eſteem'd. And indeed, as ſuch a ſenſe is moſt proper in this place, becauſe the Matter intreated of is the Penalty of a Law; ſo if we take it in the literal ſenſe, it would hardly paſs for a Penalty in the judgment of thoſe whom it was deſign'd to reſtrain: It being not to be thought, that they who make it their Paſtime to take God's Name in vain, would be deterr'd from ſo doing, by onely telling them, that God will ſuffer them to go on in it, and not purifie them from a Sin in which they ſo much delight. Foraſmuch therefore as the Words *Lo Jenakkeh* may import the not accounting of the Offender as clean; foraſmuch as that ſenſe is the moſt proper in this place; laſtly, foraſmuch as the literal one carries nothing at all of dread in it; it is but reaſonable we interpret the *Hebrew* לֹא יְנַקֶּה יְהוָה The Lord will not account of him as clean; which is all one with *He will not hold him guiltleſs*. From that firſt Notion of the *Hebrew* phraſe, paſs we to the ſecond, and conſider the Word יְנַקֶּה with reference to the Purifications of the Law; with analogy to which, if we underſtand it, ſo the meaning will undoubtedly be, That God will not hold ſuch an Offender as a guiltleſs Perſon. For it being certain on the one hand, that the Cleanſing here ſpoken of, muſt refer to the Sin before forbidden; as on the other, that the Deſign of the Purifications of the Law was not to take away the Sin it ſelf, but the Guilt Men contracted by it: to ſay, The Lord will not cleanſe ſuch or ſuch a Perſon, is as much as, That he will ſuffer his Guilt to reſt upon him, and conſequently, That *he will not hold him guiltleſs*. Which ſheweth, that though there be ſome difference between the *Hebrew* and the *Engliſh* in the Expreſſion, yet they are the

the ſame in ſenſe; and conſequently, whatſoever is the importance of *The Lord will not hold him guiltleſs*, the importance of the other.

Now there are two things implied in thoſe Words, *The Lord will not hold him guiltleſs.*

1. That God will *puniſh* him that taketh his Name in vain: And,
2. That he will do it *with rigour and ſeverity.*

For inaſmuch as there is no Mean between Guiltineſs and Guilty; inaſmuch as Puniſhment naturally follows the guilty Perſon; it muſt needs be, that if God will not hold us guiltleſs, he will account of us as guilty, and accordingly proceed to puniſh us. Again, Though thoſe Words *will not hold him guiltleſs*, do not neceſſarily, and of themſelves, import any extraordinary ſeverity; yet, as it is not unuſual for ſuch Negative Expreſſions, by a Figure the Rhetoricians call Μείωσις, to ſignifie much more than they ſeem to intend; ſo, that that Figure ought to have place here, beſide the Conſent of Interpreters, is evident from the hainouſneſs of the Sin againſt which it is denounc'd, and the little dread it carries in it, if taken in the literal ſenſe. For, who can think God would threaten ſo great a Crime as Perjury, with a Threat which is common to it with the meaneſt Offences in the World? Or what likelihood is there, if he had (which yet is the End of all Penalties) that the Falſe Swearer ſhould be thereby deterr'd from taking God's Name in vain? It being not to be thought, that he who hath the impudence to call God to witneſs to a Lie, ſhould be much affrighted by onely telling him, that God will look upon him as an Offender. How ſmall ſoever therefore the taking of God's Name in vain may ſeem, and how mildly ſoever the Penalty wherewith it is threatned is expreſs'd; the true intent of that *Sanction* is, That God will ſeverely puniſh ſuch an Offender, and not onely not hold him as a guiltleſs Perſon, but as one of the greateſt Criminals in the World.

2. Having thus ſhewn the Importance of the preſent Penalty, proceed we to the Confirmation of it: For my more advantageous performance whereof, I will apply it to the ſeveral Perſons whom I have ſaid to take Gods Name in vain. Where,

1. I ſhall ſet before you ſuch as ſpeak diſhonourably of him, and either attribute to him ſuch Qualities as do no way belong to him, or deny him thoſe that really do. For, that God will not hold ſuch Perſons guiltleſs, may appear, if we conſider onely the End for which the Tongue was given: For the Tongue being given Man not ſo much for any other end, as for the glorifying the Maker of it, it muſt needs be, that God ſhould hold him as highly criminal, who ſhall turn that Tongue againſt him, and not onely not glorifie, but diſhonour him therewith. The Threat will appear yet more reaſonable and certain, if we apply it to ſuch a Perſon who ſhall proceed to downright blaſphemy againſt the Almighty: For beſide the enormity of the Crime, we have Inſtances in the Scripture of God's diſpleaſure againſt the Authors of it. Thus when the Son of an *Iſraelitiſh* Woman proceeded to ſo great an Impiety, as to blaſpheme the Name of the Lord, he himſelf was not onely ſton'd to death for it, but a Law thereupon made, That *whoſoever ſhould offend* in like manner, *ſhould be put to death, as well the ſtranger, as he that ſhould be born in the land*, Lev. 23. 11. and ſo on. Again, when the King of *Aſſyria* ſent *Rabſhakeh* to reproach the Living God, as one who could not deliver his

his People, any more than the Gods of other Nations, God was ſo diſpleaſed with the contumely, that he ſent an Angel to deſtroy his Army, and delivered up the King himſelf into the hands of his Sons, who ſlew him, 2 *Kings* 19. 35. and ſo on.

2. From blaſpheming the Name of God, paſs we to the diſhonouring it in an Oath, which I have ſaid to be the principal thing forbidden in the Commandment; where again I ſhall conſider thoſe who take it in an Oath vainly and unneceſſarily, and then thoſe who cite it to procure credit to a Lie.

That God will not hold the former of theſe guiltleſs, will appear to any who ſhall conſider onely the nature of the Crime: For inaſmuch as ſuch an Oath is nothing elſe than the calling God to witneſs to thoſe Impertinencies to which they are affix'd, it muſt needs be a great temptation to the Almighty to revenge it upon the Authors of it, leſt his Name ſhould be contemptible in the World. And indeed, as where it hath otherwiſe hapned, it ought to be imputed to the Mercy of the Almighty, and his willingneſs that even ſuch Sinners ſhould come to repentance; ſo God hath not left himſelf and Name without witneſs of the dreadfulneſs of them both, leſt any ſhould think him tamely patient. For thus it is ſtoried, by an Author of good credit*, concerning one *Grillon*, a famous Captain in *France*, and as famous, or rather infamous, for his profaning the Name of God by frequent Swearing; That many years before his death, though he had perfect ſtrength and vigour in all his other Parts, yet he had ſo great a weakneſs in his Tongue, that he could not *articulate* or bring out one word that any Body could underſtand: God (as that Author remarks) being doubtleſs pleas'd by a manifeſt Judgment to puniſh him in that Part, which by ſo many Oaths and Blaſphemies had ſo often offended againſt his Divine Honour and Holy Name. Which Story is the more to be credited, becauſe the forecited Author relates it from the mouth of that truly Noble Perſon the *Duke of Eſpernon*, who had that Captain long under his Command.

* The Life of the Duke of *Eſpernon*, *lib.* 4. *pag.* 190.

But leaving the Common Swearer to ruminate upon God's threatning not to hold him guiltleſs, and upon this and ſuch like Inſtances of his Judgments upon the Aſſociates of his Crime; let us go on to inquire, how little reaſon there is for the Falſe Swearer, or perjur'd Perſon, to expect to be free. In order whereunto, I will firſt alledge a Parallel, ſhall I ſay, or rather much more ſevere Denunciation of the Almighty, againſt thoſe who ſhall thus take his Name in vain. 'Tis in the fifth of *Zachary*, and the fourth Verſe; where ſpeaking of a Roll of Curſes, he brings in God threatning that *he would cauſe it to enter into the houſe of the thief, and into the houſe of him that ſweareth falſely by his Name*; as alſo that it ſhould *remain in the midſt* of the Houſe it did ſo enter, *and conſume it with the timber and ſtones thereof.* Than which, what more could be ſaid to expreſs the height of God's diſpleaſure againſt ſuch Perſons, and the certainty of his not holding them guiltleſs in any meaſure? For, to be ſure he will not hold them ſuch, whom he will not onely viſit for their Tranſgreſſion, but bring an utter devaſtation upon. Agreeable hereto is that of the Oracle in *Herodotus*, though expreſs'd under another Metaphor.

Ἀλλ' ὅρκυ παῖς ἔθην ἀνώνυμος, ἀδ' ἔπι χεῖρες
Οὐδὲ πόδες· ταχινὸς δὲ μετέρχεται εἰσόκε πᾶσαν
Συμμάρψας ὀλέσῃ γενεὴν ἠ οἶκον ἅπαντα.

That is to ſay, *An Oath has a Child which hath neither Hands nor Feet; howbeit it paſſeth quickly into the Houſe of the perjur'd Perſon, and laying hold of it, deſtroys his whole Race and it.* Neither doth the Event (I ſpeak as for the moſt part) fall ſhort of what is ſuggeſted, either by the one, or the other Oracle: For, as I ſhall afterward produce from the Scripture remarkable Inſtances of God's Judgments upon thoſe who have thus violated the Oath of God; ſo the verification of this Threat was taken notice of, where God was little known, and where therefore one might think God would be leſs careful to ſecure the Honour of his Name: *Heſiod*, an ancient *Greek* Poet*, affirming of an Oath, That it doth for the moſt part deſtroy thoſe who either ſwear falſely, or act contrary to it when they have ſworn. But becauſe the Scripture, upon which we may moſt ſecurely relie, is not without eminent proofs of Gods diſpleaſure againſt the perjur'd Perſon; ſetting aſide the Proofs which might be brought from *Heathen* Authors, I will betake me to the Scriptures, and prove from thence, That God doth not hold them guiltleſs who thus take his Name in vain. And here, in the firſt place, I ſhall alledge that known Story of the *Gibeonites*, with whom the Oath of the Lord had paſs'd. For though that Oath had been drawn from the *Iſraelites* by the falſe Pretences of the *Gibeonites*; though thoſe who had given them that Oath, had now a long time been laid in their Graves, together with thoſe *Gibeonites* to whom it was, and a new Generation ſprung up, which neither knew thoſe *Gibeonites*, nor their own Anceſtors; though what *Saul* did to them, was out of his *Zeal* to the Children of *Iſrael* and *Judah*, and not out of any private grudge, or worldly Intereſt whatſoever; laſtly, though that *Saul* was laid in his Grave alſo, and, as one therefore might well imagine, his Wickedneſs and Guilt together with him: yet was his Deſtruction of the *Gibeonites*, with whoſe Anceſtors the Oath of God had paſs'd, ſo diſpleaſing to the Divine Majeſty, that he viſited them with a three years Famine, neither would he be entreated for the Land, till *David* had delivered up ſeven of *Saul*'s Sons to the *Gibeonites*, to be by them hang'd up unto the Lord. All which Circumſtances, whoſoever ſhall conſider, will not doubt in the leaſt of God's holding him guilty who taketh his Name in vain. For, what queſtion can there be of that, when, to ſay no more, we ſee the Guilt of it to have deſcended upon the Children of the perjur'd Perſon, yea, to have involv'd a whole Nation in it? So very great reaſon is there to interpret the Threat of not holding guiltleſs, to a ſenſe more ſevere than the Words do of themſelves import: The forementioned Story ſhewing it to be alike, or rather more ſevere, than the viſiting of the Iniquity of the Fathers upon the Children to the third and fourth Generation, with which the former Commandment is enforc'd. From the Buſineſs of the *Gibeonites*, paſs we to a no leſs famous Inſtance of God's diſpleaſure againſt *Zedekiah*; who after he had given an Oath of Fidelity to the King of *Babylon*, yet no leſs

* Ὅρκου δ' ὡς δὴ πλῆσεν ὀπιχθονίους ἀνθρώπους
Πημαίνει, ὅτε κέν τις ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ.

leſs impiouſly than fooliſhly brake it, by rebelling againſt him: For, *Shall he* (ſaith God by the Prophet *Ezekiel*) *proſper? Shall he eſcape, that doth ſuch things? or ſhall he break the Covenant, and be delivered? As I live, ſaith the Lord God, ſurely in the place where the King dwelleth that made him King, whoſe Oath he deſpiſed, even with him in Babylon ſhall he die*, Ezek. 17. 15, 16. And again, *verſ.* 18. and ſo on, *Seeing he deſpiſed the Oath, by breaking the Covenant, (when loe, he had given his hand) and hath done all theſe things, he ſhall not eſcape. Therefore, thus ſaith the Lord God, As I live, ſurely mine Oath that he hath deſpiſed, and my Covenant that he hath broken, even it will I recompence upon his own head. And I will ſpread my net upon him, and he ſhall be taken in my ſnare, and I will bring him to Babylon, and will plead with him there, for his treſpaſs that he hath treſpaſs'd againſt me.* Which accordingly we find to have come to paſs: For the ſame Scripture informs us, That, becauſe *Zedekiah* rebell'd againſt King *Nebuchadnezzar*, who had made him ſwear by God, God brought upon him the Army of the King of *Babylon*, which took him and brought him to their Maſter, where he had Judgment given upon him, and after he had had his Sons ſlain before his Eyes, had thoſe miſerable Eyes of his put out, as you may ſee in *Jeremiah*, *chap.* 39. Such was the diſpleaſure of God againſt King *Zedekiah*, for violating the Oath of God: And if ſo, we may be ſure God will not hold any Man guiltleſs that ſo taketh his Name in vain. The onely thing remaining to be prov'd, is, That God will not hold him guiltleſs who diſhonoureth his Name in a Vow; which accordingly I come now to evince. In order whereunto, I will conſider, firſt, thoſe who make unlawful or trifling Vows; and then, thoſe who violate what they have made.

That God will not hold him guiltleſs who ſins in Vowing, will manifeſtly appear, if we reflect upon his diſpleaſure againſt the Profaner of his Name in an Oath. For inaſmuch as a Vow is more Sacred than an Oath, becauſe whilſt in the latter God is onely cited as a Witneſs, in a Vow we contract with him as a Party; he who holds the Swearer guilty, muſt be thought to do ſo much more to him who profanes his Name in a Vow, and doth not onely apply it to a Sin, or to an Impertinence; but, as I may ſo ſpeak, doth it *to his face*. The Reaſon is the ſame in him who breaks the Vow he hath made, and acts contrary to what he hath moſt ſolemnly promis'd to the Almighty; he that ſo does, as he contracted with God as with a Party, ſo falſifying to him directly and immediately, and conſequently (becauſe ſo much the more diſhonouring him) the more liable to the ſeverity of his diſpleaſure. And accordingly, when *Ananias* and *Saphira* had, agreeably to the Cuſtom of thoſe Times, by a Vow dedicated the Price of their Poſſeſſions unto God, God, for a partial breach of that their Vow, inflicted a ſudden death upon them, and made them feel the dreadfulneſs of that Name which they had profan'd. So true is that of *Solomon**, even in the Times of the Goſpel, That *it is a ſnare to a man to devour that which is holy, and after vows to make inquiry*: The forementioned Offenders having not onely been taken in the Snare, but made to feel the Hands of the Fowler. Thus, which way ſoever Men take the Name of God in vain, they incur the diſpleaſure of the Almighty; and though they are not always immediately puniſh'd, yet

* Prov. 20.25.

they are ſo often enough, to ſhew that God doth not hold any of them guiltleſs; and that, whom he now ſpares, he will puniſh ſo much the more hereafter, when he comes to render to every Man according to his Works.

What remains then, but that I admoniſh, if not for the Sacredneſs of the Name of God, yet that at leaſt for the ſecurity of their own Souls and Perſons, Men would not take that Name of his in vain. For if either the Threat of God, or the Exemplifications of it in thoſe that have offended, may be credited, the taking of his Name *in vain*, however *ſuch* as to what it is apply'd to, yet will not be *vain* as to the Conſequences thereof: For, as it ſhall be with effect, ſo a very direful one to thoſe who are the Authors of it, They ſhall not (as they do often with Men) find Commendation and Applauſe; they ſhall not be look'd upon as ſo much the better bred, or the greater Wits for it; laſtly, they ſhall not (as they do for the moſt part here) find an Excuſe for their Profanations, and be abſolv'd either from all Offence, or all that is notorious: God, whoſe Name they take in vain, and who is the moſt competent Judge of their Actings, having promis'd, or rather threatned, that he will look upon them under another notion, and not onely not hold them guiltleſs, but look upon them as notorious Offenders. And indeed, thus far the Judgment of the World hath concurr'd with that of God, as to condemn the taking of it to a Lie; Falſe Swearing and Perjury having not onely been branded with reproachful Puniſhments, but the Authors thereof excluded from giving Teſtimony in any Courts of Judicature. If other Profanations of God's Name have not found the *like Cenſure*, it is not ſo much becauſe they imagin'd them ſpecifically different, but becauſe they are not ſo immediately deſtructive to Humane Society, which Humane Judicatures are more particularly oblig'd to preſerve. But as that is accidental to the taking of God's Name in vain, or at leaſt makes the Crime to which it adheres onely gradually different from the other; ſo the Judgment-ſeat of God takes notice of all that entrencheth upon his Honour, and will therefore be ſure *not to hold them guiltleſs who any way take his Name in vain.*

THE

THE FOURTH
COMMANDMENT.

THE FOURTH COMMANDMENT.

Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day. Six days shalt thou labour, and do all that thou hast to do; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God. In it thou shalt do no manner of work, thou, and thy son, and thy daughter, thy man-servant, and thy maid-servant, thy cattel, and the stranger that is within thy gates. For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day; wherefore the Lord blessed the * seventh day, and hallowed it.

* or, Sabbath day.

PART I.

The Contents.

The general Design of the Fourth Commandment, the setting apart a Portion of our Time for the Worship of God, and particularly for the Publick one. The particular Duties, either such as appertain to the Substance of the Precept, or such as are onely Circumstances thereof. Of the former sort are, 1. *The Worshipping of God in private, and by our selves; the Morality whereof is evidenced from the particular Obligation each individual Person hath to the Divine Majesty.* 2. *The Worshipping of him in consort with others; which is also at large establish'd upon Principles of Nature and Christianity.* 3. *The setting apart a Time for the more solemn performance of each: As without which, Religious Duties will be either omitted, or carelesly perform'd; but to be sure no Publick Worship can be, because Men cannot know when they shall meet in order to it.* 4. *Such a Rest from our ordinary Labours, as will give us the leisure to intend them, and free us from distraction in the performance of them.*

BEING now to enter upon the Fourth Commandment, about the Nature whereof there hath been so much Contention in the *Church of England*, I cannot forbear to say, There is all the reason in the World to believe it to be *Moral* in the main; as having

ving a place among those Commandments which contain nothing in them which is not confessedly *Moral*. But because, when we come to understand its general Design and particular Precepts, we shall be much better able to judge whether or no, and how far the Matter thereof is Moral, I will without more ado apply my self to the investigation of them, and shew to what Duties it oblig'd.

Now the general Design of this Fourth Commandment is, *the setting apart a Portion of our Time for the Worship of God, and particularly for the Publick one.* That it designs *the setting apart some Portion of our Time*, the very Words of the Commandment shew; as not onely acquainting us with God's sanctifying a Seventh part, but obliging the *Jews*, in conformity thereto, to rest from their ordinary Labours, and observe it as holy unto the Lord. The onely difficulty is, Whether it designs the setting apart of that Time *for the Worship of God*, and particularly *for the Publick one*. For the proof of the former part whereof, though I cannot say we have the same clearness of Evidence from the Letter of the Commandment it self, yet I shall not scruple to affirm, That it may be inferr'd from thence by necessary consequence, and not onely be prov'd to be a part of the Precept, but the principal one. For how is that day kept as *holy*, which hath nothing holy performed in it? Or what reference can it have to God (as the Word *holy* implies) where God is not at all honour'd in it? Neither will it suffice to say, That the very Resting on that day, is of it self a Consecration of it unto God: For as it becomes a Consecration onely by the Parties so resting in compliance with the Command and Ends of God; so it supposeth at least, that they should on that day order their Thoughts to him, and rest from their ordinary Labours, in contemplation of his Command, and in remembrance of his resting from that great Work of the Creation. Again, Though to rest from their ordinary Labours, especially as was before understood, were a kind of devoting it unto God; yet there being other and more acceptable ways of keeping it holy, than by a simple Rest from them, it is but reasonable to think, when God caution'd the *Jews* so to remember it, he design'd no less to be honour'd other ways. Lastly, Forasmuch as God not onely commanded to keep it holy, but in this very Precept represents it as *his own**, as in *Isaiah*‖, under the Title of *his holy day*, and *the holy of the Lord*; he thereby manifestly implies, that it should be dedicated to his Worship, and not onely not be profan'd by ordinary Service, but hallowed by his own. For how is it God's Holy day, but by being dedicated to his Service? or how observ'd as such, but by giving him his proper Service in it? Whence it is, that where the Prophet *Isaiah* gives it those Elogies, he infers our honouring him from them, as well as the not pleasuring of our selves. Though therefore so much be not directly and *in terminis* express'd, yet it is clearly enough imply'd, that God design'd his own Honour and Service in it, and commanded it to be set apart for the performance of it. Lastly, As God design'd the setting apart of a certain Time for his own Worship, so more especially for the *Publick* one: Of which, though there be no Indication in the Commandment it self, yet there is proof sufficient in the 23d Chapter of *Leviticus*, where we find not onely the forementioned Rest required, but the day it self appointed *for an holy Convocation*, as you may see

* But the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God.
‖ *Isa.* 58. 13.

ſee *ver.* 2. of that Chapter. And accordingly, though the *Jews* did generally look no farther than the Letter of the Law, and ſome of them (as is probable here) content themſelves with an outward Reſt, as by which they thought to ſatisfie the Commandment; yet the generality of them have in all times look'd upon the Service of God as the End for which they were commanded to keep the Sabbath. For thus *Joſephus*, in his ſecond Book againſt *Appion*, tells us, That *Moſes propounded to the Jews the moſt excellent and neceſſary Learning of the Law, not by hearing it once or twice, but every ſeventh day, laying aſide their Works, he commanded them to aſſemble for the hearing of the Law, and throughly and exactly to learn it.* As in like manner *Philo*, in his Third Book of the Life of *Moſes*, That *the Cuſtom was always when occaſion gave way, but principally on the ſeventh day, to be exercis'd in Knowledge; the Chief going before and teaching, the reſt increaſing in goodneſs, and bettering in Life and Manners.* I will conclude this Particular with that of St. *James*, *Acts* 15. 21. where, to fortifie his Opinion concerning the prohibiting of Blood to the *Gentile Chriſtians*, he alledgeth for a Reaſon, That *Moſes had in old time them that preach'd him, being read in the Synagogues every Sabbath-day.* From all which put together, it is evident, that the Service of God, and particularly the Publick one, was the Thing deſigned in this Commandment. The *Jews* themſelves, who were none of the moſt quick-ſighted, being able to diſcern it; and accordingly, both of old and in latter days, framing their Practice after it.

Thorndike of Religious Aſſemblies, *ch.* 2. where this of *Joſephus*, and that of *Philo* are quoted.

The general Deſign of the Commandment being thus unfolded, proceed we to the Particular Things under Command; which, for my more orderly proceeding in this Affair, I will rank under two Heads, to wit,

1. Such as appertain to the Subſtance of the Precept: Or,
2. Such as are onely Circumſtances thereof.

I. Of the former ſort again are theſe four things.

1. The Worſhipping of God in private, and by our ſelves.
2. The Worſhipping of him in conſort with others.
3. The ſetting apart a Time for the more ſolemn performance of each. And,
4. Laſtly, Such a Reſt from our ordinary Labours, as may give us the leiſure to intend them, and free us from diſtraction in the performance of them.

Now concerning *each of theſe*, there cannot be the leaſt doubt of their being *Moral*, and conſequently of Univerſal Obligation.

1. That ſo it is to Worſhip God *in private*, the Obligation each of us have to the Divine Majeſty, and the Words of the Firſt Commandment ſhew. For being he is the Creator and Suſtainer of each Individual, as well as of Humane Nature; being there is no individual Perſon which hath not ſome peculiar Obligation to the Divine Majeſty, whether in reſpect of ſome Bleſſing receiv'd, or Evil averted from him; laſtly, being (as was before ſhewn) thoſe Expreſſes of the Divine Goodneſs lay a neceſſity upon the Perſon that hath receiv'd them, to honour the Author of them; it follows, becauſe each individual Perſon hath been ſo oblig'd, that each of them do for himſelf acknowledge thoſe Obligations, and pay God that Service and Adoration which is due becauſe of them. Again, Foraſmuch as the Firſt

Commandment

Commandment doth not onely exclude the having of other Gods, but injoyn the having and owning of the True; foraſmuch as it requires that of every individual Perſon, as the expreſſing it in the *Singular Number* ſhews; laſtly, foraſmuch as the Matter of that Commandment is Moral; it follows, That to worſhip God in private, and by our ſelves, is a Moral Duty: Which was the firſt thing to be prov'd.

2. From the *Private Worſhip* of God, or that which is due from each particular Perſon, paſs we to the Worſhipping him *in Publick*; which we have before ſhewn to be the Deſign of this Commandment. Where, firſt of all, I ſhall ſhew it to be a Moral Duty; and ſecondly, a *Chriſtian* one.

To worſhip God *in conſort* with others, being generally look'd upon as ſo much a Duty, that no Sect of *Chriſtians*, for ought I know, have ever made a queſtion of it, I have often wondred with my ſelf, whence ſo general a Perſwaſion ſhould ariſe, ſince the New Teſtament hath ſaid ſo little by way of Precept concerning it: But conſidering with my ſelf, that the ſame Perſwaſion hath prevail'd whereever the Worſhip of God hath taken place, I entred into a ſuſpicion, that the ſame Common Principles had been the Author of it in both, even thoſe which Reaſon and Nature teacheth. And indeed, that there is enough in them to oblige Men to a Publick Worſhip, will appear to any that ſhall conſider, 1. Not onely that God hath made Man a Sociable Creature, but that Men have actually entred themſelves into Societies. For as it was but reaſonable, that thoſe whom God had made Sociable Creatures, ſhould, in return for ſo great a Bleſſing, give a proof of it in his Service, and with joynt Forces worſhip him, who had both inclin'd and fitted them ſo to aſſociate; ſo, actually entring into Societies, they thereby became Sharers of the good or evil Fortune of thoſe reſpective Societies which they eſpous'd. In conſideration whereof, as they were oblig'd either to pray or give thanks, according to the ſeveral Fortunes which befel them; ſo, to do both thoſe Duties, not onely apart and by themſelves, but in conjunction with thoſe to whom they were ſo aſſociated; common Senſe requiring, that where the Bleſſing obtain'd relates to any Body, that Body to which it ſo relates ſhould pay its Thanks for it; as on the other ſide, that where the Evil either threatned or undergone, relates to a Community, that that Community to which it doth ſo, ſhould offer up its joynt Prayers to God to avert that Evil from it. My ſecond Argument for the Morality of Worſhipping God in Publick, ſhall be taken from the Obligation that lies upon us to provoke each other to the Adoration of him. For being by the Deſign of our Creation not onely to glorifie God in our own Perſons, but, as much as in us lies, to procure the Glorification of him by other Men, we are accordingly (as our Saviour ſpeaks) *ſo to make that light of ours to ſhine before men, that they ſeeing our works of piety, may glorifie our Father which is in heaven.* Now foraſmuch as it is no way proper that our Perſonal Devotions ſhould be ſo laid open, becauſe of neceſſity containing ſuch Petitions as are not fit to be communicated to the World, Reaſon requires that there be a Publick Worſhip inſtituted, by our diligent attendance whereof, we may provoke each other to the more devout Adoration of our Maker. Which Argumentation I do the rather make uſe of, becauſe the Author to the *Hebrews* uſeth the ſame, where he ſpeaks of the

the Publick Service; in pursuance of his exhorting to * *consider one another, to provoke unto love and to good works*, adding, *not forsaking the assembling of themselves together, as the manner of some then was; but exhorting one another, and so much the more, as they saw the day approaching.* Lastly, Forasmuch as on the one hand there is a necessity of instructing the Generality in the Duty they owe to God, and every one that stands in need of Instruction, cannot have a particular Teacher assign'd him; as, on the other, all of us do stand in need of each others help in promoting our Petitions unto God: it is but necessary we should sometimes meet together, that they who stand in need of Instruction may receive it, and both Teacher and Taught put to the utmost of their Endeavours to obtain of God those Blessings which they need. For, as (God knows) our Devotion is at best but weak, and consequently may well require the twisting of some others with it; so there is none of us which may not be sometime indispos'd to ask as we ought, or unlikely, by reason of some Sin, to prevail, though we should. By which means, as our own Prayers must needs be very defective, so that defect naturally prompts us to adjoyn our selves to other Men, as by whom it will be best supply'd: What St. *Paul* spake concerning Charity, being no less true in the matter of Devotion, That *the abundance* of such or such particular Persons *may be a supply for the want of others*; as, on the other side, that when their *abundance fails*, the abundance of the other may be *their supply*, and so by turns be assisting to each other. * *Heb.* 10. 24, 25.

The *Morality* of *Publick Worship* being thus establish'd, proceed we, according to our proposed Method, to shew it to be a part of *Christianity*; which will bind it so much the faster upon our Consciences. In order whereunto, I shall alledge, first, its being a part of *Moral* or *Natural Religion*, according as was but now declar'd. For it being the design of *Christianity* to establish *Natural Religion*, and oblige us to be pious, and just, and temperate, which are the general Heads of it; whatsoever is a part of *Natural Religion*, is *eo nomine* to be look'd upon as a part of the *Christian* one, though it be not expresly commanded: The confirmation of Natural Religion inferring the confirmation of all those Duties which are cleat and undoubted Portions of it. The same is yet more evident, from the confirmation of those Grounds upon which the Publick Worship of God is founded; such as are the making our Piety *to shine* before others, and the need each of us stand in of one anothers help in Prayer: For our Saviour in expres Terms injoyning the observation of the former, and St. *Paul* giving testimony to the truth of the latter, where he affirms us to be *members of each other*, they do thereby consequently establish the necessity of Publick Worship, because (as was before shewn) naturally arising from them. But because what hath been hitherto alledg'd from *Christianity*, is rather *constructive* of the Morality of the Publick Worship of God, than any *immediate or direct* proof of its own enjoyning it; for the fuller declaration of our Duty in this Affair, I will proceed to more immediate Proofs, and such as are properly *Christian*.

1. Now the first that I shall alledge, shall be taken from those Spiritual Gifts which God bestow'd upon his Church; and particularly, the Word of Wisdom, the Word of Knowledge, Prophesieing, Inter-

pretation of Tongues, and Praying by the Spirit, or Immediate Inſpiration: For theſe being given to thoſe that had them, *to* * *profit withal*, or (as the ſame St. *Paul* elſewhere || more expreſly declares) *for the work of the Miniſtry, for the edifying of the Body of Chriſt*, ſuppoſe the meeting of that Body to receive profit by them, and conſequently (becauſe that is the End of thoſe Gifts) for Publick Inſtruction and Prayer.

* 1 *Cor.* 12. 7.
|| *Ephes.* 4. 12.

2. My ſecond Argument for the neceſſity of the Publick Worſhip of God, ſhall be taken from the Rules St. *Paul* often gives for the right management of *Chriſtian* Aſſemblies; ſuch as are, That *no man ſhould ſpeak in an unknown tongue, if there were not one by to interpret*; That when they ſpake, *they ſhould do it by two, or at the moſt by three*; and in fine, That *all things ſhould be done decently and in order.* For what need were there of all this ſtir about the management of *Chriſtian* Aſſemblies, if the Author of our Religion had not at all enjoyn'd them, but left Men to their own Private Worſhip? Neither will it avail to reply, as poſſibly it may be, That the Rules laid down for the management of Aſſemblies, do rather ſuppoſe them uſeful, than neceſſary to be held: For, as what is ſo hugely uſeful, cannot be ſuppos'd to be other than neceſſary, if we conſider the many Precepts that enjoyn us the edifying of one another; ſo he that ſhall conſider St. *Paul*'s Accuracy in laying down Rules concerning *Chriſtian* Aſſemblies, will not doubt of their being neceſſary to be held: it being not to be thought, that he who is ſo careful elſewhere to diſtinguiſh between *his own* * *Advices*, and *the Commands of the Lord*, would take ſo much pains in preſcribing Rules for the management of *Chriſtian* Aſſemblies, without ſo much as taking notice, that thoſe Aſſemblies, concerning which he gave Rules, were no other than Advices of his own. Add hereunto,

* 1 *Cor.* 7. 8, *&c.*

3. The perpetual Practice of the Church, and that too at ſuch times when thoſe Aſſemblies were perillous to thoſe that held them: For that ſhews plainly, that the holding of Aſſemblies had ſome higher Original, than onely the uſefulneſs thereof: It being not to be thought, that the *Chriſtians* of all Times, and even of the moſt dangerous ones, would have held ſuch Aſſemblies, if they had not look'd upon themſelves as ſtraitly obliged to them.

4. But to come up yet more cloſely to the Ground of holding Aſſemblies, which I think I may not without cauſe eſtabliſh in that of our Bleſſed Saviour, *Mat.* 18. 20. to wit, That *where two or three were gathered together in his Name, he would be in the midſt of them.* For, as thoſe Words of his are an aſſurance to thoſe who ſhould be ſo gathered, that *Chriſt* would be in the midſt of them, that is to ſay, (as the foregoing Words import) to grant them the Petitions they ſhould ask, and more particularly ſuch as were of Publick concern *; ſo the ſame Words do imply, that he would not be ſo preſent to thoſe who ſhould not ſo aſſemble together. Otherwiſe the Reaſon wherewith he recommends the Aſſembling in his Name, would be weak and null; becauſe ſo it might be affirm'd, that they might have *Chriſt* preſent to them without. Now, foraſmuch as *Chriſt* not onely promiſes that he would be in the midſt of thoſe who ſhould ſo aſſemble, but inſinuates alſo, and that clearly enough, that he would not be ſo preſent to thoſe that did not; he thereby lays a neceſſity upon *Chriſtians*

* For he ſpeaks before of Men that neglect to hear the Church, and of God's confirmation of the Churches Cenſure of them.

ſtians of ſo meeting in his Name, for the welfare of the Church, and particularly for the imploring of ſuch Bleſſings as are neceſſary for it. I will conclude this Particular with that of the Author to the *Hebrews*, *chap.* 10. 23. Where having exhorted in the foregoing Verſes, that they *ſhould hold faſt the profeſſion of the faith* themſelves, and *provoke others to the ſame love and good works*, which are undoubted Precepts of the Goſpel; he adds in the ſame breath, and by way of explication, *not forſaking the aſſembling of your ſelves together, as the manner of ſome then was; but exhorting one another, and ſo much the more as they ſaw the day approaching.* Which Words, as they are a manifeſt condemnation of the neglect of Aſſemblies, and conſequently an eſtabliſhment of the neceſſity of Worſhipping God in them; ſo ſuch a condemnation of the forſaking of them, as to make it in effect not onely a breach of Charity, but a renouncing the Profeſſion of our Faith. However it be, moſt certain it is, that Apoſtle manifeſtly condemns *the forſaking the aſſembling* of our ſelves together; and if ſo, we may be ſure the ſerving God in the Solemn Aſſemblies is a part of a *Chriſtians* Duty; and therefore the Fourth Commandment, wherein it is enjoyn'd, ſo far obligatory.

3. I am now arriv'd at the third of thoſe Things which I ſaid before to appertain to the Subſtance of this Commandment, and that is, *The ſetting apart ſome portion of our Time for the more ſolemn performance of Gods Worſhip*; this being ſo much of the Subſtance of the Commandment, that it is the onely thing clearly expreſs'd in it, and may ſeem at firſt ſight not onely to be the Main, but the Whole. Now that this alſo is *Moral*, will appear, if we conſider it with reſpect to the Worſhip of God in general, or with reſpect to the Publick one. For, inaſmuch as the Worſhip of God, as well as all other Actions, requires ſome Time for the performance of it; and Experience ſhews, that what is left at large for the Time, is either very rarely or perfunctorily perform'd; there ariſeth from thence a neceſſity of appointing a certain Time, that it may not be either altogether omitted, or careleſly celebrated, when it is not. And accordingly, as all Nations have agreed in the owning of a God, and in their own Obligation to worſhip him; ſo we find them alſo univerſally to have ſet apart certain Times for the Adoration of that Deity they profeſs'd to own: Not perhaps without ſome hint from the Tradition of better Times, or from the Example of God's peculiar People, (for even in Natural Precepts the dull Mind of Man may ſometime need to be excited by the inſtigation of others;) but, without doubt, for the main, out of their own conſciouſneſs of the neceſſity of fixing a certain Time, that ſo it might not either be omitted, or careleſly perform'd. There is yet another Reaſon of ſetting apart a certain Time, if we conſider it with reſpect to the Publick Worſhip; and that is, That they who are ſo to worſhip, may know when they are to meet for that purpoſe: For, *if* * *the trumpet give* none, or *an uncertain ſound, who ſhall prepare himſelf to the battel?* or know *when* (as *Tertullian* || ſpeaks) *they are to meet to beſiege God, and extort from him thoſe Bleſſings which they need.*

* 1 Cor. 14. 8.

|| Apol. c. 39. *Coimus ad deum, quaſi manu facta precationibus ambiamus. Hæc vis deo grata eſt.*

4. But beſide the ſetting apart of a certain Time for the Celebration of the Worſhip of God, there is alſo requiſite *ſuch a Reſt from our Employments as may give us the leiſure to intend it, and free us from*

diſtraction in the performance of it. For as the Mind of Man cannot at the ſame time intend Things of ſo diſtant a nature as Sacred and Civil are; ſo, if there be not ſome Interval between our Employments and our Devotions, the Buſineſſes of the World will be apt to inſinuate themſelves into our Thoughts, and thereby divert us from intending of the other. Such are the *Subſtantial* Parts of this Fourth Commandment of the *Decalogue*, ſuch their Nature, and the Obligation which they induce. What the *Circumſtances* thereof are, and what their Nature and Obligation, is another Queſtion, and will therefore require a diſtinct Conſideration.

PART II.

Concerning ſuch Duties as are onely Circumſtances of the Precept, which do either reſpect the determination of the Time wherein we are to worſhip, or the manner of the Obſervation of it. That there is no Obligation upon us, either from Nature, or the preſent Precept, to obſerve a Juſt day, a Seventh day, or that Seventh day which is here preſcrib'd. The Ancient Chriſtians *Obſervation of the* Jewiſh *Sabbath, together with their own Lord's-day, conſidered, and anſwered. A Tranſition to the Obſervation of the Lord's-day, where is ſhewn, That much leſs than a whole day cannot be deem'd a competent Time for the ſolemn performance of God's Private and Publick Worſhip; That ſince God exacted of the* Jews *a Seventh part of their Time, we cannot give leſs, who have far greater Obligations to the Almighty; and, That Chriſt's Reſurrection upon the Lord's-day, is as juſt a Motive to conſecrate it unto God, as that of God's Reſting the* Jewiſh *Sabbath. The Obſervation of the Lord's-day founded in the Univerſal Practice of the Church, which is there alſo deduced from the days of the Apoſtles, down to the Times of* Tertullian. *That ſuch a Practice is of force to infer an Obligation; partly becauſe declaring the Conſent of that Body wherein it is, and to which therefore it is but reaſonable that particular Men ſhould ſubject themſelves; and partly becauſe an Argument of its having been inſtituted by the Apoſtles: According to that known Rule of St.* Auguſtine, That what the Univerſal Church holdeth, and always hath, if it appear not that the ſame was firſt decreed by Councils, is moſt rightly believ'd to have been delivered by the Authority of the Holy Apoſtles. *The Reaſon why, when God gave the* Jews *ſo clear a Precept for the Obſervation of their Sabbath, he ſhould leave us, who live at ſo great a diſtance from the Inſtitution of ours, rather to collect it from the Practice of the Apoſtles and the Church, than to read it in ſome expreſs Declaration.*

II. HAVING ſhewn in the foregoing Diſcourſe what the *Subſtantial* Parts of this Precept are, together with the *Morality* thereof; it remains that I proceed to thoſe which are *Circumſtantial*, which may be reduc'd to two Heads.

1. The

1. The Determination of the Time wherein we are to Worſhip: And,
2. The Manner of the Obſervation of it.

1. In the handling of the former whereof, I will proceed in this Method.

1. I will inquire whether the Determination of the Time, according as it is here fix'd, be directly obligatory to us *Chriſtians.*
2. Whether, if not, any thing may be inferr'd from it toward the eſtabliſhing of the *Lord's-day*, and by what it is further to be ſtrengthned.
3. To which I ſhall add, in the third place, an Account of *other Chriſtian Feſtivals*; and ſhew their Lawfulneſs, Uſefulneſs, and the Eſteem wherein they ought to be held.

1. Now there are three things which this Commandment preſcribes concerning the Time of the Solemn Worſhip of God; That it be *a Day*; That it be *a Seventh day*; and, That it be *that Seventh day on which the Jewiſh Sabbath fell*, or *Saturday*. Concerning each of which, I will particularly inquire, Whether they are morally, or otherwiſe, obligatory to us *Chriſtians.*

And firſt, If the Queſtion be concerning *a Day according as the Jews reckon'd it*, and as they were commanded to obſerve their Sabbaths *, that is to ſay, *of that ſpace of Time which is between the Evening of the foregoing Artificial Day, and the Evening of the following one*; ſo no Reaſon appears, either from Nature, or otherwiſe, why ſuch a Day ſhould be look'd upon as obligatory to us *Chriſtians.* For be it, that that Account is moſt agreeable to the Order of Nature, in which, as the firſt Chapter of *Geneſis* aſſures us, Darkneſs had the precedency of Light, and accordingly had the precedency both in the Scriptures, and the *Jews* Account; Be it, ſecondly, as was before inſinuated, that the *Jews* were oblig'd ſo to reckon their Sabbaths, as the foremention'd Precept, and their own Practice ſhew: Yet, as no Reaſon in Nature can be given, why the Worſhip of God ſhould begin rather with the Evening than the Morning, according as it conſtantly doth with us; ſo, that this Commandment binds not ſuch a Day upon us, the perpetual Practice of the Church, and the Occaſion of that Feſtival we weekly obſerve, ſhew. For, the *Firſt day* of the Week, or *Lord's-day*, being ſet apart by the Church in Commemoration of the Reſurrection of our Saviour, it is in reaſon to begin when that Reſurrection did, which we find to have been when it began to dawn towards day. All therefore that can be meant in reſpect of us, muſt be the Obſervation of ſuch a portion of Time as their Day amounted to, which is the ſpace of Twenty four Hours, or the Natural Day. But even here it will be a hard matter to find any thing in Nature to evince our Obligation to it: For though Nature it ſelf perſwade, that a competent time be appointed for the Publick Worſhip of God; yet that the Time ſo appointed ſhould conſiſt of juſt ſo many Hours, this no Principle in Nature teacheth, ſo far as I have been acquainted with them. The onely thing that can found the Obſervation of ſuch a Time, is that Poſitive Law which is now before us: But, as I have already ſhewn the Letter thereof not to concern us as to the Day here requir'd; ſo, *Chriſtianity* being apparently not ſo

* Lev. 23. 32.

nice

nice as to the obſervation of Circumſtances, we are in reaſon to meaſure our own Obligation as to the time of our Worſhip, rather by the Equity than Letter of the Commandment; which what that is, I ſhall in due place declare.

Now though, from what hath been ſaid, a Judgment may be made, what we are to think of the Obſervation of *a Seventh* day, and particularly of *that Seventh* day which was the *Jewiſh* Sabbath; yet to make my Diſcourſe ſo much the more compleat, and becauſe there want not particular Arguments to propugn my Opinion in thoſe Particulars, I will make it my Buſineſs to ſhew, That there is no Obligation upon us *Chriſtians*, either from the Law of Nature, or this particular Precept, to obſerve either a preciſe Seventh day, or that Seventh day which the *Jews* obſerv'd.

To begin with the former of theſe, even the Obſervation of *a Seventh*, which hath by ſome Men been pleaded for with ſo great earneſtneſs; concerning which I ſhall ſhew, firſt, That it hath no Foundation in the Law of Nature; and ſecondly, That it hath as little in this, if conſider'd in reſpect of us. That it hath not in the former, this one Character of the Law of Nature may ſuffice any ſober Man to conclude: For the Law of Nature preſcribing onely ſuch things to our Obſervation, as are in their own Nature good, before the ſuperinducing of any Poſitive Law; it would follow, that the Obſervation of a Seventh day had a peculiar Goodneſs in it, and that it ought to be obſerv'd, though God had by no Poſitive Law enjoyn'd it. But what Goodneſs can even they who profeſs to believe it Moral, ſhew in a Seventh day, more than in a Sixth, or Eighth, or any other Day whatſoever? unleſs it be, that God reſted upon it from the Works of the Creation, which is the Reaſon here alledg'd for its obſervance. But, firſt of all, if God's reſting upon it gave it any peculiar Goodneſs, what need was there of his adding *his Bleſſing*, and Command, to oblige Men to the Obſervance of it? For the Day being Holy without and before it, it would have ſuffic'd to have declar'd, That that was the Day on which he reſted. Again, Foraſmuch as Bleſſing and Sanctifying ſuppoſeth that which is ſo bleſſed and ſanctified to have been before in the common condition of Things, God's ſo bleſſing and ſanctifying of the Seventh day, ſuppoſeth that to have been of the nature of other Days, and conſequently not to be conſecrated by his bare Reſting on it. Laſtly, Foraſmuch as whatſoever Goodneſs there is in any thing, it muſt be ſuppos'd to deſcend upon it by the Influence of the Divine; if we ſuppoſe the Seventh day to have had any peculiar Goodneſs and Holineſs, we muſt alſo ſuppoſe it to have receiv'd it from the ſame Influx: which cannot be affirm'd in the preſent caſe; becauſe that to which it is aſcrib'd, is not any Influence of the Divine Goodneſs, but onely the Suſpenſion of it. I conclude therefore, That God's Reſt upon it did not give the Seventh day any peculiar Holineſs; and conſequently, becauſe that is the onely Reaſon alledg'd, that there is nothing of Morality in the Obſervance of it. From Nature and Morality therefore, paſs we to the preſent Precept, and inquire whether that induceth any Obligation upon us to obſerve it. Give me leave onely to premiſe, That the Queſtion is not (as is commonly deem'd) Whether *One in Seven* be of neceſſity to be obſerv'd; but, Whether *a Seventh day after Six days of Labour.* For, though

though it be true, that he who requires a Seventh day, requires One in Seven; yet requiring it with reference to God's Reſt from his Six days of Creation, he determines it to the laſt of thoſe Seven, becauſe no other beſide the laſt can anſwer it. Which ſaid, I ſhall not ſtick to affirm, That there is no Obligation upon us as to a Seventh, becauſe the Precept, ſo conſidered, related onely to the *Jews*. For the evidencing whereof, I will alledge that of *Exodus*, *chap.* 31. 16, 17. *Wherefore the children of Iſrael ſhall keep the Sabbath, to obſerve the Sabbath throughout their generations for a perpetual Covenant: It is a ſign between me and the children of Iſrael for ever. For in ſix days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the ſeventh day he reſted and was refreſhed.* For, as it is ſufficiently known, that the Covenant between God and the *Iſraelites* left no place for any that was not of their Nation or Religion; ſo the Sabbath being for a Sign of that Covenant, was conſequently to extend no farther than the Covenant did, and therefore alſo to no other than themſelves. The onely difficulty is, Whether what is affirm'd of the Sabbath in particular, be to be underſtood alſo of a Seventh day in the general. For the reſolution whereof, we ſhall need to go no further than the cloſe of that Place we have now before us: For affirming the Sabbath whereof he ſpeaks, to be *a ſign* between him and the Children of *Iſrael*, as it was *an Image of his own Reſt* after his Six days work of Creation, he thereby appropriates to them, though not the Remembrance of the Creation, yet the keeping ſuch a Memorial of it, and conſequently, of a Seventh day. And indeed, however ſome Men contend eagerly for a Seventh day, as ſuppoſing thereby to advance the Authority of that which we *Chriſtians* think our ſelves obliged to obſerve; yet the granting of it to them, would ſerve onely to diſcredit that Day for which they ſo contend. For though the Lord's-day be One of Seven, yet it is the Firſt of thoſe Seven, and is not preceded by Six days of Labour, but followed: By which means it holds no analogy with the Deſign of the Inſtitution, becauſe intended to commemorate the Six days of the Creation, and that Reſt which followed. Neither will it ſuffice to ſay (as perhaps it may be) That the Analogy between it, and that Reſt it is propos'd to imitate, may be ſalved well enough, by making it look back to the Six foregoing days of Labour; For as by ſo doing we muſt alter our Account, and make the Lord's-day not the Firſt, but the Seventh; ſo, though this way of Computing ſhould agree well enough to the reſt, yet it hath no place at all in the Firſt and Chief; the Day of our Saviour's Reſurrection being not onely the Firſt of the Goſpel Age, but the Firſt day after the *Jewiſh* Sabbath; which leaves no place for any preceding Days of Labour.

From the Obſervation of a Seventh day, paſs we to *that Seventh on which the Jews kept their Sabbath*, even the Seventh from the firſt falling of the Manna in the Wilderneſs, and, as is probable alſo, from the Creation of the World: Which, that it is not obligatory to us, is ſufficiently evident from the foregoing Conſiderations; but will be rendred yet more clear from thoſe which follow. Whereof the firſt that I ſhall alledge, is its being inſtituted to remember God's giving them Reſt after their ſore Travels in *Egypt*: For, that ſo it was, the Prophet *Moſes* doth more than intimate, *Deut.* 5. 15. where repeating the ſame Precept we are now upon, he alledgeth the Reaſon of God's commanding

commanding it, to be, to put them in mind of their Bondage in *Egypt*, and of God's wonderful delivering of them from it. Now foraſmuch as that Mercy had relation onely to the *Jews*; foraſmuch as their Sabbath was appointed to commemorate it: it follows, that the *Jews* onely were concern'd in the Obſervation of it, and conſequently, that it is not obligatory to us. Add hereunto that of St. *Paul* to the *Coloſſians*, *chap.* 2. 16, 17. where not contented to forbid *the judging* of any one *in meat and drink*, *in reſpect of an Holy-day*, *or of the New-moon*, *or of the Sabbath-days*, which yet ſhews their Obligation to be null; he affirms moreover, and particularly concerning thoſe Sabbath-days, That *they were ſhadows of good things to come*, and therefore to diſappear when they actually were. Now if any ſhould demand (as the Queſtion is not unſeaſonable) wherein the Sabbath was a Shadow of things to come, according as St. *Paul* affirms; I think we cannot more rightly place it, than in that Reſt which it enjoyn'd, becauſe that was one great End of its appointment; as neither the Typicalneſs of that Reſt, than in its ſhadowing forth that Eternal Reſt which we ſhall be poſſeſs'd of in Heaven. For beſide that the Author to the *Hebrews* not onely compares thoſe Reſts together, but calls that Eternal Reſt by the Name of * *Sabbatiſm*, as it were on purpoſe to ſhew it to have been typified by the other ‖; the *Jews* themſelves may ſeem not to have been without ſome knowledge of it, becauſe calling that Eternal Reſt *the day which is all Sabbath.* The onely thing that can with reaſon be objected againſt this and the foregoing Argument, is, *the Chriſtians ſo long and ſo generally obſerving the Jewiſh Sabbath*, as well as their own *Lord's-day*, or *Sunday*. But as it is to be obſerv'd, that that Cuſtom had no place in the * *Churches of Rome, and Alexandria, and throughout Africa*, the firſt whereof was anciently the moſt Eminent in the *Chriſtian* World; ſo, where it had, it may ſeem to have proceeded not ſo much from any firm belief of its Obligation, as from weakneſs in ſome, and compliance in others, and in both an unwillingneſs utterly to ſhake off that Day which had by God himſelf been ſet apart for Religious Exerciſes: Witneſs their preſcribing *not to obſerve it after a Jewiſh manner* ‖, who adviſ'd the Obſervation of the Day; the * Obſervation of it *in ſuch Places where the Jews moſt were*, as in the Eaſtern Parts, and not in the other; in fine, the † *Romans* and *Alexandrians* converting the Sabbath-day, or *Saturday*, *into a day of faſting*; and the generality of the *Chriſtians* at laſt agreeing with thoſe of *Rome*, in the aboliſhing of it. I will conclude this Particular with that of St. *Paul*, *Gal.* 4. 10, 11. where having twitted them with the Obſervation *of days, and months, and times, and years, agreeably to the beggarly elements of the Law*, to let them know how much he was concern'd about it, he immediately adds, *I am afraid of you, leſt I have beſtow'd upon you labour in vain*; thereby intimating (as *Grotius* ſpeaks) his fear of their falling back to *Judaiſm*, (to which the Obſervation of their Days was a great ſtep) and caſting off that Religion they had receiv'd from him. I ſpeak not this to invalidate the Authority of the *Lord's-day*, which ſome, I know, have endeavour'd to eſtabliſh upon ſuch Grounds as I have labour'd to decry: For, as I mean by and by to give ſuch an Account of it, as ſhall oblige any ſober Man to the Obſervation of it; ſo, next to that, I know not what better Service I could poſſibly do it, than by taking Men off from

* *Heb.* 4. 9. Ἄρα ἀπολείπεται σαββατισμός, &c.

‖ *Vid. Lud Capell. in locum.*

* See *White's* Treatiſe of the Sabbath-day, *p.* 72.

‖ *Interpolat. Epiſt. Ignat. ad Magneſianos.* Μηκέτι ἓν σαββάτῳ ζωντες Ἰουδαϊκῶς, ἀργίαις χαίροντες, &c. *Vid. Uſſer. Ign. p.* 57.

* *Vid. Uſſer. in notis ad loc.*

† See Biſhop *White ubi ſupra*, and *Uſſer. in Proleg. ad Ign. Epiſt. c.* 13.

from adhering too much to the Letter of this Commandment; becauſe, whilſt ſome Men have gaz'd too much upon it, they have been induc'd thereby, and not without reaſon, to obſerve the *Saturday* rather than the *Sunday*, as which indeed the Commandment enjoyns. Again, As by inculcating the Letter of the Commandment too far, occaſion hath been given to prefer the *Jewiſh* Sabbath before the *Chriſtian*; ſo there is no doubt the like occaſion may be given, if not to admit of the *Jewiſh*, yet to think very meanly of the *Chriſtian*: It being not very likely that Day ſhould be much eſteem'd, which hath nothing brought to eſtabliſh it, but the Letter of a Commandment, that eſtabliſhes another day, and ſuch a one as by the Deſign of God was a Shadow of that Body which we enjoy.

2. But not any longer to defer the paying of that Debt which our Lord's-day, as well as my own Promiſe, exacts of me; I will proceed, in the ſecond place, to inquire, Whether, though the determination of the Time, according as it is here fix'd, be not directly obligatory to us *Chriſtians*, yet ſomewhat may not be inferr'd from it, toward the eſtabliſhing of the Lord's-day; and by what that is farther to be ſtrengthned? For the reſolution whereof, the firſt thing I ſhall offer, ſhall reſpect the appointing of a Day. For being (as I have before ſhewn) it is neceſſary that a competent Time be ſet apart for the Worſhip of God; being leſs than a Day, or at leaſt the major part of it, cannot be deem'd a competent Time for the Solemn Performance of the Private and Publick Worſhip of God; laſtly, being God requir'd of the *Jews* to ſet apart a Day, to give him that Worſhip which is due unto him; we cannot think a leſs Time incumbent upon *Chriſtians* to obſerve as Holy, who have both a much greater Obligation to the Almighty, and a much more weighty Service to intend. Again, Foraſmuch as it is no leſs neceſſary under the Times of the Goſpel, than it was under the Law, that a Time be ſet apart for the Publick Worſhip of God; foraſmuch as it is but reaſonable, that under the Times of the Goſpel an equal portion of Time, if not a far greater, ſhould be allotted for the Performance of it; the ſame Reaſon requires, that ſince God exacted a Seventh part of the *Jews*, we are not to content our ſelves with a leſs, or imagine that God himſelf will be. For, though there be no Morality in the Obſervation of a juſt Seventh; though the ſpecification of a Seventh, proceeded from a Reaſon which was never cogent in it ſelf, but to be ſure is not now obligatory: yet, as whatever the Reaſon thereof was, it is certain God requir'd a Seventh part of the *Jew*, in order to his own Service; ſo it is both Moral and *Chriſtian*, that they ſhould not go leſs than a Seventh, who have much greater Obligations to the Almighty. And indeed, well may we think ſo, when we find the Primitive *Chriſtians* in the *Acts* meeting every day to worſhip, and not onely giving God a Seventh part of their Time, but the greateſt. Laſtly, If the Creation of the World, and God's Reſt from it, were a juſt Motive to conſecrate that Day into a Holy-day, wherein God ſo reſted from the Creation; to be ſure that is no leſs, upon which the Hopes of a *Chriſtian* do ſo much depend, even the Reſurrection of our Bleſſed Lord and Saviour. So that thus much may be inferr'd from the Equity of this Commandment, That as much leſs than a Day, and a Seventh day, cannot be thought neceſſary to be ſet apart for the *Chriſtian* Worſhip; ſo, that which is ſet *Acts* 2, 46.

apart by us, even the First day of the Week, had a juſter Motive to the Conſecration of it, than that which was ſanctified under the Law. But becauſe what hath been hitherto, or may be inferr'd from this Commandment, doth rather perſwade than neceſſitate the Obſervation of that particular Day which we obſerve, and I have promis'd a farther ſtrengthning of its Authority; therefore, to give the greater force to it, I will produce the Practice of the Church from the Apoſtles days; and when I have done ſo, ſhew the Obligation it induceth.

That it had the Obſervation of a *Chriſtian* Feſtival *in the Apoſtles days*, that of St. *Luke* ſhews, *Acts* 20. 7. where we find the Diſciples *met together upon the firſt day of the week to break bread*; that is to ſay, one Species being put for all the reſt, to communicate with each other in the Publick Exerciſes of their Religion: *The breaking of bread* not onely referring either to the Lords Supper, or the Love-feaſts that clos'd it; but joyn'd by this very Author *with doctrine, and fellowſhip, and prayer*, *Acts* 2. 42. The ſame is no leſs evident from that of St. *Paul* to the *Corinthians*, 1 *Cor.* 16. 1, 2. where, according to an Order he had before given to the Churches of *Galatia*, he enjoyns thoſe of *Corinth*, That *upon the firſt day of the week every one ſhould lay by him in ſtore, that ſo there might be no collections when he came.* For, *wherefore* (as St. *Chryſoſtom* obſerves*) *ſhould St.* Paul *appoint that day to the Churches of* Galatia *and* Corinth, *for the laying by of what God had proſpered them, for charitable uſes, but that that day, by the reſt it afforded, gave them opportunity to do it? and moreover, by the Bleſſing which it remembred, and the Sacred Offices that were perform'd in it, was apt to incite them to a more chearful and liberal diſtribution?* To all which, if we add the Title which St. *John* gives it, *Rev.* 1. 10. ſo no doubt can remain of the Churches obſerving it as Holy. For as it is evident from the Conſent of Interpreters, and the Language of the ſucceeding Age, that what St. *John* there calls *The Lord's-day*, was no other than what we now ſtile ſo; ſo the leaſt that can be made of that Appellation is, That it was ſet apart by the Church in memory of the Lord *Chriſt*'s Reſurrection, and dedicated to his Honour and Service: The Lord's-day importing his having a peculiar propriety in it, which muſt be either by his own Inſtitution of it, or the Conſecration of it by his Church. From the Apoſtles days, paſs we to thoſe that immediately ſucceeded; where we ſhall find yet more clear Teſtimonies of the Obſervation of it. For thus *Ignatius*, the Contemporary as well as Succeſſor of the Apoſtles, in his Epiſtle* to the *Magneſians*, doth not onely make mention of the Lord's-day, but exhort them, *that laying aſide the Obſervation of the Sabbath, they would keep the Lord's day* for a Feſtival, *wherein our Life roſe alſo.* To the Teſtimony of *Ignatius*, ſubjoyn we that of *Juſtin Martyr*‖, as neareſt to him, and to the Apoſtles; where we have not onely an Account of the Chriſtians aſſembling on the *Sunday*, but the Buſineſs of thoſe Meetings at large declared, to wit, *the reading of the Scriptures of the Old and New Teſtament, Preaching, Praying, and other ſuch Religious Exerciſes.* And though, in that known Paſſage of *Pliny* †, where he gives an Account to the Emperour *Trajan* concerning the Aſſemblies of the *Chriſtians*; though, I ſay, in that Paſſage there be no expreſs mention of the Day wherein they were held: yet affirming from the Mouth of ſome *Chriſtians*, whom he had examin'd, that *they were wont upon a ſet day to meet*

* *Chryſoſt. in* 1 *Cor. Hom.* 43.

* Μηκέτι σαββατίζοντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ κυριακὴν ζωὴν ζῶντες ἐν ᾗ καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἡμῶν ἀνέτειλεν δι' αὐτοῦ, *Ed. Voſſ.* p. 35.

‖ *Apol.* 2. *pro Chriſtianis*, p. 99. Τῇ δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου ἡμέρᾳ κοινῇ πάντες, *&c.*

† *Plin. Epiſt. li.* 10.

meet together before the Morning-light, and ſing a Song unto Chriſt, as unto God; it is but reaſonable to think that day was meant, the Obſervation whereof we are now eſtabliſhing. What ſhould I tell you of *Tertullian*'s affirming in one place*, That the *Chriſtians had every Eighth day for a Feſtival?* and in another ||, That the *Sunday* was the Day? For, as that is ſo certain, that, as the ſame *Tertullian* intimates, the *Heathens* accus'd them for it, as Worſhippers of the Sun, whoſe Name that Day bore; ſo, in and after his Time, there is ſo little doubt to be made of its Obſervation, that I muſt but light a Candle to the Sun, if I ſhould go about to prove it. The onely thing worthy our conſideration, will be, what uſe may be made of it, to infer our own Obligation to obſerve it.

* De Idololatr. cap. 14. *Si quid & carni indulgendum eſt, habes, non tamen dies tantùm ſed & plures. Nam Ethnicis ſemel annuus dies quiſque feſtus eſt, tibi octavus quiſque dies, &c.*

|| Apolog. cap. 16. *Æque ſi diem Solis lætitiæ indulgemus, alia longe ratione quam religione Solis, ſecundo loco ab eis ſumus, qui diem Saturni otio & victui decernunt, exorbitantes & ipſi ab Judaico more, quem ignorant.*

And here, in the firſt place, I ſhall alledge the Practice it ſelf, as a ſufficient Argument to evince it. For, as an approved Cuſtom hath the nature of a Law, becauſe declaring the Conſent of that Body wherein it is, and to which it is but reaſonable that particular Men ſhould ſubject themſelves; ſo St. *Paul* gives it that force in the Church, where diſputing againſt the *Corinthian* Women's praying uncovered, he alledges, That they *had no ſuch cuſtom, nor the Churches of God*, 1 *Cor.* 11. 16. For if the Argument from a Cuſtom *negative* be good and valid, much more from the ſame *poſitive*, and eſpecially when there is ſo general an one. But becauſe ſuch arguments as theſe, through the contempt Men now have of the *Church*, may poſſibly not have their due efficacy, I will alledge, in the ſecond place, that there is reaſon enough, even from that Practice, to believe it to have been of *Apoſtolical* Inſtitution. For, it being morally impoſſible, that the *Chriſtians* of all Places ſhould ſo unanimouſly agree to the Obſervation of it, if there had not been ſomething of a Law to conſtrain them to it; and there appearing no ſuch Law of the Church it ſelf, antecedent to the Practice of it; it is but reaſonable to believe it to have been Inſtituted by thoſe who were the firſt Founders of it; according to that known Rule* of St. *Auguſtine*, *That what the Univerſal Church holds, and always hath, if it appear not that the ſame was firſt decreed by Councils, is moſt rightly believ'd to have been delivered by the Authority of the Holy Apoſtles.* And higher than that we ſhall not need to go; becauſe he, who had *all power in heaven and earth given* him, did at his departure hence delegate ſo much of it to them, as was neceſſary for the regulating of the Church. The onely thing that may ſeem to have any difficulty, is, Why, when God gave the *Jews* ſo clear a Precept for the Obſervation of their Sabbath, he ſhould leave us, who live at ſo great a diſtance from the Inſtitution of ours, rather to collect it from the Practice of the Apoſtles and the Church, than to read it in ſome expreſs Declaration. But even this, how difficult ſoever in appearance, will not be hard for him to unriddle, who ſhall remember what hath been before brought to eſtabliſh it: For the Law of Nature, and this of *Moſes*, evidencing the neceſſity of a Set Time; and the Equity of *Moſes* Law, and our own Obligations to the Divine Majeſty, that we cannot give God a leſs proportion

* *Quod univerſa tenet Eccleſia, nec Conciliis inſtitutum, ſed ſemper retentum eſt, non niſi Authoritate Apoſtolica traditum rectiſſimè creditur.*

of our Time, than what he exacted of the *Jews*; nothing remained for God to declare, but whether he would require more than a Seventh (of which there is not the leaſt Indication); or if not, which of thoſe Seven he would make choice of: which an eaſie hint might ſuffice to diſcover. For the *Saturday*, which is the laſt of thoſe Seven, being expreſly aboliſh'd, and no other having the like Pretences to ſucceed it, it was eaſie to gueſs God meant that Day, which had not onely our Saviour's Reſurrection to adorn it, but was moreover by the Apoſtles, and thoſe that followed them, kept as holy unto the Lord.

PART III.

A Digreſſion concerning the Faſts and Feſtivals of the Church; where the Lawfulneſs of their Inſtitution is evicted, and vindicated from the Exceptions of their Adverſaries. That they are of ſignal uſe to inſinuate the main Articles of our Religion into the Underſtanding of the Weak, to bring the Occaſions thereof to the Memories of the Strong, and prompt us all both more particularly, and with greater edification, to conſider them. That being inſtituted by the Church, they ought to be Religiouſly obſerv'd by all that are the Members of it. Of the Manner of the Obſervation of the Jewiſh *Sabbath, which is another of the Circumſtantials of this Commandment. Of the Strictneſs of the Reſt enjoyn'd the* Jews *on it; and that, as ſuch, it is not onely not obligatory to us, but ſuperſtitious. What Reſt is now obligatory to us by vertue of this Commandment; where that Reſt is conſidered, both in the Letter, and in the Myſtery. To whom, and in what manner the* Jewiſh *Reſt appertain'd; with an application thereof to our own Concernments. A particular Inquiry concerning thoſe who are under the Power of others; and whether or no they are oblig'd to Reſt, where they are conſtrain'd to Labour by Threats or Stripes. Of Recreation on the* Jewiſh *Sabbath, and our own; and that, rightly diſpos'd, it is not onely not unlawful, but uſeful. An Objection from* Iſa. 58. 13. *propos'd, and anſwered. A Reſtriction of Recreations to ſuch as are neither unſuitable for the Kind to the Gravity of ſuch a Solemnity, nor take up too much time in the Exerciſe thereof. A Caution againſt profane neglect of the Lord's-day, with the neceſſity that lieth upon the Generality of Men, more than ordinarily to intend their Eternal Concernments on it.*

3. THE Lord's-day being, as you have ſeen, eſtabliſh'd upon *Chriſtian* Principles, and thereby equally ſecur'd from a *Judaical* Obſervance, and a profane Neglect; the Commandment I am now upon, no leſs than my propoſed Method, obligeth me to entreat of *other the Feſtivals and Faſt-days* of the Church. For though theſe have not the Authority of a Divine Command, as the *Jewiſh* Sabbath had; though there is not the ſame clearneſs of Evidence for their Apoſtolical Inſtitution, as there is for the Lord's-day, or *Sunday*:

day: yet they have this in common with the *Jewiſh* Sabbath, and our own, that they have the ſame Worſhip of God for their End, and the like ſignal Acts of God for the Occaſions of their Inſtitution; even thoſe which have the Title of *Saints-days*, looking through them to the Mercy of God, who made them what they are, and dedicated to his onely Worſhip and Service. Having therefore ſo much affinity with the Day here enjoyn'd, I ſhall think it no way impertinent to my preſent Argument, to inquire into the *Lawfulneſs of their Inſtitution*, their *Uſefulneſs*, and the *Eſteem* wherein they are to be held.

1. It being certain, that that is to be look'd upon as *lawful*, which is not forbidden by any Command; nothing can be requir'd to eſtabliſh the Holy-days of the Church, but the taking off thoſe Objections which may be made againſt the *lawfulneſs* thereof. Now there are two things commonly objected againſt them, and to which therefore, before I proceed, I will ſhape an Anſwer; the former whereof ſtrikes at the Obſervation it ſelf, the other at the Injunction of it. The ground of the former is laid in thoſe Words of St. *Paul*, *Gal.* 4. 10, 11. where the Apoſtle not onely finds fault with their *obſerving days, and months, and times, and years*, but ſo far as to affirm, *he was afraid he had beſtowed upon them labour in vain.* As if the very Obſervation of ſuch things, were inconſiſtent with *Chriſtianity*, or at leaſt were in the way to deſtroy it. And indeed, if (as is pretended) thoſe Words of his were to be conſtrued of the Obſervation of all Days whatſoever, there is no doubt the Obſervation of thoſe I am now ſpeaking of, were to be look'd upon as inconſiſtent with *Chriſtianity*. But he that ſhall ſeriouſly compare theſe Words of the Apoſtle with the foregoing and following ones, will find them to ſtrike either at the *Jewiſh* onely, or at their Manner of Obſervation of them: For, aſſerting, as he doth in the beginning of the Chapter, their having been in *bondage under the Law*, and the Son of God's Redemption of them from it; aſſerting moreover, *ver.* 21. That *they were deſirous to be under the Law*, and remitting them to the Law for their ſatisfaction; what can we in reaſon think meant by their *turning again to the weak and beggarly elements wherein they deſir'd again to be in bondage*, but their return to the beggarly Elements *of the Law*, and conſequently (becauſe that is given as an Inſtance of it) either to the Obſervation of ſuch Days and Times as were laid upon them by the Law, or obſerving them after the manner preſcribed by it? The Caſe is yet more plain in that other commonly alledged Text, *Let no man judge you in meat and drink, or in reſpect of an Holy-day, or of the New-moon, or of the Sabbath-days*, *Col.* 2. 16. Not onely the mention of *Sabbaths*, which every one knows to have been peculiar to the *Jewiſh* Nation, determining it to their Faſts and Feaſts; but St. *Paul*'s affirming moreover, that they were *ſhadows of things to come*, which is to be affirm'd onely of Legal ones. To make theſe Texts therefore of any force, it muſt be prov'd, either that ours are the ſame, or at leaſt of the ſame nature with the *Jewiſh*; or that a like Obſervation is requir'd. But as the Feſtivals of the Church are ſo far from being the ſame with the *Jewiſh*, that, on the contrary, they proclaim the actual exhibition of thoſe things which the other did onely foreſhew; ſo there is nothing, either in our Canons, or Practice, which can miniſter an occaſion of ſuſpicion, that a Judaical Obſervation is requir'd. For,

beſide

beſide that the Offices thereof are all purely *Chriſtian*, and not mix'd with Incenſing, as the *Jewiſh* were, and the *Popiſh* are; neither is their number ſo great, as to be a burden to the Obſervers; nor thoſe few that are impos'd, impos'd upon them as Divine Commands. In fine, neither is the Duty of the Day ſo appropriated to it, as to make it unacceptable upon others; nor yet exacted with ſo much rigour on it, as not to leave place for neceſſary Occaſions. All therefore that can be ſuppos'd to lie againſt the Feſtivals of the Church, muſt be drawn from their being inſtituted by Men, and that Will-worſhip which it is conceiv'd to involve. But as I have heretofore ſaid enough to take off that Charge, even as to this particular Affair; ſo, having done ſo, I ſhall in ſtead thereof ſet before you the Practice of the *Jews*, which in this Particular deſerves hugely to be conſider'd. For, if it were lawful for the *Jews*, notwithſtanding the many Feſtivals God had inſtituted among them, to add others thereto upon occaſion; how much more for *Chriſtians*, where, ſetting aſide the Lord's-day, there is not any thing to determine the Time of their Solemn Worſhip. Now that this was their Practice, is evident, firſt, from that of *Eſther*, *chap.* 9. and 27. where, upon occaſion of their great Deliverance from the Miſchiefs intended againſt them by *Haman*, *Mordecai wrote to the Jews, and accordingly they ordained, and took upon them, and upon their ſeed*, and upon all ſuch as joyn'd themſelves to them, that they would keep thoſe Days in which they reſted from their Enemies, according to their Writing, and according to their appointed Time, every Year. In like manner, when the Altar of God had been polluted by the *Heathen*, but was repair'd and dedicated again by *Judas Maccabeus*; the ſame *Judas* and his Brethren, with the whole Congregation, ordain'd, That the Days of the Dedication of the Altar ſhould be kept in their Seaſon from Year to Year, 1 *Mac.* 4. 59. Which, as accordingly we find to have been obſerv'd even to the days of our Saviour; ſo, which is more, to have been graced by his preſence, as you may ſee *Joh.* 10. 22. As to the Lawfulneſs therefore, either of the Inſtitution, or Obſervation of Feſtivals, there is not the leaſt doubt to be made; and much leſs can we ſuppoſe there will, if they be alſo uſeful: which accordingly I come now to ſhew.

2. For the evidencing whereof, the firſt thing I ſhall alledge, is, that *Inſtruction* which might thereby accrue to the weaker ſort, if they were but attended to as they ought. For the Church having appointed particular Days for the Commemoration of the Chief Things that either were performed by, or hapned to our Saviour, *if the Plain Man* (as a Reverend Perſon hath expreſs'd it) *would but ply his Almanack well, that alone* * *would teach him ſo much Goſpel, as to ſhew him the Hiſtory of his Saviour.* For there, even upon the Feaſt of the *Annunciation*, might he ſee his Saviour's Conception, declar'd by an Angel; and him Born forty Weeks after, upon the Feaſt of the *Nativity*: He ſhould ſee him eight days after that, Circumcis'd on *New-years-day*; then Viſited, and Ador'd by the Wiſemen, in the *Epiphany*: He ſhould ſee him preſented to God in the Temple, on the Day of *Purification*; then Tempted, and Faſting forty days, in *Lent*: He ſhould ſee him uſher'd in by his Forerunner *John the Baptiſt*, ſix Months before his Birth; attended by his Twelve Apoſtles in their ſeveral Ranks, and *Thomas* the laſt for his Unbelief: And at laſt, after

*Biſhop *Hall's Remains*, Serm. on 1 *Joh.* 1. 5.

ter infinite and beneficial Miracles, he ſhould ſee him crucified upon *Good-fryday*, Riſing from the Dead on *Eaſter*, Aſcending to Heaven on *Holy-Thurſday*; and, to ſupply the want of his Preſence, the Holy Ghoſt deſcending upon the Apoſtles, and the Church. In fine, there he ſhould ſee the Belief of all theſe ſumm'd up in the Celebration of the Bleſſed *Trinity*, on that *Sunday* which bears its Name. All which, whoſoever ſhall duely conſider, will not think ſuch Inſtitutions unuſeful, nor the Church much beholden to them who have endeavour'd to remove them. For, as it is apparent the foregoing Days carry Marks upon them of the principal things which it is neceſſary for a *Chriſtian* to underſtand; ſo, by their ſeparation from other days, they do naturally prompt thoſe that are ignorant, to inquire into the Occaſion of them: By which means, they who fly other ways of Inſtruction, would be in a manner conſtrain'd to receive it here, and either be wrought upon to glorifie God for the Benefits they receive from them, or be rendred inexcuſable if they did not. But then, if we add farther, That they who have inſtituted thoſe Days, have moreover fitted them with ſuch Services, as may both explain their meaning, and the uſe we are to make of them; ſo it will be impoſſible for thoſe who ſhut not their Ears as well as their Eyes, to be ignorant of thoſe Truths, the Notices whereof they are intended to convey.

But beſide that ſuch Inſtitutions miniſter to the Inſtruction of the weaker ſort, which (God knows) are both the moſt, and moſt carefully to be provided for; they are alſo *of excellent uſe to bring the Occaſion thereof to the remembrance of the Strong, and oblige them to conſider what they know.* For being plac'd (ſo near as the Church can fix them) upon the Returns of the ſame Periods of Time wherein they are recorded to have hapned; and being moreover diſtinguiſh'd from other Days by viſible Solemnities; and the Commemoration of that remarkable Work which they ſometime produc'd: the notice of them is in a manner thruſt upon us, whether we will or no: And though we may be ſo bruitiſh, as not to remember them with thoſe Affections which becomes us; yet it is made impoſſible for us to forget them. Laſtly, As the ſetting aſide particular Days for particular Accidents, is of excellent uſe to bring them to the remembrance of the Strong, and oblige them to conſider what they know; ſo they miniſter *an occaſion* ſhall I ſay, or rather *an incitement to us all, more particularly to conſider them, and improve them to our utmoſt advantage.* For, as it is eaſie to ſuppoſe, thoſe things will be but ſuperficially conſider'd, which are not allow'd a diſtinct conſideration; ſo the thus ſeparating them from each other, lays a kind of neceſſity upon Men to look more nearly and narrowly into them, and weigh all the Advantages which they contain: By which means, they who otherwiſe perhaps would have had but a ſlight taſte of any, ſhall ſuck them in in greater proportions, and not onely find in themſelves a fuller perception of their Sweetneſs, but a more grateful ſenſe of his Goodneſs from whom they come. Thus, for example, whilſt the Feaſt of our *Saviour's Nativity* doth not onely admoniſh us of that, but in a manner determine our Thoughts to it, we have thereby both an opportunity and an engagement, I will not ſay ſo much to dive into the Myſtery, as to contemplate the Goodneſs of him who was ſo incarnate; paſſing through all thoſe Stages through which his Goodneſs and Condeſcenſion

ſion did, from the Aſſumption of a Humane Body, to all thoſe humble and even contemptible Circumſtances in which he was pleas'd to aſſume it. Such are the Advantages of the Faſts and Feaſts of the Church, whereſoever they are diligently intended. It remains that we inquire *in what account* they are to be held, the third thing propos'd to be diſcours'd of.

And here not to tell you, becauſe no Man, for ought I know, hath ever taken upon him to affirm it, That ſuch Days have no inherent Holineſs in them; nor yet (becauſe the Church doth not) repreſent them as Apoſtolical Inſtitutions, (though the Feaſt of *Eaſter* have a fair pretence to it) and much leſs as Divine Commands; it ſhall ſuffice me to repreſent them as ſet apart by the Church of God, for the Commemoration of thoſe Things whoſe Titles they bear. For though this do not make them equal to ſuch as have the Command of God for their Inſtitution, nor yet to that *Lord's-day* which with great probability pretends to an Inſtitution by the Apoſtles: yet, as it ſeparates them from the Rank of Ordinary Days, and conſequently obligeth us ſo to look upon them; ſo it particularly obligeth us to intend thoſe ſeveral Offices for the performance whereof they are ſet apart. For if, for inſtance, it be in the Power of the Church to ſet apart certain Days for the Commemoration of the Divine Goodneſs towards us, there is no doubt but it is the Duty of particular Members to comply with their Inſtitutions, and make the Mercies which they ſo commemorate, the Occaſion of their Thanks and Praiſe. This onely would be added, That as what is ſo determin'd by the Church, may by the Laws of the ſame be taken away, if the Profit or Neceſſity thereof do ſo require; ſo particular Perſons may without Sin omit the Solemnization of them, if the neceſſity of their Affairs ſhall ſo require. For if the Sabbath it ſelf was to yield to Neceſſity, much more thoſe Feſtivities which pretend not to the Inſtitution of the Divine Majeſty. Care onely would be taken, that, under a falſe pretence of Neceſſity, Men violate not the Order of the Church: For, ſo doing, they ſhall offend againſt God, as well as it; becauſe profaning thoſe Days which were ſet apart for his Worſhip and Service.

Vid. Daven. in Col. 2. 16.

2. Having thus conſider'd *the Determination of the Time* of our Worſhip, which I ſaid to be one of the *Circumſtantials* of this Commandment; proceed we in the next place to conſider *the Manner of its Obſervation*: where again theſe three things would be inquir'd into.

1. What kind of Reſt it was to be obſerved with.
2. Whether it admitted of any Recreation: And,
3. Laſtly, With what Holy Offices to be celebrated? Subjoyning to each, as being the principal thing we are to aim at, how far we our ſelves are concern'd.

1. I begin with the firſt of theſe, even the *Reſt* enjoyn'd the *Jews* in the Obſervation of their Sabbaths: Concerning which, I ſhall ſhew,

1. What kind of Reſt it was.
2. To whom, and in what manner it appertain'd.

1. For the *Reſt* enjoyn'd the *Jews*, it was evidently ſtrict enough, and ſuch as excluded all kind of Labour which was not either plainly Neceſſary, or was not grounded upon Pious and Charitable Conſiderations; ſuch as were the Circumciſing of Children upon the Sabbath, ſlaying

ſlaying of Oxen for Sacrifices, or lending Help to the Diſtreſſed. For, beſide that here, and elſewhere, the Voice of God is not, as it is in ſome others *, That they ſhould do *no ſervile work*; but, that they ſhould do *no manner of work* upon it: beſide, ſecondly, that they were forbidden ſo much as *to kindle a fire on it*, as you may ſee *Exod.* 35. 3. the Reſt ſeems to have been ſo ſtrict, as not onely to reſtrain Men from Labour, but even from moving from their Places: For, *abide ye* (ſaith God, *Exod.* 16. 29.) *every one in his place; let no man go out of his place on the ſeventh day.* And though there is no doubt this was to admit of ſome relaxation, becauſe that would have hindred them from reſorting to the Solemn Aſſemblies, for the holding whereof I have ſhewn the Sabbath to be ſet apart; yet it is apparent enough, from the End of its Inſtitution, and the *Jews* * Practice, that there was ſomewhat more than ordinary enjoyn'd, even as to their not ſtirring from their Habitations. Now concerning each of theſe Reſts, I ſhall not ſtick to affirm, that, according as before-ſtated, they are not onely *not obligatory* to us *Chriſtians*, but *ſuperſtitious*. That they are *not obligatory*, will appear, if we conſider, that the Sabbath it ſelf is not: For the Sabbath (as was before-ſhewn) being peculiar to the *Jews*, to whom it was given as a Sign of the Covenant between God and them; that Reſt which gave it its Name, and a great part of its Nature, muſt be look'd upon as in like manner peculiar to them, and conſequently not obligatory to us. But neither is it leſs evident that ſuch a Reſt would be *ſuperſtitious*, if either impos'd or obſerv'd as Religious; becauſe placing Religion in that, which however it might have ſome place in the *Jewiſh*, yet is no part of the *Chriſtian*, becauſe exhibiting that better Reſt of which the other was a Type. If therefore there be any Obligation upon us, from the Reſt here commanded, it muſt be either to the Obſervation of that *Spiritual Reſt* of which it was a Type, or to *ſuch a Bodily one as is requiſite to the Solemn Performance* of God's Worſhip; each of which I come now to conſider. Of the former of theſe Reſts, there is not the leaſt doubt to be made; that is to ſay, of a Spiritual one, or Reſt from Sin. For it being evident on the one hand, that the Law of *Moſes* was written for our Direction and Obedience, as well that which is * Ceremonial, as that which was Moral and Subſtantial; and it being no leſs evident on the other, that that of it which was Ceremonial, was not written to oblige us to the Ceremony it ſelf: it follows, becauſe it was written for our Direction and Obedience, that it was intended to oblige us to thoſe Spiritual Duties of which the other were Types and Shadows. Now foraſmuch as the Reſt enjoyn'd the *Jews* was a Type of ſome *Chriſtian* Duty; foraſmuch as there is no Duty in *Chriſtianity*, which can better anſwer it, than a Reſt from Sin; it follows, that though we look not upon our ſelves as concern'd in the Reſt enjoyn'd the *Jews*, yet we look upon our ſelves as concern'd in that Reſt of which it was a Type, and accordingly ceaſe from our Sinful Works, as they did on the Sabbath from the Works of their ſeveral Employments. Again, Though the Reſt enjoyn'd the *Jews*, oblige us rather to the Thing ſignified by it, than to the Reſt it ſelf; though, in the Circumſtances in which it was enjoyn'd, it was apparently Legal, and conſequently one of thoſe Bondages from which *Chriſt* came to ſet us free: yet ſo far forth as that is requiſite to

* See *Lev* 23. 7, 8.

* *Vid. Act.* 1. 12. & Selden. *de Jure Nat. &c. l.* 3. *c.* 9.

* See the Diſcourſe concerning the Poſitive Laws of God, *&c.*

the performance of God's Worſhip, there is no doubt it doth oblige us, even as to the thing it ſelf: Becauſe (as was before ſhewn*) a part of the Moral Law, and ſubordinate to the main End of this. But from hence (as was there obſerv'd) it will follow, that we are to reſt from our Employments, both in, and ſome time before the Time of God's Solemn Worſhip; the Mind of Man being neither able to intend them both at once, nor yet the Service of God alone, with that freedom which it ought, where the Cares of this World preſs too near upon it. Which though it amount not to the ſtrictneſſes of the *Jewiſh* Sabbath, yet will oblige us to ſuch a Reſt, as will leave little leiſure for other earthly Thoughts, than what the Neceſſity of our Affairs, or the Conveniences of Life will take up. But, as farther than this I neither ſhall nor dare preſs upon you the Reſt enjoyn'd the *Jews*; ſo even they who are more ſevere, will not know how to free themſelves, if they ſhould be preſs'd with their own Actions: For who of them thinks himſelf a Sinner, for gathering a few Sticks on the *Chriſtian* Sabbath, or going about to kindle a Fire on it? The * latter whereof was yet expreſly forbidden the *Jews*, as the || former puniſh'd with death.

* See Part 1. of the Explic. of this Commandment.

* *Exod.* 35.3.

|| *Num.* 15.36.

2. Having thus ſhewn what kind of Reſt was impos'd upon the *Jews*, and withal how far we our ſelves are concern'd to obſerve it; inquire we in the next place, *To whom, and in what manner it appertain'd*, or rather into the latter onely; the Commandment being expreſs not onely for the reſting of all ſorts of Perſons, but alſo of the very Beaſts themſelves. And firſt of all, if the Queſtion be concerning thoſe who were *ſui juris*, or permitted ſo to be as to the Reſt here enjoyn'd; ſo there is no doubt that Reſt appertain'd to them, not onely as a Privilege, but a Duty: the Reſt here ſpoken of being the Matter of a Command, and conſequently intended to oblige all thoſe who were in a capacity to yield obedience to it. On the other ſide, if the Queſtion be concerning Cattel, which by the Tenor of the Commandment were to have a ſhare in it; ſo there is no doubt the reſt here ſpoken of appertain'd to them onely by way of Privilege: For being uncapable either of underſtanding, or giving obedience to Laws, they muſt be ſuppos'd to have been free from this, and conſequently, what is ſaid concerning their Reſt, to have appertain'd to them onely by way of Privilege. Setting aſide therefore both the one and the other, as whoſe Caſe admits not of the leaſt difficulty, we will conſider, firſt of all, the Caſe of *Parents and Maſters*: 2. Of *Children and Servants*: And 3. and laſtly, (becauſe there is ſomething particular in his) *of the Stranger that was within their gates.* For the firſt of theſe again, there is no great difficulty in explicating their particular Concerns, becauſe the Commandment is clear, not onely that they ſhould reſt themſelves, but oblige thoſe who were under their Power to do ſo: For thoſe being more in their Parents and Maſters Power, than in their own, the Command is in reaſon to be ſuppos'd to have appertain'd chiefly to them in whoſe Power their Labour or Reſting was. From Parents and Maſters, paſs we to *Children and Servants*, and inquire into their particular Concerns: Where, firſt of all, there is no doubt, for the Reaſon before alledg'd, that it was no leſs their Duty than Privilege, to reſt from their Labours, where they might be permitted ſo to do. The onely doubt is, whether it were incumbent upon them ſo to do, though their cruel

Maſters

Maſters ſhould have us'd Threats or Chaſtiſements to conſtrain them to their ordinary Labours. For the reſolution whereof, I ſhall deſire you firſt to conſider that of *Deut.* 5.15. For it being manifeſt from thence, that the great Deſign of the Reſt enjoyn'd, was, that Servants ſhould have eaſe from their Labours, it is hard to ſuppoſe, God would oblige them ſo to reſt, when a far greater Evil than their Labour impended on them: For, by this means God ſhould not onely not have conſulted their Benefit, but brought upon them a far greater Evil than their own Pains. The Caſe will be yet more clear, if we remember, that the principal End of Reſt, was the attending to the Worſhip of God: For it being not to be thought, that they would ſuffer their Servants to intend the Worſhip of God, who would be ſo wicked as to conſtrain them to their ordinary Labours, the main Reaſon of the Commandment muſt have been taken away as to them, and conſequently the Command alſo. All therefore that remains to be conſidered, is the Concernment of *the Stranger*, *who was not of the ſame Religion with the Jew*: Where, in like manner, it muſt be ſaid, That the Precept of Reſt appertained rather to the *Jew* that had Authority over him, than unto *him*: For the Sabbath (as was before ſaid) being a Sign of that Covenant which God made between the *Jews* and himſelf, it is in reaſon to be conſtru'd to have laid an Obligation upon ſuch onely to whom the Covenant appertain'd. All the Obligation that a Stranger could be ſuppos'd to lie under, muſt have riſen not from the Law of *Moſes*, with which he had nothing to do; but from the Law of Nations, which preſcribes, that they who live in any Place, ſhould be obedient to the Orders of it. By which means the Stranger's Obligation became rather Civil, than Religious; and conſequently, ty'd him not to the Obſervation of it upon a Religious account, but onely upon a Civil one. The ſame, *mutatis mutandis*, is to be ſaid of the Concernment of *Chriſtians*, unleſs it be as to the Reſt of Cattel: For though it be a matter of Morality to allow them Reſt, yet neither Morality, nor Chriſtianity, ties us to allow it them on that day wherein we are to reſt our ſelves. This onely would be added, That as the doing it at that time is generally neceſſary, becauſe we cannot well deny them Reſt, but we muſt abridge our ſelves; ſo it is no unhandſom Expreſſion of our Thanks to God for the Benefits we our ſelves enjoy, to make our Fellow-creatures at the ſame time to taſte of ours. But as, ſetting aſide this particular Caſe, little need to be added, to ſhew in what ſort the Reſt here ſpoken of appertains to us and ours; ſo I will not trouble my ſelf, or you, with making any Application of it: Onely becauſe what I have ſaid concerning *Servants*, may be liable to miſconſtruction, I will reſume that Matter anew, and apply it to our own Caſe. And firſt of all, when I ſay, That Servants are not oblig'd under Sin to reſt from their Labours, if they who are their Maſters ſhall conſtrain them to it by Threats or Stripes, my meaning is, provided they uſe all due Means to free themſelves from them, which in a *Chriſtian* State are not ordinarily wanting to them that look after them: For ſo long as the State forbids ſuch Labours, it is in the power of Servants to complain to thoſe that are in Authority, and thereby procure both a freedom from their Labours, and a Liberty to attend the Worſhip of God. Where therefore ſuch a Redreſs is to be had, there no doubt it ought

to be endeavour'd after: otherwiſe the Servant becomes acceſſary to his own Profanation, as well as the Maſter that compells him. But when, as it may ſometimes happen even in *Chriſtian* States, the Servant is in no capacity of delivering himſelf from ſo great an Evil; or when (which is, God knows, the Caſe but of too many) a Man falls into the Hands of *Turks*, who it may be will exact a greater Service from him on that Day, than on any other: in ſuch a Caſe, there is no doubt he need not expoſe himſelf to danger, by refuſing that Service which is impos'd upon him: It being not to be thought God will puniſh him for thoſe Labours, which are rather his Unhappineſs than Choice, and by the refuſal whereof, he ſhould not onely not have the more freedom for Religious Actions, but the leſs. It may ſuffice ſuch a one to lift up his Heart to God, which no violence of Men or Devils can reſtrain him from: For, as that is all he is able to do, ſo it is the beſt part of that Worſhip for which the *Jewiſh* Sabbath of old, and the *Chriſtian* now, is commanded to be ſet apart. I will conclude this Particular with that known Affirmation * of our Saviour, That *the Sabbath was made for Man, and not Man for the Sabbath*: For if it was made for Man, to be ſure it was not meant to ruine him, and bring upon him a greater Evil than all his Toil or Travel.

* *Mark* 2. 27.

2. Of the Reſt here enjoyn'd I have ſpoken hitherto, and ſhewn both what it is, and to whom, and in what manner it appertains: It follows, that we inquire whether either that, or the Day, admitted of any *Recreation*. For, as nothing hinders, but at the ſame time Men might ceaſe from Labour, and yet not ceaſe from Recreation; ſo he that ſhall conſult either the *Jewiſh* Writers, or their preſent Practice, will find them not to have underſtood it to have extended to the prohibition of it. Whence it is, that *Lyra*, a converted *Jew*, ſpeaking of their permitting *a Sabbath-days Journey*, alledgeth for the Reaſon of it, That *ſuch a Walk was more a Recreation, than a Labour*; for which cauſe it was not againſt the Reſt enjoyn'd. And indeed (however ſome Mens Prejudices have made it otherwiſe thought) neither is Recreation, provided it be moderate, any way unſuitable to their Feaſts, or ours. For, as it is but reaſonable that the Body ſhould ſhare with the Soul in its Joys, as well as be afflicted in its Griefs; ſo Recreation, rightly diſpos'd, may make the Mind ſo much the more apt to intend the Offices of Religion. In fine, take away all Recreation, and you make the Sabbath to afford little Refreſhment to Servants, and other ſuch Labouring People, for whoſe Benefit we find it to have been in a great meaſure deſign'd; a continu'd Intention of Mind, eſpecially to thoſe who know not the pleaſure of Contemplation, being no leſs weariſom to the Fleſh, than the Labour of the Body. The onely thing that can in reaſon be offer'd againſt the allowance of Recreations, is that of *Iſa. chap.* 58. 13. where we find *the doing and finding of ones own pleaſure*, joyn'd with *the doing of a mans own ways*, as equally unlawful on the Sabbath. But beſide that the Word we render *pleaſure*, doth alſo ſignifie * *purpoſe*, which, if admitted here, would convert it to another ſenſe; beſide, ſecondly, that no other may be meant, than the forbidding of Pleaſures in exceſs, and when they are us'd rather to thruſt out the Worſhip of God, than to fit Men the better, and render them more apt for the Practice of

Vid. Seld. de Jure Nat. & Gent. li. 3. c. 9.

* *Vid. Eccl.* 3. 1. *ubi quod in Heb.* לכל חפץ *LXX. reddunt* τῷ πάντι πράγματι. Chald. *Omni negotio, ſenſu etiam id poſtulante.*

of it; both the *Chaldee* *, and the || *Septuagint*, underſtand it of *the pleaſure of gain*, of making proviſion for their neceſſities and commodities. Which reſtriction is the rather to be admitted, as becauſe the Sabbath was ordain'd for † *refreſhment*, ſo becauſe there is not the leaſt mention elſewhere of forbidding Recreation on it. Add hereunto, what will farther confirm the former Notion, that of the ſame Prophet, *verſ.* 3. *Behold, in the day of your faſt you find pleaſure, and exact all your labours.* For as it is probable from what he there ſubjoyns concerning the *exacting of their labours*, that he meant no other *pleaſure* than the purſuing of their *profits*; ſo, that he could not mean *pleaſures*, in the proper acception of the Word, the fifth Verſe of the ſame Chapter ſhews, he there intimating, that they were not wanting *in afflicting their ſouls*, which ſhews they were far from finding pleaſure. This onely would be added, That as Recreation, how lawful ſoever in it ſelf, may upon other Days become unlawful, according as it may happen to be circumſtantiated; ſo it will become ſo more eſpecially upon this, if either it be unſuitable for the Kind to the Gravity of ſuch a Solemnity, or take up too much Time in the exerciſe thereof. Upon which account, I ſhould make no difficulty to condemn, (as the Statute 1 *Caroli, chap.* 1. did) all Meetings, Aſſemblies, or Concourſe of People, out of their own Pariſhes, for any Sports or Paſtimes whatſoever, or any Bear-baiting, Bull-baiting, Enterludes, or Common Plays, within them; theſe *latter*, as they are rarely managed without either thoſe Vanities or Heats which are very unſuitable to the Day, ſo both *the one* and *the other* being not well to be either provided for, or attended to, (according as that Statute remarques) without entrenching upon thoſe Duties for which it was ſet apart. Beſides, when it is apparent how great the Neceſſities of Men's Souls are, and how little leiſure the Common ſort have to conſider them upon other Days; when it is farther apparent, how ill the other Feſtivals of the Church are obſerv'd, and conſequently how little likelihood there is of Mens ſupplying thoſe Neceſſities in them, by a conſcionable diſcharge either of Publick or Private Duties of Religion; laſtly, when it is apparent how apt Men are to exceed, and, upon a pretence of the lawfulneſs of Recreation on it, to convert that Day, which was ſet apart for God's Service, into a Day of Sloth or Merriment; it is eaſie to ſee how much it concerns Men to ſet Bounds to their Recreations on it, and avoid a *profane neglect*, as well as a *too nice and ſuperſtitious obſervation* of it.

* *Chal.* pro eo quod eſt in *Hebr.*—— *faciendo voluntatem tuam,*——*ut non facias neceſſaria tua,* pro—*ab inveniendo voluntatem tuam*—*neque provideas in eo quæ tibi neceſſaria ſunt.*

|| *LXX.* pro—*à faciendo vias tuas, ab inveniendo voluntatem tuam,*—— οὐκ ἀρεῖς ἀ πόδα σε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ.

† *Vid. Exod.* 23. 12. *ubi LXX.* ἵνα ἀναψύξῃ ὁ υἱός σου ὁ παιδίσκης σου, &c.

PART

PART IV.

By what Religious Offices the Jewiſh *Sabbath was ſanctified; which, beſide the offering of Sacrifices, and other ſuch Legal Miniſtrations, are ſhewn to have been, the reading of the Law and the Prophets. An Explication of, and Exhortation out of them, Praying to, and Praiſing God. A Tranſition to the Publick Sanctification of the Lord's-day, where the ſeveral Offices thereof are commemorated, and evidenced at large, both from Scripture and Antiquity. Of Reading the Scriptures in the Publick Aſſemblies, and the both Neceſſity and Uſefulneſs of continuing that Practice in them. That the Reading and Hearing of the Scriptures is no improper part of God's Worſhip. A Caution againſt thoſe who reject the Reading of the Scriptures, as inſufficient to convert Souls unto God. Of the Explication of the Scriptures, and Exhortations out of them. What the Ancient Form of Sermons was, and the Uſefulneſs of all. Concerning Prayer and Praiſe, both which are at large evidenc'd to be Parts of the Lord's-day Service. The vanity of thoſe Mens Pretences, who abſent themſelves from our Publick Prayers, becauſe (as they think) they can make as good at home. The Adminiſtration of the Lord's-Supper, a great part of the Office of the Day.*

3. BEING by the Order of my Diſcourſe to inquire *by what Offices the Jewiſh Sabbath was, and ours is to be ſanctified* after its example; I muſt admoniſh you in the general, That it is *eſpecially by ſuch as are ſtrictly and properly Religious*: For though God may be honour'd by other Offices, yet thoſe tend more directly towards it, and conſequently alſo to the Sanctification of thoſe Days which were ſet apart for his Honour. Setting aſide therefore, for the preſent, what place other good Offices may have in it, I will make it my buſineſs to inquire, what *Religious* ones were requir'd toward the Sanctification of the *Jewiſh* Sabbath, and what are to the Sanctification of our own.

And firſt of all, if the Queſtion be concerning the Sanctification of the *Jewiſh* Sabbath, and particularly concerning the Sanctification of it in Publick; ſo, beſide the offering of Sacrifices, and other ſuch Legal Miniſtrations, we ſhall find they had,

1. The Reading of the Law and the Prophets. For that this was a great part of the Buſineſs of their Sabbath, is evident from what was * heretofore alledg'd out of the *Jewiſh* Writers, and a Paſſage of St. *James*; but may be made yet more clear from *Acts* 13. 27. where St. *Paul* not onely affirms *the Prophets to have been read every Sabbath-day*, but makes it an aggravation of the *Jews* ignorance in the matter of our Saviour, concerning whom they ſo clearly foretold.

* See Part 1. of the Explic. of this Commandment.

2. But beſide the Reading of the Law and the Prophets, which yet was always a part of their Service, they had, at leaſt for the moſt part, *an Explication of them* by thoſe who were the moſt eminent in Knowledge among them. And accordingly, as we find our Saviour, after the reading of a Paſſage in *Iſaiah*, proceeding to the Explication of

of it, *Luke* 4. 16. ſo the Rulers of the Synagogue of *Antioch*, after the reading of the Law and the Prophets, ſending to *Paul* and *Barnabas*, to tell them, that *if they had any word of exhortation to the people, they ſhould ſay on*, *Acts* 13. 14. Agreeable hereto is a Paſſage of *Philo*, concerning a Sect among the *Jews* call'd *Eſſenes*; to wit, *That coming to their Holy Places called Synagogues, they ſit down in Ranks according to Years, the Younger under the Elder, with fit decorum diſpos'd to hear: Then one taketh the Book and readeth; another of the beſt practiſed cometh afterwards, and recogniſeth that which is leaſt underſtood*, that is, *expoundeth it*. From all which it appeareth, that the Expoſition of the Law and the Prophets was a part of their Sabbath-Service, as well as the Reading of it. *Thorndike* Rel. Aſſembl. *ch.* 3. *p.* 60.

3. The Caſe is no leſs plain as to the Duty of *Prayer*, which is one of the moſt proper Acts of Divine Worſhip; St. *Luke* not onely telling us of a Place built for Prayer, but of certain of the *Jewiſh* Women alſo reſorting to it on the Sabbath-day; and St. *Paul* taking occaſion from thence to open his Doctrine to them, *Acts* 16. 13. Which Paſſage is the more to be noted, becauſe where there were no Synagogues, yet they had their Places* of Prayer, which ſhews they look'd upon that as one of the more eſpecial Parts of God's Worſhip, and ſuch as ought not to be neglected, though the Reading of the Law and the Prophets ſhould. * *Grot. in Act.* 16. 13.

4. Again, As Prayer was a Part of the Buſineſs of the Sabbath, ſo alſo *Praiſe and Thanksgiving*, even by the Directions of God himſelf. For, as we find it to have been the Office of the *Levites* to ſtand every Morning and Evening to thank, and particularly* upon the Sabbath-days, 1 *Chron.* 23. 30. ſo the Title of 92 *Pſalm* proclaims it to have been made for the Sabbath-day, as you may ſee if you pleaſe to peruſe it. And indeed, well may we think Praiſing God a part of the Buſineſs of the Sabbath, when the Sabbath it ſelf was inſtituted in remembrance of the Creation, and therein both of their own Being, and the Means which that furniſh'd for their Support. Such were the Offices by which the *Jewiſh* Sabbath was to be ſanctified; and not unlike, it is probable, was their way of Sanctification of it in private: But becauſe we have not the like Evidence for it, we will leave Men to their own Conjectures, and paſs to the Sanctification of the *Chriſtian* one; for my more orderly Explication whereof, I will conſider it, * See the *Septuag. Verſion* of that place; and *Thorndike* of Rel. Aſſem. *c.* 7. *p.* 219, *&c.*

1. As to the Publick; And,

2. Then, as to more Private Concerns.

1. And, firſt of all, if the Queſtion be concerning the Sanctification of it *in Publick*, for which both the one and the other Sabbath were chiefly ſeparated, ſo we ſhall find *the Reading of the Scriptures* to have had a place in it, as well as in the *Jewiſh* one. It is true indeed, if we look no farther than thoſe ſlender Narrations which the New Teſtament gives us of the Lord's-day Service, we ſhall not be able to diſcover any thing which may warrant us to affirm, that the Reading of the Scriptures had any place in it: But as that is not much to be wondred at, when we ſee ſo little there concerning the Obſervation of it at all; ſo there want not Reaſons to believe, however there be no expreſs mention of it, that the Reading of the Scriptures had a part in it, even then. For, as it is not eaſie to ſuppoſe (eſpecially when there were ſo many newly converted *Jews*) that they would lightly depart

depart from the Cuſtom of the Synagogue, where the Scriptures were conſtantly read; ſo it is probable they did not, becauſe there was the like neceſſity of Reading them, that there had been in the *Jewiſh* Synagogues. For though, ſince *Printing* came in uſe, the Scriptures are become more common, yet anciently they were in few Perſons hands; and conſequently, if they had not been read in Publick, the generality of *Chriſtians* would not have had Knowledge enough of them, to have guided them in their Opinions and Actions. Since therefore it was but neceſſary they ſhould be read, it is but reaſonable to conclude they were, eſpecially when we know our Saviour to have exhorted to the *ſearch* of them, and St. *Paul* to repreſent them as *able to make a man wiſe unto ſalvation.* But it is not onely Probability we have to ground our ſelves upon, as to the Scriptures being made a part of the Lord's-day Service: For though (as I ſaid) there be no mention of Reading them upon that Day; yet there is mention of Reading them in their Aſſemblies, which that Day was ſet apart for the holding of. For thus, *Col.* 4. 16. we find St. *Paul* giving in charge, that when that Epiſtle of his had been read amongſt them, *they ſhould cauſe it to be read alſo in the Church of the Laodiceans, and in like manner read that from Laodicea* themſelves. And thus too, though with much more earneſtneſs, he gives a Charge to the *Theſſalonians*, that *that Epiſtle of his ſhould be read unto all the holy Brethren*, 1 *Theſſ.* 5. 27. But becauſe Cuſtoms, like Rivers, are beheld with the greateſt advantage at ſome diſtance from the Springs from whence they flow; from the Practice of the Church in the Apoſtles Times, paſs we to thoſe that immediately ſucceeded, where we ſhall find clearer Expreſſes of it: For thus it is the Affirmation of *Juſtin Martyr**, one of the Ancienteſt Writers the Church hath, That *upon the day call'd Sunday there was an Aſſembly of all that abode in the Cities, and the adjacent Countries, where the Commentaries of the Apoſtles, or the Writings of the Prophets were read, ſo far as Time and other Duties would give leave.* Agreeable hereunto is that of *Tertullian*, in *Chap.* 39. of his *Apologetick*, where ſpeaking of the Buſineſs of *Chriſtian* Aſſemblies, which is principally to be underſtood of thoſe of the Lord's-day, becauſe the Chief, he hath theſe Words: ‖ *We come together to the repeating of the Divine Scriptures, according as the condition of the preſent Times enforceth, either to forewarn, or look back.* In like manner, the ſame *Tertullian*† ſpeaking of a certain Virgin, who had Revelations during the Solemn Service of the Lord's-day, affirms, That *the matter of her Viſions was miniſtred as the Scriptures were read, or Pſalms ſung, or Exhortations produc'd, or Prayers preferr'd.* Which ſhews the Reading of the Scripture to have been a part of the Publick Service, and particularly of the Day of the *Chriſtian* Sabbath.

* Καὶ τῇ τῦ ἡλίυ λεγομένῃ ἡμέρᾳ πάντων κατὰ πόλεις ἢ ἀγρὲς μενόντων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συνέλευσις γίνεται, καὶ τὰ ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων, ἢ τὰ συγγράμματα τῶν προφητῶν ἀναγινώσκεται μέχρις ἐγχωρεῖ. *Apol.* 2. *pag.* 98.

‖ *Coimus ad literarum divinarum commemorationem; ſiquid præſentium temporum qualitas aut præmonere cogit, aut recognoſcere.*

† De Animâ, cap. 9. *Jam vero prout Scripturæ leguntur, aut Pſalmi canuntur, aut Adlocutiones proferuntur, aut Petitiones delegantur, ita indè materia Viſionibus ſubminiſtrantur.*

Now, though what hath been ſaid, be ſufficient to ſhew the Reading of the Scriptures to be a part of the Publick Service; and as ſuch, to be diligently attended to: yet becauſe ſome have rejected it, as of none, or of little Edification; and others, as more proper for the Cloſet than the Church; I will, before I proceed, obviate each of theſe

theſe Opinions, and ſhew the groundleſneſs thereof. For, be it, firſt, that the main Deſign of the Scriptures is to teach us how to live, and particularly in reference to God; upon which account, the Reading of them may ſeem rather a Means to inſtruct us in, than any Part of the Worſhip of God: yet if it be with a regard to the Author of them, ſo we ſhall find both the Reading and Hearing thereof to be *no improper Parts* of God's Worſhip: He that reads or liſtens to them, as to the Word of God, no leſs acknowledging his Authority over us, than he who either prays to, or praiſes him. And accordingly, as Prayer and Praiſe (as being immediate Parts of God's Worſhip) were always accompanied with ſome outward Teſtimony of Reſpect; ſo we find alſo, that the Reading of the Law and the Prophets ſometime was, as is evident from a Paſſage in each Teſtament: The former giving us to underſtand, that *when Ezra opened the Book of the Law*, not onely he himſelf, but *all the People ſtood up*, Nehem. 8. 4, 5. the latter, that our Saviour us'd the ſame Poſture at the Reading of the Prophet *Iſaiah*, and *ſate not down* till he clos'd it: both the one and the other thereby declaring their Acknowledgment of his Authority by whoſe Spirit each of thoſe Books was dictated. Whilſt therefore the Scriptures are thus attended to, we do no leſs worſhip God, than learn how to do it; and the Reading and Hearing of them, is not onely the way to, but a part of that very Worſhip to which it leads. But becauſe there are ſome who, though they queſtion not the Reading of the Scriptures upon that account, yet reject it either as unedifying, or at leaſt not very proper for the Publick Aſſemblies; inſtead of proſecuting the former Argument, we will conſider each of theſe Pretenſions, and firſt that which excludes it as no way proper for the Publick. For, be it, which is commonly alledg'd, that Men may read the Scriptures at home, as well as at the Publick Aſſemblies: yet as there are a great number of Men who cannot read at all, and others who have no leiſure for it, though they could, by means whereof they muſt have been ignorant of the Scripture, unleſs God had provided for them by the Publick Reading of it; ſo it is apparent, that they who both can read, and have leiſure for it, are too apt to omit it, and conſequently, were it not for the Publick Reading of it, would have had no farther knowledge of it, than they ſhould have receiv'd from the Diſcourſes of their Inſtructers: By which means they might not onely have ſuck'd in their Infirmities together with it, but ſometimes alſo their Errours and Extravagancies. Again, If the Scriptures had been confin'd to Cloſets, and no more of them produc'd in Publick, than what might ſerve either for the Subject or ſtrengthning of a Sermon, it had been no hard matter (eſpecially before *Printing* came in uſe) to have corrupted the Scriptures, without remedy as to the Common ſort, and made them ſpeak, not what they ought, but what every perfidious Heretick would have had them: for ſo thoſe that are unlearned would have had no means to inform themſelves, whether that which was ſuggeſted to them as Scripture, were genuine or no. But when the Scriptures were not onely in the hands of Private Perſons, but preſerv'd in Churches, and, which is more, publickly read in them; as there was not the like encouragement to evil Men to corrupt private Copies, as knowing that their Corruptions might be detected by thoſe Books, which were in the cuſtody of,

and publickly read by the Church; ſo, if they had been ſo bold, what was read in the Aſſemblies would have help'd Men to have diſcover'd the Fraud, and preſerv'd them from the Attaque of it. This onely would be added, That though there be not the like danger ſince *Printing* came in uſe, and Men were appointed by Authority to preſide over it; yet there would be danger enough, if the ſame Cuſtom were not continued, of Reading the Scriptures in the Aſſemblies. For, as corrupt Copies may come abroad, notwithſtanding all the diligence of thoſe who have the Charge of the Preſs; ſo, if they ſhould, the Common ſort of Men would have nothing left to fence themſelves againſt them, if the Reading of the Scriptures were baniſh'd out of the Aſſemblies. Add hereunto, which, though but an Argument *ad hominem*, may perhaps prove more prevalent, than thoſe that ſpeak to the Thing it ſelf; and that is, the abhorrency that even they who would not have the Scriptures publickly read, profeſs to have for the *Papiſts* robbing the People of it: For, what do they leſs, who would have them baniſh'd from the Publick Aſſemblies, where alone the Ignorant ſort are in a capacity of receiving them? So ſlight, or rather ſo dangerous, are the Pretenſions of thoſe, who would have the Reading of the Scriptures appropriated to Mens Cloſets: How much more then, the rejecting of the Reading of them, as if, when onely read, they were not able to convert a Soul unto God? For as whatſoever force there is in Sermons, is for the ſubſtance of them deriv'd from the Scriptures, and therefore the Power of converting Souls to lie chiefly there; ſo, if thoſe Scriptures have not loſt their *credit*, as well as their *converting* Faculty, the bare Reading of them, through God's Bleſſing, may be a means to convert Souls unto God. Otherwiſe, why ſhould God, as he did, command the Reading of the Law, *that the children of Iſrael might hear and learn, and fear the Lord their God, and obſerve to do all the words of this Law? Deut.* 32. 11, 12. or St. *John* affirm of his Goſpel, that it was *written that we might believe, and that believing we might have Life through his Name?* For, if it was written that Men might believe, there is no doubt it is able to effect it when read, becauſe that is enough to let Men into the Senſe of it. And indeed, as, if Sermons prove more effectual, it is oftentimes becauſe they are more attended to, their novelty and ſpruceneſs engaging our attention, whilſt the plainneſs of the other makes it leſs regarded; ſo, if they have any advantage in themſelves, it is not ſo much for the Arguments they alledge, which are the ſame in both, but by the order wherein they are diſpos'd, and the manner of application.

Having thus ſhewn the Reading of the Scriptures to be one part of the Publick Service, and thereby aſſerted it from that Contempt into which it is now fallen; I proceed to inquire, Whether, as in the Service of the *Jewiſh* Sabbath, ſo alſo in the *Chriſtian*, the Explication of the Scriptures is to have a part. Now that ſo it is, will appear if we look into the Service of the Church, as it was in the firſt Inſtitution of it. And here, not to tell you, that the firſt Account we have of the Publick Service, preſents us with the mention of *the Apoſtles Doctrine*, I ſhall begin my Proofs with that of *Acts* 20. 7. becauſe ſpeaking of the Firſt day of the Week, or *Sunday*: For there we are told, That, among other the Exerciſes of that Day,

Day, the Diſciples had a Sermon from that excellent Preacher St. *Paul.* All the difficulty is, what kind of Sermon that was, and whether it were not made rather in regard to his being to depart the next day, than out of a belief of its being a Requiſite of that Days Service. But as the former will be eaſily voided, if we conſider what he elſewhere * affirms of his Preaching, That *he ſaid no other things than the Prophets and Moſes did ſay ſhould come*; thereby making his Sermons but an Explication and Confirmation of the Prophets: ſo, that it was in regard to the Day that he ſo preach'd, as well as to his being to depart the next, the mention of *the Apoſtles Doctrine* before, among the Parts of their Publick Worſhip, as well as the ſubſequent Practice of the Church, ſhews. If, as that Text manifeſtly implies, his purpoſe of going away the next day had any influence upon it, it was not ſo much for the producing of it at all, as for his drawing it out to that length to which it was; and would therefore more agreeably to the Senſe, and no way diſſonant to the Stile of the New Teſtament, where ſuch like *Trajections* || are us'd, be rendred, *That on the foremention'd day St. Paul preach'd unto them; and, becauſe he was to depart the next, continued his Speech until midnight.* From the Apoſtles Days, paſs we to the ſubſequent Age, where again we ſhall have a pregnant Proof, from *Juſtin Martyr* *, who continuing his Account of the *Sunday*-Service, adds, That *after the Reader had done, the Preſident or Biſhop, in a ſet Diſcourſe, made an Admonition and Exhortation, to the imitation of thoſe excellent things they had before read*; agreeably to the Cuſtoms of thoſe Times, as Mr. *Thorndike* || hath obſerv'd, where the Sermon or Diſcourſe was not, as now, upon any Subject indifferently, but to the Explication and Application of that which was read in the Aſſembly. From the Teſtimony of *Juſtin Martyr*, paſs we to that of *Tertullian* †, where we ſhall find a Proof of the ſame uſance: For after he had given an Account of their coming together to reherſe the Scriptures, he adds, which, to my ſeeming, plainly referrs to their Sermons, *However, we fail not with holy Speeches to feed Mens Faith, erect their Hope, fix their Confidence; neither forget we in the mean time to thicken the Diſcipline with the frequent inculcation of Precepts*: This thickning of the Diſcipline with the inculcation of Precepts, being more proper to Sermons, where there is liberty to heap up many to the ſame purpoſe, than to the Reading of the Scriptures, which paſs from one thing to another. However it be, as it there follows, that *there alſo are* * *Exhortations, Caſtigations, and a Divine Cenſure*; ſo, in the Place before-quoted out of his Book *de Animâ*, among the *Solennia Dominica* as he there calls them, he reckons *Adlocutiones*, or Speeches, as diſtinct from the Reading of the Scriptures. And indeed, though the Word barely read might ſuffice to Edification, if it were but attended to as it ought; yet foraſmuch as ſome Men are dull of hearing, or rather of underſtanding, and a greater number are backward to make application of it to themſelves, hence it comes to paſs, that, to make them the more prevalent, it is at leaſt very behoveful, that they to whom the Office of Preaching is committed,

* *Acts* 26. 22.

|| *Vid. Knatchbull, Animadv. in Nov. Teſt. ſpeciatim in Annot. ad Act.* 13. 27.

* *Ibid.* Εἶτα παυσαμένου τοῦ ἀναγινώσκοντος, περαιτέρω διὰ λόγου τοῦ τοιούτου ἡ πρόκλησις καὶ ἡ τῶν καλῶν τούτων μιμήσεως ποιεῖται.

|| Religious Aſſembl. *ch.* 6.

† Apol. c. 39. *Certe fidem ſanctis vocibus paſcimus, ſpem erigimus, fiduciam figimus, diſciplinam præceptorum nihilominus inculcationibus denſamus.*

* *Ibidem etiam exhortationes, caſtigationes, & cenſura divina.*

committed, not onely open their Understandings in them, but bring such things especially to their remembrance, as it most concerns them to consider; thickning them moreover (as *Tertullian* speaks) by the frequent inculcation of those several Precepts which lie dispersed in the Scriptures. But other advantage than this, as Sermons have not above the Word read, so to give them any other, were to set up the Compositions of Men (for such all Sermons are) above the pure Dictates of God's Spirit.

From the Word Read or Preach'd, pass we to *Prayer*, an Office of the *Jewish* Sabbath, and no less undoubtedly of the *Christian*: For, as in the place before-quoted out of the *Acts* *, it is expressly reckon'd as a Part of the Publick Worship; as, before that, by our Saviour ||, for one of those things in the performance whereof he would be present to them when they met; so, that it was one main Business of the Lord's-day Service, those very Ancient Authors before-quoted, largely shew: *Justin Martyr* * after the ending of the Sermon, mentioning *their all rising up to Prayer, and praying not onely for themselves, but for all the World; of Prayer again, at the Consecration of the Eucharist, which he moreover affirms the President or Bishop to pour forth with all his might.* In like manner *Tertullian* || not onely affirms the *Christians to come together to God, as it were to make up a Party, by which to besiege him with their Prayers*; adding moreover, *that therein they recommended also the state of Emperours, and their Ministers*: but in the place so often quoted out of his Book *de Animâ*, makes mention of the preferring of Prayers, as one of the Lord's-day Solemnities. Which Testimonies I do the rather inculcate, because though Publick Prayer be one of the Chief, and always so accounted, yet it is now neglected and contemn'd; upon how small a pretence, we may easily judge, by what we often hear from some, That they can make the same, or as good Prayers at home: For though they could, yet not with the same advantage, either to themselves, or others, because wanting the concurrence of the Devotion of other Men, which is that that makes Prayer so acceptable. And I cannot but upon this occasion call to mind a Saying of *Maimonides*, remembred out of him by * a Learned Man of our own Nation, to wit, That *he that dwelleth in the City where there is a Synagogue, and prayeth not there with the Congregation, this is he that is call'd a Bad Neighbour.* For, as he may well be call'd *a Bad Neighbour* (as the same Learned Man goes on) that will not lend his Neighbours Prayers the strength of his own; so he himself findeth the Fruit of his own bad Neighbourhood, when his own Prayers want the assistance of his Neighbours.

Next to Prayer, subjoyn we the Duty of *Praising* God, whether in or out of a Song: For that this was a part of the Publick Service at the Assemblies, and consequently of the Lord's-day, which was appointed for the holding of them, the Scriptures do abundantly declare. For beside that St. *Paul* calls upon the *Colossians*, that they should *teach and admonish one another in Psalms, and Hymns, and spiritual*

* *Act.* 2. 42.

|| *Mat.* 18. 19, 20.

* *Apol.* 2. Ἔπειτα ἀνιστάμεθα κοινῇ πάντες καὶ εὐχὰς πέμπομεν, i. e. ut ante explicat, ὑπέρ τε ἑαυτῶν καὶ τοῦ φωτισθέντος, καὶ ἄλλων παντάχου πάντων ἐντόνως ὅπως καταξιωθῶμεν τὰ ἀληθῆ μαθόντες, καὶ δι' ἔργων ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται εἶναι, καὶ φύλακες τῶν ἐντεταλμένων εὑρεθῆναι, ὅπως τὴν αἰώνιον σωτηρίαν σωθῶμεν.—καὶ ὡς παρέφημεν, παυσαμένων ἡμῶν τῆς εὐχῆς, ἄρτος προσφέρεται καὶ οἶνος καὶ ὕδωρ· καὶ ὁ πρωτὼς εὐχὰς ὁμοίως, καὶ εὐχαριστίας ὅση δύναμις αὐτῷ ἀναπέμπει.

|| *Coimus ad deum, quasi manu facta precationibus ambiamus. Hæc vis Deo grata est. Oramus etiam pro Imperatoribus, pro ministris eorum ac potestatibus, pro statu seculi, pro rerum quiete, pro mora finis.*

* *Thorndike* Rel. Assembl. *chap.* 6.

spiritual

ſpiritual Songs, *Col.* 3. 16. it is evident from ſeverall Paſſages in 1 *Corinth.* 14. that it was a great part of their Publick Service. Thus when the Apoſtle, *verſ.* 15. and ſo on, ſays, *I will ſing with the ſpirit, and I will ſing with the underſtanding alſo. Elſe when thou ſhalt bleſs with the ſpirit, how ſhall he that occupieth the room of the unlearned ſay Amen at thy giving of thanks?* he plainly ſuppoſeth, (becauſe ſpeaking all along of their Aſſemblies) that the Bleſſing and Praiſing God in a Song, was a part of the Publick Service at them. In like manner, when he ſaith, *verſ.* 26. *How is it then, Brethren? when ye come together, every one hath a Pſalm, a Doctrine, and a Tongue, &c. Let all things be done to edifying*; though he finds fault with the diſorderly performance of thoſe ſeveral Duties, yet he ſuppoſeth them to be Duties, becauſe preſcribing Rules for the right ordering of them. From the Times of the Apoſtles, paſs we to thoſe that immediately ſucceeded, where we ſhall find yet more expreſs Teſtimonies of this being a part of their Lord's-day Service. For thus *Pliny* *, giving an Account of what the *Chriſtians* did upon the Set-day of their Aſſemblies, which, as was before ſhewn, could be no other than the Lord's-day, tells us, from the mouth of ſome of themſelves, *That it was, among other things, to ſay one with another, by turns, a Song or Hymn to Chriſt, as unto God*; thereby not onely ſhewing that to have been a part of their Publick Service, but, as a Learned † Man hath well obſerv'd, confirming that way of alternate Singing, which is ſtill in uſe in the Church of *England*. Neither is *Pliny* alone in this Teſtimony, either as to the Singing of Hymns upon that Day, or Singing Hymns unto *Chriſt*, as God: For, as *Tertullian* expreſly reckons the Singing of Pſalms among the Lord's-day Solemnities, ſo *Euſebius* || alledges againſt thoſe who deny'd the Divinity of our Saviour, *certain Pſalms and Songs, written anciently by the Brethren, wherein they magnified Chriſt as God.* It is true indeed, he ſaith not in that place, that they were ſung in the Church, which may ſeem to render that Teſtimony ſo much the more defective: But as it is evident from *Tertullian* *, that *Men were invited to ſing in their Aſſemblies, as well their own Compoſitions, as thoſe of Scripture*; ſo *Euſebius* elſewhere || gives us plainly to underſtand, that the Pſalms before ſpoken of were ſung in their Aſſemblies: He there charging *Paulus Samoſatenus with cauſing them to ceaſe, and Songs in honour of himſelf to be ſung in the Church.* For how could *Paulus Samoſatenus* cauſe thoſe Songs to ceaſe, unleſs they had been publickly ſung? or, what likelihood is there, if they had not been ſo, that he would have introduc'd Songs concerning himſelf? I will conclude this Particular with that famous Canon of the Council of *Laodicea* *, where the Canonical Books of Scripture are enumerated: For, forbidding, as it doth, *the uſe of ſuch private Pſalms in the Church*, it ſhews them to have been before in uſe; and much more, that the Singing unto God was.

But of all the Religious Exerciſes wherewith the *Chriſtian* Sabbath

* Lib. 10. Ep. 97. *Adfirmabant autem hanc fuiſſe ſummam vel culpæ ſuæ vel erroris quòd eſſent ſoliti ſtato die ante lucem convenire, carmenque Chriſto quaſi Deo dicere ſecum invicem.*

† Ham. Præf. to Annot. on the Pſalms.

|| *Eccl. Hiſt. lib.* 5. *c.* 28. Ψαλμοὶ μὲν ὅσοι καὶ ᾠδαὶ ἀδελφῶν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πιστῶν γεγραφῶσαι, τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν Χριστὸν ὑμνοῦσι θεολογοῦντες.

* Apol. c. 39. *Poſt aquam manualem & lumina, ut quiſque de Scripturis ſanctis, vel de proprio ingenio, poteſt, provocatur in medium deo canere.*

|| *Eccl. Hiſt. lib.* 7. *c.* 30. Ψαλμοὺς μὲν γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἰς τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν χριστὸν ᾠδὰς, ὡς ἐκ νεωτέρας καὶ νεωτέρων ἀνδρῶν συγγεγραμμένα εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐν μέσῃ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῇ μεγάλῃ τῇ πάσχα ἡμέρᾳ ψαλμῳδεῖν γυναῖκας παρεσκεύαζον.

* *Can. ult.* Ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἰδιωτικοὺς ψαλμοὺς λέγεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, &c.

bath was to be celebrated, there is certainly none which hath more to be ſaid for it, than the *Adminiſtration of the Lord's Supper*, that real Thankſgiving and Praiſe of the Almighty, for the Bleſſings of the Creation, but more particularly for the Death of our Saviour. For, as we find it to have been the Attendant of the Publick Aſſemblies of the *Chriſtians*, both in the *Acts*, and in the Firſt Epiſtle to the *Corinthians*; ſo, to be ſo much a part of the Lord's-days Buſineſs, as to be ſet to denote the whole: St. *Luke*, *Acts* 20. 7. making the end of the Diſciples meeting together upon the Firſt day of the Week, to be *to break Bread*, that is to ſay, as the *Syriack* interprets it, *the Bread of the Euchariſt*. Agreeable hereto is that of *Pliny**, in the Teſtimony ſo often produc'd, he there telling us, That upon the Set-day ſpoken of before, *they oblig'd themſelves by a Sacrament, not to any wickedneſs, but that they would not commit Thefts, Robberies, Adulteries, &c.* Which (as hath been before ſhewn) cannot be underſtood of any other than the Sacrament of the *Euchariſt*, which we know to be an Obligation to that purpoſe. And though it be true, that *Tertullian* makes no mention of it in his *Apologetick*, probably becauſe it was not his purpoſe to make known the manner of it to the *Heathen*, leſt the miſunderſtanding of it ſhould bring it into contempt; yet, as in his Book *de Coronâ militis* ||, he mentions it *as a part of the Buſineſs of thoſe Aſſemblies before day*, whereof we have mention in *Pliny*; ſo *Juſtin Martyr* † not onely mentions it as a part of the Lord's-day Service, but deſcribes the Manner of the Celebration of it. From all which put together, it is evident, I do not ſay, how much we have departed from the Devotion of the Apoſtles Times, and thoſe that ſucceeded; but even from the due Obſervation of that Day which we pretend to keep as Holy unto the Lord.

* Ibid. *Seque ſacramento non in ſcelus aliquod obſtringere, ſed ne furta, ne latrocinia, ne adulteria committerent, ne fidem fallerent, ne depoſitum appellati negarent.*

|| Cap. 3. *Euchariſtiæ Sacramentum, & in tempore victus & omnibus mandatum à Domino, etiam antelucanis cœtibus, nec de aliorum manu, quàm præſidentium ſumimus.*

† *Vid. Apol.* 2. *loco prius citato.*

PART

PART V.

An Hiſtory of the due Obſervation of the Lord's-day, both in Private and Publick: Where, among other things, is ſhewn the Excellency of our Churches Service, and with what Affections it ought to be intended; the unſuitableneſs of Faſting to ſo joyful a Solemnity, and the great inconvenience that muſt neceſſarily enſue from the not relaxing of our Intentions: In fine, The both neceſſity and benefit of Meditating upon what we have heard, and applying it to our own Souls. That the Viſiting and Comforting of the Sick and Diſtreſſed, the Reconciling of Parties that are at variance, and the begetting or maintaining Friendſhip, by kind and neighbourly Entertainments, are no improper Offices of the Day.

2. BY what Publick Exerciſes of Religion the *Chriſtian* Sabbath is to be celebrated, hath been at large declar'd, both from the Precepts and Practice of the Apoſtles: It remains, that we inquire how it is to be *ſanctified in Private*, which is a Duty no leſs incumbent upon us, than the former. For the multitude of our Affairs not permitting us on other Days to intend the Matters of Religion with that freedom and ſolemnity which becomes them, there ariſeth a neceſſity, when we have both leiſure, and ſo fair an Invitation to it, to apply our ſelves to the performance of it, and ſupply thoſe Defects which the Neceſſities of the World have made. Taking it therefore for granted, that ſuch a Sanctification is requir'd, I will make it my buſineſs to inquire wherein it doth conſiſt, and what particular Duties it exacts. Onely becauſe I have not told you how we are to intend the Publick Exerciſes of Religion, I will mix that with the Conſideration of the other, and ſo give you *a kind of Hiſtory* of the due Obſervation of the Day.

The Lord's-day ſaluting our *Horizon*, and admoniſhing us both of the Bleſſings and Duties which it brings; it is but reaſonable, where the Labours of the foregoing Day have not made it neceſſary to do otherwiſe, that we ſhould be *up betimes* to meet them, and pay them that Regard which they deſerve; as remembring, that the *Chriſtian* Sabbath is rather a Day of Buſineſs, than of Reſt, though of an eaſie and a gracious one. Now the firſt Buſineſs that preſents it ſelf on that Sacred Day, is the offering up our Sacrifice of Praiſe for the Reſurrection of our Lord, and the Opportunity we our ſelves have to celebrate it. And herein it becomes us to be ſo much the more hearty, becauſe it is the Ground of its Inſtitution, and that which gives it both its Being, and its Name. Next to the Sacrifice of Praiſe, ſubjoyn we that of Prayer for the Aſſiſtance of God in the due Celebration of it; not onely our own unaptneſs ſo requiring, but the importance of the Buſineſs we are to intend, and particularly of the Publick one. For now we are not, as upon other Days, barely to worſhip God, but to do it with a more than ordinary fervour, as being thereby to ſupply the Defects of our paſt Piety, and lay a firm foundation of our future one. The Sacrifice of Prayer and Praiſe being thus offer'd

fer'd up to God, and thereby an entrance made into the Sanctification of the Day, there is then place for those Businesses which our own Necessities or Conveniences invite to the performance of; but so, as that we remember we have a weightier Business to intend, and particularly our looking back into our past Impieties: For inasmuch as we are assur'd that *God heareth not sinners*, such I mean who continue in them without remorse, we are in reason, before we address our selves to the Duty of Publick Prayer, *to break off our sins by repentance*, and, like the Prophet *Moses*, *to put off our shoes before we tread upon holy ground*. Not that it were not convenient that this should be done at other times, and we to inquire every Night (as *Pythagoras* his Scholars were oblig'd) πῆ παρέβην; τίδ' ἔρεξα; τί μοι δέον οὐκ ἐτελέσθη; *Wherein have I offended? what good have I done, and what omitted?* and accordingly, as that Philosopher * adviseth, *either to afflict, or chear our selves*: But that, howsoever it should, either through the necessity of our Affairs, or inadvertency, be omitted at other times, we should not fail to do it then, when we are to address our selves to Publick Prayer, by which, if by any thing, we must hope to obtain God's Favour.

* Ἀρξάμενος δ' ἀπὸ πρώτου ἐπέξιθι· καὶ μετέπειτα δεινὰ μὲν εὐπρήξας ὀπιπλήσσου, χρηστὰ δ' ἔρπου. *Vid. Pythag.* χρυσᾶ ἔπη.

Imagine now the Bell calling you to the Publick Assemblies; or rather, because both the *Jewish* Sabbath and ours was instituted for the holding of them, that you hear God himself doing it: In answer to which Call, you are to bring *both your selves and your Dependents*, and that too *at the Beginning of God's Publick Worship*. The former, because though other Persons may sanctifie the Sabbath by their own single Piety; yet they who have Children and Servants, are to see to the Observation of it in them, as being under their direction and command: Though, were they not so oblig'd, the Advantage that might arise from the doing of it, might be a sufficient inducement to endeavour it; that which made *Abraham* so great a Confident of God, being, that *God knew he would command his children, and his houshold after him, to keep the way of the Lord*, as you may see *Gen.* 18. 19. But neither is there less reason that *the Beginning of God's Service* should have both their Company and ours, than there is that it should have it at all; an imperfect Service arguing a slight esteem of him, and that we are no farther his Servants than we our selves please: And it calls to my mind that Expostulation of God in *Malachi*, chap. 1. 8. *And if ye offer the blind for sacrifice, is it not evil? and if ye offer the lame and sick, is it not evil? Offer it now unto thy Governour: Will he be pleas'd with thee, or accept thy person, saith the Lord of hosts?* For what is that, but a *blind* and a *lame* Service, where it may be the best part of it is wanting? or how can we think God will be pleas'd with that which an Earthly Prince would disdain to accept? We may suppose, by this time, the Man who desires to sanctifie the Lord's-day aright, entred the Church; where having prostrated himself before the Divine Majesty, and implor'd his Blessing upon his Endeavours, he will need little other direction than to mind that which he comes about, and not either drowsily or irreverently to perform it: Onely, that I may set the better edge upon his Devotions, I will apply my Instructions to some of those particular Duties which the Day, and the Order of our

Service

Service doth require. With admirable reaſon doth our Church, and almoſt *all the Reformed ones, begin their Service with *Confeſſion* of Sins, as knowing how likely they are, whilſt thus bewail'd, to ſeparate between us and God: And there is the ſame reaſon we ſhould bring to the Rehearſing of it, that due Remorſe and Sorrow which the conſideration of our ſeveral Offences call for; otherwiſe we rather dare God to avenge himſelf upon us, than take the way to appeaſe or pleaſe him. But when we, who are vile enough in the eyes of God, make our ſelves ſuch both in our own eſteem and expreſſion; when we frankly lay open the Errors we have committed, and acknowledge them to be ſuch, by our inward Contrition, and outward Sorrow; then our Confeſſion is no leſs ſure to be follow'd by the *Abſolution* of God, than it is by that of the Prieſt; or rather, that God will confirm that which the Prieſt pronounceth: it being not certainly for nothing, that our Saviour hath ſaid, *Whoſeſoever ſins ye remit, they are remitted; and whoſeſoever ſins ye retain, they are retained.* From the Confeſſion and Abſolution, paſs we to the *Lord's Prayer*, according as our Liturgy doth; in the Repetition whereof, there is but reaſon we ſhould rally together all the Forces of our Soul, and intend it with all our Heart and Strength; I ſay, not onely in reſpect of its Author (though that certainly ſhould procure its Regard) but in reſpect of its ſignal Uſe and Advantage. For whereas in our other Prayers we may ask amiſs, whether in reſpect of the Things themſelves, or the Order of our Petitions; here we are ſure not to offend, becauſe the Prayer we ſo utter contains all that is to be deſired, and in that manner and order wherein it ought. Again, whereas in the long continuance of our Devotions, our Thoughts may be apt to flag, or wander from that Subject which they have before them, we have an opporunity to make ſome amends for it, by intending this excellent Prayer, wherein all thoſe Petitions are ſumm'd up. The Mind being thus prepar'd by Confeſſion of Sin, and the Devotion which the forementioned Prayer ſuggeſts, it may not be unſuitable for us to ſound forth the Praiſes of God, which is the next thing the *Liturgie* ſuggeſts. For though the *Pſalms* which it makes uſe of for this purpoſe, are generally read, and therefore look'd upon by ſome as onely matter of Inſtruction: yet as care hath been taken that they ſhould be ſung where they may be, which ſhews for what uſe they were deſign'd; ſo it is apparent from the *Pſalms* themſelves, that they were intended not ſo much to inſtruct us, as to be Inſtruments in praiſing God for the ſeveral Bleſſings they commemorate. And indeed, as its Strains are all admirable, and worthy that Spirit by which they were firſt ſuggeſted; ſo they are fraught with ſuch variety of Matter, that there is no State or Condition of Life which may not find ſomewhat in them ſuitable to it. If we lie under the Conſcience of Sin, the 51 *Pſalm* will fit us, as containing both an ingenuous Acknowledgment of it, and an earneſt Prayer for the Pardon of it. If we find in our ſelves that Pardon, the 32. will be a fit matter for our Devotion, becauſe compos'd by *David* after an Abſolution from his. If we lie under any Sorrow, by reaſon of the Proſperity of the Ungodly, we have the 72 *Pſalm* to entertain us, the Subject whereof is no other than to ſhew both the certainty and ſuddenneſs of their downfal. If we have receiv'd any

* *Thorndike* Rel. Aſſembl. *ch.* 10.

great Deliverance from them, the Eighteenth will furniſh us with Words to expreſs our Reſentment of it, as being *David*'s Triumphant Song, when God had given him reſt from his. In fine, whatever it be, here our Condition may be fitted, from the ſoreſt Evils we lie under, to the greateſt Bleſſings we are in a capacity to enjoy. Neither will it ſuffice to ſay, That each particular *Pſalm* cannot fit all the Conditions before remembred: For, as it is not to be expected that they ſhould, ſo an Advantage may be made of them, even by thoſe States and Conditions with which they ſeem but ill to accord. Thus, for example, if the *Pſalm* be a *Pſalm* of Joy and Thankſgiving, and it may be too for thoſe very Mercies under the want whereof thou now laboureſt; yet being agreeable enough to the Condition of other Men, thy Charity will teach thee how to make uſe of it, by prompting thee to rejoyce with thoſe to whom it is more accommodable. In like manner, though the *Pſalm* ſhould ſpend it ſelf in Complaints, which thou, through the Mercy of God, findeſt little cauſe for; yet ſo long as there want not ſuch to whoſe Condition they are agreeable enough, there is place for the ſame Charity, and an Invitation to mourn with and for them. Which Anſwer is of ſo much the more force, becauſe we are not now entreating of Private Worſhip, which, as much as may be, ought to be adapted to our own particular Concerns; but of the Publick Worſhip of God, which is to extend it ſelf to the Concernments of all. As little ground of Exception is there againſt the uſe of the *Magnificat*, becauſe in the ſtrictneſs thereof proper to her that made it: For, beſide that the Repetition of it is one of the moſt ſignal Completions of all Generations calling her Bleſſed, according as ſhe there foretold, each of us hath ſo much Intereſt in the Birth of our Saviour, eſpecially if he be alſo born in us, that it can be no way improper to ſay, *My ſoul doth magnifie the Lord, and my ſpirit hath rejoyced in God my Saviour.* If there be any thing in that, or other the like *Pſalms*, peculiar to the Makers of them, it will be no hard matter for a diligent Obſerver ſo to accommodate them to himſelf, as to make them fit his Mouth, provided he take care to ſuit his Heart to them, and to that Heavenly Spirit wherewith they were fram'd. Sure I am, what is now thought an Objection againſt them, was not thought ſo by St. *James*, or St. *Paul*; the former whereof invites to the Private Singing, the latter to the Teaching and Admoniſhing one another, in Pſalms, and Hymns, and ſpiritual Songs: For what other Pſalms can we think intended, than thoſe of *David*, which before and ſince that time have in a manner appropriated that Title unto themſelves? I will conclude this Particular with that *Doxologie* wherewith they are clos'd, of giving Glory to each Perſon in the Trinity: For whilſt we thus direct them to the Son, and to the Holy Ghoſt, as well as to the Father, we fit them yet more to our Mouths, becauſe making them to proclaim the Honour of our Saviour, and of that Spirit which he hath pour'd out upon his Church. Such are our Concernments in the Duties before remembred; and not unlike are thoſe, in the Duties that remain: and therefore, in ſtead of proſecuting them any further, I ſhall ſubjoyn this general Advertiſement, which each one may make uſe of as occaſion requires; to wit, That as the Remainder of our Service doth ordinarily conſiſt in *Reading, or Preaching the Word,*

in

in Confeſſion of Faith, and *in Prayer*; ſo Men will ſatisfie the firſt by a diligent and affectionate Intention; the ſecond, by a Reſolution to adhere to that Faith which they profeſs; and the third and laſt, by a hearty and fervent Devotion.

The Morning-Sacrifice being thus offer'd up to God, Cuſtom, and our own Neceſſities licence us to retire to our own Homes, there to give our ſelves that Repaſt, and other Relaxation, that is due. Which Particulars I the rather alledge, to confront the Practice of ſome Men, whom Superſtition, more than any well-guided Zeal, hath influenc'd. For is it any other, *to turn a Feſtival into a Faſt*, and keep that Day as a Day of Humiliation, which was the happy Parent of the greateſt Joy? Nay, is it not in ſome meaſure an Affront to that Bleſſed Work, by which it became ſeparate from others? For, if that were a matter of rejoycing, why ſhould we make it a matter of Sorrow? and when God calls ſo loudly to Joy and Gladneſs, preſent him with all the Expreſſions of Grief? And it calls to my mind that known Paſſage of the Book of *Nehemiah*, where the People of *Iſrael* wept ſore at the hearing of the Law: for, in ſtead of encouraging them in it, *Ezra*, who read the Law, bad them *go their way, eat the fat, and drink the ſweet, and ſend portions to them for whom nothing was prepar'd, becauſe that day was holy to the Lord*, *Nehem.* 8. 9. plainly intimating, that ſuch a Return was no way becoming a Day of Gladneſs; and if ſo, neither a *Chriſtian* one. Sure I am, as the Ancient Church * *religiouſly abſtain'd from faſting* on the Lord's-day, as no way ſuitable to the Buſineſs of it; ſo the Apoſtles, and the Church in their time, not onely held their Lord's-Supper on it, but thoſe Feaſts of Charity alſo which were the Attendants of it. But neither is it leſs unreaſonable, if Men would conſider it without prejudice, to enjoyn Men ſo to keep up their Intention of Sacred Things, as not to allow a Relaxation of it at their Meals. For, as it is abſolutely impoſſible, ſo long as we carry about us the Infirmities of Humane Nature, to have our Thoughts always fix'd upon Heaven, and Heavenly Things; ſo, by impoſing it either upon our ſelves, or others, we make our ſelves the more unapt for the Publick Worſhip of God, when we are call'd to the Celebration of it: our preceding Intention taking off from that Vigour and Spritelineſs which is requiſite to the performance of it. On the contrary, if we would but for ſome time unbend our Cares, or divert them to leſs ſerious purpoſes, like thoſe who run back to make the more advantageous Leap, we ſhould come on with the greater vigour, and not onely not diſhonour this Sacred Day, but ſanctifie it the more.

* Tertull. de Coronâ. *Die Dominico jejunium nefas ducimus, vel de geniculis adorare.*

Having thus given our ſelves ſome reſpite from Religious Exerciſes, and thereby fitted our ſelves for the more advantageous performance of it, it will be time for us both to look back to the Duties we have paſs'd, and forward to the Duties that remain: the former, that if any thing have been amiſs in them, we may retract and bewail it; the latter, that we may come prepar'd to the due performance of them. But of all the Duties that are to take up our Thoughts, between the Morning and the Evening Sacrifice, there is none which is more incumbent on us, than a ſerious Reflexion upon thoſe we have receiv'd from the Mouth of our Inſtructer: For, as otherwiſe they will be apt to ſlip out of our Minds, and thereby deprive us of thoſe Advanta-

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ges which might otherwiſe accrue, ſo, unleſs we meditate upon them, like Meat unchew'd, they will contribute little to our Nouriſhment, in thoſe Spiritual Graces wherein we are to grow. From a Reflexion upon what is paſt, paſs we to a Conſideration of that which is to come, even thoſe ſeveral Publick Duties we are again to paſs: Where, ſetting aſide all other Thoughts, we ſhould endeavour to imprint in our Minds how much it concerns us to intend them: For, as by ſo doing we ſhould be the more excited to implore the Divine Aſſiſtance, without which it is impoſſible to be done, ſo we ſhould be much more apt to pay them that Regard which the Importance thereof doth require: It being no ſlight Conſideration, where it is well inculcated, that our Eternal Welfare doth depend upon it, and that, as we obſerve this Temporal Sabbath, we may either attain, or come ſhort of that Eternal Sabbath in the Heavens. For, as there is no doubt our Eternal Welfare depends upon the performance of Religious Actions, and particularly of thoſe wherein the Honour of God is immediately concern'd; ſo there will be little likelihood of our intending them at other times, if we ſlight them over then, when we have both leiſure, and all other requiſite means, to help us in the performance of them. By theſe, and ſuch like Conſiderations, if we arm our ſelves, we ſhall be in a good diſpoſition to offer up the *Evening-Sacrifice*; which ſuppos'd, we ſhall neither need any Incitement to the performance of it, nor Direction after what manner we are to doit; it being not hard, eſpecially after what was ſaid concerning the *Morning-Service*, to read our own Qualifications in thoſe Duties which we are ſummoned to perform.

Suppoſe we now, having laid down Rules for the Obſervation of it ſo far, that the Religious Man hath aſſiſted at the *Evening Sacrifice*, and thereby acquitted himſelf of the Publick Duties of the Day; yet, even ſo, there will not want wherewith to exerciſe himſelf, till he commit himſelf to his Reſt, and unto God. Not but that there is place for neceſſary Occaſions, and a moderate Relaxation of himſelf; but that his Heart ought to be in a diſpoſition to embrace all Occaſions to do Honour to God, and to the Day. Among which, I reckon chiefly the Meditating upon what he hath heard, and Applying it to his own Soul; it being for want of this, that ſo many Souls periſh, which might otherwiſe have prov'd glorified ones. They hear indeed what they ought, and what they ought not to do; they liſten to the Judgments which God denounceth againſt the one, to the Promiſes whereby he encourageth the performance of the other: but taking no care afterwards to conſider how far they are concern'd in either, both the one and the other quickly vaniſh, and they go on as ſecurely, as if they had nothing to fault in themſelves, or there were no other World to puniſh them, though they had. But not any longer to entertain the Mind of the Religious Man with ſuch Things wherein God's Glory is immediately concern'd, let us ſee whether he may not find Matter enough for his Lord's-day Service *in viſiting the fatherleſs and widows in their affliction*, in which St. *James* makes *Religion* in part to conſiſt: For though it be true, that thoſe are no part of the Worſhip of God or *Chriſt*, for which eſpecially this Day is ſet apart; yet they draw ſo near towards it, that they may not onely be thought to be a part of the Buſineſs of it, but a conſiderable one; our Saviour having told

told us, that what is done unto the Sick and the Diſtreſſed, he takes as done unto himſelf. And accordingly, as *Juſtin Martyr* * tells us, that Charity had a conſtant place even in their Publick Aſſemblies upon it, *the Rich, according as they ſaw good, contributing to that Stock out of which the Poor and the Neceſſitous were to be reliev'd*; ſo, that that and other ſuch like Works were no way improper to the Day, St. *Paul* ſhews, where he commands the *Corinthians*, as he had before the Churches of *Galatia*, *to lay by them on that day, as God had proſper'd them, toward the relief of the poor Saints at Jeruſalem.* The ſame is to be ſaid of *reconciling Parties at variance*, of *endeavouring to beget or maintain Friendſhip*, as *by other ways*, ſo *by a kind and neighbourly treating of each other*; witneſs thoſe Feaſts of Charity of which St. *Jude* ſpeaks, which were anciently an Appendix of the Lord's Supper, as that was of this Sacred Day. Care onely would be taken, that whilſt theſe have their due Regard, we forget not thoſe higher Purpoſes for which the Day was ſet apart; ſuch as are the Reading of the Scriptures, and other ſuch Books of Inſtruction and Devotion; our inſtilling into thoſe who are under our reſpective Charges, the Precepts of a Holy Life; and, in fine, the Commending both of our ſelves and them, by Prayer, to the Protection of that God to whoſe Service this Day was ſet apart.

* *Apol.* 2. *p.* 98. Οἱ εὐποροῦντες δὲ, καὶ βουλόμενοι κατ' προαίρεσιν ἕκαστος τῶν ἑαυτῶν, ὃ βούλεται δίδωσι· καὶ τὸ συλλεγόμενον παρὰ τῷ προεστῶτι ἀποτίθεται, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπικουρεῖ ὀρφανοῖς τε καὶ χήραις καὶ τοῖς διὰ νόσον ἢ δι' ἄλλην αἰτίαν λειπομένοις, καὶ τοῖς ἐν δεσμοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τοῖς παρεπιδήμοις οὖσι ξένοις, καὶ ἁπλῶς πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν χρείᾳ οὖσι κηδεμὼν γίνεται.

AN

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EXPLICATION OF THE FOLLOWING Commandments. IN A DISCOURSE

Concerning that Most Excellent

RULE OF Life and Manners,

Which prescribes

The doing as We would be done by;

And is moreover Represented by

OUR SAVIOUR AS

The LAW and the PROPHETS.

LONDON,

Printed for *John Martyn*, at the *Bell* in S^t^ *Paul's* Church-yard. M. DC. LXXV.

AN

INTRODUCTION

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In a DISCOURSE concerning that

Moſt Excellent RULE of *Life* and *Manners*,

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The doing as we would be done by.

The Contents.

Of the Nature of the preſent Rule, and that it is neither the Primary, nor an Abſolute Rule of Humane Actions. The former hereof evidenced from our Saviour's recommending it as the Sum of the Law and the Prophets; but, more eſpecially, from that Divine Law's being the Primary Rule of them: The latter, from the poſſibility of our Deſires becoming irregular, and ſo far therefore no legitimate Meaſure of our Actions. Inquiry is next made into the Senſe and Importance of it; where is ſhewn, firſt, both from the Nature of the Rule, and particular Inſtances, That we are to underſtand thereby The doing unto others what we our ſelves can lawfully deſire to be done unto our ſelves by them. An Objection againſt this Limitation, anſwered. It is ſhewn, ſecondly, That we are to underſtand by it, The doing unto others what we ſhould deſire to be done unto our ſelves, if we were in their place and condition: As, thirdly, That we ſhould do to others what we ſhould deſire to be done unto our ſelves, by thoſe particular Perſons, or any other. A Tranſition to the Conſideration of the Equitableneſs thereof; which is evinced, firſt, from the Reputation it hath either procur'd to it ſelf, or met with among Natural Men; from its being ſo eſteem'd of even by thoſe who do moſt tranſgreſs it; and from the Equality of all Men,

both in their Nature, and Obligation to the Divine Laws. Of the Comprehenſiveneſs of the preſent Rule, and in what ſenſe it may be affirmed to be the Law and the Prophets. In order whereunto, is ſhewn, firſt, That it is not to be underſtood as an Abſtract of that Part of the Law and the Prophets which contains our Duty to God, as which the preſent Rule is neither any proper Meaſure of, nor intended by our Saviour as ſuch: Secondly, That it comprehends in it the whole of our Duty to our Neighbour, and particularly all thoſe which are compris'd in the following Commandments. A Concluſion of the whole, with a Reflexion upon that more uſual Rule of Humane Actions, even of doing to Men as they have done to us; the Iniquity whereof is noted, and cenſured.

THOUGH Abridgments, where they are rightly order'd, do onely pare off unneceſſary Things, and, like Pictures in little, preſent us with all the Lineaments of that Work they pretend to abridge, without taking notice of its Dreſs, or the Embelliſhments thereof: yet they are for the moſt part ſo ill manag'd, that they do rather maim than contract it; and, in ſtead of giving us a juſt Proſpect of the Whole, preſent us with no one Part entire. But as we cannot lightly preſume thoſe Abridgments to be ſuch, which have the Wiſdom of the Father for their Author; ſo, if we carefully ſurvey the Abridgment that is now before us, we ſhall find it to be as comprehenſive as our Saviour hath repreſented it, and not onely a *Compendium* of, but the *very* Law and the Prophets: There being no one Precept of the Second Table, to which this Great Rule of Life and Manners will not reach, and lead us both to underſtand and practice. Onely as in reaſon Men ought to have a diſtinct knowledge of the Rule it ſelf, before they proceed to conſider it as the Abſtract of others; ſo I intend accordingly to inquire into its *Nature*, *Importance*, and *Equity*, before I attempt to ſhew the *Comprehenſiveneſs* thereof.

I. 1. That the Rule we have now under conſideration, is no *primary* Rule of Humane Actions, is evident both from that Argument whereby our Saviour hath enforc'd it, and the Meaſure from which Humane Actions receive their Rectitude or Obliquity: For our Saviour preſſing upon his Diſciples *The doing as they would be done by*, upon the ſcore of its being the Sum of what the Law and the Prophets taught, he gives us thereby to underſtand, That the Law and the Prophets are the Meaſure of that alſo, no leſs than of our Converſation and Obedience. And though, to Minds not prepoſſeſs'd, this one Conſideration might ſuffice to perſwade, that the Rule now before us is no Primary Rule of Humane Actions; yet I cannot forbear to ſay, it will become much more apparent, if we conſider from whence Humane Actions receive their reſpective Rectitude or Obliquity. For receiving both their Denomination and Quality from the Law and Will of God, to whom, as being our Lord and Maker, we are in reaſon to conform; *the doing as we would be done by*, can be no farther

farther a Rule of our Deportment, than as thoſe Deſires of ours ſhall appear to be conformable to his Laws, and conſequently thoſe Laws of his, and not our own Deſires, the Primary Rule of Humane Actions. Of what uſe this Obſervation is, will hereafter appear more clearly, when I come to declare the due Importance of the Rule now before us: It may ſuffice here to note, That, being no Primary Rule of Humane Actions, it cannot have place but either *in the want of ſome expreſs Law*, or *where we are under any prejudices againſt it.* For, the Law and Will of God being the Primary Rule of Humane Actions, there is no doubt but, if that give us information, we ought to be guided by it, and not ſeek direction elſewhere: Otherwiſe we do like thoſe who take directions from a Clock, at the ſame that the Sun ſtares them in the Face, and, by a Language that is eaſie to be underſtood, calls upon them to look up to him, or upon thoſe Dials whereon he ſhines: For, as it would be abſurd for any Man to take his Directions from ſuch Helps, when he may know the Hour of the Day from the other; ſo it would be no leſs for us to inveſtigate our Duty to our Neighbour, by what we our ſelves would deſire to be done to us, when at the ſame time we may read that Duty in God's expreſs Declarations concerning it. Onely, as it may ſometime happen, (and I wiſh I could ſay it doth not often do ſo) that what is clearly enough reveal'd, may yet be obſcure to us, or at leaſt difficult to be practis'd, through the Prejudices we have againſt it; ſo, in that caſe, I ſhould no way doubt the foremention'd Rule may be made uſe of to inſtruct us in our Deportment to our Neighbour: He who in ſuch a caſe conſiders, what he himſelf could be content to have done unto himſelf, if he were in the ſame Circumſtances with his Neighbour, making uſe of it, not ſo much to detract from the Honour of the Primary Rule of Vertue (which, ſo far as he underſtands it) he faileth not to conſider) but in compliance with his own Infirmities, and that he may be the more eaſily induced to yield Obedience to it; Men being more apt to ſee what is juſt and equitable, when their own Concernments are interwoven with it, than they are in the condition of a Stranger.

2. It is to be obſerv'd, ſecondly, That as *to do as we would be done by*, is no Primary Rule of Humane Actions; ſo neither is it, though in a ſecondary ſenſe, an *abſolute* and *unlimited* one: Becauſe, though we cannot deſire any thing which comes not unto us under the notion of Good, yet we may take that for Good which is far from being ſuch, and conſequently make it the Object of our Deſires. For, what through the weakneſs, or rather crazedneſs of our Underſtandings; what through the Power our Affections have to corrupt and debauch their Sentence, it happens not infrequently, that even theſe alſo do φιλοπτωχεῖν, and propheſie rather what is ſuitable to the corrupt temper of thoſe that ask, than what is agreeable to Truth and Equity. Upon which, as there will neceſſarily follow a like Irregularity in our Deſires, becauſe moulded and faſhioned by our Underſtandings; ſo thoſe Deſires of ours therefore can no more be an abſolute Rule of our Deportment, than they can be ſuppos'd to be the Primary one. But from hence it will alſo follow, that when we make the preſent Rule our own, we underſtand the doing unto others as we our ſelves can *fairly* deſire to have done unto us by others. For, *to do as we would be*

done by, being not the Primary Rule of Humane Actions, nor yet an abſolute and unlimited one, it is in reaſon to be bounded by that Law of God which is the Primary Rule both of our Deſires and Actions, and therefore alſo the Meaſure of this Rule, no leſs than of our Converſation and Obedience.

II. It being thus evident of what nature the Rule before us is, that is to ſay, a Secondary and a Limited one; inquire we, in the next place, into the *due Importance* of it. Where,

1. Firſt, The Premiſes ſo perſwading, we are neceſſarily to underſtand the doing unto others what we our ſelves can *lawfully* deſire to be done unto our ſelves by them: For if our deſires be irregular, thoſe Actions will be alſo ſuch which receive their Meaſure from them, and conſequently cannot be ſuppoſed to be any part of our Saviour's meaning. Thus, for inſtance, if a Woman ſhould conſent to comply with anothers Luſt, upon the ſcore of her own deſiring that that other ſhould ſo comply with hers, we are not to think that Action of hers to be therefore legitimate, or indeed to admit of any Excuſe; becauſe her Deſire being ſinful, that Action muſt alſo be ſo, which is influenc'd and directed by it. In like manner, if it ſhould be pleaded, as it ſometimes is by thoſe who call for *Liberty of Conſcience*, That we our ſelves, if we were in their Circumſtances, would not be well pleas'd to be reſtrain'd; I ſhould think it no hard matter to preſcribe againſt that Plea, from the Limitation before laid down: For, the Queſtion is not, Whether we our ſelves, if we were in their Circumſtances, ſhould not deſire a freedom from Puniſhment, (for what Malefactor doth not, how obnoxious ſoever to the ſtroke of it?) but, Whether we can lawfully deſire it, and whether the Supreme Magiſtrate ought not to puniſh thoſe who ſeem to him to tranſgreſs the Rules of *Chriſtianity*, whatſoever their Pretences be? Which, if true, that other Plea will come to nothing. For, as it ceaſeth not to be lawful for the Magiſtrate to inflict a Puniſhment upon Malefactors, becauſe it is not unlikely that, if he were in their Condition, he would not be overwilling to ſuffer it; ſo, neither for the ſame Perſon, ſuppoſing as was before ſuppos'd, to reſtrain thoſe who live in diſobedience to the Laws of *Chriſtianity*, becauſe if he were ſo affected, he would be deſirous to be freed from it. It is indeed an excellent Rule *to do as we would be done by*; it is of great advantage to the right ordering of our Lives, and of like neceſſity to be conſidered: But as it is not either the Primary, or an Abſolute Rule of Humane Actions; ſo, there is no doubt it is a much more excellent Rule, *to do to other Men what God hath particularly directed us to do*, and what we our ſelves, if we were well adviſed, would deſire they ſhould do to us. This onely would be added, That when I ſay, we are to underſtand by *doing as we would be done by*, the doing what we our ſelves can lawfully deſire to be done unto us by others, we underſtand this Limitation onely where ſome *particular* Rule may appear to judge of the Lawfulneſs of the Action by: For though there may, and no doubt ought to be place for the conſideration of the Lawfulneſs of our Deſire, where any ſuch Rule appeareth; yet there is no neceſſity at all for ſuch a Conſideration, where no ſuch particular Rule appeareth: partly, becauſe in that caſe we may reaſonably preſume the Deſire to be lawful, and therefore need not make any ſcrupulous Inquiſition into it;

it; and partly becauſe the Rule now before us having place eſpecially in the want of a more particular one, it is in reaſon to have its full force in the directing of our Actions, where no ſuch particular Law appeareth to controul it.

But becauſe it may be ſaid, That, if the foreſaid Limitation be at all admitted, the Rule we have now before us will be ſo far forth of no uſe; it ſeeming as eaſie to diſcover what we ought to do unto others, as what we may lawfully deſire to have done unto our ſelves: Therefore, before I proceed to any new Limitations, I will endeavour to remove that Umbrage, which the following Conſiderations will effect. For, though it may be as eaſie in it ſelf to diſcover what we ought to do unto others, as what we may lawfully deſire to have done unto our ſelves; yet it is not ſo, conſidering the Prejudices we lie under againſt the Improvement of their Happineſs: what we do toward the Improvement of their Happineſs, for the moſt part detracting from our own, and therefore not likely to be very favourably conſidered by us. Again, Though it ſhould be as eaſie to diſcover what we ought to do to others, as what we our ſelves may lawfully deſire from them; yet will not the former Diſcovery be of equal force to incline us to the doing of it: becauſe, whilſt that hath meer Duty to bind it on us, this hath Self-intereſt alſo to recommend it, which is one of the moſt potent Incentives to Obedience. And indeed, as Experience ſheweth, that we do never with greater advantage conſider the Concernments of other Men, than when we do conſider what we in the like caſe ſhould deſire to be done unto our ſelves; ſo we do not infrequently take that courſe, not ſo much to ſatisfie our ſelves concerning our Duty to them (as, which is oftentimes apparent enough) but the better to inculcate the Practice thereof upon us. In which caſe, the bounding of our Duty to our Neighbour, by what we our ſelves may lawfully deſire, will be no hinderance to its uſe; becauſe there can be no doubt, that what we ought to do unto others, may lawfully enough be deſired by our ſelves. Thus, without leaving the Rule in that generality wherein it is delivered, it may be of ſignal uſe to us in directing our Deportment to our Neighbour; he who makes his Neighbour's Caſe his own, as the preſent Rule obligeth, being both moſt likely to diſcern the Equitableneſs of what he demands, and moſt likely to be prevail'd upon to comply with it.

2. I obſerve, ſecondly, That when queſtion is made concerning the Importance of the preſent Rule, we are to underſtand the doing unto others what we would ſhould be done to us if *we were in their place and condition.* For, it being manifeſtly its intention, that we ſhould take our meaſure of doing to others, from what we our ſelves ſhould deſire to have done unto our ſelves; it doth conſequently ſuppoſe, that their Caſe and ours be brought to an equality, becauſe otherwiſe there could be no equality in the Meaſure. Thus, for example, if a Man be well provided of this Worlds Goods, and conſequently neither needeth nor deſireth to borrow ought from others; yet it will not follow from thence, that he may lawfully hold his hand from the diſpenſing of thoſe Goods to the Neceſſitous: becauſe the Queſtion is not, Whether a Rich Man, as ſuch, would content himſelf without any Contribution from others; but, Whether or no he

he would be ſo contented, if his Caſe were as neceſſitous as theirs, who addreſs themſelves to him for Relief. On the other ſide, if a Man be of mean and private Condition, and agreeably thereto content himſelf with it, and neither aſpire after Honour and Obedience from others; yet it will not follow from thence, that he may withhold that Reſpect and Obedience from thoſe who are his Superiours in Birth or Place: becauſe, the Queſtion is not, Whether, under the preſent Circumſtances, he can content himſelf without them; but, Whether, if he were in the Quality and Condition of thoſe that are above him, he would not expect that Reſpect and Obedience which is due to their Place and Birth. A thing which is not hard to be divin'd by thoſe who have ſeen the World, or made any Obſervations in that Part of it in which they live themſelves. For thus we have ſeen Men, who, when low, walk'd with down-caſt Looks, and breath'd nothing but Mortification and Self-denial; but being advanc'd to Places of Eminency, look'd as high as thoſe whom they before condemn'd, and call'd for that Reſpect and Obedience which before they thought it ſo indifferent to ſhew.

3. Laſtly, When it is ſaid, (for ſo our Saviour, whoſe this Rule is, hath expreſs'd it) *Whatſoever ye would that men ſhould do to you, do ye alſo to them*; the meaning thereof is not, Whatſoever ye would that *this* or *that particular Perſon* ſhould do to you, do you alſo to *thoſe particular Perſons*; but, Whatſoever you would ſhould be done to you by *whomſoever*, do you alſo do to *all* in the like Circumſtances. For, the force of our Saviour's Words conſiſting in this, that we ſhould make our own Deſires the Rule of our Deportment unto others, it matters not whether we deſire the Thing in queſtion of this or that particular Perſon, ſo we deſire it at all under the ſame Condition. And therefore, if there be any ſo fond, as not to afford Relief to a diſtreſſed Enemy, becauſe he himſelf would, it may be, be ſo haughty as not to deſire it from any ſuch, he is not therefore to think himſelf to be diſoblig'd from this Rule of *doing as he would be done by:* For if he could not but deſire to be reliev'd under the ſame diſtreſſed Condition, the Rule obligeth to the affording of it, becauſe making our own Deſires to be the Meaſure of giving unto others. And more than this I ſhall not need to ſay concerning the Importance of the preſent Rule, and may therefore go on to ſhew the *Equity* thereof, the third Thing propos'd to be diſcours'd of.

III. Now the firſt thing that I ſhall alledge for the Equity of this Rule, is the *Reputation* it hath either procur'd to it ſelf, or met with among *Natural Men*, and ſuch as had no other Light than their own Reaſon to direct them. For, though it be apparent, that the *Heathen* borrowed many of their Sayings from the Scriptures, and we therefore not lightly to look upon every thing that proceedeth from them, as a pure Dictate of Reaſon and Nature; yet I know not how we can avoid the looking upon this Rule as ſuch, becauſe us'd by a *Heathen* long before our Saviour's time, and indeed before there was any clear mention of it in the Scripture. For thus we are told by *Diogenes Laertius**, of *Ariſtotle*, That *when he was ask'd how we ought to carry our ſelves towards our Friends*, he made anſwer, That *we are ſo to carry our ſelves towards them, as we our ſelves could wiſh they ſhould carry themſelves to us.* And though the Emperour *Severus*, who had this

* *Lib.* 5. *in vita Ariſt.* Ἐρωτηθὶς πῶς ἂν τοῖς φίλοις προσφεροίμεθα, ἔφη, ὡς ἂν ἀξιώσαιμεθα αὐτὸς ἡμῖν προσφέρεσθαι.

this Saying often in his Mouth, *Whatſoever thou wouldeſt not ſhould be done unto thy ſelf, do not thou unto another*; though he, I ſay, be known to have borrowed that Saying either from the *Jews*, or *Chriſtians*; yet the great eſteem he, though a *Heathen*, had of it, ſhew'd that it was agreeable to Reaſon; and though his own Underſtanding help'd him not to diſcover it, yet it taught him to approve it.

I alledge, ſecondly, (For in things of this nature ſuch kind of Proofs are allowable, partly becauſe things ſo clear will hardly admit of any other Proof, and partly becauſe the laſt Appeal in things of Reaſon and Morality, muſt be made to the Conſciences and Perſwaſions of Men.) I alledge, I ſay, for the Equitableneſs of the preſent Rule, That *it is ſo eſteem'd of by all ſorts of Perſons*, yea *even by thoſe who do moſt tranſgreſs it*. For, as *Tertullian* * concluded it to be the Teſtimony of a Soul *naturally Chriſtian*, That there is but One True God, becauſe they who worſhipp'd Many, could not yet forbear, in their common Diſcourſe, to ſay, *God grant*, and *If God will*, and *God ſeeth all things*; ſo may we, That this Precept is a Dictate of Nature; becauſe even thoſe who tranſgreſs it themſelves, do yet acknowledge the Equity thereof. For though in the Concernments of others, ſuch Perſons cannot, or will not ſee it; yet when the Tables come to be turn'd, and their Adverſaries deal more harſhly with them than they think themſelves to have deſerv'd, there is nothing more uſual than to object, That they themſelves would not be contented to be ſo uſed, if they were in the ſame Circumſtances with them.

* *De teſtimonio animæ*, cap. 2.

Laſtly, (For I am unwilling to let any thing paſs without a more direct Proof, which may be ſuppos'd to be capable thereof.) I alledge for the Equity of the preſent Rule, *the Equality of all Men*, both *in their Nature*, and *Obligation to the Divine Laws*. For, being there is no difference between one Man and another in their Nature, and much leſs in their Obligation to the Divine Laws; being whatſoever difference there is between us in Condition, is by God's ſetting one above another, and placing him in a higher State and Degree: if, that Difference ſet apart, as the preſent Rule ſuppoſeth, and the Change that hapneth in Humane Affairs obligeth us to do; if, I ſay, that Difference ſet apart, I could not but deſire, that he who is better furniſhed with this Worlds Goods, ſhould afford ſome Relief to me in my neceſſity, I cannot but think it juſt to afford the ſame Relief to him who is under the like Circumſtances. For, it being but reaſonable, that *thoſe things which are equal, ſhould have an equal meaſure*; If I, who am but equal to my Brother in Nature, and, by my own ſuppoſition, now equal to him in Condition, could not yet but deſire Relief my ſelf, from thoſe that are able to afford it; there is the ſame reaſon for his deſire of it, and conſequently the ſame neceſſity of his being gratified in it, by me, or any Man elſe that is in a Capacity to afford it.

IV. The laſt thing comes now to be ſpoken to, even the *Comprehenſiveneſs* of the Rule now before us; a thing which our *Catechiſm* doth not obſcurely inſinuate, when it premiſeth it to thoſe Duties we owe unto our Neighbours: but our *Saviour* much more clearly, when he affirms it to be *the Law and the Prophets*. Now there are two ſorts of Duties which the Law and the Prophets contain, and to one or both of

of which therefore this Rule is to be ſuppos'd to have a regard; *the Duties* we owe to the *Great Creator* of the World, or *the Duties* which are owing by us to *our Neighbour.* The *former* of theſe are no way pertinent to the preſent Rule, or at leaſt not in thoſe Terms wherein it is delivered by our Saviour; becauſe the Perſons from whom we expect a favourable deportment, and to whom accordingly we ought to be ready to afford it, are by our Saviour * ſuppos'd to be *Men*, or rather in expreſs Terms declar'd ſo to be. Not to tell you, that it would be a kind of arrogancy to apply it to the Duty we owe to God, or attempt to judge of that Duty by it; becauſe ſo we could not do, without ſeating our ſelves in the Place of God, which is too great a Preſumption to do, even by a Suppoſition. If *the doing as we would be done by*, may with any propriety be referr'd to God, it is onely as the deſire of his dealing favourably with us, is conſidered as an Argument to prompt us to the like deportment towards our Brethren. And in this ſenſe there is no doubt it hath the countenance of Equity, as well as the Suffrage of the Almighty. For, as God hath not allow'd us to expect Mercy from him, upon any other Terms than the ſhewing the like Mercy to our Brethren; ſo they who conſider the little reaſon we have otherwiſe to expect it, will think it but equitable to afford it. For, if we would that God, who is no way oblig'd to us, yea, who is many ways diſoblig'd by us, ſhould yet afford ſome Relief to our Neceſſities; how much more reaſonable muſt we think it to be, to allow the ſame unto our Brethren, to whom we are even by that God oblig'd?

* Mat. 7. 12. *Therefore all things whatſoever ye would that* Men *ſhould do unto you, do ye even ſo to them.*

But not to inſiſt any longer upon ſo remote a Senſe, eſpecially after that we our ſelves have declared it ſo to be; proceed we to conſider it with reference to *the Duty we owe to our Neighbour*, and as the Sum of the Law and the Prophets *concerning it.* For my more advantageous Explication whereof, I will apply it to all thoſe Precepts of the *Decalogue*, which reſpect the Welfare of our Neighbour.

To begin with that which gives beginning to them, even that which calls upon us to *Honour our Father and Mother*, whether as that imports the Honour that is due unto *Superiours*, or as it doth alſo connote that Fatherly and gentle Uſage which thoſe Superiours are to ſhew to *thoſe that are under their command.* For, who that carries about him, I do not ſay the common Infirmities of Humane Nature, but even the moſt innocent Affections of it; who, I ſay, that is onely ſuch, but would expect Honour and Obedience, if he were advanced to that Dignity, to which his envied Neighbour is? Shall we ſuppoſe the lowlineſs of his Mind to repreſs ſuch Deſires? But as that requires no more than ſuch an humble Opinion of a Mans ſelf as is anſwerable to his own Quality and Condition; ſo we ſee but too frequently, that a change of Fortune produceth a change alſo in the Mind, yea ſuch a change as is alſo ſuperiour to the other. Shall we then ſay (and indeed more than that we cannot ſay) that the preſent lowneſs both of his Fortune and Mind may keep him at leaſt from thinking that he ſhould give entertainment to more lofty Deſires? But even that will not be a bar to the diſcovery of other Inclinations, if he will but advert to his preſent Demeanour under it. For, as there are few ſo low, who have not ſome alſo under them, whether in the relation of Children or Servants; ſo we ſee but too

too apparently, that even they cannot without regret receive from the other any Diſreſpect or Diſobedience. Now foraſmuch as it is impoſſible for any Man not to deſire Reſpect and Obedience, ſuppoſing himſelf advanc'd to that Dignity which doth require it; foraſmuch as that Impoſſibility will eaſily diſcover it ſelf to him who ſhall but reflect upon his own Demeanour toward thoſe that are below him; it will not be hard to collect, That, if he have alſo a regard to this Rule of our Saviour, , he will find himſelf in a manner neceſſitated to pay the ſame Reſpect and Obedience unto others: He who doth as he would be done by, being not in a condition to deny it; becauſe, if he were in their Circumſtances, he could not but deſire it. And though they who are in any Place of Eminency, will be as apt to forget their reſpective Duties, and treat their ſeveral Inferiours rather as Slaves than Subjects; yet would they not continue ſo to do, if they would but ſuppoſe thoſe their Subjects Condition to be their own, and reflect withal upon that Demeanour which ſuch a Suppoſition, and the preſent Rule inferreth. For it being not to be thought that any Man will be ſo much an Enemy to himſelf, as not to deſire to be favourably treated, though in the Condition of a Subject; the very ſuppoſition of ſuch a Condition, and the Rule we have now before us, will oblige him that maketh it, to ſhew the ſame favourable Treatment unto others: He *doing not as he would be done by*, who treats his Subjects as Slaves, when it is manifeſt, that, if he were in their condition, he would both deſire and expect a more gentle uſage. And indeed, if even the Greateſt Princes would conſider the Inconſtancy of all Earthly things, and how often it falls out that they who are now at the Top, are brought down to the loweſt Round, they would not think it any way unreaſonable to ſuppoſe themſelves in the condition of Subjects, or, doing ſo, to learn Clemency by it; it being certainly more eligible to learn Clemency by ſo eaſie a Suppoſition, than by their own ſad and dear-bought Experience. So eaſie a matter were it both for Superiours and Inferiours to read their reſpective Duties in this ſhort Aphoriſm of our Saviour. And if ſo, we may well allow it to be a Comprehenſive one, yea, ſo far as the former Perſons are concern'd, the *whole* Law and the Prophets.

To that Commandment which enjoyns the Honour of Superiours, ſubjoyn we that which *forbids the killing of any Man*; whether we underſtand it as taking care for the Lives and Perſons of Men, or forbidding either greater or leſſer violations of them. For who ſeeth not, that the preſent Rule hath equal place here, yea that it extends it ſelf to the ſeveral Injunctions and Prohibitions of it? For, is there any Man who would not deſire all requiſite Love and Benevolence to his Perſon, or at leaſt who would not be in ſome meaſure provided againſt the ſeveral Neceſſities and Exigencies thereof? Is there any Man who would not be ſecur'd from any greater or leſſer Violences, who would not deſire to have his Life preſerv'd to him, yea the Pleaſures and Happineſſes thereof? But, ſo if there be not, let the Tranſgreſſour of this Commandment ſee, how he will anſwer either his own Uncharitableneſs or Maliciouſneſs to other Mens? his withholding from them the Offices of Humanity, or bringing upon them Miſery and Death? For whatever this may otherwiſe be, to be ſure it

is no way anſwerable to his own Expectations or Deſires; and he muſt give the Lie to his own Conſcience, as well as to the common Sentiments of Humane Nature, if he pretend to act herein as he deſires to be dealt withal himſelf.

I will not ſo much as ask, or onely ask, if I do, whether the *Adulterer* or *Adultereſs* would be content to fall under that Injury and Reproach which they ſtick not to bring upon another: for as there is no one thing which Humane Nature doth more paſſionately reſent, than the Violation of the Marriage-bed; ſo it is not at all rare, to ſee thoſe exalt the Fidelity of their Conſorts, who are not over-guilty of it themſelves. Inſtead therefore of inſiſting any longer upon this Commandment, I will go on to thoſe that follow, and ſee whether they alſo do not ſtand or fall, according as this moſt excellent Rule is either obſerv'd or neglected.

For to addreſs my ſelf to that which is next in order, though that no more than the other will require any long Diſcuſſion; Is there any Man who could be contented to have his *Property* either *invaded* or *purloyn'd*, to have it *extorted from him by force*, or *drawn away from him by deceit?* Nay, is not the contrary apparent enough in thoſe who are moſt concern'd to inquire, becauſe, without any ſcruple, preying upon the Properties of Men? For, as it hath been of old obſerv'd, that Juſtice is ſo neceſſary a Vertue, that even *Thieves* think themſelves obliged to preſerve it among themſelves; ſo, how ill pleas'd they would be with the loſs of their legitimate Properties, their ill reſenting of any unfaithful diſpenſation of the Common Booty, proclaims both to others and themſelves.

Laſtly, (For in ſo large a Subject it is harder to know when to make an end, than to want proper Matter for a Diſcourſe.) As there is no Man who can well brook the being *falſely ſpoken of*, or that his Neighbour ſhould *covet* his Poſſeſſions; ſo the Rule we have now before us, obliging us to frame our Deportment by *what we would ſhould be done unto our ſelves*, doth conſequently reſtrain us from *bearing falſe witneſs* againſt, or *coveting* the Poſſeſſion of our Neighbour. For, whatever guilty Men may ſay or think, he certainly that cannot keep his Mind from hankering after his Neighbour's Poſſeſſions, would be much leſs ſatisfied to have that Neighbour of his caſt an evil eye upon his own.

Now though having ſaid thus much concerning the Rule that is now before us, I may ſeem not to have omitted any thing which may be of force to recommend it; yet becauſe there is another *Rule* which pretends to Rival it, and which therefore, whilſt it continues in reputation, may not a little impede the eſpouſing of it; I deem it but neceſſary to bring that alſo before you, and examine the legitimateneſs of its Pretenſions. For, do not the generality of Men think it reaſonable enough *to do to others as they have done to them*, and return upon them thoſe Violences they have offer'd? Doth not the Magiſtrate proceed conformably to that Rule, in his ſeveral Decrees and Judgments? and all Men look upon thoſe as receiving but their Deſerts, who ſuffer no other than what they inflicted? And though *Tully* be a Perſon who hath certainly done more right to Morality, than any or almoſt all that preceded or followed; though the Precepts he delivers be generally very conformable to thoſe of Nature

and

and *Chriſtianity:* yet even he ſeems to adviſe, or at leaſt not to forbid the doing unto other Men as they have before done themſelves; where he repreſents it as a part of Juſtice, * *not to hurt any Man*; adding by way of exception, *unleſs* before *provoked by an Injury:* which ſhews at leaſt, that he thought it no way unlawful to retaliate. But as the Scripture, which is more to be credited, hath taught us another Leſſon, becauſe forbidding us to ſay, ‖ *I will do to* my Neighbour *as he hath done to me, I will render to the man according to his works*; ſo it hath elſewhere aſſign'd ſuch Reaſons of it, as both ſhew the unlawfulneſs of ſuch a Procedure, and take off from the force of its Pretenſions: For giving us to underſtand, that God, to whom Vengeance originally belongeth, reſerveth that part of Juſtice to himſelf †, and to thoſe whom he hath entruſted * with his Authority; it doth conſequently make it unlawful to any other than ſuch, to aſſume to themſelves the Execution of it, and therefore alſo to do to Men as they have before dealt with them. If he who hath his own Injuries return'd upon him, receive no more than he doth deſerve; yet will not that warrant our retaliating them, becauſe we have no Authority to chaſtiſe him. The more Equitable, as well as more *Chriſtian* Rule, is certainly, *Do to other Men as ye would they ſhould do to you*; as you your ſelves, if you were in their Circumſtances, would be forward enough to deſire from them. So doing, you will not onely not uſurp upon the Prerogative of God, or of his Vicegerent; but comply with the Sentiments of Nature, and Revelation; with the ſeveral Precepts and Intimations of the one; with the Law, and the Prophets, and Goſpels of the other.

* De Offic. l. 1. *Sed juſtitiæ primum munus eſt, ut ne cui quis noceat, niſi laceſſitus injuriâ.*

‖ *Prov.* 24.29.

† *Rom.* 12.19.

* *Rom.* 13. 4.

THE FIFTH
COMMANDMENT.

THE FIFTH COMMANDMENT.

Honour thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee.

PART I.

The Contents.

A Tranſition to the Duty we owe to each other, whether conſider'd onely as Men, or under a more near Relation. The latter of theſe provided for in this Fifth Commandment, which is divided into a Duty and a Promiſe. An Eſſay toward a general Explication of the Duty; where is ſhewn, That under Father and Mother are comprehended, 1. Grandfather and Grandmother, and other the Anceſtors from whom we came; becauſe, though at a diſtance, Authors of our Being. 2. Kings and all that are in Authority; partly becauſe in the place of Parents to their People, and partly becauſe their Authority is a Branch of the Paternal one, and ſucceeded into the place of it. 3. Our Spiritual Paſtors, becauſe begetting us to a better Birth: And, in fine, All that are our Superiours, whether in Authority, Dignity, or Age. The like Comprehenſiveneſs evinc'd in the Honour that is requir'd; which is ſhewn alſo to include Fear and Love, together with the Expreſſions of them, and Honour. The Duty of Superiours connoted in the Honour that is to be paid to them; and how that Duty may be inferr'd. An Addreſs to a more particular Explication of the Duty; where the Honour of Parents is reſum'd, and the Grounds thereof ſhewn to be, firſt, Their being under God the Authors of ours, and, ſecondly, the Maintainers of it. The Conſequences of the former Ground propos'd, and ſhewn to preclude all Pretences of Diſreſpect.

OUR Duty to *God* being provided for in the firſt place, as which is both the Foundation and Limitation of all others; proceed we, according as the *Decalogue* invites, to conſider the Duty we owe to *each other*; which may be reduc'd to two Heads, that is to ſay, ſuch as we owe to one another as *Men*, or ſuch as ariſe from ſome more *intimate Relation*

Relation between us. The latter of these is my Task at this time, because the Design of the Commandment that is now before us; for the Explication whereof, I will consider,

1. The Duty enjoyn'd: And,
2. The Promise wherewith it is enforc'd.

I. Now though, if we look no further than the Letter, we could not be long to seek what that is which is here bound upon us; yet because I have before shewn, that many things are contain'd in a Commandment, beside what is expres's'd in it; to attain the full importance of this, we must enter into the very Bowels of it, and extract that Sense which is wrapp'd up in it, as well as that which is apparent. In order whereunto, I will inquire,

1. Whether *any Superiours* are here meant, besides *Fathers and Mothers.*
2. What is the importance of that *Honour* which is here requir'd.
3. Whether the Commandment provide for the Behaviour of *Superiours towards Inferiours*, as well as of *Inferiours towards them.*

1. And first of all, though *Father and Mother* be the onely Persons expres's'd, to whom we are requir'd to give Honour; yet the general Reason of the Commandment obligeth us to extend it to *Grandfathers* and *Grandmothers*, and other the *Ancestors* from whom we are descended; because, though they contributed not immediately to our Birth, yet mediately they did, as being the Authors of those from whom we deriv'd it. Whence it is, that in the Scripture they have often the Name of Fathers; as, *Your Father Abraham rejoyc'd to see my day, and was glad.*

But beside that Grandfathers and Grandmothers are to be understood, and other the Stocks from whence we came; there is no doubt but *Kings*, and *all that are in Authority*, are included in the same general Names: Witness first, their being *in the place of Fathers* to those who are under their Dominion. For though, as *Moses* sometime told God, they do not *beget* their People, if we understand it with reference to their Natural one; yet as their Civil Birth is from them, so they *carry them in their bosom, as a nursing Father beareth the sucking Child*, as the same God commanded the angry *Moses*, *Num.* 11. 12. Again, As Kings are in the place of Fathers to their People, especially in respect of their Tuition, so the Authority of Kings is *a Branch of the Paternal one*, and succeeded into the Place of it. Of which, beside the Testimony * of *Aristotle*, who was no Friend of Kingly Government, and the great number of Kings that was anciently in every little Country, and particularly in the Land of *Canaan*; we may discern evident Marks in the Authority of Fathers, even after the Empire was otherwise dispos'd of: these having anciently *the Power of Life and Death*, which is one of the principal Flowers of the Regal Diadem. Now forasmuch as Kings are not onely in the place of Fathers to their People, but vested in that Authority which was originally and naturally theirs; it is but reasonable to think, that when God commanded to honour these, his Intention was to include the other, as who, beside their resemblance to them, had also the best part of their Authority.

* Ἐν οἰκίᾳ πρῶτον ἀρχαὶ καὶ πηγαὶ πολιτείας, καὶ δικαίου. *Vid. Sanders. de Oblig. Conscient. Prælect. 7. sect. 16.*

Next

Next to Kings and Princes, conſider we our *Spiritual Fathers*, even thoſe who beget us to Piety, and to God; concerning whom, there can be no place for doubt, that they ought to be underſtood in thoſe Fathers we are here commanded to revere: For if our Earthly Father is to have Honour, thoſe certainly ought not to go without it, who beget us to an infinitely better Being. To all which, if we add, that the *Decalogue* is a Summary of all Moral Duties, as well thoſe which reſpect our Neighbour, as thoſe which have an aſpect upon God; ſo there can be no doubt, not onely that the former are included, but *all other our Superiours*, whether in *Authority*, or *Dignity*, or *Age*: Becauſe, as the Honour of theſe may be fairly reduc'd to this Commandment (as I ſhall ſhew more at large, when I come to handle them apart) ſo there is no other Commandment to which they can, if you except onely the Honour of *Husbands*, which may have a place in that Commandment which forbids violation of it.

2. Having thus ſhewn what is meant by that *Father* and *Mother* which this Commandment requires us to honour, I come now to inquire what is the importance of that *Honour*, which we are under an Obligation to exhibit; it being likely enough, where the Objects thereof are ſo various, that there is ſome variety in that Honour which is due. To find out therefore the full importance of it, I will inquire,

1. Whether under the Affection of Honour, any other be underſtood: And,
2. Whether the Expreſſions thereof be not equally due with the Affections themſelves.

For the Reſolution of the former whereof, the firſt thing I ſhall offer, is, the primary Notion of the *Hebrew* Word we render *Honour*, which the Maſters of that Language inform us ſignifies to be *heavy*, or *weigh* ſo, and conſequently in *Piel*, not to *account lightly* of, to eſteem of as a thing *of weight and moment*. Now though in the common acception of the Phraſe, that be moſt accommodable to that Honour by which we have choſen to expreſs it; yet it contains within the compaſs of it, all other Reſpects which ariſe from any conſiderable Quality of the Thing we ſo value, that is to ſay, as well thoſe which ariſe from its lovelineſs or terribleneſs, as from the eminency of its Nature and Authority. For, if we give any Thing or Perſon its due weight and moment, we muſt alſo, if they be lovely, afford them as great and intenſe a Love; or, if terrible, fear them proportionably to it. Whence it is, that what is here, *Honour thy father and mother*, is in *Lev.* 19. 3. expreſs'd by *fear* or reverence them; and accordingly, is no leſs uſually ſet to denote the Duty we owe to our Parents, than that which is here made uſe of to expreſs it. But beſide the Comprehenſiveneſs of the *Hebrew* Word, with the Addition of God's expreſſing our Duty as well by Fear as Honour; it is to be obſerv'd, that there is not in Parents *a greater ground for any thing than Love*; witneſs the tenderneſs they have over us, and particularly that which the Mother hath: For, if ſo, Love muſt be ſuppos'd to be as much a Duty as any thing, and conſequently to be included in that Affection which is requir'd. To all which, if we add, That it is not unuſual *under one Species to underſtand all of the ſame Genus*, ſo no doubt can remain, but under the Name of Honour all the former Re-

quiſites are contain'd. For the Commandment we have now before us, being one of thoſe which were intended as an Abſtract of the whole Duty of Man, it is in reaſon to comprehend the whole of our Duty to our Superiours; and therefore alſo, becauſe not otherwiſe to be done, to ſet that *Species* of our Duty for all the reſt.

But beſide that the Affection of Honour includes all the reſt that are due from us to our Parents, they are in like manner to be ſuppos'd to include the *Expreſſions* of them, and particularly the Expreſſions of Honour; of which, beſide the uſual acceptation of the Word *Honour*, which, together with the Eſteem of the Mind, connotes the Expreſſions of it, we may fetch a Proof from the Nature of the Affections of the Soul, and the neceſſity of their exerting themſelves in outward Acts: For, as the Affections of the Soul are naturally operative, and ſeek out proper ways to expreſs themſelves; ſo, unleſs they do, they are of little, or rather of no uſe to whom they are commanded to be exhibited. For what avails Charity to a diſtreſſed Perſon, if it ſhew not it ſelf in Alms, and other ſuch like Expreſſions of it? Or, what ſatisfaction can an honourable Eſteem bring to our Parents, if it contains it ſelf in the Mind, where it is neither to be diſcern'd, nor can produce any Advantage to them? But becauſe, to make it evident that the Expreſſions of Honour are requir'd, no better way can be taken, than by inſtancing in the Expreſſions themſelves; before I leave this Head, I will attempt the Probation of it in each, beginning with the Expreſſion of it in *Outward Geſtures*: For thus *Lev.* 19. 32. we are commanded to *riſe up before the hoary head*, and to *honour the face of the old man.* For, if we are to do that before the Face of the Old Man, much more before the Face of our Natural Parent, or him that is the Father of our Country. From Reverence in Geſture, paſs we to the ſame teſtified in *Words*, which we ſhall find to be no leſs a Duty than the former; witneſs the ſeveral Cautions that are given againſt *curſing* our Natural, or *ſpeaking evil* of our Civil Parent: For, that ſhews our Words to be under a Law as to that particular, and conſequently, becauſe they are equally capable of honouring our Parents, that they ought to be employ'd to that purpoſe. The ſame is much more evident concerning our *Actions*, and particularly concerning yielding *Obedience to their Commands:* For, as a due apprehenſion of their Authority doth naturally lead us to yield Obedience to thoſe Commands that have their Authority ſtamp'd upon them; ſo, that this Expreſſion of our Honour was intended, St. *Paul* plainly ſhews, *Epheſ.* 6. 1, 2. For inferring, as he doth, the Juſtice of Obeying our Parents from this very Commandment we have now before us, he ſuppoſes Obedience to their Commands, to be a part of that Honour which this Commandment requires us to give. In like manner, foraſmuch as where *ſubmiſſion to chaſtiſement* is not, there can be no due apprehenſion of their Authority, the oppoſing our ſelves thereto being a denial of it, and therewith of the Juſtice of their Proceedings; it follows, that to honour our Parents, includes that Expreſſion alſo; and we are not onely to be obedient to their Will, but *ſuffer without murmuring* under the Inflictions of it. Such are the *Superiours* whom we are requir'd to honour, ſuch the *Honour* and *other Duties* which we are by the ſame Commandment enjoyn'd to pay. Nothing remains toward a general Explication of it, but to inquire,

3. Whether

3. Whether *Superiours* may not read their *Duty* alſo in it? Which Queſtion is the rather to be ask'd, becauſe, ſetting aſide this Commandment, there is no other to which it can be reduc'd. But, as, for that cauſe, it is but reaſonable to ſeek it here, where the Duties of their ſeveral Correlatives are deſcrib'd; ſo it will be no hard matter for Superiours to read it in that Honour which is commanded to be paid unto themſelves: For though, as I ſhall afterwards ſhew, their very begetting of us require our having them in eſteem; yet, if it be not alſo accompanied with a Paternal Care over us, it muſt needs be a great Stumbling-block to us, and, if not deſtroy, yet very much diminiſh their Eſteem. Again, Foraſmuch as our Honour, though built in part upon their giving us a Being, yet is alſo founded by the Scriptures themſelves upon their lending us their Aſſiſtance to ſupport it; hence it comes to paſs, that, to obtain a complete Honour from us, they muſt ſhew us the way by their Kindneſs, and feed us with the ſame Kindneſs that the Stork doth her Young ones, that Emblem both of Paternal Affection, and Filial Duty: It being impoſſible for Children *to* * *requite* their Parents, as the Young ones of the Stork do theirs, where the Parents have not ſhew'd themſelves Storks before.

* ἀντιπελαργῆν.

Having thus given you a general Scheme both of this Commandment, and my Deſign; and ſhewn both who, and to what they are oblig'd: I intend now to preſent them to you a ſecond time, and allow them a more diſtinct Conſideration. In order whereunto, I will begin with *Parents*, becauſe expreſs'd in the Commandment; and ſhew both,

1. What is due from their Children unto them: And,
2. What is due from them unto their Children.

I. Now there are Five things, within the reſolution whereof, all that is neceſſary to be known concerning the former of theſe Obligations, is comprehended.

1. The Grounds of our Honour.
2. The Kinds of it.
3. With what variety it is to be exhibited to either Parent.
4. Whether or no, and how far a Child may be freed from it.
5. To which I ſhall ſubjoyn, in the fifth place, ſomewhat concerning Fear and Love, which I have ſaid to be a part of Childrens Duties.

1. And here, though I very well might, not to eſtabliſh it upon this Commandment, nor yet upon that Strength which *Chriſtianity* hath added to it by its own; I will make it my Buſineſs to inquire, whether Nature it ſelf hath not afforded *Grounds* enough to eſtabliſh that Obligation upon. Now there are two things upon which the honouring our Parents is grounded, and which indeed do each of them evince its neceſſity: how much more then, when as for the moſt part conjoyn'd? The former whereof is, their being under God the *Authors* of ours; and, ſecondly, the *Maintainers* of it.

That they are the *Authors* of our Being, is too evident from Experience, to admit of any the leaſt doubt: That, as ſuch, they ought to be honour'd, will be no leſs evident, if we conſider either the *Excellency* thereof, or the *Authority* that it naturally infers. For, inaſmuch as Excellency is a juſt Object of Honour (Honour, as was before obſerv'd, being a juſt Valuation of that which is ſo); inaſmuch

as there is a peculiar Excellency in being the Author of anothers Being, he who is ſo, thereby partaking of one of the great Prerogatives of the Divine Nature; it follows, becauſe our Parents are Partakers of that Prerogative, that they are to be look'd upon as the Objects of Honour, and next to him to be regarded by us. And accordingly, as ſome have not ſtuck to call them *viſible* Gods*, in reſpect of that reſemblance which they have to the Great Creatour of us all; ſo, if it be cautiouſly underſtood, it is not without Warrant, even from the Scriptures themſelves; God himſelf ſo ſtiling both the Angels and Magiſtrates, for that Image they have of his Nature and Authority. However it be, there is a great Reſemblance between our Earthly Parents and God, as being each in their meaſure the Authors of our Being: and if ſo, there can be little doubt of their being the juſt Objects of our Honour, if God may be allow'd to be a juſt Object of it. But then, if we add moreover, That the Authors of our Being have *eo ipſo* a Natural *Authority* over thoſe to whom they are ſo; Nature and Reaſon dictating, that the Maker of any thing ſhould have the diſpoſal of it: ſo there will not onely follow a neceſſity of honouring them, but of giving them ſuch an Honour as includes Obedience to their Commands. But beſides the Reſemblance there is between our Parents and God in that particular, and that Authority which it naturally infers; we are alſo to conſider, according as was before inſinuated, that they are God's *Inſtruments* in the producing of us. For, if ſo, they cannot be neglected without *caſting a contempt upon God*, || *whoſe Inſtruments and Miniſters they are*; the Vertue of an Inſtrument being not ſo much its own, as that Cauſes by which it is manag'd. And accordingly, as among Men, what is done or not done unto an Agent, is by the Prince, and all others, interpreted as done or not done unto himſelf; ſo there have not wanted, even among the Heathen, who ſaw the legitimateneſs of making ſuch an Interpretation of the Diſhonour that is done to God's Inſtruments, our Earthly Parents: *Menander* † in particular affirming of him who *reproacheth his Father*, That *though his Words go no farther than him, yet he aims at the Divine Nature.* The ſame is no leſs evident, in that the Honour of Parents hath even in the New Teſtament the Title of * *Piety.* For that being the proper Word to expreſs our Duty to our Maker, ſhews the thing to which it is attributed to have a peculiar aſpect upon him, and that it is Sacrilege, as well as Injuſtice, to deny it. I have inſiſted ſo much the longer upon this Head, as becauſe the Scripture ſeems to found our Obligation upon it, when it requires us to *hearken to the father that begat* us, *Prov.* 23. 22. ſo alſo becauſe it cuts off all Pretences of doing diſhonour to thoſe whom this Commandment obliges us to revere. For, be it, firſt, that thy Parents may prove unnatural, and thereby ſo far deveſt themſelves of that Honour which is due from other Children unto theirs; yet ſo long as that which is paſt cannot be recall'd, they cannot ceaſe to be thy Parents; and it is eternally true, that the one is thy Father that *begat* thee, and the other thy Mother that *conceiv'd* thee. Be it, ſecondly, which is another Pretence of Diſobedience, that though they gave Being to thee, yet they deſign'd not that ſo much as the gratification of their own Appetites, which will conſequently

* Τῶν δ' ἀντολμούντων ἀποσεμνύνεσθαι τὸ γονέων ὄνομα φασί τινες ὡς ἄρα πατὴρ καὶ μήτηρ ἐμφανεῖς εἰσὶ θεοὶ, μιμήμασι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν τῷ ζωοπλαστεῖν. *Philo de Decal.*

|| Θεῷ γὰρ ὑπηρέται πρὸς τέκνων σπορὰν οἱ γονεῖς· ὁ δ' ὑπηρέτην ἀτιμάζων, συναλιμάζει καὶ τὴν ἀρχοῦσαν. *Philo de Decalog.*

† Ὁ λοιδορῶν τὸν πατέρα, δυσφημεῖ λόγῳ, Τὸν εἰς τὸ θεῖον δὲ μελέτῃ βλασφημίαν.

* Εἴ τις χήρας τέκνα ἢ ἔκγονα ἔχει, μανθανέτωσαν πρῶτον τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον εὐσεβεῖν, 1 *Tim.* 5. 4.

conſequently cut off all Moral Right to that Honour which they exact of thee; yet inaſmuch as they were the Authors of thy Being, they have a Natural Right to it, and therefore ought not to be deny'd it, any more than we may deny Honour to a Man of Natural Parts, or to one who was born a Prince. Be it, thirdly, that all other Obligations could be fully requited, and conſequently we our ſelves freed from any Tie of Honour which might be ſuppos'd to ariſe from them; yet *unleſs* (as * *Philo* ſpeaks) *we could beget thoſe who begat us*, that of our Birth will remain uncancell'd, and together therewith, our Obligation of honouring them becauſe of it. Laſtly, Be it, that thou hadſt no Obligation to thy Parents in themſelves, as neither intending any other than their own Pleaſure in the Begetting, nor concerning themſelves for thee when thou wert; yet ſo far as they were God's Inſtruments in bringing thee into the World, they call for thy Regard; neither can they be neglected, without caſting a Contempt upon God himſelf: So that ſtill, if our Honour have this ground, it will be of eternal neceſſity; and we may as ſoon ceaſe to be Children, as ceaſe to be oblig'd to thoſe whom we are requir'd to honour.

* Τίνα γὰρ ἕτερον τῶν ποιήσεων ὁ μὴ συγγενεσάτων, καὶ τὰς μεγίστας παρεσχημένων δωρεὰς ὁλεγωρεῖν ἐᾷ; ὃν ἕνεκα δὲ ὑποβολιμαῖος, ἢ δι' ἀμοιβαὶ ἐνδέχονται· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ὁ γνησιωθεὶς ἀντιγωνῆσαι δύναιτο τοῦ σπείραντος, κλῆρον ἐξαίρετον ἡ φύσεως χαλεπαίνουσα πρὸς παῖδας γονεῦσιν, οἷς ἀντίδοσιν ἐλθεῖν ἀδύνατον. *Philo. de Decalog.*

But becauſe there are few Parents who contribute no farther to their Children than their Birth, and much leſs like the *Oſtrich*, which *Job* ſpeaks of, that *leaveth her eggs in the earth, and warmeth them in the duſt; forgetting in the mean time that the foot may cruſh them, or that the wild beaſt may break them*, *Job* 39. 13. and ſo on: Becauſe, I ſay, there are few Parents that ſhew themſelves ſo unnatural, nay, which do not, on the contrary, dandle their Children in their Arms, and in their Heart, and never leave off *providing for* them, till they are in a capacity to provide for themſelves; hence there ariſeth another Obligation to pay them Honour and Obedience, and ſuch a one as we muſt be very ungrateful to forget. For, if we think it a juſt ground of Honour, that we feed thoſe whom we retain, and furniſh them with all other things neceſſary for their ſupport; in the mean time not concerning our ſelves any farther, and much leſs making them the Subject of our perpetual Care, and the End of all our Toil and Travel: what Ground of Honour may we think it to be, when we have infinitely much more done for us by our Parents, to make us happy, both in this World, and in the next?

PART II.

Of the Kinds of that Honour which is to be given to Parents, which are ſhewn to be, 1. *An awful Eſteem of them, as which is the very Soul of Honour.* 2. *An outward Declaration of it, whether it be in our Geſture and Behaviour, where the general neceſſity of ſuch Expreſſions of Honour is evinced; or in our Language to or of them, the Nature whereof is alſo declared; or in our Actions. Theſe laſt divided into ſuch as miniſter directly and immediately to their Honour, or indirectly and by conſequence. Of the former ſort are, firſt, Our adminiſtring to them in their Wants, which is ſhewn both to be a Duty, and, as it may, and ought to be manag'd, an Expreſſion of our Honour: and, ſecondly, miniſtring to them in their Weakneſſes. Of the latter ſort are ſuch Actions, whatever they are in themſelves, which are done with their Conſent, in compliance with their Advice, or in obedience to their Commands. The Queſtion concerning the Conſent of Parents reſum'd, and that ſhewn to be generally neceſſary in the Principal Actions of our Life, ſuch as are, in particular, the diſpoſal of our ſelves in Marriage, or entring upon any laſting Courſe of Life. The Advice of Parents alſo conſidered, and ſhewn to have the nature of a Command, where the Parent may be preſum'd to make uſe of that Form of Speech for Loves ſake onely; but however not to be departed from, where we have not a conſiderable Reaſon to the contrary. Of the Commands of Parents, and by what our Obedience to them is to be bounded; where is ſhewn, That their Commands are of no force againſt the Commands of God, or the Magiſtrate; in things that carry an invincible Antipathy to our Inclinations, or ſuch as are greatly diſhonourable to the Child. Submiſſion to the Chaſtiſements of Parents, the fourth and laſt Declaration of our inward Eſteem.*

2. THOUGH this, and other ſuch like Precepts, whilſt they continue in their generality, do carry Conviction with them where-ere they come; yet they have not the like ſucceſs when drawn down to particular Inſtances, and apply'd to each Man's immediate Concern: The Reaſon whereof is, partly their preſſing ſo hard upon Men, aud partly that Relief which the conſideration of General Precepts gives. For finding themſelves pinch'd with ſo particular an Application, and, what ſuch a Preſſure doth naturally produce, deſirous to free themſelves; and conſidering moreover, that there is no Precept almoſt ſo general, which doth not admit of ſome Exceptions; the forementioned Preſſure, and their deſire to free themſelves from it, makes them firſt willing to believe their own caſe to be one of thoſe Exceptions, and after that actually to do it. In conſideration whereof, as the Maſters of Morality have ever thought it their chiefeſt Buſineſs to be as particular as they could in deſcribing and confirming the ſeveral Duties of it; ſo I intend at this time to follow their Example, and ſhew what particular Duties the Honour of Parents does involve.

1. And

1. And here in the first place, because that is the very Soul of Honour, and gives Life both to it and all the Expressions of it, we are to entertain in our Minds such an awful Regard of them as the Dignity of their Relation doth require; that is to say, we are to account of them as so many *Mortal Gods*, as *by whom*, under the True, *we live, and move, and have our being*: lastly, we are to account of them as his *Images* and *Agents*, as *Resemblances* of the Great Creator, or rather *Cooperatours* with him: For, as the Notion of a Parent involves all this, and therefore in reason to regulate our inward esteem of them; so the consideration thereof is of excellent use to stifle all those Conceptions which the weaknesses of our Parents might suggest. For, be it that our Parents are either of crazie or deformed Bodies, that they have weak Understandings naturally, or have liv'd to see them die before them, either of which may tempt unsetled Minds to abject thoughts concerning them; yet if we remember they were under God the Authors of our Being, and thereby, as *Moses* sometime was to *Aaron*, a *kind* of *Gods* to us, such thoughts as the other will quickly vanish, and we shall, in spite of all their Infirmities, look upon them as in the place of God, and next to him to be honour'd and rever'd.

2. But beside the entertaining honourable Thoughts of our Parents, to which I have over and above represented the most proper Motives; we are also, as was before shewn, to express those Conceits of ours by some *sensible declarations* of them: Whereof,

1. The first I shall represent, is, that which of all others seems to be the most natural, even that of *our outward Gesture* and *Behaviour*. For, as Nature it self hath prompted us to such an Acknowledgment, because inclining us to shew forth in the Behaviour of our Bodies those Affections and Passions we have within; so the Custom of the World, which is the most proper Judge of Affairs of this nature, hath made it a necessary part of that Acknowledgment; I say, not onely in respect of the Esteem of the World, but also in respect of God: For requiring, as he doth, an Acknowledgment of our inward Esteem, and such a one as may satisfie the World concerning it, he doth consequently leave it to the Judgment of the World to determine after what manner it is to be done. Now forasmuch as the Judgment of the World hath determin'd the shewing our Respects by our outward Gesture and Behaviour, it follows, that to the due honouring of our Parents, we are to take that course, and make our outward Behaviour bespeak our inward Reverence and Esteem. But from hence it will follow, that according as the Custom of the Country is, we are to rise up or bow before our Natural Parents: Which is the rather to be represented, because a Generation of Men have sprung up, with whom all these things are either superfluous or superstitious; never considering in the mean while, that they not onely run counter to the Judgment of the World (which yet, as was before observ'd, is the most proper Judge of Affairs of this nature) but also to the Judgment and Practice of the best of Men, and such whose Carriage is not lightly to be despis'd; among whom we find nothing more usual than bowing down before their Superiours, and sometimes throwing themselves as low as the Earth they trod on. Now though the omission of such like Expressions of Reverence be a sufficient breach of this Commandment, which enjoyns us the honouring

of

of our Superiours, and particularly of our Parents; yet certainly that is much more, becauſe contrary to it, which preſents them with *contemptuous* ones: Of which nature is the receiving their Advices with Laughter, or a leſs compoſed Countenance, pointing at them with the Finger, or winking with the Eye; there being no doubt a Child may be as undutiful in his Looks, as either in his Words or Actions. That of *Solomon* * ſhall ſerve both for a Proof and a Concluſion of this Affair, becauſe ſhewing both the undutifulneſs of ſuch a Behaviour, and the diſpleaſure of God againſt it: *The eye that mocketh at his father, and deſpiſeth to obey his mother, the ravens of the valley ſhall pick it out, and the young eagles ſhall eat it.*

* *Prov.* 30.17.

2. Next to honouring our Parents in our outward Geſture, proceed we to the honouring of them with our *Tongues*, which is another requiſite Expreſſion of it; the Tongue being of all the other Members the moſt apt to expreſs our inward Conceits, and therefore not to be wanting in this. Now this the Tongue may do, by ſpeaking honourably to or of them; by proclaiming their Vertues, and our own Obligations to them; by extenuating, as much as may be, their ſuppos'd Defects; by taking off the ſeveral Objections that are made againſt them; in fine, by not ſuffering any thing to fall from it (for even ſuch a *Silence* is expreſſive) which may any way offend or grieve them. Agreeable hereto is that excellent Advice of the *Hebrew* Maſters *, when the Children had occaſion to repreſent to their Parents any of their Miſcarriages: For, in ſuch a caſe (ſay they) a Man was not to ſay to his Father, *You tranſgreſs the words of the Law*; but rather, *It is written in the Law thus or thus*; and ſo as if he meant rather to *conſult* them about the meaning of it, than to admoniſh them of their Tranſgreſſion. But ſo, which is of much more force, St. *Paul* inſinuates, 1 *Tim.* 5. 1. For requiring *Timothy not to rebuke an elder, but to entreat him as a father*, he plainly ſuppoſes, that Fathers ought to be treated with reſpectful Language, even when they do offend; and how much more then, when they are not guilty of any Miſcarriage?

* *Vid. Seld. de Jure Nat. & Gent. l.* 7. *c.* 2.

3. From Reſpectfulneſs in our Language, paſs we to Reſpectfulneſs in our *Actions*, which is another Requiſite to the honouring of our Parents; as becauſe they are the moſt effectual Expreſſions of our Thoughts, ſo becauſe they are the cleareſt Acknowledgments of that Authority which God hath veſted in them, and of our own readineſs to comply with it. The onely thing worthy our pains, will be to point out thoſe Actions whereby we may do Honour to them. Now there are two ſorts of Actions whereby we may and ought to do Honour to our Parents, the former whereof miniſter *directly* and *immediately* to it, the latter *indirectly* and *by conſequence*, that is to ſay, as they are Inſtances of our Compliance with their Will and Pleaſure.

I. Of the former ſort is, firſt, the *adminiſtring to them in their wants*, and furniſhing them with all things neceſſary to their ſupport. For beſide that the Law of Gratitude requires this of us, and therefore in reaſon to be ſuppos'd to be included in that Commandment which entreats of our Duty to our Parents; it is by the *Jewiſh Maſters* * reſolv'd to be the very *Formality* of that Honour which here we are requir'd to exhibit: Wherein though perhaps they too much over-laſh'd, becauſe the Word is of a more general ſignification; yet

* *Vid. Seld. de Jure Nat. & Gent. l.* 7. *c.* 2. *p.* 834.

yet that they thought not amiſs, when they made it a principal part of Honour, the language both of the New Teſtament and Heathen Writers ſhew; St. *Paul* expreſſing the relieving of Widows, by the Title of *honouring* them, and *Hierocles** declaring that *we ſhall then honour our Parents exceedingly, when we afford them the miniſtry of our Bodies, and the aſſiſtance of our Wealth.* But ſo, when our Saviour recommended the Virgin *Mary* to St. *John*, ſaying, *Behold thy Mother*; St. *John*, as knowing that to be a part of the honour that is due unto a Parent, expreſs'd his Obedience to it by *taking her to his own home*, *Joh.* 19. 27. And indeed, however the notion of Honour may ſeem no way to agree to this affair, becauſe maintenance of it ſelf contributes little honour to him that receives it; yet, if we look more narrowly into it, we ſhall find it oftentimes to be a mark rather of Honour than Contempt. For firſt of all, Though Kings are of all others the greateſt *Almſmen*, if we ſhould judge of their Quality by their Receipts; yet inaſmuch as what they ſo receive, they receive by way of Homage, and as an Acknowledgment of their Authority over their reſpective Kingdoms; the maintenance they receive, is not only no leſſening of their eſteem, but on the contrary, an aggrandizing of it. The caſe is much the ſame as to thoſe of whom we are diſcourſing, and to whom we are required to give honour as well as to Kings and Princes; that maintenance which we afford them, being not, like other Gifts, the reſults of a voluntary Bounty, but a Tribute which we owe them, and an Acknowledgment of our Obligations to them: *It being but juſt*, as *Hierocles** ſpeaks, *that Parents ſhould make uſe of thoſe whom they have begotten and bred up.* From that firſt inſtance paſs we to another, which will yet more fully evidence the propriety of this Notion of Honour, and that is the large Penſions which Kings beſtow upon their Subjects in conſideration of ſome ſignal Service they have done them. For theſe are ſo far from being a diſhonour to the parties that have them, that on the contrary they are a credit, becauſe marks of his Eſteem by whom they are beſtowed. Whence it is, that among the *Latins* they had the Title of *Honoraria*; as if you ſhould ſay, The honourable gifts. But ſuch will our Liberality to our Parents prove, if it be in ſome meaſure anſwerable to the many Obligations they have laid upon us. For thereby we ſhall declare we give them not as Alms, but as a mark of that eſteem we have for them. Our Liberality to our Parents will prove yet more an Honour, if it be tranſmitted to them with that reſpect which is due from a Chi d unto his Parents. For ſo doing, be the Gift never ſo ſmall, it will be lookt upon as an honourable maintenance, and be an inſtance of our eſteem, as well as of our Love and Tenderneſs. And I cannot but upon this Occaſion call to mind ſome cuſtom of the *Spaniards**, who, however a proud Nation otherwiſe, do in this give a great teſtimony of their Humility; it being reported of them, that when they give an Alms they *pull off their Hats*, and put it into the Beggars hands, with a great deal of Humility. For whatever may be due from us toward indigent Perſons, this is but due from us to our Parents, and we cannot hope our Liberality will be accepted, if we conſult not their reputation in it, becauſe obliged as well to honour, as relieve them.

* *In Carm. Pyth.* Εἰς ἣ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, γονέας τιμήσουμεν ὑπερβαλλόντως, σώματος ὑπηρεσίαν καὶ χρημάτων χορηγίαν αὐτοῖς παρέχοντες, &c.

* *Loco prius citato.* Δίκαιον δὲ χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς, οὓς ἐγέννησάν τε, καὶ ἔθρεψαν.

* *See Howels Letters. Vol.* 1. *Sect.* 3. *Lett.* 31.

Next to the adminiſtring to our Parents wants, place we the *miniſtring*

* *Loco ſupra citato.*

ſtring to them in their weakneſſes, according as *Hierocles** doth; for ſo doing we ſhall yet more declare the honour we have for them, and conſequently our obſervation of this Commandment: It being far more irkſom to part with our eaſe than wealth; to lend them our perſonal Services, than ſome of the good things we enjoy. And indeed, as whoſoever ſhall conſider the Care and Pains of a Father, the Fears and ſleepleſs Nights, and homely Offices of a Mother; as, I ſay, whoſoever ſhall conſider theſe things, will not think much to miniſter to them, in the meaneſt employments which their ſeveral Infirmities may exact; ſo I know not whether it be poſſible to give them a greater teſtimony of our Honour, or requite that Care and Pains towards us. For, by thus miniſtring to them by our perſonal Services, we do in a manner outdo our ſelves, and ſhew our ſelves not their Children but their Servants. The only thing wanting to make us completely ſuch, is, that love draws us to it, and that we embrace as well as ſubmit to the Employment. That known ſtory of *Æneas* ſhall put a period to this Argument, becauſe a noble Inſtance of his Piety. For when others, after the Deſtruction of *Troy*, took care to reſcue other things, this man took up his Houſhold-gods firſt, and after that his aged Father upon his ſhoulders. By which laſt, as well as by the former, as he very well deſerv'd the Title of *Pius*, which is given him by the *Prince* of Poets, ſo he therein acted the part rather of a Father than of a Son, becauſe carrying him, who was now become a Child as he had been before borne himſelf.

2. But beſide ſuch Actions of ours as miniſter directly and immediately to the honour of our Parents, ſuch as are eſpecially thoſe before remembred; there are other that miniſter to it *indirectly*, and *by conſequence*, that is to ſay, as inſtances of our Compliance with their Will. Of which ſort are all thoſe that are done *with their conſent*, in *compliance with their advice*, or in *obedience to their commands*; whatſoever is ſo done, being a manifeſt acknowledgment of their Authority with whom we do ſo comply. The only difficulty is, how far we are bound to comply with our Parents in each of theſe, which accordingly I come now to conſider.

And firſt of all, If the queſtion be concerning the *conſent* of Parents, which is the firſt of the Inſtances before remembred, ſo I ſhall not doubt to affirm that it ought to be had in the *principal* Actions of our Life. Among which I reckon particularly, Childrens diſpoſing of themſelves in *Marriage*, or entring into any *laſting courſe of Life*. That the conſent of Parents is generally neceſſary, in the former may appear, not only from hence, that Children are not *ſui juris*, but thoſe in whoſe power they are; but alſo from the power which God hath given them over their Children, as to this particular affair; witneſs the Scriptures preſcribing Rules for Parents *taking Daughters* unto their Sons, and again, for *giving their Daughters* in Marriage unto others, as you may ſee, *Exod.*34.16. and 1 *Cor.*7.38. For the Scripture there and elſewhere attributing the Marriing of Sons and Daughters to the act of their reſpective Parents, ſuppoſeth them as to that particular, to be more in their Parents power than their own, and conſequently their Conſent at leaſt to be requiſite to the making of it. Generally ſpeaking therefore there is no doubt, the Conſent of Parents is neceſſary to be had, to make the Marriage lawful before God. Then, and then only may it be wanting when the Child is in imminent danger of falling into ſin without it, in which

which caſe, though the Conſent of Parents may and ought to be ſought, yet it is not neceſſary to be obtain'd. From the Conſent of Parents in Marriage, paſs we to the neceſſity of it toward the taking *any laſting Courſe of Life*; which we ſhall find to ſtand upon as firm Grounds as the other: For the Son, till freed by the Father, being more the Fathers than his own, he is in reaſon to be diſpos'd of by him to whom he doth ſo belong, or at leaſt not without his Conſent. If the Son do at any time fall into his own diſpoſal, as I will not ſay but ſometimes he may, it muſt be, when the Father takes no care at all of him, which is a kind of emancipation of him.

From the Conſent of Parents, paſs we to their *Advice*, and conſider what Regard is due to it in our ſeveral Actions; where again we are to conſider, whether the Father intends it onely as an Advice, and leaves it to the liberty of his Son either to follow it, or not; or whether or no, *for Loves ſake*, he chuſes to expreſs his Will in the form of one, as St. *Paul* did his to *Philemon* in the form of an *Entreaty*. If the latter of theſe be it, there is no doubt it is not onely obligatory, but much more obligatory than any Command: For, beſide that it hath in effect the nature of a Command, it hath over and above the addition of the Parents Kindneſs, which cannot be reſiſted without a great Ingratitude. The Caſe is ſomewhat different, and our Obligation alſo, if he who doth adviſe, leaves it to the liberty of his Child either to follow it, or not: For, in ſuch a Caſe, there is no doubt, if our own Reaſon leads us otherwiſe, it is lawful for us to depart from it. This onely would be added, That as we are to receive it with reſpect, and to ſhew ſome kind of unwillingneſs even in our departing from it; ſo we are not to depart from it, where we have not a conſiderable Reaſon to the contrary, and ſuch as may abſolve us before God, and all diſintereſs'd Perſons, for not adhering to it. For though an Advice have not the nature of a Command, and therefore neither the departure from it the nature of Diſobedience; yet the neglect of it, where there is not a weighty Reaſon to the contrary, hath the nature of a *Diſreſpect*, which is equally a breach of this Commandment.

The third and laſt Rule follows, even the *Command* of our Parents, which is much more cogent than the other; this being a Natural Effect of that Authority they have over us, and therefore not to be deſpis'd, without a manifeſt violation of their Honour. And accordingly, as among the *Jews* Diſobedience to them was puniſh'd with Death, as a kind of abdication of their Parents; ſo the Scriptures of the New Teſtament repreſent it among thoſe things that are *worthy of death*, as you may ſee *Rom.* 1. 30, 32. The onely thing of difficulty is, *how far* our Obedience is to extend; which accordingly I come now to conſider. For the reſolution whereof, the firſt thing I ſhall offer, is, That it *ought not* to extend to thoſe things that are *forbidden by a Power Superiour* to that of our Parents: For the Ground of Obedience being the Authority of him that commands, it is in reaſon, where it cannot be given to more, to be given unto him, where is the greateſt Authority to require it. But from hence it will follow, firſt, That we are not to obey our Parents in things before forbidden by God; God being not onely Superiour to all other Powers, but the Fountain and Author of them. Whence it is, that though St. *Paul* in one place exhort Children to be obedient to their Parents *in every*

thing, *Col.* 3. 20. yet, as he aſſigns for the Reaſon of it, its being *well-pleaſing to the Lord*, which ſhews, that it was not to extend to things of a contrary nature; ſo elſewhere * he limits it to Obedience *in the Lord*, that is to ſay, ſo far as our Obedience to him is conſiſtent with it. It will in like manner follow, ſecondly, That we are not to obey our Parents in things forbidden us by the Magiſtrate: For, though his Authority be not like that of God, yet it is ſuperiour to theirs, as having by the command of God the Souls even of Parents ſubject to it. But beſide that Obedience to Parents is to ceaſe there, where either God or the Magiſtrate have laid a Prohibition, it is alſo to be ſuppos'd not to be requir'd, where the thing under command carries *an invincible Antipathy* to our Inclinations. Thus, for example, if a Father offer ſuch an Husband to his Daughter, whom, though ſhe has endeavour'd, yet ſhe can by no means bring her ſelf to like of; in this caſe, there is no doubt ſhe is not oblig'd to marry him, how ſtrongly ſoever her Father enjoyns it on her: It being not to be thought, that where the Children themſelves have not power over their own Affections, the Parents of the Children ſhould. Laſtly, As our Obedience is not to be thought to be requir'd, where the thing under command carries an invincible Antipathy to our Inclinations; ſo, neither where it is *greatly diſhonourable* to the Child upon whom the Command is impos'd. Thus, for example, If a Father, for the hope of Lucre, or any ſuch like cauſe, command his Son to marry a Perſon who is of an ill Fame, or to enter into ſome Trade that is infinitely below his Quality; as, for example, if a Perſon of Noble Rank ſhould command his Son to be a Cobler: In theſe, and other the like Caſes, there is no doubt he may refuſe that which is ſo impos'd upon him; becauſe the Son, where the Father's Ability will ſuffice, hath a Natural Right to be bred up in ſome meaſure anſwerably to that Condition wherein he was born. Care onely would be taken, that, as we pretend not ſuch a diſparity, where in truth there is no other but what our Pride and Self-conceit makes; ſo, in this, and all other Refuſals of Obedience, we proceed with Modeſty and Humility, and rather ſeem to decline the Task that is impos'd upon us, than contemptuouſly reject it. But as other Carriage than this is not conſiſtent with that Honour, which we owe to the Authors of our Being; ſo other Commands than thoſe before-remembred, we cannot think it lawful to diſobey, if we conſider, that the Apoſtle enjoyns us to be obedient to our Parents *in all things*.

* *Epheſ.* 6. 1.

4. One onely thing remains to fill up the meaſure of that Honour which we have ſaid to be due from us to our Parents; and that is, that we expreſs our Eſteem of them by *ſubmiſſion to their Chaſtiſements*, as well as by yielding Obedience to their Commands. But becauſe that will fall in more pertinently hereafter, when I come to entreat of the Chaſtiſements of a Father, I will defer the proſecution of it till then, contenting my ſelf at preſent with that of the Son of *Sirach* *, as it lies in the Vulgar *Latin*, *Honour thy father and thy mother in work, in word, and in all patience, that a bleſſing may come upon thee from them.*

* *Eccluſ.* 3. 8.

PART

PART III.

With what variety the Honour here requir'd is to be given to either Parent: Where the giving the Father the priority in our Honour, and, when they draw different ways, the obeying him againſt the Mother, is aſſerted againſt Mr. Hobbes, *and his Objection anſwered. The Honour of our Parents otherwiſe equal. The Caſe of a Mother, who is either a Princeſs or a Chriſtian, when the Father is either a Subject or Heathen, propos'd and ſtated. A Caution againſt deſpiſing our Mother, even when we depart from her Advice or Command; and with what Humility and Modeſty that is to be done. Inquiry is alſo made, whether or no, and how far a Child may be freed from the Obligation of Honour; which is conſider'd with relation both to Deceaſed and Living Parents. That even Deceaſed Parents ought to have all thoſe Honours of which they are capable in that State, which alſo are there enumerated. Whether any Regard be due to their paſt Advices and Commands; which alſo is anſwered, and our Regard limited to ſuch Commands wherein the Honour of our Parents is concern'd; or ſuch as enjoyn few things, and eaſie of practice. The like Regard not due to thoſe Commands which relate peculiarly to the Child, or to ſuch as enjoyn things many and burdenſom. The Caſe of the* Rechabites *propos'd and conſider'd. That Children cannot be altogether free from the Obligation of any Honour, ſo long as their Parents are alive, becauſe their Parents are as much ſuch at one time as at another. All the Exemption that they can plead, is either in the Manner or the Meaſure; the Exemptions in both which, are exemplified and prov'd. That thoſe Exemptions ariſe from a ſtraiter or more important Obligation, and therefore are no farther pleadable againſt the Honour of a Parent, than thoſe Obligations ſhall be found to contravene it. Of the* Fear *of Parents, what the Ground of that* Fear *is, and how it ought to be expreſs'd. A brief Account, in paſſing, of the Dreadfulneſs and Efficacy of their Curſes. What Obligation we alſo have to* love *our Parents, and how that* Love *of ours is to be expreſs'd. That our Honour, or Fear, or Love of our Parents, is not to terminate in their Perſons; becauſe a Parent may be honour'd, or fear'd, or lov'd in others, as well as in himſelf; as, on the other ſide, ſo diſregarded and hated: The Conſequences whereof are,* 1. *The paying Honour to them that ſtand upon the ſame Level with our Parents, and particularly, to Uncles, Aunts, and Mothers-in-law.* 2. *The ſhewing Affection to thoſe who do alike deſcend from their Loins, as Brothers and Siſters.* 3. *The affording it, though not in an equal degree, to Couſins, and other remoter Kindred, becauſe iſſuing from the ſame Grandfathers and Grandmothers. As alſo,* 4. *To thoſe Friends or Servants they ſet a value on.*

3. HAVING in the foregoing Diſcourſes eſtabliſh'd the Grounds, and ſhewn the ſeveral Kinds of that Honour we are to exhibit;

hibit; the Method before laid down prompts us to inquire, *with what variety it is to be given to either Parent:* For though, as *Grotius* hath obſerv'd*, the Laws made by Men provide moſtly, if not onely for the Honour of the Father; yet the Commandment we have now before us, makes the Mother alſo the Object of it: And not without Reaſon, if we conſider, that the Mother hath a great ſhare in the begetting, a far greater ſhare than the Father in the firſt Education, and, if not an equal, yet a conſiderable part in the ſucceeding one. Taking it therefore for granted, that the Mother ought to have a ſhare in it; we will inquire, whether Honour be to be exhibited to both alike, or, if not, with what proportion to each. That it is not to be exhibited to both alike, we need no other Argument, than that it impoſſible it ſhould be: For the Father and the Mother drawing different ways, it is impoſſible they ſhould be both comply'd with; and therefore either both to be diſobey'd, which were a ſtrange way of honouring our Parents; or one of them of neceſſity to be preferr'd. The onely Queſtion therefore is, which ought to be preferr'd, and how. A *Modern Writer* * of our Nation, whether out of his kindneſs to the Female Sex, or rather to new and uncouth Opinions, prefers the *Mother*, becauſe of the ſurer ſide; and poſſibly not without reaſon, if there were any ſuch Natural State as he, though groundleſly, fancies. But as in reputation of Law both Parents are alike certain, and therefore that Suggeſtion of his of no force in the preſent Affair; ſo God himſelf, in the very Beginning, ſubjected even the Mother to the Father, and thereby plainly ſhew'd, that he ought to be preferr'd: There being no doubt (as that Author himſelf afterwards acknowledges) that he who is Head even of the Mother, is, to a far greater purpoſe than ſhe, the Head alſo of her Child. If it be ſometime otherwiſe, as, for example, when the Mother is a Princeſs, and the Husband a Subject; yet is not that ſo much becauſe ſhe is a Mother, in which reſpect ſhe is Inferiour; but becauſe ſhe hath over and above the addition of the Regal Power. One onely Caſe remains, to wit, Where the Father is *Heathen*, and the Mother *Chriſtian*, which of the two ought to be preferr'd? But as in Civil Matters there is no doubt the Father ought, becauſe *Chriſtianity* doth rather confirm than deſtroy the ſeveral States and Conditions in which it found us at our Converſion; ſo, if in Religious Matters the Mother be preferr'd, as for example, in the Educating her Child in *Chriſtianity*, it is by the Prerogative of God and *Chriſt* *, who is the Head of the Church, to which all Earthly Powers are to yield. It being thus evident, that generally the Father ought to be preferr'd; we are in the next place to inquire, after what manner that is to be done. In anſwer to which, I ſay, firſt, That it ought not to be done to the contempt of the Mother: For both of them being by Natures Law, and God's, to be the Object of our Honour, neither is to be deſpis'd; yea, though one of them, and particularly the Father, ſhould be ſo wicked as to oblige the Son to it. I ſay, ſecondly, That ſo far as they may be both honour'd, ſo far there is no doubt they ought to be; both of them being Sharers in the begetting of us, and in like manner in our Education. I ſay, thirdly, That ſo far as our outward Behaviour can declare it, they are both

* Explic. Decalog. *Leges à viris factæ ferme ſolis conſulunt patribus, ut Perſica memorata Ariſtoteli Romana deſcripta in Digeſtis ac Inſtitutionibus, Græcis etiam Philoſophis, Epicteto primum deinde & Simplicio memorata neque minùs Philoni Judæo libro de legatione.*

* *Hobbes Leviath.* ch. 20.

* *Vid. Taylor. Duct. Dubit.* l. 3. c. 5. Rule 4.

both to have an equal ſhare of it, becauſe the Father is honour'd in the honour of the Mother, as the Mother again in the honour of the Father. Only as the Father ought to have the precedency, as being but due to him for the Order wherein he ſtands; ſo, where they command different things, there is no doubt thoſe of the Father ought to be preferr'd, as becauſe for the moſt part the moſt capable of judging what is fit; ſo becauſe the head of the other Parent. Only a good Child will ſo far take care to honour both, as never to deſpiſe either; and at the ſame time he prefers the commands of his Father, ſhew by his humble and modeſt behaviour to his Mother, that he does it not in the leaſt wiſe to aggrieve her.

4. The fourth Queſtion follows, to wit, *whether or no*, and *how far, a Child may be freed from the obligation of Honour.* For the reſolution whereof, I will conſider the Child, 1. *As bereft of his Parents by death*, and 2. *As having them ſtill living.*

And firſt of all, if the Queſtion be concerning *deceaſed Parents*, who may ſeem, and no doubt have the leaſt tye upon their Children, ſo I ſhall not ſtick to affirm that they ought to have *all that honour* of which they are *capable in that ſtate*: Not only the Law of Gratitude ſo requiring, but the Honour of Almighty God whoſe Inſtruments they were, and to whom they live, though they be dead to us. Of this nature is the beſtowing upon them a Funeral anſwerable to their Condition, ſpeaking honourably of their Perſons and Actions; in fine, eſteeming thoſe perſons for whom they had a regard, and eſpecially ſuch as they upon their Death-beds commended to ours; for as theſe are no other than their Relation, and our Gratitude doth require, ſo they are ſuch of which they are equally capable as when alive. The only difficulty is, what regard is due to thoſe *Advices* or *Commands* which they laid upon us when alive. For as on the one ſide it may ſeem unreaſonable, that the Fathers authority on Earth ſhould abide after he himſelf hath no further place on it; ſo on the other ſide it hath been obſerv'd, that God hath ſtrangely blaſted thoſe Children who have gone contrary to the Commands of their deceaſed Parents; and as ſtrangely bleſſed thoſe who have been obedient to them; witneſs for the latter, that known ſtory of the *Rechabites* who are not only commended by the Almighty for abſtaining from Wine, and dwelling in Tents, in obedience to their Anceſtor *Jonadab*'s command, but promiſed moreover that their Generations ſhould abide, *Jer.* 35. 14. 19. For the reconciling of which two, ſo as neither to depreſs the authority of the Son, who ſucceeds into the Fathers Rights, nor yet to deſpiſe the Authority even of a deceaſed Father. I will firſt of all diſtinguiſh between ſuch commands wherein *the Father's honour is concern'd*, and ſuch as *relate peculiarly to the Son.* Now in the former of theſe it is, eſpecially, wherein a Father is to be heeded, becauſe he hath an equal concernment in them. Thus for Example, if, as it ſometime happens, a* Father ſhould command his Son, if need were, rather to ſell an Eſtate that came to him by others, than that which came to him by deſcent from himſelf; in ſuch a caſe I ſhould not doubt the Son were oblig'd to obſerve his command, and rather ſell any thing than that his Patrimony; becauſe by ſelling the latter he ſhould do diſhonour to his Family, and therein in particular to his

* *Fullers Worthies, Hertfordſhire.* Speaking of the *Horſeys*, obſerves that one of them diſobeying ſuch a command of his Father proſpered no whit the better for it; not one Foot of Land in *Hertfordſhire* now remaining to his Poſterity.

Father

Father from whom it immediately deſcended. In like manner, if a Father ſhould charge his Son not to marry into a Family which hath been at enmity with himſelf; in this caſe I do no way doubt but the Son is bound up to obſerve the Commands of his Father, becauſe as the matter of it hath nothing of evil in it; ſo the acting contrary thereto, unleſs where there is a great neceſſity, would be a diſhonour to his Father, inaſmuch as it may give that Family occaſion to triumph over the memory of him whom they before hated. I ſay not, the ſame of that command, which the Father of *Hannibal* laid upon him with an Oath, to proſecute the *Romans* his Enemies with an immortal hatred. For though it be not unlawful to avoid an intimate alliance with ſome perſons, yet it is both inhumane and unchriſtian to proſecute any perſon with an irreconcileable hatred, and therefore no fit matter for a Son's obedience. But let us ſuppoſe the command laid upon the Son, relate to his perſon only, (which is the other member of the diſtinction) as for Example, not to be a Biſhop, a Prieſt, or a Magiſtrate; in which caſe, though a pious Son will be well adviſed before he tranſgreſs it, and conſider what reaſon his Father might have ſo to adviſe or command him, yet he will not ſuffer himſelf to be ſo far over born by it, as to neglect his own Reaſon and great Conveniencies. For (as a Learned man * hath well obſerv'd) in thoſe things wherein a mans own meer Intereſt is concern'd, his own Underſtanding muſt be his guide, and his Will his Ruler. For he alone does lie at Stake, whether it be good or bad, and it is not reaſonable that he ſhould govern, who neither gets nor looſes, nor knows. Again, the things that are commanded (thoſe I mean that relate to the Sons perſon only) are either few, and eaſie of practice, or many and burthenſome. If the things commanded be either few, or eaſie of practice, or both, they cannot be omitted without a diſhonour to our Parents, whoſe memory we will not gratifie in ſo ſmall a matter. But if they be many, and burthenſom, the omiſſion thereof is not to be looked upon as a diſhonour to them, but as a juſt compliance with our own reaſonable Conveniencies. The only thing that will give us any trouble, is, the Inſtance of the *Rechabites*, who may ſeem to have had no very eaſie load impoſed upon them. But beſide that, the ſtory is only mentioned on the By, by which means we cannot ſo eaſily judge of the intention of *Jonadab* in it; beſide ſecondly, That it is not improbable it was enjoined in order to Religion, which if it were, will determine ſuch laſting commands to the things of Religion only; it is apparent enough they did not think themſelves ſo ty'd, but when there was a juſt cauſe, ſuch as the fear of the *Chaldeans*, they diſpens'd with their own dwelling in Tents, which was one of the things enjoin'd them. And indeed, as it will become Children not lightly to depart from their deceaſed Fathers commands, leſt they be thought to have a leſs regard for them than they ſhould. So it will no leſs become Parents, when they extend their Authority beyond their own time, to ſee that the things they impoſe be neither many nor unreaſonable; as remembring that after their deceaſe, they are at their own diſpoſal for the main, and have reaſon enough for the moſt part to guide them in the management thereof.

* *Tayl. Ductor Dubit. Book 3. Chap. 3. Rul. 6.*

From the honour of deceaſed Parents, paſs we to that of thoſe that are *alive*, and conſider whether or no, and how far Children may be freed

freed from it. In anſwer whereunto, I ſay firſt, that they can never be *abſolutely* freed from any of the kinds of Honour before remembred: Becauſe our Parents are as much ſuch in our riper years, as in our greener, when we are departed out of their Houſes, as whilſt we continued in them. And indeed, as no queſtion hath been made of that part of honour which is uſually ſtil'd Reverence, that is to ſay, of thinking honourably of, and expreſſing it in our words and geſtures; as moreover, no queſtion hath or can be made of that part of Honour which hath the name of Piety, becauſe Children muſt generally be ſuppoſed both to be of years, and of a diſtinct Family, before they can be in a capacity to relieve their Parents; ſo as little queſtion would be made of Obedience, if men did but conſider that the principal ground of it doth always abide: for it being alike true at all times, that the one is thy Father that *begot* thee, and the other thy Mother that *conceiv'd* thee; it muſt be alike true, becauſe that is the ground of thy Obedience, that thou art always to give obedience to their commands. If therefore Children be at any time free from the tie of Honour, it muſt be as to the *manner* or *meaſure*, which accordingly I come now to conſider. Thus for inſtance, Though Reverence be always due from us to our Parents, and accordingly hath by good Children been always paid to them, yet there is no neceſſity it ſhould be expreſs'd after the ſame manner by one of *full age*, as by one who is ſtill *under Pupillage*; becauſe the ſame geſtures become not one of full age, that are ſuitable enough to the tenderneſs of the other. Whence it is, that though Children in their minority are always bare before their Parents, yet thoſe of Riper age have by a general cuſtom (which muſt be judge of matters of this nature) been indulg'd a greater liberty as to that particular, even by the conſent of Parents themſelves. In like manner, that I may inſtance in the *meaſure*, Though Children dwelling in their Parents houſes, and under their power, be to yield Obedience to all their commands, and particularly thoſe that concern the Family whereof they are Members; whence it is, that we find the Father in the Parable, *Mat.* 21. 28. commanding his Sons to *go and work in his Vineyard*; yet there is not the *ſame tie* upon thoſe that are *ſent out of it*, that have a *Wife and Family* of their own to provide for, that are *delivered over to the tuition of other perſons*, or in fine, have any *publick charge* upon them. Not upon thoſe that are *ſent out of the Family*, becauſe as ſent out with their leave, ſo of neceſſity to intend their own proper Affairs. Not upon thoſe Children that *have a Wife and Family* of their own to provide for, becauſe, beſide the foremention'd reaſon, by the command of God himſelf to *forſake Father and Mother, and cleave unto their Wives*, *Gen.* 2. 24. The ſame is to be ſaid much more of Daughters, when Married, becauſe not only equally oblig'd to cleave to their Husbands, but alſo ſubjected to their commands. Whence it is, that when *Pharaoh*'s Daughter was brought to be a Wife to *Solomon*, we find her exhorted to *forget her own people and her Fathers houſe*, and to look upon, and *worſhip Solomon* as her *Lord*, *Pſal.* 45. 10, 11. But neither thirdly, is there the ſame tie upon Children that are *ſubjected to the Tuition of others*, as to thoſe that are under their Fathers roof and power, as will appear if we conſider them as made Servants to another, or paſs'd over into another Family by Adoption; for being by the Parents conſent ſubjected to

other Maſters or Fathers, they are now no more theirs who gave them Being, but thoſe Maſters or adopted Fathers, to whom they are ſo transferr'd. This only would be added, That as the Children ſpoken of in the former Inſtances, are only free from their Fathers commands by means of thoſe new Relations they have contracted; ſo they are conſequently no farther free from yielding Obedience to their Fathers commands, than the neceſſity of ſerving thoſe Relations doth exact. And therefore if a Son or Daughter that is ſent abroad to intend their own Affairs, or one that is entred into Marriage, or made a Servant, or a Son, and Daughter by Adoption; if (I ſay) any of theſe have opportunity and power to ſerve their natural Parents, there is no doubt they ought to do ſo, no leſs than thoſe who continue under their Roof. For the exception of their obedience being only in regard to thoſe new Relations they have contracted, according to that known Rule of the Lawyers, *Exceptio firmat regulam in non exceptis*, it muſt ſtrengthen the tie of Obedience where thoſe Relations do no way hinder. The only Children to be accounted for, are ſuch as have *a publick charge* upon them, whether in the Church, or in the State. For though Children are not to enter into theſe without the conſent of their Parents, if under their Fathers Tuition, or at leaſt not without the call of their and their Fathers Superiours; yet being entred, they are in reaſon to prefer the diſcharge of their Place, before any Commands of their Father; the Private Good being in reaſon to yield to the Publick; the Commands of Parents, to thoſe of Kings and Princes. Onely, as if the Child can, without the neglect or debaſement of his Charge, fulfil his Fathers Commands, there is no doubt he is oblig'd ſo to do; ſo there is ſo much of Authority in the Name of a Father, that no Dignity whatſoever will make a good Son forget it, where it is not contrary to a more important Concern.

5. The Duty of Honour being thus explain'd, and ſhewn in what manner and meaſure it is incumbent upon Children; it may not be amiſs to ſubjoyn ſomewhat concerning *Fear* and *Love*, which I have ſaid to be alſo a part of their Duty. Onely becauſe they are rather Acceſſaries, than Principal parts of Childrens Duties, I will be ſo much the ſhorter in deſcribing the Obligation they have upon them.

That we are to *fear* our Father and Mother, the Scripture hath told us, *Lev.* 19. 3. and not without cauſe, if we conſider, either that it is a part of Honour, or that there is in Parents a juſt Object of it. For, as Fear is a confeſſion of the Power of thoſe whom we have ſuch an apprehenſion of; ſo there is Power enough in Parents to excite that Paſſion in us, and make us as well to dread as eſteem them. Of this nature is, firſt, the Power of Chaſtiſement, whether as to the Body or Poſſeſſions of the Son: For, as I ſhall afterwards ſhew, that Parents have Authority to inflict either; ſo, Experience makes it evident, that they want not Power, eſpecially as to the latter Chaſtiſement; it being ordinarily in the power of Parents to withhold their Poſſeſſions from ſuch as are diſobedient to them. But of all the things we are to fear in a Parent, there is certainly nothing more requiring it, than *the Power they have with God* to procure a greater Puniſhment of our Diſobedience, than they themſelves are able to inflict. For, though (as the Scripture ſpeaks) *the Curſe cauſeleſs ſhall not come*; yet both Reaſon and Experience warrant us to believe, that the *Curſes*

ſes of Parents ſhall not be without effect, where they proceed upon a juſt Cauſe. For be it, which is true enough, that ſuch Curſes are not lightly to be us'd; be it, that generally they are not ſuitable either to the Tenderneſs of a Father, or the Spirit of the Goſpel, which will render them ſo much the more unlikely to have effect: yet, as it is evident from St. *Paul's* denouncing a Curſe againſt *Simon Magus*, and *Alexander the Copperſmith*, that Superiours are not wholly forbid the uſe of them; ſo, that it is not improper for Fathers towards their diſobedient Children, their being *a kind of Gods* to us, may ſerve for abundant evidence. But then if we add thereto, *Noah's* curſing the Poſterity of *Cham*, for making a mock of his Nakedneſs, and that Effect which it had upon them in after-times; if we moreover reflect * upon the ſad Examples which *Heathen* Stories have repreſented to us in the Children of *Oedipus*, *Amintor*, and *Theſeus*, who grew miſerable upon their Fathers Curſes; laſtly, if we add, that the ſame thing was obſerv'd by the *Jews*, one of whom, even the Son of *Sirach*, obſerves, that *the Curſe of the Mother rooteth out Foundations*, *Ecclus.* 3. 10. ſo we ſhall not need to doubt of the Effect of their Curſes, and therefore neither of their being the Object of our Fear. For if, as the *Greek* Poet obſerves,

* *Jer. Taylor, Duct. Dubit.* l. 3. c. 5. Rule 1.

Δειναὶ τοι καὶ γαῖαν ἐείνυνες ἀσὶ τοκῆων,

the Curſes of Parents are grievous upon the Earth, we have reaſon enough to fear leſt their Curſes ſhould ſometime fall upon our Heads. The onely thing worthy our farther inquiry, is, how this Fear of ours ought to be expreſs'd; which is, in ſhort, by our carefulneſs to pleaſe them in all things: For, as by ſo doing, we ſhall beſt declare the Fear we have of them, Fear naturally prompting Men to ſeek the Favour of thoſe they have ſuch an apprehenſion of; ſo we ſhall thereby ſecure our ſelves from the Effects of their Diſpleaſure, and (which is more to be dreaded) from the Effects of that of God.

From the Duty of Fear, paſs we to that of *Love*, which we ſhall find to be no leſs incumbent upon us than the former, as becauſe our Saviour hath reduc'd the Whole of the Law to Love, ſo becauſe our Parents are of all others the juſteſt Object of it: Witneſs the extraordinary Love they have naturally for us; their many, and weighty, and conſtant Demonſtrations of it; their taking care of us, when we are not able to provide for themſelves; their continuing that care over us, even when we are; their furniſhing us from time to time with all things neceſſary for our Temporal Happineſs; their inſtilling into our Minds what may make for our Eternal one; their bearing with the weakneſs and peeviſhneſs of our Infancy and Childhood; their enduring, with much long-ſuffering, the diſobedience and ſtubbornneſs of our riper Years; laſtly, their perpetual fears leſt any Evil ſhould betide us, their frequent and importunate Prayers to avert any Evil from us. For, as out of the Bowels of a Parent ſuch a Love will hardly be met with, though you ſhould ſearch for it even in the moſt tender and affectionate ones; whence it is, that God, to commend the Love he hath to us, doth for the moſt part aſſume to himſelf the Perſon of a Father: ſo, *for a recompence in the ſame* (as St. *Paul* ſpeaks) it is but requiſite that our Hearts ſhould be equally

enlarged, and expreſs it ſelf in the ſame or the like Inſtances; that is to ſay, in providing for them, when they are not able to provide for themſelves; in endeavouring to leſſen their Care and Trouble, when they in ſome meaſure are; in bearing with the weakneſſes and peeviſhneſs of their declining Years; in doing what in us lies either to remove or abate them; in furniſhing them, when they lie upon their Sick-beds, with our Aſſiſtance and Comfort; in ſupplying the defects of our Endeavours, by begging the Aid of the Divine; laſtly, in giving them the ſatisfaction of ſeeing their Care and Labour ſucceſsfully employ'd, whilſt they behold thoſe for whom they have thus labour'd, travelling equally for their Happineſs, and reflecting back upon them that kindly Heat which they ſometime gave. So doing, we ſhall at the ſame time give a proof both of our Love, and of our Honour; pay them the Affection which is due to the Bowels of a Father and a Mother, and the Reſpect which belongs to their Authority.

Now though, if we look no further than the Perſon of our Parents, what hath been already ſaid concerning their *Fear*, and *Love*, and *Honour*, will comprehend within the compaſs of it the whole of our Duty to them; yet becauſe a Man may be lov'd and honour'd in his *Relations* and *Dependents*, as well as in his *own proper Perſon*; and in like manner hated and deſpis'd: hence it comes to paſs, that to complete our Duty, we are to extend our Love and Honour *unto them*, according as their ſeveral Relations do exact. The ſequel whereof will be,

1. The paying Honour unto thoſe which ſtand upon the ſame Level with our Parents. Thus, for inſtance, though an Uncle or an Aunt can claim no Reverence or Love by vertue of the Letter of this Commandment; yet inaſmuch as they are the Brothers and Siſters of my Father or Mother, and the Sons and Daughters of the ſame Common Parents, if I either love or honour my Parents, or theirs, I muſt afford theſe a portion of it, becauſe of their near Relation. In like manner, though a Mother-in-law can claim no Reverence or Love of her ſelf, becauſe none of the Stock from whence I came; yet a Regard is due to her, as being made one with him whom this Commandment requires me to revere. Which Particular I the rather obſerve, becauſe, contrary to all right, thoſe are uſually both hated and deſpis'd: For, how can he honour his Father, who deſpiſes the one half of him, yea, ſuch a one as by the Laws of God and Man is become one Perſon with him?
2. Again, As Love and Honour is due to thoſe who ſtand upon the ſame Level with my Parents, by reaſon of their Proximity to them; ſo an Affection, though not an Honour, is due from us to our Brethren and Siſters, becauſe deſcended from the ſame Common Parents, and no leſs the Object of their Love: To whom therefore, as it concerns me to ſhew my ſelf affectionate, if I would oblige my Parents; ſo, if I ſhew my ſelf churliſh to them, I wound my Parents Bowels through their Sides, if thoſe Parents be yet alive; but, if they be not, their Honour.
3. It is to be obſerv'd, thirdly, as the reſult of the foremention'd Principle, That though the ſame Love be not due to Couſins, and

and other remoter Kindred, that is to Brethren and Siſters; yet there is a Love due to them, by reaſon of thoſe Common Grandfathers and Great-grandfathers from whom both they and we are deſcended. For, inaſmuch as they, though at a greater diſtance, contributed to our Being, and conſequently are to have a proportionable Love and Honour from us; ſo, if we have a Reſpect and Kindneſs for them, we muſt have a Love for thoſe who are equally deſcended from them with our ſelves.

4. Laſtly, If Love and Honour do naturally diffuſe themſelves from thoſe that are the immediate Objects of it, to thoſe that are their Relations and Dependents; if we have a Reſpect for our Parents, we ſhall ſhew ſome portion of it to thoſe, whether Friends or Servants, whom they made the Object of theirs.

PART IV.

A Diſcourſe of what is owing by Parents to their Children; which is ſhewn to be, firſt, the providing for their Subſiſtence. This evidenc'd from the common Conſent of Mankind, that Natural Affection which God hath implanted in Parents, and from the Scripture. The ſame farther evidenc'd from the Intention of God and Nature, in that Being which he conferreth upon Children by them, from that Dignity to which Parents are advanc'd, and from that Self-love which God hath implanted in their Hearts. That the Proviſion Parents are to make for their Children, ought to be as large as their Neceſſities, till they come of Years to provide for themſelves; yea, to continue always ſuch, if they prove impotent or fooliſh. The like not to be affirm'd, where there is no ſuch Inability. Conſideration onely to be had, whether the Ability of Children can reach to ſuch a Proviſion as is ſuitable to their Condition; for otherwiſe it ought to be ſupplied by the Parents. That the Proviſion of Parents ought to extend beyond their own Times, and they accordingly either to lay up for them, or put them into a Vocation whereby they may provide for themſelves. A Caution againſt Parents ſuffering their Care for them, to entrench upon the Duties of Juſtice or Charity; becauſe theſe are alike incumbent on them, and the beſt Legacies they can bequeath their Children. Inſtitution of Children in Life and Manners, a ſecond Duty of a Parent, as is made appear both from Nature and Scripture. The particular Duties implied in it, Inſtruction, Command, and Example; the firſt being neceſſary to teach them how to live; the two latter, to oblige them to the Practice of it. Chaſtiſing of Children, a third Duty of a Parent, and therefore alſo largely inſiſted on. That it extends not now to Death, or the cutting off a Limb; as neither to a total Diſinheriting, or the ſetting a laſting Note of Infamy upon them: Becauſe either the Peculiar of Princes, upon whom a great part of the Parents Authority is deriv'd; or not ſo agreeable to Paternal Affection; or tending rather to provoke than amend the Parties chaſtiſed. Corporal Puniſhments leſs

than

than thoſe, within the power of Parents; but yet not to be inflicted upon thoſe of riper Years, or not in the ſame manner wherein they are upon younger Perſons. Of the Meaſure in which Chaſtiſements are to be inflicted upon Children. That a principal Regard ought to be had that they be within the Quality of the Offence; and how they may be known ſo to be. The Strength of the Child, another Meaſure of Chaſtiſement; and that that, and that alone, can be look'd upon to be within it, which doth not diſable the Child from the performance of thoſe ſeveral Offices which Nature or Religion doth exact. The Relation of the Chaſtiſer, another Meaſure; and what that Relation leads to: which is either, firſt, the reforming of the Party chaſtiſed, or the deterring other Children from the like Offences. To correct either for ones own Pleaſure or Revenge, not ſuitable to a Parent. That all poſſible Submiſſion is due to thoſe Chaſtiſements which are within the forementioned Bounds; but however, no other Reſiſtance to be made, than by Flight, or an Appeal to the Magiſtrate. An Inquiry into the ſuppoſed Obligation of the Mothers Nurſing her own Child; and the Arguments for it propos'd, and anſwered.

II. OF the Duty of Children to their Parents, what hath been ſaid may ſuffice; proceed we therefore to conſider the Duty of Parents towards them, or rather unto God concerning them. Where,

1. Firſt, I ſhall conſider thoſe that are common to each Parent: And,
2. After that inquire, Whether there be any peculiar to the Mother.

1. Now there are three things incumbent upon Parents, in order to the Welfare of their Children.

1. Providing for their Subſiſtence.
2. Inſtitution of them in Life and Manners: And,
3. Chaſtiſement.

1. I begin with the firſt of theſe, even Parents providing for their Childrens Subſiſtence; where again theſe three things would be inquir'd into.

1. How it appears to be a Duty.
2. Whence the Obligation thereof ariſeth: And,
3. What Proviſion they are to make.

1. Now though *the Duty* of Parents in this Affair would moſt naturally be made out by pointing at the Grounds from whence it ariſeth; yet becauſe there are other ways to make the neceſſity thereof to appear, and ſuch too as are more intelligible to the Common ſort of Men, I think it not amiſs to begin with them; whereof, the firſt I ſhall alledge is, the Common Conſent of Mankind concerning it: For, it appearing not how all Mankind ſhould ſo unanimouſly agree upon the Neceſſity of Parents providing for their Children, if there were not ſome Principle in Nature to lead them to it; it is in reaſon to be preſum'd to be a part of Natural Duty, and ſuch as Reaſon, no leſs than Revelation, doth tie upon them. From the Conſent of Mankind, paſs we to that Natural Affection which God hath implanted

planted in the Breasts of Parents: For, as that doth naturally lead Men to make Provision for those toward whom they have so strong an Affection; so it is a sufficient Proof of the Intention of the Almighty to oblige Parents to the Practice of it: no other account being to be given, why God should implant in them so strong an affection, but to be as a Spur to them to make Provision for them. But so that Parents are naturally obliged, St. *Paul* declares in his Epistle to the *Romans*, and the Second to the *Corinthians*: Witness for the former, his charging upon the *Heathen*, among other things, the * want of *natural affection* to their Children, *Rom.* 1. 31. for the latter, his express Affirmation, that *Parents ought to lay up* for them, 2 *Cor.* 12. 14. For, inasmuch as nothing but a Sin could be the matter of a Charge; as nothing could be a Sin to the *Gentiles*, which was not a breach of Nature's Law; by charging the want of natural affection upon the *Heathen*, he manifestly implies it to have been a transgression of Nature's Law, and consequently that the contrary was commanded by it. The same is yet more evident from that other place, where he affirms in express terms, *That Parents ought to lay up for them*, for, *though* (as a Learned Man * hath observ'd) *St. Paul speaks it, but upon the By, and by way of illustration of another Argument*, yet is that so far from lessening the importance of it, that on the contrary it adds a greater Force to it; *such illustrations* (as the forequoted Person remarks) *being ever taken à notiori*, and from such common notions as are granted and consented unto by all reasonable men.

* Text. *Gracus ἀστόργους. Quod propriè significat expertes naturalis affectûs erga liberos.*

* *Sanderson.* Two Cases of Conscience, pag. 72

2. Having thus shewn it to be a natural duty of Parents to provide for their Childrens subsistence, which is the first of those things we proposed to consider, proceed we in the second place, according to the method before laid down, to shew *from whence the Obligation thereto ariseth*; which is first of all *from the intention of God and Nature, in that Being which he conferrs* upon Children by them. For the Intention of God and Nature being to make those to whom he gives it happy, he must consequently be supposed to have enjoin'd the adding of those things which may serve for the procuring of it. Otherwise our Birth would have been rather an Infelicity than a Benefit, because exposing us to those Evils which but for our Birth we should never have receiv'd. Now, forasmuch as God intended our Birth for our benefit, forasmuch as that cannot be, where the conveniencies of Life are wanting, he must consequently be supposed to have enjoin'd the adding of them also, so far as it is in the power of Parents to procure them. From the intention of God and Nature in our Birth, pass we to that *dignity* which we have before said, Parents to be advanc'd to; that is to say, to be as Gods to those whom they were the Authors of. For as that dignity of theirs doth oblige those who are their Children, to look upon and revere them as such; so it doth no less oblige the Parents to do things becoming that divine dignity to which he hath advanc'd them. Otherwise they shall not only bring a scandal upon themselves, but upon him whose Images they are. Now forasmuch as it is no way becoming that dignity to which they are advanc'd, to cast off those creatures which they have produc'd, God whose Image they bear no less, providing for his Creatures when made, than contributing to the Being of them at first; it follows, that as Parents are a kind of Gods to us, by the Being which they gave us, so they ought to shew them-

themſelves to be farther ſuch, by preſerving what they have made, and continuing what they before gave. Laſtly, foraſmuch as Children are not only the workmanſhip of their Parents, but alſo like that of the Spider, *woven out of their own Bowels.* Hence there ariſeth another Obligation of making proviſion for them ſo far as they may ſtand in need of them. For, inaſmuch as *no man* yet either did, or could without a great unnaturalneſs, *hate his own fleſh*, no man can without the like unnaturalneſs withold nouriſhment from thoſe who are no other than a portion of it.

3. That Parents ought to make proviſion for their Children, together with the grounds of that Obligation, we have ſeen already; proceed we now to conſider *the proviſion they are to make.* In order whereunto, I will conſider their ſeveral ſtages through which their Children are to paſs. And firſt of all, If the queſtion be concerning Children, before they have either Ability or Reaſon to provide for themſelves, ſo, there is no doubt the proviſion of Parents ought to be as large as the neceſſities of their Children. For as the weakneſs of Children in that ſtate takes away all pretence of putting any part of it upon them, ſo the ſame reaſon, which obliges Parents to provide for their Children at all, obliges them to provide for them altogether, where there is a like neceſſity of it. The ſame is to be ſaid of Children, who, however of years of ſtrength and diſcretion, are yet by reaſon of ſome defect in Nature, either impotent or fooliſh; theſe being as much Children, as thoſe of younger years, and therefore to have a like Intereſt in our care and providence. From Children which have not arriv'd to Ability and Diſcretion, paſs we to thoſe that have, but continue ſtill in their Fathers Family, or at leaſt have the opportunity of their Fathers Aſſiſtance and Advice. Where firſt, I ſhall not ſtick to affirm that there is no neceſſity the proviſion ſhould be as large, as for Children of a lower ſtate. For the general ground of making proviſion for others, being the neceſſities of thoſe we provide for; our obligation to make proviſion muſt ſo far ceaſe, as we ſee their neceſſities do. And therefore if a Child be in ſome meaſure able to provide for himſelf, there is no doubt but a Father may oblige him to it, and ſubſtract ſo much of his own providence. But to thoſe very creatures, whom God hath ſent us to learn Providence of, have taught us by their example to proceed. For how great ſoever their affection to their young ones is, yet they generally leave them to their own conduct, when they are able to ſhift for themſelves. This only would be added, which hath no place in other creatures, that conſideration ought to be had of the quality of Children, or rather of thoſe from whom they are deſcended. For, as, the proviſion Parents ought to make for their Children, ought to be anſwerable to the condition, both of themſelves and of their Children; ſo if the ability of their Children will not reach to ſuch a proviſion, the Parent is to ſupply it by his care and providence, and not only furniſh him with ſuch things as are neceſſary for a Son, but for the Son of ſuch a Father. For by the ſame reaſon a man is to provide more for a Child, as being of a nobler Nature, than we find other Creatures do for their young Ones; by the ſame, a Man of more noble Condition, is to provide more largely for his Child, than if he were the Son of a more Inferiour Perſon. But becauſe what hath been hitherto ſaid, doth rather concern the making proviſion for

a Child in his Fathers Houſe, or at leaſt during his Life, then after his Fathers deceaſe; and becauſe St. *Paul* hath repreſented this laſt as no leſs the Duty of Parents, where he tells us, that they ought *to lay up for them*: therefore inquire we, in the third place, *Whether or no Parents are oblig'd to do it*, and *after what proportion*. Now, *that ſo they are*, (which is the firſt thing to be ſhewn) beſide what was alledged out of St. *Paul*, will appear from the neceſſity Children generally ſtand in of it. For, beſide that after their Parents deceaſe they muſt needs be leſs able than before to attain to ſuch a condition of life as is ſuitable to their reſpective qualities, they wanting in that ſtate, that Advice and Aſſiſtance of their Parents which might have facilitated their way to it; ſo it is but requiſite, that, to ſupply that defect, Parents ſhould either train up their Children to ſome Calling by which they may be able to provide for themſelves, (which is indeed an *excellent Portion*) or, if that will not ſuffice, or be not ſuitable to their Condition, that they lay up for them that which *Solomon* tells us anſwers all things? Otherwiſe they will leave them unprovided for, as to that ſtate, which ſtands moſt in need of it. Neither will it avail to ſay, there is no reaſon the Fathers care ſhould reach beyond his own life, when we have before ſaid, that the Child's obedience generally ought not. For as I have before ſhewn, that the Honour of a Parent ought to abide after his death, and Obedience to his Commands alſo, ſo far as that is concerned in it; ſo it is but requiſite, that, anſwerably to that, a Fathers care ſhould extend beyond his own time, and not only provide for his Children during his own life, but as much as in him lies afterwards; eſpecially when the neceſſities of his Child, which is the ground of making proviſion for them, is then likely to be greater than before. The only thing to be enquired into, in this affair, is, after what proportion a Father is to provide for them. For the reſolution whereof, though I might have referr'd you to what was ſaid before, concerning making proviſion for them in the Parents life time, becauſe giving us to underſtand that both the one and the other ought to be according to the condition of the Father, yet I thought it not amiſs to bring it anew before you, if it were only to add this neceſſary limitation to a Fathers care; to wit, that he ought not ſo to ſee to the providing for his Children, as to forget to miniſter of his ſubſtance to the more publick concernments of Church or State, or the preſſing and inſtant neceſſities of thoſe charitable Objects he hath before him. For, as both the one and the other ought rather to be regarded, than the leaving to our Children a pompous and glorious Eſtate, ſo he that *forgets not to do good and to communicate*, provides much better for his Children, than he who will not ſuffer any, the leaſt part of his Eſtate to paſs away from them; *Money lent to God*, as all that is ſo employ'd is*, being (as *Maſter Herbert* hath well obſerv'd‖) *plac'd ſurer for the Childs advantage, than if it were given to the Chamber of London*, which was *in his time* the beſt ſecurity in the world.

* *Pro.* 19. 17.
‖ Country Parſon. chap. 10.

2. The ſecond duty of Parents follows, even the inſtitution of their Children in Life and Manners, which is a proviſion for their better part, their Souls, concerning which, therefore, I will ſhew firſt, *the Authority by which it ſtands*, the *Duties it contains*, and the *Inconveniences that attend the omiſſion of it*. And firſt, if we enquire *by what*

Authority the Inſtitution of Children ſtands, we ſhall find it to be by the ſame whereby all other moral Duties do, that is to ſay, by the *Law of Nature* and *Revelation*; both the one and the other binding it upon the Conſciences of Parents, and that too, more ſtronger than the former. That *the Law of Nature* doth, the Argument before alledg'd for Parents making proviſion for their Subſiſtence, is to me an abundant Evidence. For the deſign of God in our Birth, being the happineſs of thoſe to whom he gives a Being, he muſt conſequently be ſuppoſed to have enjoyn'd the adding of thoſe things which may ſerve for the procuring of it: Which being in an eſpecial manner to be underſtood of a holy Inſtitution, becauſe our Eternal happineſs doth depend upon it, will make the addition of that, even by Natures Law, more incumbent upon Parents, than the providing for their Temporal one. The ſame is no leſs evident from *the poſitive Laws of God*, as well thoſe of *the Old Teſtament*, as *the New*; in the former whereof * we find Parents commanded to *teach Gods Commandments diligently unto their Children, and to talk to them of them when they ſit in their Houſe, and when they walk by the way, when they lie down and when they riſe up*; in the latter ||, which is tantamount, though expreſſed in fewer words, *that they ſhould bring them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord.* From the Authority by which this Duty ſtands, paſs we to the particulars it contains, which may be reduced to theſe Three Heads, *Inſtruction*, *Command*, and *Example*; the firſt to ſhew them how they ought to Live and Act, the two latter to induce them to the practice of it. For as it is impoſſible for Children to live well till they know what it is to do ſo, or know it without a precedent Inſtitution, they neither bringing with them into the world a knowledge of their Duty, nor being able through the tenderneſs of their Underſtandings to find it without the help of others; ſo the pravity of their Natures makes it but neceſſary that they ſhould be Oblig'd as well as Inſtructed, and Encourag'd as well as Oblig'd. The former whereof, as it is beſt done by the Parents commands, which, till the minds of Children come to be debauch'd, have a mighty influence upon them; ſo the latter, by the Parents ſhewing themſelves a Pattern of thoſe things which they bind upon them by their Inſtruction and Commands; nothing prevailing more with Children than Example doth, nor any Example more than that of a Father. Which therefore, as it is but neceſſary that Parents ſhould ſuperadd to compleat the Inſtitution of their Children, ſo woful experience ſhews, that the want of that alone makes all other ways of Inſtitution fruitleſs; it being rare to find a Child, who is not more debauch'd by his Fathers ill Example, than regulated by his wholeſome Inſtruction and Commands. Having thus ſhewn, as well what the Inſtitution of Children implies, as by what Authority it ſtands, it remains only to give it ſo much the more weight, that I repreſent ſome of thoſe *inconveniencies* which attend the omiſſion of it. For, to ſay nothing at all, that that Father is like to be ill ſerv'd himſelf, who hath not taught his Children to revere his and their common parent God; nor yet that the omiſſion of a Holy Inſtitution may expoſe them to the taking ſuch Courſes as will bring little comfort, either to their Children or themſelves; I ſhall deſire ſuch Parents to conſider how they will be able at that great day to look thoſe Children in the face, whom they have begotten only to Eternal Torments. For, as, if they have the bowels of a Father, it can-

* Deut. 6. 7. 11. 19.

|| Eph 6. 4. Gr. ἐν παιδείᾳ, quod ſignificat inſtitutionem per pœnas. vid. Grot. in loc.

cannot but be an infinite affliction to them, to ſee thoſe who are a part of themſelves plung'd in Eternal Torments; ſo, if they have any the leaſt ſhame, it will be an equal confuſion to them to conſider, that they became ſo by their means, even by theirs who ought in reaſon to have done their utmoſt to make them happy, and enſtate them in Gods Kingdom, as well as in their own poſſeſſions. For by how much greater their obligation thereto was, ſo much the more reproachful muſt be the violation of it, and though it could be ſuppoſed poſſible to bear up againſt the reproaches of a ſtranger, yet it will be a hard matter certainly to hear a Son, and that juſtly, curſing his Father for giveing him a Being, which hath only helped to make him Eternally miſerable.

3. To the Inſtitution of Children in Life and Manners, ſubjoin we *the chaſtizing* of them, for ſo both the neceſſities of Children and the Scriptures require; there being no Children ſo towardly, which may not ſtand in need of it, nor any other thing more enjoyn'd upon Parents when they do. Of which, beſide the many Precepts that the Scriptures afford us, and particularly the *Proverbs of Solomon**, that of the ‖ Author to the *Hebrews*, *If ye be without chaſtiſement, whereof all are partakers, then are ye Baſtards and not Sons*, may ſerve for an abundant evidence. For well may that be look'd upon as a duty of a Parent to his Child, the omiſſion whereof muſt put the Child into the number of Illegitimate ones. The only thing of difficulty in this affair, is *to what evils it may extend, what ought to be the meaſures of the inflicting of thoſe which it doth*, and *what ſubmiſſion is due from Children to them.* And firſt of all, If the queſtion be concerning *the Evils to which a Fathers chaſtiſement may extend*, ſo I ſhall not doubt to affirm firſt, that it ought not to go ſo far, as the taking away the Life of the offending Son. For, though Fathers anciently had power of Life and Death, yet it was then only when they were alſo Princes; which Authority being now veſted in other hands, the power of Life and Death muſt be ſuppoſed to paſs over to them, and conſequently, not now to belong to Fathers. The ſame is to be ſaid of taking away a Limb, however, no doubt, anciently in the power of Fathers. For beſide that, this would be an entrenchment upon the Prerogatives of Princes, to whom by the Inſtitution of God, the Sword of Juſtice is committed, it is neither agreeable with the nature of a Father, which is kind and affectionate, nor with thoſe bounds which the Apoſtle hath ſet to a Fathers chaſtiſement; there being, no doubt, ſuch an Evil would rather exaſperate Children againſt their perſons, than prompt them to yeild them a more ready obedience to their commands. The ſame is to be ſaid Thirdly, of cutting off an offending Son from any Right in his Fathers Eſtate, that is to ſay, not only from being his Heir, but from enjoying any part of his Poſſeſſions. For, however ſuch Actions as theſe may well ſuit with the Authority of Kings, yet not with that of Fathers, which is an Authority mixt with Clemency, and deſigns not ſo much the execution of Vengeance, as the reclaiming of the Offender. Laſtly, though it may be ſuitable enough to the Authority of Princes, to ſet a laſting note of Infamy upon the Diſobedient, yet it is no way agreeable to that of Parents, becauſe, though allowed to chaſtiſe, yet not to provoke their Children, which ſuch a Brand would infallibly do. But other Chaſtiſements than theſe, as I

* *Prov.* 13. 24. 19. 18. 22. 15. 23. 13.

‖ *Heb.* 12. 8.

ſee no reaſon to forbid Parents, provided they be us'd with moderation; ſo, the Charge of Chaſtiſing being general, it is in reaſon to extend to all thoſe Evils which there is not ſome peculiar Reaſon to reſtrain Parents from; eſpecially when it is certain they have the power of Corporal Puniſhment*, which is the higheſt they are in a Capacity to inflict. This onely would be added, That in the inflicting of Corporal Puniſhments, reſpect ought to be had to the Age of the Party chaſtis'd: For though, as was but now ſaid, Corporal Puniſhments are within the power of Parents, if we conſider it in the full Latitude thereof; yet they are not to be inflicted upon Children of full age, or at leaſt not in that manner, in which they may be upon younger Children: ſuch Chaſtiſements, by the reproachfulneſs thereof, being more likely to provoke Perſons of Years to ſhew themſelves undutiful, than incline them to yield a more ready Obedience to their Commands.

* See the places before-quoted out of the *Proverbs.*

Having thus ſhewn to what Evils the Power of Paternal Chaſtiſement doth extend, inquire we, in the next place, into *the meaſure of inflicting them*: For the reſolution whereof, I obſerve in the general, That conſideration ought to be had of *the Quality of the Offence*, of *the Strength of the Offender*, and of *the Relation of the Chaſtiſer*: He that chaſtiſeth his Child *beyond the merit of his Offence*, being certainly *unjuſt*; he that chaſtiſeth him *beyond his Strength*, *cruel*; he that doth *beyond the meaſures of a Father*, *unnatural*. But becauſe it may be ſtill inquir'd, when the Chaſtiſement is within the aforeſaid limits, that is to ſay, within the Quality of the Offence, the Strength of the Offender, and the Meaſures of a Father; I think it not amiſs, for the farther elucidation of this Affair, to ſay ſomewhat to each of theſe. For the firſt of theſe, to wit, when the Chaſtiſement is *within the Quality of the Offence*, much muſt be left to the Conſcience of the Chaſtiſer, becauſe of the variety of Circumſtances wherewith they may be attended: Onely, that I may not leave it altogether uncertain, I will ſubjoyn this general Rule, which may ſerve for a competent Direction in it; that is to ſay, That conſideration be had of the Contumacy of the Offender, and the general Cuſtom of Parents. For, as one and the ſame Crime may admit of Degrees, according to the Degrees of Contumacy wherewith it is committed; ſo, what Chaſtiſement is due to each, will be beſt judg'd of by the general Cuſtom of *Chriſtian* Parents; a general Cuſtom being, for the moſt part, the reſult of an approved Reaſon, and therefore no unfit Rule for particular Perſons to proceed by. From the Quality of the Offence, paſs we to *the Strength of the Offender*, which will miniſter leſs Matter for our Inquiry: For, as it will be eaſie for Parents, upon the knowledge they have of their Childrens Conſtitutions, to diſcern what they will be able to bear; ſo, that, and that onely, is to be concluded to be within their Strength, which does not diſable them from the performance of thoſe ſeveral Offices which Nature or Religion does exact. The onely thing requiring a more accurate Examination, is, What are *the Meaſures of a Father*; which are, in ſhort, theſe two: Firſt, and chiefly, *the Reformation of the Party chaſtis'd*; and ſecondly, *the deterring his other Children from the like Offences.* For, as it is evident from the * Scripture, that the Parents Love of the Child is the moſt proper Ground of Chaſtiſement; ſo, the Places before-quoted

* *Prov.* 13. 24. — But he that loveth him, chaſteneth him betimes. *Heb.* 12. 6, 7.

quoted out of the *Proverbs*, ſhew the Reformation of the Child to be the principal, if not onely end of Gods obliging Parents to chaſtiſe them. But from hence it will follow, not onely that Parents ought not to chaſten Children for their own pleaſure, or to gratifie their Anger and Revenge; but alſo, that, where a leſs Chaſtiſement is likely to have effect, the Parent is not generally to inflict a greater: I ſay, generally, becauſe a greater one may be ſometimes neceſſary, to deter his other Children from the like Offence: Which, as there is no doubt the Parent ought to have a regard to, as being concern'd for the welfare of them all; ſo the offending Son hath no juſt Cauſe to take exception at it, provided the Puniſhment be within the meaſure of the Offence: It being but reaſonable, that he ſhould inſtruct thoſe by his Chaſtiſement, whom by his evil Practice he hath given a temptation to offend. Which ſaid, nothing remains to account for, but *what Submiſſion is due from Children to the Chaſtiſement of their Parents*; which will require no great pains to reſolve. For, as no doubt can be made, but where the Chaſtiſement is within due Bounds, all poſſible Submiſſion is due from the Children to it; the ſame Authority that licenſeth the Parent to chaſtiſe, obliging the Child to acquieſce in it: ſo, even where the Chaſtiſement is exorbitant, no other Reſiſtance can be ſuppos'd to be lawful, than what is made either by flying from it, or appealing to thoſe to whom even Parents ought to be ſubject; other Reſiſtance than that, overthrowing that Subordination which God hath ſet between a Child and a Parent.

2. Of thoſe Duties which are common to both Parents, what hath been ſaid may ſuffice; proceed we therefore to inquire, whether there be any peculiar to the Mother. The Ground of which *Quærie* is an Opinion that hath prevail'd, of Womens being generally obliged to nurſe their own Children. What Reaſons there are for ſuch a Surmiſe, may be ſeen in a Diſſertation of *Favorinus**, where that Matter is argued with great Eloquence and ſhew of Reaſon. The ſum of his Argumentation is, That Nature doth as it were prompt the Mother to it, by that Nouriſhment which it ſends into her Breaſts; that the Milk of the Mother is moſt agreeable to the Child that is to be maintain'd by it; that ill Diſpoſitions of Mind may be contracted from the Nurſes they make uſe of; and in fine, that much of that Affection which is due from the Child to the Mother, and, on the other ſide, from the Mother to the Child, may be taken off, by putting them out to Nurſe to Stranger Women. Which Reaſons, how plauſible ſoever in appearance, ſeem to me not to have that force which they are commonly apprehended to be of: For though it be true, in the firſt place, that Nature commonly furniſheth the Mother with an Ability to perform that Office to the Child; yet as that may be look'd upon rather as the Kindneſs of God and Nature, than any Obligation to the doing of it; ſo, that it induceth no Obligation to the Undertaking of it, will need no other proof, than that the Nouriſhment of the Child may be otherwiſe as happily procur'd. For the Means of any thing becoming valuable by its ſubſerviency to that End which it is made uſe of to procure; where the End may be attain'd by more Means than one, there, no doubt, it ſhall be lawful for the Party concern'd to make uſe of either, according as their own Conveniences, or other Circumſtances ſhall perſwade. All therefore that it will concern us to

* *Vid. A. Gell. N. A. Attic. l. 12. c. 1.*

to ſhew, is, That the End may be as happily attain'd by other Means; which will conſequently lay the ſtreſs of Mothers Obligation (if indeed there be any) upon the leſs aptitude of other Means, which the following Objections are intended to eſtabliſh. To bring therefore the Controverſie to an Iſſue, let us conſider thoſe Objections, and firſt of all that which pretends, that the Milk of the Mother is moſt agreeable to the Child that is to be maintain'd by it. Now, that ſo it is not, will appear, if either we compare it with the Bringing up of Children by Hand, as it is commonly called, or with the Milk of other Women. For beſide that late Experience ſhews, that many Children have been brought up the former way, without any conſiderable inconvenience; the ſame Experience gives us to underſtand, that Nurſes, if healthful Women and ſtirring, (as the greateſt part of them are) do perform that Office with as great or greater ſucceſs, than the Mothers themſelves do, eſpecially if (as moſt of thoſe are that put out their Children) they be Women of more nice Conſtitutions, and more dainty, and therefore leſs healthful Feeding. As little or leſs am I mov'd with that following Suggeſtion of *Favorinus*, of Childrens contracting ill Diſpoſitions of Mind, and particularly Poorneſs of Spirit, from thoſe mean Perſons Women make uſe of for their Nurſes. For beſide that the contrary is frequently ſeen in the Children of greater Perſonages, who are all upon the matter nurs'd by Women of meaner Birth than their Mothers, there want not even among the poorer ſort, Women of Spirits above their Fortunes, and, to whom therefore, if that be all, they may put their Children. By which means, all the force there is in Womens being obliged to nurſe their own Children, muſt be grounded upon the preſumption of the Affections of the Mother and the Child being likely to be abated, by making choice of a Stranger to perform the Office of a Nurſe to them. But as that is on the part of the Child a groundleſs Preſumption, it being not at all rare for thoſe Children who have been nurs'd by their Mothers, to ſhew as little affection to them, as thoſe that have been nurs'd by others; ſo, that it is otherwiſe on the part of the Mother, will be hard to be believ'd by thoſe who have made any Obſervations upon it: Women of better Fortunes, and who therefore for the moſt part place their Children abroad, being generally as fond or fonder of their Children, than Women of meaner Birth and Fortunes, who for the moſt part are their own Nurſes.

PART V.

Of Kings *or* Princes, *and all that are in Authority. The Ground of the Honour of Princes, their being,* 1. *God's Miniſters and Vicegerents;* and, 2. *Of his Deſignation and Appointment. The former of theſe evidenced from their being ſtiled Gods, as their Throne the Throne of God. That this was not peculiar to the Jewiſh Princes, evidenced from St.* Paul, *who ſtiles the Powers of his Time the Miniſters of God. An Anſwer to what is objected out of St.* Peter, *concerning their being ſtiled the Ordinance of Man. That Princes are of God's Deſignation and Appointment, as well as his Miniſters and Vicegerents; becauſe that Authority wherewith they are inveſted, cannot become theirs, but by the Grant of him to whom they do originally belong. How it may appear, that the Princes that now are, are of God's Deſignation and Appointment; where is ſhewn, firſt, That they neither do nor can pretend to any Immediate Appointment, as thoſe of the* Jews *might; but onely a mediate one: And ſecondly, That that Appointment is mark'd out to us by the Diſpenſations of his Providence, which are moreover ſhewn to be a ſufficient Teſtimony of it. Evidence of that Appointment in ſuch Princes as arrive at their Authority by the ordinary Courſe of Things, or ſuch as arrive at it by extraordinary Means, and particularly by Fraud and Violence. By what Means theſe laſt become legitimate Powers; and particularly, by what Means the* Roman *Emperours came to be ſo. Of the ſorts of Honour which are to be paid to Princes, which are ſhewn, as before in Parents, to be,* 1. *An Inward Eſteem of them;* and, 2. *An Outward Declaration of it. This latter evidenc'd in the Declaration that is made by the Geſture, and by the Tongue: where moreover is ſhewn at large, the Sinfulneſs of ſpeaking evil of Princes, even where there want not real Failings in them.*

IT being evident from the general Explication of this Commandment, that *Kings*, and *all that are in Authority*, are included in the Name of Fathers; and it being no leſs evident from St. *Peter*, 1 *Pet.* 2. 17. that the Honour of Kings is a part of *Chriſtianity*; for the fuller Explication of this Commandment, I will allot them a place in my Diſcourſe, and therein inquire,

1. What the Grounds of Honouring Kings or Princes are.
2. What Honours are to be exhibited to them.
3. Anſwer the Objections that are commonly made for the denial of thoſe Honours, and particularly that of Submiſſion to their Cenſures.
4. After which I will deſcend, in the fourth place, to conſider of the Honour of Inferiour Magiſtrates, and ſhew upon what Grounds, and after what Manner and Meaſure, that Honour is to be paid.
5. And laſtly, Speak a Word or two of their Duty.

1. Honour, as was before ſhewn, being nothing elſe than an Acknowledgment

knowledgment of his Excellencies whom we honour; to know what the ground of the Honour of Princes is, we muſt enquire what thoſe Excellencies are by which they ſtand commended to the world. In order whereunto, I know not what ſhorter courſe to take, than by having recourſe to the 13. Chapter to the *Romans*, where this matter is both largely and perſpicuouſly handled. For exhorting, both once and again, that *every Soul* ſhould be *ſubject* to them, and that too, *not only for Wrath, but for Conſcience ſake*; the Apoſtle aſſigns for the reaſon of that ſubjection, that they are men of *Power* or Authority, that they are inveſted with that Authority by God, that they are appointed by him over thoſe that are under their ſubjection, that they are Gods *Miniſters* and Vicegerents in the governance of them, that they have both Authority and Command to reward and encourage the good, and to draw out the Sword of Juſtice againſt Evil doers; from all which put together, it is evident that the ground for which a Prince is to be honoured, is, that he is *Gods Miniſter* and Vicegerent here on Earth, and of *his deſignation* and *appointment*.

For the further evidencing the former, whereof, as in which it concerns us to be well ſatisfied in regard of ſome evil Opinions that have been lately oppoſed to it; the firſt thing that I ſhall alledge, is, Gods giving them *his own* Auguſt *name*. For thus, *Exod.* 22. 28. after he had ſaid, *Thou ſhalt not revile the Gods*, to let us know what *Gods* he means, he ſubjoins in the next words, *nor ſpeak evil of the Ruler of thy people*. But ſo we find them elſewhere more apparently ſtil'd, *Pſal.* 82. 6. For as his words there are expreſs, *I have ſaid ye are Gods*, ſo it is apparent from the whole Pſalm that they are Princes to whom he thus ſpeaketh, ſuch, to whom it belongs *to judge* the cauſes that are brought before them, to *do juſtice to the afflicted and needy*, by *defending* and *delivering* them, and *ridding them out of the hand of the wicked*. Which Offices, though they may, and for the moſt part are communicated to Inferiour Magiſtrates, and particularly to thoſe that have the name of Judges; yet as they are originally in the Prince by whom they are ſo communicated, and executed in his Name, and by his Authority, ſo that they are a part of his natural Power, *Solomon* ſhews, 1 *Kings* 3. 7. 9. he upon Gods making him King in the ſtead of *David* his Father, begging of him that he would give him *an underſtanding heart to judge his people*, and *to diſcern between good and bad*. And accordingly as we find *Solomon* himſelf, in conſequence of the Royal Authority, giving judgment between the two Harlots that contended for the Living Child, *verſ.* 27, & 28. of the forequoted Chapter; ſo that the Kings of *England* heretofore ſat perſonally in judgment, is notorious from Story, and the *Bench* whereon they ſat, for that very reaſon ſtiled to this day, The *Upper* or *Kings Bench*. But beſide that, Princes have the name of God, which is no contemptible indication of their being his Subſtitutes and Vicegerents; we find moreover, that *God judgeth* among them, yea, that *their Throne* is no other than *Gods*. For thus, what is in 1 *Kings* 2. 12. *Then Solomon ſat upon the Throne of David his Father*, is elſewhere expreſſed, *Then Solomon ſat upon the Throne of the Lord as King, inſtead of David his Father*. 1 *Chro.* 29. 23. And, which comes yet more home to our purpoſe, what was ſaid by *Jehoſaphat* to the Judges he had appointed, that they *judged not for man but for the Lord*, 2 *Chron.* 19. 6. for what

what greater proof can we desire of Princes, being Gods Substitutes and Vicegerents, than the bearing of his name, and sitting in his Throne, and that they who judge for, and under them, judge not for Man, but for the Lord? Neither will it avail to say, that how true soever this may have been of the Kings of *Judah*, which had sometime the Title of a *Theocraty*, yet the like cannot be affirmed of other Princes. For as it is apparent enough that they were not such at the time of their Kings (God himself having told *Samuel*, that when they went about to desire a King, they *rejected him from being King* over them, and the Word of God, that they both *desired* and *had* a King *after the manner of other Nations*) So what is in the Old Testament affirm'd of the *Jewish* Kings, St. *Paul* sticks not to affirm of the *powers* that then were, where he calls them the *Ministers of God*. But from hence it will follow, whatever hath been pretended to the contrary, that Princes do not derive the power they have from the people. For, if they be Gods Ministers, it is his Authority by which they shine, neither have they any other Fountain of their Power, than that * which is the Fountain of their Being. And though I know the contrary hath been pretended from the Scripture, inasmuch as those Powers are by our Translation of it stiled *the ordinance of man*, 1 *Pet.* 2. 13. yet, as the words which they render, *Submit your selves to every ordinance of Man*, import no other than || the doing of it *to every humane creature*, that is to say, (for so both the Subjection injoin'd, and the Persons † into whom it is branch'd shews) *to every humane creature* that is *in Authority*; so what the same St. *Peter* adds, as the grounds of our so doing, doth plainly overthrow that counterfeit interpretation. For, requiring the subjecting our selves to them *for the Lords sake*, he shews it is his Authority which commends them, and for which they are to be rever'd.

* Irenæ. l. 5. c. 24. *Cujus enim jussu homines nascuntur, hujus jussu & reges constituuntur.* Tertul. Apol. c. 30. *Inde est imperator, unde & homo antequam imperator; inde potestas illi unde & spiritus.*

|| Ὑποτάγητε πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει. See Ushers Power communicated by God to the Prince, &c. pag 3. & seq

† Εἴτε βασιλεῖ, ὡς ὑπερέχοντι, εἴτε ἡγεμόσιν.

That Princes are Gods Vicegerents here on Earth, hath been at large declar'd, it remains that we also shew them to be *appointed by God* as such. For as no one *taketh to himself the honour* of Priesthood, *but he who is called of God, as was Aaron*, so undoubtedly no one can assume to himself the honour of Gods Vicegerent, unless he be thereto appointed by himself: That which is originaly anothers being not capable of becoming ours, but by the grant of him to whom it doth so belong. To make out therefore the rightfulness of Princes Pleas, we must enquire after the donation of the Almighty, and by what means both they and we may be assured of it. That the Princes of the *Jews* were appointed by God as his Vicegerents, no doubt can be made, because he, whose Vicegerents they were, declared them to be such by men immediately inspired by himself, and assured them of that declaration by his word: After the former, whereof as it was not in the power of their people to doubt, so it would have been extremity of madness, as well as of Impiety to deny it. But because there is not the least appearance of any such immediate appointment of other Princes, and, beside that, they who arrogate to themselves the same Authority, do not in the least pretend to it; therefore to make out the legitimateness of their Plea, some other course must be taken, which accordingly I come now to attempt. In order where-

unto, the firſt thing that I ſhall alledge, is thoſe words of St. *Paul* before remembred, that the *powers* that then were, were *ordain'd of God.* For, though that will give us little light into the manner of their appointment, and conſequently contribute little to the underſtanding of that of our own; yet thus far it will contribute to it, as to give us to underſtand, that thoſe Princes may be appointed by God who have no immediate deſignation. For, inaſmuch as it is notorious both from the Scriptures and Profane Authors, that the Powers that then were, were no other than the *Roman* Emperours, of whoſe immediate appointment by God there is not the leaſt footſtep either in the one or the other; it will follow, that thoſe Princes may be appointed by him as his Vicegerents who have no ſuch immediate call. I obſerve, ſecondly, That as the Powers that then were, though they had no immediate call, yet are affirm'd by St. *Paul* to have been ordain'd by God; ſo that they who know nothing of God, or of their own appointment, are ſtil'd the Anointed of the Lord, which, if any thing, may ſeem to have been peculiar to the *Jewiſh* Princes. For thus in particular, *Iſa.* 45. 1. We find God ſtiling *Cyrus* his *anointed*, though, as the ſame God immediately after tells us, he had then *no knowledge of him.* I obſerve, thirdly, which will bring us yet more neer to the thing intended, that though the Powers, that now are, have no ſuch immediate appointment as the *Jewiſh* Princes had, yet is there as good Authority for the being of ſuch Power, though there be no ſuch deſignation of the perſons that are to be inveſted with it. For it being the voice both of Nature and Scripture, that God is not the Author of Confuſion, but of Peace and Order; and it being no leſs evident from experience, that Peace and Order cannot be either had or maintain'd without the Inſtitution of Rulers; it is neceſſarily to be preſum'd to be the will and pleaſure of God that there ſhould be ſuch Rulers in every Nation. Which ſaid, a way is opened to the diſcovery of that appointment, which we have ſaid the Powers on Earth to ſtand by. For, it being of Divine appointment that there ſhould be Rulers in every Nation, and God Almighty having not by any immediate Revelation ſignifi'd his pleaſure concerning the Perſons that are to be ſo; it follows, that to attain the knowledge of his Will in this particular we are to have recourſe to his Providence, which is the only way beſides to come to the knowledge of it. For, though the Providence of God be no Rule againſt his revealed Will, becauſe that is the proper meaſure of Good and Evil; yet, inaſmuch as that alſo is a declaration of his Will, nothing hinders, but it may have place, where the other is not contradicted, and mark out the appointments of our great Maſter to us. But from hence it will follow, firſt, That thoſe Powers are to be looked upon as ordain'd by God, which come to that Power they have, as without any fraud or violence, ſo by the ordinary courſe of Gods Providence. For that Authority, to which they arrive, being conſign'd into their hands by his alone Providence, in whom all Authority in Heaven and Earth is veſted; it is in reaſon to be preſum'd to be appointed by himſelf, and accordingly to be look'd upon as ſuch. Upon which account all thoſe Powers muſt be look'd upon as ordain'd by God, that either come to the Throne by a lineal deſcent from former Kings, where the Kingdom is Hereditary; or by a free and unconſtrained Choice, where it is Elective.

Elective. It will follow, ſecondly, That thoſe alſo are to be look'd upon as ordained of God, which, however they do at firſt attain to their Power by Fraud or Violence, yet are confirm'd in it by the Submiſſion and Acceptance of thoſe in whom the Government formerly was, and over whom it is to be exercis'd. For, it being the Appointment of God, that there ſhould be Rulers in every Nation; and, which is more, where there is no other Declaration of his Will, that we ſhould have recourſe unto his Providence: it follows, that where the Throne becomes empty, as it is by the Rendition of thoſe that before ſate in it, he is in reaſon to be preſum'd to be appointed to it, who is not onely permitted by God to aſcend to it, but thoſe to whom it formerly belong'd, together with thoſe that were govern'd by it, mov'd by God to accept of him for their Governour, who was ſo advanc'd to it. And upon this account it is, that the Powers St. *Paul* ſpake of, became legitimate, and the *Chriſtians* were ſo earneſtly exhorted to ſubmit themſelves to them: Becauſe, though the Authority of thoſe Powers were founded in Violence, yet it was ſubmitted to and accepted * by the Senate and People of *Rome*, who were both the Governed and Governours. In which Caſe, as there could not be any pretence for any other Powers to interpoſe; ſo God Almighty ſufficiently intimated his Pleaſure concerning the *Roman* Emperours, by not onely ſuffering them to riſe to that Greatneſs, but by moving the Hearts of the Senate and People quietly to ſubmit to, and own them as their Lords and Governours.

* Juſtinianus in Inſtit. lib 1. tit. 2. *Sed & quod Principi placuit, legis habet vigorem; quum lege Regia, quæ de ejus imperio lata eſt, populus ei & in eum omne imperium ſuum & poteſtatem concedat.* Vid. & Strabonem in fine Operis, cit. à Grotio in Flor. ſparſione ad Jus Juſtinianeum. Αι ὴ ἐπαρχίαι δήθεν ἄλλο τε μὴ ἄλλως· ἐν ὴ τῳ παρόντι ὡς Καῖσαρ ὁ Σεβαστὸς διέταξεν. Ἔπειτα γὰρ ἡ παλαιὰ ἐπιτρέψεν αὐτῳ τὴν πρωτασίαν τ ἡγεμονίας, καὶ πολέμε καὶ εἰρήνης κυρίῳ· διὰ βίε, ἵνα δῆλε πᾶσιν τῳ χάρεν, καὶ τὴν μὴ ἀπέδειξεν ἑαυτῳ τὴν τῳ δήμε.

2. Having thus ſhewn that there is in Princes a juſt Foundation of Honour; and moreover deſcrib'd at large what are the proper Grounds of it: my propoſed Method leads me to inquire, what *Kinds* of Honour we are to give them; which we ſhall find to be much the ſame, though in a greater degree than that of Parents. Of this nature is,

I. The entertaining *an awful Apprehenſion* of them, and regarding them in our Thoughts both as God's Vicegerents, and of his Appointment. For, the very Life of Honour conſiſting in our Inward Eſteem of thoſe whom we pretend to honour, it is in reaſon to be given to thoſe who are a kind of Gods on Earth, and appointed as the Repreſentatives of the onely True and Immortal One. The ſame is no leſs evident from the Influence which the want of it is apt to have upon our Outward Actions: For, it being impoſſible for Men to give the beſt and chiefeſt Expreſſions of Honour, where there is not a due Apprehenſion of the Excellencies of the Party honoured; where ſuch an Eſteem is wanting, thoſe Outward Expreſſions will naturally fail, and conſequently our Honour together with it. For though a Man may bow down before, or ſpeak with ſubmiſſion to thoſe whom he honours not in his Heart; yet it is impoſſible he ſhould ſubmit his Actions to be guided by their Laws: which I ſhall afterwards ſhew to be a great part of the Honour that is requir'd.

II. From our Inward Eſteem, paſs we to the *ſeveral Acknowledgments* which the Honouring of any Perſon doth manifeſtly involve:

among which, I reckon, firſt, the honouring them with *our Outward Geſture and Behaviour*, Bowing down to them, or falling down before them. For, as Nature it ſelf hath prompted us to ſuch an Acknowledgment, becauſe inclining us to ſhew forth in the Behaviour of our Bodies, thoſe Affections and Paſſions we have within; ſo, where the Cuſtom of the Place hath made them neceſſary, they cannot be omitted without a manifeſt violation of their Honour; it being impoſſible for him to think himſelf honour'd, who wants thoſe Expreſſions of it, which the Cuſtom of the Place, and of the World, hath appointed as Declarations of it. Whence it is (as was before obſerv'd) that we find all Good Men have ever given it, and that too in ſuch Inſtances as would be look'd upon by us as Notes of Servitude; witneſs one for all, their falling flat upon their Faces before them, and thereby in a manner profeſſing themſelves their Footſtools.

Vid. Part 2. of the Explic. of this Commandment.

Next to the honouring them with our Geſture, proceed we to the honouring them with *our Tongues*, and giving them thoſe Titles which their High Place and Authority doth exact. Which is the rather to be inculcated, as becauſe the Tongue was given us to expreſs our inward Conceits, ſo becauſe we find the Apoſtles thus honouring even the *Heathen* Powers, and ſuch by whom they were at that very inſtant call'd in queſtion. For thus, when St. *Paul* anſwered for himſelf before King *Agrippa* and *Feſtus*, he did not onely give *Agrippa* frequently the Title of *King*, as you may ſee in the 26 Chapter of the *Acts*; but when *Feſtus* told him he was *beſide himſelf* (which had been enough to have ſtirr'd an ordinary Patience) yet gave him the Title of *moſt Noble Feſtus*, as you may ſee *verſ.* 25. of that Chapter. But from hence we may collect, I do not ſay, what is to be thought of thoſe who omit ſuch Acknowledgments, but in ſtead thereof, employ their Tongues to defame and to diſgrace them. For, if we are to honour Princes with our Tongues, to be ſure we are not to revile them, as being directly contrary to the other. And accordingly, as in the Law of *Moſes*, which to be ſure was ſo far Moral, becauſe containing no other thing in it, than what the Light of Nature doth confirm; as, I ſay, in the Law of *Moſes*, Men were expreſly forbidden to *revile the Gods*, or *ſpeak evil of the Ruler of the People*, *Exod.* 22. 28. ſo, that it was of force to St. *Paul* when converted, and conſequently to us *Chriſtians*, his Acknowledgment before the *Jewiſh Sanhedrim* ſhews: For having been charg'd by the *Jews* for calling the High Prieſt *Whited wall*, in ſtead of going about to excuſe the Fact, any other way than that it was done through inadvertency, he acknowledges it for a Fault, as being committed againſt that known Rule, *Thou ſhalt not ſpeak evil of the Ruler of thy People*, *Acts* 23. 5. Which Paſſage is the more to be remark'd, becauſe it ſhews the Prohibition to extend not onely to Calumnies or unjuſt Reproaches, but alſo to the ſpeaking reproachfully even of the real Failings of our Governours; there being no doubt he was no better than *a Whited wall*, who pretending to judge according to the Law, did, in contradiction to that Law, cauſe an undeſerving Perſon to be ſtricken. Neither let any Man ſay, That theſe are trifling Matters, or at leaſt not ſo criminal as we have endeavour'd to repreſent them: For, beſide that we are not lightly to eſteem of any thing which God hath thought fit to make the Matter of a Prohibition, and much leſs of what he hath

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ſo in relation to thoſe to whom he hath given the Name of Gods, and moreover imparted to them of his own Authority; beſide that the ſpeaking evil of Princes is apt to expoſe them to contempt, as that Contempt to the reſiſting of them, which St. *Paul* hath pronounc'd to be damnable; beſide theſe things, I ſay, St. *Jude* hath repreſented it as the Character of thoſe Ungodly ones, which he placeth in the ſame Rank with the Apoſtate Angels, and filthy *Sodomites*: For, *likewiſe alſo* (ſaith he, *verſ.* 8.) *theſe filthy dreamers defile the fleſh, deſpiſe dominion, and ſpeak evil of dignities*; adding, *verſ.* 9. (which ſhews yet more the hainouſneſs of the Crime) That *Michael the Archangel* had it in ſuch abhorrence, that *when contending with the Devil*, who was ſometime a glorious Angel, *he diſputed with him about the Body of Moſes*, yet *he durſt not bring even againſt him a railing accuſation, but ſaid, The Lord rebuke thee.* I will conclude this Particular with that of St. *Peter*, as well for the affinity it hath with the fore-quoted Paſſage of St. *Jude*, as becauſe it will add more ſtrength to the Prohibition of Evil ſpeaking. 'Tis in 2 *Pet.* 2. 10, 11. For, as he there reckons thoſe that *deſpiſe Government* amongſt ſuch unjuſt ones *whom God hath reſerv'd to the day of Judgment to be puniſh'd*; ſo, reſuming their Character anew, he tells us, among other things, that *they are not afraid to ſpeak evil of Dignities*; plainly intimating the ſo ſpeaking to be a thing which is not onely unlawful for a *Chriſtian* to do, but to ſuch a degree alſo, as that he ought to tremble at the very thoughts of it; adding moreover, that *the Angels themſelves, however mightier and greater, do not bring a railing accuſation againſt them before the Lord.* They may perhaps, according to their Office, repreſent their Crimes before the Almighty; they may, for God's Glory, and the ſake of the Oppreſſed, invoke the Divine Majeſty to avenge himſelf upon them: But remembring that, how criminal ſoever they may be, they are God's Vicegerents, and of his own Divine Appointment, they abſtain from all reviling Speeches, and rather accuſe their Enormities than their Perſons. Now foraſmuch as even the Angels, who are *mightier* either than us, or Princes themſelves, do yet religiouſly abſtain from all reproachful Language of them; foraſmuch as *Michael the Archangel* durſt not ſo treat the *Devil* himſelf, becauſe, as anciently a glorious Image of the Almighty, ſo, at this very time, an Inſtrument of his Vengeance upon ungodly Men; foraſmuch as both St. *Peter* and St. *Jude* reckon thoſe who ſpeak evil of Dignities amongſt the worſt, yea the moſt obnoxious to the Divine Juſtice; and St. *Peter* moreover intimates the ſo ſpeaking to be a thing which a *Chriſtian* ought to tremble at the thought of: it is eaſie to gueſs, that Princes, as they are in no ſmall conſideration with God, ſo they ought to be had in no ſmall veneration with thoſe over whom God hath appointed them to preſide.

PART VI.

Of that Declaration of our Eſteem which is made by Obedience to the Commands of Princes; the Neceſſity whereof is evidenc'd from their Legiſlative Power, as that again from the Scriptures attributing that Power to Princes, and from the impoſſibility of compaſſing otherwiſe the Ends of their Inſtitution. The ſame Obedience evidenced to be neceſſary, from expreſs Precepts of Scripture. That every Soul whatſoever is under the tie of this Obedience, as well of the Clergie as the Laity. The onely particular Limits of this Obedience, an expreſs Prohibition from the Almighty, or thoſe which the Prince hath ſet to himſelf. Of the Authority of Princes in Religious Matters, which is either Indirect, or Direct; the former whereof is evidenc'd from the Influence Religious Matters have upon the State, and which therefore are to be ſo far under their Inſpection, as the Weal of the State is concerned in them. The Reſult of this Power, the Calling or Limiting of Religious Aſſemblies, the Appointing thoſe that ſhall ſerve at the Altar in them, or putting by thoſe that are. That Princes have alſo a Direct Authority in Religious Matters; that is to ſay, an Authority in them conſider'd as ſuch: Where is alſo ſhewn, what that Authority is, and that it conſiſts rather in encouraging or compelling thoſe that preſide in Religious Matters, to do their reſpective Duties, than to take upon themſelves the Adminiſtration thereof. The Reſult of which Authority is, the Defending the Church from all both Foreign and Domeſtick Enemies, the keeping the Members of it within their reſpective Duties, and puniſhing with the Civil Sword thoſe that ſhall refuſe ſo to do; the calling Councils to determine of Matters of Religion, and giving force to thoſe Things that ſhall be rightly determin'd by them. The Accordance both of the Practice of this Kingdom, and of the Doctrine of the Church, with the foregoing Determination. Of Submiſſion to the Cenſures of Princes, which is another Declaration of our Inward Eſteem. The Neceſſity thereof evidenc'd from the Power of Coercion in them; which infers a like Neceſſity in the Subject, of ſubmitting to it. Whether this Submiſſion be to be underſtood, where the Coercion is ill employ'd; which is anſwered by diſtinguiſhing of Submiſſion; to wit, as that is oppos'd to all Means of avoiding it, or onely to forcible ones. The former Submiſſion no way neceſſary, as appears by our Saviour's exhorting Men to flee in Caſe of Perſecution; and the Liberty that is given by the Laws to appeal to the Princes Courts of Judicature. The latter Submiſſion is of indiſpenſible Duty, as appears both by the Scripture, and the Practice of the Ancient and Pureſt Church. The like evidenc'd from the inconſiſtency of Reſiſtance, with Princes being the immediate Miniſters of God, with the End of their Inſtitution, and the Counſels of the Divine Providence: The firſt, becauſe he who reſiſteth them, endeavours to ſubject thoſe who are God's immediate Miniſters, and therefore ſubject to no other, ſo far at leaſt unto himſelf, as may ſecure him from the Effects of their Violence: The ſecond, becauſe leaving it in the power of the Subject to reſiſt when he will himſelf;

himſelf; which will make the Power of the Prince precarious, and conſequently, becauſe that depends upon it, the Weal of the People; which is the end for which all Governours were inſtituted: The third, becauſe the Counſels of the Divine Providence are no leſs intereſſed in the Violence of Evil Princes, than in the Power of Good. Of the paying of Tribute to Princes, and that it is both a Duty, and a Declaration of our Eſteem. What Tribute to be paid, to be judg'd of by the Laws.

IT having been before ſhewn, That Honour, in the Latitude of the Word, comprehends *Obedience to Commands*; it remains, that we now inquire, *whether the Honour of Princes does ſo alſo, by whom,* and *in what meaſure that Obedience is to be paid.*

1. That *Obedience* is part of that Honour we are to give to Princes, is evident from that *Legiſlative Power* which God hath given them over their reſpective Subjects: For Laws being nothing elſe than Rules preſcrib'd by thoſe that give them, for the regulating the Actions of thoſe to whom they are; if it be in the power of Princes to preſcribe ſuch Laws, it muſt be the Duty of the Subject to obey them; becauſe that Power would be otherwiſe in vain. Now, that it is in the power of Princes to give ſuch Laws to their Subjects, will appear, firſt of all, from the Scriptures annexing this Power to them, as the main of that Authority by which they ſhine. Thus, for inſtance, when *Jacob* would deſcribe the continuance of the Regal Dignity in *Judah*, till *Shiloh* or the *Meſſiah* ſhould appear, he expreſſes it by affirming, that as *the Scepter* (which is an Enſign of Regal Power) *ſhould not depart from Judah*, ſo *neither a Lawgiver from between his knees*, *Gen.* 49. 10. In like manner as *Homer* (if we may joyn Profane Authors with Sacred) where he ſpeaks of the ſame Regal Dignity.

——— ἓις πολέων ἔτω
Εἷς βασιλεύς, ᾧ ἔδωκε Κρόνου παῖς ἀγκυλομήτεω
Σκῆπτρόν τ' ἠδὲ θέμιστας, ἵνα σφίσιν βασιλεύῃ.

But ſo alſo, that I may return to the Scripture, after it had been ſaid, that *Moſes commanded a Law to the Inheritance of the Congregation of Jacob*; to let us know by what Authority he did ſo, the Scripture adds, *And he was King in Jeſurun, when the Princes and Tribes of the People were gathered together* to receive it, *Deut.* 33. 4, 5. But not to content my ſelf with theſe or the like Texts, which attribute the Power of Making Laws to Princes; let us (which will be a yet more convincing Topick, at leaſt to ſome Men) conſider the End of their Inſtitution: For, if that End be not to be compaſs'd without the Power of Making Laws, Princes muſt conſequently be ſuppos'd to be inveſted with that Power, and their Subjects under a neceſſity of obeying them. It is the Affirmation of St. *Paul*, *Rom.* 13. 3, 4. That Rulers are appointed by God for the encouragement of thoſe that do good, and the avenging of thoſe that do evil. Now though each of theſe Ends may ſeem to be compaſs'd by having a regard in them to the Laws of God and Nature; yet, if we do more nearly conſider it, we ſhall find they cannot compaſs either, unleſs they have

a Power of Making Laws. For, the Laws of Nature and Scripture deſcending not to all thoſe Particulars which are neceſſary to be obſerv'd in order to the attaining of them, hence there ariſeth the neceſſity of a Power to draw them down to particular Inſtances, and accommodate them to the Exigencies of their reſpective Governments. Thus, for inſtance, though the Laws of God require the Judging of Offenders, and inflicting on them ſuch Puniſhments as they ſhall be found to deſerve; yet inaſmuch as they preſcribe nothing concerning the Manner or Time of Judging them, and much leſs mark out the Puniſhments which are to be inflicted on particular Offenders, hence there ariſeth a neceſſity in Princes to preſcribe when and after what manner they ſhall be judg'd, and what Puniſhments they ſhall undergo, if they be found guilty of the Crimes laid againſt them. In like manner, though the Laws of God and Nature preſcribe the encouraging of the Good, and doing (as much as lies in Princes) toward the ſecuring and advancing of their ſeveral Properties; yet inaſmuch as they preſcribe nothing at all by what Means that is to be done, nor indeed can do, by reaſon of the multiplicity and variety of Humane Affairs; hence there ariſeth a neceſſity of making Laws, by which they may be ſecur'd in their ſeveral Properties, or enabled to improve them to their and the States advantage. Foraſmuch therefore as without Laws the Good cannot be ſecur'd, as neither Evil-doers either judg'd or condemn'd, it follows, that they who are appointed both for the one and the other, are inveſted with a Power of Making Laws, and conſequently the Subjects under a neceſſity of obeying them. But ſo that they are, is yet more evident from *the expreſs Declarations of the Scripture:* For, beſide that in the forequoted place of St. *Paul*, Men are required to be ſubject to them, which, as *Grotius* hath well obſerv'd, imports * Obedience to their Commands, as well as Submiſſion to their Coercion: Beſide that diſobedience in Things lawful, is a reſiſting of their Authority, and therefore the contrary to be thought to be intended in that Subjection which is there requir'd: Beſide, laſtly, that he who requires every Soul to be ſubject, doth it upon intuition of their receiving Praiſe from them, as well as not receiving Vengeance, the former whereof cannot in reaſon be expected, where there is no compliance with their Commands: to cut off all doubt concerning Obedience to them, the ſame St. *Paul* admoniſheth *Titus*, *chap.* 3. 1. not onely to *put* his Charge *in mind of being ſubject to Principalities and Powers*, but *to obey Magiſtrates*, and to be *ready to every good work*, in compliance with their Commands, as well as far from doing ſo much evil as to oppoſe themſelves againſt their Power and Government.

* *Rom.* 8. 7. Τῷ γὰρ νόμῳ τῦ Θεῦ ὐκ ὑποτάσσεται. *Ephes.* 5. 24. Ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἡ ἐκκλησία ὑποτάσσεται τῷ Χριστῷ, ὕτω καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνδράσιν ἐν παντί. 1 *Pet.* 3. 5. Οὕτω γάρ ποτε καὶ αἱ ἅγιαι γυναῖκες, &c. ὑποτασσόμεναι τοῖς ἰδίοις ἀνδράσιν Ὡς Σάῤῥα ὑπήκουσε τῷ Ἀβραάμ, &c.

2. That Obedience is to be given to Princes, we have ſeen already; inquire we now *by whom*, and *after what meaſure*. For the reſolution of *the former* whereof, it may ſuffice to alledge that of St. *Paul*, *Rom.* 13. 1. for requiring there *every Soul* to be ſubject to the Higher Powers; and neither he, nor any other of the Apoſtles, elſewhere making any Exception from it; he thereby plainly ſhews, that all are to be ſo, of what Rank and Condition ſoever. And accordingly, as whatever is now pretended by the *Papiſts* for an Exemption of

of the Eccleſiaſtical Order, yet no ſuch Plea was ever made by the Prieſts or Prophets of the Old Teſtament; ſo till Luxury and Wantonneſs made the Clergy forget their Duty, they alſo were of the ſame mind, and declar'd it both by their Actions and their Writings; St. *Chryſoſtome* * in particular explaining *every Soul* by *the Soul of an Apoſtle*, as well as *of a Layman*; *of one in the higheſt rank in the Church*, as well as *of the moſt inferiour Members of Church or State.*

* *Hom.* 2. 3. *in Epiſt. ad Rom.* Καὶ ἑκάστην ψυχὴν ὁ-ρᾷ τὰ αὐτὰ διδάσκει, καὶ ἱερέως, καὶ μοναχοῦ, καὶ τοῖς βιωτικοῖς μόνον, ἐκ προοιμίων αὐτὰ δῆλον ἐποίησε τοῦτο λέγων· πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἐξουσίαις ὑπερεχούσαις ὑποτασσέσθω, κἂν ἀπόστολος ᾖς, κἂν εὐαγγελιστὴς, κἂν προφήτης, κἂν ὁτιοῦν ——

3. From the ſubjects of this Obedience, therefore paſs we to *the meaſure* of it, which is both a more important queſtion, and more difficult to be reſolv'd. Where, firſt of all I ſhall obſerve, that it muſt be in ſuch things *as are not forbidden by the Almighty.* For, as where God and Man's commands come in competition; it is ſo clear we are to prefer thoſe of God, that St. *Peter* permits it to the judgment of thoſe who commanded him to act contrary to it, *Act.* 4. 19. So that we ought to obey God rather than Princes, the place they hold under God, may ſerve for an abundant Evidence. For, inaſmuch as Princes are only the Miniſters of God, they are in reaſon to be poſt-poſed to him whoſe Miniſters they are. Care only would be taken, firſt, That we do not fondly, and without juſt ground, pronounce thoſe things as forbidden by God, which are impoſed upon us by the commands of Princes. For though we may be excus'd for not obeying where the thing commanded by Princes is ſo forbidden, yet we cannot without ſin refuſe our Obedience to ſuch commands, as are not any where countermanded by the Almighty. Again, though we are not to obey, where the matter of the Command is evidently againſt that of God, becauſe the Inferiour ought to give place to the Superiour, yet there is not the ſame reaſon, where the thing commanded is not evidently againſt the Law of God, but only doubted of, whether it be ſo or no. For, it being certainly a duty to obey the Magiſtrate in all things not forbidden, and but uncertain, whether the thing commanded by him be forbidden; reaſon would that that which is the more certain, ſhould be preferr'd before that which is uncertain; and conſequently a clear and expreſs Command, before an uncertain ſcruple. But, as where the thing commanded by Princes, is apparently againſt that of God, there cannot be the leaſt pretence of yeilding Obedience to it; ſo *other limits of our Obedience* I know none (ſaving thoſe before-mentioned * where we entreated of the Obedience due to Parents, and which are no leſs appliable here) unleſs it be *where the Prince hath ſet bounds to his own Power by Laws*, or *accepted of them* when tendred by others. In which caſe (becauſe the Princes Laws are the moſt Authentick declarations of his Will) it is to be preſum'd, that he wills not my obedience in any thing, which is contrary thereto, and conſequently that in thoſe things it is no ſin to refuſe it.

* *Vid.* Part 2. of the Explic. of this Commandment.

Now, though what hath been already ſaid concerning the meaſure of our Obedience, may ſuffice any reaſonable man in civil matters, yet becauſe Princes do alſo challenge to themſelves an Authority *in Religious* ones, and we of this Nation, in particular, are oblig'd under an Oath to acknowledge it; it will be neceſſary to enquire farther, whether they have *any ſuch Authority*, and *what obedience* is due from us to it.

Now, *the Authority of Princes in Religious matters* may be two-fold, *indirect* or *direct*; by the former whereof, we are to understand that which pretends to have *an overſight of them only in relation to the State*; by the latter, that which pretends *to have an Intereſt in Religious matters as ſuch.* If the queſtion be, whether Princes are inveſted with ſuch an Authority as pretends to an overſight of them *in relation to the State*, ſo no doubt can be made by thoſe who ſhall conſider the influence Religious matters may have upon the State. For, inaſmuch as on the one hand the powers of the world were before the Church, and the Church it ſelf is by the command of God oblig'd to revere them, and on the other hand, the things of Religion, according as they are conſtituted, may be profitable or hurtful to the State which is committed to their cuſtody; thoſe Powers muſt of neceſſity be inveſted with ſuch an Authority therein, as may preſerve the peace of the State entire. But from hence it will follow, That Princes have a power, ſo far, of *calling or limiting Religious Aſſemblies*, of *appointing who ſhall ſerve at the Altars* in them, or *putting by thoſe* that are. For, inaſmuch as the Peace of the State may be concern'd in all theſe particulars, they are of neceſſity ſo far to fall under the cognizance of thoſe to whom the Government of the State doth appertain. And accordingly, as all Princes, of what perſwaſion ſoever in Religion, have in Profeſſion or Fact, arrogated ſuch an Authority to themſelves; ſo, provided they do not entrench upon the Laws of Chriſtianity, they cannot in the leaſt be faulted for the exerciſe thereof, nor be diſobey'd without a violation of the Ordinance of God that conſtitutes them: Becauſe what they do is no more than neceſſary for the preſervation of that State, which God hath committed to their charge. Thus for inſtance, inaſmuch as by means of the Aſſemblies of diſcontented Perſons, there may ariſe great prejudice to the State; no man in his right wits can deny but it may be lawful for a Prince to retrench the number, or appoint the manner of the holding of them. For, though Chriſtianity enjoin upon Chriſtians the aſſembling of themſelves for Religious Worſhip, yet no Law of Chriſtianity appoints, that they ſhould meet by Thouſands, but on the contrary aſſures them, that *where even two or three meet together in* his *name*, *there* Chriſt *is in the midſt of them.* From the indirect Authority of Princes in Religious matters, paſs we to that which we call *direct*, which intereſts it ſelf in Religious matters as ſuch. For the eſtabliſhing whereof, I ſhall deſire you in the firſt place to reflect upon that of St. *Paul* to *Timothy*, 1 *Tim.* 2. from Verſe 1. to 4. *I exhort therefore, firſt of all, that ſupplications, prayers, interceſſions, and giving of thanks be made for all men: For Kings, and all that are in Authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godlineſs and honeſty. For this is good and acceptable in the ſight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be ſaved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.* From which words, as it is evident: that it is acceptable to God that Kings become Chriſtians, (this, as will appear by comparing the firſt Verſe and the fourth, being the thing he inſtructs *Timothy* to beg of God for them,) ſo alſo, that being made Chriſtians, they ſhould by their Authority procure to other Chriſtians, a peaceable exerciſe of that Religion whereunto they are called: The reaſon aſſign'd by the Apoſtle for praying for their Converſion, being, that *under them*, and by their Arbitriment

they

they might lead a quiet and peaceable Life in all godlineſs and honeſty. From the exhortation of St. *Paul*, paſs we to that of *David*, which will both lend light to the former Exhortation, and more clearly diſcover to us that Authority wich we ſeek. *Be wiſe now therefore, O ye Kings; be inſtructed ye Judges of the Earth, ſerve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiſs the Son, leſt he be angry, and ye periſh from the way, when his wrath is kindled but a little:*—— For *herein* (as St. *Auguſtine* obſerves) *do Kings ſerve the Lord as Kings, if in their Kingdom they command thoſe things that are good, and forbid evil, and, that not only ſuch as appertain to Humane Society, but ſuch as appertain alſo to the Religion of God.* And elſewhere, *Wherein then doth Kings ſerve the Lord in fear, but by forbidding and puniſhing with a Religious ſeverity thoſe things which are done againſt the commands of the Lord Jeſus? For one way doth a King ſerve the Lord as a man, and another way as a King*; And a little after to the ſame purpoſe, though yet more cloſely; *Herein therefore do Kings ſerve the Lord as Kings, when they do thoſe things to ſerve him, which they could not do unleſs they were Kings.* Add hereunto that known Prophecy of *Iſa.* 49. 23. where ſpeaking of the times of the Church, he affirms that *Kings* ſhould be its *nurſing Fathers, and Queens its nurſing Mothers.* Which, what other is it than that the Church ſhould be taken care of by them, and conſequently, that it ſhould be committed to their truſt? But from hence we may collect what the Authority of Princes in Religious matters is, and wherein it ought to be exerted, to wit, *not in determining of them* according to their own will and pleaſure, and much leſs in invading the Office of the Prieſthood, which we know he that attempted was ſtrucken with a Leproſie for, but *in defending the Church from all, both Foraign and Domeſtick Enemies, in keeping the Members of the Church within their reſpective Duties, and puniſhing with the civil Sword thoſe that ſhall refuſe ſo to do, in calling Councils to determine of matters of Religion, and giving force to thoſe things that ſhall be rightly determin'd by them.* For, as more than theſe cannot be legitimately inferr'd from thoſe places we have made uſe of, to eſtabliſh the Authority of Princes by, ſo that they cannot rightly claim more, the nature of the Church (according as I have before ſtated it) ſhews. For, ſince the Church, by the Inſtitution of Chriſt is endow'd with a power in determining in things relating to it ſelf, ſince alſo the ſecular Powers, as well by their Baptiſm as the precepts of the Scripture, are bound to be defenders of it, (for he who gives up himſelf to the Chriſtian Religion, doth thereby profeſs that he will perform his proper part in it, and therefore, if he be a King, the part of a King) it muſt needs be, that their Authority in ſacred matters, ſhould conſiſt rather in obliging the ſeveral members of it to their reſpective duties, than in determining of their own head concerning them. The ſame is no leſs evident from the practice of Chriſtian Princes, in calling together a Council, as often as any thing hath ſtood in need of a definition. For, as Mr. *Thorndike** hath well obſerv'd, he who calls a Council, of Biſhops to make a Decree, to receive a civil ſanction from himſelf, doth thereby profeſs, as well, that it belongs to the Church to determine in it, as to himſelf to paſs that Decree into a Law: Which is ſo true, (as the ſame Mr. *Thorndike*‖ hath obſerv'd) that though *Conſtantius* the Emperour would fain

* *De ratione de jure finiendi controverſias.*

‖ *Ibid.*

have undone what had been decreed by the Council of *Nice*, yet he never attempted it, but by Decrees of other Councils, which ſhews what opinion was had of the Authority of the Church, even by the Enemies of the Church it ſelf. Theſe two things only ſeem neceſſary to be ſubjoin'd, that we may give Chriſtian Princes the whole of what is due to them.

1. That it belongs to Princes *to judge what is rightly or not rightly decreed* by the Church, and according as they ſhall judge either to give or withold their aſſent, and

2. That though in things dubious, or not at all determin'd by Councils, the Prince is to expect the deciſion of the Church, yet *there is no neceſſity of ſo doing, where the thing is evident from the word of God*, or *hath been generally defin'd by former Councils.* For as where the word of God is clear, the Prince need no other warrant, who by that word it ſelf is call'd upon to *ſerve the Lord*, and add the force of his Sanction to the general Injunctions of it; ſo where the thing hath been generally defin'd, little doubt can be made of Princes paſſing what is ſo into a Law, partly becauſe it hath been in ſome meaſure defined by the Church, and partly becauſe it is to be preſum'd the Church gives way to a more particular determination, where the thing doth require a preſent definition, or is not of ſuch moment to require the calling of the Biſhops from their ſeveral charges, with the far greater detriment of the Church over which they are appointed to preſide. In the mean time, as it is not to be deny'd that thoſe Princes ſhall beſt provide for the peace of their own Conſciences, who ſhall not ordinarily determine of Eccleſiaſtical affairs without the conſent of the Church, or at leaſt of ſome of the principal Biſhops of it; ſo we can never ſufficiently commend the Inſtitutions of this Kingdom, whereas in the Parliament, the place where all Laws are framed, the Biſhops have the principal place; ſo the commands of King and Parliament in Eccleſiaſtical Affairs, do for the moſt part follow the Canons dereed by our Convocations. For after this manner, both now and heretofore, the Book of Common Prayers underwent the Examination of a Convocation before the uſe of it paſſed into a Law, and extraordinary Forms of Prayers are approv'd by ſome Biſhops, before they have the Kings Mandate affix'd to them. I will conclude this Diſcourſe with the Doctrine of the Articles of our Church, becauſe exactly according with what I have before delivered. For as the 20th. of thoſe Articles declares *the Church to have power to decree Rites or Ceremonies, and Authority in controverſies of Faith*, ſo the 37th. not only *excludes from Princes the miniſtring either of Gods word or of the Sacraments*, but makes their Supremacy to conſiſt *in ruling all Eſtates and Degrees committed to their charge by God, whether they be Eccleſiaſtical or Temporal, and reſtraining with the civil Sword the ſtubborn and evil doers.* To which, as I know not what any reaſonable man can oppoſe, becauſe ſo exactly diſtinguiſhing between the Churches Power and that of Princes; ſo I ſee not how any reaſonable man, where the Authority of Princes keeps within theſe bounds, can think himſelf exempted from yeilding obedience to it. He who commits the care of the Church to ſecular Princes, neceſſarily allowing them a ſuperintendency over it, and conſequently alſo, where that ſuperintendency is not manifeſtly made uſe of to the prejudice of Religion,

obliging

obliging all the Members of the Church to yield obedience to their Commands.

How we are to honour Princes by our Obedience, hath been at large declar'd: It remains that we alſo ſhew, both *that we are*, and *how we are* to honour them *with ſubmiſſion to their Cenſures:* Which will appear, firſt of all, from *that Authority* wherewith they are inveſted, *of drawing the Sword of Juſtice againſt Offenders.* For, as an Authority to Command, infers a neceſſity of Obedience in all thoſe that are ſubjected to it; ſo, a Power of Coercion, a like neceſſity of Submiſſion to it, in all thoſe who are ſubjected to it. The onely thing of difficulty is, Whether that Submiſſion be neceſſary, where the Power of Coercion is us'd againſt thoſe who ſeem to themſelves, and it may be not without reaſon, to have done nothing to deſerve it: For, inaſmuch as the Sword of Juſtice is committed to Princes for the avenging of ſuch onely as are Evil doers, it may ſeem but reaſonable to infer, that they who are not Evil doers, are free from ſubmitting themſelves to the Stroke of it. And indeed, if the Queſtion be concerning the avoiding of it by Flight, there is no doubt it is in the power of the Subject, who conceives himſelf not to have deſerv'd it, ſo to avoid, if he can, the falling under the Power of it: Our Saviour having expreſly given leave, that if we be *perſecuted in one City*, we ſhould, to ſave our ſelves, *flee* from that *unto another.* As little difficulty ſhould I find, if that were the thing in queſtion, to licenſe the avoiding of the Princes Severity, by appealing to his own Courts of Judicature, where that is by Law ſo allow'd, as it is in ſeveral Caſes here; that being not to be look'd upon as a Reſiſtance, and much leſs as an injurious one, which is with the leave of him againſt whom it is directed. But if the Queſtion be concerning reſiſting by Force of Arms, and ſo avoiding the Severity of the Prince; ſo it is as certain, both from *the Scripture*, and *Reaſon*, that we ought not to avoid it, but rather with all readineſs ſubmit to the Strokes of it. That it is certain from the *Scripture*, that known paſſage of St. *Paul* may ſerve for an abundant Evidence; he not onely affirming, *Rom.* 13. 2. that *whoſoever reſiſteth the Power, reſiſteth the Ordinance of God*; but alſo that *they that reſiſt, ſhall receive to themſelves damnation.* For though it be not there expreſs'd *in totidem terminis*, that it is not lawful to reſiſt where the Party ſuffers undeſervedly; yet to reſiſt being in that place indefinitely forbidden, and no Limitation being in that Chapter or elſewhere affix'd, nor deducible from any Principle of Reaſon or Nature, it is but reaſon it be underſtood in its full Latitude, that is to ſay, ſo as to exclude all Caſes whatſoever; eſpecially if we add thereto that of another Apoſtle, even St. *Peter*, where Reſiſtance, even by an innocent Perſon, is forbidden: For, *What glory is it* (ſaith that Apoſtle, 1 *Pet.* 2. 20.) *if when ye be buffeted for your faults, ye ſhall take it patiently? But if when ye do well, and ſuffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with God: for even hereunto were ye called; becauſe Chriſt alſo ſuffered for us, leaving us an example that ye ſhould follow his ſteps: Who did no ſin, neither was guile found in his mouth: Yet notwithſtanding, when he was revil'd, reviled not again; when he ſuffered, he threatned not: but committed himſelf to him that judgeth righteouſly*, as to whom onely it was lawful for him to appeal, even from

from the unjuſt Sentence of the High-Prieſt and *Pontius Pilate*. Which Inſtance ſhews by the way, that though the Apoſtle primarily intended to proſcribe Servants reſiſting of their Tyrannical Maſters, yet it is alike to be underſtood of reſiſting the Supreme Powers, becauſe they were ſuch, whom our Saviour is commended for ſuffering patiently under. And though it be true, that few now follow his Examples, and Men of all Profeſſions almoſt take upon them to reſiſt the Secular Power, as often as his Commands thwart either their Perſwaſions or Intereſt; yet it is clear from *Tertullian* and others, that *the Ancient Chriſtians* were of the ſame temper with their Maſter *Chriſt*, and ſubmitted themſelves to the Penalties of thoſe Laws, whoſe Injunctions they thought it not lawful to obſerve. And this they did too, not, as a Seditious Perſon would have the World believe, when they were not in a capacity to reſiſt; but, as the ſame *Tertullian* inſtructs us*, when there were *great numbers* of them, and *ſuch too* againſt which, if they would have rebell'd, their Perſecuting Princes would not have been *able to have ſtood*. And accordingly, when the || *Thebean* Legion, which conſiſted of Six thouſand ſix hundred ſixty ſix *Chriſtian* Soldiers, were by the Emperour *Maximian* commanded to offer Sacrifice to the *Heathen* Gods, though they refus'd to obey his Commands, yet when the Emperour, upon that refuſal, commanded every Tenth Man to be ſlain, they ſuffered themſelves to be ſo, without making any the leaſt reſiſtance. In like manner, when the Emperour, not ſatisfied with the former Slaughter, gave command to thoſe that ſurviv'd to offer Sacrifice; though they refus'd, as their Fellows had done, to offer Sacrifice, yet they ſubmitted themſelves to his Coercion, in theſe following Words: *We, indeed, O* Cæſar, *are thy Soldiers, and have taken up Arms for the Defence of the* Roman *Commonweal; neither have we ever been Deſerters of the Wars, or Betrayers of the Soldiery, or fallen under the imputation of any baſe and ſluggiſh Fear. We would alſo obey thy Commands, if we were not forbid by the Laws of* Chriſtianity *to pollute our ſelves with the Worſhip of Devils. We find that thou haſt reſolv'd either to pollute the* Chriſtians *with them, or terrifie us by the ſlaughter of every Tenth Man. Do not inquire any longer after us, as Men that would conceal our ſelves; know, that we are all* Chriſtians. *All our Bodies thou ſhalt have ſubjected to thy Power; but our Souls thou ſhalt never have, becauſe remembring they belong to their Author* Chriſt. In conformity whereto, as we find they did proceed, preſerving themſelves pure from the Sacrifices of Idols, ſo that when the Emperour gave order for the Slaughter of the reſt, they threw away their Arms, and offered their naked Bodies to the Fury of his Executioners. What the Voice of the Scripture is, together with the Comment of the Primitive *Chriſtians*, both Opinion and Practice, you have heard already: It remains that we evidence the ſame to be the *Voice of Reaſon and Nature*. In order whereunto, I ſhall firſt of all alledge Princes being the *immediate Miniſters* of God: For, being his immediate Miniſters, they are ſubject to him onely whoſe immediate Miniſters they are. Now, foraſmuch as no Man can reſiſt a Prince, without an intention of ſubjecting him ſo far to himſelf, as may ſecure him from the Effects of his

* Apolog. c. 37. *Si enim & hoſtes exertos, non tantùm vindices occultos agere vellemus; deeſſet nobis vis numerorum & copiarum. Plures nimirum Mauri & Marcomanni, ipſique Parthi vel quantæcunque, unius tamen loci & ſuorum finium gentes, quam totius orbis. Heſterni ſumus & veſtra omnia implevimus, urbes, inſulas, caſtalia, &c.* Vid. ibid.

|| Vid. *Hug. Grot. de Jure Belli, &c.* lib. 1. cap. 4. ſect. 17.

his Violence; it will follow, that no Man can, without Sin, reſiſt him in any caſe, becauſe endeavouring, by that Reſiſtance, to ſubject the Miniſter of God to him. And here very opportunely comes in an Anſwer to that Objection, which I before alledg'd, in behalf of reſiſting the Prince, where he endeavours to inflict an undeſerved Puniſhment. For though it be true, that a Prince hath no Authority to inflict an unjuſt Puniſhment; yet he is privileg'd by the Place he holds under God, from being ſubjected unto Man; and ought not therfore, by any Force, to be brought into ſubjection to him. From the Place which Princes hold, paſs we to *the End of their Inſtitution*; which we ſhall find to be equally inconſiſtent with making reſiſtance to them. For, as if it be allow'd the Subject to reſiſt in caſe of Innocency, you muſt leave it at liberty to him to reſiſt when he will himſelf, becauſe it muſt be alſo left to him to judge whether his be ſuch or no: ſo, if you leave it at liberty to the Subject to reſiſt when he will himſelf, you make the Power of the Prince precarious; and conſequently, becauſe that depends upon the Power of the Prince, the Safety of the People; which is the End for which all Governments were ordain'd. Laſtly, As Reſiſtance in any caſe is inconſiſtent with the End of Government, and therefore to be rejected by all thoſe, I do not ſay, who believe it to be the Ordinance of God, but who believe it onely to be neceſſary to the Well-being of the World; ſo it is equally inconſiſtent with the *Counſels of God's Providence*, which are no leſs intereſſed in the Violence of Evil Princes*, than in the juſt Adminiſtration of God. For, as whoſoever believes that there is no Evil in a City which God hath not done, muſt believe alſo, that Evil Princes are from God, no leſs than Good: ſo, he that ſo believes, muſt conceive alſo, that God, who acts nothing without Advice, muſt have ſome peculiar End in it, whether it be, as in the Caſe of *Saul* and many others, for the puniſhment of an Evil People; or, as is moſt probable in the Caſe of the *Roman* Emperours, for the trial of the Primitive *Chriſtians* Faith, and the Honour of that Goſpel which they believ'd. In conſideration whereof, as whoever reſiſteth Evil Powers, muſt be thought in a particular manner to fight againſt God; ſo I will leave you to judge, what a diſappointment muſt needs have been to the Counſels of the Almighty, if it had been permitted *Chriſtians* to reſiſt. For where then had been all thoſe glorious Examples of Meekneſs, and Submiſſion, and Patience, for which the Faith of *Chriſt* was then ſo renown'd, and by which we, who live at this diſtance from its firſt Inſtitution, are in a great meaſure induc'd to embrace it? Foraſmuch then as Evil Princes are from God, no leſs than God; foraſmuch as God, by their injurious Actions, doth not onely puniſh an Evil Nation, but brings Glory both to himſelf and to his Son: I think it not onely lawful to ſay, as *Tacitus* ſometime did, That *they ought to be tolerated as we do Barenneſs and Rains, and other ſuch, the Evils of Nature*; but *ſubmitted to with chearfulneſs*, and as ſuch; which, however now afflictive, may prove hereafter Matter of exceſs of Joy. If there be any thing that can enervate ſuch an Inference, it muſt be, that ſuch a Ground of Subjection would oblige

* *Cujus enim juſſu homines naſcuntur, hujus juſſu & Reges conſtituuntur apti his qui in illo tempore ab ipſis regantur. Quidam enim illorum ad correctionem & utilitatem ſubjectorum dantur; & conſervationem juſtitiæ; quidam autem ad timorem & pœnam & increpationem; quidam autem ad illuſionem & contumeliam & ſuperbiam, quemadmodum & digni ſunt Dei juſto judicio, ſicuti prædiximus, in omnibus æqualiter ſuperveniente.* Iren. adv. Hæreſ. lib. 5. cap. 24.

‖ *Quomodo ſterilitatem aut nimios imbres, & cætera naturâ mala, ita luxum vel avaritiam dominantium tolerate.* Hiſt. l. 4.

oblige us to make no reſiſtance to the injurious Actings of Private Perſons. But as I do no way doubt, that we are in ſome meaſure ſo oblig'd, and ſhall not therefore go about to avoid the force of it altogether; ſo there is not the ſame reaſon for the not reſiſting of Private Perſons, though injurious, as there is for the not reſiſting of injurious Princes; becauſe theſe are appointed by God for the Government of the World, which the other have no pretence to.

One onely *Species* of Honour remains, even *the Honour of Tribute*; concerning which I ſhall ſay the leſs, becauſe it is ſo evidently both our Duty, and a *Species* of Honour. Witneſs for the former, not onely the reaſonableneſs of our Contributing to the Maintenance of thoſe who watch for the Publick Good, but alſo the clear and expreſs Precepts of the Goſpel: Our Saviour*, where he ſpeaks of this very thing, commanding us to *give unto Cæſar the things that are Cæſar's*; and St. *Paul*‖, to *render to all their dues*, and particularly, *Tribute to whom it is* ſo, even to *thoſe Miniſters of God who attend continually* upon the Publick Welfare. But neither is there leſs Evidence of Tribute being a *Species* of Honour, and conſequently a part of that Duty which the Commandment calls for; the fore-named St. *Paul* repreſenting Tribute not onely as due to the Higher Powers, but due to them as the Miniſters of God, and as a Teſtimony of our Subjection to them. The onely difficulty is, what Tribute we are to pay: For the reſolution whereof, we of this Nation ſhall not need to go any farther than our own Laws, by which that Tribute is exacted, and beyond which our Princes do not pretend at all. For, as thoſe Laws are a formal Declaration of the Pleaſure of the Prince, who is the moſt competent Judge of the Neceſſities of that State, which is by God committed to his Tuition; ſo they do moreover involve in them the Conſent of thoſe by whom that Tribute is to be paid; whether Implicit, as all thoſe Tributary Laws do, which ſtand by the Uſances of the Kingdom; or more Explicit, as thoſe which are conſented to by their ſeveral Repreſentatives in Parliament. After which, to inquire whether we may pay a leſs Proportion, were to inquire whether it might be lawful for us to depart from that which we our ſelves have conſented to perform: The Conſent of particular Perſons being ſufficiently imply'd in a general one, or in the Conſent of thoſe who are empower'd to act for them.

* *Mat.* 22. 21.

‖ *Rom.* 13 6, 7.

PART

PART VII.

An Anſwer to certain Pleas which are made in the behalf of Reſiſtance; where, firſt of all, is conſidered the Magiſtrates ſetting himſelf againſt our Religion, the Cauſe whereof may ſeem preferable to all Conſiderations whatſoever. That that Plea is not ſtrong enough to juſtifie a Reſiſtance, is made probable, 1. *Becauſe Submiſſion to Princes is an undoubted Duty of Chriſtianity, and conſequently, the contrary thereof no proper means to defend.* 2. *Becauſe God, who hath commanded that Submiſſion, hath not derogated from it by the Exception of any Caſe.* 3. *Becauſe the Princes to whom the Apoſtles requir'd Men to ſubmit, were both foretold by our Saviour to be Perſecutors of Chriſtianity, and ſhew'd themſelves ſuch in an extraordinary manner; which made it reaſonable for the Apoſtles to except the Caſe of Religion, if that had been intended by God ſo to be.* 4. *Becauſe to allow of Reſiſtance in the Caſe of Religion, would open the gap to all manner of Seditions; becauſe Religion comprehending within it the whole Duty of a Chriſtian, that Pretence may be adapted to infinite Caſes. An Addreſs to a more direct Solution of the Difficulty; where is ſhewn at large, That Religion gains more by a patient Submiſſion to Perſecuting Princes, than it can be ſuppos'd to do by oppoſing them. The like evidenc'd from the proſpering of Chriſtianity under the Primitive Perſecutions. An Anſwer to that Plea which is made for Inferiour Magiſtrates reſiſting, upon the account of their being Publick Perſons, and by the Prince himſelf Commiſſionated to execute Juſtice. The former of the two Pretences evidenced to be vain, becauſe though the Inferiour Magiſtrate be a Publick Perſon, in reſpect of his Fellow-Subjects; yet he is but a Private one, when conſidered with relation to the Supreme. The Caſe of the Decree of a Judge prevailing againſt any private Order of the Prince, ſhewn not to make at all for Inferiour Magiſtrates reſiſting the Supreme; becauſe the Prevalency of that Decree is founded upon the Preſumption of its being the Will of the Prince, rather than any private Order againſt it. The latter Pretence, of Inferiour Magiſtrates being Commiſſionated by the Supreme to puniſh Offenders, ſhewn to be more vain than the former; becauſe it is not to be preſum'd, that he who by Divine and Humane Law is Supreme, will Commiſſionate any Perſon againſt himſelf. That famous Saying of* Trajan *to the* Præfectus Prætorio, Hoc pro me utere, ſi rectè impero, ſi malè, contra me, *rather a piece of Oſtentation, than any real Intendment of his; but however, no way ſuitable to the Mouth of the Supreme Magiſtrate. Another Plea for Reſiſtance, drawn from Princes ſwearing before their Coronation to Govern according to the Laws; that ſeeming to imply a Compact between them and their Subjects, upon the breach whereof on their part, the Subjects may depart from their Allegiance, and reſiſt them in the Execution of their Power. This Plea evidenced to be vain as to the Kings of* England, *becauſe fully ſuch before their Coronation; and the Reaſon of ſuch Oaths declar'd. The like Vanity ſhewn in that other Plea, which alledgeth, That ſome Kings are ſuch rather in Title than Reality, and*

conſequently not Supreme in their Dominions: Where the Supremacy of our own Kings is evidenced, both from their Titles, and their Actions. Of the Honour of Inferiour Magiſtrates, and what the Grounds thereof are, which are ſhewn to be, The Authority they have from God for the Deputing of Inferiour Magiſtrates, and their actual Deputation of them. The former of theſe evidenc'd from the impoſſibility of their diſcharging the Duty of their Place without it; as the latter, from their being God's Miniſters in ſolidum, *in thoſe Places where they are appointed to Preſide. Thoſe Inferiour Magiſtrates which are inveſted by leſſer Powers, no prejudice to the forementioned Ground; becauſe thoſe Powers do what they do by Commiſſion from the Prince. The Honours of the Inferiour Magiſtrate the ſame upon the matter, for the Kind, with thoſe of the Supreme; but different as to the Meaſure, which alſo is there declar'd. That the Honour which is to be paid to them, be with ſubordination to that of God, the Supreme Magiſtrate, and thoſe of Higher Authority than themſelves; in fine, that it be according to the Meaſure of that Authority which is imparted to them, and according to the Pleaſure of him by whom it is imparted. The Reſult whereof is,* 1. *That if the Inferiour Magiſtrate command any thing which is not within his Commiſſion, it is lawful to diſobey him.* 2. *That in caſe of hard Meaſure ſhew'd by him, we may appeal from him to the Superiour.* 3. *That as they who have a greater Authority, ought to have a greater Honour; and they who have a leſs Authority, a leſs: ſo the preciſe Meaſures of them are beſt learn'd from the Laws, becauſe the cleareſt Declarations of the Pleaſure of the Prince. A ſhort* Paræneſis *to Inferiour Magiſtrates, where ſomewhat alſo of their Duty is deſcrib'd.*

3. HAVING in the foregoing Diſcourſes eſtabliſh'd the Grounds, and ſhewn the Kinds of Honour, that are due to Soveraign Princes, nothing more ſeems requiſite to be done, than to ſhew why, and in what manner or meaſure we are to honour thoſe Perſons that are Commiſſionated by them. But becauſe ſome Mens *impatiency of the Yoke of Government* hath made them willing to find out *Reaſons to licence them to ſhake it off*, and after that, actually to believe them; I think it not amiſs, before I proceed any further, both *to propoſe* and *and anſwer their Objections.*

That it is not lawful to reſiſt the Supreme Powers, even when they make uſe of their Power againſt the Innocent, hath been at large declar'd, and confirm'd both from Reaſon and Scripture; and poſſibly not without effect, as to the Reſiſters themſelves, if there wanted not ſome ſpecious Reaſons to take off the force of it, as to ſome particular Caſes. Of this nature is, firſt, thoſe Princes oppoſing themſelves oftentimes *againſt God, and againſt that Religion* which he hath eſtabliſh'd in the World: For, though we may be oblig'd to ſit down tamely under the Violence of Evil Princes, when that Violence reacheth no farther than our Perſons; yet, who can think the ſame Patience neceſſary, when Religion it ſelf is ſtruck at, which we are in reaſon to prefer before all other Conſiderations? In anſwer to which, not to tell you, as I well might, that Submiſſion to Princes is an undoubted Duty

Duty of *Chriſtianity*, and conſequently, that the contrary thereof is no proper Means to defend *Chriſtianity* by: Not to tell you, moreover, that that God who hath commanded our Submiſſion to the Higher Powers, hath no where derogated from that Command, by the exception of any Caſe; (And what reaſon have we to diſtinguiſh, where the Law of God doth not?) Not to tell you, thirdly, that the Princes to whom the Apoſtles requir'd Men to ſubmit, were both foretold by our Saviour * to be Perſecutors of *Chriſtianity*, and ſhew'd themſelves to be ſuch in a more than ordinary manner; which made it reaſonable for the Apoſtles to except the Caſe of Religion, if that had been intended by God to be ſo: Laſtly, not to tell you, that to allow of Reſiſtance upon colour of Religion, would have opened the Gap to all manner of Seditions, both becauſe it had been eaſie to adapt that Pretence to a thouſand Caſes, and becauſe Religion comprehends within it the Whole of a *Chriſtians* Duty: But not, I ſay, to inſiſt upon any, or all of theſe, which yet are a ſufficient Prejudice to the Exemption pleaded for, I ſhall chuſe rather to ſhew (which will come up more cloſely to the Objection) That Religion gains as much or more by a patient Submiſſion to Perſecuting Princes, than it can be ſuppos'd to do by oppoſing our ſelves againſt them. For the evidencing whereof, I will firſt inquire, *What Religion may* rationally *be ſuppos'd to gain by oppoſing Perſecuting Princes?* 2. What it may *hope for* from *ſubmitting to their Coercion?* And, 3. and laſtly, *compare them* both together. I begin with the firſt of theſe, even *What Religion may* be ſuppos'd to *gain by oppoſing the Perſecutors thereof.* For the reſolution whereof, the firſt thing I ſhall return, is, That the utmoſt it can be ſuppos'd to gain, above what Submiſſion doth, is *onely the free Exerciſe thereof in Publick*; the Inward Acts of Religion, and all private External ones, being equally ſecure when we ſubmit to all thoſe Severities that are laid upon us. I obſerve, ſecondly, That as the free Exerciſe of Religion in Publick, is the onely peculiar Advantage that can be ſuppos'd to ariſe from making oppoſition to Perſecuting Princes; ſo, *it is very uncertain, whether we may be able to attain it*, notwithſtanding all the oppoſition we can make. For, as Princes ſeldom want a competent Aſſiſtance againſt thoſe who oppoſe them in the Adminiſtration of their Government; ſo Experience ſhews, that in tract of Time they rarely fail to reduce thoſe to Obedience, who have ſet themſelves againſt their Authority. Upon which, what can any one expect, but that they ſhould lay a more ſevere Reſtraint upon thoſe, by whom they have been ſo oppos'd? I obſerve, laſtly, That as it is very uncertain whether the free Exerciſe of Religion in Publick may be compaſs'd by all our Reſiſtance; ſo it is very hazardous, that *that Reſiſtance may draw* thoſe that do reſiſt *into more than ordinary Cruelties and Extravagancies*; no Wars having been obſerv'd to be more bloody and exorbitant, than thoſe which have been made upon pretence of Religion. From the Advantage that may ariſe to Religion from oppoſing the Perſecutors thereof, paſs we to inquire *what Advantages* may accrue *from a patient Submiſſion* to their Coercion: Which are, firſt of all, *the glorification* of it; I do not ſay, onely by thoſe that ſubmit (who do ſo obey a Precept of it) but alſo by *others*, yea Strangers: It being impoſſible not to think honourably of that Religion by which

* *Mat.* 10. 18.

Men are induc'd to ſuffer the extremeſt Evils the Perſecutors thereof are able to inflict. In conſequence whereof, as it is eaſie to ſuppoſe many that were Enemies to it, may be brought to the embracing of it (which may paſs for a ſecond Recommendation of it); ſo alſo, which may ſerve for a third, that thoſe Perſecuting Princes may be thereby mollified, and induc'd to permit, if not an unlimited, yet ſome tolerable Exerciſe thereof: That which generally draws Princes to the perſecuting of thoſe that are of a different Religion from themſelves, being not ſo much any hatred of their Religion, as the jealouſie they have, leſt, under the Pretences of that, and the Aſſemblies which are made for it, ſome ſecret Deſign againſt the State ſhould lurk. Which Jealouſie muſt needs be taken away, when it appears to them from undoubted Experiments, that they who do profeſs it, will not attempt any thing againſt them, how ſeverely ſoever they may be handled by them. The Advantages both of the one and the other being thus unfolded, in order to the ſhewing on which ſide they do preponderate; let us now, if you pleaſe, *put them into the Scales*, and make our own Eyes *the Judges, which of the two is moſt conducible* to Religion. On the one ſide indeed, even on the ſide of Reſiſtance, there is a poſſibility of attaining the free Exerciſe of Religion in Publick, which is of very great advantage to the welfare of it, as by means of which, God may not onely have the Tribute of his Publick Worſhip, but the weak *Chriſtian* be encourag'd to grow in Grace, and our Religion be tranſmitted to Poſterity inviolate. But as it would be conſider'd, that it is very uncertain, whether Men by all their Reſiſtance ſhall be able to attain that Freedom, and much more, whether it be worth attaining, if it be not likely to be compaſs'd without enormous Wickedneſſes; ſo it would be conſidered on the other hand, that there is a poſſibility of attaining by ſubmiſſion ſome tolerable Exerciſe thereof, and that too not onely without any Enormity, but by our Graces; a patient Submiſſion to the Cenſures of Princes, being no improbable means to mollifie their Hearts, and induce them freely to grant what the others are forced to contend for. But let us ſuppoſe, that Submiſſion fell ſhort of Reſiſtance, as to this particular, that is to ſay, as to the freedom of Publick Worſhip, or the probability of attaining it; yet even ſo it would not follow, that it does at all yield to it, as to the Great Concernments of Religion: For, beſide that God is glorified no leſs by our Sufferings, than by our Actions, which is the main thing we are to look at in the Buſineſs of Religion, (he who ſuffers for the ſake of it, not onely fulfilling the Precepts thereof himſelf, but inviting other Men to think honourably of it, and embrace it, which it is not at all likely Reſiſtance ſhould ever effect) there is as great a probability of its ſecuring the weak, and tranſmitting of Religion to Poſterity: The former, becauſe as thoſe Weak ones may be ſtrengthned by the Conſtancy of the Strong, and that Patience wherewith they ſhall behold them to undergo all their Sufferings; ſo there is reaſon to believe, that God, who is not wanting to any, will furniſh them with Grace proportionable to the greatneſs of their Exigencies. The ſame is to be ſaid as to the tranſmitting of Religion to Poſterity inviolate, however that may ſeem peculiar to the free Exerciſe of Publick Worſhip; it being not at all improbable, that our Conſtancy in ſuffering for it, may induce our

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Posterity to look upon it as so much the more worthy their embracing. To all which, if we add the story of the Primitive times, so we shall not need to doubt of Religion's being more than secur'd by a Patient submitting to persecuting Princes; it being manifest from thence, that Christianity was so far from being destroy'd by the blood of its many Martyrs, that on the contrary it thriv'd and propagated it self by it.

Having thus taken off the plea of Religion, which seems of all others to be the most plausible ground of making resistance, I proceed to that which is made in the behalf of *Inferiour Magistrates*, to whom some men have been willing to indulge it, though they have deny'd it to private Persons; as because they are *publick Persons*, as well as the Supreme, so, because by the Supreme Magistrate himself *oblig'd to draw the Sword of Justice against Offenders.* But first of all, as in Logick *, though the *intermediate species* be a *Genus* in respect of *those species* that are subjected to it, yet it is but a *species* if consider'd with relation to a superiour one; so, though *inferiour Magistrates* are *publick Persons* in respect of their *Fellow-subjects*, yet they are *private Persons* only, if consider'd with relation to *the Supreme.* For all the power of governing, that is in inferiour Magistrates, being deriv'd to them from the Supreme, and consequently subordinate to his, whatsoever is done by them contrary to his Will, must be supposed to want that Power, and consequently, they so far to be look'd upon as private Persons. Whence it is, that, though St. *Peter* oblige all men to be subject to these, as well as to the Higher Powers; yet with this difference, as you may see 1 *Pet.* 2. 13, 14. *To the King as Supreme, but unto Governours as them that are sent by him:* Making the Authority of inferiour Magistrates to result from the will of the Supreme; and consequently not to be made use of against it. Neither will it avail to say, that the constitution of our Nation bears witness to the contrary; as by which the Sentence of a Judge, in matters of Estate, shall be of force, not only against any private Order of the Princes, but even where his own property is concern'd. For, as on the one side that Constitution neither reacheth any farther than matter of Estate, neither hath any farther power to pass it, than the *Posse comitatus* will afford it, which at the most extends no farther than the County where the Sentence is to be executed; so the reason why a Decree of the Judge shall prevail against any private Order of the Kings, is not because our Law allows the inferiour Magistrate to oppose the Supreme; but because, the Judge being commissionated by the King himself, to judge between Him and his Subjects in matters of Estate, what is so sentenc'd by him is rather to be presum'd to be the will of the Prince, than any private Order against it. As little of force is there, as to what is pleaded for inferiour Magistrates resisting the exorbitant power of the Prince, because *commissionated by him to draw the Sword of Justice against Offenders.* For as St. *Paul*, after he had affirm'd that God had *put all things under* our Saviour's *feet*, yet ceased not to add, as a limitation of that affirmation, that it was *manifest he is excepted which did put all things under him*, so we may, that when the Prince commissionates the inferiour Magistrates to punish Offenders, it is no less manifest, that he is excepted who did so commissionate him; it being not to be presum'd, that he, who by the Laws of God and Man

* *Grot. de Jure Belli ac pacis. l. 1. c. 4. §. 6.*

Man is conſtituted as ſupreme, will commiſſionate any perſon againſt himſelf. As for that ſaying of *Trajan* the Emperor when he delivered a Dagger to the *Præfectus Prætorio*, *Uſe this for me, if I govern rightly, but if ill, againſt me*; it is but agreeable (as *Grotius* * hath obſerv'd) to that Princes other demeanour, who made ſhew of behaving himſelf not ſo much as an Emperor, but as the Servant of the Senate and the people; In which caſe there is no doubt, but it might have been lawful for the Præfect to oppoſe him, if the Senate and people ſhould upon the Emperors default have ſo commanded him: Becauſe ſo the Emperor ſhould not be the Supreme, but that Senate and people, to whoſe judgment he profeſſed to ſubject himſelf. But as it doth not follow that the like may be done to Soveraign Princes, whoſe Supremacy is a bar to all attempts of the inferiour Magiſtrate; ſo if Soveraign Princes ſhould give ſuch a Power, they ſhould neither conſult their own honour, nor the welfare of that Kingdom which is committed to their truſt: He who gives another a power againſt himſelf if he govern ill, not only making him the judge, whether he govern ſo or no, but giving him a power againſt the Commonwealth, which depends on the well-being of him that adminiſters it.

* *De Jure Belli ac Pacis. l.* 1. *c.* 4. *Sect.* 6.

From that ſecond plea paſs we to a third, which is taken from thoſe *Oaths* which Kings do commonly make (before they are ſolemnly crown'd) *of governing the people by the Laws*; the government (as ſome think) ſeeming thereby to ariſe from a compact between them and their Subjects; upon the breach whereof on the Kings part, it may be lawful for the Subject to depart from their Allegiance, and reſiſt him in the execution of his Power. For anſwer to which, not to tell you what intolerable miſchiefs would enſue from ſuch a Tenent, as often as any ſeditious man ſhould go about to perſwade the people, they were not ſo well govern'd as they ought; I will alledge in behalf of our own Princes (farther than which we ſhall not need to look) that which will cut the throat of this objection; to wit, that *our Kings* are to as full purpoſe *ſuch before* their Coronation as *after*: Witneſs, not only their peforming all the Acts of a King, but that known Maxim in our Laws, that *the King of England never dies*. From whence as it will follow, that the Kings of this Nation owe not their being ſuch to any compact between them and their people, that upon any ſuppoſed breach thereof it might be lawful for the Subject to reſiſt them; ſo alſo that the Oaths taken by them at their Coronation, are not to procure them that Power, which otherwiſe they could not have; but for the encouraging the people to yeild the more ready obedience to them, which they may very well do, when they, who are to govern, plight their Faith and Reputation, to govern them according to their own Laws.

There is but one Objection behind, that is any thing conſiderable, which alledgeth that there are many Kings *in Title*, which are *not ſo in Reality*, as being not Supreme in their ſeveral Dominions: In which caſe, nothing hinders, they may be reſiſted, becauſe the command of *every Soul's* being *ſubject to the higher powers*, is by St. *Paul* himſelf limited to thoſe that are *Supreme*, that being the true notion of the word ὑπερεχούσαις. But neither will this plea be of any avail, if conſider'd with relation to our own Princes, beyond which we ſhall not be concern'd to enquire. Becauſe it is certain from the Laws and Cuſtoms

ſtoms of this Realm, that they are both the *Supreme* and *the only Supreme*. Witneſs, not only the ſeveral Titles* that are given them, ſuch as that beforementioned, *The Lieutenants of God, immediate from God*, and *the heads of the Commonwealth*, as to their Crown of being *an Imperial Crown*, and *immediately ſubject to God and to no other Power*, but alſo that Power wherewith they are Inveſted. All Laws are made by them, (their *Le Roy le Veult* inſcrib'd upon all Acts of Parliament evidently ſhewing it) all Proceedings in Law run in their name; To them it belongs to Treat of War and Peace; By them Parliaments are at Pleaſure call'd, and diſſolv'd again when they think good to do it: In fine, all juriſdiction flows from them, and is beſtow'd as they are pleaſed to appoint. All which put together make it evident that the Kings of *England* are Supreme, and therefore to be reckoned among thoſe higher Powers, to whom St. *Paul* hath commanded every Soul to be ſubject. And indeed, as ſo to be is the intereſt of the People, whatſoever the Prince is, it having been happily obſerv'd, that, how bloody ſoever *Nero* was, yet there was not ſo much Blood ſpilt in his fourteen years Raign, as there was in a few months after his death; ſo by reſiſting the Supreme Powers they make God their enemy (I ſpeak as to the preſent world) whom otherwiſe they might experiment as their friend. For, as on the one hand there is no doubt but he will avenge the contempt of his Vicegerents, becauſe it is his Authority, and his alone by which they ſhine, ſo there is as little doubt on the other hand; but if men would ſubmit their Necks to the Yoak, God Almighty himſelf would ſooner or later eaſe them of it: It being not to be thought but that he, who is no reſpecter of Perſons, would be as ready to avenge the Exorbitances of Princes, as of thoſe who are ſubjected to their commands.

* See Lord Chief Baron Bridgman's Speech at the Tryal of the Kings Judges.

4. Having thus ſhewn what Honour is due from us to the Higher Powers, and moreover remov'd thoſe Objections which are commonly made againſt ſubmitting to their Cenſures, nothing remains upon this head, but to enquire into the *honour of Inferiour Magiſtrates*, what are *the grounds* of it, *the kinds*, and *in what meaſure* it is to be exhibited. For that theſe alſo are to have our honour, St. *Peter* ſhews in the place by me ſo often quoted, where he requires not only that we ſhould *ſubmit* our ſelves *to the King as Supreme*, but *to Governours, as thoſe that are ſent by him*. Now, though it be not to be deny'd, that theſe alſo are Gods Miniſters, and as ſuch to be rever'd by us; yet, becauſe it is certain that theſe are neither Gods immediate Miniſters, nor immediately appointed by himſelf, therefore to make out the grounds of their Honour, we muſt take another courſe, than what we before did in that of Sovereign Princes. Now there are two things upon which the honour of Inferiour Magiſtrates is grounded, and into which therefore it is to be reſolv'd by us; *The Authority Princes have to conſtitute* Inferiour Magiſtrates, and *their actual conſtitution* of them. Of the former of theſe we need no other proof than that *the ends of Government are not to be attain'd without*. For it being impoſſible for any one man, eſpecially where his Dominions are any thing large, to diſtribute juſtice to all thoſe that are committed to his charge; there ariſeth a neceſſity of conferring part of the care upon other men, as without which it is impoſſible to be diſcharged. In conformity whereto, as we find *Jethro*, the Father-in-Law of *Moſes*,

Moſes, adviſing him for his own eaſe, and the benefit of the people to ſet ſuch inferiour Rulers over them, *Exod.* 18. 21. and ſo on; ſo we find the ſame *Moſes* conſtituting ſuch Rulers over them, from Rulers of Thouſands to Rulers of Fifties and of Tens, *verſ.* 25. of that Chapter. Now, foraſmuch as the ends of Government are not poſſible to be attain'd, unleſs there be Inferiour Rulers as well as others, it is to be look'd upon as the intention of God, who doth nothing in vain, that ſuch Rulers are to appointed, and where they are, to be rever'd and obey'd. As little doubt is to be made of Princes *conſtituting* the Perſons that are to be ſo, *to procure them that honour which is due* unto them. For being appointed by God as his Miniſters *in ſolidum*, in thoſe places where they are authorized to preſide, witneſs St. *Paul's* both commanding *every Soul to be ſubject* to them, and repreſenting them as *Gods Miniſters*, for Reward and Vengeance, which comprehend within them the whole of all Civil juriſdiction; whatſoever other Powers there are, muſt derive their Authority from them, whom he hath entruſted with that command. Whence it is that St. *Peter* himſelf, where he ſpeaks of ſubmiſſion to them, requires it upon this ſcore, even becauſe they are *ſent*, or rather *commiſſionated* by the Supreme. It is true indeed, that deſignation is not always apparent, not only the Election of Inferiour Magiſtrates being permitted to ſeveral Societies, but thoſe Magiſtrates formally Inveſted in that Authority by ſome of the members of it: But as the Election or Conſtitution of ſuch is indulg'd to thoſe ſeveral Societies by the Laws or Charters of Princes, ſo being ſuch, they who are ſo Elected or Conſtituted, are to be look'd upon as the Miniſters of the Prince, and appointed by his Authority and Command: He who is appointed by thoſe, who are comiſſionated by the Prince, being to be look'd upon, as appointed by himſelf.

Having thus ſhewn the ground of honouring Inferiour Magiſtrates to be, that they are with the approbation of God conſtituted by him whom he hath immediately appointed, and conſequently that they are Gods Miniſters in a ſecondary manner,; the next thing to be enquir'd into, is, what kind of Honours are to be afforded them: Which we ſhall find to be much the ſame with thoſe we are to pay unto the Supreme, becauſe, though in an inferiour manner partaking of that Authority with which the Prince himſelf is veſted. Of this nature is firſt *eſteeming of them* according to their ſeveral places, *demeaning our ſelves reſpectfully* toward them, and *ſpeaking honourably to and of them*, ſo far I mean, as their reſpective Dignities do exact, no Authority being likely to have its due force and efficacy where theſe are not duly paid. Of the ſame nature is, ſecondly, *yielding Obedience to their Commands*, and *ſubmitting our ſelves unto their Cenſures*; otherwiſe we do in effect oppoſe our ſelves to the Authority of the Prince, from whom they have their Commiſſion, and conſequently alſo to that of God. Add hereunto, where any ſuch thing is made their due, *the miniſtring to them of our ſubſtance*; as being but a juſt reward for their attending upon the affairs of the Republick, and a juſt regard to him by whom they are appointed over us. The only thing of difficulty is, *in what meaſure* theſe Honours are to be paid, which accordingly I come now to reſolve.

In order whereunto, the firſt thing that I ſhall offer, is, that it ought always to be *with ſubordination to the Divine Majeſty.* For if we are to obey God rather than Princes, how much more ought we to do ſo, rather than thoſe who are but their Miniſters? As little doubt is to be made, in the ſecond place, but that the Honour which is to be paid to Inferiour Magiſtrates, is to be *with ſubordination to the Supreme.* For being, as St. *Peter* inſtructs us, to be ſubmitted to, and honour'd as Perſons that are *ſent by him*, that Honour is in reaſon to be ſubordinate to his, by whom they are ſo ſent or commiſſionated: That, by which any thing is ſuch, being much more ſuch it ſelf, and conſequently to be preferr'd before it. Excellent to this purpoſe is that of St. *Auguſtine*, as I find him quoted by the late Reverend Primate of *Armagh**. *If thy Curator command thee any thing, muſt it not be done? (yes queſtionleſs.) And yet if the Proconſul countermand (and thou obey him) thou deſpiſeſt not the power of thy Curator, but ſerveſt a greater. Neither ought the leſſer to be angry, if the greater be preferr'd before it.* Again, *If the Proconſul does command one thing, and the Emperour does command another, is there any doubt, but that contemning the one, we are to ſerve the other?* I obſerve thirdly, That as the Honour of Inferiour Magiſtrates is to be with ſubordination to that of the Supreme; ſo alſo, as was before noted out of St. *Auguſtine*, *with ſubordination to ſuch Powers as are in higher place* than the other; the leſſer being in reaſon to give place to the greater, and conſequently the honour of the former to be limited by that of the other. Laſtly, (which will upon the matter acquaint us with the full meaſure of our duty) We are to honour Inferiour Magiſtrates *according to the meaſure of that Authority which is imparted to them*, and *according to the pleaſure of him* by whom it is ſo *imparted.* For, inaſmuch as they are to be honour'd as perſons that are ſent by the Prince, they are conſequently to receive honour from us according to that Authority which they receive from him, and according to his pleaſure from whom they do. But from hence it will follow, Firſt, That if the Inferiour Magiſtrate command us any thing which is not within the power of his Commiſſion to do, in that caſe I may, without ſin, withdraw my obedience from him; becauſe, ſo far he hath no Authority to command. It will follow, Secondly, That, if I think I have receiv'd hard meaſure from the Inferiour Magiſtrate, I may, without breach of ſubmiſſion, appeal from him unto the Superiour, even as we find St. *Paul* to have done from the Provincial Governour to *Cæſar*: Becauſe he, by whom thoſe Inferiour Magiſtrates are commiſſionated, does not ordinarily commiſſionate them ſo far, as not to leave an appeal from them unto himſelf. Care only would be taken, that we appeal not from them but upon juſt cauſe, and where it appears to us they exceed the bounds of their Commiſſion and the Law. For, otherwiſe we ſhew our ſelves refractory to that ſupreme Authority by which they are conſtituted, and conſequently alſo unto God. Laſtly, it will follow from the premiſes, That as they, who are inveſted with a greater Authority, are to have a greater honour; and they, who are inveſted with a leſs Authority, a leſs: ſo the preciſe meaſures both of the one and others honour will be beſt learn'd from the Laws, becauſe moſt evidently declaring the pleaſure of the Prince that conſtituted them. And

* Power Communicated by God to the Prince, and the Obedience required of the Subject. pag. 116.

more than this I ſhall not need to ſay concerning the honour of Princes, or of thoſe who are commiſſionated by them.

5. The order of my Diſcourſe now leads me to enquire of the duty of Princes toward their Subjects, and of Inferiour Magiſtrates toward thoſe, over whom they are appointed to preſide; the Commandment as was before ſhewn, being intended no leſs for their regulation, than of thoſe who are ſubjected to their commands. But becauſe I have to do, not with Princes, but with Subjects, and but little with Inferiour Magiſtrates, and, becauſe too, for the moſt part they are too intelligent to ſtand in need of an Inſtructour, and have more than enough of Monitors, even among thoſe who ought rather to obey than to adviſe: it ſhall ſuffice me to addreſs this general exhortation to all thoſe who have any Authority in the Commonwealth; That *they would remember themſelves to be Gods Miniſters, and act with reſpect to his glory, the Princes Miniſters, and make uſe of their Authority, for and with him.* That *they would remember they are the Miniſters of both, for the encouragement of the good, and not make uſe of their Authority to vex and worry thoſe that are ſo, the Miniſters of both for the puniſhing of evildoers, and therefore neither to connive at, or protect them.* That *they would remember the Oath they have taken, which binds their duty ſo much the faſter on them, and for the violation whereof, if the Prince does not, God whoſe name is invok'd in it, will call them to a ſevere account.* Laſtly, That *they would remember that all profanation of Gods day by Tipling and Idleneſs, all profanations of his Name by vain Oaths and Execrations*; In fine, That *much of the violation of the Laws of God and Man will lie at their doors, if they ſuffer them to go unpuniſhed.* For, inaſmuch as all that the Prince can do, is to look after the great affairs of State, and the appointing of Inferiour Magiſtrates for the puniſhing of Offenders; the whole of the guilt of private mens Offences muſt be chargeable upon them, who are appointed to take cognizance thereof. Which however thoſe men may now make light of, becauſe, conſidering not to what judgment it doth expoſe them, yet will appear to be of more importance, when God ſhall *render to every man according to his works*, and particularly to thoſe to whom he hath committed the Sword of Juſtice. For where ſhall they appear, who, beſide their own perſonal miſcarriages, ſhall have to anſwer for ſo many and great miſcarriages of other men?

PART

PART VIII.

Of the honour of Spiritual Parents, which is ſhewn to be their due from Reaſon and Scripture. The Grounds of that Honour, their begetting us unto God, and being appointed by God as his Miniſters in things pertaining to the Conſcience. All power in Spirituals veſted in our Saviour, and from him therefore to be derived, through thoſe to whom he tranſmitted it. The kinds of Honours, either ſuch as are more peculiar to their Function, or ſuch as are common to them with other Parents. Of the former ſort are, 1. The reſorting to the place where they Teach, and attending both to them and to their Doctrine. 2. The yeilding Obedience to their Commands, ſo far as the nature of their Function, and the meaſure of their Office doth require. This evidenced from Scripture, and from the nature of their Authority, which is ſhewn at large to be Imperative as well as Doctrinal. That that Authority of theirs extends no further than to matters of Religion, and is bounded as to them alſo, within the diſcipline of our Saviour, and the edification of the Church. 3. The deferring to them in their Decrees concerning matters of Faith; whether it be by aquieſcing in them, ſo far as to make no publick oppoſition to them, which is the duty of all; or by contenting our ſelves to be debarr'd any publick employment in it, unleſs we declare our cordial aſſent to ſuch Articles of Religion as they ſhall judge expedient to be publickly Profeſs'd and Taught. 4. Submiſſion to their reſpective Cenſures, where the Churches power of inflicting ſuch is alſo ſhewn. An enquiry concerning ſuch Honours as are common to them, with other Parents, which alſo are ſhewn from Scripture to be their due, and particularly an honourable maintenance. The like evidenc'd from the impoſſibility of their being otherwiſe in any eſteem with the generality of men, and from the improbability of drawing Men of Worth and Parts into that Function. The whole concluded with a ſhort Prayer to God, to direct thoſe that are our ſpiritual Parents in the diſcharge of their reſpective duties.

FROM our Natural and Civil Parents, paſs we to our *Spiritual ones*, under which name I comprehend the ſeveral *Governours* and *Miniſters* of the Church; becauſe, however the Title of *Fathers* may belong more peculiarly to ſome of them, yet all of them do in their meaſure contribute to our *Spiritual birth*, which is the proper foundation of their *Paternity*. Now concerning theſe, I ſhall ſhew,

1. That they ought to be honour'd by us.
2. Enquire into the grounds of that Honour we are to pay them.
3. And Laſtly, what Honours we are to afford them.

I. That our Spiritual Parents are to have a ſhare of *our Honour*, much need not be ſaid, to ſhew, whether we do conſider the neceſſity of Honouring our Earthly Parents, or the ample Teſtimony the Scripture gives to the Honouring of our Spiritual ones. For, as, if our Earthly Parents be to be honour'd, Reaſon would that they ſhould

much rather be ſo, who beget us to an infinitely better Being; ſo eſpecially if the Scripture hath added her Suffrage to it, and not onely given Teſtimony to that their Paternity, but expreſly requir'd an honourable Acknowledgment of it. Now, that ſo it hath, is evident from 1 *Tim.* 5. 17. and 1 *Theſſ.* 5. 12, 13. In the former whereof, St. *Paul* gives in charge, that *the Elders that rule well, be accounted worthy of double honour, eſpecially they who labour in the Word and Doctrine:* In the latter, that *the Brethren ſhould know them which labour'd among them, and were over them in the Lord, and admoniſh'd them; and eſteem them very highly in love, for their Works ſake.* To both which, if we add that of *Heb.* 13. 17. ſo the proof will be full and cogent; St. *Paul*, or whoever was the Author of that Epiſtle, obliging thoſe he wrote to, *to obey them that had the rule over them, and to ſubmit themſelves*; which are the Higheſt Expreſſions of Honour we can give.

II. The neceſſity of Honouring our Spiritual Parents, being thus evinc'd from clear and expreſs Places of Scripture; proceed we now, according to the Method before laid down, to inquire into *the Grounds* of it: which we ſhall find to have ſomething common with the Grounds of honouring our Natural Parents, and ſomething with thoſe of honouring of our Civil ones. With the former, becauſe by theſe it is we are begotten unto God through the Laver of Regeneration, and nouriſhed afterwards by the Word of Truth: With the latter, becauſe appointed by God as his Miniſters and Vicegerents in things pertaining to the Conſcience: Not indeed immediately; for ſo none but *Chriſt*, the Apoſtles, and other the Primitive Doctors of the Church were: but by thoſe who were their lawful Succeſſors, and to whom they had delegated their Spiritual Power: Which Particular is neceſſarily to be added, becauſe without one or the other Deſignation, we can have no Title to that Honour. For however ſome may think that Honour due unto themſelves, for travelling together with us in the Diſpenſation of the Word and Sacraments, and other ſuch like Offices, by which Men are to be begotten and conſerv'd unto God; yet inaſmuch as all Power in Spirituals was veſted in our Saviour, and by him tranſmitted to his Apoſtles (our Saviour not onely affirming, that *as the Father ſent him, ſo he ſent them*; but appointing them for the Teaching and Diſcipling of the World) no Man can ordinarily aſſume to himſelf that Honour, without an immediate Call from God, or from thoſe whom he hath intruſted with the Management thereof. Which ſaid, nothing remains to do, but to inquire *what kind of Honours* we are to give to theſe our Spiritual Parents.

III. For the reſolution whereof, I will inſtance,

1. In ſuch Honours as are *more peculiar* to their Function; and after that,
2. In thoſe that are *common to them with other Parents.*

1. Of the former ſort is,

1. *The reſorting to the Place where they teach, and attending diligently to them when we do; the laying up what we ſo learn from them in our Memories, and in our Hearts, and copying them out in our Lives and Converſations.* For, being appointed by God the Teachers of his People, as their Teaching, for the inſtructing and bettering of thoſe

thoſe that are; he that doth any thing to the prejudice of either, muſt conſequently deny them the Honour of Teachers, and ſo far therefore offend againſt this Commandment. Of the ſame nature is,

2. The *yielding Obedience to their Commands, ſo far as the nature of their Function and the meaſure of their Office doth require.* For being appointed by God, not onely as Teachers, but as Rulers; and, as you ſaw but now, out of the Author to the *Hebrews*, we oblig'd to obey them; (for, *Obey*, ſaith that Apoſtle, *them that have the rule over you, and ſubmit your ſelves; for they watch for your ſouls, as they that muſt give account, that they may do it with joy, and not with grief.*) Being therefore, I ſay, appointed by God, not onely as Teachers, but as Rulers, and the People oblig'd to obey them; he that refuſeth ſo to do, denies them the Honour of Rulers, becauſe that implies Obedience to their Commands. The onely thing that hath with any ſhew of Reaſon been objected (if yet that it ſelf may be allow'd to have any ſhew of Reaſon) is, that the *Rule* whereof the Scripture ſpeaks is onely *doctrinal and declarative*, and conſequently, no neceſſity of Obedience, properly ſo called. But beſide that ſuch violence is not lightly to be offered to the Signification of Words, becauſe, if it might, there could be nothing certain, either in the Scriptures, or other Authors; Beſide that theſe our Spiritual Parents are more often repreſented under ſuch Titles that imply *Authority*, than in thoſe that imply *Teaching* onely; witneſs the Title of Πρεσβύτεροι, Ἐπίσκοποι, Ποιμένες, and the like, which are uſual Titles of Authority: Beſide, laſtly, that in the place before quoted out of St. *Paul*, a difference is made between thoſe *that rule well*, and thoſe *which labour in the Word and Doctrine*; which what were it but a mockery, if all their Ruling were labouring in the Word and Doctrine? Beſide theſe, I ſay, and a great many other things that might be produc'd, which I paſs the rather over, becauſe I think the Objection deſerves no farther Confutation out of the Scripture; the very Being of the Church implies that Power of Commanding, which thoſe *Novelliſts* are ſo willing to diſcard. For the New Teſtament preſcribing nothing particularly, or at leaſt very imperfectly, as to the Time, or Place, or Manner of holding Aſſemblies, which, for the orderly management thereof, are of neceſſity to be determin'd; either *Chriſtian* Aſſemblies are not to be held, which is directly contrary to the Precept of our Religion; or there muſt be a Power in the Church to determine them, and conſequently, a neceſſity of yielding Obedience to them. The onely thing that can admit of a Diſpute, is, What are *the Limits* of their Power? Which it will not be hard for him to diſcern, who comes to it with an unprejudic'd Mind. For, inaſmuch as that Society whereof they are Governours, is inſtituted by God, for the Conſervation of Religion; it will follow, that the onely Authority to which they can pretend, is to extend no farther than to *Matters of Religion*, or what is *neceſſary to the Conſervation of it.* Which makes it ſtrange, that the Church of *Rome* ſhould pretend to a Power of taking away the Civil Rights of Princes, or their Subjects; eſpecially when he, who is Head even of their Head, hath ſo frankly declar'd, that *his kingdom is not of this world.* If the Governours of the Church claim any Power of that nature, it muſt be by the Indulgence of Princes, and to it they are to aſcribe it. Again,

Foraſmuch

Foraſmuch as the Governours of the Church are but the Miniſters of him who is the *Great Shepherd and Biſhop of our Souls*; whatever Authority they have, muſt be *within the Limits of his Diſcipline*, who is the Author no leſs of their Power than it. Laſtly, Foraſmuch as that Power which the Governours of the Church have, was given for *the edification*, and not for *the deſtruction* of thoſe that are to be ruled by it, 2 *Cor.* 10. 8. it will follow, that that ought to be the Limit of their Commands, and conſequently alſo of our Obedience. Care onely would be taken, that we do not raſhly, nor indeed without great and manifeſt reaſon, pronounce of any thing they enjoyn, as either not for *edification*, or to the *deſtruction* of the Church; partly becauſe what is for edification of the Publick, is not eaſily to be judg'd of by Private Perſons; and partly, becauſe there are few things more deſtructive to the Being of the Church, than the diſſolution of that Diſcipline by which it is ty'd together.

3. From the Commands of the Governours of the Church, as which do for the moſt part reſpect things to be done, paſs we to *their Decrees* in ſuch Controverſies as do ariſe concerning thoſe things which are to be believ'd; where at the ſame time I ſhall ſet down *what Authority* thoſe our Spiritual Parents may pretend to, and *what kind of Honour* is to be paid by us to it. For the reſolution whereof, I ſhall no way doubt to affirm, firſt, That it is in the Power of thoſe Governours *to come to a deciſion* in them, and oblige the ſeveral Members of the Church *not to make any Publick Oppoſition to them.* For, the Peace of the Church being broken, not ſo much by any thing, as by Controverſies which may ariſe concerning thoſe things that are to be believ'd; the Governours of the Church, to whom the preſervation of the Peace thereof is committed, muſt conſequently be ſuppos'd to be furniſh'd with ſuch a Power of Deciſion, as ſhall bind up the ſeveral Members thereof from making any Publick Oppoſition to what they do ſo decide. Which is ſo reaſonable a thing, that there is no formed Church in the World, which doth not claim ſuch a Power; nor any reaſonable Man in them, which doth not think himſelf to be ſo far bound up by it: provided the Deciſion do not entrench upon an Article of Faith, nor be impos'd upon ours, but recommended as ſuch onely, to which Men ſhall not openly oppoſe themſelves. For, though it be not lawful for any Man to abjure that which he does believe to be a Truth; yet it may be lawful, and ſometime neceſſary, not to make profeſſion of ſome Truths, if the Peace of the Church be like to be broken by it. But beſide that the Honour of the Governours of the Church may require an Acquieſcence in their Deciſions, where thoſe Deciſions, though it may be not exact, do not entrench upon an Article of Faith, nor are impos'd upon our Belief; I do no way doubt, but it may alſo require the exacting *a cordial Acknowledgment of them* from *thoſe that are the Miniſters thereof.* For, it being of great importance to the Welfare of the Church, that thoſe which are its Teachers ſhould be well perſwaded themſelves, leſt (as is but too frequent) they diſperſe their Errours among the People; it cannot but be thought requiſite for thoſe who are the Governours, to exact of thoſe Teachers, before they be approv'd, a cordial Acknowledgment of ſuch Articles of Religion, as they ſhall deem expedient to be publickly profeſs'd and taught: For, how ſhall they otherwiſe provide

provide for the Welfare of that Church which is committed to their Charge, and for which they ſhall be accountable to Almighty God? or thoſe Candidates of the Miniſtry provide for the Honour of their Governours, who ſhall not be content to make ſuch an Acknowledgment, if they do heartily believe the things propos'd; or to be excluded from the Office of Teachers, if they do not? Honour implying an Acknowledgment of all ſuch Power and Authority as is requiſite in a Governour, for the conſervation of that Society, over which he is appointed to preſide.

4. One onely *Species* of Honour remains, of thoſe which are more peculiar to their Function; and that is, *Submiſſion to th Cenſures* of theſe our Spiritual Parents. Of which, beſide the Admonition of the Author to the *Hebrews*, where he requires us not onely to *obey thoſe that have the Rule over us*, but alſo *to ſubmit our ſelves*, a Proof may be fetch'd from the Authority thoſe Governours are inveſted with, of excluding them from the Communion of the Church, who ſhall not ſhew themſelves faithful Members of it. For, beſide that every Member of the Church covenants in Baptiſm to ſhew himſelf a faithful Soldier of *Chriſt Jeſus*, and conſequently cannot be thought to have any injury done him, if he be debarr'd the Communion of the Church, upon the breach of that his Covenant; beſide that the Scripture doth ſo far enjoyn it upon particular Perſons, as to oblige them *to withdraw themſelves from every Brother that walketh diſorderly*; beſide, laſtly, that God hath committed to the Governours of the Church *the power of binding and loſing*, and promis'd that *what they do ſo bind and looſe on earth, ſhall be bound and loos'd in heaven*, which the Church of God hath ever underſtood with reference to the Power of Excommunication and Abſolution; that Power is no more than neceſſary, for the conſervation of the Church in obedience to God, and to the wholſom Commands of their Superiours. For, who will generally be very careful of keeping the Covenants they have made in Baptiſm, if it be not in the Power of the Governours thereof, to debar them the Priviledges of that Communion which the more ſound Members of the Church enjoy? Now foraſmuch as it is in the Power of theſe our Spiritual Parents, not onely to command ſuch things as are ſalutary, but to exclude from the Communion of the Church all ſuch as are diſorderly walkers; if we will give them that Honour which is due to them, we muſt of neceſſity acquieſce in that their Cenſure, if juſtly inflicted, ſo long as they ſhall think fit to continue it; and, becauſe that their Cenſure is in order to our Amendment, give them ſuch Proofs of our Sorrow and Repentance, as may oblige them to receive us again into the Boſom of that Church, out of which we have been ejected for our diſorderlineſs.

2. Now, though it were to be wiſh'd, that even theſe kinds of Honour were paid unto the Clergy; partly becauſe they are more proper to their Function, and partly becauſe the welfare of Religion is more immediately concerned in them: yet foraſmuch as by the Conſent of the World, they have been thought worthy of *other Honours*, even ſuch as in themſelves *ſavour more of Earth than Heaven*; I think it not amiſs to make theſe alſo the Subject of my Inquiry; and the rather, becauſe they have been of late deny'd them. In order whereunto,

whereunto, I ſhall lay for my Foundation, that which, if it had been heeded, would perhaps have made this Queſtion unneceſſary; I mean, the Behaviour of thoſe of *Melita* to St. *Paul*, and them that travell'd with him, *Acts* 28. 20. concerning whom, St. *Luke* there tells us, that they *honour'd* them *with many Honours*; *and when they departed, laded them with ſuch things as were neceſſary.* For, there appearing not any the leaſt intimation of thoſe Iſlanders converſion to the Faith, that we ſhould think the Honours they beſtow'd upon St. *Paul* were other than Civil ones; and St. *Luke*, who writes the Story, and had a ſhare in thoſe Honours, remembring this Act of theirs with Commendation and Applauſe, it is evident that *Civil* Honours are not onely not diſagreeable to their Function, but alſo (becauſe we are indefinitely commanded to honour them) in the number of thoſe that are to be paid. For, how ſhould we think thoſe other than due, which we find both St. *Paul* and St. *Luke* to have willingly receiv'd, and the latter moreover to have tranſmitted the Cogniſance of to the World, as it were by their Example to incite others to the like. And though it be true, the Text particularizeth not the Honours that were beſtow'd upon them, and leaves us to collect, that they were, for the kind, Civil ones; yet foraſmuch as it makes mention of their *honouring them with many Honours*, and moreover expreſſeth in the ſame Period, their furniſhing them *with ſuch things as were neceſſary* at their departure; I think it but reaſonable to collect, that whilſt the Apoſtle and his Company were with them, they treated them with all kind of Reſpect, in Geſture, Language, and Entertainment; and when they departed, no leſs officiouſly than courteouſly accompanied them to their Ship. But becauſe, in this particular, we have to do with envious Men, who will not eaſily be convinc'd of what they are unwilling to believe; and becauſe the thing whereof we ſpeak, is a matter of Intereſt, in which (whatever profeſſions we may make) Men will be apt to think, we will be partial to our ſelves; therefore, to make our Cauſe ſo much the more plauſible, I will both inſtance in *one kind* of Civil Honour, and ſhew from *Reaſon* the Equity of others. Now the Honour that I ſhall inſtance in, is that of *Maintenance*; becauſe St. *Paul* hath ſo expreſly aſſerted the paying of it to the Miniſters of Religion. Witneſs, firſt of all, that Affirmation of his, 1 *Cor.* 9. 14. Where having premis'd many Arguments concerning this Affair, and inquir'd in particular, whether the *Corinthians* were not very well ſatisfied, that they who miniſtred about Holy Things in the Temple, were Partakers with it; he ſubjoyns, in the next Words, *Even ſo hath the Lord ordain'd, that they which preach the Goſpel, ſhould live of the Goſpel.* In which place, not onely affirming the neceſſity of a Maintenance, but arguing that neceſſity from what God had eſtabliſh'd among the *Jews*, he gives us plainly enough to underſtand, that he meant an Honourable one, becauſe the Prieſts among the *Jews* were ſo provided for. But ſo the ſame Apoſtle gives us yet more clearly to underſtand, 1 *Tim.* 5. 17, 18. where he exhorts, that *the Elders that rule well, be accounted worthy of double honour, eſpecially they who labour in the Word and Doctrine*; becauſe (as he there ſubjoyns) *the Scripture hath ſaid, Thou ſhalt not muzzle the mouth of the Oxe that treadeth out the Corn, and the Labourer is worthy of his Reward.* From which Reaſon, as it is manifeſt, that the thing

thing whereof he entreats, is the Maintenance of those *who labour in the Word and Doctrine*; so it is no less manifest, from his before expressing it under the Title of *Honour*, and a *double* one, that he meant such a Maintenance as should not onely afford them a Subsistence, but above the common Condition of Ordinary Men. Of which, even some of those, who were otherwise no great Friends to the Clergy, were so sensible, that one of them did not stick to affirm in the late *Long Parliament*, That they were Scandalous Livings, that made so many Scandalous Ministers in the Church.

Now though from this one Topick, because the Reason is the same of all, it were easie to infer, that those of whom we speak, are susceptible of other Civil Honours; yet I think it not amiss, especially having before promis'd it, to add the Suffrage of Reason also. Now there are two things which Reason offers toward the confirmation of those outward Marks of Honour, which this Church, and almost all others, have set upon the Ministers of Religion; whereof the former respects the generality of those that are under their respective Charges; the other, the Invitation of such as are to be admitted into them. For though (to begin with the former) there be enough in that Sacred Function, to engage Mens Esteem; though it had nothing to commend those who were of it, beside the Dignity of their Office, and the Honourableness of their Work: yet forasmuch as the Common sort judge rather by their Eyes, than by their Understandings, and indeed cannot well do otherwise, unless they had more exalted ones; how is it possible to think, they should ever hold such in reputation, upon whom they discern no outward Marks of Honour? Especially when they see all other Governours adorned with the like, and appearing outwardly as Specious, as they are inwardly Great and Glorious? For by how much the more their Eyes are dazled with that outward Pomp and Splendor which they do every day behold those Ministers of God in the State to be compass'd with, so much the less regard must they be suppos'd to have for his Ministers in the Church, upon whom they discern none of the same Greatness: Unless (as it hapned in the Apostles times) they could bear themselves above the Condition of Men, and outshine the Laity as much by the miraculousness of their Works, as they do them by the outward Marks of Majesty and Greatness. There is the same, or far greater reason for the Confirmation of those outward Marks of Honour, if we consider the necessity there is of them to invite Men of Worth and Parts to enter themselves into the Sacred Function. For, though that which ought chiefly to draw Men, be the Nobleness of the Work, and the Honour they may thereby do both to God, and to his Church; yet inasmuch as the Candidates of this Function carry about them the Infirmities of Men, by means of which it is not impossible they may stand in need of other Motives, it is not easie to believe, that, quitting those Worldly Employments, for which they are equally fitted, and to which they are tempted by the pleasing Baits of Advantage and Honour, they will betake themselves to a Function, in which they shall live poorly and contemptibly, and not onely miss of the former Rewards, but be trampled upon, and despis'd. Of which, what can any Man imagine to be the consequence, but that the Office of the Priesthood become a Prey to the meanest both in Parts

and Quality, and both That, and Religion it ſelf, thereby fall into the contempt of all.

I have done with the Honour of our Spiritual Parents, and ſhewn both upon what Grounds it ſtands, and to what Expreſſions it is to extend: It remains, were the generality of Men ſo proper for it, or indeed I proper for the Work, that I ſhould entreat of the Duty of thoſe Spiritual Parents, toward ſuch whom they beget unto their Maker. But becauſe I have to do, not with thoſe Parents, but with the Children; and beſide that, am more fitted to learn of them, than to inſtruct them; I ſhall chuſe rather to turn my Diſcourſe into a Prayer, and call in your Devotion to aſſiſt me in it; Beſeeching God, whoſe the Clergy are, and from whom *every good and perfect gift cometh*, That *he would give them Abilities anſwerable to the weight of their Employment, and Grace and Tenderneſs proportionable to their Abilities*; *That he would incline the Governours of the Church to lay Hands upon ſuch, and ſuch onely, as may give their Children their Meat in due ſeaſon, and both teach and prompt the Inferiour Clergie rightly to divide it*; That *he would inſpire both the one and the other to go before them by their Example, as well as by their Doctrine*; *and ſhew them how to live vertuouſly, as well as inſtruct them what it is to do ſo.* So doing, however they may be contemn'd by the ignorant and the diſobedient, they ſhall ſee of *the travel of their ſoul* upon the truly Religious, and (which will be an ample Reward of all their Labours, and an abundant Compenſation of their Contempt) be admitted to the participation of their Maſter's Joy and Crown.

PART

PART IX.

An Appendix to the Honour of our Spiritual Parents, in an Inquiry concerning the deference that is to be us'd to the Doctrine of them and others, in the framing of our Conceits about Religious Matters. Of the Ancient Fathers, and particularly of such of them as had any Eminent Place in the Church of God: Where is shewn, that much is to be deferr'd to them, even in our Belief, where they deliver what they do, as Apostolical Tradition; and that too, either unanimously, or without any material difference: This being but due to the Rank they held in that Purer Church, and the Opportunity they had, by their nearness to the Apostles Times, to know the Sense both of them, and of our Saviour. Of what consequence this is in the Question concerning the Government of the Church by Bishops, Priests, and Deacons. Where those Fathers speak their own Sense onely, yet, cæteris paribus, *to be preferr'd before those of later date for the same Reasons. Of the Judgment of Learned Men in general, and what deference is to be given to it in our own: Where is shewn, first, That it ought not to prescribe against the clear and express Dictates of Reason and Scripture; as neither, secondly, against a strong and very probable one. Where there is no such Evidence or Probability, it is but reasonable to incline to the Judgments of Learned Men, as being but a just Respect to their Learning, and to God, who is the Donor of it. This acknowledg'd by all, in Matters of Health and Estate; and no doubt equally due in Things relating to the Discipline and outward Oeconomy of the Church. Where Learned Men are found to differ, as they often do, regard is to be had, in the first place, to the Judgments of those whom we apprehend to be right in the main; as, secondly, where there is no difference, there to the Judgments of those, upon whom we can discern the cleareſt Footsteps of Peaceableness, Humility, and Obedience; and, thirdly, to that Party which hath the most and best Learned——— Of the Honour of the Aged, and what the Grounds thereof are: Which are shewn to be, first, That Wisdom which doth generally adorn them. 2. That Testimony which God gives by their Age, of his approbation of their Actions, or at least of his Forbearance. 3. Their freedom from those Lusts wherewith younger Tears are agitated: And, 4. Their being, by the similitude of Tears and Dispositions, the usual Companions of our Parents; and who, as such, cannot be despised, without the dishonour of the other. Of the Kinds of Honour that are to be given to the Aged: Where is shewn, That we ought to rise up before them; to withhold from speaking, till they have deliver'd their Sense, and speak to them, when we do, with submission and respect; to afford them that Relief and Assistance, which either their Necessities or Weaknesses require; and, in fine, to submit to their Reproofs with all patience and meekness——— Of the Honour of those who are Superiour to us in Dignity; whether it be, 1. Upon the account of their Parts and Endowments: Where is shewn, what the Ground of their Honour is, even those Gifts of God that are in them; and in what order such Dignified Men ought to be honour'd by us. 2. Upon*

the account of the Nobility of their Birth, as which cannot be despis'd, without an Injury to the Merits of their Anceſtors, yea to Virtue it ſelf. 3. Becauſe of the Amplitude of their Fortunes, as which beſpeaks the Favour of the Divine Providence, and the Vertues either of them or of their Anceſtors. 4. Upon the account of thoſe Marks of Honour which are beſtow'd upon them by the Prince, and to which therefore, though they had no Perſonal Merits, a juſt Reſpect is due. A ſhort Paræneſis *to thoſe who have any of the former Dignities to commend them; where alſo their reſpective Duties are not obſcurely intimated.*

THE Buſineſs of my laſt Diſcourſe being to ſhew what Honour is due from us to our Spiritual Parents, I think it not amiſs, by way of Appendix, to ſhew *what deference is to be us'd to the Doctrine of them and others, in the framing of our Conceits concerning the Matters of Religion.* For though, when the Authority of Men oppoſes our particular Intereſts, it is with contempt enough rejected and deſpis'd; yet is there none who thinks not the better of his Cauſe, if he can confirm it by the Suffrages of thoſe who have been eminent for their Learning or Piety in the World.

I begin with the *Ancient Fathers*, both becauſe the firſt in Time, and becauſe they have been moſt unanimouſly eſteem'd: For the judging of whoſe Authority, and conſequently of the Honour that is to be given by us to them, I will firſt of all conſider them as *Witneſſes* of *Eccleſiaſtical Tradition*, and then as *delivering their own Senſe* in Matters of Religion. If we conſider them in the former notion, ſo little doubt can be made of their Authority; eſpecially if we underſtand by *Fathers*, ſuch of them *as had eminent Places in the Hierarchy of the Church*, as Mr. *Thorndike* * hath ſhewn out of * Ancient Writers, that we ought to underſtand the Name of *Fathers*, For, living ſo near as they did to the Times of the Apoſtles, by which means they had opportunity to know what things had been delivered by *Chriſt* and his Apoſtles; and being moreover thought worthy in thoſe purer Times to be ſet in the higheſt Places of Dignity and Authority in the Church; the Prerogative of that their Rank, and their nearneſs to the Apoſtles Times, is in reaſon to oblige us to look upon them as competent Witneſſes of the Tradition of the Apoſtles, and conſequently, to give up our Belief to what they ſhall ſo teſtifie; eſpecially if we find them to have ſo teſtified with one conſent, or with no material difference in it. Whence it is, that all reaſonable Men muſt look upon the Government of the Church by Biſhops, Prieſts, and Deacons, as inſtituted by the Apoſtles; becauſe, with one conſent, ſo declar'd by the Ancient Fathers. And though the ſame Authority be not to be given to them, where they pretend to ſpeak rather *their own Senſe*, than the Tradition of the Church, which is the ſecond Notion under which I promis'd to look upon them; yet even there they are, *cæteris paribus*, to be preferr'd in their Opinions, before thoſe of later date: both becauſe, as was before ſaid, they were of eminent account in

* Socrates Hiſt. Eccl. li. 2. c. 40. Ἀπανλήσει δ' ἄν τις καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον. Πῶς τοὺ ὂν ἀνλιοχείᾳ συνελθόνλας πατέρας ὀνομάζεις ἐλεύσε, τοὺ ἐμοίνων πατέρας ἀρνέωθαι; εἰ γὰρ ὂν νικαίᾳ συνελθόνλες, καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον τῇ πίσῃ συμτωνήσανλες, κρεωτέρων ἂν πατέρες λέγοιντο, τῷ καὶ πρεσβεβηκέναι τοῖς χρόνοις, καὶ ὅτι οἱ ἐν ἀνλιοχείᾳ χιροθέωοι ἐκ ἐκείνων εἰς τὸν ἐπισκοπὸν πρεσβέβληνο, *Vid. eundem, lib. 2. cap. 10. & Hilar. in fine libr. de Synodis, cum obſervat. Thorndic. lib. de ratione ac jure finiendi controverſias, cap. 25. pag. 489, &c.*

in the Church, and becauſe of the opportunity they had, by their neerneſs to the Apoſtles times, to know the ſenſe both of them and of our Lord and Saviour.

Of the Fathers of the Church, what hath been ſaid may ſuffice, at leaſt, as to thoſe who are moſt like to be my Readers, proceed we now to conſider how far *the judgment of Learned men in general* is to prevail with us in the ſquaring of *our own* in matters of Religion. In order whereunto,

1. The firſt thing I ſhall repreſent, is, that whatever Authority the judgment of Learned men ought to have with us, yet *ought it not* to be *of any account*, *againſt the clear and expreſs Dictates of Reaſon* and Scripture. Becauſe, whatever their judgment is, it is but the judgment of men, whereas the voice of Reaſon and Scripture is no other than the Voice of God. To which therefore, there is but reaſon the other ſhould yield, becauſe it is but fallible, whereas Reaſon and Scripture is the voice of him whoſe property it is, not to be in a capacity to be deceiv'd. Again, foraſmuch as, whatever force the judgment of Learned men may be of, it is upon the preſumption of the concurrency of their judgments with Reaſon and Scripture which they have ſuch ability to diſcern; the voice of Reaſon and Scripture muſt conſequently be of more force it ſelf, as, which gives all the force it hath to the judgment of Learned men. Againſt the clear and expreſs dictates of Reaſon and Scripture, therefore the judgment of Learned men can be of no avail, and conſequently in that caſe, no Honour to be given to it.

2. But *neither*, ſecondly, *is any ſuch Honour* to be given to the judgment of Learned Men, *where there is a ſtrong, or very probable reaſon againſt it.* For, beſides that, Learned Men may be biaſt by Intereſt, and other ſuch like conſiderations which ſerve rather to corrupt than inform their judgments, *a reaſon* (as a Learned Man* obſerves) *is an intrinſecal, proper, and apportion'd Motive to the Conſcience; but humane Authority, or citation of conſenting Authors, is but an extrinſecal, accidental, and preſumptive Inducement, and a meer ſuppletory in the deſtitution of Reaſon; Truth* (as the forenamed Perſon obſerves from *Socrates*) *being not to be weighed by Witneſſes, but by Argument; not by the Authority of Authors, but by the Reaſons they alledge.*

* Taylor's Ductor Dubit. l. 1, c. 4. Rule 9.

3. But becauſe, what the voice of Scripture or Reaſon is, is not *always apparent* of it ſelf, nor yet with *any great probability to be collected*, or at leaſt not by men of ordinary Capacities; hence there ariſeth a neceſſity of *having recourſe to the judgment of the Learned, and a reaſonableneſs of things of that nature, of being bound up by it.* For, as it is but reaſonable to yeild to the judgments of others, where our own will not ſerve to extricate our ſelves; ſo it is but a juſt reſpect which we owe to their Learning, and indeed to God himſelf, who is the Author of it. For, what other is it than a contempt of their Gifts, and of God who is the Donor of them, not to ſubmit to their judgments, whom God hath ſo well furniſh'd with an ability to inform us? Whence it is, That, though in matters of Religion, men are generally more headſtrong, yet in matters relating to their Health or Eſtate, there are none of Common Underſtanding, which do not ſquare their Opinions and Actions by the advice of thoſe who are the

Sages

Sages, either of the Law or Phyſick. But, ſo the ſame Reaſon will oblige us to proceed in things relating to the diſcipline and outward œconomy of Religion. For, what can be more reaſonable (eſpecially in things of that nature) than to ſquare our judgments by theirs whom God hath bleſs'd with an ability to diſcern? The only ſcruple in this Affair, is, what is to be done, where we find *Learned Men to differ.* Where, firſt, little doubt is to be made, but we are to follow the judgments *of thoſe* whom we apprehend to be *in the right, as to the main.* Thus, for example, Though there be as much Learning among the Papiſts, as the Proteſtants, in all ſorts of knowledge relating to Religion; yet, inaſmuch as, I believe the latter to be in the right, as to the main, and the other not, I think it but reaſonable to defer to their judgment, whom I am ſo well perſwaded of: There being more reaſon to believe them to be in the right, as to the particular whereof I enquire, who are ſo in the main, than thoſe who ſhew their Ignorance or Prejudice in matters of the greateſt weight. Again, If the difference be between men of the ſame Proteſtant Profeſſion, and of the ſame Belief in the main matters, wherein we have ſeparated from the Papiſts, I think it but reaſonable to incline to the judgment *of thoſe* upon whom I can diſcern the cleareſt Teſtimonies of *Peaceableneſs, Humility, and Obedience:* It being but juſt to preſume, that God, who *promiſeth his Grace to the humble,* will beſtow the light of his Truth there, where that Grace, and other ſuch like, do moſt prevail. Laſtly, Foraſmuch as, in any difference between Learned Men there is a greater preſumption of Truth, where there are *the moſt and beſt,* than among *the fewer and the worſe*; Reaſon would, that we ſhould pay them ſo much reſpect, as to chooſe to opine *with them,* rather than with others that are *both fewer* in number, and *leſs Learned* than they. All which I ſay, not to invite you *to have the Faith of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt with reſpect of perſons,* which I know that very Faith doth forbid, but that, where that Faith or Reaſon is not apparent, we ſhould chooſe rather to follow the conduct of thoſe whom God hath bleſs'd with an ability of diſcerning, than our own groundleſs Fancies, or the Fancies of thoſe whom God hath not endu'd with the like Abilities: That being but a neceſſary reſult of an humble opinion of our ſelves, and an Honour, which we owe to the abilities of thoſe, whom God hath bleſs'd with a more exalted Underſtanding.

To go on now to ſhew the Honour that is due from us to *other Superiours,* to which I told you in my entrance upon this Commandment, that the Precept is to be thought to extend; Where, firſt I ſhall enquire, what Honour is due from us to *the Aged,* as, becauſe by a general conſent they have acquir'd to themſelves the name of *Fathers,* ſo alſo becauſe St. *Paul* hath commanded us *to treat them as ſuch*: His Injunction to *Timothy* being, not only that he ſhould not *rebuke an Elder, or a man of Years,* but that he ſhould *entreat him as a Father, and the elder Women as Mothers,* 1 *Tim.* 5. 1, 2. Now concerning theſe, following my uſual Method, I will enquire,

1. Upon what grounds the Honour of theſe Fathers is built, and
2. What kind of Honours we are to afford them.

1. It is the affirmation of *Solomon, Prov.* 16. 31. That *the hoary head is*

is a crown of glory, if it be found in the way of Righteouſneſs; and ſo indeed it is, becauſe, beſide the Honour of its Gray Hairs, it doth alſo connote a long continuance in Piety, which is of all other things the juſteſt ground of Honour. But becauſe, as Old Age is ſometime found without this attendant; ſo the precept of *riſing up before it*, is without any ſuch limitation, as you may ſee, *Lev.* 19. 32. therefore it may not be amiſs to enquire after ſuch *grounds* as are ſeparate from the way of Righteouſneſs, or at leaſt as do not neceſſarily involve a perfect one. Of which number is,

1. That *Wiſdom* which doth generally adorn it, and is indeed one of the faireſt Jewels of its Crown. For, as, according to the ſaying of *Elihu* in *Job*, it is but reaſonable *that Days ſhould ſpeak, and multitude of Years teach Wiſdom*; ſo experience ſhews, that Wiſdom is no where found more perfect, nor any where elſe a more clear and ſolid Underſtanding: Partly through the manifold experience they have had of thoſe things that fall under Conſideration, and partly through the advantage of their Temper; Old Men having neither any of that heat which is natural to younger Perſons, and by which they are precipitated to act, before they have ſufficiently conſidered, nor yet of thoſe Luſts by which their judgments are either perfectly debauch'd, or at leaſt very much clouded in their perceptions. Which by the way (as *Tully* * obſerves) may make amends for that weakneſs of body wherewith the Hoary Head is commonly attended, and for which it is ſo oft deſpis'd as uſeleſs. For, who (as the ſame Author * there ſpeaks) will ſay *the Maſter of the Ship does nothing, becauſe younger Men perhaps climb the Maſt, run over the Decks, or empty the Pump?* whilſt in the mean time the good Old Man *ſits at the Helm*, and directs both the Ship, and all that manage it. And accordingly, as in all Nations, Men have generally made choice of the *Elder* ſort for the managing of the moſt Important Affairs of State, ſo the Cuſtom hath ſo prevail'd, that in all Nations almoſt, the word *Elder* hath been ſet to denote a Counſeller or a Governour, and they have born the Name who have not had Years to anſwer it, nor any thing but their Place and Wiſdom. As if Wiſdom were ſo peculiar to the Ancient, that Young Men muſt become Old to learn it, and not be admitted to govern, till either Time had planted Hoary Hairs upon their Head, or the Elder Ones made them a Periwig of theirs.

* Tullius de Senectute. *Nihil igitur afferunt, qui in re gerenda verſari ſenectutem negant: ſimileſq; ſunt, ut ſiquis gubernatorem in navigando nihil agere dicat, cum alii malos ſcandant, alii per foros curſent, alii ſentinam exhauriant: ille autem clavem tenens quietus ſedeat in puppi.*

2. But beſide the wiſdom of the Hoary Head, which yet is no contemptible ground of that Honour which we are to afford them; the Hoary Head hath alſo to commend it, *the favour of God* towards it, above and beſide, what greener Ones have: Thoſe Hoary Heads betokening *Gods Approbation* of their Perſons and Actions, or at leaſt his *Compaſſion and Forbearance*. For, as that Crown of theirs generally ſhews them to be free from thoſe enormous Vices, concerning which, God hath ſaid, that they which do them, *ſhall not live out half their days*, *Pſal.* 55. 23. So where it doth not, yet at leaſt that God hath a favour to them, and deſires their Converſion and Amendment: In order thereunto, whilſt he cuts off younger Perſons in the midſt of their Years and Sins, yet continuing them to Gray Hairs, that ſo they may have opportunity to return. And it brings to my Mind what is

to be ſeen in a Medal of *Theophylactus* a Chriſtian Emperour, even a Hand betokening that of Heaven, putting a Crown upon his Head. For, if this Crown of Glory on the Hoary Head be a mark of the favour of the Almighty, it may very well have the ſame device, becauſe planted on the Ancient head by the hand of God, no leſs than that of time. Which as it ought in reaſon to call for our regard, (for, how ſhould we not honour thoſe, whom God hath ſo ſignally vouchſafed to do ſo?) to excite the gratitude of ſuch who have the honour, as well as the happineſs to wear it.

3. From the favour of God, wherewith we have ſaid the Hoary Head to be no leſs encircled than with its Gray Hairs, paſs we in the third place, to that which is no leſs a ground of Honour, even its *freedom from thoſe Luſts* wherewith younger years are agitated: That however among ſome Perſons paſſing for a reproach, yet being indeed its Priviledge and Honour; or, that I may ſpeak with *Solomon*, in the place ſo often alluded to, its Crown of Glory. For, is there any thing in the world more diſhonourable than Vice? nay, doth not the World it ſelf confeſs ſo much, by making ſome Vice or other always the matter of its reproach? or any Age which is more freed by Nature from the temptations to it, or more inſtructed by it to abhor it? It hath either none, or very languid inclinations to the pleaſures of Senſe; it hath no perception of them, or ſuch as is eaſily corrected. It is dead to the World even before it is ſo, it is a ſtranger to its delights and recreations. As if it had already paſs'd from Earth to Heaven, where all thoſe Earthly delights periſh, and that Crown of Glory, which it wears, were a Crown of Glory indeed; that is to ſay, an Immortal and Immarceſſible one. But then, if to the no inclinations of that age to ſenſual pleaſures, we add its experience of the vanity of them all; its knowledge how little of ſatisfaction there is in them, and with how many and how great evils they are commonly attended; ſo we may very well pronounce it to be a very glorious age, and to carry away the Crown from all the reſt. For, where there is not only no guſt of ſenſual pleaſures, but an experimental Knowledge of their Vanity and Vexation, how can ſuch perſons but deſpiſe them, and purſue thoſe which are more ſpiritual and heavenly? Not but that the contrary may, and ſometimes doth happen (for God knows there are Boys of above Threeſcore years of Age) but that that is the uſual attendant of Old Age, and that their Gray Hairs do always diſpoſe them to it.

4. Add hereunto (and more I ſhall not need to add, to ſhew the ground of honouring the face of the Old Man) ſuch perſons by the ſimilitude of their years, and likeneſs of diſpoſition, are the uſual Companions of our Natural Parents; and being ſuch cannot be deſpis'd without a diſhonour to our Parents, into whoſe ſociety they are aſſum'd.

2. Having thus ſhewn the grounds of *honouring the face of the Old Man*, according as the Scripture preſcribes, enquire we in the next place, what *kind* of honours we are to afford them. And, here not to tell you, that they are to have a ſhare in our *inward eſteem*, becauſe without that (as hath been often ſaid) all expreſſions of Honour are but a mockery; I ſhall without more ado deſcend to thoſe *expreſſions* of Honour, which either the Scripture or Reaſon do preſcribe. But ſuch is.

1. The

1. The honouring them with *our outward geſture*, riſing up, or falling down before them; the injunction of God in the place before quoted out of *Leviticus* being, *Thou ſhalt riſe up before the hoary head, and honour the face of the old man, and feare thy God, I am the Lord.* In which place we have, not only an expreſs command for *riſing up before the hoary head*, but what is of much more importance, the ſo doing join'd in the ſame period with the reverence of God himſelf.

2. To reſpectfulneſs in our outward behaviour, ſubjoin we the reverencing them *with our Tongues*; whether it be (for that is no ſmall ſign of honour) by ſuſpending the expreſſions of it, at leaſt till Elder men have deliver'd their ſentence, or ſpeaking with ſubmiſſion and reſpect. For ſo (that I may begin with the former) we find *Elihu* in *Job* to have proceeded, *Job.* 32. 7. he there telling us that, becauſe he was *young*, and thoſe other Friends of *Job very old*, he was *at firſt afraid, and durſt not ſhew them his opinion*; and not without reaſon, becauſe (as he afterwards intimates) Wiſdom is the priviledge of Old Age; in conſideration whereof, it is but reaſonable that the Younger and leſs wiſe ſhould give them leave to ſpeak before them. But neither is it leſs evident, or rather much more, that when we do ſpeak, we are to ſpeak with Submiſſion and reſpect; St. *Paul* in the place before quoted, admoniſhing *Timothy* a Governour of the Church, (and how much more then inferiour Perſons?) that he ſhould *not rebuke an Elder*, but *intreat him as a Father, and the elder Women as Mothers*, 1 *Tim.* 5. 1, 2. and though there be no obedience due to Aged Perſons as ſuch, becauſe their Superiority implies rather a preeminence than Authority, yet inaſmuch

3. As they are capable of Honour in Deed, as well, as in Geſture and Language, we are in reaſon to make *our Actions* to beſpeak our Eſteem of them no leſs than our behaviour and words; to that end giving them that aſſiſtance which their bodily weakneſſes, and that relief which both their weakneſſes and neceſſities may require: St. *Paul* in the forequoted Epiſtle, commanding the thus honouring of *Widows*, and particularly *the elder ones.*

4. The only Species of Honour to be ſpoken of, is that of *ſubmiſſion to their cenſures*, which we ſhall find to have a place here, no leſs than in other Fathers. For though theſe Fathers, as ſuch, have no Authority to command, and therefore neither to puniſh; yet their great Wiſdom and Experience priviledge them to rebuke the diſorders of younger perſons, to which therefore if we give them that Honour which is required, we muſt ſubmit with all patience and meekneſs. Care only would be taken (that I may not leave thoſe elder ones without an exhortation) that they behave themſelves with that Wiſdom, and Gravity, and Sobriety which becomes them. For much of the Honour that is due to them, being founded upon the preſumption of their Wiſdom, Gravity, and Sobriety; Reaſon would, if they expect Honour from the younger ſort, that they ſhould give proof of thoſe in their behaviour, and not, as too often happens, purſue their *youthful Luſts*, or fall into their Follies and Indecencies.

Of the Honour of Parents, whether *properly* or *improperly* ſo ſtil'd, what hath been ſaid may ſuffice, and, becauſe that is principally intended, of the main concernments of this Commandment. But, be-

cauſe (as was before ſaid) it was alſo intended to comprehend the honour *of all* that are in *any Dignity or Authority*, therefore, for the fuller explication thereof, it will be requiſite to ſubjoin ſomewhat concerning both the one and the other, and firſt of all of thoſe that have any thing of *Dignity* to commend them.

Now there are Four things, that procure *dignity* to Men, as that is ſet to denote a preeminence without Authority,

1. Their Parts and Endowments.
2. Their Birth.
3. Their Fortunes,
4. And Laſtly, The Titles and Characters that are beſtow'd upon them by Princes and Societies.

1. That *the firſt* of theſe ought to have our Honour, and conſequently the Perſons that are endu'd with them, needs no other proof than that they are the Gifts of God. For, being ſo, they are in reaſon to be reſpected by all thoſe who think God a due object of it. The only thing worthy our enquiry, is, *in what order* they are to be honour'd, and *what kind* of Honours we are to afford them: the former whereof, will beſt be judg'd of by the Honour they bring to God, or the uſe they are of unto the World. For thus, becauſe Piety doth moſt immediately tend to the honour of God, as being nothing elſe than an immediate regard, both of him and of his Laws; the Parties in whom it is, are, *cæteris paribus*, to be honour'd before thoſe that are Maſters of any other Endowments. In like manner, becauſe *Divinity* miniſters more directly to that end, than any other kind of Learning or qualification in the World, Reaſon would that thoſe who are eminent in it ſhould be preferr'd before the Learned of other Profeſſions. Laſtly, becauſe Learning contributes more to Religion than Courage or Strength, and is generally more uſeful to the World, hence it comes to paſs, that by the conſent of Nations *Arms yield to the Gown*, and *the Lawrel* of the Conqueror to the Eloquence of *the Tongue*. All therefore that remains to enquire, is, *what kind* of Honours we are to afford them, which in general is, the giving them that Reſpect and Encouragement which their ſeveral Endowments and Uſefulneſs in the World doth require; in particular, the attending to their particular Excellencies, and demeaning our ſelves anſwerably thereunto. Which we ſhall do, if we imitate the Vertues of the Pious, follow the directions of the Learned in their ſeveral Faculties, and as much as in us lies, promote the welfare of thoſe who hazard their Lives for the ſafeguard of the Publick.

2. From Mens Parts and Endowments, paſs we to *the nobility of their Birth*, which we ſhall find to be another ground of Honour; this being but a juſt tribute to the merits of their Anceſtors, and a neceſſary means to promote Virtue and Piety in the World. For who would willingly Travel for the Publick good, if the reward thereof ſhould reach no farther than himſelf? or think himſelf well apaid, if the Children of leſs deſerving Perſons ſhould enjoy the ſame Priviledges with his: eſpecially when it often happens that they who deſerve ſo well of the World, are either by the ſuddenneſs of their death, or the conſtancy of their Travels, debarr'd the enjoyment of them in their own perſons.

3. To the Nobility of Mens Birth, ſubjoin we, *the amplitude of their*

their Fortunes, as which, next to that, is a juſt ground of Honour. Not that it is ſimply Noble, to be Rich; but that it beſpeaks, on the one hand, the Virtues of them, or of their Anceſtors; and on the other hand, the Favour of the Divine Providence. For, though Men do ſometimes acquire Wealth by evil means, and ſuch as therefore make their Wealth rather a Reproach, than a Mark of Honour; yet ordinarily it is by Induſtry and Wiſdom, by the Eminency of their Learning, and the Greatneſs of their Valour: things which are ſo Honourable, that they may very well caſt a Luſtre upon thoſe very Fortunes that are acquir'd by them. And though Grace and Virtue be undoubtedly a greater Mark of God's Favour, than any outward Acquiſitions whatſoever; yet inaſmuch as even theſe happen not to Men without the Divine Providence, they cannot but be look'd upon, as Teſtimonies of his Favour, where they are honeſtly acquir'd; and thoſe that have them, upon that ſcore to be reverenc'd and eſteem'd. Laſtly,

4. As Mens Parts, or Birth, or Fortunes, do call for that Honour which is here requir'd; ſo the ſame Honour is due to *thoſe Dignities that are conferr'd upon Men by the Favour of the Prince*; or under him, *by the indulgence of thoſe Societies or Corporations which are by the Prince priviledg'd to beſtow them*: Such as are for the former, the Dignities of Dukes, Marqueſſes, and the like; as for the latter, the Degrees that are beſtow'd in Univerſities. For, as theſe are generally the Rewards of their Vertue upon whom they are beſtow'd; ſo they are, in all, the Marks of the Favour of thoſe whom God hath commanded us to honour. In conſideration whereof, as it cannot but be thought reaſonable to honour them, becauſe otherwiſe, through their Sides wounding the Honour of the Prince; ſo all fear is remov'd of paying Reſpect to their Worthleſneſs whom Princes do ſometime promote: He who pays a Man reſpect for the Dignity which the Prince beſtows upon him, doing it not ſo much to him, as to the Prince by whom it is conferr'd. In the mean time, though that may be ſome ſatisfaction to the Honourer, and, where Men are wiſe, take off from thoſe Prejudices which the Vices of Noble Perſons give; yet, as it can afford little ſatisfaction to the Honoured, who thus ſees himſelf made onely an Inſtrument of anothers Honour; ſo we are not to expect, that he ſhould ſignifie ſo much with thoſe who have not the like faculty of diſcerning. For, inaſmuch as Excellency is the proper ground of Honour, it will not be eaſie to procure them any perfect Honour, who have not ſome Perſonal Excellency to deſerve it. What remains then, but that *they who are thus dignified, ſhew themſelves worthy of their ſeveral Titles, and be no leſs glorious in their Actions, than in the Characters that they bear?* That *the Learned and the Valiant, employ their Learning and Valour for the Publick Weal; and the Man of high Birth, do Things worthy of thoſe Anceſtors from whom he ſprang?* That *the Man who is truly Pious, continue, and add to it, and not make it a pretext for a future ſlothfulneſs, or to be able ſo much the more ſecurely to deceive?* In fine, That *he who is rich in this World, ſhew himſelf rich in good Works, and be as vertuous in the diſpenſation of his Wealth, as he or his Anceſtors have been happy in acquiring it?* So doing, they ſhall not onely have Honour among Men, but be reſpected by the Almighty; and when all their Earthly Honour ſhall be laid in the duſt, be ad-

vanc'd to a Crown, and ſuch a one, whoſe Luſtre no Time or Malice ſhall be able to impair.

PART X.

Of the Honour of thoſe who are Superiour to us in any Private Authority or Dominion, whether it be that of a Lord of a Mannor over his Tenants, or of a Maſter over his Servants. The Ground of the Honour of the former, that Emolument the Tenants receive by him, and their own Oath and Compact, as the Honours they are to pay, thoſe Rents, Services, and Homages by which they hold their reſpective Emoluments. The Duty of the Lord, to afford them again that Protection, Aſſiſtance, and Redreſs which the Laws of the Land, the Cuſtom of the Place, or the Nature of their Dominion doth require. Of the Honour of Maſters, and what the Grounds thereof are. In order whereunto, inquiry is firſt made concerning ſuch of their Servants as become ſo by Conſtraint, and particularly by Conqueſt, by Sentence, or by Purchaſe. Where the Servants become ſuch, either by Conqueſt, or a Condemnatory Sentence, thoſe to whom they do belong, have for the Ground of their Honour, their giving them that Life, which it was in their power to have taken away. Where Servants become ſuch by Purchaſe, there is the Title of thoſe, whether Conquerors, or Princes, to whom they did originally belong; and that Valuable Conſideration which the Purchaſer paid for it. If the Servant become ſuch by his own free Conſent, as it is in Days-men, Menial Servants, and Apprentices; there is not onely his own free Conſent, to entitle his Maſter to Honour from him, but thoſe Wages and Nouriſhment which the two former receive, and that Skill or Craft which the latter is inſtructed in. An Addreſs to the Declaration of what Honours are due from Servants to their Maſters, and in what meaſure and proportion: Where entrance is made with the Conſideration of ſuch Servants as become ſo by conſtraint; and all ſort of Honour ſhewn to be due from them, which they are in a capacity to pay. This evidenc'd both from Scripture, and the Life which they receive from their Maſters. A Digreſſion concerning the Abolition of Servitude in the Chriſtian World; where is ſhewn, That it was neither founded upon any juſt Reaſon, nor is much for the Commodity of it. Of the Honours that are due from ſuch as become Servants by Conſent, which are ſhewn to be in a great meaſure determinable by their own Compacts. Certain Rules laid down for the more certain inveſtigation of them, ſuch as are, That they ſhew reſpect to their ſeveral Maſters in Geſture and Language; That they yield Obedience to their Commands, and particularly, in all ſuch things as are expreſly covenanted, or are by Law or Cuſtom impos'd upon them; yea, even when the matter of the Command is harſh, provided it be not eminently ſuch. An Account of the Qualifications wherewith this Obedience of theirs is to be attended; which are Singleneſs of Heart, and a Chearful Mind. Submiſſion to the Cenſures of the Maſter, another part of the Servants Duty, even where

where they are rather frowardly than juſtly inflicted; provided they be not often repeated, nor prove intolerable. An Appeal to the Magiſtrate, in that caſe allowable; but no violent Reſiſtance, in that, or any other. Of the Duty of Maſters to their Servants, and particularly to ſuch as are Servants by Conſtraint, or Slaves: Where is ſhewn, firſt, That they ought to furniſh them with Food and Rayment, in ſuch a proportion as may ſuffice the Neceſſities of Nature: Secondly, That they impoſe ſuch Tasks upon them, as are not above their Strength to undergo: Thirdly, Not to puniſh them above the demerit of their Crime, or above what their Strength will bear: And, in fine, That neither their Commands nor Puniſhments be extended any farther than the Laws of the Place give leave, or Equity and Chriſtian Charity permit. It is however neceſſary for ſuch Servants, to ſubmit to whatever is impos'd, provided it be not above the proportion of their Strength; partly upon the account of St. Paul's *commanding Subjection to the Froward, and partly upon the Account of that Life which is indulg'd them. Of the Duty of Maſters to Servants by Conſent, which, to be ſure, comprehends,* 1. *All things that are owing from them to Slaves.* 2. *What they expreſly covenant to afford them, whether that be Wages or Inſtruction.* 3. *To treat them agreeably to the Nature of that Service into which they are admitted.* 4. *The exacting of due Labour from them; and, where they fail, Chaſtiſement.* 5. *The reſtraining them from Vicious Courſes, and both prompting and obliging them to the Practice of Religious Duties: Where both the Ground and Uſefulneſs of the Maſter's ſo doing is declar'd.*

WHAT Honour is due from us to thoſe that have any thing of *Dignity* to commend them, hath been already declar'd; together with the Grounds upon which it ſtands. It remains onely, that we entreat of the Honour of *ſuch* as are alſo *in Authority*, and may command our Obedience, as well as Reſpect: I do not mean, by vertue of any Publick Employment (for what Honour is due to ſuch, hath been before ſufficiently declar'd), but by vertue of ſome *Private Dominion*, ſuch as is that of a *Lord of a Mannor over his Tenants*, or of *a Maſter of a Family over his Servants.*

Of *the former* of theſe much need not be ſaid, whether as to the *Neceſſity* or *the Kinds* of Honour that are to be paid. For, holding their Lands from them, upon condition of certain Rents, Services, and Homages, to which they do moreover by Promiſe and Oath oblige themſelves, at their ſeveral Admiſſions to them; the Benefit they enjoy by them, and their own Compact, ſhews the neceſſity of honouring them: as the latter, becauſe particularly expreſſing them, the Kinds of Honour they are to pay. In conſideration whereof, as no Man of Conſcience can pretend to withhold them, were it onely for the Oath of God, by which the Payment thereof is bound upon them; ſo thoſe who challenge this Honour from them, are in reaſon to afford them that Protection, Aſſiſtance, and Redreſs, which the Laws of the Land, the Cuſtom of the Place, or the Nature of their Dominion doth require.

From

From this first Dominion, pass we to that which is more general; I mean, that of *the Master over his Servants*: Where, first of all,

1. I shall shew the Duty of Servants honouring their Masters.
2. The Grounds upon which the Honour of them is built.
3. What Kinds, and Measure, and Quality of Honour, is due unto them.
4. And lastly, What is due from them again to their Servants.

1. I begin with the first of these, even *the Duty of Servants honouring their Masters*; concerning which, the Scriptures of the New Testament speak much and often, as to that part of Honour which consists in Obedience and Submission. But because, when I descend to shew the Kinds of Honour they are to give them, there will be a necessity of producing those Texts anew, I shall content my self at present with that general Proof which St. *Paul* gives us in his First to *Timothy*, and with that which this Commandment, if well considered, will be found to do. For, though the Letter of it specifie onely the Honour of Parents, yet it sufficiently implies the Honour of other Superiours, and particularly that Honour which is due from Servants to their Masters; there being certainly a far greater Preeminence of a Master over his Servant, than there is of a Father over his Child. But so, that I may strengthen this Inference with the Doctrine of *Christianity*, St. *Paul* doth expresly enjoyn, willing *as many Servants as are under the yoke, to count their Masters worthy of all Honour*, 1 Tim.6.1.

2. The necessity of Servants honouring their Masters being thus evinc'd, both from St. *Paul*, and the general Reason of the Commandment; my proposed Method obligeth me to inquire into *the Grounds* of it, which are different, according to the different sorts of Servants: For, either they are such as become so,

1. By their own free consent: or,
2. Such as become Servants by constraint.

The latter of these are again of three sorts, according to the different means whereby a Man may come to have Dominion. For, either he may acquire it,

1. By the means of Conquest; or,
2. By Sentence; or,
3. And lastly, By Purchase from those who have either the one or the other Title to their Service.

If the Question be concerning *the first*, that is to say, *of such as become Servants by Conquest*; so the Ground of Honouring their Masters, is the giving them their Life, when it was in their power to have taken it away. For, being by the Law of Nations priviledg'd to take away the Life of those which should be taken by them in the Wars, it seemed but reasonable, and indeed is no other, that, if the Conquerour give them their Life, they should, for so great a Benefit, dedicate that Life unto his Service. Whence it is, as * *Justinian* observes, that Servants, among the *Romans*, had the Name of *Mancipia*, and *Servi*; the former importing their being taken by the Hand of the Enemy; the latter, the saving of them by those that took them, when it was in their Power to have destroy'd them. In like manner, if the Magistrate, when for any Offence he might take away the Malefactor's Life, condemns him to a perpetual Slavery; that Indulgence of his is a sufficient Ground to oblige the Malefactor to submit his Neck

* *Institut. lib.1. tit.3. sect.3.*

Neck unto the Yoke. The Tie is much the ſame, though with the addition of a farther one, upon ſuch Servants as become ſo by Purchaſe: For the Conqueror and the Magiſtrate transferring their Title unto another, and moreover taking a Valuable Conſideration for it, Reaſon and Equity would, that he who is ſo paſſed over, ſhould look upon himſelf as obliged to ſerve the Purchaſer, becauſe ſucceeding into their Rights, and moreover paying a Valuable Conſideration for that Honour and Service which he exacts.

From ſuch Servants as are made ſo by conſtraint, paſs we to thoſe which are made ſo *with their own free conſent*; ſuch as are Days-men, Menial Servants, and Apprentices: Concerning whom, it will be no hard matter to ſhew, that there is a juſt Ground of giving Honour to their Maſters; nor yet, what thoſe Grounds are: The two former having for the Ground of their Honour, thoſe Wages and Nouriſhment which they receive; the latter, moreover, that Skill or Craft which their Maſters profeſs; all of them, the Aſtipulation of their own Conſent and Compact, by which that Honour and Service is bound ſo much the faſter on them. For, what can be more reaſonable, than the paying them Honour and Service, who give them a Valuable Conſideration for it? eſpecially when they do moreover oblige themſelves thereto, and covenant for the paying of it? It being a known and undoubted Maxim, That there can be no Injury there, where that which is exacted is with the free Conſent of him that is to pay it.

3. Having thus ſhewn the Grounds of that Honour which Servants owe unto their Maſters, and thereby evinc'd the Reaſonableneſs, as well as Neceſſity thereof; nothing remains, on the part of Servants, but to inquire, *what kinds* of Honour they are to pay, and *in what meaſure and proportion*. For the reſolution whereof, we muſt recall the forementioned Diſtinction of Servants by Conſtraint, and ſuch as are made ſo by their own Conſent and Compact. If the Queſtion be concerning *the former*, that is to ſay, of ſuch as become Servants by right of Conqueſt, by the Condemnation of them for ſome notorious Wickedneſs, or by Purchaſe; ſo, little doubt can be made, but *all Honour* is due from them to their ſeveral Maſters, which they are in a capacity to pay. For, beſide that St. *Paul*, in the place before-quoted, commands ſuch Servants to think their Maſters worthy of all Honour; it is no more than is due from them, for the Benefit they enjoy from thoſe to whom they are ſubjected: I ſpeak not onely as to their conſtant Suſtenance, but the granting them that Life which it was in their power to have taken away. And though, ſince *Chriſtianity* took place in the World, ſuch kind of Servitude or Slavery hath been more rare, eſpecially in ſuch Perſons as are of the ſame Profeſſion with their Maſters; yet I think ſo general an Abolition of it was neither founded upon any juſt Reaſon, nor hath prov'd much for the Conveniency of the World. Not the former, becauſe (as *Busbequius* * well obſerves) *neither can all Men bear a Liberty that is attended with Poverty*; neither are all Men ſo fitted by Nature, as to know how to govern themſelves, without the Conduct and Command of others; being herein not unlike to certain Beaſts, whoſe Fierceneſs would be always to be dreaded, unleſs they were reſtrain'd by Bonds. Which ſuppos'd, what can be more reaſonable, where a juſt Cauſe precedes, than the introducing of ſuch a Servitude as we ſpeak of;

* Busbeq. Turcic. Epiſt. 3.

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as by means of which, the Maſter may live by the Servants Labour, and the Servant, on the other ſide, not onely be maintain'd by it, but be reſtrain'd from thoſe Exorbitances, to which either his Ignorance, or the Pravity of his Nature may incline him? But neither hath ſo general an Abolition of Servitude been much for the Conveniency of the World: For, as the ſame *Busbequius* * obſerves, if it had ſtill continu'd, neither would the Wars nor the Gallows take off ſo many Men, which might otherwiſe be of great uſe unto the World; that Profit which might ariſe from the Uſe or Sale of them, being likely to make the Conqueror leſs cruel, and the Magiſtrate leſs ſevere in his Executions. To ſay nothing at all, that through the fear of that, ſome Men might be more effectually reſtrain'd from thoſe Exorbitances which the World labours under; a conſtant Slavery being undoubtedly more terrible to the idle Gallant, than either a Gibbet, or an Ax. Add hereunto (and more I ſhall not need to add) that St. *Paul* himſelf doth not onely no where diſallow this Servitude, but commands thoſe that are under it, to think their Maſters worthy of all Honour; ſuch Servants as are *under the yoke*, being no other than Bondſlaves, as you may ſee, if you compare that Phraſe with *Lev.* 26. 13. and *Iſa.* 9. 4.

* *Busbeq. ubi ſupra.*

But becauſe, at leaſt in this corner of the World, there is but little of ſuch kind of Servitude; and becauſe, when I come to entreat of the Duties of Maſters to their Servants, I ſhall have occaſion to ſay ſomewhat of the Meaſure of thoſe Servants Subjection and Obedience; therefore ſuperſedeing any farther conſideration of it for the preſent, I will go on to ſhew, what *Kind*, or *Meaſure*, or *Quality* of Honour is due to their Maſters, who are *Servants* not by Conſtraint, but *by Conſent and Compact*. For the reſolution whereof, though much need not be ſaid, becauſe what Kinds or Meaſure of Honour is due from them, is in a great meaſure determinable by thoſe Compacts by which they become their Servants; yet becauſe thoſe Compacts do ſometimes run in more general Terms, and becauſe Servants are generally backward enough in the apprehending of their Duty, I think it not amiſs to be a little more particular in deſcribing the ſeveral Portions of it. In order whereunto, the firſt thing I ſhall offer, is, *the ſhewing Reſpect to them in Geſture and Language*; becauſe, as that is the primary Notion of that Honour which Servants are oblig'd to think their ſeveral Maſters worthy of; ſo, without that, much would be taken off from the readineſs of that Submiſſion and Obedience, which are the principal and undoubted parts of their Duties: Men being not over-forward to ſubmit themſelves to thoſe, whom they have not an honourable Eſteem of; nor to entertain ſuch an Eſteem long, where they are ſuffered either to bear themſelves as their Maſters Fellows, or talk to them as to their Equals. From Reſpect in Geſture and Language, paſs we to *Obedience*; concerning which Duty, the Scriptures ſpeak much, and often: Witneſs, to omit others, *Epheſ.* 6. 5. and *Col.* 3. 22. In the former whereof, St. *Paul* commands Servants to be *obedient unto them that are their Maſters according to the fleſh*: In the latter, to *obey them in all things*, and that too with ſuch Qualifications as are there ſubjoyn'd. The onely thing of difficulty is, what ought to be *the Meaſure* of their Obedience, and *with what Qualifications* to be attended. And here, not to tell you concerning the

the former, that it ought to be in things lawful, and poſſible; becauſe to other than ſuch, there can be no Obligation: that ſuppos'd, I ſhall affirm, 1. That their Obedience ought to extend to *all thoſe things that are expreſly covenanted* between their Maſter and them; there being nothing more reaſonable or neceſſary, than to pay their Maſters that Service, which they expreſly promiſe to afford them. But from hence it will follow, that there can be no pretence for withholding their Obedience in the Matters of that Employment or Trade for which they are more particularly hir'd; becauſe, however other things may be ſet down in more general Terms, theſe are always expreſly covenanted by them. There is the ſame neceſſity, ſecondly, of yielding Obedience *in all thoſe things* which, though not particularly expreſs'd in the Agreement, yet *are by Law or Cuſtom impos'd* upon them; partly becauſe of that Obedience we all owe unto the Law, and partly becauſe their Maſters ſtipulating with them in the general, to be obedient to their Commands, it is in reaſon to be underſtood of all ſuch Commands as either the Law or Cuſtom privilege them to impoſe: It being but reaſonable to ſuppoſe that to be underſtood, which is not onely too long to expreſs, but is by the generality of the World preſum'd as due. But from hence it will follow, not onely that Servants are to obey their Maſters in ſuch things as relate to that Employment, for which they are more particularly covenanted with; but alſo, that, if they be requir'd, they are to tend upon them, and do other ſuch like Offices about them; after the ſame manner that we find thoſe Servants in the Goſpel, after they were come out of the Field, obliged by their Maſter to *make ready firſt for him, and gird themſelves and ſerve him*, before they ſate down themſelves, *Luke* 17. 8. Which is the rather to be taken notice of, becauſe ordinary Servants now adays look upon their Employment rather as an Office, than a Service, and conſequently, do but in part give obedience to their Maſters Commands. Thirdly, As Servants are to yield obedience in ſuch things as are expreſly covenanted for, and in ſuch as are by Law or Cuſtom impos'd upon them; ſo they are to do the like even *where the Matter of the Command is harſh*, provided it be not eminently ſuch; the Precept of St. *Peter* being, That Servants ſhould be ſubject, not onely *to the good and gentle*, but alſo to *the froward*, 1 *Pet.* 2. 18. Which ſaid, nothing remains to account for, but *the Qualifications* of that Obedience which both Nature and Scripture exacts of them; which is either, firſt, the doing it with *ſingleneſs of Heart*; or, ſecondly, with *a ready and a chearful Mind*: The former whereof excludes all Eye-ſervice, and ſuch as ſtudies rather to avoid the Maſters diſpleaſure, than to do him true and faithful Service; the latter, all obeying with murmuring and repining. Both which Vices, as they are plainly enough condemn'd by St. *Paul*, *Col.* 3. 22, 23. and the contrary Qualifications enjoyn'd; ſo the latter (as the ſame St. *Paul* * obſerves) have this farther Reaſon to bind them upon Servants, that that Obedience which is requir'd of them, is impos'd upon them *by God and Chriſt*, as well as by their Earthly Maſters. Which latter, however Servants may think to put off with a deceitful or repining Service, yet they cannot hope ſo to ſatisfie God, who both ſees them, when their Maſters do not, and requires nothing more than a willing and a chearful Mind. Laſtly, As Servants are to be obedient

* *Verſ.* 23, 24. & *Eph.* 6. 6, 7.

to their Masters, so also to *submit unto their censures*, yea such as are rather frowardly than justly inflicted, the command of St. *Peter* being, that Servants should be so subject to the froward, as the Reason he subjoins, shews, even because, as he there goes on, That and that only is *thank-worthy with God, if a man for Conscience toward God endure grief, suffering wrongfully*, 1 *Pet.* 2. 18, 19, This only would be added, that though Servants are by the command of God to submit even to unjust Censures; yet it ought to be understood, provided they be not often repeated, nor prove intolerable, when they are. For in that case, though the Servant may not violently resist, yet there is no doubt he may endeavour to avoid them, by making his appeal to the Magistrate, to whom the redressing, even of Servants unjust sufferings doth appertain. Whence it is, that by the Rescript* of *Marcus Antoninus*, even Slaves had the priviledge of flying to the Temple, or the Statues of the Prince, and the Presidents of the Provinces were commanded to take cognisance of their Complaints, and deliver them from their Masters cruelties. But, as where the Chastisement is neither intolerable, nor often repeated, it cannot be thought reasonable, when St. *Peter* commands Submission to the Froward, for Servants to oppose themselves, so, if they should be allow'd to do so, it would introduce a greater confusion in Families, than either the Peace of them, or of the State would be consistent with.

* *Vid. Justinian Institut. l. 1. tit. 8. s. 2.*

4. What Honour is due from Servants to their Masters, hath been at large declar'd, and thereby, so far as this particular is concern'd, the main intendment of the Commandment discharg'd; But because I have often said, that the Commandment which is now before us, was intended also to comprehend the duty of Superiours toward Inferiours, as well as of Inferiours toward them: I think it not amiss to speak somewhat of *the duty of Masters* toward their Servants, and the rather, because oftentimes they stand as much in need of an admonition as the other. In order whereunto, following the division before laid down, I will consider the duties of Masters toward their *Slaves*, and and then of their duties toward such, as though their *Servants*, yet are so *in a more ingenuous way*.

Now, though the Authority of Masters over *Slaves* be undoubtedly much greater than that over other Servants, though anciently, as *Justinian** tells us, they had the power of Life and Death, and were not accountable for it, though they put them to death unjustly; yet as the *Roman* Laws* set bounds to that exorbitant Power of theirs, and our own hath yet more retrench'd it; so if we consult the Laws of Nature and Christianity, we shall find there is more owing from them unto their Slaves, than is ordinarily thought fit to be paid. Of this Nature is, first, Furnishing them *with Food and Rayment, in such a proportion as may suffice the necessities of Nature*; this being absolutely necessary to enable them to the performance of that Service and Labour which they exact. Of the same nature is, secondly, The imposing *such Tasks* upon them *as is not above their strength* to perform; this being no more than common humanity requires, of which Slaves are equally partakers with our selves. But such also is it, thirdly, Not to punish them *above the demerit of their Crime*, nor *above what their Strength will bear*; Justice requiring that the Punishment do not exceed the Proportion of the Offence, and com-

* *Institut.*

* *Lib. 1. tit. 8. sect. 2, 3.*

mon

mon humanity that it paſs not the bounds of their Natural Abilities. In fine, for ſo St. *Paul* plainly intimates, where he commands Maſters to *give unto their Servants that which is juſt and equal*; their Commands and Puniſhments ought to extend no farther than *the Laws of the place* give leave, or *Equity and Chriſtian Charity* permit; which to be ſure will not only exclude all Cruelty and Injuſtice toward them, but impoſe a neceſſity upon the Maſter, of ſhewing ſuch Compaſſion to them, as their Weakneſs or Neceſſities may at any time require. In the mean time, though I no way doubt but Maſters are to give unto their Slaves that which is *juſt and equal*, and conſequently to abſtain from all Cruelty, either in their Commands or Cenſures, yet I think it neceſſary for them, to ſubmit both to the one and the other, where the burthen which is impos'd, is not above the proportion of their ſtrength: partly, becauſe St. *Peter* commands ſubjection to the *froward* and *difficult*, and partly, becauſe that they have ſo much as their life is, owing either to the mercy of their preſent Maſters, or of thoſe from whom they were purchas'd.

From the duties of Maſters to their Slaves, paſs we to the *duties of the ſame to their Servants*, ſuch I mean, as are ſo in a more ingenuous way. Where, firſt of all, I ſhall make no difficulty to affirm, as I ſuppoſe, neither will any man ſo grant, that *all thoſe things* are undoubtedly owing to Servants, which are *from a Maſter to his Slave*; the condition of Servants being much better than that of Slaves, and therefore, to be ſure, not to require leſs of their Maſters than the other. As little difficulty can be made, that *all that* is owing to them from their Maſters, *which* at the entrance upon their ſervice, they do *expreſly covenant* to afford them, a Promiſe, even where there is no other Obligation, making the party promiſing a Debter; and how much more then, where there is a valuable conſideration to engage him? But from hence it will follow, firſt, Where there is any ſuch thing covenanted, that they are to give them *the promiſed reward or wages*, and that too, at or near the time wherein they become due to them; he *paying leſs than he ought*, who pays not *at* or *near the the time*, becauſe depriving the party to whom he owes it, of that uſe and advantage which he might, and which, becauſe it is his own, it is fit he ſhould receive by it. It will follow, ſecondly, where that is a part of the Contract, that Maſters carefully and faithfully *teach their Servants that Trade*, for the Learning whereof they become Servants to them; which is the rather to be obſerv'd, becauſe it is oftentimes through ſloathfulneſs omitted, or baſely and invidiouſly conceal'd, at leaſt as to the *cheifeſt Myſteries* thereof; as if a Contract could be ſatisfied by paying one half the thing contracted for, and it may be too, the leſs conſiderable one. I obſerve, thirdly, That in ſuch Servants as are by Contract to receive their whole maintenance from their Maſters, a regard is to be had, not only of what neceſſity, but what *the condition* of that Service, into which they are aſſum'd, requires. For by how much the more Ingenuous the Service is, ſo much the more free in reaſon ought to be the entertainment of thoſe that are in it; eſpecially, when as it moſtly happens, paying accordingly to their Maſters for it. Whence it is, that no Man of reaſon doubts but that the Apprentice of a Merchant, or other ſuch more liberal Profeſſion, ſhould be treated in a better faſhion, than one of

a man of a more inferiour one, or an ordinary Serving Man to the ſame. I obſerve, fourthly, That as care is to be taken on the one hand, that they afflict not their Servants with immoderate Labours or Puniſhments, ſo alſo on the other hand, that they ſuffer them *not to be Idle*, nor *be ſparing of juſt Chaſtiſements*, when they deſerve them; the omiſſion of that not only proving the bane of their Servants, but being a falſification of that Truſt which is repoſed in them by their Servants Parents, and an injury to the Commonwealth, which by their ſlothfulneſs or cowardiſe is like to have ſo much the worſe Subjects. Fifthly and Laſtly, (more than which I ſhall not need to ſay, unleſs it be to exhort them to the practiſe of what they are thus bound to) It is incumbent upon all Maſters of Families *to reſtrain their Servants from all Vitious Courſes*, and *both prompt and oblige them to the practiſe of Religious Duties*; not indeed by any direct obligation upon them from their Authority, which reacheth, rather to Temporal than Spiritual matters; (whence it is that they are call'd *Maſters according to the Fleſh*) but by virtue of that Great Law of Chriſtianity, which commands Men, as much as in them lies, to promote the buſineſs of Religion: Which lying more in Maſters powers than in other Mens, by means of that Authority they have over them; there doth from thence ariſe an Obligation upon them to promote Religion by their commands in all thoſe which are ſubjected to their Dominion. And indeed, as that which is honeſt will very rarely be found to be ſeparate from profitable, if Men would eſtimate the advantageouſneſs of a thing by that which is moſt certainly and laſtingly ſo; ſo there cannot be a more compendious way to promote our Intereſt in the World, than by endeavouring as much as in us lies, to make thoſe Religious whom we employ: Becauſe, as what ſuch do is moſt faithfully and diligently done, ſo it is moſt likely to be proſper'd by the Divine Providence, from whom, as all other good Gifts, ſo this Worlds Wealth will be found to come.

PART

PART XI.

Of the Promiſe wherewith the Duty of this Commandment is enforced, and what the due importance of it is. Where is ſhewn, 1. *That the Bleſſing here promis'd, is a long and happy Life, and particularly in the Land of* Canaan. 2. *That that Bleſſing is to be expected from our Parents as well as from God; partly by that ſuſtenance and encouragement which our Honour will prompt them to afford, and partly by their Interceſſion with God for us. Upon occaſion whereof, the efficacy of a Parent's bleſſing is declar'd, and the reaſonableneſs of Children's deſiring it of them is aſſerted.* 3. *That the Bleſſing here promiſed, implies a contrary Curſe to the Violators of the Commandment, as is evident both from the ineffectualneſs of a ſingle Promiſe to perſwade, and the denunciations of God elſewhere. Whether or no, and how far the promiſe belongs to us Chriſtians. Evidence of its belonging to us from the obligation of that Duty, to which it is annexed, and from* St. Paul's *making uſe of it to perſwade the* Epheſians *to the performance of the other. An Eſſay toward the ſhewing in what manner and meaſure it appertains to us. Where, firſt, is made appear, that it appertains not to us in the ſame manner and meaſure wherein it did unto the* Jews. *Evidence hereof from its referring to the Land of* Canaan, *which was the proper Portion of the* Jews, *and from the nature of thoſe earthly promiſes that were made to them; thoſe, as they were not clogg'd with the ſame exceptions wherewith they are now, ſo intended in a great meaſure, as ſhadows of more ſubſtantial Bleſſings. That this and other ſuch like Promiſes appertain to us, Firſt and chiefly, in the Myſtery or Subſtance; where withal is ſhewn, what the Myſtery here adumbrated is, even a Happy and Immortal Life in Heaven. That they appertain to us alſo in the Letter, but not without the exception of Perſecutions, nor yet any farther than they ſhall be found to be ſubſervient to our Spiritual welfare, and the Glory of God and of his Goſpel. Enquiry is next made, whether or no, and in what proportion the preſent Promiſe doth belong to the Obſervers of the ſeveral Duties of this Commandment. That it belongs in ſome meaſure to all, is evidenced from the extenſiveneſs of the Duty, which the Promiſe is in reaſon to anſwer; But firſt, and principally, to the Honourers of Parents, becauſe that is the only Duty expreſſed, and becauſe that tye, which Parents have upon us, approacheth neareſt unto that, whereby the Honour of God is bound upon us. The honourers of other Superiours more or leſs entitled to it, according as thoſe Superiours approach neerer to, or are farther removed from our Natural Parents. The conſequence whereof is, that it belongs more to the honourers of our Civil and Spiritual Parents, than to other Superiours; as again, more to the honourers of our Civil than Spiritual ones, becauſe the former have a greater Intereſt in our Temporal Being. The Explication concludes with enquiring, what appearance there is of the literal completion of this promiſe. Evidence hereof in the Honourers of our Natural Parents from the obſervations both of* Greeks *and* Jews; *As in the Honourers of other Superiours, and particularly of our Civil*

or

or Spiritual Parents, partly from the orderlineſs of their behaviour, which is more likely to be ſucceſsful than Turbulent and Seditious ones, and and partly from their preventing thoſe Wars and Confuſions, which do principally occaſion the ſhortning of Mens days.

II. HAVING entreated at large in ſeveral Diſcourſes, of the Duty here enjoin'd, as well that which we owe to our Civil and Spiritual Parents, together with all other kinds of Superiours, as that which we owe unto our Natural ones; it remains that we proceed to *the Promiſe*, wherewith it is inforc'd, of the prolongation of our days. For though the words wherein it is expreſs'd, look rather like a Motive drawn from the Conſequents of our Honour, than a Promiſe of what God will beſtow upon it; yet, as that Law-giver, who propoſeth any thing under the Notion of a Motive, muſt, if he Act like a Law-giver, both repreſent that which is advantageous, and moreover, if the thing depend upon his Will, an aſſurance of his own readineſs to contribute towards it, which is the very formality of a Promiſe; ſo that that which God propoſeth under that Notion, was intended as a Promiſe, St. *Paul* gives us to underſtand, *Epheſ.* 6. 2. He there ſtiling this Commandment, *a Commandment with a Promiſe*, and *the firſt* of that Nature, meaning thereby, the firſt of the Decalogue, to which there was any expreſs and ſpecial one. Taking it therefore for granted, that the words now before us have the nature of a Promiſe to the due obſervers of this Commandment, I will make it my buſineſs to enquire,

1. What is the due importance of it, and
2. Whether or no, and how far it appertains to us Chriſtians upon the performance of the duty enjoin'd.
3. Whether, and in what proportion it belongs to the ſeveral duties therein contain'd.

I. Now there are three things, within the reſolution whereof, the anſwer to the firſt of theſe will be comprehended.

1. What the Bleſſing here promiſed is,
2. From whom it is to be expected. And
3. Whether it implies any thing of a Curſe to the violators of the Commandment.

1. What *the Bleſſing* promiſed is, we ſhall not be long to ſeek, becauſe ſo particularly expreſſed in this place, and in the parallel one of *Deuteronomy*, chap. 5. 6. it being evident from them both, that *a long life* is promiſed, from that of *Deuteronomy* *, that that life ſhall be *happy* as well as long; and from both, again, that that long and happy life ſhould be ſpent *in their own Country*, and particularly, *in the Land of Canaan:* that being the Land promiſed by God unto the *Iſraelites*, and to which this Promiſe, and in a manner all the Promiſes in the Old Teſtament do refer.

* And that it may go well with thee.

2. From the Bleſſing promiſed, paſs we to *the Perſons from whom we are to expect it*, which is no doubt, firſt and chiefly God; both the Commandment and the Promiſe being perfectly his, and therefore the completion of the latter to be expected from him. But becauſe, even in thoſe things, of which God is the firſt and principal Authour, there are other leſs principal and ſubordinate cauſes, and, becauſe, though

though our Tranſlation and others read only *that thy days may be long*, or *be prolonged*; in the mean time taking no notice of the means by which it is to be convey'd, yet the *Hebrew*, which is in reaſon to give meaſure to them all, reads * *that they, even thy Father and Mother may prolong them*, therefore I think it but reaſonable to collect from thence, that that long and happy Life, is next under God, to be expected from our Parents; partly by means of that Suſtenance and Encouragement which our Honour will invite them to afford us, but more eſpecially, (becauſe *every good and perfect Gift cometh from above*) by their Interceſſion to God for us, from whom they receive ſuch Honour. For, though (as *Grotius** hath obſerv'd) it be not unuſual for Verbs of an Active Form, to be taken in a Paſſive or Reciprocal Senſe, in which Senſe, both the Septuagint and moſt other Tranſlaters underſtood the Hebrew Verb here; yet, inaſmuch as it is certain from the Scriptures, and particularly from the Story of *Jacob* and *Eſau*, that the Bleſſing of the Child depended much upon the Prayers of the Father, inaſmuch as that wiſe Author of the Book of *Eccleſiaſticus* || repreſents it as a known truth, That *the Fathers Bleſſing eſtabliſheth the Houſes of Children, but the Curſe of the Mother rooteth out Foundations*, I think it no way improper to underſtand the Hebrew in its literal ſenſe, and upon that account, though in a ſecondary ſenſe, to aſcribe the prolongation of Childrens days to the bleſſing, or devout Prayers of their Parents. But be there ſufficient ground or not, in this particular place, for the influence the Parents Prayers may have upon the happineſs of the Child, and particularly upon his length of days; yet as it is not without ground, if we take the practiſe of the *Patriarchs* for one, and the obſervation both of *Jews* and *Gentiles*, ſo it wants not that, the force whereof will be more hard to reſiſt, I mean the aſtipulation of Reaſon, the Prayers of Parents for their obedient Children, being not only, through the affection from which they proceed, likely to be more than ordinarily intenſe, and therefore ſo much the more likely to prevail; but the cleareſt atteſtations that can be of that reſpectful behaviour of the Child, to which a long and happy Life is promiſed. Which atteſtations, however, God ſtands in no need of, and much leſs can the want of them be thought to be able to divert him from his purpoſes, yet may very well be preſum'd, when concurring with them, to quicken the execution of them, and preſs him to perform what he himſelf hath promiſed. Upon which account, I cannot but wonder that Children ſhould now be taught not to beg thoſe Prayers which have ſuch viſible advantages, eſpecially when the ſo doing hath had the general approbation of Chriſtendom, and is moreover no contemptible teſtimony of that Honour which they are to pay; The Authour to the Hebrews having told us, That *without all contradiction, the leſs is bleſſed of the better*, and conſequently, that the begging of a Fathers Bleſſing is a teſtimony of Honour, becauſe implying a confeſſion of his Superiority from whom they deſire it.

* לְמַעַן יַאֲרִכוּן יָמֶיךָ

* *Explicat. Decalogi. Not. ad Prac. 5.*

|| *Eccl. 3. 9.*

3. The only thing to be accounted for, is, whether the Promiſe annex'd to this Commandment, implies *any thing of a Curſe* to the violators of it. Which, that it doth, will evidently appear, if we mean no other by a Curſe than the ſhortning of thoſe Children's Lives that diſobey. For, as that naturally follows, from the ſole withdrawing

ing the Influence of the Divine Providence; ſo, that God will withdraw that Influence from diſobedient Children, needs no other proof, than that he hath particularly promis'd to continue it to obedient ones. For, what great encouragement could it be to honour our Parents, to have the Promiſe of that, which thoſe who do not honour them may be alike Partakers of with our ſelves? Neither will it ſuffice to ſay, (as perhaps it may be) That the certainty which a Promiſe inferreth, makes it reaſonable to perform that to which it is annex'd, rather than run the hazard of failing of it. For, how reaſonable ſoever it may be to prefer a Certainty before an Uncertainty, where no other Conſiderations intervene; yet is it not to ſuch a degree, as to be likely to prevail, where there are any preſent Temptations to the contrary: Experience ſhewing it a hard matter to reſiſt ſuch, even where there is an aſſurance of our Loſs; and how much more hard then (that I ſay not, the weakneſs of Humane Nature conſidered, impoſſible) where there is a poſſibility of avoiding it? To all which, if we add the many Expreſſions of God's diſpleaſure againſt the Violators of his Laws, and particularly of that Law which is now before us; ſo, no doubt can remain, but that at the ſame time God promiſeth a long and happy Life to the dutiful, he meant the contrary to diſreſpectful and diſobedient Children. For, how can we think otherwiſe, when there is a Command to the Magiſtrate to put him to death who curſeth his Father or Mother? *Exod.* 21. 17. and the People, *Deut.* 27. 16. are taught to invocate the Curſe of God upon them that ſet light either by the one or the other?

II. The ſecond Queſtion follows, to wit, *Whether or no*, and *how far* the Promiſe that now is before us *appertains to us Chriſtians*. That *it doth appertain to us*, much need not be ſaid to ſhew, becauſe I have already * prevented my ſelf in that Argument: It may ſuffice here to ſay, That as it is reaſonable enough to believe the Promiſe doth, becauſe that Precept, to which it is annex'd, is bound upon us by our Bleſſed Saviour; ſo it is no leſs reaſonable to believe ſo, becauſe St. *Paul*, where he inculcates the Precept, forgets not to add, that it is *a Commandment with a Promiſe*, and *the firſt*. For, what would it have ſignified to *Chriſtians*, to have told them of its being *a Commandment with a Promiſe*, if that Promiſe which belongs to it had been none of their Concernment? Taking it therefore for granted, or rather as ſufficiently proved, that the Promiſe now before us appertains to us, we will proceed to inquire, (as in which the main difficulty lies) Whether it appertains to us *in the ſame manner and meaſure it did* unto the *Jews*; and if not, *in what*.

* See the Diſcourſe of the Meaſures whereby we are to proceed in the Interpretation of the *Decalogue*.

That it appertains not to us *in the ſame manner and meaſure*, is evident, firſt, from hence, that it particularly refers to the Land of *Canaan*; the Promiſe being not onely of a long and happy Life, but of a long and happy Life in the Land *which the Lord thy God giveth thee*; which we know to have been the Land of *Canaan*. Whence it is, that the *Septuagint*, which oftentimes act the part rather of Paraphraſts, than ſtrict Tranſlators, add to the Name of Land, the Title of *Good*; which we know, from *Deut.* 8. 7. to have been the peculiar Elogie of the Land of *Canaan*. Now foraſmuch as the Land of *Canaan* was particularly promis'd to the *Jews*; foraſmuch as it doth not appear, that it was ever intended for *Chriſtians*, nor was capable of

of containing the thouſandth part of thoſe who have or do give obedience to this Commandment; it follows, that ſo far at leaſt we have no concernment in the Promiſe, and muſt therefore look out for other ways of the completion of it. But ſo St. *Paul* gives us plainly enough to underſtand, in the place before quoted out of the *Epheſians*; that Apoſtle, though he repreſent the Promiſe, yet * leaving out that Clauſe of it, *which the Lord thy God giveth thee.* But neither is it leſs evident, but that, abſtracting from the Land of *Canaan*, the *Jews* to whom it was firſt made, had a far greater Title to it, if it be ſtrictly and literally underſtood: partly becauſe thoſe earthly Promiſes which were made unto the *Jews*, were not clogg'd with thoſe Exceptions which we find thoſe of the New Teſtament to be, and partly becauſe they are repreſented by the Writers of it, and particularly by St. *Paul*, as the Shadows of thoſe things to come, which the Goſpel exhibited. Which reaſon alone, if well conſidered, will be found to make a great difference between the Times of the Law and the Goſpel. For, the Subſtance being come, it was but reaſonable to think the Shadow was to diſappear, or at leaſt not ſo to prevail, as it did before the appearing of it. All therefore that remains to inquire, is, *in what manner and meaſure* this, and other ſuch Promiſes, are to be conſtru'd to appertain to us, and what kind of Completion we are to expect. Where, firſt, no doubt can be made, that this, and other ſuch like Promiſes, appertain to us *in the Myſtery or Subſtance.* For, the Goſpel propoſing to exhibit that of which the Law was a Type or Shadow, thoſe Temporal Promiſes which the Law propos'd, muſt conſequently be ſuppos'd to be fulfill'd in the Myſtery or Subſtance, to all thoſe which are under its Oeconomy: Which, by the way, will not onely confirm the truth of thoſe Promiſes belonging to us, but moreover take off from thoſe diſcontents we are apt to conceive upon the difference there often is between us and the *Jews*, as to Temporal Promiſes. The former, becauſe the main Intendment of all Symbolical things, is the Myſtery which is repreſented under them: the latter, becauſe exhibiting a more ſubſtantial Good, though leſs apparent, than that which the Law doth. For, what juſt ground of complaint can there be, if the Goſpel, though it provide not alike for our Temporal welfare, yet provides much more for our Spiritual one, and exhibits the Subſtance of that of which the other had but the Shadow? Which ſaid, nothing remains to do, but to point out the Myſtery or Subſtance of thoſe Earthly Promiſes which were by God in this Commandment made to the Honourers of their Parents. But ſuch is, firſt, *Heaven*, in reſpect of that *Land* which was to be the Seat of their Life, who among the *Jews* were due Obſervers of this Commandment; the Author to the *Hebrews* not onely ſtiling it *a better and a heavenly Country*, in reſpect of the Land of Promiſe; but affirming moreover, that *Abraham* and *Sarah look'd through* that Land of Promiſe, to the Heavenly Country, and ſet up their Reſt in it, and in that City which God hath there prepar'd; which ſhews, that this Heavenly Country was figur'd in the Land of Promiſe, and conſequently, to be beſtow'd upon all ſuch, under the Goſpel, who ſhould ſhew themſelves faithful Obſervers of this Commandment. The Myſtery will be yet more eaſie to be diſcovered, as to the reſidue of that Promiſe which is here

* *Epheſ.* 6. 3. Ἵνα ἔυ σοι γένηται, καὶ ἔσῃ μακροχρόνιος ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.

made to the Religious Honourers of their Parents. For, as, in order to that, nothing more can be neceſſary, than to inſtance in ſuch Evangelical Bleſſings, as bear a perfect reſemblance to the promis'd ones (an Antitype being nothing elſe, either in the Literal or *Chriſtian* ſenſe, than that which bears the ſame Signatures with its Type) ſo it will be no hard matter to point out ſuch of the Evangelical Bleſſings, as do exactly accord with thoſe which the Law promiſed. For, as that *Heavenly Country* which the Goſpel promiſeth, hath not onely the Name of Πατρὶς, or *Patria*; but our Πολίτευμα, or *Citizenſhip* affirmed to be there, *Phil.* 3. 20. becauſe (as is elſewhere affirm'd) that New Birth, which we have, is from thence, and our Original is not Earthly, but Heavenly; ſo, correſpondently to that long and happy Life which the Law propoſeth, we have the promiſe of a Life which doth infinitely ſurpaſs it in both, becauſe devoid of any thing which may interrupt our Happineſs; and, beſide that, not onely ſimply long, but of ſuch a duration as ſhall never have an end.

From the Bleſſings typified by Earthly Promiſes, paſs we to *thoſe Earthly ones themſelves*, and inquire, *whether or no*, and *how far* they appertain to us *Chriſtians*. For the reſolution of the former whereof, we ſhall not be long to ſeek, becauſe ſo diſtinctly ſtated by St. *Paul*; he expreſly affirming, 1 *Tim.* 4. 8. That *Godlineſs hath the promiſe of the Life that now is, and of that which is to come.* The onely thing of difficulty is, *in what meaſure* they belong to us; which accordingly I come now to reſolve. In order whereunto, the firſt thing I ſhall offer, is, That however the *Jews* might expect a perfect Completion of them, upon the performance of their Duty, yet the like is not to be expected by us, as being propos'd *with an exception of Perſecution:* Our Saviour, where he makes the largeſt Promiſe of things of that nature, yet forgetting not to add that Allay to it. 'Tis in *Mark* 10. 29, 30. *And Jeſus anſwered and ſaid, Verily I ſay unto you, there is no man that hath left houſe, or brethren, or ſiſters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my ſake, and the Goſpels; but he ſhall receive an hundred fold now in this time, houſes, and brethren, and ſiſters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with perſecutions; and in the world to come, eternal life.* From which place, as it is manifeſt, that a *Chriſtian* may be ſometime oblig'd to part with all Earthly Bleſſings; ſo, that though he may hope to retrive them with advantage, yet not without Perſecutions for the ſake of that Religion which he profeſſeth. But beſide that what Promiſes ſoever there may be of Earthly Happineſs, yet it is not to be expected we ſhould enjoy an uninterrupted one; ſo neither any portion of it, *any farther than may be ſubſervient to our Spiritual and Eternal one*, which is that which the Goſpel chiefly promiſeth. For, as otherwiſe Earthly Bleſſings ſhould be rather an Infelicity, than a Happineſs, and therefore not to be look'd for from him who profeſſeth a more than ordinary Kindneſs for us; ſo being leſs principally intended by the Goſpel, which is ſaid to be built upon *better Promiſes*, they are in reaſon to give place, where they cannot be perform'd without entrenching upon the Completion of thoſe more principal and better ones. Laſtly, As whatſoever Earthly Happineſs may be thought to belong to us, yet it is of neceſſity to be underſtood with *ſubſerviency* to our Spiritual welfare;

welfare; ſo alſo, *to the Glory of God, and of his Goſpel*, which may be ſometime much more promoted by our Happineſs. Upon which account, I conceive, it was, that, in the Times near to our Saviour and his Apoſtles, the moſt faithful Diſciples of our Lord did not onely meet with little of Earthly Happineſs, but were moreover, beyond meaſure, perſecuted and deſtroy'd; God Almighty, by their exemplary Patience and Humility, giving the *Heathen* to underſtand, how admirable a Religion they had eſpous'd. But, as where the Glory of God, or our own Eternal Welfare is conſiſtent with it, I ſee not how we can avoid the thinking of Earthly Promiſes to be our Portion, when St. *Paul* hath ſo diſtinctly affirm'd it; ſo I cannot forbear to ſay, that the want of Earthly Happineſs is in a meaſure imputable to our neglect of that Piety to which it is even now promiſed: Partly, becauſe I ſee the generality of *Chriſtians* falling ſhort of that Piety which they profeſs; and partly, becauſe of that ill uſe which they generally make of that Plenty and Proſperity which God often heaps upon them. Upon which account, there is a neceſſity upon God, if he will provide for our Eternal Welfare, to withdraw thoſe Earthly Bleſſings, which otherwiſe we might have quietly enjoy'd.

III. The third Queſtion follows, to wit, *Whether or no, and in what proportion the Promiſe of a long and happy Life belongs to the Obſervers of the ſeveral Duties of this Commandment.* That *it belongs to all*, much need not be ſaid to prove, after what hath been ſaid to ſhew their ſeveral Concernments in the Precept of Honour: For, it appearing from the former Diſcourſes, that the Commandment is to be extended as well to the Honour of our Civil and Spiritual Parents, together with all other Superiours, as to the Honour of our Natural ones; the Promiſe which is annex'd to it, is in reaſon to be extended to all the Obſervers of it, in their ſeveral meaſures and proportions. The onely thing of difficulty is, *what thoſe Meaſures and Proportions* are; which yet will not coſt either much Time or Pains to void. For, as the Promiſe is in reaſon to be thought principally and eſpecially to belong to the Honourers of their Natural Parents, partly becauſe the Honour of our Natural Parents is the onely thing expreſs'd, and partly becauſe that Tie which they have upon us, approacheth neareſt to that whereby the Honour of God is bound upon us: ſo, the ſame Reaſon obligeth us to think it to belong more or leſs to the Honourers of other Superiours, as thoſe Superiours approach nearer to, or are farther remov'd from our Natural Parents. Upon which account, the Promiſe of a long and happy Life muſt be thought to belong more to the Honourers of our Civil and Spiritual Parents, than to thoſe of other Superiours; as again, more to the Honourers of our Civil, than Spiritual ones: Becauſe, though our Spiritual Parents give us a much better Being than any of the former, yet our Civil ones have a greater Intereſt in our Temporal Being, and conſequently, the Honour of them more likely to partake of the Promiſe of Earthly Happineſs, as being more commenſurate to it.

IV. One onely Queſtion remains, of thoſe before propos'd; with the reſolution whereof, I will put an end both to this Argument, and the Commandment: and that is, *What appearance there is of the Literal performance of that Promiſe* which is here made to the Honour

of our Superiours. For my more orderly ſolution of which, I will inſtance, firſt, in the Honour of our Natural Parents, becauſe the Promiſe of a long and happy Life is expreſly annex'd to it. Now though it be not to be doubted, but even good Children have been ſometime unfortunate, and have found their Days either few or evil; yet, that generally it hath hapned otherwiſe, we have the Experience of the World to atteſt, as well of that part of it which was moſt remov'd from the true Religion, as of that which had the cleareſt ſenſe of it. Witneſs, for the former, thoſe Sentences of the *Greeks* remembred by *Grotius*, in his Notes upon the ſecond Verſe of the ſixth to the *Epheſians*.

Ἱκανῶς βιώσεις γηροβοσκῶν τὺς γονῆς.

Thou ſhalt live long enough, if thou nouriſh thy Parents in their Old age: And,

Ἔλπιζε τιμῶν τὺς γονῆς πεύξειν καλῶς.

Aſſure thy ſelf, that it ſhall be well with thee, if thou honour thy Natural Parents: Than which, what could be ſaid more agreeably to the Commandment? though, for ought appears, they had nothing but their own Experience to prompt them to the affirmation of it. The ſame is to be ſaid for the People of the *Jews*, among whom the ſame Proſperity of obedient Children was obſerv'd: Witneſs the Saying before remembred, out of *Eccleſiaſticus*, with others that precede and follow it; *For the bleſſing of the father eſtabliſheth the houſes of children, and the curſe of the mother rooteth out foundations.* And though among *Chriſtians* there is not the like certainty to be expected, becauſe our Religion leads us to Promiſes of a higher nature; yet I doubt not, but they who either have or ſhall obſerve the World, may find Inſtances enough to juſtifie the generality of the Completion of the long and happy Life of obedient Children; as, on the other ſide, of the misfortunes and ſhortlivedneſs of the diſobedient and unnatural: According to that ancient Obſervation of *Homer*, concerning *Simoiſius*, in the fourth Book of his *Iliads*.

——————— ὐδὲ τοκεῦσι
Θρεπτὰ φίλοις ἀπέδωκε, μόρῳ δὲ ἑῷ ὑπὸ αἶσαν.

He did not afford Suſtenance to his Parents, and therefore he had but a ſhort Life.

From the Honourers of Natural Parents, paſs we to the Honourers of Civil and Religious ones, and all ſuch as are in Dignity and Authority; for whom, that God Almighty is not without thoughts of kindneſs, even as to the preſent Life, may appear from hence, that he hath ſo conſtituted the World, that Men cannot reaſonably expect either a long or happy Life, without giving Honour to them: Diſreſpect of Superiours not onely introducing Confuſion and Sedition, from whence naturally ariſe Wars, and all the Miſchiefs that attend them; but obliging Superiours, for their own ſafety, and that of the Commonwealth, to cut thoſe off which ſhall be found to withdraw Obedience

Obedience from them. And though it ſometime happen, that the Peaceable and Obedient meet with a Fate no way anſwerable to their Merit; yet as, generally ſpeaking, they are more likely to be ſucceſsful, than turbulent and ſeditious Men; ſo, where they are not, they have the Conſcience of their own Goodneſs to ſupport them, and the certain expectation of a Reward in another World: That being a Bleſſing which, as no Violence of Men can obſtruct, ſo God hath, without any Exceptions, oblig'd himſelf to beſtow.

THE

THE SIXTH
COMMANDMENT.

THE SIXTH COMMANDMENT.

Thou ſhalt * do no murther. * or, not kill.

PART I.

The Contents.

Of the Duty we owe to each other as Men, and particularly to each others Perſons and Lives, the violation whereof, this Commandment forbids. The Affirmative part of the Commandment, the ſhewing Humanity or Benevolence unto all; the Grounds whereof are alſo declar'd. Thoſe either, firſt, our deſcending originally from the ſame Common Parents, the ignorance whereof was probably the cauſe of the Heathens not extending their Humanity uſually beyond their own Nation: Or, ſecondly, our deſcending from the ſame Cœleſtial Parent, God; and being created by him in his own Image: Or, thirdly, that Natural Compaſſion which God hath implanted in all our Hearts, that neceſſity we ſtand in of one anothers Help, and that Ability which we have, by means of Reaſon and Speech, to afford it. The particular Duties this Humanity includes, an inward Affection to, Praying for, and doing all thoſe things which may promote each others Happineſs: Of which nature, are the aſſiſting one another with our Advice, lending one another the Aſſiſtance either of our Perſons or Fortunes; and, where there is a neceſſity of puniſhing, uſing moderation in it. This Humanity to extend in ſome meaſure to all, unleſs where there is a Command of God to the contrary; which is not to be ſuppos'd under the Goſpel. Of the Meaſure wherein this Humanity is to be extended; where is ſhewn, firſt, That it ought to be extended even to evil and unjuſt Perſons, ſo far as is conſiſtent with the Glory of God, the Publick Good, and the Good of our own Souls. What the Reſult of that Determination is, and that it no way hinders, but Offenders may be brought to condign Puniſhment; becauſe Clemency to them, is Cruelty to the Innocent. Inquiry is next made in what proportion this Humanity is to be extended to the ſeveral ſorts and degrees of Men; where is ſhewn, That where it cannot, or not alike, be afforded unto all, thoſe of the ſame True Religion with us, are to be preferr'd before thoſe of a Falſe; as thoſe who are nearly related to us, before thoſe who are more remote. Our ſelves, cæteris paribus, *to be preferr'd before other*

Men; but not ſo, where there is an Inequality: our own Pleaſure being to be poſtpos'd to the neceſſary Support of a Neighbour; and our own Welfare, as well as Pleaſure, to that of the Society whereof we are.

WHAT is owing from us to each other upon the account of *any near Relation*, was the Buſineſs of that Commandment to ſhew, which entreats of the Honour of Parents: It remains, that we inquire what we owe to one another as *Men*, which is the purport of the following ones. In the inveſtigation whereof, following the Order of the *Decalogue* and Nature, we will inquire, firſt of all, what is owing from us to each others *Perſons and Lives*.

Now, though, if we look no farther than the Letter of the Commandment that is now before us, the Whole of what is requir'd of us may ſeem to be no other, than the not invading each others Lives, or at leaſt offering no violence to them; yet becauſe it is certain, from the Laws of God and Nature, that *a poſitive Benevolence* is alſo requir'd; and becauſe both our Saviour, and St. *Paul*, reduce the whole of the Law to Love, which could not be done with any congruity, if Benevolence had not a portion in it; therefore I think it not amiſs to allot it a place in my Diſcourſe, and inquire,

1. Upon what Grounds it ſtands.
2. What Duties it contains.
3. To whom; and,
4. In what meaſure it is to be extended.

1. And here not to tell you that Benevolence to all Mankind is ſo confeſſedly a Duty, that it hath obtained the name of *Humanity*; becauſe though that be a proof of the Worlds believing it to be ſuch, and conſequently, that it hath a foundation in Nature; yet it gives no account of the *Grounds* upon which it ſtands: I ſhall, without more ado, apply my ſelf to the inveſtigation of thoſe *Principles*, from which both ſo general a Perſwaſion, and the Obligation thereof doth ariſe.

Now the firſt Obligation we have of ſhewing Humanity to each other, ariſeth from hence, that *all of us*, though at at a greater diſtance, *deſcend from the ſame Common Parents*. For, being by the former Precept oblig'd to give Honour to our Parents, as well thoſe which are farther remov'd from us, as thoſe which are more immediate to us; being alſo (as was there obſerv'd) we cannot give Honour to them, unleſs we have a regard to thoſe that are alike deſcended from them; it follows, that if we are all deſcended from the ſame Common Parents, we are to look upon one another as of the ſame Family, and conſequently, to afford one another a ſhare in our Affections. And though, in tract of Time, the Tradition of our Deſcent from the ſame Common Parents was in a manner quite forgotten among the *Heathen*, which is probably the reaſon why they ſhew'd ſo little Humanity out of their own Nation: yet, as, where there was a perſwaſion

See Explicat. of the Fifth Commandm. Part 1. in the beginning of it; and Part 3. towards the end—.

perſwaſion of deſcending from the ſame Common Stock, there was always a Religious Friendſhip between them, yea, though Neceſſity, or ſome other Cauſe had ſeparated them, as to the place of their abode; ſo *Joſephus* * tells us, That, when the *Lacedemonians* found by a certain Writing, that they and the *Jews* deſcended from the ſame Stock, as being both of the Poſterity of *Abraham*, they did, in a Letter of their Kings to *Onias* the High Prieſt, both offer and require a mutual Friendſhip, as the reſult of that Cognation that was between them: *It being but juſt* (as the Words || of their Letter are) *that ſince you are our Brethren, you ſhould ſend to us for ſuch things as you deſire, as in like manner we ſhall do, and both look upon your Poſſeſſions as our own, and have our own in common with you.* From which Ratiocination of theirs, it is apparent, that, though the *Heathen* had not the knowledge of all Mens deſcending from the ſame Common Stock, yet they judg'd it, ſo far as it could be prov'd, a juſt Foundation of Humanity; and accordingly, where they diſcerned any ſuch, look'd upon themſelves as oblig'd to afford it. In the mean time, you may ſee, with what reaſon God premiſeth the Precept of Honouring our Parents, before thoſe others of ſhewing Kindneſs to the generality of Mankind; that being not onely a ſtraiter Obligation, but the Fountain and Foundation of the other.

* *Antiqu. Judaic. lib.* 12. *c.* 5.—Βασιλεὺς λακεδαιμονίων ἀρείῳ, ὀνίᾳ χαίρειν. Ἐνηυχήσατές τινι, ἐυρεθῆναι ὡς ἐξ ἐνὸς ἐσμὲν ἡμεῖς ἰουδαῖοι καὶ λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἀβραὰμ οἰκειότητος δίκαιον ἦν, &c.

|| Δίκαιον ἦν οὖν ἀδελφοὺς ὑμᾶς ὄντας, διαπέμπεσθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς περὶ ὧν ἂν βούλησθε· ποιήσομεν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερα ἴδια νομιοῦμεν, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ κοινὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔξομεν. *Joſeph. ibid.*

But becauſe, as was now intimated, how rational ſoever it may ſeem to be, to ſhew Humanity to each other, upon the account of our deſcending from the ſame Common Stock; yet that Reaſon could not appear to all who were perſwaded of the Obligation of it, becauſe the Tradition of that Deſcent was almoſt obliterated among the *Gentiles:* Therefore it may not be amiſs to inquire, whether there be not ſome other ground of it, and ſuch too as was more diſcernable to the *Heathen:* Of which nature I reckon, *our deſcending from the ſame Cœleſtial Parent, God; and being created by him in his own Image.* Which Ground is the more to be ſtood upon, becauſe God himſelf aſſigns it for the Reaſon of the Prohibition that is now before us: For thus, after the ſignification of his diſpleaſure againſt the ſhedding the Blood of Man, he aſſigns for the Reaſon of it, and of that Vengeance which he inculcates, that *in the image of God made he man, Gen.* 9. 6. Neither will it ſuffice to ſay, That this is a ſufficient ground of Humanity to thoſe to whom the Scripture, where it is recorded, was made known; the Honour, and much leſs Love of God, being by no means to be ſalv'd, where a Regard is not had to thoſe that are both of his Off-ſpring and his Image. For, as the ſame Truth is deducible from Natural Principles, even from thoſe which evince God to be the Creator of the World, and the worth of thoſe Souls of ours in which his Image doth moſt ſhine forth; ſo, that the *Heathen* were not without the knowledge of it, is evident from ſeveral Paſſages of their Writings *, and particularly from that which St. *Paul* quotes out of one of their own Poets; *For we are alſo his off-ſpring.* Now foraſmuch as even by the confeſſion of the *Heathen*, we are all the Off-ſpring of God; and that too to ſuch a Degree, as to have his Image plainly ſhining on us: it cannot but be look'd upon as a diſho-

* *Ariſtides dixit,* Ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσις ἐκ Διὸς ἡμῖν. —— *Manilius.*

An quoquam genitos niſi cœlo credere fas eſt
Eſſe homines? ——
Idem de animâ humanâ.
—— *Cœlo ſcrutatur in alto*
Cognatumq; ſequens corpus ſe quærit in aſtris. Vid. plura apud Priczum in Act. 17. 28.

nour to Almighty God, not to have a regard to thoſe, who are both deſcended from him, and of the ſame glorious Image with him. But what ſpeak I of the *Heathens* acknowledging all to be the Sons of the ſame God, when it is evident from *Arrian*, that they did no leſs acknowledge the concluſion we have deduced from it, and the reaſonableneſs of that Humanity which we commend? For, *what* (ſaith he, in the perſon of *Epictetus*, to a Maſter who was more than ordinarily diſpleaſed with his Slave) *wilt * thou not bear with him who is thy Brother, who hath God, no leſs than thy ſelf for his Anceſtor? who as a Son, is procreated of the ſame Seeds, of the ſame Cœleſtial Emiſſion? But, what if thou wert plac'd in the ſupremeſt dignity, wouldſt thou therefore preſently make thy ſelf a Tyrant? and not rather remember what thou art, and over whom thou ruleſt? that thou ruleſt over thy Kinſmen, thy Brethren, and the Offspring of God.* From all which it is evident, both that the *Heathen* themſelves look'd upon all Mankind as the Off-ſpring of God, and upon that account the juſt object of their Humanity.

* *Arrian in Epictet. lib. 1. cap. 13.* — Ἀνδράποδον, οὐκ ἀνέξῃ τῷ ἀδελφῷ τῷ σαυτῦ, ὃς ἔχει τὸν Διὰ πρόγονον; ὥσπερ, οὗτος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σπερμάτων γέγονε, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἀνωθεν καταβολῆς. Ἀλλ' εἰ ἦν τις τοιαύτῃ χώρᾳ κατεστάγης ὑπερεχούσῃ ἐυθὺς τύραννον κατασήσης σαυτὸν; ὑ μιμνήσῃ τί εἶ, καὶ τίνων ἄρχεις; ὅτι συγγενῶν, ὅτι ἀδελφῶν φύσει ὅτι τῶ Διὸς ἀπογόνων. *M. Antoninus.* Τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν, *l.* 2. *ſ.* 1. Ἐγὼ δ' τεθεώρηκως ἢ φύσιν τῶ λογικῶ ὅτι καλὸν, καὶ τῶ κακῶ, ὅτι αἰσχρὸν, καὶ τίνα αὐτῶ τὸ ἀμαρτάνον φύσιν, ὅτι μοι συγγενὴς ἐχὶ αἵματος, ἢ σπέρματος τῶ αὐτῶ, ἀλλὰ νῶ, καὶ θείας ἀπομοίρας μέτοχος, ὅτε βλαβῆναι ὑπό τινος αὐτῶν δύναμαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ με ὑδεὶς πρὸς αἰσχρὸν μεταβάλλει· ὅτε ὀργίζεσθαι τῷ συγγενεῖ δύναμαι, ὅτε μισεῖν δύναμαι.

Add hereunto, that *natural compaſſion which Nature hath implanted in the hearts of all men, that neceſſity which they ſtand in of one anothers help, and that ability which they have, by means of their Reaſon and Speech, to afford it.* For, inaſmuch as all thoſe things muſt be acknowledg'd to be from God, inaſmuch as they naturally prompt men to the ſhewing of that humanity, which it is the deſign of my preſent Diſcourſe to eſtabliſh; it muſt be look'd upon as the intention of God, who makes nothing in vain, to oblige us to exert it to all thoſe, who are partakers of the ſame Nature and Infirmities with our ſelves. And, though having eſtabliſh'd the former grounds, there lies no neceſſity upon me, to reflect upon thoſe other *Hypotheſes*, upon which the Ignorant and the Atheiſtical have thought fit to erect the frame of Humane Society, and thoſe actions that tend to the conſervation of it; yet, even ſo, we ſhould not find our ſelves without a proof of that humanity which this Commandment was intended to ſuggeſt. For, be it, that at firſt Men lived a wandring and a ſavage Life, and had no Bond, either of Laws or Speech to conjoin them; Be it, that their own danger, whether from Wild Beaſts, or as Wild Men, oblig'd them to have recourſe to others, and by dumb Signs at firſt, and afterwards by Speech, which neceſſity put them upon the invention of, both to implore the aſſiſtance of others, and promiſe them their own: Yet, even ſo, as *Lactantius* * obſerves, no contemptible proof might be found of ſhewing kindneſs and humanity to one another. For if, according to that hypotheſis, men entred into, and eſtabliſh'd a Society with one another for their mutual aſſiſtance and ſupport, it muſt be look'd upon as the higheſt wickedneſs, either to violate or not obſerve thoſe compacts, whereby, from the beginning of their Being, Mankind was ſo link'd together.

* *Lactant. l. 6. c. 10.*

2. Having thus ſhewn upon what grounds that Benevolence or Humanity ſtands, which we are oblig'd to ſhew to all mankind, proceed

ceed we to enquire *what duties* it contains, ſo far at leaſt as this Commandment is concern'd in it. Where, firſt of all, no doubt can be made but we are to have *an inward affection* for them, and to begin our benevolence to them in our ſouls; not only the word Benevolence ſo perſwading, but that abſtract of the ſecond Table which we learn both from our Saviour and St. *Paul*; for, both the one and the other ſumming up the duties of that Table in *the loving of our Neighbour as our ſelves*; it is apparent we cannot ſatisfie the ſeveral precepts of it, unleſs we have an inward affection for thoſe who are the objects of them. As little doubt can be made, but we are to *wiſh well* to them, and employ *our Prayers to God* on their behalf; this being not only a natural reſult of Love, but a duty which is particularly bound upon us by Chriſtianity, by which we, at leaſt, are to take our meaſures of the Commandments. In fine, becauſe the lives and perſons of Men, are the things this Commandment aims at the felicitating of, we are in reaſon to do *all that may any way tend to the promoting of their welfare and happineſs*. Now, though, what thoſe things are, is not hard to be diſcover'd, and much leſs by thoſe, who will make their Neighbours caſe their own, according as Chriſtianity obligeth; yet becauſe all men will not uſe that advertency which is requiſite, and much leſs be ſo juſt as to ſuppoſe their Neighbours caſe their own, leſt they ſhould be forc'd to love them as themſelves, I think it not amiſs to inſtance in ſome of thoſe things which tend to the happineſs of Mankind. Of this nature is, firſt, the giving them *the aſſiſtance of our advice* in all thoſe ſtraits and exigencies, into which they may often fall; this being not only an uſeful part of Humanity, but of the nature of thoſe offices of it, which bring not the leaſt prejudice to the Doer; Such as are the ſuffering a man to drink of the Waters of our Fountain, or to light his Candle at ours: * *He who courteouſly ſhews an erring perſon his way, or gives him faithful counſel, being like him who ſuffers his Neighbour to light his Candle at his, which ſhines never the leſs to him for what the other borrowed.* Again, foraſmuch as, though our advice may be of ſignal uſe to promote the happineſs of our Neighbour: yet, it may ſo happen ſometime, that it may be of no more force, than *Be warm'd and fill'd*, and other ſuch like wiſhes to diſtreſſed perſons, the inability of their perſons requiring the aſſiſtance of our bodies, as the ſlenderneſs of their fortunes, an addition to them from our own, hence it comes to paſs, that our benevolence is to extend to the lending them *our perſonal aſſiſtance*, where their diſtreſſes do ſo require, as *the aſſiſtance of our Fortunes* where their neceſſities do. Laſtly, foraſmuch as Juſtice and the neceſſities of the Publick may require the inflicting of puniſhment upon Offenders; hence it comes to paſs, that our Humanity is to expreſs it ſelf in ſuch *a moderate infliction*, as may ſuit with the ability of the ſufferer.

* *Homo qui erranti comiter monſtrat viam,*
Quaſi lumen de ſuo lumine accendat, facit.
Ut nihilominus ipſi luceat, cum illi accenderit.

Ennius apud Tull. de Officiis l. 1.

3. The order of my Diſcourſe, now leads me to enquire to whom the Humanity here ſpoken of is to be extended, a queſtion which may ſeem at firſt ſight unneceſſary, becauſe the title of Humanity extends it to all thoſe, who are partakers of the ſame nature and infirmities with our ſelves. And indeed, ſimply ſpeaking, no doubt can be made, but all men whatſoever are to have a ſhare of it, becauſe,

cauſe, as was before ſhewn, all men are deſcended from the ſame common Parents, and are no leſs the Off-ſpring and Image of God than our ſelves. But as Benevolence to Men is in reaſon to yeild to the Commands and Glory of God, by whom even that Benevolence is made a duty; ſo it may ſometime happen that they may interfere in ſome perſons, in which caſe there is no doubt our Humanity is to be ſo far ſuſpended. Thus for example, There being a command of God to the *Jews*, not onely, that they ſhould generally abſtain from Commerce with other Nations, but that they ſhould ſhew no pity to ſome of them, and particularly to thoſe who Inhabited the Land of *Canaan* before them, there is no doubt but ſuch Perſons were out of the compaſs of that Humanity, which this Precept is ſuppos'd to enjoin. But, becauſe, however the *Jews* might be forbidden the expreſſions of Humanity to ſome perſons; yet there appears not the like interdict to the Chriſtians; yea, becauſe the like Interdict is ſo far from appearing, that Chriſt hath commanded us to look, even, upon a *Samaritan* as a *Neighbour*; therefore, if we ſpeak of Humanity in the general, there is no doubt but all men whatſoever are to be allow'd to have a ſhare of it, and that, not onely becauſe of the foregoing Precept of our Saviour, but becauſe (which is a far greater endearment) he laid down his life for all, yea, even for thoſe that deny him. All therefore that can be ſaid, as to us Chriſtians, is, that there may be ſome Offices of Humanity, which may be deny'd at ſome times, and to ſome perſons, which will beſt be conſidered in the reſolution of that queſtion.

4. *In what meaſure* our humanity is to be extended, the fourth and laſt thing propos'd to be entreated of. Now there are three things, within the reſolution whereof, I ſuppoſe, all that is neceſſary upon this Head will be comprehended.

1. What Humanity is to be ſhewn to evil and unjuſt perſons.
2. In what proportion it is to be extended to the ſeveral ſorts and degrees of Men. And
3. Laſtly, what the meaſure thereof ought to be in compariſon with that love which we owe unto our ſelves.

1. I begin with the firſt of theſe, to wit, *what Humanity is to be extended to evil and unjuſt perſons*, concerning which, I ſhall not doubt to affirm, that all ſuch is to be afforded them, as ſhall be found to be *conſiſtent with the glory of God*, *the publick good*, *and the good of our own ſouls*. For Humanity being bound upon us, not onely by the Laws of Nature, but by the Laws of Chriſt, and of his Religion, nothing can be ſuppos'd to conceal its obligation, which is not ſome way ſuperiour to it, ſuch as are thoſe before mentioned. But from hence it will follow, that we are to wiſh well to, and pray for them, to give them our aſſiſtance where they are unjuſtly oppreſs'd, to relieve them in their wants and neceſſities; in fine, to converſe with them ſo far, as that may be done without danger of infection to our ſelves, or ſcandal to others, and our Religion; none of theſe in any meaſure thwarting the Glory of God, or our own, or others welfare, but on the contrary, very much promoting both: Partly becauſe a means to work upon thoſe evil ones, and partly becauſe an innocent compliance with that Humanity which Nature and Chriſtianity hath bound

bound upon us; He who thus ſheweth mercy to an Evil man, as *Ariſtotle* * ſometime anſwered an importunate Caviller, *having a regard, not to his Manners, but to the Man*, or, as it is expreſs'd by ſome others, *not to the Man, but to Humanity.* But as, where the offices of Humanity are inconſiſtent with a higher good, there is no doubt, the obligation thereof doth ſo far ceaſe; ſo nothing hinders, but they, who have Authority, both may and ought to draw the Sword of Juſtice againſt Offenders, and not only cut them off, but with ſeverity; Clemency to Offenders being Cruelty to the Innocent, who ought in all reaſon to be preferr'd. Only as Humanity may be ſhewn in puniſhing, as well as in redreſs or relief, care would be taken, where either the enormity of the Crime, or the deterring of others doth not ſo require, that the puniſhment, which is inflicted, be not attended with that cruelty wherewith it too often is.

* Ὀνειδιζόμενός ποτε ὅτι πονηρῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐλεημοσύνην ἔδωκεν, ὁ δ' τερόπον, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ δ' ἄνθρωπον ἠλέησα. Laertius in vita Ariſtot. l. 5. p. 118. & p. 119. de eodem Πρὸς δ' αἰτιασάμενόν ὡς τὴν μὴ ἀγαθῷ ἔρανον δεδωκὼς (φέρεται γὰρ καὶ οὕτως) ὁ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, φησὶν, ἔδωκα ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ.

2. Having thus ſhewn in what meaſure our Humanity is to extend to evil and unjuſt perſons, proceed we to enquire *with what proportion it is to be exhibited to the ſeveral ſorts and degrees of Men.* For, though it be not to be doubted, but that it is to be extended unto all, in as great a proportion as we are able to afford, yet, inaſmuch as, according * to *Tully*, our ſtock is but mean, and the multitude of thoſe that want, infinite; hence it comes to paſs, that our Humanity muſt be with ſome variety, and though all are to have it, yet all muſt not have it in the ſame proportion. Thus for example, Though I can wiſh well to, and pray for all men whatſoever, yet it is impoſſible for me, either to be liberal or aſſiſtant to all that may ſtand in need of my ſupport, hence it comes to paſs, (becauſe otherwiſe my benevolence would be ineffectual to any) that the ſtream thereof muſt paſs more fully to ſome, than it can be ſuppoſed to do to others. The only thing worthy an enquiry, is, *where the exceſs of it is to go*, which yet will not coſt much pains to reſolve. For, inaſmuch as, *cæteris paribus*, thoſe are a juſter object of our benevolence, who are of the ſame true Religion with us, than thoſe who are of another, and of a falſe; it will follow, as St. *Paul* hath taught us, that though we are to *do good to all*, yet, *eſpecially to thoſe that are of the houſhold of Faith, Gal.* 6. 10. In like manner, though I can wiſh well to, and pray for all Mankind, as well ſuch of them, as are fartheſt remov'd from me in Converſation and Nature, as thoſe that are neareſt to me in any, or all, yet, inaſmuch as I cannot * tranſmit the outward effects of my benevolence to all, or at leaſt not in the like proportion, Reaſon would that *the preference be given to thoſe of my own Kindred, and Country, and Converſe*, becauſe, having a ſtraiter tie upon me than the other. For, if all men are to have a ſhare in my benevolence upon the account of their deſcending from the common Parents of Mankind, to be ſure, if a difference be to be made, it ought to be to the advantage of thoſe, who, beſide that general cognation, have a ſtraiter and more particular one to us.

* *De Officiis Lib.* 1. *Loco poſt citato.*

* *Sed quoniam copiæ parvæ ſingulorum ſunt: eorum autem, qui his egeant, infinita eſt multitudo, vulgaris liberalitas referenda eſt ad illum Ennii finem,* Nihilominus ut ipſi luceat, *ut facultas ſit, qua in noſtros ſimus liberales. Gradus autem plures ſunt ſocietatis hominum. Ut enim ab illâ diſcedatur infinitate, propior eſt ejuſdem gentis, nationis, linguæ, qua maximè homines conjunguntur, interius etiam eſt ejuſdem eſſe civitatis, multa ſunt enim civibus inter ſe communia* ——— *Arctior vero colligatio eſt, ſocietas propinquorum: ab illa enim immenſâ ſocietate humani generis in exiguum anguſtumq; concluditur.* Tull. de Officiis, Lib. 1.

3. One

3. One only Queſtion remains, relating to the meaſure of our benevolence, and that is, *what proportion it is to bear to that which we owe* unto *our ſelves*, concerning which, no doubt can be made, but that it ought to go *leſs*, than that which we owe unto *our ſelves*. For though the Commandment be, that we ſhould *love our Neighbour as our ſelves*, according as *Moſes* firſt, and after him our *Saviour* enjoins, which may ſeem to import an equality, yet as nothing more can be inferr'd therefrom than a ſimilitude in our benevolence, which may be, where there is not an equality; ſo every man according to the uſual ſaying, being neareſt to himſelf, is in reaſon to give himſelf the preference, and love himſelf both before and above another. This only would be added, that when we ſpeak of giving our ſelves the preference, it is to be underſtood where the compariſon is *ad idem*, both in reſpect of the thing, and the Perſon. For who either doubts, or can doubt but that a man ſhould foregoe *his own pleaſure*, rather than ſuffer a Neighbour to want *neceſſaries*. For, as it were a ſtrange kind of Humanity that would not poſtpoſe a pleaſure to the ſuſtentation of a Neighbour; ſo it is, in truth, no better than an injuſtice, which no love of our ſelves can warrant; he, who gave the earth to the Children of Men, by that act of his, entitling all that are ſo, to ſome portion in it, and conſequently, where they are not actually enſtated in it, obliging thoſe that are, to communicate ſo much of their enjoyments to them, as may ſerve them for their ſupport. In like manner, though I ſay, that in the matter of Benevolence, a Man is, *cæteris paribus*, to prefer himſelf before any other, yet, I ſay not the ſame, where the compariſon is made between *Us* and *thoſe Societies*, of which we are, either by Compact or the Inſtitution of God, Members. For, as it is impoſſible for any Society to ſubſiſt, where they, who are the Members of it, ſubject not their particular Intereſts to it, ſo, to do ſo is no more, than what upon due conſideration will be found to be owing from particular men to it; whatſoever we are, or have, being next under God owing to thoſe Societies whereof we are Members.

PART

PART II.

An Addreſs to the Explication of the Negative Part of the Commandment; where is ſhewn, That that which is literally and expreſly forbidden, is the Murthering of our Neighbour. The Criminalneſs thereof evinced from the Affront it offers to God, whoſe Image it thus violates; from the Injury it doth to Humane Society, but eſpecially to the Party murthered. The like Criminalneſs evidenced from the Conſequences thereof, and particularly from its clamorouſneſs in the Ears of God, and of our own Conſcience. An Inquiry what Killing is to be look'd upon as Murther; where is ſhewn, firſt, That all killing is not; and particularly, that that is not which is inflicted by the Magiſtrate, where the Authority is competent, the Manner legal, and the Party that is killed deſerves it. All other deſign'd Killing, even by him, to be look'd upon as Murther, whether accompliſh'd by the Hands of the Executioner, or in War. An Exception in the behalf of thoſe who ſerve Princes in War; where is ſhewn, That it is not neceſſary that they ſhould know the Quarrel wherein they engage to be juſt; it being enough to them, that they know it not to be Unjuſt, that they are commanded by the Prince to ſerve him in it, and that they paſs not the Bounds of his Commands. All deſigned killing by Private Perſons, to be look'd upon as Murther, unleſs what a Man is put upon in his own neceſſary Defence. A brief Cenſure of Duels.

THIS Commandment, with thoſe that follow, rather pointing at ſuch things as we are to avoid, than at thoſe which we are oblig'd to purſue; Reaſon would that we ſhould employ the main of our Endeavours in the diſcovery of thoſe Sins which this and the other Commandments do forbid. Having therefore in my laſt ſet before you what regard we ought to have for one anothers Perſons and Lives, I think it not amiſs to conſider *by what means they may be prejudic'd*, as from which the preſent Precept aims eſpecially to ſecure us. In order whereunto, becauſe that ſeems to me to be the moſt natural way of procedure, I will,

1. Firſt of all, entreat of that which is literally and expreſly forbidden: and,
2. When I have done ſo, proceed to inquire, Whether any other Sins are included in it, and what thoſe Sins are.

1. To begin with that which is *literally and expreſly forbidden*; concerning which, no doubt can be made but it *is the killing of our Neighbour*: becauſe, however the Commandment expreſſeth no more than *Thou ſhalt not kill*, yet this, and thoſe that follow, are reſolv'd by St. *Paul* to be comprehended *in loving our Neighbour as our ſelves*. Which Reſolution of his could not have truth in it, if the Crimes that are forbidden, had not our Neighbour for the Object of them. Taking it therefore for granted, that the killing of a Neighbour is the thing here forbidden, I will inquire,

1. Wherein the Criminalneſs thereof doth conſiſt.
2. What Killing is to be ſuppos'd to be underſtood: And,
3. And laſtly, What is to be thought of Self-murther, and how that is reducible to this Commandment.

1. Now though, for the Criminalneſs of Murther, it might be enough to alledge, that it is *a violation of this Commandment*; and, which is more, *of one of thoſe which were given to Noah*, which I have ſhewn to be in themſelves of Univerſal obligation: yet becauſe I have undertaken to ſhew, that this, as well as the reſt, is a Violation of the Law of Reaſon and Nature, as well as of God's Poſitive ones, waving the conſideration of the other, I will betake my ſelf to ſuch Topicks as the Light of Nature will afford us. Whereof, the firſt that I ſhall aſſign, is, *the particular Affront it offers to the Divine Nature*: For though Man, as ſuch, be the immediate Object of its Injuriouſneſs, and accordingly ſo reſolved by us; yet inaſmuch as Man is no other than *the Image of God*, and acknowledg'd ſo to be, no leſs by the *Heathen*, than by our ſelves; what is thus done to Man, muſt be look'd upon as an Affront to God, *whoſe Image is thus defac'd* in him. Excellent to this purpoſe is that of *Philo**, in the entrance of his Diſcourſe upon this Commandment: *Murther hath indeed the name of Man-ſlaughter, becauſe Man is the Perſon ſlain; but it is in truth Sacrilege, and the greateſt of Sacrileges, becauſe than Man there is not any thing more Sacred, or which is a more expreſs Image of the Divine Reaſon and Perfection.* And indeed, if even the Images of *Emperours* have had ſuch a Veneration, that it hath been look'd upon as a violation of their Majeſty, to draw thoſe from them who had fled thither for Succour, or (which is an Inſtance better known to us) to deface them in their Coins; it is eaſie to ſuppoſe, it ought to be look'd upon as no mean Crime, to deface the Image of God in Man: not onely becauſe of the Eminency of the Perſon repreſented, but of the Repreſentation it ſelf, which is of the ſame nature with its Archetype. But let us ſuppoſe, for once, that Murther reach'd no further than the Man, and that, as it is properly a breach of the Second Table, ſo it had no evil Aſpect at all upon the Firſt; yet even ſo we ſhould find it to be criminal enough for all conſidering Men to ſtand agaſt at; becauſe of *that Injury which it offers to Humane Society*, which is the Band and Cement of the World. For, beſide that Murther *robs it of one of its Members*, and conſequently doth ſo far weaken it; it doth *by its evil Example tempt others to do the like*, and *by its noxiouſneſs beget a diffidency in Men towards each other*: Upon which, what can any Man imagine, but that others ſhould be drawn to offer the like injury to it; or, if all cannot be prevail'd upon ſo far, yet to avoid each others Converſe, and treat with Men, not as their Brethren, but as their Enemies? Which, what is it, but to bring in that State of War, which ſome, though fondly, have imagin'd to be the State of Nature? Laſtly, (more than which I ſhall not need to alledge from the Law of Reaſon and Nature) As Murther offers a great injury to Humane Society, ſo it offers *an irreperable one to the Party murther'd*; there being no return from the State of Death to Life, and much leſs (if the Perſon have been taken away in his

*Ὄνομα μὲν ἀνδροφονία καὶ τὸ κλεῖναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπιζημίζεται· τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἱερὸν ὄζειν ἱεροσυλία, καὶ ἱεροσυλιῶν ἢ μαλίστα, διότι οὐδὲν ἐν κόσμῳ κτημάτων καὶ κειμηλίων, οὐδὲν ἔτι ἱεροπρεπέστερον ἔτε θειότερον ἔστιν ἀνθρώπου, παγκάλης εἰκόνος καὶ πάγκαλον ἐκμαγεῖον, ἀρχετύπου λογικῆς ἰδέας παράδειγμα τυπωθέν. *De ſpec. legibus.*—

his Sins) to a poſſibility of obtaining Pardon from God, which is a thing not to be thought of without horrour. For, though an *Italian*, it may be, may hug himſelf ſo much the more in it, concerning one of whom it is reported, that he made his Enemy abjure his God before he murther'd him, that ſo he might at the ſame time deſtroy both Soul and Body; yet none that hath the Bowels of a Man, can think of it without regret, that by his means Men have not onely been depriv'd of the preſent Life without remedy, but condemn'd to an endleſs Torment.

Now though this alone might ſuffice to deter Men from the commiſſion of it, which is the reaſon I have taken no notice at all of *the Conſequences* of Murther, in the general Scheme of my Diſcourſe; yet I think it not amiſs, ἐν παρέργῳ, to repreſent *ſome of them* alſo to the Conſciences of thoſe that are not yet infected with it. Whereof, the firſt that I ſhall aſſign, is, *the clamorouſneſs thereof, in calling for vengeance* upon the Murtherer. For, however it may be with other Sins, none of which yet is without a Voice, this is importunate for Vengeance; and, if God will not deſcend to Earth, that will aſcend to him, and fill his Ears with the News of the Crime, and Prayers for a Judgment on the Committer of it.. 'Twas thus (as we learn from *Moſes*, *Gen.* 4. 10.) when *Cain* had kill'd his Brother *Abel*; Heaven it ſelf was fill'd with the Outcries of the Murther, and the many loud Anthems that are ſung by thoſe thouſands of Angels that inhabit there, were drown'd by that ſingle Voice; God himſelf there telling him, *that the voice of his brothers blood cried unto him from the ground.* It is true indeed (For what ſhould hinder me from making an Objection which it is ſo eaſie to aſſoil?) It is true, I ſay, that the Subject of that Voice is not expreſs'd, and much leſs is it affirm'd, that it call'd for Vengeance: But, as it is not to be imagin'd, that that ſhould call for any thing elſe, when we find God himſelf ſubjoyning ſo ſevere a Curſe againſt him that had been the Shedder of it; ſo, that it did not, will be made more than probable by the *cry of the ſouls under the Altar*, even the Souls of thoſe Perſons *that were ſlain for the Word of God, and the Teſtimony that they held*, *Rev.* 6. 9, 10. the Subject of their Cry being no other than *How long, holy and true, doſt thou not judge and avenge our blood upon them that dwell on the earth?* But ſo we find alſo (which may ſerve for a farther confirmation) that becauſe *the cry of Sodom and Gomorrha was very great*, or rather, of the Sins of their Inhabitants, as you may ſee *Gen.* 18. 20. therefore the Lord ſent Angels to deſtroy them, *Gen.* 19. 13. For, as it is apparent from thence, that the Subject of their Cry was no other than the Vengeance of the Sinners; ſo, that the Cry of foul Crimes is ſo loud and earneſt, that God cannot be at reſt, till he hath diſpatch'd the Inſtruments of his diſpleaſure. The reſult of the Premiſes is this, That all hainous Sins are in Scripture ſaid to have a Voice, and that that of Murther is as loud as any; and then we may have leave to conclude it to be one of the firſt Magnitude, becauſe it is ſo importunate for Vengeance.

Τῶν ὕβεις τε βίη τε σιδήρεον ἔχεγον ἦκα.

But Murther is not *more clamorous* in the Ears of the Almighty, than

it is *in his who is guilty of it*; which though intended onely to repreſent the Horrours it creates in the Conſcience of the Man of blood, was yet literally true in him of whom *Plutarch* ſpeaks in his Book *De ſerâ Numinis vindictâ*. For, paſſing one day by a Neſt of chattering Swallows, he thought he heard them upbraiding him with the Murther he had committed; and his Ears were no leſs filled with the noiſe of his own horrid Act, than his guilty Conſcience was. And indeed, if, as the Scripture ſpeaks, *Sin lies at* any Perſons *doors*, the Sin of the Murtherer doth, being ever ready to fly in his Face, and afflict him with the remembrance of it. Of which, though it were eaſie to alledge other convincing Proofs, and particularly thoſe *Spectra*, or Repreſentations of the murthered Party, which they themſelves have often complain'd to have diſturb'd their Repoſe; yet I ſhall chuſe rather to repreſent, as being both more apparent and more convincing, their own eaſie diſcovery of the Murthers they have been guilty of. For, well may we think the diſquiets of thoſe Mens Conſciences to be great, who chuſe rather by ſuch a Diſcovery to expoſe themſelves to the Severity of the Law, than lie any longer under the ſecret Laſhes of the other. What ſhould I tell you of the *inquiſition God is ſaid* in Scripture *to make after it*, of *the ſtrange and unuſual ways he makes uſe of to diſcover it*, of *the diſcovery that hath been ſometime made by the Corps* of the Murthered Party*, of *the ſure and certain Vengeance that attends it?* For, as theſe are ſo known, both from Hiſtory, and our own Experience, as not to admit of any the leaſt doubt; ſo all of them do ſufficiently proclaim Gods deteſtation of the Crime, and what dread it ought to be held in by us.

* *Thuan Hiſt. l.* 32. *pag.* 159.

2. The Criminalneſs of Murther being thus explain'd, proceed we to inquire, *what killing* is to be accounted ſuch. In order whereunto,

1. The firſt thing I ſhall obſerve is, That *all killing* is not ſo to be eſteem'd; becauſe, where God firſt of all forbids the ſhedding of Blood, he doth not onely except the ſhedding of the Blood of the Murtherer, but enjoyns the effuſion of it. For thus, *Gen.* 9. 5. not contented to affirm, that he himſelf *would require the life of man at the hand of that, whether man or beaſt, that ſhould invade it*; he ſubjoyns in the next words, that *whoſo ſheddeth mans blood, by man ſhould his blood be ſhed*. Neither will it avail to ſay, That, if any Limitation be admitted, we muſt find out other Reaſons for the prohibition of Murther, than thoſe we have before laid down. For, beſide that the killing of the Murtherer is not onely not injurious to Humane Society, but, on the contrary, a great Safeguard to it, as by means of which other Men may be deterr'd from offering the like Injury to it; beſide that the ſlaying of the Murtherer, though it take away his Life, yet doth it not without juſt cauſe, and cannot therefore be ſaid to offer an irreparable Injury to him; it offers no Affront to the Divine Nature, by the violation of that Image of God which is ſuppos'd to be upon him: Partly, becauſe the Murtherer hath in a great meaſure defac'd that Image, as well upon himſelf, as the Party ſlain; and partly, becauſe the ſlaying the Murtherer conduces to the Glory of God himſelf, which is in reaſon to be preferr'd before the preſervation of his Image. The Murtherer hath indeed the Image of God upon him, though much defac'd; and, upon that account, ought

to

to be look'd upon with a proportionable Reſpect; but as an Image is in reaſon to yield to the Honour of that of which it is ſo, becauſe deriving all its Luſtre from it; ſo it ceaſes to be Sacred, where it cannot be preſerv'd without the violation of his Honour whom it was deſign'd to repreſent.

2. That all Killing is not Murther, or the Killing here forbidden, enough hath been ſaid to ſhew: Proceed we now to inquire, *what is*, or *is not* to be accounted ſuch. For my more orderly reſolution whereof, I will conſider the Act of Killing, 1. As purpoſely effected; or, 2. As caſual, and beſide the Intention of the Doer. The former again will require a double Conſideration, according to the different ſort of Perſons by whom it may be effected; which are either ſuch as are inveſted with Publick Authority, or ſuch as are onely Private Perſons. If the Queſtion be concerning *the former, killing by ſuch as are inveſted with Publick Authority*, ſo *it is not to be look'd upon as Murther*, or as the Killing here forbidden, where *the Authority is competent, the manner legal, and the Party that is kill'd deſerves it.* For, beſide that where God firſt forbids the ſhedding of Blood, he commands the ſhedding of the Murtherers, to wit, as the *Chaldee* Paraphraſe well interprets it, *upon proof made by witneſſes, and by the Sentence of the Judge*; beſide that under the Law, of which this Commandment was a part, there was both leave and command to thoſe that were in Authority, to take away the Lives of Offenders, which ſhews, that that Killing was not here intended; we are told for *Chriſtianity* by St. *Paul*, that the Powers that are, have *the Sword* of Juſtice committed to them; for what reaſon, think we, but to make uſe of it upon occaſion, and, as it follows in that Apoſtle, *to execute vengeance* with it *upon all thoſe that do evil.* Neither will it avail to object, That the ſame St. *Paul* forbids *Chriſtians the avenging of themſelves*, and, which is more, upon the account of *Vengeance belonging to the Lord.* For, as immediately after that, he admoniſheth Magiſtrates to execute Vengeance; which ſhews, that ſo far they were not intended in the former Prohibition; ſo, the Reaſon that is alledg'd doth not onely not include Magiſtrates, but, on the contrary, ſhew them not to be intended. For, though Magiſtrates are not Gods, unleſs in a ſecondary ſenſe, and as the Images and Subſtitutes of the True; yet being his Miniſters, and Miniſters to execute Vengeance, what is inflicted by the Magiſtrate doth not onely not ceaſe to be God's, but is, on the contrary, to be look'd upon as one of the ways of God's repaying it, which ſhews it rather to be their Duty, than their Offence. Care onely would be taken, that as it is God's Vengeance which they execute, ſo they do it with regard to the Command of God, and not to gratifie their own Malice; otherwiſe they avenge not God, but themſelves, which is a thing no where permitted to them. What Killing is lawful on the Magiſtrates part, hath been ſhewn already: proceed we to inquire, *what killing is forbidden*; which will not be hard to judge, after the explication of the other. For, it appearing from the Premiſes, that no other Killing is lawful to them, than what is annex'd to their Authority; it will follow, that *all that is forbidden, which either proceeds from an incompetent Authority, or is illegally and undeſervedly executed.* The ſame is to be ſaid of *killing in War*, as is of that which is effected by the Hand of the Executioner.

cutioner. For, as no doubt can be made, but that it is lawful for Princes to make War, and conſequently to kill, where the State which is under their inſpection cannot otherwiſe be ſecur'd; ſo it is no leſs unqueſtionable, that War is not, where they who make it have either not Authority ſo to do, or levy it without a juſt provocation. For, Vengeance (as St. *Paul* tells us) belonging unto God, and to thoſe whom he hath entruſted with the Execution thereof; it can be no farther lawful for the Magiſtrate to execute it, than is within the power of his Commiſſion to do. Upon which account, all unprejudic'd Men muſt condemn the War of the late *Long Parliament*, becauſe it is ſufficiently known, the Power of War was not in them, till they did in an unlawful manner aſſume it unto themſelves. In like manner, the Execution of Vengeance being entruſted to Princes, to make uſe of againſt thoſe that do evil; that, and the Actions that attend it, muſt be look'd upon as unlawful, where it is directed againſt thoſe who have done nothing to deſerve it. This onely would be added, for the ſake of thoſe who are by Princes appointed to draw the Sword in War, That it is not neceſſary for them to know the Juſtneſs of that Quarrel in which they do ſo kill and ſlay: For, inaſmuch as Private Perſons neither do nor can well underſtand the Juſtneſs of any Publick Quarrel, becauſe, to the underſtanding thereof, it is requiſite they ſhould be acquainted with the great Tranſactions of their own State, and of that againſt which they make War, (which it is not to be ſuppos'd Private Perſons ſhould be able certainly to attain) either it ſhall be lawful for them to withdraw their Aſſiſtance from the Prince, which muſt prove the bane of the State; or they muſt be content to ſerve him in his Wars, without any ſuch knowledge of the Juſtneſs of his Quarrel. Again, Foraſmuch as the making of Wars, and other ſuch Publick Matters, belong properly to him, to whom God hath committed the Sovereign Power, it muſt be left to him to judge, whether that Quarrel wherein he engageth, be ſuch as is juſt and warrantable. It may be enough to the Subject, that he doth not know it to be unjuſt, and that he is commanded by the Prince to ſerve him in it: For, however he may thereby be ſometimes engag'd in an unjuſt Quarrel, yet the blame thereof ſhall fall not upon him, who is neither concern'd nor qualified to judge of it; but upon the Prince, who is both, and by whoſe Authority the War is levied. This onely would be added, That, as the Commiſſion * of the Prince is the onely Warrant the Subject hath to intereſt himſelf in War; ſo it will become him, for that reaſon, to take care, that private Revenge do not puſh him on to do further miſchief, than it is the intention of the Prince he ſhould. Upon which account, I cannot but highly commend the Carriage of one of *Cyrus* his Soldiers, as which is a noble Inſtance both of his Humanity, and obſervation of Diſcipline. For, having (as *Xenophon* informs us) in the time of Battel lift up his Hand to ſtrike his Enemy, when he heard the Trumpet begin to ſound the Retreat, he let fall his Arm, and willingly loſt his Blow, becauſe he thought the time of ſtriking paſt.

* Tull de Officiis, lib. 1. *Pompilius Imperator tenebat provinciam in cujus exercitu Catonis filius tiro militabat. Cum autem Pompilio videretur unam legionem dimittere, Catonis quoque filium, qui in eadem legione militabat, dimiſit. Sed cum amore pugnandi in exercitu remanſiſſet, Cato ad Pompilium ſcripſit, ut ſi eum pateretur in exercitu remanere, ſecundo eum obligaret militiæ ſacramento: quia, priore amiſſo, jure pugnare cum hoſtibus non poterat.* See alſo *Sanderſon's* Caſe of a Military Life.

Of killing by Publick Perſons, I have ſpoken at large, and both ſhewn

ſhewn what is, and what is not to be accounted Murther: It remains, that we inquire concerning *killing by Private Perſons*; which will require no great pains to reſolve. For, the Execution of Vengeance being challenged by God to himſelf, and to thoſe to whom he hath committed the Sword of Juſtice, it will follow, that the Execution of it belongs not to private Perſons, and conſequently, that generally all Killing by them is Murther. If there be any Caſe wherein it may be lawful for a Private Perſon to kill another, it muſt be when a Man is ſet upon by another, and forc'd to it in his own defence; In which Caſe, as we have the Warrant of the Law of God in part to ſecure us, which acquits that Perſon from Murther, who ſhould ſlay a Thief that was found breaking in upon him in the Night, *Exod.* 22. 2, 3. ſo it will be found not to be without Licence from the Law of Reaſon and Nature; partly, becauſe in the Caſe of a ſudden Onſet, we can have no recourſe to the ordinary Means of Defence, I mean, the Patronage of the Magiſtrate; and partly, becauſe thoſe whom God hath entruſted with the Power of Vengeance, do empower Private Perſons to ſlay the Invader, where there is no other Means to ſecure themſelves. But as, ſetting aſide the Inſtance of a Man's own neceſſary Defence, it will be hard to find any wherein it may be lawful to kill a Man; ſo the pretence of Honour, upon which Duels are commonly grounded, is ſo pittiful a one, that I wonder it ſhould ſo long abuſe the World. For, beſide that, as one hath well obſerv'd *, *Drinking, Gaming, and Whores are thoſe rotten Bones that do, for the moſt part, lie hid under this painted Sepulchre and Title of Honour*; beſide that there are other ways to recover Mens Honour, than by killing them that do affront them, which makes it different from the Caſe of killing a Man in his own defence; it is a part of our Profeſſion, as we are *Chriſtians*, to ſuffer that wrong and diſgrace, which theſe Men are ſo haſty to revenge. From whence, as it will follow, that diſgrace is ſo far from being a juſt ground of killing, that, on the contrary, an eaſier Revenge will hardly be found to be allowable; ſo it would be conſidered, by thoſe eſpecially who ſtand ſo much upon their Reputation, whether it be any Honour to them, to bid open defiance to that peaceable and gentle Religion which they have ſo often and ſo ſolemnly made profeſſion to embrace.

* *John Hales* Sermon of Duels, *pag* 93. of his *Remains.*

PART

PART III.

Of Casual Homicide; and, first of all, of that which is Casual onely as to the Effect; which is also shewn to have the nature of Murther, though a less criminal one. The like inquir'd concerning that Homicide which is perfectly Casual; where, if the Act from which it proceeded were conversant about something ludicrous, the Party killing is in some measure declar'd to be guilty of it; as, on the other side, if it were conversant about serious or necessary Business, to be chargeable, or not chargeable with it, as he either neglected or used all requisite Means for the preventing of it. Of Self-murther, and how it is reducible to this Commandment. The Criminalness thereof evinc'd from its contrariety to that Natural Inclination there is in us to preserve our selves; from its Usurpation upon the Prerogative of God, at whose disposal we are; from the Injury that is thereby done to the Commonwealth, which is depriv'd of a Member; and, in fine, from the dissatisfaction it implies with the present Dispensations of the Divine Providence, or despair of a Redress from future ones. Ἐν παρόδῳ an Account is given of the Doctrine of the Stoicks *in this Affair; and of the Weakness, as well as Criminalness, of those that lay violent Hands upon themselves. Inquiry is also made, whether all killing of our selves be to be look'd upon as Self-murther; where is shewn, That all such Killing is, which we have not a Call from God to; but that there wants not such a Call oftentimes, or at least not to that which is interpretatively a killing of our selves: Amongst which Calls, I reckon the Preservation either of our Friend or Country, a secret Impulse from God's Spirit (which was the Case of* Samson, *and some of the Primitive Martyrs) and the asserting the Honour of God, and of our Religion.*

OF such Killing as is done purposely and with Design, I have spoken hitherto, and shewn both what is, and what is not, to be accounted the Killing here forbidden: Proceed we to inquire as much of *Casual Homicide*, or such as, though effected by the Slayer, yet is beside his intention. Where again we are to consider,

1. Whether it be Casual onely as to the Effect; or,
2. Perfectly and intirely such.

If the Question be concerning the former, even concerning that Homicide which is *Casual onely as to the Effect*, so no doubt can remain, but that though inferiour in Guilt to that Killing which is design'd, yet it is to be look'd upon as one of the Killings here forbidden; because, by the Law of the same God, *if a man*, onely in his haste, *struck another with a weapon or a stone*, so that he died, though the Striker intended onely to hurt, *he was to die for it*, as you may see *Numb.* 35. 16, 17, 18. It is true indeed, it is not there added, *though he intended onely to hurt*; which may give occasion to some Men to understand it of designed Murther: But as the Text speaks onely of smiting so that he die, in the mean time taking no notice of an intention of killing; and beside laying the stress of the Threat upon

upon the Death that did enſue: ſo, both here, and elſewhere, the Scripture diſtinguiſhes * it from preſumptuous and deſigned Killing, which ſhews, that Caſual Homicide was intended. That the Perſon who ſlew his Neighbour did it in his anger, that he did it in his drink, that he did it provok'd, or in defence of his Honour and Reputation, none of all theſe Pretences (as a Learned Man || hath obſerv'd) might excuſe him from that Death which God had denounc'd againſt the Murtherer. For, though the Effect that enſu'd were not voluntary, becauſe beſide the intention of the Slayer; yet the Cauſe of it was; which is enough to make a Man guilty before God: Men being juſtly chargeable with thoſe Effects which are but the natural Reſults of thoſe Inordinacies from whence they proceeded.

* See *Numb.* 25. 20 & *Deut* 19. 1, 2. *Exod.* 21. 14.

|| *John Hales* Serm. of Duels, p. 83. of his *Remains.*

From ſuch Homicides as are Caſual onely as to the Effect, proceed we to thoſe that are *perfectly ſuch*; that is to ſay, where neither Homicide, nor any the leaſt Hurt was intended. Where again we are to conſider, whether the Act from which the Homicide proceeded were *converſant about any ſerious or neceſſary Buſineſs, or onely about ſomething ludicrous and vain.* If the Queſtion be concerning *the latter*, as, for example, if a Man ſhould raſhly ſhoot of a Gun, not conſidering whither the Bullet might flee, or not knowing whether it were charg'd or no; in this Caſe, if Murther follow, there is no doubt, but the Party doing it is in ſome meaſure guilty of the Offence; becauſe, as in things of ſuch conſequence Men ought to be well advis'd, ſo it is the leſs excuſable, becauſe it proceeds from ſuch an Act as is perfectly ludicrous and vain. From ſuch Homicides as enſue from ludicrous Actions, paſs we to thoſe which follow upon *more ſerious ones*, ſuch as are the Actions of Mens Vocations: Where again we are to conſider, whether Men have us'd all requiſite diligence for the preventing of Miſchief, or whether ſomething have been neglected by them. Thus, for inſtance, if a Man who is either building or repairing a Houſe, ſhould make uſe of unſound Materials to make up his Scaffolds with; in this Caſe, there is no doubt, if any Miſchief ſhould enſue by their fall, the Party by whom it is occaſion'd is chargeable with it, becauſe it is through his neglect, that they who paſſed by have come to thoſe untimely Ends to which they did. The ſame is not to be ſaid, if the Workman have made uſe of ſound Materials, or at leaſt ſuch as were not eaſily to be diſcern'd to be other; nothing having the nature of a Sin, which is not ſome way voluntary in him who is the Committer of it. Upon which account, we find God himſelf excuſing him from the guilt of Murther, who, fetching a ſtroke with his Ax to cut down a Tree, had the ill luck to have the Head of it fall off from the Helve, and ſo ſlay his Neighbour unawares, *Deut.* 19. 5. In the mean time, as it is not to be deny'd, but even ſuch a one might be ſlain by the Avenger of Blood, if he could not firſt recover one of the Cities of Refuge, or afterwards, if he were found out of it before the death of the High Prieſt, (God thereby declaring, how precious the Life of Man was with him, and that it ought to be no leſs with us) ſo even Caſual Homicide hath been look'd upon with ſo evil an eye, that in the days of our Fathers, an Archbiſhop of this Nation was ſometime ſuſpended from his Charge, for having onely unfortunately kill'd a Man, as he was ſhooting at a Deer.

Archb. *Abbot.*

3. Being now to enter upon my third Inquiry, to wit, what is to

be thought of *Self-murther*, and *how that is reducible to this Commandment*, I think it not amiſs to ſpeak firſt unto *the latter*, becauſe, till that be ſhewn, my Diſcourſe upon the former muſt be look'd upon as impertinent and unſeaſonable. And here not to urge (what St. *Auguſtine* doth *) that the Commandment ſaith not, *Thou ſhalt not kill another*, but, *Thou ſhalt not kill*; which doth equally include the not killing of our ſelves: becauſe (as was before obſerv'd) this, and other the Commandments that follow, are to be underſtood with relation to our Neighbour, in the Love of whom St. *Paul* reſolves the whole of them to be comprehended; I ſhall chuſe rather, with the ſame Father ||, to evidence the pertinency thereof to this Commandment, from that general Rule of *loving our Neighbour as our ſelves*. For, inaſmuch as we are to receive the meaſure of loving our Neighbour from our ſelves; if we are not to kill our Neighbour, much leſs are we to kill our ſelves, the Love whereof is the Meaſure of the other. From all which, as it is eaſie to infer, that the not killing of our ſelves hath *no direct* place in this Commandment, becauſe primarily intended to deter us from invading the Lives of others; ſo alſo, that though it hath no place in it directly, yet it has *by conſequence*; and ſuch too, as, becauſe drawn *à fortiori*, ſhews it to be more criminal than the other. Taking it therefore for granted, that Self-murther hath a place here, I will proceed to inquire, 1. Wherein *the Criminalneſs thereof* conſiſteth; and, 2. Whether *all killing* of our ſelves is to be accounted ſuch

* *De civitat. Dei*, l. 1. c. 20.

|| *Loco prius citato.*

Now though, for the reſolution of *the former*, it might be enough to alledge thoſe Reaſons which I before produc'd for the Criminalneſs of the Murther of our Neighbour; Self-murther being no leſs a Violation of the Image of God, a great Injury to Humane Society, and an irreparable one unto our ſelves: yet I ſhall chuſe rather to inſiſt upon ſuch as are more proper to this Affair, whereof the firſt ſhall be taken from that *natural inclination there is in every one of us to the preſervation of our ſelves*. For that which is natural in us, being, as ſuch, the Work of God, who is the Author no leſs of Nature than of Grace; it muſt be look'd upon as an Act of oppoſition to God, not to comply with it, and much more to act contradictorily to it. But beſide that Self-murther is a contradiction to our own Natural Inclination, and conſequently alſo to God, who is the Author of it, it is *an Uſurpation upon the Prerogative of God, at whoſe diſpoſal we are*. A thing which even the *Heathen*, how blind ſoever in other things, were not yet unacquainted with; it being a Saying of *Pythagoras*, as I find him quoted by *Cicero* *, that *no Man ought to depart from the Garriſon and Station of Life, without the Command of his Great General, God*. And indeed, as a more apt Similitude could not poſſibly be found out, to expreſs the nature of Self-murther; ſo it is no leſs convincing a Proof of the unlawfulneſs thereof, than an apt Illuſtration of it. For, inaſmuch as God hath full Power and Authority over us, as he is the Great Creator of the World; it will follow, that in what Station ſoever he hath ſet us, therein we are to abide, till we are diſcharged by him. Since therefore he who hath ſuch Authority over us, hath plac'd us in this World, it will be neceſ-

* De Senectute. *Vetâtq; Pythagoras injuſſu Imperatoris, id eſt Dei, de præſidio & ſtatione vitæ diſcedere.*
Ad idem alludit Plato in Phæd. ubi hæc habet verba Ὁ μὲν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λεγόμενος περὶ αὐτῶν λόγος, ὡς ἐν τινι φρουρᾷ ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ οὐ δεῖ δὴ ἑαυτὸν ἐκ ταύτης λύειν οὐδ' ἀποδιδράσκειν, μέγας τέ τις μοι φαίνεται, &c. *Sect.* 5. *edit. Cant.*

ſary

ſary for us to abide in it, till he ſhall be pleas'd to call us out of it. Add hereunto, becauſe near of kin unto the other, that Intereſt which the Commonwealth, whereof we are Members, hath in every one of us. For, being (as was ſhewn in the entrance upon this Commandment) born for others, as well as our ſelves, and particularly for thoſe to whom we are neareſt conjoyn'd in Nature, Habitation, and Laws; we cannot make away our ſelves, without an Injury to thoſe who have a Right to our Service and Aſſiſtance. But to return to God, againſt whom (as all Offences either mediately or immediately are, ſo) this of Self-murther is in a more than ordinary manner in both: For the evidencing whereof, I ſhall alledge, in the next place, *the Affront* this Sin of Self-murther *offers to the Divine Providence*: Which will appear, if we conſider *the diſſatisfaction it implies with the preſent Diſpenſations of it*, or *the diſtruſt and deſpair of a Redreſs from a future one*. For, are not the Evils Men either labour under, or fear, the great cauſe of their laying violent Hands upon themſelves? Nay, are they not aſſign'd by the *Stoicks* (the great Patrons of Self-murther) among the Grounds of that Εὐλογος ἐξαγωγη which they ſo inculcate? I appeal to the Doctrine and Practice of *Zeno* the Father of that ſullen Sect: Concerning the former whereof, as *Diogenes Laertius* * tells us, that it was his and his Followers Opinion, that *a wiſe Man might rationally quit the World, if he labour'd under any great Grief, mutilation of Members, or an incurable Diſeaſe*: So, for the latter, that having liv'd to a very great Age, and without any the leaſt of Sickneſs or Infirmity, it hapned || that *going out of his School, he ſtumbled, and broke his Finger: Whereupon ſtriking the Earth with his Hand, he us'd that out of* Niobe, *I come, why do you call me? and accordingly went and ſtrangled himſelf*; or, as *Menagius* obſerves out of *Lucian*, pin'd himſelf to death. But who, ſave a *Stoick*, could think ſo ſmall a matter a juſt Ground of making away ones ſelf? Or what may be look'd upon as a diſguſt of the Divine Providence, if ſuch a kind of departure is not? But with much more reaſon did *Marcus Antoninus* † (though a *Stoick*, and one who in ſeveral places * propugns the ſame Εὐλογος ἐξαγωγη) repreſent it as a part of Philoſophy, *to receive all Accidents whatſoever, as coming from him from whom we our ſelves do*; and *Job* interrogate his querulous Wife, *Shall we receive good at the hand of God, and ſhall we not receive evil? chap.* 10. 20. For, beſide the Ingratitude which the contrary Practice involves, it is a manifeſt reluctancy to the Diſpenſations of his Providence, to whoſe Will the Authority he hath over us, obligeth us to ſubmit our ſelves. What ſhould I tell you of the many Precepts *Chriſtianity* ſuggeſts concerning the bearing of Evils and Afflictions? For, as thoſe Precepts are no leſs obliging to us, than the Laws of Reaſon and Nature; ſo they require us rather to maintain, than quit our Station; to bear up againſt Evils, than endeavour to withdraw our ſelves from them. The ſame is to be ſaid of Self-murther's oppoſition to the Divine Providence, if you conſider it as to that diſtruſt of it, which it involves. For, as it is apparent enough, that one great occaſion of Self-murther is Mens de-

* *Lib.* 7. *in vitâ Zenonis, p.* 198. Εὐλόγως τέ φασιν ἐξάξειν ἑαυτὸν τῷ βίῳ ὁ σοφὸν, κἂν ὑπὲρ παλείδου, κἂν ὑπὲρ φίλων· κἂν ἐν σκηρότερα νόσῃ λυπῆται ἀλγηδόνι, ἢ πηρώσεσιν, ἢ νόσοις ἀνιάτοις.

|| *Ib. p.* 171. Ἐτελεύτα δ' οὕτως· ἐκ τῆς σχολῆς ἀπιὼν προσέπταισεν, καὶ τὴν δάκτυλον προσέρρηξε· παίσας δὲ τῇ γῇ τῇ χειρὶ φησὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς Νιόβης. Ἔρχομαί τί μ' αὐθις καλεῖς, καὶ παραχρῆμα ἐτελεύτησεν, ἀπαγξάμενος ἑαυτόν.

† Ἔτι δὲ τὰ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ὑπομενόμενα δεχόμενον ὡς ἐκεῖθεν πόθεν ἐρχόμενα, ὅθεν αὐτὸς ἦλθεν, *lib.* 2 *ſect.* 17. πρὸς ἑαυτόν.

* *Lib.* 3. *ſect.* 1.—*lib.* 5. *ſect.* 29.

ſpair of a recovery from thoſe Evils they labour under; ſo, by that deſpair of theirs, they manifeſtly call in queſtion, if not the Juſtice, yet at leaſt the Goodneſs of the Divine Providence. For, what cauſe can there be of deſpair, where that hath a place in our Belief? or what neceſſity of making an eſcape at that *door* * which Self-murther opens, and which the *Stoicks* do ſo often point us to? Eſpecially when, beſide the Goodneſs of the Divine Nature, we have the aſſurance of his Promiſe, that he will make another way for us to eſcape. For thus, after St. *Paul* had told his *Corinthians*, that *no temptation had taken them, but ſuch as was common to man*, he ſubjoyns, in the very next Words, *But God is faithful, who will not ſuffer you to be tempted above what ye are able, but will with the temptation alſo make a way to eſcape, that ye may be able to bear it*, whether it be by leſſening of that Burthen under which you groan, or giving you proportionable Strength to bear it, 1 *Cor.* 10. 13. And though, after I have thus ſhewn the unlawfulneſs of Self-murther, no neceſſity lies upon me to conſider of that Magnanimity which it is thought by ſome to involve; it being rather to be conſider'd (as St. *Auguſtine* || inſinuates) whether a thing be well done, than whether it be done magnanimouſly; with ſoundneſs of Wiſdom, than with greatneſs of Spirit: Yet as many things appear otherwiſe than they will be found to be, if they be examin'd as they ought; ſo, as the ſame Father * obſerves, *if we look more narrowly into this, we ſhall find it rather to be poorneſs than greatneſs of Spirit, to lay violent Hands upon our ſelves, to avoid the preſſure of Afflictions, or other Mens Offences: That Mind being to be look'd upon as infirm, which cannot bear the hard Servitude of its Body, or the fooliſh Opinion of the Vulgar; as, on the contrary, that truly great, which can rather bear, than fly a miſerable Life; and prefer the Light and Purity of its own Conſcience, before the Opinion of the Common ſort, which is, for the moſt part, clouded with Errour.* And though the *Roman* Stories are full of the Commendations of *Cato* and *Lucretia*, the former whereof kill'd himſelf, that he might not fall into *Cæſar*'s Power; the latter, that ſhe might not be thought in the leaſt to have approv'd of that Rape which was committed upon her: yet as there wanted † not thoſe of *Cato*'s own Friends, who diſſwaded him from the Attempt, as a ſign rather of a weak than a ſtrong Mind; ſo he himſelf † gave ſufficient Indications of it, by adviſing his Son to live, and to hope well of the Mercy of the Emperour. For if (as the ſame Father † obſerves) he had thought it any thing of turpitude to live under the Power of the Emperour, why did he not rather compel, or at leaſt adviſe his Son to fall under the ſame Fate with himſelf? eſpecially when, as *Ludovicus Vives* || obſerves, no Perſwaſions of *Cato* could make his Son leave him before his Death. The like Judgment is to be made (in the Opinion of the ſame Father*) of that no leſs celebrated Fact of *Lucretia*; it being a weak baſhfulneſs ſo to fear the ill Opinion of Men, as to run upon an evil Action to avoid it; eſpecially

* *Arrian. in Epict. li.* 1. *c.*24. Τὸ δ' κεφάλαιον μέμνησο, ὅτι ἡ θύρα ἤνοικται· μὴ γίνου σὺ πωδίων θειλότερος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐκεῖνα, ὅταν αὐτοῖς μὴ ἀρέσκῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα, λέγει, ὅτι οὐκέτι παίζω· οὐ σὺ ὅταν σοι φαίνεταί τινα εἰς τοιαῦτα, εἰπὼν, οὐκέτι παίζω, ἀπαλλάσσῃ· μένων δ', μὴ θρήνει.

|| *De civit. Dei*, l.1.c 22.

* Aug. loco citato. *Quanquam ſi rationem diligentiùs conſulas, nec ipſa quidem animi magnitudo recte nominatur, ubi quiſque non valendo tolerare vel quæq; aſpera, vel aliena peccata, ſeipſum interemerit. Magis enim mens infirma deprehenditur, quæ ferre non poteſt vel duram ſui corporis ſervitutem, vel ſtultam vulgi opinionem. Majorq; animus merito dicendus eſt, qui vitam ærumnoſam magis poteſt ferre quàm fugere, & humanum judicium maximè vulgare, quod plerumq; caligine erroris involvitur, præconſcientia luce ac puritate contemnere.*

Rebus in anguſtis facile eſt contemnere vitam:
Fortiter ille facit qui miſer eſſe poteſt.
Martial. Epigr. l.11. ep.57.

††† *Aug. de Civit. Dei*, lib. 1. cap. 23.

|| *Not. ad loc. præd.*

* *De Civitat. Dei*, l.1.c.19.

cially when we have the Teſtimony of our own Conſcience, and both the Inſpection and Approbation of God, to ſupport us.

Of the Criminalneſs of Self-murther, what hath been ſaid may ſuffice: Proceed we to inquire, whether *all killing* our ſelves be *ſuch*. Where, firſt of all, I ſhall make no ſcruple to grant, that *all ſuch* killing of our ſelves is ſo, *where we have not a Call from God to it*: Becauſe (as was before ſaid) we are his, and not our own; and therefore not to depart from thoſe Stations wherein he hath plac'd us, without his leave. The onely difficulty is, whether we can have *any Call* to it, beſide what God's uſual Meſſengers of Death give? which yet is not ſo much a Call, as a Compulſion, becauſe forcing us from theſe our Earthly Tabernacles. For the ſolution whereof, not to bring again before you thoſe Evils and Calamities which the *Stoicks* made a juſt ground of a voluntary Departure, becauſe *Chriſtianity* and Nature both oblige us to the bearing of them; I will chuſe rather to inquire, whether there be any thing of truth in thoſe other Grounds aſſign'd by them, even *the Profit of our Country or Friends* *; as alſo, in what they little dream'd of, *the Inſtinct or Impulſe of God's Spirit, and the aſſerting of his Glory*. This onely would be premis'd, becauſe neceſſary ſo to be, inaſmuch as all the Inſtances to be alledg'd do not reach the killing of our ſelves in the ſtrict and moſt obvious acception of the Words, that when we ſpeak concerning *the killing of our ſelves*, we mean not onely that *wherein we are the immediate Inſtruments of our own Execution*, but *where we expoſe our ſelves alſo to ſuch dangers, from which nothing, in all probability, but Death is to be expected*. For though, *in ſtrictneſs of ſpeaking*, this is not to be accounted the killing of our ſelves; yet it is *interpretatively* as much, becauſe putting our ſelves into ſuch a Condition, from which in all probability it will enſue. Now that one or other of theſe ways, a Man may not onely with the leave, but alſo with the approbation of God, procure his own death, will appear, if we reſume the former Grounds, and, firſt of all, *the Advantage of a Friend*.

* *Vid. locum ante citatum ex Laertio de Dogmatibus Zenonis, &c.*

It is a known Story, and by all that I know of, whether *Chriſtians* or *Heathens*, remembred with applauſe, That there were two *Pythagoreans* of ſo faſt a Friendſhip ||, that when one of them had by *Dionyſius* the Tyrant been condemn'd to die, and begg'd onely a few days reſpite to diſpoſe of his Affairs, the other became Surety to the Tyrant for his Friend, ſo that, in caſe he ſhould not return at the time appointed, he himſelf would die for him. What the Sequel of this Story is, I will not now tell you, becauſe not pertinent to our purpoſe, though it was both to the one and the others glory: I demand onely, whether he who thus offer'd himſelf to be the others Surety, did that which was lawful and commendable? If we ſay he did, we have what we deſire, even an Inſtance wherein it may be lawful to make our ſelves a Prey to Death, upon the account of Friendſhip. For, beſide that the Perſon before-mentioned did expreſly ſtipulate to die for him, in caſe he did not return, which without doubt he ought not to have done, if it had not been lawful to lay down his Life for him; he expos'd himſelf to ſuch a hazard as was not common, and from which there was more probability of Death, than of the contrary: Becauſe, what

|| *Damonem & Pythiam Pythagoreos ferunt hoc animo inter ſe fuiſſe, ut cum eorum alteri Dionyſius tyrannus diem necis deſtinaviſſet, & is, qui morti addictus eſſet paucos ſibi dies commendandorum ſuorum causâ petiviſſet, vas factus ſit alter ejus ſiſtendi, ut ſi ille non reverriſſet ad diem, morierdum eſſet ipſi, &c.* Cicero de Offic. 3.

what confidence ſoever he might repoſe in his Friend's Juſtice and Kindneſs, yet as it was not impoſſible ſome Accident might detain him beyond the time appointed, ſo there are few Friendſhips ſo ſacred, as to oblige Men to prefer Death before it; St. *Paul* having told us, *Rom.* 5. 7. that *ſcarcely for a righteous man will any one die, and but peradventure*, which muſt be alſo a great piece of Courage, for one who is alſo *good* and benign. Which Words, as they are a manifeſt confirmation of the danger that Perſon run, who made himſelf a Surety for a condemned Man; ſo ſeem to me to declare ſuch an Act to be, in the Opinion of the Apoſtle, an Heroical one, and not onely not deſerve to be condemn'd, but to be applauded. For, however the Rarity of ſuch a Love among Men might ſerve in ſome ſort to commend the Love of *Chriſt* to us, who, as he had power to lay down his Life, as well as take it up again, ſo laid it down for thoſe that were Enemies; yet would it have been ſome diminution to its Commendation, if it had not been lawful for one Man to lay down his Life for another; becauſe it might have been objected, That the rarity of ſuch an Accident proceeded not ſo much, or at leaſt not altogether, from the impoſſibility of a Love ſtrong enough to do it; but from the unlawfulneſs thereof. In the mean time, if the foremention'd place will not be look'd upon as concluſive, I ſee not in the leaſt how that of St. *John* can be evaded, 1 *Joh.* 3. 16. where he tells us, that *as Chriſt laid down his life for us*, ſo there may be Inſtances wherein it may be our Duty *to lay down our lives for one another.* For, though (as *Grotius* * interprets it) nothing elſe ſhould be there meant by *laying down our lives for the brethren*, than expoſing our ſelves to danger for them, (though, as he himſelf obſerves, our Saviour, who is propos'd for our Example, muſt be confeſs'd to have done more than ſo) yet even that would not prejudice the Concluſion I would commend, nor hinder it from being reputed a kind of deſtroying of our ſelves: He being in truth a *Felo de ſe*, though no criminal one, who ſhall, for the ſake of another, object himſelf to a Danger from which, in all probability, his Death may enſue. But let us inſtance, if you pleaſe, in a Caſe which is more clearly one of the *Stoicks* ἐξαγωγαὶ and ſee whether it contains any thing diſſonant either to Reaſon or Religion: As ſuppoſe, for example, that after a Shipwrack a Man light upon a piece of a Plank, which will ſuffice onely for the Security of one Perſon; and ſuppoſe withal, that, ſeeing a dear Friend of his ready to periſh, he ſhould quit his Plank to him, and commit himſelf, being moreover unable to ſwim, to the mercy of the Sea: Will any Man now ſay, that ſuch an Act is not properly enough a caſting away of a Mans ſelf; or condemn him that doth ſo, for it? nay, will he not rather look upon it as a noble Act of Virtue and Friendſhip; eſpecially, if we alſo ſuppoſe the Friend for whom he does it, to be of more uſe to the Publick than himſelf. For, though a Man may, and perhaps ought, *cæteris paribus*, to prefer himſelf before any other; yet nothing hinders him (as I have before ſhewn) to prefer a Publick Good before a Private, and therefore alſo, another Mans Welfare before his own, if that other be in a greater capacity to promote it. I will conclude this Particular with a Saying of *Seneca* ||, as I find it cited by *Grotius* in his Notes upon the fore-quoted place to the *Romans*: *I will* (ſaith he) *ſuccour a periſhing Man, but ſo, that*

* *Annot. in loc. & Joh.* 10. 11.

|| *Succurram perituro, ſed ut ipſe non peream, niſi ſi futurus ero magni hominis aut magnæ rei merces.*

I my ſelf do not periſh, unleſs I may thereby purchaſe the ſecurity of a Great Man, or a Great Thing. Then belike he thought, and ſo, I think, do all rational Men, that he might without any Crime, lay down his Life for them.

From the Utility of a Friend, paſs we to the *Welfare of our Country*, which, as it is a more Publick Good, ſo may therefore (if neceſſity require) command the ſubmitting our own to it, and even our own Life. Upon which account, I think, no Man can do other than commend (ſo far is it from being to be look'd upon as a criminal ſlaying of ones ſelf) if, as it ſometimes happens in War, Men chuſe rather to blow up or ſink themſelves, and the Ship they go in, than ſuffer it to fall into the hand of the Enemy. For, where ſuch a Loſs may not more prejudice our Country, than diſadvantage the Enemy, I ſee not where the evil of it conſiſts; nay rather how it can be look'd upon as other than a lawful, yea honourable departure out of this World; there being nothing too dear for any Man to part with for his Country, from which he had his Birth, and by which not onely he himſelf hath been hitherto ſecur'd, but all his Relations both have and muſt be. And indeed, though all that go Voluntiers into the Wars do not thus much, which may ſeem to make the Inſtance the leſs pertinent, yet as all Men that do, expoſe themſelves to mortal danger, and conſequently make a ſtep towards a voluntary Death, or a killing of themſelves; ſo thoſe may well be ſaid to come up to it, who, to recover a Battel almoſt loſt, do, though few in number, ruſh in among the thickeſt of the Enemy. For, inaſmuch as the foremoſt of them can expect no other than to periſh, they muſt upon that account be look'd upon as *Felo's de ſe*, or the Authors of their own death; there being no material difference, as to this Affair, between running upon a Mans own Sword, and running upon as mortal a one of an Enemy. For, if *David* were rightly accus'd by the Prophet, for the death of *Uriah* the *Hittite*, though he were ſlain *by the ſword of the children of Ammon*, according as the Scripture * it ſelf expreſſes it, there is no doubt he may be as rightly ſaid to be the Author of his own, who ruſhes upon the Swords of thoſe, from whom he cannot rationally expect any other.

The Grounds of the *Stoicks* being thus explain'd, proceed we to thoſe, which as we learn from far better Maſters, ſo are more accommodable to the Facts of *Chriſtians*; who, if they have at all exceeded as to a voluntary Death, may ſeem to have done it in the point of Martyrdom: For, not contented to ſuffer when ſeis'd upon by their Enemies, and even to provoke thoſe Beaſts, to which, according to the Cuſtom of thoſe days, they were caſt; we find, that ſome ‖ of the Primitive Martyrs, unask'd, unſought after, offer'd themſelves to it, with the general approbation of the Age they liv'd in; I will not ſay all altogether without fault, (it being hard in Heroical Actions to keep a Mean) but many of them certainly unblameably, and not onely unblameably, but commendably. For, as Holy Men of God heretofore *acted*, as well as *ſpake*, as *they were moved by the Holy Ghoſt*; ſo, no doubt can be made, but if *that* puſh'd any of them on to do ought toward the deſtruction of themſelves, that was warrant enough to them for the doing of it. Upon which account, St. *Auguſtine* † anciently, and moſt other Writers after him, have juſtified the Act of *Samſon*,

* Thou haſt killed *Uriah* the *Hittite* with the Sword—and haſt ſlain him with the Sword of the children of *Ammon*, 2 *Sam.* 12. 9.

‖ *Pearſon. Vindiciæ Epiſtolar. S. Ignatii, Parte poſterior. cap.* 9 *p.* 111.

† *Nec Samſon aliter excuſatur, quòd ſeipſum cum hoſtibus ruinâ domûs oppreſſit; niſi quia ſpiritus latenter hoc juſſerat, qui per illum miracula faciebat.* De Civitate Dei, l. 1. c. 21.

Samſon, in pulling down the Houſe he was appointed to make ſport in, upon the Head of himſelf and the *Philiſtines*; it being eaſie to believe, that was not without an intimation from God, which was accompanied with his miraculous Power in the accompliſhing of it. And though, I know, there is not the ſame conſent among Authors, for thoſe Mens acting by a Divine Impulſe, who, among the Primitive Martyrs, rather ſought than expected their Tryal; yet am I not in the leaſt diſcouraged thereby from alledging it in their defence, becauſe there appear to me ſo juſt Grounds for the aſſerting of it. For, who can think they acted without a Divine Impulſe, who, as they had nothing to blemiſh them in their Lives, ſo ſhew'd ſo much *Chriſtian* Fortitude and Generoſity in their Deaths? eſpecially when it is certain, not onely that the extraordinary Illuminations of the Spirit were not then ceas'd, but ſome of thoſe Martyrs themſelves have alledg'd the immediate Call of that Spirit to them. For, thus *Ignatius*, than whom no Man ſeems to have been more deſirous of Martyrdom, in his Epiſtle to the *Romans**, tells us, that *as his Love, even Chriſt, was crucified for him, ſo he was not without the like ardent Affections, both for him, and a conformity to his Death.* Not that he run upon it of his own head, but that he was mov'd to it by God's Spirit, who *living and ſpeaking in him, ſaid unto him, Come unto the Father.* Though, ſetting that aſide, I no way doubt, but many of the Martyrs might be juſtified in their Zeal, *from the neceſſity there was ſometimes of it, toward the aſſerting the Honour of God, and of their Religion.* Witneſs the Behaviour of that Deacon ‖ of *Cæſarea*, *Romanus* by Name; who ſeeing many of *Chriſt's* Soldiers forſaking their Colours, and chuſing rather to Sacrifice to the *Heathen* Gods, than to bear witneſs to their own; out of zeal to the Worſhip of the True God, and impatience of the Devil's Triumph, offer'd himſelf to the Judge, as a Soldier whom he ſhould not ſo eaſily overcome. For, what louder or more importunate Call to a voluntary Death can we have, than when we do not onely find in our ſelves a readineſs to undergo it, but may by it, as in the foremention'd Caſe, not onely vindicate the Honour of God, and of our Religion, from contempt, but make it conſpicuous and illuſtrious? Eſpecially when our Saviour, who, to be ſure, laid down his Life voluntarily, is propos'd to our example, and we call'd upon to take up his Croſs, and follow him.

* *Vivens enim ſcribo vobis, deſiderans mori. Meum deſiderium crucifixum eſt, & non eſt in me ignis amans aliquam aquam: ſed vivens & loquens eſt in me, intus me dicit, Veni ad Patrem.* Vetus Verſio Armachana.

‖ *Vid. Euſeb. li. de Martyribus Palæſtinæ, c. 2. cum notis Valeſii ad locum.*

PART

PART IV.

That there are other Sins included in this of Murther; together with an Account of what are ſo included: Whether they be ſuch as are more near of kin to it, or are farther removed from it. Of the former ſort are, the commanding or inſtigating Men to Murther, or aſſiſting the Murtherer in it; the uſing ſuch Means as are likely enough to produce it, or entertaining any murtherous Intention or Deſire. Of the latter, the procuring of Abortions, even where the Child is not Quick; wounding or maiming; and, in fine, all Violences whatſoever, unleſs in the caſe of a Man's own neceſſary Defence. All Violences that are vindictive, perfectly unlawful, whether accompliſhed by our own Hands, or ſought at thoſe of the Magiſtrate. The Paſſion of Hatred conſidered, as to its lawfulneſs or unlawfulneſs; and ſhewn to become unlawful onely when it is plac'd upon a wrong Object; ſuch as is that Hatred which hath Good Men for its Object, or Evil Men any otherwiſe than as they are ſuch. The ſame Hatred conſidered with reference to this Commandment; where is ſhewn, both its oppoſition to that Love which the Commandment enjoyns, and its cognation to that Murther which it forbids. The like unlawfulneſs and murtherous cognation evinc'd in the envying the Proſperity of another, in wiſhing ill to him, or rejoycing at it; in fine, in cauſeleſs and immoderate Anger, and contumelious or reproachful Speeches.

II. THAT the *killing of another* is the thing expreſly forbidden in this Commandment, you need not be told, becauſe the place this Commandment hath in the *Decalogue*, ſufficiently informs you; as neither, after my laſt Diſcourſe, that *the killing of our ſelves* hath a place in it *indirectly* and *by conſequence*. It remains, that we inquire whether *any other Sins* are included *in them*, and *what thoſe Sins* are.

For *the former* of theſe, much need not be ſaid, after what hath been alledg'd in the general, to ſhew the Comprehenſiveneſs of the Ten Commandments: Onely, that it may more clearly appear, that this particular Prohibition includes others alſo, I will alledge *a Saying* of our Saviour, and *another* of his Beloved Diſciple St. *John*. From the former whereof we learn, that, however the Letter of the Prohibition, or at leaſt * the Notion of it in the *Jews* Courts of Judicature, extended onely to the killing of a Man; yet in the Spirit and Evangelical Senſe, it reach'd to the forbidding of Anger and Reproach, *Mat.* 5. 21, 22. From the latter, that Hatred is not onely included in it, but a part of it; and that he who harbours it in his Heart, is as truly a Murtherer, as he who unjuſtly takes away a Mans Life, 1 *Joh.* 3. 15. Taking it therefore for granted, that the Prohibition now before us includes that of other Sins, we will inquire, *what* thoſe Sins are; and firſt of all (becauſe that is principally intended in the Prohibition) *what Sins* are included *in the Murther of another.*

* Ye have heard that it was ſaid by them of old time, Thou ſhalt not kill, *and whoſoever ſhall kill, ſhall be in danger of the judgment.*

1. And here, in the first place, I shall not doubt to reckon, as forbidden, *the commanding* or *instigating* other Men to do it: Because, as he who sets another upon the doing of any thing, is to be look'd upon as the principal Cause of it; so, it is but reasonable to suppose, that he who forbids the doing of any thing toward the taking away a Mans Life, which hath onely the nature of an Instrumental Cause, doth much more forbid the Efficacy of the Principal. Whence it is, that we do not onely find *David* praying to be delivered from blood-guiltiness, though he onely put another upon the setting *Uriah* so, that he might die by a third Person or Persons; but the Prophet *Nathan*, in the Name of God, charging him with the Murther, and affirming him to have *slain Uriah with the sword of the children of Ammon*, 2 *Sam.* 12. 9.

2. As little doubt is to be made, secondly, that it is alike unlawful by this Commandment *to assist the Murtherer*, either by our Counsel or Actions; he who doth so, contributing in part to that which it forbids, and consequently so far chargeable with the violation of it.

3. I observe, thirdly, That though Killing be the onely thing expressly forbidden; yet inasmuch as he who forbids any Effect, is in reason to be suppos'd to forbid the Means whereby it is apt to be procur'd; he that makes use of *destructive Means*, whether they take effect or no, is chargeable with the violation of this Commandment. By which way of reasoning, he shall be concluded to be a Murtherer in the sight of God, who should, after the corrupt Custom of the *Heathen*, expose a helpless Infant in a Desart place, where it may be in danger of perishing either by Wild Beasts or Famine.

4. In fine, Forasmuch as the Consent of the Will is the principal thing in all Actions, and so estimated by God himself, both in the Old and New Testament; he is in reason to be look'd upon as a Violator of this Commandment, who shall entertain any *murtherous Intention or Desire*; after the same manner that he who onely *looketh upon a woman to lust after her*, is affirmed by our Saviour to *commit Adultery with her in his heart.*

Of such Sins as are more neer of kin to that which is expresly forbidden, I have spoken hitherto, and shewn them to be included in it: Proceed we to inquire the same of those which, though of the same cognation, yet are farther remov'd from it. Where,

1. First of all, I shall reckon *the procuring of Abortions*: I do not mean, where the Child is perfectly form'd, and quick, (for then, if Death follow to the Child, it is Murther properly so call'd) but before the Child is animated. Concerning which, before I deliver my own Opinion, give me leave to give you that of the Ancients, as it is set down by *Tertullian*. *After the forbidding of Murther* (saith he*) *it is not lawful to us Christians to dissolve that Off-spring which is conceiv'd in the Womb, even while Nature is onely in consultation to make a Man of it. It is a committing of Murther before-hand, to hinder any thing from being born: neither matters it whether a Man take away a Soul that is already born, or disturb it in its Birth. He is a Man, which is in a disposition to be so; and the Fruit is already in the Seed which produceth it.* Now though, to speak mine own Opinion freely,

* *Nobis vero homicidio semel interdicto, etiam conceptum utero, dum adhuc sanguis in hominem deliberatur, dissolvere non licet. Homicidii festinatio est, prohibere nasci, nec refert natam quis eripiat animam, an nascentem disturbet. Homo est, & qui est futurus. Etiam fructus omnis jam in semine est.* Apolog. c. 9.

I cannot but look upon this of *Tertullian* as ſomewhat hyperbolically expreſs'd; there being no place for Murther there, where there is not a Life to take away: yet, as what he ſaith, is proof enough of the Ancient *Chriſtians* believing it to be included in this Prohibition, becauſe here, and all along, pretending not ſo much to deliver his own Senſe, as theirs; ſo the Reaſon by him inſinuated, is a ſufficient Argument, that they were not out in their Belief. For, though that be not a Man, which is onely in a diſpoſition to become ſo; yet it is the Rudiments of one, and conſequently alſo of the Image of God: To which therefore, whilſt Violence is offer'd, a Violence muſt be ſuppos'd to be ſo far offer'd to the Image of God, which is the Fundamental Reaſon of the Prohibition. Now, foraſmuch as the Fundamental Reaſon of the Prohibition hath place in Abortions, as well as in perfect Murthers; it is to be ſuppos'd, though not expreſs'd, yet to be underſtood in it; eſpecially being one of thoſe Preceps which were intended as General Heads of Moral Duties. In like manner, becauſe one great Reaſon of the Prohibition of Murther, is the great Injury it doth to Humane Society, by robbing it of one of its Members; it is but juſt to think it to have been the ſame God's intention to forbid thoſe Abortions, by which Humane Society is, though in another way, depriv'd of thoſe which ſhould help to maintain and propagate it.

2. But becauſe, beſide Murther, or what approacheth very near to it, there are other things pernicious to the Lives of Men, ſuch as *wounding*, *maiming*, *and the like*, which are commonly reduc'd to this Commandment; therefore inquire we, in the ſecond place, what ground there is to believe that *theſe* alſo are forbidden by it. In order whereunto, I ſhall alledge, firſt, That thoſe do oftentimes procure that very Murther which is here forbidden: In conſideration whereof, as they are to be look'd upon as no other than Murther, where they have that effect upon whom they fall; ſo, it is but reaſonable to believe, that God, who profeſſeth to hold Murther in ſuch deteſtation himſelf, and forbids it ſo ſeverely to others, intended the Prohibition of ſuch Violences by which they do often enſue.

2. And though the ſame cannot be ſaid of all Violences that are offer'd, which will oblige us to look out for ſome other Reaſon of the Prohibition of them; yet inaſmuch as *all Violences whatſoever* are contrary to that Love which I have before ſhewn we ought to have for the Perſons of Men, even by the force of this Commandment, it will follow, that thoſe alſo are to be thought to be forbidden by it, and conſequently, that it is our Duty to avoid them. Which Inference is to be look'd upon as of ſo much the more force, becauſe he who in this Commandment forbids onely to kill, if we underſtand it ſtrictly and literally, doth in the very next Chapter forbid the doing of leſſer Miſchiefs, ſuch as Burning, Wounding, Stripes, and Mutilating, and gives command, that they who are guilty of them, ſhould ſuffer the like in their own Perſons, *Exod.* 21. 24. and ſo on.

Now though what hath been ſaid upon this Argument, may ſeem to ſuffice, becauſe ſhewing leſſer Violences to be equally forbidden with Mortal ones; yet becauſe, when we diſcours'd before concerning Killing, we excepted that from the number of forbidden ones, which is done *in a Mans own neceſſary defence*; therefore it may not

be amiſs to inquire, whether even in thoſe leſſer Violences *ſome exception* be not to be made *in the like caſe*, ; and whether or no, becauſe ſuch Courſes are commonly look'd upon as lawful, it be lawful *to retaliate* thoſe Injuries we have before receiv'd.

Of the former of theſe much need not be ſaid, I mean as to the Caſe of *a Man's own neceſſary defence*. For, as where ſuch Violences are not reſiſted, a Man's Life may ſometime come to be endanger'd by them; in which caſe no Man thinks it unlawful to reſiſt: ſo more encouragement would thereby be given to violent Perſons, than is conſiſtent with the Peace and Advantage of Humane Society: Becauſe, however the Law have provided Puniſhments againſt ſuch Violences, yet they are long before they can be procur'd, and oftentimes are too weak to deter Men from the like Practices. This onely would be added, That, when we affirm it to be lawful to uſe Violence to defend a Mans ſelf from the Violences of others, we are neceſſarily to underſtand, where no more is us'd on our part than is neceſſary to defend our ſelves; becauſe by this Rule made onely lawful in our own defence, and therefore not to proceed beyond what is neceſſary to it. For, as for that Exception which may be made from out Saviour's forbidding us *to reſiſt evil*, it is nothing at all to the preſent purpoſe, becauſe, as *Grotius* * hath obſerv'd, the oppoſition being made between that, and *Moſes*'s his Aſſertion, of an Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth, we are neceſſarily to underſtand by the not reſiſting of Evil, the *not returning of Evil by way of Puniſhment*, becauſe that of *Moſes* was manifeſtly ſuch.

* *Annot. in Mat.* 5. 39.

The Caſe of a Man's own neceſſary Defence being thus diſpatch'd, proceed we to inquire, whether it be lawful *to retaliate* by way of Puniſhment, and return thoſe Evils we have receiv'd. Concerning which, I ſay, firſt, That no queſtion can be made of *the unlawfulneſs of retaliating with our own hands*; partly, becauſe Vengeance is by God claim'd to himſelf, and to the Magiſtrate; and partly, becauſe a private retaliating was not permitted even to the *Jews*; the Law of an Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth, being left to the Execution of the Judges, upon complaint made to them thereof, as you may ſee *Exod.* 21. 22. and ſo on, and *Deut.* 19. 16. and the following Verſes. The onely thing of difficulty is, whether a Man *may ſeek a retaliation from the Magiſtrate*; becauſe our Saviour oppoſes his Doctrine to that of the Law, which gave ſuch a permiſſion to the injur'd Party. And indeed, if we ſpeak of *a Retaliation properly ſo call'd*, that is to ſay, of ſeeking *the avenging of our ſelves* of the injurious Party, by procuring to him the like Evils he hath inflicted; ſo, no doubt can remain, but that it is *abſolutely unlawful* to a *Chriſtian*; and that not onely becauſe of the former Prohibition of our Saviour, but becauſe the Scripture hath forbid us the returning Evil for Evil, and enjoyn'd us to be patient under it, and ready to forgive; which that Man can in no ſenſe be ſaid to do, who ſhall ſeek to avenge himſelf, either by himſelf, or the Magiſtrate. The onely thing that can be *lawful* to a *Chriſtian* in this Affair, is, 1. To ſeek *a Reparation of the Damage* he hath ſuſtain'd; which yet muſt be *in greater Inſtances*, and ſuch as cannot well be born: of which nature are thoſe Injuries which either diſable the Body, or bring any conſiderable Pain to it. For, what place can there be for Patience, where they

they who ſuffer Violence will have Satisfaction made them for every the leaſt that is offered? or how can he be ſaid to endure an Injury or Affront, who will not be content unleſs he have amends made him for every one? But becauſe it may ſometime happen, that the Violence which is offer'd may be ſuch as may, *to deter others from the like*, require the delating it to the Magiſtrate, and imploring the drawing of the Sword of Juſtice againſt the Offender; therefore it muſt be added farther, That where the Caſe is *ſuch*, it is not onely *lawful*, but *neceſſary* for the injur'd Party to do it; provided, that *Zeal of Juſtice and the Publick Weal* be the thing that prompts him to it, and not either in whole or in part *the gratifying of his own Revenge*; that being, in the higheſt ſenſe, *rendring evil for evil*, becauſe not onely returning Miſchief for Miſchief, but with the ſame malicious purpoſe and intent: Which, as *Seneca* * well obſerves, *differs onely from an Injury in the order of its commiſſion; and is onely a more excuſable Sin, becauſe provoked by, and following after the other.*

* *Immane verbum eſt ultio, & ab injuria diſtans tantùm ordine Qui ulciſcitur, non niſi excuſatiùs peccat.*

To go on now to ſhew what other Sins are included in that of Murther, beſide thoſe before rehears'd: Where,

1. Firſt, I ſhall preſent you with that of *Hatred*, becauſe it is the Parent of all that follow. Now there are two things which will be neceſſary to be inquir'd into, for the better explication of this Paſſion.

1. *What Hatred* is to be look'd upon *as ſinful*; and,
2. How *that which is ſuch*, is *redneible to this Commandment.*

That it is not unlawful *ſimply to hate*, is evident from hence, that it is a Natural Paſſion of the Soul: it is no leſs evident, becauſe evil is the proper Object of it, that when it is employ'd about that, it is not onely not unlawful, but juſt and commendable. To make it therefore at any time a Sin, it muſt be employ'd about a wrong Object; which how it may be, as to the preſent Affair, I come now to ſhew. And here, in the firſt place, I think no Man will make any difficulty to grant, that it muſt neceſſarily be ſinful to hate *a Good Man, as ſuch*: becauſe, as Evil, and not Good, is the proper Object of Hatred; ſo, much leſs that which is Good, as ſuch. Now, that ſuch a Hatred as this hath found place in the World, is evident from that of *Wiſdom, chap.* 2. 12. and ſo on; where he doth not onely repreſent it as the general Character of Evil Men, to hate and perſecute thoſe which are better than themſelves; but fortifies that his Opinion with ſuch a Reaſon, as puts it paſt all contradiction. For, it being uſual with Men to hate thoſe which are not onely of a contrary temper, but do, by that temper of theirs, make the others to be the worſe thought of; it is eaſie to ſuppoſe, that Evil Men will hate Good, becauſe (as the Wiſe Man there ſpeaks) they are *not onely contrary to Evil Men's doings*, but *tacitely upbraid* † them with their Impieties and Tranſgreſſions; that Virtue by which they ſhine, at the ſame time it ſhews forth its own Worth, diſcovering the Deformity of the other. From that firſt ſort of Hatred, paſs we to another, which hath the Good Man alſo for its Object: I do not ſay ſimply for his Goodneſs, and that Reproach which it naturally caſts upon the contrary Temper; but becauſe, as the ſame Wiſe Man ſpeaks,

† Sulpitius Severus Sacræ Hiſt. li. 2. p. 368. *Hic primus* [nempe Nero] *Chriſtianum nomen tollere aggreſſus eſt. Quippe ſemper inimica virtutibus vitia ſunt, & optimi quique ab improbis quaſi exprobrantes aſpiciuntur.*

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he expreſly objecteth, to their infamy, the tranſgreſſions of their Education, and chargeth them with thoſe Impieties they are guilty of. Now, that even this Hatred is not without a Crime, is evident from hence, that as he who tells them of their Faults, doth it out of kindneſs; ſo that very Act of theirs is the greateſt Kindneſs in the World: becauſe, by ſuch an Act they may not onely come to know their own Errours, but be thereby provoked to diſcard them. And indeed, ſo far is it from an Unkindneſs, however commonly ſo interpreted, to reprove Men for their Errours and Extravagances, that God himſelf reckons the neglect of it as a ſign of Hatred, as you may ſee *Levit.* 19. 17. Foraſmuch therefore as to rebuke is not onely not evil, but the greateſt kindneſs a Man can do to a wicked Perſon; it muſt needs be look'd upon as a Sin, to make it the ground of our Hatred: which was the ſecond thing to be demonſtrated. Next to the Hatred of Good Men, conſider we that of *the Evil and Injurious*, which may ſeem to have nothing Criminal in it: And indeed, neither would it, if it had onely *their Injuriouſneſs* for its Object, or *the Perſons* of wicked Men *meerly for it*; becauſe every thing that is evil, either in it ſelf, or to us, is a juſt ground of hatred and averſation. But, as it would be conſider'd, that he who hates a Perſon for his Injuriouſneſs, can be privileg'd no farther by that hate, than to diſcountenance him in it; ſo alſo, that there may be more in him to excite our Love, than there is to ſtir our Hatred: in which caſe, there is no doubt, but that our Hatred is to be bounded by it, and go no farther than is conſiſtent with the other. Now, that this is the Caſe of all evil and injurious Men, will appear, if we conſider, that they are God's Creatures, and adorn'd with his Image; that they are the Subjects of his Providence, yea, for whom he ſent his Son to die. For, having all theſe Relations to God, who is the Supremeſt Good, both in himſelf, and to us, they muſt needs be look'd upon as a juſter Object of our Love, than all their Evil and Injuriouſneſs can be a ground of Hate. Though therefore Evil Men, as ſuch, may and ought to be hated; though, ſo far as we can ſeparate their Injuriouſneſs from their more lovely Qualities, they may lawfully enough become the ground of our averſation: yet inaſmuch as they have more to commend them to our Love than Hatred, as we cannot hate them altogether, ſo neither any farther than is conſiſtent with thoſe things which are the juſt Object of our Love. The reſult of which Conſideration will be, that though *we may hate them as Sinners*, yet *we may not hate them as Men*, but, on the contrary, *love*, and *pray for their converſion*, and *proſperity in all their lawful Undertakings.*

What Hatred is to be look'd upon as ſinful, we have ſeen already; inquire we in the next place, how *that which is ſo, is reducible to this Commandment.* A Task which will not be difficult to perform, if we conſider this Sin of Hatred either *with relation to that Love which the Commandment enjoyns*, or *to that Sin of Murther which it forbids.* For, if (as we learn from the Apoſtle) this, and other the Commandments that follow, enjoyn the loving of our Neighbour; they muſt conſequently be ſuppos'd to forbid the *hatred* of him, as being *contrary to*, and *inconſiſtent with* it. And though it be true, that Hatred is not Murther, or other the like Injuriouſneſs, if we mean thereby thoſe of the Hand; yet it is either *the murther and injuriouſneſs of the*

the Heart (which I have ſhewn to be equally forbidden) or at leaſt *the Producer of it:* he who hates any Perſon in the leaſt, naturally wiſhing ſome ill or other to him; but he who perfectly hates him, Death: According to that Saying of *Ennius*, remembred by *Tully* †, *Quem quiſque odit periiſſe expetit; He who hates any Perſon, deſires his deſtruction.* To all which, if we add, That St. *John*, in the place before-quoted, affirms the *hater* of his Brother to be *a Murtherer*, and that * God *abſolv'd that Manſlayer* from the guilt of it, *who hated him not in time paſt*; ſo, no doubt can remain, but that the ſame Commandment which forbids the murthering of a Man, forbids alſo the hating of him: That being in reaſon to be thought to be forbidden, to which the Scripture doth not onely give the Title of Murther, but abſolves even that Manſlayer in whom it ſhould be found not to be.

† Tull. de Offic li 2. *Praclarè Ennius, Quem metuunt oderunt, quem quiſque odit periiſſe expetit.* * *Deut.* 19. 4. &c.

2. That great Crime of Hatred being thus diſpatch'd, proceed we to that of *Envy*; which is, in ſhort, nothing elſe than a Grief of Mind for that Good which happens to another. I do not mean, as that Good may become the Inſtrument of much Miſchief, by the Poſſeſſors abuſe; for in that caſe a good Man may be griev'd: but becauſe he whom we envy is like to be advantag'd by it. Now, that this, no leſs than the former, hath the nature of a Sin, and particularly againſt the preſent Prohibition, will require no great pains to prove. For, beſide that ſuch a Grief, Spider-like, ſucks its Poyſon from the choiceſt Flower, becauſe, contrary to Nature, making that which is the proper Object of Joy, the matter of its own Sadneſs and Diſcontent; beſide that it is a manifeſt reluctancy to the Diſpenſations of the Divine Providence, from whence, as all other Good proceeds, ſo that particular one which we ſo much envy; beſide, laſtly, that it is a natural effect of Hatred, and conſequently to be ſuppos'd to be forbidden with that Hatred from which it ariſeth; it is oftentimes *the cauſe of Murther*, and other injurious Actions; but, to be ſure, *doth always diſpoſe* Men to it; The firſt Murther that was ever committed, proceeding from hence, that the Sacrifice of the murther'd Perſon was more accepted by God, than that of the Murtherer was.

3. The ſame is to be ſaid of *wiſhing any Evil*, and *particularly Death, to any Perſon*, or of *rejoycing in it when it doth befal him*; of *being angry with our Brother without a cauſe, or above meaſure*; of *proceeding to contumelious or reproachful Speeches to or of him*: theſe, as they are but the *fruits of Hatred*, ſo *diſpoſing Men to Murther*, and conſequently to be ſuppos'd to be forbidden with it: He that forbids any Action, or at leaſt with any ſeverity, being in reaſon to be thought to forbid that which diſpoſeth Men to it; becauſe, where that is not carefully avoided, it will be hard to avoid the other. Onely becauſe Anger, and that reproachful Speaking which proceeds from it, is by our Saviour himſelf particularly referr'd to this Commandment, I think it but a juſt reſpect to him, and to his Authority, to allot them a more diſtinct Conſideration. But of that, σὺν Θεῷ, in my next.

PART

PART V.

Anger reduced by our Saviour to the Commandment we are now upon; and therefore the Conſideration thereof reſum'd anew: Where is ſhewn, firſt, what Anger is, and that it is not abſolutely ſinful; as is made appear from its being a natural Paſſion, from St. Paul's *admoniſhing to be angry and ſin not, from our Saviour's giving entertainment to it, and the unavoidableneſs thereof. The Objections that are made againſt this Determination, propos'd, and anſwered. An Inquiry what Anger is to be look'd upon as ſinful; where is ſhewn, firſt, That no other Anger is, than what is avoidable by Deliberation; where the* motus primo-primi *of that Paſſion are abſolv'd. An Addreſs to a more particular diſcovery of ſinful Anger, which becomes ſuch,* 1. *When it is raſh and precipitate, the inordinacy whereof is at large declar'd.* 2. *When it is cauſeleſs, or at leaſt without a ſufficient one; ſuch as are thoſe which ariſe from things done caſually, or inadvertently; from Provocations that bring with them no conſiderable Detriment, or greater ones, provided they be not many, from a Friend.* 3. *When our Anger exceeds the meaſure due to it: Of which ſort are thoſe which exceed the Merit of the Cauſe, which tranſport Men beyond the Bounds of Sobriety ond Prudence, or continue longer than they ought; as they do, when they continue after Satisfaction offer'd, after the Puniſhment of the offending Perſon, or when they continue in their Heats to the uſual times of Prayer and Meditation. The Remedies of this diſorderly Paſſion pointed at.*

YE *have heard* (ſaith our Saviour) *that it was ſaid by them of old time, Thou ſhalt not kill; and whoſoever ſhall kill, ſhall be in danger of the judgment. But I ſay unto you, That whoſoever is angry with his brother without a cauſe, ſhall be in danger of the judgment; and whoſoever ſhall ſay unto his brother, Racha, ſhall be in danger of the Council; but whoſoever ſhall ſay, Thou fool, ſhall be in danger of hell-fire, Mat.* 5. 21, 22. It ſeems, that however in the *forinſick* ſenſe this Commandment extended no farther than Killing, yet Anger and Reproachful ſpeaking had a place in it, as it was intended for *a Rule of Piety and Manners*, or at leaſt was *ſo reckon'd by our Saviour:* And not without cauſe, if we conſider the Nature either of the one or the other, and the occaſion which they miniſter to that Murther which is here forbidden; Anger naturally inclining the Perſon in whom it is, to malicious, and ſometimes murtherous Purpoſes; as Reproachful ſpeaking, thoſe who are the Objects of it, both to take them up, and proſecute them againſt the Reviler. From whence, as it will follow, that both the one and the other have too much affinity with Murther, to ſuffer us to doubt of their being forbidden by this Commandment; ſo, that being ſuppos'd, I will go on to inquire into the Nature of them, and ſhew wherein the Criminalneſs thereof conſiſteth.

I begin with *Anger*, becauſe our Saviour doth ſo, and becauſe it is the

the Fountain from which thoſe bitter Streams of reproachful Words iſſue. Where,

1. Firſt of all, I ſhall inquire, what Anger is.
2. Whether all Anger be to be look'd upon as ſinful: Or,
3. If not, what Anger is to be accounted ſuch. And,
4. And laſtly, What are the moſt proper Remedies thereof.

1. Of *the firſt* of theſe much need not be ſaid, becauſe Men are pretty well agreed concerning the Nature of it; Anger being nothing elſe than *a mixture of Hatred* and Grief, ariſing from an Opinion of ſome injury done to us, or to thoſe in whom we have an intereſt, and accompanied with a deſire of revenge.* This onely would be added, That though any ſort of Injury may ſerve to excite that Paſſion, yet it ariſeth moſtly from *Contempt*, as which of all others we are leaſt able to bear, and moſt deſirous to revenge.

* *Ariſt. Rhet. li.* 2. *c* 1. *in initio.* Ἔστω δὴ ἡ ὀργὴ, ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν περὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ εἰς αὐτῶ τινα μὴ προσηκόντως. *Idem fere apud Carteſium de Paſſionibus, parte* 3. *art.* 199. *niſi quod (ut nos) definiat eſſe ſpeciem odii aut averſionis, quam habemus erga eos qui* aliquid malum *fecerunt, &c.*

2. The Nature of Anger being thus unfolded, proceed we to inquire, whether *all Anger* is to be look'd upon *as ſinful.* A Queſtion which, among *Chriſtians*, might perhaps be look'd upon as needleſs, were it not, 1. That however we read in the fore-quoted place, *whoſoever is angry with his brother without a cauſe*, others anciently read it without *any ſuch limitation:* And, 2. Becauſe of that *deſire of Revenge* which we have affirmed all Anger to involve. For, who otherwiſe could lightly condemn that Paſſion altogether, which is not onely a Natural Affection of the Mind, but ſuppos'd by St. *Paul* to be lawful, even where he cautions Men againſt the exceſs of it? He who bids us *be angry and ſin not*, ſuppoſing it to be lawful in it ſelf, becauſe otherwiſe we could not be angry without offending. To all which, if we add the Example of our Saviour, ſo the ſimple condemnation of Anger will appear yet more unreaſonable. For, as it is certain from the Scripture, not onely that he did no Sin, but that he was in himſelf of a moſt ſedate temper; ſo, it is no leſs certain from thence, that notwithſtanding that, he was ſometime provok'd to Anger, and that Spirit of his ruffled by it, which was generally ſmooth as the face of the Deep, when there is not the leaſt breath of Wind to diſcompoſe it: St. *Mark* telling us of him, *chap.* 3. 5. that *he look'd upon* the *Phariſees* with *grief and anger, when he conſider'd the hardneſs of their hearts.* But his Paſſion ſwole much higher, when he found Men buying and ſelling in the Temple, and converting a Church into a Den of Thieves: For then, like the troubled Sea, it overflow'd its Banks, and overwhelm'd thoſe Perſons that had diſturb'd it; that Zeal or Fiery Indignation wherewith he was then poſſeſs'd, prompting him to overthrow the Tables of the Money-changers, and ſcourge both them and others out of it, *Joh.* 2. 13. and ſo on. And indeed, when the Love of any thing hath taken poſſeſſion of the Soul, and inſinuated it ſelf into its Temper, it can no more brook any the leaſt Affront that is offer'd it, than the Eye, which is the tendereſt part of the Body, can the piercing of a Needle, or of a Thorn. Foraſmuch therefore as there is ſo much evidence, both from Scripture and Reaſon, concerning the lawfulneſs of Anger in it ſelf; nothing could be pretended for the ſimple condemnation of it, or indeed ſo much as for the making a queſtion of its lawfulneſs, if it were not for the Exceptions before-remembred. Which,

though they are not ſo ſlight as to be deſpis'd, yet neither ſo ſtrong as to overthrow the contrary Evidences; as will appear upon a Survey of them. For, be it, firſt, that the Word εἰκῇ, or *without cauſe*, were wanting heretofore * in ſeveral *Greek* Copies, as we learn both from St. *Jerome* and St. *Auguſtine*; be it, that it is not to be found in a *Greek* Copy in the *Vatican Library*, as *Lucas Brugenſis* || informs us; nor yet in the † *Arabick* and *Æthiopick Verſions*: nay, be it (which is more than either is, or can with Juſtice be affirm'd by any) that it were not even now to be found in any one *Greek* Copy: yet even ſo it could not be reaſonably concluded, that all Anger is forbidden by our Saviour; becauſe, as there are few indefinite Propoſitions which do not admit of an Exception, ſo Anger is onely forbidden in this place, as a ſtep towards, or diſpoſition to that Killing which is forbidden by this Commandment: Which (as was before-ſhewn) being not all Killing whatſoever, neither can all Anger be look'd upon as unlawful, but onely that which is a diſpoſition to that Killing which is forbidden by it. And though I think it becomes not me to call in queſtion the Sincerity or Diligence of the Parties before-mentioned, who have given ſo clear a Teſtimony concerning the Ancient Readings; yet as I cannot forbear to ſay, that all * our preſent *Greek* Copies have it, except that before-mention'd, as alſo the || *Perſian* and *Syriack Verſions*, the latter whereof thought the Word εἰκῇ ſo proper and ſignificant, that it choſe rather to retain than interpret it; ſo neither to add, that that, and other the Arguments alledg'd by *Grotius* †, are much to be preferr'd before the other. For, as it is not lightly to be thought, that the Word εἰκῇ ſhould be ſo generally receiv'd, if they had not found upon examination that it ought to have a place in the *Greek* Copies; ſo both they and we have the more reaſon to ſuppoſe it to be the true Reading, becauſe (as the ſame *Grotius* hath obſerv'd) the *Greek* Interpreters, who were moſt likely to know the true *Greek* Reading, generally read it ſo themſelves; as alſo *Irenæus* *, in two places of his Book *Adverſus Hereſes*, and *Juſtin Martyr* ||, in his *Epiſtle to Zenas and Serenus*, as I my ſelf have found upon examination, and as the Words themſelves by me alledged ſhew. If there lie any juſt Exception againſt the lawfulneſs of Anger in it ſelf, it muſt be from that *deſire of Revenge* which we have ſaid it to involve, and which therefore I will in the next place conſider.

* *Vid. Druſium in locum.*

|| *Notæ ad varias Lectiones edit. Græc. novi Teſt.*

† *Vid. Biblia Polyglotta.*

* *Vid. Luc. Brug. Notas ad varias Lect. edit. Græc. Novi Teſt.*

|| *Vid. Bibl. Polygl.*

† *Annot. in loc.*

* Adv. Hær. li. 2. c. 56. *Et non ſolum qui occidit, reus erit occiſionis ad damnationem, ſed & qui iraſcitur ſine cauſâ fratri ſuo.* Li. 4. c. 31. *Et qui iraſcitur fratri ſuo ſine cauſâ, reus erit judicio.*

|| *Juſt. in dict. epiſt.* Γέγραπται γὰρ ὅτι πᾶς ὀργιζόμενος εἰκῇ τῷ ἀδελφῷ αὐτοῦ, ἔνοχος ἔσται τῇ κρίσει.

Now though it be not to be deny'd, that the deſire of Revenge is generally unlawful to a *Chriſtian*; yet may it be ſo circumſtantiated, as to have nothing of Criminalneſs in it, yea moreover, to be good and commendable: as for example, when we are angry to ſee God diſhonoured, or any of his Commandments trangreſſed; he who deſires the puniſhment of theſe, and in his Station endeavours it alſo, where there is no hopes of amendment, doing no more than what the Love of God will naturally prompt him to. For, how can we love God with that ardency which becomes us, and not deſire the puniſhment of thoſe by whom he is ſlighted and contemn'd? And though, eſpecially ſince *Chriſtianity* came in place, we cannot ſo ſafely deſire the puniſhment of thoſe who have been injurious to our ſelves; yet as nothing forbids us to deſire that alſo, where Zeal of Juſtice

Juſtice prompts us to it, ſo neither in reſpect of our ſelves, where we ſeek no more by their Puniſhment, than the redreſſing of our own Wrongs: it being not ſimply evil to deſire the Puniſhment of Offenders, but to deſire it with a miſchievous intent, that is to ſay, for the afflicting of our Brother; or to deſire the inflicting of it otherwiſe than God and Reaſon do allow: Which is for the moſt part when we deſire the inflicting of it with our own Hands; becauſe, as the Scripture hath told us, God hath challeng'd the Execution of it to himſelf, and to thoſe who have his Authority in the World. If (as I for my own part neither can nor will deny) few angry Perſons keep within theſe bounds; for which cauſe, of all the Paſſions of the Soul, I think it ought the leaſt to be indulg'd: yet I no way doubt, a good and virtuous Man may ſo reſtrain his Anger, as not to deſire the Puniſhment of the injurious Party, any farther than the Glory of God doth require, or the Reparation of his own Loſſes Witneſs ſuch Perſons eaſie admittance of a Satisfaction, and ſometimes of a meer Verbal Acknowledgment; whereas, on the other ſide, evil Men will not be appeas'd, unleſs they ſee the injurious Perſon ſuffer as much, or more than they themſelves have, yea, though there doth not thereby accrue to them any Reparation of their own Loſſes. Now, foraſmuch as Anger, generally ſpeaking, hath not onely the Verdict of Reaſon and Scripture to evince it to be lawful, but is fairly defenſible from thoſe Exceptions which are made againſt it; I think it but juſt to ſuppoſe, that all Anger is not ſinful: and, upon that account, go on to inquire,

3. *What Anger* is to be accounted *ſuch*, the third thing propos'd to be inquir'd into. For the reſolution whereof, we muſt diſtinguiſh between ſuch Motions of it as the Philoſophers call *motus primo-primi*, or *the firſt ſtirrings* of Anger, and *the more deliberate efforts* of it. If the Queſtion be concerning *the firſt ſtirrings* of Anger, which the ſame Philophers compare to the twinkling of the Eyes, upon any ſudden Violence that approacheth them; ſo, no doubt can remain, but that they are *generally lawful*, becauſe no leſs neceſſary than that twinkling of the Eyes before ſpoken of, and antecedent to any free Conſent of the Will: *It being difficult*, or rather impoſſible, to be without thoſe beginnings of perturbation which the Greeks call* προπάθειαι, when any thing is offer'd to excite them. Onely, as Cuſtom, which is a ſecond Nature, and Grace, which is above it, may contribute not a little to the repreſſing of them; ſo, if we do not make uſe of the one, and implore the other, in order to the reſtraining of them, they will be ſo far look'd upon as voluntary, and therefore alſo as ſinful, if they paſs the bounds of Reaſon. But then, if the Queſtion be concerning *thoſe efforts of Anger* which precede not the free Conſent of the Will, but, on the contrary, are ſubject to its controul; theſe, as they are not purely natural, ſo they may be either lawful, or unlawful, according as they ſhall be found to be circumſtantiated. Foraſmuch therefore as theſe are capable of being vicious, we will now inquire *when they do become ſo:* Which is,

* Hieron. ep. ad Demetriadem. *Difficile quin potius impoſſibile perturbationum initiis cavere quempiam, quas ſignificantiùs Græci* προπαθείας *vocant.* Vid. Grot. in Mat. 5. 22.

† *Jam* 1. 19.
‖ *Eccl.* 7. 9.
* *Nicomach. l.* 4. *c.* 5. Ὀι μὲν γὰρ ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται, οὐδὲ οἷς δεῖ, οὐδὲ ἐφ' οἷς, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ.

1. When they are *raſh* and *precipitate*. For, beſide that that Anger which is ſo, is a direct contradiction to the Scripture, which commands in one place † to be *ſlow to wrath*, and in another ‖, *not to be haſty in our ſpirit*, it lays us open, as *Ariſtotle* * obſerves, to the com-

miſſion of *all thoſe irregularities* whereof the Anger of Man is capable. For, Anger naturally hurrying Men to the proſecution of all thoſe things which are grateful to its own Vindictive Humour, what ſhould hinder it, where it ſtays not to deliberate, from venting its own Inordinacies, as well againſt whom, and for what, and after what meaſure it doth not become it to be ſevere, as where there is a juſt ground for it in all? Neither is the Voice of Experience any whit different in this Affair from the Voice of Reaſon and Diſcourſe: For, who ever yet ſaw a haſty Perſon obſerve a Mean in any thing, ſo long as his Paſſion continu'd? If we inquire concerning thoſe who are to be the Objects of our Anger, theſe make all Perſons ſuch, yea even bruit Beaſts, nay, inanimate Creatures: if concerning the Grounds of it, they are angry for any thing, for nothing, for but coming in their way, or ſpeaking to them, though upon never ſo juſt and neceſſary an occaſion: laſtly, if of the Meaſure, they are angry beyond Reaſon, and againſt it, they commit all the Indecencies which it is poſſible for any rational Man to be guilty of, they fall into abſurd, reproachful, and ſometimes blaſphemous Speeches. If there be any thing good in a haſty Spirit, it is, as the ſame *Ariſtotle** obſerves, that as as their Fury is very extravagant whilſt it laſts, ſo it is *not of any long continuance*: Which yet (as he *there goes on) is not *ſo great a commendation* of it, as is commonly both thought and repreſented; it being not much to be wondred, that their Paſſion ſhould not be of long continuance, who *retain not* their Wrath at all, but do *immediately wreck* its Fury upon their Oppoſites.

* * *Ariſt. ubi ſupra.* Παύονται ϑ ταχέως ὅ ϰ βιαλίσϰειν ἔχουσι· συμβαίνει ϑ αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι ϰ ϰαλέχουσι ϑ ὀργὴν, ἀλλὰ ἀνταποδιδόασιν.

2. Next to the precipitateneſs of Anger, ſubjoyn we *the cauſeleſneſs* thereof, as in which our Bleſſed Saviour particularly placeth its Inordinacy: by which I do not mean its being *without any cauſe at all* (for who is there that is ſo provok'd?) but the being angry *vainly* and *fooliſhly*, as *Heſychius* || interprets the Word, and *without any rational ground* for ſuch a Reſentment; as if a Man ſhould be angry becauſe another treads upon his Shadow, or it may be throws Straws in his way; things which a wiſe Man would either take no notice of, or paſs by with contempt and pity. But ſuch, though not of the ſame trifling nature, is that Anger which is ſtirr'd by a *great but caſual* Miſchief, or by Words that proceeded from the *meer inadvertency* of the Speaker; by Mens *differing* from us in Opinion in matters of *no great weight*, or *expreſſing* their Conceits *after another manner*: theſe things having nothing of real evil in themſelves, and much leſs of injuriouſneſs to us. Of the ſame nature is, ſecondly, that Anger which ariſeth from *ſlight provocations*, ſuch I mean as *bring no conſiderable detriment* either to our Perſons, or Reputations, or Fortunes; from an *unkind word* let fall in the *heat of Diſcourſe*; or, in fine, from any thing elſe that is a *common Infirmity* of Humane Nature. Not but that theſe things are evil in themſelves, and to us; but that they are in a manner unavoidable, and ſuch as we our ſelves are ſometime or other guilty of. The former whereof, as it leaves no place for Anger, which ſuppoſeth, that that which ſtirr'd it, might have been avoided by the injurious Perſon; ſo the latter carries its own Excuſe in it, and ſuch as will either exempt the injurious Perſon from blame, or reflect it upon the angry one. For, if the Errour by which we are ſtirr'd, be a common Frailty, it ought in reaſon to have a common

|| *Heſych. Lex.* Εἰκῇ, μάτην, ὅθεν ϰ εἰκαῖος ὁ μάταιος, &c.

and

and uniform reception, and we muſt either be contented to be condemn'd * our ſelves, which we ſhall hardly think reaſonable, conſidering the infirmity of our own Nature; or acquit thoſe that are but alike guilty. Add hereunto, thirdly, (becauſe though juſt enough in it ſelf, yet is not ſo, if we conſider the Perſon by whom it is ſtirr'd) that Anger which ariſeth from *ſome one or two greater provocations of a Friend*, or *of one by whom we have been much more oblig'd.* For, as Friendſhip and Beneficence are things of ſo great worth, that whoſoever is ſenſible of them, muſt think much ought to be pardon'd to it; ſo eſpecially when the Errours are not many, and have been much out-done by the Kindneſſes we have receiv'd. For though the Injury, as ſuch, may be apt to ſtir us; yet ſurely not when there is ſo much more to reſtrain us, and for one real Unkindneſs, we have receiv'd many ſignal Favours. From whence, as it will appear, that it was not without great reaſon that *Ariſtotle* makes the Perſons with whom we are angry to be a neceſſary part of our conſideration; ſo, that it ought to be a very great provocation, which can licence a deliberate Anger againſt a kind and indulgent Parent, a gracious Prince, or one who hath been the Author of our Fortunes.

* *Juſtin. Martyr. in ep. ad Zenam & Serenum.*—Ἤδη δέ τινας ἴσμεν διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸν πλησίον γενέσθαι ἑαυτοῦ καλαισίονας· ἐὰν γάρ τις παίσῃ τὸν ἕτερον, τὸν αὐτὸν ποιείτω πρότερον· μύρια λάβῃ διὰ τὸ πλησίον καὶ ἑαυτῷ πεισόμενος τὸ ὑπόταιον· ῥητέον ἦν τῷ εὐγνώμονι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν, ἐπειδήν τινων ἁμαρτήματα τὰ ἑαυτῷ χρήσῃ νῦν, μή τι δεῖ κἀγὼ τοιοῦτος.

3. We are now arriv'd at the laſt Vice of Anger, which is when it *exceeds the meaſure* due to it: For the underſtanding whereof, we are to conſider it,

1. With relation to the Cauſe.
2. To the Rules of Sobriety and Prudence: And,
3. Laſtly, To the Continuance: Becauſe in each of theſe our Anger may exceed, and ſo paſs into unlawful and diſorderly.

I begin with the firſt of theſe, becauſe neareſt of kin to the foregoing Vice, and becauſe we ſhall need no other Argument to evince our Anger to be unlawful, when it *exceeds the merit* of the Cauſe. For, if we may not be angry *without a cauſe*, neither may we be angry *beyond* it; all Anger being ſo far cauſeleſs, , as it exceeds the Provocation which occaſion'd it. The onely difficulty will be to know when our Anger doth ſo exceed; which muſt be left to every Man to determine. This onely may be ſaid in the general, That as a leſſer Provocation muſt have a leſſer Anger, and a greater Provocation a greater; ſo, whether the Provocation be greater or leſſer, will beſt be eſtimated by the conſideration of the Circumſtances of the Time when it is given, of the Perſons by whom, the Place where, and the Miſchiefs that accrue to us by it. But other determination than that, as it will be impoſſible to give, amidſt the variety of Circumſtances wherewith a Provocation may be attended; ſo I will not add any thing more, ſave that Prudence, as well as Equity, will adviſe, rather to go leſs in our Anger, than more, and to proportion it not ſo much by the Dictates of our own diſtemper'd Breaſts, which are for the moſt part very unfaithful Counſellors, as by the Advice of diſintereſſed Perſons, and the Examples of good and prudent Men.

From that Anger which exceeds the Merits of the Cauſe, paſs we to that which *tranſports us beyond the bounds of Sobriety and Prudence*, and makes us abſurd in our Behaviour. Of which nature are all thoſe

thoſe actions which are before obſerv'd in haſty men, but are common to other angry perſons with them; ſuch as are the being angry with any man whatſoever that comes in our way, yea, even with Inanimate Creatures themſelves. Which, if not ſins in themſelves, yet are infallible indications of one, inaſmuch as they declare the mind within to be more than ordinarily diſtemper'd, and to have paſs'd thoſe bounds which God and Nature have ſet it. So true is that which the Heathen Poet hath taught us, that *Anger is a ſhort madneſs.* Herein only they differ, that Madneſs is oftentimes innocent, but both of them offer violence to our Reaſon.

One onely exceſs of anger remains, by which we have ſaid our anger to become vitious, and that is, *when it continues longer upon us than it ought.* Which is firſt, *when it continues with us after a ſatisfaction is offered*, or, where that cannot be made, *an humble and hearty acknowledgment is:* The former in its own nature, taking away the cauſe of our anger, the latter, by vertue of the precepts of Chriſtianity, which enjoins upon us the forgiving of injuries, if they, who have committed them, return and repent. The ſame is to be ſaid of that anger which *continues, even after it hath procur'd the due puniſhment* of the injurious Perſon; ſuch an anger being unjuſt, becauſe importing a deſire of a farther revenge, than is due to the meaſure of the offence. And though I am of opinion that *Grotius* ſpake not amiſs, when he interpreted that of the Apoſtle, *Eph.* 4. 26. *Let not the Sun go down upon your wrath*, by, *let it not be protracted longer than its due time*, ſuppoſing the Apoſtle to allude to that of *Deut.* 24. 15. where command is given by God, *not to let the Sun go down upon the Hirelings wages*, meaning thereby (as the foregoing words perſwade) that it ſhould be given him at his day, and when it was due, leſt for the want of it *he cry unto the Lord againſt his Maſter:* Yet when I conſider with my ſelf, that the former part of thoſe words, *Be ye angry and ſin not*, is taken out of the 4th. Verſe of the 4th. *Pſalm*, according to the *Septuagint verſion*, the latter part whereof adviſeth that men ſhould *commune with their own hearts upon their bed and be ſtill*, I cannot but conclude with a Learned Gentleman * of our own Nation, that more than that is intended in it, even, that the heat of our fury ſhould paſs over before the Even-tide, becauſe that is a time of Prayer and Meditation which require a ſedate and well compoſed Soul, as alſo that we ſhould be by that time in a diſpoſition to forgive, becauſe, in thoſe and all our other prayers, taught to beg forgiveneſs of God upon no other terms, than the forgiving of our Brethren.

* *D. Norton Knatchbul in loc. Animadverſ. in libros Novi Teſtamenti.*

4. The order of my Diſcourſe now leads me to enquire into the remedies of this diſorderly paſſion; which are

1. As much as may be *to forbid entrance*, eſpecially in our own Concernments. For though anger be not in it ſelf ſinful, yet it aproacheth ſo very near to it, and is ſo hardly to be kept from it, that it were much better for the moſt part not to be at all, than to venture thoſe evils to which it expoſeth us. Now this we may in ſome meaſure procure by reflecting upon the evils which uſually follow where it is admitted; but more eſpecially by preventing that which may prove an incentive to it. After the ſame manner that we find *Pomponius* to have done, who having intercepted the letters of *Sertorius*, where-

in

in he knew were the names of his chiefeſt enemies, threw them into the fire, and would not read them, leſt he ſhould meet with ſomewhat in them that might ſtir his indignation; Or he in *Plutarch*, who, having ſeveral curious Glaſſes ſent him, threw them preſently againſt the ground, leſt (as he anſwer'd one who enquir'd the reaſon of it) he ſhould be afterwards angry with his Servants who ſometime or other would have done the ſame.

2. But becauſe, as was before ſaid, it is both lawful to be angry, and ſometimes impoſſible not to be ſo, I ſhall chooſe rather to adviſe *the moderation of it* by all thoſe ways which Reaſon or Religion can ſuggeſt; Such as are the repreſenting to our ſelves *how ill immoderate anger becomes others, and into what indecencies it doth ordinarily betray them*; the *weaning of our ſelves from the love of earthly things, from which, as all other Wars, ſo this of anger doth proceed*; the *entertaining* (as becomes us) *a modeſt opinion of our ſelves, becauſe anger doth moſtly ariſe from an overweaning conceit of our own excellencies.* In fine, the *reflecting upon our own errours, which are oftentimes not inferiour to theirs with whom we are diſpleaſed*, and *the both great need we have of the pardon of the Almighty for them. and the impoſſibility of attaining it, without affording the like to others.* For certainly that man muſt be more diſpleaſed with himſelf than others, if he can be immoderately angry, when it is ſo much more to his own prejudice.

PART VI.

Of reproachful Speeches, where is ſhewn from the Example of our Saviour and his Apoſtles, that all reproachful Speeches are not unlawful, as, from our Saviour's annexing the Prohibition of them to that of Anger, that ſuch only are ſo as ariſe from the Anger by him condemned. The ground of their Prohibition here; their taking away that which is the life of Life it ſelf, even Mens good Name, and not ſeldom tending towards, if not actually procuring the deſtruction of the other. The murther of the Soul to be reckoned to the preſent Prohibition, as both properly enough ſuch, and more pernicious than the other. This effected by tempting men to deſtructive courſes, by giving them an ill Example, by Scandal, or forbearing of Reproofs. An addreſs to the declaring of what ſins are included in Self-murther, which are, The neglect of our health, The expoſing our ſelves to unneceſſary dangers, Intemperances and Debauches, Eating or Drinking ſuch things as are prejudicial to our health, Taking immoderate Cares, or uſing immoderate Labours or Studies; In fine, the neglect of ſuch Remedies as Nature or Art have taught men for the removal of their Diſtempers. The concluſion of the whole with the criminalneſs of Murther, in order whereunto is alledg'd Gods requiring the life of Man, even of Beaſts, and the Athenians *ſitting in judgment upon that wall which ſhould happen to be the deſtruction of it.*

HAVING entreated at large in my laſt of the paſſion of Anger, and both ſhewn it to have a place in the preſent prohibition, and diſcovered its Malady and its Cure; it remains that we addreſs our ſelves to the conſideration of *reproachful language*, as being alike reckon'd by our Saviour to it. For my more orderly explication whereof, I will enquire,

1. Whether all reproachful ſpeaking be to be look'd upon as forbidden by him, or
2. If not, what reproachful ſpeaking is, and
3. Laſtly, How that which is forbidden by him, becomes a violation of this Commandment.

1. That *all reproachful Speeches* are not to be look'd upon *as forbidden* by our Saviour, the frequent uſe of thoſe compellations in Scripture which he expreſly preſcribes, may ſerve for an abundant evidence. For did not our Saviour himſelf, than whom no man ever ſpake, either more calmly, or more conſiderately, did not he (I ſay) beſtow the titles of *Fools and blind* upon thoſe who accounted it ſomething *to ſwear by the gold of the Temple*, but not ſo *by the Temple that ſanctified it? Mat.* 23. 17. As in like manner upon thoſe who thought it of force *to ſwear by the Gift*, but of none at all *by the Altar that ſanctified it*, *verſ.* 19. of the ſame. Nay did he not even after his Reſurrection, and when he may be ſuppos'd to have put off ſo much as their innocent infirmities, call his Diſciples themſelves *fools*, *for not believing what the Prophets had ſpoken Luke?* 24. 15. But it will be ſaid it may be, that our Saviour was an extraordinary perſon, and ſo

ſo not obnoxious himſelf to thoſe Rules which he preſcribed to others. Yet certainly the like cannot be ſaid for his Diſciples, and much leſs for thoſe upon whom his commands were immediately laid. Which notwithſtanding, we ſhall find, that even theſe were not ſparing upon occaſion of thoſe reproachful compellations which were expreſly forbidden by their Maſter. I appeal for the proof hereof to that of St. *James* where he gives the title of *Rakah* or *empty* * *perſon* to thoſe who reli'd upon a naked Faith. For *wilt thou know* (ſaith he) ὦ ἄνθρωπε κενὲ, *that Faith without Works is dead, chap.* 2. 20. Nay I appeal to St. *Paul* who gives the *Galatians* the title of *Fools*, that much more reproachful term, and threatned with a ſeverer penalty. For, *O Fooliſh Galatians* (ſaith he) *who hath bewitched you that you ſhould not obey the truth? Gal.* 3. 1. And again, *verſ.* 3. *Are ye ſo fooliſh* and unreaſonable, *as having begun in the Spirit*, to think *to be made perfect by the Fleſh?* For though the Apoſtle doth not make uſe of the ſame word that our Saviour, or at leaſt the Evangeliſt did, yet he uſeth one ‖ that is tantamount, if yet it be not more piquant than the other. Add hereunto, which are alike, or more contumelious, our Saviours calling the *Scribes* and *Phariſees* by the name of *Hypocrites*, and *a generation of Vipers*, as St. *Peter* by the name of *Satan*, his Apoſtle St. *Paul*'s ſtiling *Elymas a child of the Devil*, and *an enemy of all righteouſneſs*; all which, with the like expreſſions, ſhew plainly enough, that neither did the Maſter himſelf mean to adjudge all, calling *Rakah* or *Fool*, to *the danger of the Councel and Hell fire*, nor thoſe that were his Scholars underſtood him ſo. Foraſmuch therefore as all reproachful ſpeaking cannot be looked upon as forbidden, as having been ſometime uſed, both by our Saviour himſelf and his Apoſtles; proceed we to enquire *what is* to be look'd upon *as ſuch*, the ſecond thing propoſed to be diſcourſed of.

* *Heſych.* Ῥακὰ ſeu potius Ῥακὰ κενός LXX. *Jud.* 11. 3. ἄνδρες κενοὶ pro H. אבשים דיקים.

‖ ἀνόητοι *Heſych. Lex.* ἀνόητοι εἰσὶν μωραίνοντες ἀνοί. ſeu potius ἀνοίας, μωρίας.

2. For the reſolution whereof, we ſhall need to go no farther than the words immediately preceeding the prohibition of it. For, forbidding not ſimply and abſolutely that Anger from which reproachful Speeches flow*, but ſuch only as was either *raſh*, or *cauſeleſs*, or *immoderate*, he muſt conſequently be ſuppoſed to forbid no other reproachful ſpeaking than which had *ſuch an Anger* for its Parent. Which by the way will not only ſhew what reproachful ſpeaking we are to underſtand, when we find our Saviour condemning it to *the danger of the Council and of Hell-fire*, and St. *Paul* ‖ excluding thoſe that are guilty of it from the Society of *Chriſtians* and Heaven, but with how little reaſon alſo the Examples of our Saviour and his Apoſtles are ſometime alledg'd in patronage of our own exceſſes in this particular. For, beſide that, our Saviour and his Apoſtles were *publick Perſons*, and to whom therefore it appertain'd, as well to chaſtiſe Offenders with reproaches, as to execute other ſeverities upon them; thoſe reproaches of theirs were far from being the iſſue of that Anger which we have ſhewn to be forbidden by our Saviour. Not of a *raſh* and *precipitate one*, becauſe many of them let fall by them in their writings; but all of them when they were employ'd about Sacred matters, wherein it is hard to conceive but that they had their wits about them; Not of *a cauſeleſs* anger, becauſe having ſome notorious crime for their ground*, or ſome opinion ‖ which was deſtructive of that Religion which our Saviour came to commend. Laſtly, not of

* Τὴν κακολογίαν ἡ ὀργὴ φαίνεται ἀπογεννῶσα ὥστε ἡ μήτης κ. τ. λ. *Ariſton apud Grot. Annot. in Mat.* 5. 22.

‖ 1 *Cor.* 5. 11. ——6. 9.

* See *Mat.* 23. throughout.

‖ See the fore-alledged places out of St. *James* and the Epiſtle to the *Galathians*.

an *immoderate* Anger, because at the same time giving no contemptible testimonies of the love they bear to the reproached parties. Witness our Saviours admonishing the *Pharisees* in that very Chapter, where he calls them *Fools*, and *Blind*, and *Hypocrites*, and *a Generation of Vipers*, to cast off their hypocrisie, to * *cleanse the inside* as well *as the outside* of the Platter; Witness St. *John Baptist*'s calling upon the same *Pharisees*, and with the very same breath, he gives them the title of *Generation of Vipers*, to *bring forth fruits meet for Repentance*, *Mat.* 3. 7, 8. Lastly, witness St. *James* and St. *Paul*'s instructing those *Fools* they wrote to, to deposite those their distempers, and become wise unto God and unto Salvation. Which shews that their anger, and consequently reproachful speaking, was not without a mixture of kindness, or rather that it had that in part for the fountain of it. And indeed, as *Origen* * sometime spake concerning God, that *those whom he is not angry with when they sin, he is therefore not angry with them because he is extremely such*, Οὐκοῦν ὅις ὁ θυμᾶται ἁμαρτάνουσιν, ἵν ἕτως εἴπω χωλέμενος ὁ θυμᾶται; So may we of our Saviour and his Apostles: If they had not applyed those Goads of *Racha* and *Fool* to the dull and drowsie sinner, they had shew'd themselves much more displeased with them, because suffering them so to continue unmolested in those Errors and Impieties, which would have infallibly exposed them to *the danger of the Council and of Hell fire.* The result of the premises is this, that as there is not the least appearance of the lawfulness of those Reproaches, even to publick Persons, which are the issues of a rash, or causeless, or immoderate Anger, so there is far less appearance of their being lawful to private Persons, who are generally to leave the chastising of Offenders to the other.

* *Mat.* 23. 26. compar'd with *Luke* 11. 41, &c.

* *Philocal.* c. 27.

3. What reproachful Speeches are forbidden, you have seen already, even those which proceed from a rash, or causeless, or immoderate Anger; enquire we therefore in the next place, *how those, which are so, become violations of this Commandment.* Where not again to tell you, that they incline the Person against whom they are directed, to take up murtherous purposes against the Reviler, because, though that may be enough to reduce it to the Commandment, yet it makes rather the reviled, than Revilers the direct violatours of it, as neither to insist upon our Saviours making the prohibition of *Rakah* and *Fool* an Appendix to it, because that rather proves it to be a violation, than shews how it doth become so; I shall consider, 1. The nature of that *good name* which reproachful Speeches blast. For, though a Good Name be not the life of the possessour of it, yet is it so necessary to the well Being of it, that he, who endeavours to take it away, may be look'd upon as a Murderer for so doing; because robbing a man of that which is *the life* of *life it self*, and without which whosoever is, is dead to all happiness, and to the world. Again, 2. Though the Sword of the reproachful person (I mean his reviling tongue) be not ordinarily of force enough to cut that knot which God and Nature hath knit between the Soul and Body; yet as instances might be produc'd where it hath actually done it, and where men have died of no other wounds than what a malicious Tongue gave them; so, where it hath not that effect upon the reproached Party, it is rather for want of ability than will, so to wreck their fury upon the Enemy: It being not so much, because they are otherwise resolv'd, but because they

they either cannot, or dare not ſhew their fury in effects, that they revenge themſelves of their Enemies with their tongues. Whence it is, that no perſons have been obſerv'd to be of more intemperate tongues than thoſe of the Female Sex, or weak and puſillanimous men. The ſequel of which diſcourſe will be, that though the reviler be *not always a Murtherer in fact*, yet he is *in heart*, which is enough to bring him within the compaſs of the Commandment.

Of Murther, properly ſo called, and of the Sins included in it, what hath been ſaid may ſuffice, and therefore I will ſuperſede all farther conſideration of it. But becauſe the Scripture makes mention of another Murther, even *the murther of the Soul*, by which, though it be not altogether depriv'd of Life, yet it is of the comforts of it, and thereby made much more miſerable than if it were not at all, therefore it may not be amiſs to enquire, whether *that alſo have not a place in the prohibition*, and *how men become guilty of it.*

Now there are two things which perſwade the Murder whereof we ſpeak to come within the compaſs of the prohibition now before us. 1. That what we call *the murther of the Soul*, is properly enough ſuch, and 2. That it is *a more pernicious one*, than *the other.* That the Murther whereof we ſpeak, is properly enough ſuch, is evident, not only from the Scriptures giving that State the name of death into which this Murder brings men, but alſo from the very nature of it. For, as Murder properly ſo call'd, becomes ſuch, not by the taking away of all Life; for the Soul, which is the chiefeſt part of Man, lives no leſs after that than before, but by the deſtruction of that natural Life, which he, from whom we take it, en'oy'd as to the preſent World; ſo the murder of the Soul, as we commonly expreſs it, though it introduce not a perfect inſenſibility, yet it deſpoils it of that ſpiritual Life which it en'oys in this preſent ſtate, and which is more, of that alſo of which it is capable in the next. It is no leſs evident, Secondly, That, ſuppoſing what we ſpeak of to be a Murder, it is a much more pernicious one than the other, becauſe, as that Life which it takes away is a much better one than the other, ſo it draws after it an eternity of torment. Now, foraſmuch as the Murder whereof we ſpeak, is not only properly enough ſuch, but a much more pernicious one than the other, it is eaſie to ſuppoſe, or rather impoſſible to ſuppoſe otherwiſe, than that he, who forbad the one, intended alſo the avoiding of the other; eſpecially having before ſhewn, that the Commandments, of which this is one, were intended as a ſummary of the whole Duty of Man. All therefore that remains to enquire into, upon this head, is, *how men become guilty of it*, which will require no very accurate conſideration to reſolve.

For to ſay nothing of thoſe who have the cure of Souls (though of all others the moſt obnoxious to it) partly, becauſe they are not under mine, and partly, becauſe they are better able to inform themſelves, I ſhall content my ſelf at preſent with pointing out thoſe ways whereby private perſons may come to be guilty of it, which is

1. By *prompting men to*, or *encouraging them in thoſe ſinful courſes* which draw after them *the deſtruction of the Soul*: That which gave the Devil the title of *a murderer from the beginning* (as he is called *Joh.* 8. 44.) being no other, than that, as the ſtory of *Geneſis* informs us, he ſollicited our firſt Parents

to eat of that Fruit from which both their temporal and ſpiritual Death enſu'd.

2. The ſame is to be ſaid of *giving an ill example*, and thereby drawing other Men into the commiſſion of the like Crimes: an evil Example not onely having the Nature of a Temptation, but being alſo of greater force than any other; inaſmuch as it doth more undiſcernably inſtill its Poyſon, and finds Men more ready to receive it: It being a known and undoubted Truth, that Men regard not ſo much what they ought, or what they are advis'd to, as what they ſee others do before them.

3. Add hereunto, becauſe of near affinity with the other, *the doing any thing, how innocent ſoever, whereby our weak brother may be tempted to do the like againſt his own Conſcience:* Such as was, for example, the eating of Meats ſacrificed to Idols, in the preſence of thoſe who were not ſo well inform'd of their *Chriſtian* Liberty. For though, as St. *Paul* ſpake concerning it, 1 *Cor.* 8. 4. there was no unlawfulneſs in the thing it ſelf; and conſequently therefore nothing in it, but the Conſcience of the Idol to unhallow it: yet might the doing thereof by a ſtrong *Chriſtian*, be a temptation to a weak one to do the like, if not againſt, yet without a due aſſurance of his own Conſcience: Which as St. *Paul* hath elſewhere * pronounc'd to be *damnable*, and ſo deſtructive of that Soul which is guilty of it; ſo both there †, and here ‖, he chargeth the guilt of its deſtruction upon thoſe who ſhould ſo *embolden* it to offend.

* *Rom.* 14. 23.

† —*ver.* 15. 20.
‖ 1 *Cor.* 8. 11.

4. And though the like care of other Men be not incumbent upon private *Chriſtians*, as is upon thoſe Perſons whom God hath more particularly intruſted with the inſpection of them; yet inaſmuch as by the Laws both of Nature and *Chriſtianity*, they are commanded *to reprove* an offending Brother, and *not ſuffer ſin to be upon him*; he that ſhall ſuffer ſuch a one to periſh for *want of a ſeaſonable and juſt admonition*, ſhall be ſo far chargeable with his deſtruction, whom *he did not endeavour* to reclaim.

What is meant by *Thou ſhalt not kill*, as that is to be underſtood of *the killing another*, hath been at large declar'd, together with the ſeveral Sins that are included in it: Nothing remains toward the compleating of my Diſcourſe, but to ſhew *what Sins* are included *in the killing of our ſelves*. Where,

1. Firſt of all, I ſhall reckon *the neglect of our Health*, becauſe a ſtep to that Self-murther which is here forbidden. For, though that for the moſt part be look'd upon as an Imprudence, rather than any violation of the Commandments of our Maker; yet it is becauſe Men conſider not that there is a Duty owing by them to themſelves, or rather unto God concerning them. They are (as I have before remark'd) plac'd in this World by God; they are put into a capacity of, and enjoyn'd the ſerving of their Maker in it; and being ſo, are in reaſon to intend the performance of it, and (becauſe that cannot otherwiſe be procur'd) to intend alſo the preſervation of themſelves: the neglect of that not onely making Men more unapt for it whilſt they live, but cutting them off before their time. 2. To

2. To the neglect of our Health, ſubjoyn we *the expoſing our ſelves to unneceſſary dangers*, and where nothing but vain-glory, or the deſire of filthy Lucre, prompts us to it: ſuch as are many of thoſe Dangers which they who profeſs Feats of Activity, do without the leaſt ſcruple involve themſelves in. For, as it is rare for ſuch Perſons (to what Agility ſoever they may have attain'd) not to procure their own deſtruction in the end; ſo, many of the Dangers to which they expoſe themſelves, are ſo imminent, that they muſt always be thought to run the hazard of their own deſtruction: Which, though it be not a Self-murther, yet is in a diſpoſition to it, and conſequently to be thought to be forbidden with the other: He who forbids any Action, at leaſt with any ſeverity, being in reaſon to be thought to forbid that which hath a natural tendency to it; becauſe where that is not carefully avoided, it will be hard to avoid the other.

3. The ſame is to be ſaid, and with far greater reaſon, of *all great Intemperances and Debauches*. For, beſide that the intemperate Man, no leſs than the former, runs the hazard of his Life oftentimes, partly by that Quarrelſomneſs to which his Intemperances do incline him, and partly by that Stupidity and Inſenſibleneſs which he does thereby contract, his Intemperance doth of its own nature help to ſhorten his Life, and ſo make him more literally a Murtherer of himſelf: Witneſs the Conſumptions, and other fatal Diſeaſes, which ſuch Perſons do often fall into, through the meer force of their Intemperances and Debauches: Of which, as Death is ſure to be the conſequent, ſo it matters not much, as to the Crime of Self-murther, whether it happen ſooner or later: He being no leſs truly a Murtherer who (after the manner of ſome *Italians*) gives a Poyſon which ſhall not have its effect till after many Months, than he who gives one which ſhall kill within an Hour.

4. Add hereunto all *eating or drinking ſuch things as are prejudicial to our Health*, however not ſuch either in themſelves, or to other Men; and (which is not ſo often thought of) but ought equally to be conſider'd, *the taking of immoderate Cares*, or *uſing of immoderate Labours or Studies*. For, beſide the other Irregularities wherewith theſe things are commonly attended, they do all of them confer to the deſtruction of thoſe by whom they are us'd, and conſequently become Violations of this Commandment. And I cannot but upon this occaſion call to mind a Saying * of a *Venetian Gentleman* to the famous *Father Paul*, with whom he had contracted a Religious Friendſhip: For, obſerving that moſt excellent Perſon always confining himſelf to his Cell, and there wearing away himſelf with perpetual Study, he ſtuck not to tell him in plain Terms (*as he was never wont to ſpeak to him in a Mask*‖, as the ſame Father *Paul* was wont to expreſs it) That *that unintermitted courſe of reading and writing was a kind of Intemperance, as was heretofore his Amorettes and Wantonneſſes. Here onely was the difference, that Opinion gave a Title of Lewdneſs to the one, but to the other Names of Honour.* And indeed, as that more ſober Intemperance ſhews a Man the Indulger of his Affections, no leſs than they who addict themſelves to more ignoble Pleaſures; ſo it contributes alike to the ſhortning of our Lives, and conſequently to the violation of the Commandment. This onely would be added, That as there may be ſome Works of great importance to Religion,

* The Life of Father *Paul*, &c. p. 169.

‖ *Lodato iddio, che ho pur trovato uno che mi parla non in maſchera.* Ib.

Religion, which require a more than ordinary diſpatch; ſo, if thoſe whom God hath fitted with proportionable Abilities, ſhall ſhorten their Lives in the compoſing of them, as it is ſaid of the *Judicious Hooker*, as to his *Books of Eccleſiaſtical Politie*, they ſhall be ſo far from being to be look'd upon as *Felo's de ſe*, that they ought to be had in the reputation of *Martyrs*.

5. There is but one Sin remaining of thoſe that are included in Self murther, and that is, *the neglect of ſuch Remedies as Nature and Art have taught Men, for the removal of thoſe Diſtempers into which we fall:* He who *honoureth not the Phyſician* in ſuch a Caſe, being a kind of Murtherer of himſelf, becauſe neglecting thoſe Remedies whereby he might be preſerv'd. And though the Book of *Eccleſiaſticus* be no Canonical one, nor as ſuch repreſented by that Church whereof we are Members; yet I cannot forbear to ſay, that it contains in it many Canonical Truths, and particularly, as to this matter whereof we are entreating. For, inaſmuch as St. *James* tells us, *Every good and perfect gift is from above*, what ſhould hinder us from concluding, as that Author doth, that * *God hath created both the Medicine and him that preſcribes it*; that || *he hath given Men Skill, that both they and he may be honour'd* in thoſe happy Effects which it produceth, and † *thoſe which ſtand in need of it, may be preſerved by it?* Care onely would be taken, as the ſame *Wiſe-man adviſeth, that we *neglect not to ſeek unto God* by ardent Prayer for our Recovery; to which I ſhall add, neither the imploring of theirs whom God hath appointed to mediate on our behalf; that *we leave off from ſin, and order our hands aright*, and *cleanſe our heart from all wickedneſs*. For, as theſe are both the primary and moſt ſovereign Remedies of our Diſtempers, becauſe it is from God that both thoſe Diſtempers and the Redreſs thereof cometh; ſo, the neglect of them muſt therefore be look'd upon as the pulling of Death upon us with our own Hands, and (which is more to be dreaded) of Eternal Ruine.

* *Eccluſ.* 38. 14.
|| —*ver.* 6.
† —*ver.* 7.
* —*ve.* 9, *&c.*

Being now to put an end to my Diſcourſe upon this Commandment, and thoſe Sins which I have ſhewn it to forbid, Reaſon would that, ſince I cannot do the like for all, I ſhould endeavour to ſtir up in you a juſt abhorrency of that Crime which this Commandment doth eſpecially condemn. Now, though that might be competently procur'd by the repetition of thoſe Arguments whereby I have before evinc'd the Criminalneſs thereof; yet becauſe I am unwilling to preſent you with the ſame things again, and thereby rather nauſeate than invite your Attention; and becauſe there is yet an Argument of the Criminalneſs of Murther, beſide what I have before inſiſted on; I think it not amiſs to ſet it now before you, and leave you to gueſs at the hainouſneſs of that Sin by it: Which is, That however unreaſonable Creatures cannot be ſaid to ſin, becauſe whatſoever they do, they do by the force of that Natural Inſtinct by which they are guided in all their Actions; yet if at any time they hapned to kill a Man, they were by the Law of God to fall no leſs under the Hand of Juſtice, than thoſe who had both Reaſon and Religion to reſtrain them from it. For, to ſay nothing at all of the Law of *Moſes*, by vertue of which *if an Ox gor'd a Man that he died, the Ox it ſelf was to be ſlain, and the Fleſh thereof caſt away as an abomination*, *Exod.* 21. 28, 29. By that more Catholick Law given to *Noah*, the Blood of Mens Lives

was

was to be requir'd of Beaſts, no leſs than of the Owners of them: For, *Surely* (ſaith God, *Gen.* 9. 5.) *your Blood of your Lives will I require: at the hand of every Beaſt will I require it, and at the hand of Man; and at the hand of every Mans Brother will I require the Life of Man.* And though, after the Law of God, we need not make any farther Inquiſition, becauſe we know all ſuch not to have been without juſt Grounds; yet I think it not amiſs to add, if it were onely for its affinity thereto, a like Law * of the Commonwealth of *Athens*, the purport whereof was, That if onely a Wall had by chance fallen down and kill'd a Man, the Judges of that place were to ſit upon and arraign it, and, upon conviction, throw the Stones thereof out of the Country. By which procedure of theirs, as they gave ſufficient teſtimony how ſacred a thing they eſteem'd the Life of Man to be; ſo when we have a more convincing teſtimony from the Laws of God, we muſt be ſtrangely unreaſonable, if we allow our ſelves in offering violence to it.

* See *Hales* Sermon of Duels, *p.* 82. of his *Remains.*

THE

THE SEVENTH
COMMANDMENT.

THE SEVENTH COMMANDMENT.

Thou ſhalt not commit adultery.

PART I.

The Contents.

The Crime here forbidden, the Violation of the Marriage-bed; for which cauſe, as well as for the diſcovery of the Affirmative part of the Commandment, inquiry is made into the Importance, Inſtitution, and Laws of Marriage. That defin'd to be A Compact between a Man and a Woman, of Cohabitation during Life, for the comfort of Society, and the propagation of Children: *And inquiry thereupon made, Whether it be of Divine Inſtitution. This reſolv'd, by conſidering that Inſtitution, either with reference to all that are of years to enter into that State, or to ſuch onely as intend a Cohabitation with the Female Sex. In the former of which reſpects is made appear, That though in the Infant-ſtate of the World it was of univerſal concernment, yet it is not now; as becauſe there is not now the ſame reaſon for it, ſo becauſe our Saviour hath declar'd our abſolution from it: In the latter is ſhewn, That it originally was, and now is of univerſal Obligation; as is evidenc'd at large in every Branch of its Definition. Inquiry is next made into the Laws of Marriage, and particularly into ſuch as reſpect the due contracting of it: Where is ſhewn, firſt, in reſpect of the Perſons contracting, That the Marriage ought to be between one Male and one Female, and the* Polygamy *of the Patriarchs anſwered; That it ought to be between thoſe who are not too near of kin; where the Degrees prohibiting Marriage, and the Grounds of that Prohibition are declar'd; That the Perſons contracting be of years ſufficient to underſtand the Nature of it, of ability of Body where there is a deſire and expectation of Children, and free and unconſtrained in their Choice: In fine, That they be ſo far at leaſt of one Perſwaſion in Religion, that they may joyn both in Private and Publick Prayers; the general neceſſity whereof is at large exemplified and demonſtrated. A Conſideration of thoſe Laws that reſpect the Contract it ſelf; where is ſhewn, That it ought to be made before one or more Witneſſes, and agreeably to the Conſtitutions of Church and State; That it is at leaſt highly expedient, that it be ſolemnized by a Prieſt, and with ſuch ſignificant Actions as the joyning of Hands, and the like.*

THE *Perſons* of Men being ſecur'd by the former Precept, from the attaque of greater and leſſer Violences, Reaſon would that this Law of Love ſhould proceed to ſecure them from any Injury in *thoſe who are joyned to them by Marriage*; becauſe, as in reputation of Law they are one with them, ſo they are naturally tender'd by them as themſelves. In conformity whereto, as we find the *Decalogue* proceeding, becauſe ſubjoyning the Prohibition of Adultery to that of Murther, (bearing witneſs thereby to its Author's Prudence, in the diſpoſition, as well as in the framing of his Laws); ſo having obſerv'd ſo much to you, I will deſcend to the conſideration of that Precept which intends the ſecuring of us in thoſe our other ſelves.

In order whereunto, becauſe that Crime which it forbids is nothing elſe than a *Violation of the Matrimonial Vow*, I will,

1. Firſt of all, entreat of the Importance, Inſtitution, and Laws of Marriage; which will diſcover to us the Affirmative part of the Precept.
2. Shew the Nature and Criminalneſs of Adultery: And,
3. Laſtly, inquire, Whether any other Sins are included in the Prohibition of Adultery, and what thoſe Sins are.

1. Of the *Importance of Marriage* much need not be ſaid, at leaſt as to that ſenſe wherein we are to take it in this whole Diſcourſe; the general Notion of Marriage, as well as our own private one, being, That it is *a Compact between a Man and a Woman, of Cohabitation during Life, for the comfort of Society, and the Propagation of Children.* The onely thing which will require any large Explication is, Whether ſuch a Compact be *of Divine Inſtitution*, and *by what Laws* it ought to be govern'd.

2. For the reſolution of the *former* whereof, theſe two things muſt be again inquir'd into, becauſe alike comprehended in it.

1. Whether or no it be of Divine Inſtitution for *all Perſons* to enter into it, *which are arriv'd to years of maturity*: Or,
2. If not, Whether it be of Divine Inſtitution for *them who intend any ſuch Cohabitation* with thoſe of the other Sex.

In the handling of both which (as in like manner of all that follows) I will uſe all the cleanneſs of Expreſſion imaginable, as judging it ill becoming thoſe who perſwade Purity to other Men, to offend againſt it in their own Diſcourſes concerning it.

I begin with the firſt of the Queſtions propos'd, to wit, Whether or no it be of Divine Inſtitution, for *all Perſons* to enter into Marriage, *which are arriv'd to years of maturity.* Which Queſtion I the rather put, as becauſe the *Jews* * were generally perſwaded that Marriage was of univerſal obligation, ſo alſo becauſe that Perſwaſion of theirs was not without ſome colour, even from the Scripture it ſelf; he who made them *Male and Female*, bidding them *be fruitful and multiply, and repleniſh the earth, and ſubdue it.* And indeed, if we inquire concerning *the Infant-ſtate* of the World, and before it came to be Peopled

* *Vid. Selden. de Jure nat. & Gent. l. 5. c. 3.*

Peopled as it is, ſo no doubt can remain but *Marriage was under command* to thoſe who were in a capacity to enter into it, becauſe otherwiſe they ſhould have fruſtrated the Deſign of God, who propos'd by that means not onely to continue a Succeſſion of Men, but to diffuſe the Race of them throughout the World, that they might enjoy thoſe Bleſſings wherewith his moſt liberal Hand had furniſh'd it. But, as there is not the ſame reaſon, *now that the World is Peopled*, and there are enough that have eſpous'd that State to continue the Succeſſion of it; ſo, that it is not at preſent of univerſal obligation, whatſoever it before was, is evident from that of St. *Matthew*, *chap.* 19. 12. where we have it from our Saviour himſelf, in that very Chapter where he inculcates the Inſtitution of Marriage, That as there are ſome Perſons who are incapacitated for it by Nature, and others who have been made ſo by Men; ſo there are ſome who for the Kingdom of God's ſake have abridg'd themſelves of the uſe of it, and thoſe that can receive it, permitted by our Saviour to do it. When therefore the Queſtion is concerning the Inſtitution of Marriage, it is requiſite we underſtand it with relation not to all Perſons whatſoever, but to thoſe who intend ſuch a Cohabitation with the other Sex, as Marriage doth naturally involve.

Now that Marriage, *ſo underſtood*, is of *Divine Inſtitution*, and all other Cohabitations unlawful, will appear, if we conſider either *that Cohabitation* we have affirm'd it to covenant for, or *the Covenant* it ſelf. For, it being evident from the Book of *Geneſis*, that God at the beginning made Male and Female for each others mutual help, and the propagation of Children by them; and it being further evident, both from the Words of the Inſtitution,, and our Saviour's Explication of it in the place before-quoted, that God intended not either a promiſcuous or deſultory Enjoyment of each other, but of * certain Perſons, and ſuch to which they ſhould be oblig'd to cleave; it being evident, thirdly, from our Saviour, that that Adheſion is to be underſtood not of one to more Perſons, but of one to one, becauſe he afterwards ſubjoyns, || *And they twain ſhall be one fleſh:* laſtly, it being evident that our Saviour doth not onely not reſcind that firſt Inſtitution, but confirm it †, and bind it upon the necks of his Diſciples: it will follow, That the individual Cohabitation of a Man with a Woman, for the purpoſes before ſpoken of, is ſo of Divine Inſtitution, that all others are utterly unlawful. Again, Foraſmuch as both the Scripture * every where ſuppoſeth in Marriage the entring into *covenant* concerning it; and that Adheſion which Marriage involves requires it; there being no aſſurance to either Party of ſo long a Cohabitation, if they did not bind themſelves to it by promiſe: it is but juſt to ſuppoſe, however not expreſs'd in the Inſtitution, that the ſame God who inſtituted ſuch a Cohabitation, did alſo appoint their *entring into Covenant* for it, to give each other an aſſurance of it. Which Particular is the rather to be added, leſt (as the Faſhion is now adays) Men ſhould think it enough to aſſume a Mate, with intention, it may be, if all things anſwer their expectation, to adhere to her during Life; but without any Obligation upon themſelves to do it. For, though ſuch an Adheſion ſhould happen to continue, yet inaſmuch as it is without any Tie upon the Parties, it can be none of that which is appointed, and is rather *a long Fornication*, than *a Marriage*.

* *Mat.* 19. 4, 5.

|| *Mat.* 19. 5.

† *Mat.* 19. 4. 8, *&c.*

* *Pro.* 2. 17. *Mal.* 2. 14.

3. Of

3. Of the Importance, and Inſtitution of Marriage, I have ſpoken hitherto, and both ſhewn what it is, and that it hath God for the Author of it, it remains that we enquire by what Laws it is to be govern'd, which, after the explication of the former, will be ſo much the more eaſie to reſolve. In order whereunto I will enquire,

1. What is requir'd to the due contracting of it.
2. What is requiſite to the maintaining of it when it is ſo: And
3. Laſtly, Whether or no, and by what means, it may be diſſolv'd.

I. Now there are two things, within the reſolution whereof, all that is neceſſary to be known, concerning the *firſt* of theſe, may be comprehended.

1. What Perſons may contract Matrimony.
2. What is requiſite to a legitimate contracting of it, where there is no irregularity in the Perſons.

And here in the firſt place I ſhall not ſcruple to affirm, that to make the Marriage lawful in reſpect of the *Perſons*, it ought to be not between *one and more*, whether Males or Females, but between *one Male* and *one Female*. For beſide that that Law which enjoins the cleaving to the Married party, implies it to be the cleaving of one to one, becauſe affirming not in the general, that the Married parties ſhall be one fleſh, but *they twain ſhall be one fleſh*; beſide that the aſſuming of another Husband or Wife to the former muſt divide that Unity, and make him or her that Contracts, a new Relation to ſeparate in part from the former, whereby they can no longer be one fleſh but more; our Saviour, in the cloſe of his Diſcourſe concerning the Inſtitution of Marriage, adds ſuch an aſſertion as ſhews evidently the unlawfulneſs of Marrying more than one: That I mean, which ſaith, that *whoſoever ſhall put away his Wife, except it be for Fornication, and ſhall marry another, committeth Adultery, and who ſo marrieth her that is put away committeth Adultery*, *Mat.* 19. 9. For how could it be Adultery in him, who put away his Wife to marry another, if it were lawful to aſſume another to her, even before ſhe was ſo; but what ſhadow of Adultery in him who ſhould only marry her that was ſo put away? That being not to be look'd upon as a violation of Marriage, and conſequently not Adultery, which might be done even when the Marriage was entire. To all which, if we add that of St. *Paul*, 1 *Cor.* 7. 4. that *the Wife hath not power over her own body, but the Husband, nor again, the Husband over his, but the Wife*, ſo the marrying of more than one will appear yet more unlawful. For it being not ordinarily to be thought, that either the Wife or the Husband will conſent to the admiſſion of a Copartner, it muſt upon that account be look'd upon as unlawful to aſſume a new Relation, becauſe, beſide thoſe perſons conſent who have the power over them. And indeed ſo clear is the Divine Inſtitution for the marrying of only one, eſpecially after our Saviours explication of it, that I perſwade my ſelf there had not ariſen the leaſt ſcruple concerning it, were it not that we find Polygamy frequently practiſed by the Fathers of the Old Teſtament, and, which is more, multitude of Wives reckon'd to *David* as a bleſſing. But beſide that, in the infancy of the world ſuch a practice might be more allowable, becauſe neceſſary to the peopling of it; beſide, that God might diſpenſe

ſpenſe with his own Inſtitution afterwards, if not for the hardneſs of mens hearts, as he did in the matter of Divorce, yet in regard to that infancy of Grace, which was under the pædagogy of the Law; the queſtion is not, whether polygamy were ſometimes lawful, which I for mine own part do not in the leaſt doubt of, but whether or no it were lawful by the firſt Inſtitution of Marriage, and whether it be at all lawful now. The contrary of both which, as I have already demonſtrated, both from the words of the Inſtitution, and thoſe of our Bleſſed Saviour, ſo having done that, the former exception muſt be look'd upon as trivial in reſpect of that Goſpel ſtate under which we are; the Law of that both remitting us to what Marriage was from the beginning, and adding its own ſuffrage to it. I will conclude this particular with that of *Malachy*, becauſe ſtanding as it were in the confines of the Law and Goſpel. 'Tis in the 2. Chapter of his Propheſies, Verſ. 14. and ſo on, Where having alledg'd againſt the *Jews*, Gods *regarding not their Offering, nor receiving it with good will at their hands*, he not only aſſigns for the reaſon of it, their *dealing treacherouſly with the Wife of their Youth*, but combates that with this following Argument. For *did not he*, even God, *make one, yea though he had the reſidue of the Spirit?* that is to ſay (as *Druſius* gloſſes on the words) did he not make one Male and one Female, and when he had done ſo, make them one fleſh? yea though, if he had pleaſed, as wanting not breath to animate them, he might have made and given more Wives to our Father *Adam*. *And wherefore one?* as the Prophet there goes on, *but that he might ſeek a godly ſeed*, that is to ſay (as the forequoted *Druſius* gloſſeth it) that from that one fleſh, into which thoſe two were combin'd, a lawful progeny might deſcend.

The ſecond Law of Marriage relating to the perſons, is that *thoſe between whom it is contracted, be not too near of kin to each other.* For the underſtanding whereof, we will firſt of all entreat of ſuch as are to one another *in the place of Parents and Children:* As if a Father, for example, ſhould marry his Daughter, or his Sons, or Daughters Daughter, or a Mother her Son, or her Sons, or Daughters Son. For that ſuch Matches are unlawful, even by the Law of Nature, is evident from hence, that *they deſtroy that reverence*, which we have before ſhewn *to be due from their Children to them.* Thus for inſtance, When a Mother marries her own Son, or Grand-ſon, from whom, by the Laws of Nature, there is the higheſt reverence due, inaſmuch as, by vertue of her marriage ſhe ſubjects her ſelf to him, ſhe leaves no place for that reverence which was before due unto her as a Mother. And though the like ſeem not to happen, where a Father marries his Daughter, or Grand-daughter, becauſe he, who was before Superiour, continues ſo ſtill, inaſmuch as he is the head of her whom he ſo takes unto his Wife, yet doth it in part deſtroy that reverence, which was due unto him as a Father: Becauſe, though as Husband he be ſtill head of his Child, yet he is not in the ſame meaſure as a Father, becauſe Marriage induceth a kind of parity between thoſe who enter themſelves into that State. The ſame is to be ſaid in ſome meaſure, where the Son marries his Fathers Wife, or the Niece and Nephew their Uncle and Aunt; becauſe (as was heretofore ſhewn) they are unto the former in the place of Parents, and conſequently muſt needs looſe the reverence of ſuch by being aſſum'd into ſuch a State as induceth ſuch

a Society that excludes it. Whence it is, that we find St. *Paul* not only declaiming againſt that perſon who had Married *his Fathers Wife*, and repreſenting it *as a Fornication that was not ſo much as named among the Gentiles*, but, in proſecution of that power wherewith he was arm'd, to chaſtiſe Offenders, commanding the Church of the *Corinthians* to cut him off from their Society, and ſo deliver him into *the power of Satan* for his chaſtiſement, 1 *Cor.* 5. 1, 5. As for thoſe other degrees, whether of Conſanguinity or Affinity that are forbidden in the 18th. of *Leviticus*, ſuch as are the Marrying of a whole or half Siſter, a Brothers Wife, or a former Wives Daughter, which are all, beſides thoſe before mention'd, that are expreſly forbidden by it; though the two former, at leaſt, have not the ſame exception to be made againſt them, inaſmuch as they ſeem to contain nothing contrary to natural equity, yet becauſe they are forbidden by *that* Law of God, which our Saviour profeſſeth to have come *not to deſtroy but to fulfil*, and that too (as appears by his injunction concerning divorces) in the buſineſs of *Marriage*; and becauſe the ground of the prohibition *is not peculiar to the Jewiſh Policy or Religion*, but *the nearneſs of Kindred*, which holds as much among us as among them. Laſtly, becauſe if ſuch Marriages were permitted, there might be *danger of Fornication*, by reaſon of *the free and perpetual converſe* that ſuch Perſons have with each other, therefore I think no man of Conſcience but muſt account ſuch Marriages as unlawful to him, as if the prohibition thereof had been entred into the Chriſtian Law. But other degrees than thoſe, or at leaſt ſuch as are in the ſame order with them as the Law of God condemns not, ſo neither doth our Church or State do, and therefore they, who keep within thoſe bounds, are ſo far ſecure from offending, as to that Marriage which they contract. One onely thing would be added concerning marrying the Brothers Wife, becauſe it relates to a famous inſtance of one of our own Kings, and that is, that as the Law of *Moſes* did not only permit, but command, the taking of the Brothers Wife, where there was no Child left behind; ſo it ſeems hard to ſuppoſe among Chriſtians, that it ſhould not be lawful to do the like, where not onely the caſe is the ſame, as to that particular, but (as it was in the forementioned inſtance) it was inconvenient to the Kingdom to let the Brothers Wifes Dowry, either be ſpent out of it, or at leaſt go away from the Crown.

The third Law of Marriage relating to the Perſons that enter into it, is, that *they be of years ſufficient to underſtand* the nature of that compact which they make, and to eſtimate the humour of thoſe Perſons with whom they are to aſſociate: leſt otherwiſe, that, which was intended for a help, prove a ſnare, and an incumbrance, and Marriage become not only a yoak but an inſupportable one. Whence it is, that though Cuſtom and the Laws do ſometime give way to the joyning of Children in Marriage, eſpecially of the Nobler ſort, yet the ſame Laws give leave to the Perſons afterwards to reſcind their former Contract, if they find not themſelves in a diſpoſition to confirm it.

Add hereunto *hability of Body*, where there is a deſire and expectation of Children, and *a freedom of conſent* in thoſe that are ſo to be conjoin'd. Which latter is the rather to be inculcated, becauſe

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of thoſe fatal inconveniencies which ariſe from conſtrained Matches; it being very rare to find a tolerable accord in thoſe Matches, to which young Perſons are rather compell'd than invited.

But of all the qualifications relating to the Married perſons, the want whereof doth not null the Contract between them; I think there is none more conſiderable than *that they who Marry, be ſo far*, at leaſt, *of one perſwaſion in Religion, that they may join together both in publick and private Prayers.* For though (as a Learned Man hath obſerv'd*) it would be hard to condemn the contrary Matches (how diſtant ſoever their Religions are) as ſimply evil and unlawful, inaſmuch as there may be cauſes imaginable, wherein they may ſeem not only lawful but expedient; ſuch as is, for Example, The Marrying of a *Chriſtian* with a *Pagan*, where there is none other to adjoin himſelf to, or of a *Proteſtant* Prince with a *Popiſh* Princeſs, where the good of the State doth neceſſarily require it; yet I think it would be as hard to free ſuch Matches from the imputation of ſinfulneſs, where there is not ſomething of neceſſity to prompt the Perſons to it: Becauſe, beſide the *perpetual* || *danger* the Orthodox party is in, of *being enticed from the true Religion*, there is *little probability of that entire affection and accord* which the tie of *Marriage* doth require. For to ſay nothing at all of that alienation of affection, which difference in Religion is apt of it ſelf to produce, there is a neceſſity upon the differing parties (if they will be faithful to their ſeveral ways of Worſhip) to frequent different Companies, to reſort to different Aſſemblies, and in fine, to place their Charity upon different Objects. Upon which, as Jealouſies and Suſpicions muſt needs ariſe, whether of their fidelity to each others Beds, or of their juſtice in the diſpenſing of the common Goods; it is impoſſible to think, but that thoſe Jealouſies will alſo prompt them to give a check to each other in their ſeveral courſes, which will be the parent of farther differences between them. For *who* (as * *Tertullian* ſpeaks) *would ſuffer his Wife upon pretence of viſiting the Brethren, to run up and down from houſe to houſe, and particularly to thoſe of the poorer ſort? Who will willingly bear her being taken from his ſide, to be preſent at nightly meetings, if occcaſion do ſo require? Who will ſuffer her to lie from him at the Solemnities of* Eaſter, *or be preſent at that Banquet of our Lord, which the* Heathen *do ſo defame? In fine, Who will ſuffer her to creep into Priſon, there to kiſs the Bonds of the Martyrs?* Rather than ſo (as the ſame Father immediately before diſcourſeth) if he do not reſtrain her by his Authority, yet he ſhall find out ſome means or other whereby to divert her from her purpoſes. *If a Station* ||, *or more ſolemn Aſſembly for Prayer, be to be held, it is ten to one but the Husband will appoint her that day to accompany him to the* Bath. *If a Faſt be to be obſerv'd, but that he will hold a Feaſt upon it. Laſtly, If ſhe be to go abroad*, whether to viſit the ſick, or for other ſuch like purpoſe, *but that there ſhall then be ſomewhat more than ordinary to buſie her about at home.* On the other ſide, when Husband and Wife are of the ſame perſwaſion in matters of Religion, when they are one as well in Spirit as in

* See the Caſe of Marrying with a Recuſant, by Dr. *Sanderſon.*

|| *Tert. ad Uxorem, lib. 2. Quis enim dubitet obliterari quotidie fidem commercio infideli? Bonos corrumpunt mores, confabulationes malæ: quanto magis & convictus, & individuus uſus? ib. cap. 3.*

* *Tertull. ad Uxorem lib. 2. p. 189. Quis autem ſinat conjugem ſuam, viſitandorum fratrum gratiâ, vicatim aliena & quidem pauperiora quæq; tuguria circuire? Quis nocturnis convocationibus, ſi ita oportuerit, a latere ſuo adimi libenter feret? Quis deniq; ſolennibus Paſchæ abnoctantem ſecurus ſuſtinebit? Quis ad convivium illud Domin'cum quod infamant, ſine ſua ſuſpicione dimittet? Quis in carcerem ad oſculanda vincula martyris reptare patietur?*

|| *Tertull. ib. Ut ſi ſtatio facienda eſt, maritus de die condicat ad balneas: ſi jejunia obſervanda ſunt, maritus eadem die convivium exerceat: ſi procedendum erit, nunquam magis familiæ occupatio obveniat.*

Fleſh, then there is not onely no diſſent as to Civil matters, but a perfect accord as to Spiritual ones, they think, and ſpeak, and act the ſame things. As *Tertullian* expreſſeth it in the place before quoted, *They Pray, they roul themſelves in Aſhes and Faſt together, they Teach, Exhort, and bear alike with each other*. They are both alike in the Church, and at the Feaſts of the Almighty, they are alike in ſtraights, in perſecutions, and refreſhments. Neither goes about to conceal ought from other, neither avoids the others converſe, nor is burdenſome to the other, when they afford their own. The ſick is viſited freely, and without the leaſt hinderance from the other, and the indigent perſon reliev'd. Alms are given without any fear of the others diſpleaſure, the Chriſtian Sacrifices reſorted to, without giving the other the leaſt ſcruple of their unfaithfulneſs, the daily Prayers attended without any impediment. There is no need of croſſing ones ſelf by ſtealth, of a fearful ſalutation, or a dumb benediction. Pſalms and Hymns ſound between them two, and they provoke each other who ſhall ſing beſt unto his God.* The reſult of which bleſſed harmony is, That *Chriſt who ſees and hears all this rejoiceth at it*, and foraſmuch as he is a lover of Peace and Unity, adds *his Peace and Society to theirs*, and both *excludes the company of the evil one*, and makes up a kind of Trinity in Unity with them.

* *Simul orant, ſimul volutantur, & ſimul jejunia tranſigunt, alterutro docentes, alterutro hortantes, alterutro ſuſtinentes. In Eccleſia Dei pariter utrique, pariter in convivio Dei, pariter in anguſtiis, in perſecutionibus, in refrigeriis. Neuter alterum celat, neuter alterum vitat, neuter alteri gravis eſt. Liberè æger viſitatur, indigens ſuſtentatur. Eleemoſynæ ſine tormento, ſacrificia ſine ſcrupulo, quotidiana diligentia ſine impedimento. Non furtiva ſignatio, non trepida gratulatio, non muta benedictio. Sonant inter duos Pſalmi & Hymni, & mutuò provocant quis melius Deo ſuo cantet. Talia Chriſtus videns & audiens gaudet. His pacem ſuam mittit. Ubi duo, ibi & ipſe: ubi & ipſe, ibi Malus non eſt. Tertull. ad Uxor. lib. 2. in fine.*

Having thus ſhewn what Perſons may contract Matrimony, and with whom, proceed we to enquire what is requiſite to the contract it ſelf. And, here to ſay nothing at all how far the conſent of Parents is requir'd, becauſe I have ſufficiently accounted for that, where I entreated of Childrens duties to them, I ſhall firſt of all repreſent, as neceſſary to the legitimateneſs thereof, that *the compact be made before one or more witneſſes.* For beſide that, otherwiſe a way might be opened to either Party to withdraw themſelves, and to diſſolve that Contract which God would have to be inviolable, occaſion of Scandal would thereby be given to thoſe with whom they converſe, becauſe ignorant of the grounds of that freedom of Commerce which they obſerve to be between the Parties. And accordingly, as all civil Nations have provided that Marriages ſhould be ſolemniz'd in publick, thereby both to cut off from the Married Perſons all pretexts of withdrawing from each other, and all ſcandal from thoſe with whom they converſe, ſo I ſee not how they can be ſo legitimate as they ought, where they are leſs publick than the Law requires. For though the preſence of one or two Witneſſes may be of force enough to oblige the parties to a Cohabitation, yet they cannot take of the ſcandal, which may ariſe from the clandeſtineneſs thereof.

But neither is it leſs requiſite, that Marriages ſhouldbe made *agreeably to the conſtitutions* both of that Church and State whereof the married Perſons are Members. The latter, becauſe the welfare of the State may depend much upon them, as particularly in thoſe that are Heirs or Heireſſes to great Eſtates, and as it ſometimes happens, to a Kingdom: by the former whereof, great Eſtates may come to be embezzled, by the latter, a Kingdom to be proſtituted to the arbitrement of thoſe, who are no way in a capacity to manage it. The

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ſame is to be ſaid of the neceſſity of their being made, agreeably to the conſtitutions of the Church. For the Law which God hath given concerning Marriage being general, or at leaſt not ſo particular as to determine all queſtions that may ariſe concerning it, there is a neceſſity of referring them to the determination of thoſe who are by God and the Church entruſted with the welfare of it, and conſequently, in particular Perſons, of acquieſcing in it.

I obſerve, Thirdly, that though *the ſolemnization* of Marriage *by a Prieſt*, be not *abſolutely neceſſary* to make it good and valid, upon which account we find all thoſe to have been confirm'd *, which in the late miſerable confuſions had been made another way, yet *is it of ſo great expediency*, that I ſee not how any *Chriſtian* State can introduce any other, and much leſs how private Perſons can. For beſide that the conjunction of Marriage is *the act of God* || and *not of the Contractors*, and therefore moſt meet to be diſpens'd by thoſe who are *the Miniſters of God* to us in things pertaining to God, the thing it ſelf is of ſo *great importance*, as to our whole life, that it cannot but be thought to require *the bleſſing of the Prieſt* to make it *happy* to the Contracters, and *his exhortations* to make it *holy and unblameable*. For, if ſo ſacred a tie as Marriage be ſo lightly regarded, even when it hath the Solemnities of Religion to procure it reſpect and veneration, how may we think it would be contemn'd, if it were only look'd upon as a civil one, as there is no doubt it would be, if it had not the Miniſteries of Religion to accompany it. And accordingly as in this, and I think all other *Chriſtian* Nations, the Solemnization thereof is committed to the Miniſters of Religion, ſo that it was ſo in the firſt and pureſt times of *Chriſtianity*, is too evident from Ancient Records to admit of any the leaſt doubt. For thus *Ignatius*, that moſt holy Man, and a Diſciple of the Apoſtles, in his Epiſtle to *Polycarp**, another Apoſtolical Perſon, tells him. *It becometh thoſe Men and Women that Marry, to enter into that conjunction with the conſent of the Biſhop, that the Marriage may be according to God, and not according to luſt.* And *Tertullian* another Ancient Writer, and one of great Authority in the Church, in more places than one declares the ſame uſage and belief. For not contented to ſay in his Book *de Pudicitiâ**, That *among them, even Clandeſtine Marriages, that is to ſay, thoſe that were not profeſſed before the Church were in danger to be cenſur'd next to Adultery and Fornication*: in another Tract of his, he ſpeaks yet more plainly, both as to the uſage and the reaſon of it. *How* || *may we be able to declare the happineſs of that Marriage, which the Church joins, and the Oblation or Sacrament confirms, and the Bleſſing ſeals; in fine, which the Angels* (thoſe he means which are preſent at, and behold our Devotions) *proclaim, and our Father which is in Heaven ratifies. For neither upon earth do Children rightly and lawfully Marry, without the conſent of their Parents.*

* See the Stat. of 12 *Car.* 2. c. 33.

‖ *Mat.* 19. 6.

* Πρέπει τοῖς γαμοῦσι, καὶ ταῖς γαμουμέναις μετὰ γνώμης τοῦ ἐπισκόπου τὴν ἕνωσιν ποιεῖσθαι, ἵνα ὁ γάμος ᾖ κατὰ θεὸν, καὶ μὴ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν. pag. 13. edit. *Voſſ.*

* C. 4. *Ideo penes nos occultæ quoque conjunctiones, id eſt, non prius apud Eccleſiam profeſſæ juxta mœchiam & fornicationem judicari periclitantur.*

‖ *Ad Uxor. lib.* 2. *c. ult. Unde ſufficiamus ad enarrandam felicitatem ejus matrimonii, quod Eccleſia conciliat, & confirmat oblatio, & obſignat benedictio, angeli renunciant, pater rato habet.*

I obſerve, Fourthly, that as it is expedient, and in a more than ordinary manner, for Marriage to be celebrated by a Prieſt, ſo it is alſo *expedient, and*, where Authority hath commanded it, *neceſſary to be ſolemniz'd*

ſolemniz'd with ſuch ſignificant Actions, or Ceremonies, as the joyning of Hands, and the giving and receiving of a Ring. Becauſe, though Marriage, and all other Contracts, may be made by Words onely; yet they neither do, nor can make ſo *firm an Impreſſion* upon the Minds either of the Parties or the Witneſſes, as *thoſe viſible Declarations* do. Whence it is, that in all Civil Contracts almoſt ſuch Actions as thoſe have place, and Men think not themſelves well aſſur'd, unleſs, beſide a Declaration by Word or Writing from thoſe with whom they have to do, they have alſo a Turf of that Land which they contract for, put into their Hands by the Seller, or at leaſt thoſe Deeds whereby it is convey'd. But what ſpeak I of other Contracts, when even in this particular one they who profeſs'd themſelves the Churches Adverſaries, ſhew'd themſelves to be at an Accord with it? For however that Convention which baniſh'd Marriage by a Prieſt, did alſo diſcard the Ring; yet they retain'd Joyning of Hands, which is no leſs a ſignificant Ceremony than the other.

PART II.

Of ſuch Laws of Marriage as concern the preſerving it inviolable, after it is contracted: and firſt of all, of ſuch as reſpect both the Parties. Where is ſhewn, firſt, That there is a Tie of Love upon both; and the Grounds of that Love declared: which are, firſt and chiefly, that Unity which Marriage conciliates; and ſecondly, its being intended as a Figure of that Affection which is between Chriſt and his Church. Of the Importance of that Love, and what the due Effects thereof are; which are ſhewn to be, 1. *The doing all things that may any way contribute to each others contentment; as, on the other ſide, the avoiding all things that may diſpleaſe.* 2. *The ſeeking one anothers Profit; the Means whereof are alſo declar'd.* 3. *The endeavouring each others Spiritual Welfare.* 4. *A mutual forgiving and forbearing, where Differences do ariſe. That there is a Tie of Fidelity, as well as of Love; the purport whereof is alſo declar'd. That the Married Parties are to give each other Honour; and particularly, what that Honour is which is due from the Husband to the Wife. In fine, That in reſpect to God, whoſe Inſtitution Marriage is, they ought to poſſeſs their Veſſels in Sanctification and Honour, as well between themſelves, as toward others. An Addreſs to the declaration of ſuch Laws as concern the Married Parties ſeverally; where is ſhewn, upon the part of the Husband, that the Authority he hath over the Wife, is not coercive, but directive; that accordingly it ought to proceed rather by the way of Love than Empire; as laſtly, to reſtrain it ſelf to ſuch things as are within the Bounds of Religion, and to ſuch as are ſuitable to that Fellowſhip whereinto ſhe is admitted; where the Management of Houſhold Affairs is ſhewn to be the Womans Province. On the part of the Wife is ſhewn, That ſhe ought not in any meaſure to uſurp Authority over the Man, but endeavour rather to gain him by Meekneſs and Compliance; That ſhe ought to do him Honour both in Language and Geſture, and obey him*

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in all things that are not contrary to Religion, or to that Condition of Life into which ſhe is admitted by him. A more particular Declaration of the Duty of the Wife in the matter of Obedience; where is ſhewn, That though ſhe hath no Tie upon her as to ſuch things as are contrary to Religion, yet ſhe ought to be directed by her Husband in judging of Religious Matters, and, where they are not manifeſtly contrary to the Scriptute, to ſubmit to, and follow his Advices; That though ſhe be not under obedience, as to ſuch things as are fitter for a Servant than a Wife; yet what is fit, or not fit for a Wife to do, ought not to be judg'd of by the Deportment of the moſt, and much leſs by the Caprichio's of her own Brain; but by the Example of Godly Matrons; That though the Management of Houſhold Affairs be the Wifes peculiar Province, and therefore no proper matter generally for the Husband to interpoſe his Commands in; yet ſhe ought to comply with him even there, where there is any juſt fear of his being diſcredited or undone by her evil Management. An Exhortation to the Married Parties, to perform their reſpective Duties.

II. IT being ſo rare for Popular Diſcourſes to entreat of the Duties of Married Perſons, that it is almoſt become an Abſurdity to mention them, I may perhaps fall under the Cenſure of Indiſcretion, for going about to make them the Subject of mine, though the Deſign I am now upon do naturally lead me to it. But becauſe I cannot give a ſatisfactory Account of the Nature of Adultery, and much leſs of the due Importance of that Commandment which forbids it, without entreating of the Laws of Marriage, which Adultery is a Violation of; and becauſe, how nice ſoever Men are now grown, and how fearful ſoever of incurring the Cenſure of Indiſcretion, St. *Paul* made no difficulty of interlacing almoſt all his Epiſtles with Diſcourſes of it; laſtly, becauſe there is neither that Fidelity between ſome Married Perſons, which the Divine Inſtitution and their own Covenants, nor that Accord between others, which ſo intimate a Relation doth require; I hope it will not be look'd upon by ſober Perſons as any Imprudence, if (as I have in the former Diſcourſe ſhewn what is neceſſary to the legitimate Contracting of Marriage, ſo) I make it the buſineſs of this to demonſtrate, what is requiſite to preſerve it inviolable, after it is ſo contracted. In order whereunto, I will repreſent,

1. Such Duties as are common to the Married Parties: And, after that, deſcend to
2. Thoſe which are peculiar to each of them.

Now though what both the one and the other are, be competently evident from thoſe Covenants into which the Parties enter, at the Solemnization of Matrimony between them; yet becauſe it is not impoſſible ſome Duties may be more obſcurely expreſs'd there, than will be requiſite to give each of them a due underſtanding of them; and becauſe thoſe which are more clearly ſet down, will be look'd upon as more forcible, if it can be made appear, that they have the Obligation of the Divine Command, as well as of their own Contract, to bind them on them; therefore I think it but neceſſary to inveſtigate them by the purport of the Divine Commands, as well as by the tenor of their own Compacts.

1. To

1. To begin with *those which are common to the Married Parties*, because the most natural Results of that intimate Conjunction into which they enter. Where,

1. First, I shall represent the Parties *loving of each other*, as both their own Compacts, and the Divine Commands bind them. For, though Love be most usually made the Duty of the Husband to the Wife, as, on the other side, Obedience and Reverence that of the Wife toward the Husband; yet, as it is evident from St. *Paul's* enjoyning the aged Women to teach the younger *to love their Husbands*, that Love is no less due from them, than it is from the Husband to them, *Tit.* 2.4 so the ground which he elsewhere assigns for the Husbands loving of the Wife, inferrs equally the returning of it by her. For, the Love of the Husband to the Wife being founded by him in that Unity, or Identity rather, which Marriage conciliates between the Parties, *Ephes.* 5.28. and so on; if the Wife be one with him, as well as he with her, there must be the same tie of Love upon her, as there is upon the Husband to her. Here onely is the difference, that whereas the Husband, by the Prerogative of his Sex, hath no other tie than that of Love, which is the reason why the Duty of Love is in a manner appropriated to him; the Wife, because subjected to the Husband, is to temper hers with Reverence and Obedience: for which cause we hear so little of any Love to be paid by her, and so much of Reverence and Obedience.

It being thus evident, that *Love*, how peculiar soever it may seem unto the Man, is yet alike the Duty of them both; proceed we to inquire, what is *the due Importance* of it. Where, first, no doubt can be made, but that it implies *an inward Affection*; as because Love, in propriety of Speech, denotes the Affection of the Heart; so, because all Effects, without it, are but Hypocrisie and Dissimulation. As little doubt is to be made, secondly, but that that inward Affection of Love is to exert it self in *suitable Effects*; partly because Love is naturally operative, and partly because St. *Paul*, where he exhorts Husbands to love their Wives, proposeth *Christ's Love* to the Church for the Pattern of it; which, as it was not without an inward Affection, so shew'd it self in effect; because, as the same St. *Paul* observes, prompting him *to give himself* for it. The onely thing of difficulty in this matter, is, What is *the Ground* of that mutual Love, and *what Effects* it ought to manifest it self by.

As to the former of these, much need not be said, especially if we have an eye to the principal Ground of it; the Words of St. *Paul* in the place before-quoted, no less than those of the Institution of Marriage, shewing the ground of the Parties Love to be no other than *that Unity* into which the Divine Institution hath conjoyn'd them. Onely, as so much was necessary to be observ'd here, because the proper place for it; so, the rather to take them off from laying the main stress of their Love upon the Aimiableness, or other Qualities of those with whom they are so conjoyn'd. For, as though these, and other such like, are a just ground of Love between them; yet they are neither the onely, nor the principal ones: so, he who makes them such, is in danger of overthrowing that Love which God would have to be firm and stable: Because, however the Word of God may endure for ever, yet Beauty, and other such like Qualities, perish, and come to nought,

nought, and conſequently draw after them the deſtruction of that Love which hath no other ground to ſtand upon. I ſay not the ſame of that *Affection which is between Chriſt and his Church*, of which St. *Paul* tells us Marriage was intended for a Figure; becauſe, though that be *not the principal Ground* of Love, yet it is *a neceſſary and a laſting one.* For, inaſmuch as Marriage was intended to repreſent that Affection and Unity which is betwixt *Chriſt* and his Church, that Affection and Unity ought in reaſon to be an inducement to ours, as without which we ſhall but profane the other.

The Grounds of our mutual Love being thus declar'd, inquire we, in the next place, into the due *Effects* of it: Which are, firſt, *the doing of all things that may any way contribute to each others contentment*; as, on the other ſide, *the avoiding of all things which may diſpleaſe.* Both the one and the other of which, as they are ſo eaſie to be underſtood, that it will be unneceſſary to explain them; ſo they are, for the moſt part, ſuch, that it will be much better to leave them to the Conſciences of the Parties to inform themſelves in, than to give any diſtinct explication of. It may ſuffice here to ſay, 1. That as Marriage was intended for ſuch a Society as the Parties that enter into are by Nature moſt fitted for; ſo it cannot but be look'd upon as a Violation of Marriage, and of that Love which it involves, to refuſe that Society to each other. Again, Foraſmuch as all Love, and particularly the Conjugal one, excludes the doing of any thing that may diſpleaſe the Party loved; it will follow, that they who are entred into that State, are to avoid all unkind or contumelious Words, all contemptuous and injurious Actions, but more eſpecially all ſuch as may miniſter an occaſion of ſuſpicion to each other, of their having a greater Affection for a Stranger.

Next to the Contentation of each other, ſubjoyn we *the ſeeking one anothers Profit*, as being a no leſs neceſſary Effect of Love, and of that Union that is between the Parties. For, as Love, where it is, naturally ſeeks the good of thoſe whom it makes the Object of its Affection; ſo, by ſo much the more, by how much the nearer they are to it: but how much rather then, when they are in a manner one with it. Which, as it is the caſe of the Married Couple, who, by the Inſtitution of the Almighty, are *no more twain, but one fleſh*; ſo, being ſuch, it muſt be look'd upon as unnatural, not to have the ſame care for each other, not to ſeek each others Profit and Advantage. Becauſe, however Men may ſometimes have little regard to Strangers, yet (as the Apoſtle argues in the place before-quoted) *no man yet ever hated his own fleſh, but nouriſheth and cheriſheth it, even as the Lord the Church.* Which place, as it is a convincing Argument of the Love they ought to have for each other, and, which is more, of ſeeking each othert advantage; ſo directs us withal to the Means they are to make uſe of, in order to the procuring of it: that is to ſay, *providing for each others Welfare*, whilſt it is yet entire, *by Food, and Raiment, and all other things that are neceſſary for their ſupport*; as, when it is any way impair'd by Sickneſs or Trouble of Mind, *endeavouring to reſtore it*, by the *application of inward and outward Remedies, by Advice, and Comfort, and Aſſiſtance.* Both the one * and ‖ the other of theſe, as they are the purport of thoſe Words by which St. *Paul* illuſtrates the Effects of the Husbands Love; ſo being alike common

* Ἐκτρέφει, enutrit, educat, ſic Lexicographi.

‖ Θάλπῃ, Heſych. Θάλπω, θερμαίνω, παραμυθέομαι. Idem. Θαλπωρὴ, παραμυθία, σκέπη, χαρὰ, ἡδονὴ, &c.

common to each, as both the Union that is between them ſhews, and the aptitude that is in either to promote them. For, though the Care of Proviſion lies eſpecially upon the Man, as being beſt fitted for it by ability both of Mind and Body; yet as the Woman oftentimes is in ſome meaſure fitted for it, and conſequently under a proportionable Obligation to intend it; ſo there is a Proviſion within-doors, which is her peculiar Province, and without which the Proviſion of the Man will be of little or no avail, either for himſelf or her.

But becauſe the Married Parties are Spirit as well as Fleſh, and no Proviſion can ſecure the Welfare of that, but that which Religion furniſheth; therefore it may not be amiſs to inquire, whether that Love which ought to be between them, be not to extend it ſelf alſo to *the ſeeking each others Spiritual Welfare.* For, though Marriage, in its own nature, look no farther than a Temporal one, as for the promoting whereof it was firſt ordain'd; yet, as nothing hinders, but it may be carried much higher, by the Precepts of Religion, and particularly of that which we have the Honour to profeſs; ſo, that it is ſo, we have not onely the general Commands of procuring each others eternal Welfare, (and how much more then theirs who are ſo nearly conjoyn'd to us?) but ſuch as do more particularly direct the procuring of theirs who are united to us by the Band of Marriage. For, wherefore ſhould St. *Paul*, 1 *Cor.* 14. 15. direct the Wife, *if ſhe underſtood not* what ſhe had learn'd in the Publick Aſſemblies, *to aſk her Husband at home concerning it*; but that (as Biſhop *Davenant* well argues) it is the Duty of the Husband to direct his Wife in Spiritual as well as Temporal Matters? Or the ſame St. *Paul* oblige *the believing Wife to cohabite with an unbelieving Husband*, upon the hopes of gaining him over to her Religion, 1 *Cor.* 7. 13. but that he ſuppos'd it to be the Duty of the Wife, ſo far as in her lies, to procure her Husbands Spiritual Welfare? And indeed, as it is ſcarcely poſſible for thoſe who have any great love for each other, not to deſire and endeavour each others Welfare, in that which moſt eſpecially concerns them; ſo they who remember Marriage to have been intended as a Figure of that *Myſtical Union* that is between *Chriſt* and his Church, will not think they have paid a juſt Reſpect to that Myſtery which it adumbrates, unleſs they endeavour to their power to make the Converſation of each other approach as near as may be to it.

Laſtly, Foraſmuch as there is nothing more contrary to Love, or to that Union from which it reſults, than *Strife and Contention* between the Married Parties; it will follow, that it is their Duty, as well as Intereſt, *to prevent them* what they may, or, if they happen at any time to break out, to *ſuppreſs them*: The former whereof will be done by avoiding all occaſion of Offence; the latter, by a mutual forgiving and forbearance, where ſuch Offences do ariſe. Which whilſt ſome Perſons have imprudently neglected, they have but help'd to make themſelves miſerable, and made the Yoke of Marriage as uneaſie to themſelves, as to thoſe whom they deſign'd to revenge themſelves upon. It being not to be thought, they ſhould reap any advantage to themſelves, who either kindle or maintain a War within their own Houſe and Bowels?

2. To the Duty of Love, ſubjoyn we that of *Fidelity*, which is another neceſſary Reſult of that Union which Marriage conciliates; he

he or ſhe no leſs violating that Unity, who beſtow their Affections upon a Stranger, than they who deny it to the proper Object of it. Upon which account, as *Adultery* muſt needs be look'd upon as highly criminal, becauſe violating it in that particular for which it was eſpecially ordain'd; ſo alſo, though in a lower degree, *the frequenting the Company of others, more than their own Conſorts*, or *uſing more familiarity with them, than the Laws of Decency and Modeſty do allow*; in fine, *the ſpending upon others any conſiderable part of their Eſtates, to the prejudice, or without the conſent of the other Party*; he who joyn'd them ſo cloſely to one another, as to make them one Fleſh, conſequently forbidding all Commerce with Strangers, which either exceeds, or rivals, or prejudiceth that Commerce which the Society into which they enter obligeth the Married Perſons to.

3. Thirdly, As Love and Fidelity to each other are the indiſpenſible Duties of the Married Parties; ſo alſo, though in a different meaſure, the giving each other *Honour*, according as they expreſly ſtipulate. For the evidencing whereof, we ſhall need onely to inſtance in the Deportment of the Husband to the Wife, becauſe (as I ſhall afterward ſhew) there cannot be the leaſt doubt of Honours being to be paid to the Husband by her. Now, that the Husband is to give Honour to his Wife, is evident from that of St. *Peter*, 1 *Pet.* 3. 17. where he exhorts the Husband not onely *to dwell with his Wife according to knowledge*, but *to give honour to her as to the weaker veſſel*. Which Words, as they are a convincing proof of that Honour which we have affirm'd to be due to her from her Husband; ſo ſhew the Honour that is to be given her, becauſe the Honour of the weaker Veſſel, to be ſuch as is proper to that State in which God hath plac'd her under her Husband. The purport whereof is, *not that the Husband ſhould ſubject himſelf to her*, who is but in ſome reſpects his Equal, and much leſs his Superiour; but that, inaſmuch as ſhe is aſſum'd into a Copartnerſhip with him, *he ſhould treat her not as a Servant, but a Companion*; and not onely ſo neither, but *as the Companion of ſuch a Perſon*, and *according to his own Quality or Dignity*; that *he ſhould permit her* (as in reaſon he ought) *to bear her ſelf as a Mother over his Family, and not either ſubject her to, or abridge her the exerciſe of her Authority over it*; in fine, that *he ſhould permit her*, whilſt ſhe lives, *to partake of his Worldly Goods*, and after her and his Deceaſe, *to permit her Children to ſucceed into them*. For, though I know, even among us, there are other kind of Bargains made, and ſuch as do in truth make the Woman rather a Concubine than a Wife, as ſhall hereafter be more at large declar'd; though I know alſo, that in *Germany* there is a ſort of Marriage wherein the Husband gives the Wife *the Left Hand* in ſtead of *the Right*; that is to ſay, expreſly ſtipulates with her, not to take her as a Wife of *equal Condition*: by means of which, as * *Mylerus* obſerves, neither hath ſhe all the Rights of a Wife, neither do her Children ſucceed either to the Fathers Name, or Arms, or full Inheritance: Yet as I cannot but look upon ſuch Matches among us, as a contradiction *in adjecto*, becauſe the Husband in Marriage *endows her with all his Worldly Goods*; ſo, upon all ſuch, whether here or elſewhere, as contrary to the Divine Inſtitution of Marriage, and particularly to that *Honour* which St. *Peter* requires Men to exhibit to them. For, how are they either

* *Vid Mylerum in Gamologia ſeu de matrimonio Perſonarum Imperii illuſtrium, &c. citat. in le Journal de Scavans, parte* 1.

one with their Husbands, or in the eſteem of Wives, which are ſet at ſo great a diſtance from them?

I will conclude this part of my Diſcourſe with a *Duty*, that is indeed alike common with the former, to each of the Married parties, but which hath *not themſelves, but God* for the object of it: And that is, that, foraſmuch as God is the Author of Marriage, *they would*, in reſpect to him, whoſe inſtitution it is, poſſeſs their *Veſſels in Sanctification and Honour*, as well among themſelves as toward others. Which they ſhall do, if *to give themſelves to Faſting and Prayer*, they ſhall *for a time defraud one another with conſent*, as at *all times uſe that moderation in their enjoyments, as may ſhew them ſtudious of more refined ones, and that reſervedneſs and modeſty in their outward deportment, which may neither tempt others to any impurity, nor cenſure the Divine Inſtitution becauſe of them.*

2. I have hitherto inſiſted upon ſuch Duties as are common to the Married parties, and which for that reaſon it is to be hoped will not be diſtaſteful to either of them. It remains that I entreat of *thoſe that are peculiar to each of them*, and where, if any where, I muſt expect a cenſure from my Readers. But as that rarely happens to a Teacher, from the Sober and the Vertuous, where his own indiſcrete managery thereof gives not occaſion to it: ſo he muſt very much forget his own duty, and the dignity of his Employment, who ſhall value any thing of that nature, when coming from the Ignorant and Profane. Setting aſide therefore any farther diſcourſe concerning that, I will betake my ſelf to my Task, and firſt of all to

1. *Thoſe Duties which are peculiar to the Husband.* I have heretofore ſhewn, and ſhall by and by have occaſion to confirm it; that God hath endu'd the Husband with Authority over the Wife, and commanded her to pay Obedience to it. But becauſe it is not impoſſible Men may arrogate to themſelves a greater Authority than ever God intended them, or exerciſe it more fully, and with greater rigour than they ought; therefore it may not be amiſs in deſcribing the peculiar duties of the Husband, to ſhew him *what kind of Authority* he hath, *how it is to be exercis'd*, and *about what*.

For anſwer to which, I ſay firſt, that the Authority of the Husband over the Wife, is *not coercive but directive*, that is to ſay, an Authority which priviledges him to command, but not to conſtrain her to
* *Malach.* 2. 14 Obedience. For being given by God to Man, as *a Companion* * and *a helper*, and, which is more, in ſuch a degree as to become *one with him*; it is unreaſonable to think he ſhould have ſuch a power over her, as to conſtrain her to a compliance by force and violence. A forcible Treatment degrading her from the condition of a Mate, and ranking her among Subjects or Servants. Neither will it ſuffice to ſay, that ſo alſo will the laying of Commands, becauſe according to the uſual ſaying, *par in parem non habet poteſtatem*, which is alike true as to Commands and Coercions. For beſide that, by the Divine Inſtitution, the Man is priviledg'd to *rule* over her, as you may ſee, *Gen.* 3. 16. beſide that, in this caſe there is not a perfect parity, as the rule before ſpoken of ſhews; the power of Command is not only not deſtructive of the conjugal Society, but abſolutely neceſſary to the maintaining of it. For, inaſmuch as the Married parties may both entertain different apprehenſions concerning ſuch things as are to be done,

done, and alſo take up different reſolutions concerning them; if there were not a power of ruling ſomewhere, it would be in the power of either party to obſtruct the common good of both. But as there is not the ſame neceſſity of a coercive Power, partly becauſe the Huſband hath the Law of God to back his Commands, and partly becauſe not without a ſufficient Power, from the Laws of the place he lives in, to be able to effect his own purpoſes: ſo it is perfectly inconſiſtent with that Society and fellowſhip, into which the Wife is aſſumed by him. It may ſuffice the Husband, that he hath the power of Commanding, and in caſe of refuſal, that of Reproof and Admonition, as which, thoſe of far leſs Authority are not excluded from: but other coercion than that no Law of God gives him, and is not therefore to be arrogated by him.

The Authority of the Husband over the Wife being thus explain'd, and ſhewn to conſiſt in Commands, Admonitions, and Reproofs; proceed we to enquire *how this Authority is to be exercis'd*, the ſecond thing propos'd to be diſcourſed of. For the reſolution whereof, though I might again take my meaſures from that Partnerſhip into which we have ſaid the Wife to be admitted; yet I ſhall chooſe rather to ſhape my Diſcourſe by that Love, which the Husband is every where commanded to ſhew her who is ſo admitted by him. For Love, where it is either finding, or making Perſons equal, eſpecially where there is not too great an imparity between the Parties, it will follow that the *Commands or Admonitions of the Husband are not generally to be delivered in imperious terms*, and ſuch as ſavour more of *Authority* than *Kindneſs:* St. *Paul* having taught us by his own behaviour toward *Philemon*, that though a Man may have power to Command, yet, where that will ſerve the turn, *for Love's ſake he ſhould rather entreat*, and not ſo much conſtrain, as invite them to a compliance. I ſay not the ſame, where ſhe whom God hath commanded to obey, ſhews her ſelf utterly averſe from a compliance. For in ſuch a caſe, to be too officious were to make himſelf contemptible; and not only ſo, but that Authority which God hath veſted in him: Only (as we learn from St. *Paul* elſewhere *) even here alſo a mean is to be uſed: and though nothing hinders him to expreſs himſelf in terms ſuitable to his own Authority; yet no Law, either of God or Man, allows him to be *bitter* againſt her.

* *Col.* 3. 19.

The third and laſt particular comes now to be diſcours'd of, even *about what the Authority of a Husband is to be converſant*, which, if we may judge of by the obedience the Wife is required to pay, appears to be *every thing*, as you may ſee, *Eph.* 5. 24. But as the ſame Apoſtle elſewhere, where he entreats of that very Argument, adds by way of limitation, *as it is fit in the Lord*, *Col.* 3. 18. thereby manifeſtly reſtraining the Authority of the Husband to *all ſuch things as are within the bounds of our Religion:* ſo Reaſon requires the limiting it to ſuch things alſo *as are ſuitable to that fellowſhip into which ſhe is admitted.* From whence as it will follow, that the Husband ought not to impoſe upon her ſuch things *as are more proper for a Servant, or Vaſſal, than a Wife:* ſo alſo that he is generally to leave *the adminiſtration of Houſhold affairs, to her alone care and management:* Becauſe, as I have often ſaid, ſhe is admitted into a Copartnerſhip with him, which cannot well be ſalv'd, if that ſhould be taken from her;

her; and becauſe both St. *Paul*, 1 *Tim.* 5. 14. and the Laws of Nations appropriate the *guiding of the houſe* to her. According to that known Proverb which the *Roman* Matrons were wont to uſe, when they were brought home to their Husbands Houſes; *Ubi tu Caius, ibi ego Caia*, Where you are a Maſter I expect to be a Miſtreſs, and enjoy the priviledges of ſuch.

2. Having thus ſhewn the Duty of the Husband to the Wife, as to that Authority wherewith he is inveſted over her, it remains that we enquire *what is due from her to him*, as well *in reſpect of his Authority*, as *her own neceſſary ſubjection to it*. Now though that be eaſie enough to infer from the foregoing Diſcourſe, and may therefore ſeem to require the leſs pains in the inveſtigating of it, yet I think it not amiſs, if it were only to obſerve a due proportion between them, to be as particular in the declaration of it, as I was before in that of the Authority and Duty of the Husband. In order whereunto I ſay,

1. That inaſmuch as God hath inveſted the Man with Authority over the Wife, it muſt be look'd upon *as highly irreligious in her to be ſo far from ſubmitting to it, as*, on the contrary, *to uſurp Authority over him:* Such a Behaviour bidding defiance to the order of God and Nature, becauſe not only thwarting, but perverting it. And accordingly as St. *Paul* not only proſcribes it as a thing unlawful, but moreover repreſents it as a thing *not to be ſuffer'd*, 1 *Tim.* 2. 12. So he hath alſo given us there to underſtand, what is to be thought of Womens laying Commands upon their Husbands, of entertaining them with Reproofs, or offering violence to them. For if (as he there diſcourſeth) it is not ſo much as lawful for them to take upon them to *inſtruct* their Husbands, how much leſs may we ſuppoſe it to be to command or check them, or, in fine, to offer violence to them; the two former being more apparent marks of Authority than Inſtruction, the latter of ſo high a nature, that it is not lawful from the Man to the Wife, though inveſted by God with Authority over her. It may ſuffice the Wife, where the Husband behaves himſelf otherwiſe than he ought, to expoſtulate with him in the moſt becoming terms, to exhort, entreat, and perſwade him to an amendment; in fine, to endeavour it by the piety and winningneſs of her behaviour, and particularly by *a meek and quiet ſpirit*. For as other courſes than ſuch are not likely to prevail with Men that underſtand themſelves, ſo St. *Peter* not only repreſents it as the means they are to make uſe of, to win *thoſe who obey not the word* to yield obedience to it, but gives hopes withal, by affirming it to be *in the ſight of God of great price*, that it is the moſt probable means to procure it.

2. Again, foraſmuch as God hath not only inveſted the man with Authority over the Wife, but repreſented him as the head of her, even as Chriſt is the head of the Church, *Eph.* 5. 23. it will follow as St. *Paul* infers, *verſ.* 33. that ſhe ought *to reverence her Husband*, and expreſs it both in her behaviour and language; even as *Sarah* declar'd hers to *Abraham*, by *calling him Lord*, 1 *Pet.* 3. 6. But from hence we may collect what is to be thought of thoſe reproachful titles, which Women of haughty ſpirits do oftentimes beſtow upon them. For if by the precept of the Scripture they are not to ſpeak to their Huſbands without reſpect, how much leſs may we think it lawful for them,

them, to uſe ſuch contumelious terms, as are ſcarcely fit to be given to a Slave?

3. Laſtly, Foraſmuch as God hath not only inveſted the man with Authority, but oblig'd the Woman to yield obedience to it, it will follow not only that ſhe is *under a neceſſity of obedience*, but of *ſuch an obedience alſo as is proportionable to that Authority wherewith* we have ſaid him *to be inveſted.* The reſult whereof is, that ſhe is to obey him in *all things that are not contrary to Religion*, or *to that condition of life, into which ſhe is admitted by him.* Theſe three things only muſt be added to the former exceptions, as exceptions of thoſe exceptions, or rather neceſſary explications of them.

1. That though the Wife hath no tie upon her to comply with him in ſuch things as are contrary to Religion, yet ſhe is to be *directed by him in judging of Religious matters*, and where they are not manifeſtly contrary to the Scripture, *to ſubmit to, and follow his advices.* For as there is not a more proper notion of that headſhip * which is attributed to the Man, than that which imports a power of direction, ſo that that direction is to be underſtood with reference to Religious matters alſo, St. *Paul* plainly ſhews, 1 *Cor.* 14. 35. he there obliging the Wife, if ſhe doubted of the ſenſe of any thing delivered in the publick Aſſemblies, to *ask her Husband at home*, and if ſo, to take directions from him in doubtful caſes. Which courſe (as a Learned Man * obſerves) hath this farther to recommend it, that *though if ſhe be deceiv'd alone, ſhe hath no excuſe, becauſe not attending to her inſtructor, yet if ſhe ſhould happen to be deceiv'd with him, ſhe hath much pity, and ſome degrees of warranty under protection of that humility and deference which ſhe ſhews towards him, who is by God appointed over her.*

* *Daven. in Vol.* 3. 18, 19.

* Dr. *Tayl.* Sermon on *Eph.* 5. 32, 33. Part 2.

2. Secondly, Though it be true that the Wife is not under any tie of Obedience, where the things commanded by the Husband are more fit for a Servant than a Wife; yet as there may be *a time* (particularly that of Sickneſs) wherein the Husband and Wife *both* may be oblig'd by turns to be *a kind of Servants* to each other, ſo *what is fit*, or *not fit*, for a Wife to do, is at all times to be judg'd, *not by the deportment of the moſt*, which in each Sex are always the worſt, and much leſs *by the caprichi'os of their own brain*, but *by the examples of godly Matrons*, as which are moſt likely to direct them beſt in judging of it.

3. Laſtly, Though it be true, that the management of Houſhold Affairs is the proper Province of the Wife, and therefore no proper matter generally for the Husband to interpoſe his commands in; yet as no man is oblig'd to be *impos'd upon as to his own particular*, or *diſcredited*, or *undone* by her to whom he is appointed as a head; ſo if there be *any danger of either of theſe* by her imprudent or wilful management of Affairs, there is no doubt in ſuch a Caſe he hath Authority *to controul her*, and conſequently ſhe alſo *a neceſſity of ſubmitting* to it.

Having thus ſhewn at large the Duties of Married Perſons, as well thoſe which are peculiar to each, as thoſe which are common to them both, nothing remains for me to do but to exhort them to a performance,

mance, and particularly of ſuch duties as are peculiar to each of them. For, beſide that by ſo doing they ſhall each of them comply with the Divine Commands, and (becauſe that is a natural conſequent of the other) procure the peace of their own Conſciences; beſide that they ſhall thereby conſult the peace and welfare of themſelves and families, which for want of a juſt compliance are oftentimes torn in pieces, and beggary and confuſion introduc'd; the Married parties have this farther inducement to it, that they ſhall thereby provide for their own reputation, which is a thing that prevails often, where neither Intereſt nor Religion can. For what credit can it be to the Huſband to domineer over his Wife, who as well by the weakneſs of her Sex, as by the Divine command, is obliged to ſubject her ſelf to him? or what credit to the Wife to detract her Husbands juſt commands, or uſurp Authority over him? when ſhe cannot do either, without proclaiming her ſelf to be proud and inſolent, and her Husband to be a fool for permitting it. Which laſt title, if ſuch perſons cannot with patience hear others affix unto their Husbands, becauſe of that ſtrait tie which is between them; let them ſee how they will abſolve themſelves in their own breaſts, who by their imperious carriage give occaſion to the reproach of both. On the other ſide, when Man and Wife perform their reſpective duties, and his will looks more like a deſire than a command, and her actions like the reſult of his will than of her own; when the Man avoids as much as may be the intereſting himſelf in her affairs, and the Wife not only intermeddles not with ſuch as are proper to his cognizance, but endeavours to approve her ſelf to him in the management of her own: Laſtly, when the Man treats the Wife as his aſſociate, or rather as himſelf, and the Wife demeans her ſelf to him, as her directour and ſuperiour; then there is not only a happy compliance with the Divine Inſtitution, and with one another, but a juſt foundation of univerſal applauſe: and all wiſe and good perſons think themſelves oblig'd to honour the Man for knowing how to temper his Authority ſo as to make it acceptable and pleaſant, as the Wife for being able by the obligingneſs of her behaviour to transform him into an adorer of her, and make him change his ſoveraignty into kindneſs and condeſcenſion.

PART

PART III.

Whether or no, and by what means Marriage may be diſſolved, which are reſolv'd to be no other than either the Death of one of the Parties, or Fornication. Of that Liberty which our Law allows to Marry again, where the Parties have been Seven Years abſent from, and ignorant of each others being, which is ſhewn to proceed upon the preſumption of the abſent Parties death. That Fornication is a juſt ground of diſſolving the Marriage, and that nothing in Gods Law hinders either the Innocent or Nocent Party to Marry again; but that the cognizance of the cauſe belongs to thoſe who are in Authority. An Eſſay toward the ſhewing that there is no other juſt ground of a Divorce than Fornication, or ſome uncleanneſs that is equal thereunto. This evidenc'd, Firſt, in that among the Jews, *where there was manifeſtly a greater Liberty, a Divorce proceeded not but upon ſuppoſition of ſomething of Uncleanneſs. The like evidenc'd more fully from the words of our Lord in this affair. When other crimes appear, they ought either to be born, or a ſeparation made only for ſo long time, till Time or Gods Grace ſhall bring the Parties to a better mind. The matter of Divorce, rather of Permiſſion than Command, and alike common to the Woman and the Man. A Tranſition to the Negative part of the Commandment, where is entreated firſt of all of that Adultery which lies on the ſide of the Married Parties, and the Man that is falſe to his Wife, ſhewn to be as truly guilty of Adultery, as the Woman that is falſe to her Husband. The like evinced on the part of thoſe by whom the Married Parties are debauched, with a large account of the criminalneſs both of the one and the other Adultery.*

III. WHAT is requiſite to the due contracting of Marriage, or the preſerving it inviolable, when it is ſo, enough hath been ſaid to ſhew in my former Diſcourſes upon this Argument: it remains only that we enquire *whether or no*, and *by what means it may be diſſolv'd*, which will coſt no great pains to reſolve. Not the former, becauſe at the ſame time I point out the means by which it may be diſſolv'd, I ſhall alſo prove it to be capable of being ſo; as neither the latter, becauſe however men have been willing to find out others, yet Chriſtianity generally allows only two grounds of the diſſolution of it, the former whereof is *the Death of one of the Parties*, the latter *Fornication or Adultery*.

1. Now that *the Death of one of the Parties* diſſolves the Contract, and puts the living one in the ſame condition they were in before, is evident firſt of all from *the expreſſed declaration of the Scripture*. For not contented to ſay, *Rom.* 7. 2. that *the Woman which hath an Huſband, is bound by the Law to her Husband, ſo long as he liveth: but if the Husband be dead, ſhe is looſed from the Law of her Husband*, which may be interpreted as to that relaxation which the Law of *Moſes* gave: we find the like affirmation elſewhere, and with ſuch an addition alſo, as ſhews it equally to hold under the diſpenſation of the Goſpel.

Goſpel. For St. *Paul* affirming, as he doth, 1 *Cor.* 7. 33. that *though the Wife be bound by the Law as long as her Husband liveth, yet if her Husband be dead ſhe is at liberty to be Married to whom ſhe will, only in the Lord*, he thereby plainly intimateth, becauſe entreating of the Marriage of Chriſtians, that death diſſolves the Contract, no leſs under the Goſpel than the Law. The ſame is no leſs evident from *the end of Marrige*, and *the terms of the Contract*, at leaſt as they are expreſs'd among us. For both the end of its Inſtitution being for the comfort of this preſent life, and the terms upon which it is contracted being expreſly during the continuance of it; it followeth unavoidably, that where the Society is interrupted by death, the contract muſt alſo fall, becauſe intended only for the comfort of the preſent life, and covenanting for no more than the time of the continuance of it. The only thing on this head that can admit of any juſt ſcruple, is that liberty which our Law * allows to Marry again, *where the Husband or Wife ſhall be continually remaining beyond the Seas, by the ſpace of Seven Years together, or where the Husband or Wife ſhall abſent him or herſelf the one from the other by the ſpace of Seven Years together in any part of his Majeſties Dominions, the one of them not knowing the other to be living within that time.* But even this alſo, if duly examin'd, will not be found in the leaſt to contradict the forementioned Precepts. For as it is neceſſary, in many caſes, and particularly in the preſent one, to proceed by preſumptions oftentimes, unleſs we would have very material controverſies to remain undecided, which is not for the peace or intereſt of the world: ſo there is a juſt preſumption of his or her death, where during ſo long a time, the party, that is certainly alive, knows nothing at all of the others being ſo.

* 1 *Jac.* 11.

2. It being thus evident that Death diſſolves the Contract of Marriage, and leaves the living Party to the liberty of a ſecond Marriage, it remains that we enquire concerning *Fornication*, which we have affirm'd to be another juſt ground of a Diſſolution: where again we are to enquire, whether Fornication be *ſuch a ground*, and whether it be *the only one*; both the one and the other of which will receive a ſolution from the words of our Bleſſed Saviour. For affirming (as he doth) that *whoſoever ſhall put away his Wife, except it be for Fornication, and ſhall marry another, committeth Adultery, and whoſo Marieth her which is put away, committeth Adultery*, he both implieth that Fornication is a juſt ground of a diſſolution, and declareth it to be the only one. The only difficulty that hath been made as to the firſt head, is, whether or no after ſuch a Divorce there be *a liberty to Marry again* at all, or if ſo, whether for *the Nocent* as well as *the Innocent*. But beſide that (to ſpeak firſt unto the former) there appears not any reaſon, why, if Fornication be a juſt ground of diſſolving the Marriage, it ſhould not alſo leave a liberty of a ſecond Marriage, after the diſſolution of the former; beſide that Divorces, both among the *Jews* and *Heathen*, were ever underſtood to have this effect, and therefore in reaſon to be ſo taken by our Saviour, unleſs he had otherwiſe declar'd himſelf to have intended: we may as well queſtion by the words of our Lord, whether Fornication be a juſt ground of the diſſolution of the former Marriage, as whether it makes way for a ſecond. For arguing the unlawfulneſs of Divorces, except where they are for Fornication, from the Adultery which a ſecond Marriage involves

volves the Parties in, he plainly implieth liberty of Marriage to be a proper conſequent of Divorce, and conſequently, that where the Divorce is lawful (as it is for Fornication by the words of our Lord) the after Marriage alſo is. And though there be not as much reaſon for the liberty of the offending Party, becauſe it is by their fault that the former Contract was reſcinded: yet as it is evident that among the *Jews* both Parties were at liberty to Marry after a Divorce had paſs'd; ſo I ſee not how by the Law of our Lord the knot of Wedlock can be ty'd to the one Party, though the offending one, and looſe unto the other; the offending Party after a Divorce being no more to look upon the other as a Husband or a Wife, than the innocent Huſband or Wife is upon the offending one as either. This only would be added, That though it be not unlawful by the Law of our Lord for the Divorced Parties to Marry, and much leſs for the innocent one; yet is the liberty of Marrying again of ſuch dangerous conſequence, in reſpect of the Colluſion that may be between the Parties, where oftentimes they are alike weary of each other, that our Church hath thought fit to take ſufficient Bond of them before Divorce, that neither of them ſhould Marry again whilſt the other lives. But whatever be the effect of a Divorce for Fornication, which is not ſo well agreed upon among Divines; moſt certain it is, which is a thing that would be added to the former Conſiderations, that not the Parties themſelves, but they, who are entruſted with the Authority of God in Affairs of this nature, are to pronounce the Divorce between them; partly becauſe it is God that join'd them together, and partly becauſe neither together nor apart are they competent perſons to make that ſeparation between themſelves; It being not impoſſible, where the ſeparation is deſir'd by one only Party, for that Party to pretend Adultery in the other when there is no ſuch thing, as, where it is deſired by both Parties, to agree together to offend, that ſo they may have the liberty to eſpouſe new and more deſired loves.

But becauſe the Queſtion is not ſo much concerning a Divorce for Fornication together with its effect or pronouncer, as whether there be *any other juſt ground* of the diſſolution of Marriage, therefore proceed we in the ſecond place, to make that alſo the ſubject of our enquiry, or rather to ſhew that there is not any juſt ground of doubting in it. In order whereunto, the firſt thing I ſhall repreſent is, that though among the *Jews* there were a greater liberty as to this matter by the permiſſion of God himſelf, yet even there, as appears from * *Deuteronomy*, a Divorce was not allowable, ſave where there was ſome *Uncleanneſs* in the Party Divorc'd. For how is it poſſible to think that Chriſt, who pretends to ſo much more ſtrictneſs in this matter than *Moſes* did, ſhould allow of a Divorce for leſs than Fornication, when even Divorces among the *Jews* were not allowable, ſave where ſome kind of turpitude preceeded? I obſerve ſecondly, that as there is reaſon to believe, both from the purport of *Moſes* Law and our Saviours ſetting his own above it, that leſs than Fornication cannot be look'd upon as a ground of Divorce; ſo our Saviour, in the place before quoted, hath proſcrib'd all other cauſes, ſave that of Fornication only. So that to make it out that there are other allowable cauſes of Divorce, it muſt be ſaid, either that the Greek word is not rightly rendred *Fornication*, or that other ſins are included in, or deducible from it. But beſide that the proper notion of

* *Deut.* 24: 1.

the Greek word is no other than Fornication, as that imports the higheſt act of Uncleanneſs, and conſequently, where it is in a Married Perſon, that which we call Adultery; beſide that the *Chriſtian* Church have ever ſo underſtood it here, even by the confeſſion of thoſe who have endeavour'd to oppugn it: where it is taken otherwiſe, as I deny not but it ſometimes is, it either imports that which is above it, as unnatural Luſts, or is taken not ſtrictly, but metaphorically; the former whereof, as it will not at all avail thoſe who would find out ſome lower Cauſes of Divorces, ſo it is not to be imagin'd, that the latter ſhould be of any force here, becauſe our Saviour is diſcourſing of a Man's putting away his Wife; for the Ground whereof it is certainly more proper to aſſign a literal Fornication, as being an expreſs Violation of the Marriage-Vow, than that which is but metaphorical, and conſequently of leſs affinity with it. All therefore that remains to be ſaid toward the evacuating the force of our Saviour's Teſtimony, is, That other Sins are to be ſuppos'd to be included in it, or deducible from it; it being not unuſual for one thing onely to be nam'd, where others are intended to be underſtood. And indeed, if they who thus argue, mean no other than Sins of the ſame kind, and ſuch too as are of as foul or fouler a nature than Fornication; ſo I think they ſhould ſay nothing but what the Text it ſelf would well bear, and the Suffrage of Reaſon warrant. For, as a better Reaſon cannot be rendred of our Saviour's making uſe of the Word *Fornication* in ſtead of *Adultery*, which is otherwiſe more proper, than that he intended under that name to comprehend unnatural Luſts, as well as the Act of Adultery; ſo Reaſon requires the looking upon ſuch Sins rather as a ground of Divorce, which are not onely of the ſame kind, but of a much more criminal nature than the other. But as the ſame is not to be ſaid of leſſer Sins, though of the ſame Species, becauſe it was manifeſtly our Saviour's Deſign to ſet his Law above that of *Moſes*, which allow'd not of Divorces, where leſſer Uncleanneſſes preceded not; ſo, much leſs is it to be ſaid of Sins of another Species, though no way inferiour in guilt to Fornication: becauſe God, by whom the Married Parties are joyn'd, and who hath commanded not to ſeparate them without his leave, hath both in the Old Law and New reſtrain'd the making of Divorces to greater or leſſer Uncleanneſſes. It may ſuffice, where other Crimes appear, for the Married Parties to bear with each other, where they are of ſuch a nature as to be born; or endeavour by good advice the removal of them, which will be moſt for each others advantage: as in like manner, where they are not to be born, as when they ſeek each others deſtruction, to ſeparate from each other, till Time and God's Grace have brought them to a better mind. But other Courſe than that cannot be ſuppos'd to be lawful, becauſe God hath reſtrain'd Divorces to the caſe of leſſer Uncleanneſſes among the *Jews*, as among *Chriſtians* to the greater ones. What ſhould I tell you, that the *Jewiſh* Divorces, by the Sentence of our Saviour, were rather permitted than commanded; and permitted too, not ſo much out of the kindneſs of the Grantor, as for the hardneſs of the *Jews* Hearts, and for fear leſt greater Miſchiefs ſhould enſue to the hated Party? That God profeſſeth, by his Prophet *Malachi*, that *he hateth putting away?* and that our Saviour made no other Anſwer to his Diſciples, when they

See *Hammond*'s Six Queries, and particularly that concerning Divorces.

Uxoris vitium tollas opus eſt, aut feras.
Qui tollit vitium, uxorem commodiuſcu'am
Sibi præſtat; qui fert, ſeſe meliorem facit.

they inferr'd from this his Doctrine, that *if the caſe of the Man were ſo with his Wife, it was not good to marry*, than *all Men were not able to receive it?* Theſe, and many other Arguments which might be alledg'd, ſhewing an ill Choice, whether of the Man or of the Woman, to be, as *Nazianzen* expreſſeth it, κλῆδον κακὸν ἐς ἀπέκμηλον, an Evil which being got, is not to be let go, ſave where a far worſe, even the Violation of the Marriage-bed intervenes.

But becauſe (as was before intimated) the Judgment of Divorces is not permitted to the Parties concern'd, but to the Governours of the Church, and I have all along made it my buſineſs to ſpeak onely to Private Perſons, as which alone are under my inſpection; therefore I ſhall add no more upon this Head, than that as *Divorce for Fornication* (which is the onely allowable one among *Chriſtians*) *is not of command, but permiſſion*, and conſequently left to the Prudence of the Married Parties, either to endeavour it, or not, as they ſhall judge moſt expedient; ſo *the permiſſion*, whatever it is, *is alike common to either Party*, though it appears not to have been ſo among the *Jews*; not onely the mutual Power which God hath given them over each other, ſo perſwading (for how ſhould a Divorce be more lawful to the one than the other, when by means of that Power which they have over one anothers Bodies, the cauſe for which a Divorce is allow'd, muſt equally touch both Parties?) but alſo a Paſſage of St. *Paul*, and the Practice of the Primitive Church, which is the beſt Comment both upon that and other Texts. Of which latter, as we have an illuſtrious Teſtimony, in the firſt Apology of *Juſtin Martyr*, who both tells of and commends a certain *Chriſtian* Noblewoman, who ſent a Bill of Divorce to her Adulterous Husband, after ſhe had but in vain endeavour'd to wean him from his Extravagances; ſo, that it was not without ground, even from the Principles of our Religion, that of St. *Paul* ſhews, 1 *Cor.* 7. 10. For, what place were there for that Advice of his to believing Women, *not to leave their Infidel Husbands, if they were pleas'd to dwell with them*, if it were not lawful by the *Chriſtian* Law, as well as by that of the World, for a Wife to part with her Husband at all, yea though Fornication gave occaſion to it? In the mean time, as it is not to be deny'd, that thoſe Matches ſhall be moſt happy, where a Separation ſhall be neither occaſion'd nor deſir'd; ſo they ſhall act moſt agreeably to the Inſtitution of Marriage, and the Laws of *Chriſt*, who ſhall know no other Divorce than that which ſhall make a Separation between a Man and himſelf, as well as between him and the Partner of his Bed.

II. Having thus entreated of the Importance, Inſtitution, and Laws of Marriage, and therein both given you an Account of the *Affirmative part* of the Precept, and clear'd my Way to the Explication of the Negative; proceed we now, according to our propoſed Method, to inveſtigate *the Nature*, and ſhew *the Criminalneſs* of that Sin which *the Negative* doth forbid.

Now though *what Adultery is* in the general, be not at all difficult to explain, becauſe it is agreed upon to be no other than the Violation of the Marriage-bed; yet inaſmuch as that Violation is not without ſome variety, in reſpect of the ſeveral Actors in it, in order to a more particular knowledge of it, it will be requiſite to mark out the ſeveral ways whereby that Violation may be perpetrated. To begin with

that Adultery *which lies on the ſide of the Married Parties*, as which is without doubt the moſt criminal, becauſe all Adultery receives its denomination from them. Now, though Cuſtom, which is the Maſter of Language, have in a manner appropriated the Title of *Adultery* to *the falſeneſs of the Wife, and to him that ſhould ſollicite her thereunto*; though the *Roman* Laws * have ſpoke the ſame Language, and abſolv'd the Husband from the imputation of it, where he did not defile anothers Bed; yet, as * *Lactantius* hath well obſerv'd, *Chriſtianity* and Reaſon both require the charging it upon the *offending Husband*, no leſs than upon *the offending Wife*. For, it appearing both from St. *Paul*, and that Unity which Marriage conciliates, that the Woman hath no leſs power over the Husbands Body, than he over hers; and from the Terms of the Covenant into which they enter upon Marriage, that the Husband doth no leſs plight his Troth unto the Wife, than ſhe to him: that Husband which ſhall offend, ſhall be equally chargeable with the violation of the Marriage-Bed, and conſequently with the Crime of Adultery. And though it be not to be deny'd, for Reaſons afterwards to be declar'd, that the Conſequences of the Wifes Adultery are much more fatal than that of the Husbands: yet, as it is evident from the Premiſes, that the Adultery is the ſame in both, by reaſon of their mutual Intereſt in, and Obligation to each other; ſo there is very little reaſon † for the Husband to exact that Fidelity of the Wife, which he himſelf is not careful to obſerve: Partly, becauſe † there is the ſame Tie upon them to each other, and ought therefore to proceed by the ſame Meaſures; and partly, becauſe the Husband hath generally more Reaſon to reſtrain his exorbitant Paſſions by. From that Adultery which lies on the ſide of the Married Parties, paſs we to that *which lies on the ſide of thoſe by whom they are corrupted*: For, that that alſo is Adultery, the general uſe of the Word, and our Saviour's Interpretation of this Commandment, ſhews. For, ſubjoyning by way of Appendix to it, that *whoſoever looketh upon* a Woman, *or* Wife, *to luſt after her, hath committed Adultery with her already in his heart*; he thereby plainly ſhews, that Adultery is no leſs on the part of him that doth ſo corrupt her, than on the Wife who is corrupted by him. Here onely is the difference, that though both violate the Marriage-Bed, yet ſhe doth it more criminally, becauſe oblig'd by Promiſe to preſerve it ſpotleſs, which the other is not under the Obligation of.

* * Lactant. li. 6. c. 23. *Non enim ſicut juris publici ratio eſt, ſola mulier adultera eſt, quæ habet alium; maritus autem, etiamſi plures habeat, à crimine adulterii ſolutus eſt. Sed divina lex ita duos in matrimonium, quod eſt in corpus unum, pari jure conjungit, ut adulter habeatur, quiſquis compagem corporis in diverſa diſtraxerit.* Vid. Notas Anton. Thyſii ad locum.

† † Lact. lib. 6. c. 23. *Servanda igitur fides ab utroque alteri eſt; imo exemplo continentiæ docenda uxor, ut ſe caſtè gerat. Iniquum eſt enim ut id exigas, quod præſtare ipſe non poſſis.* Idem paulo poſt.— *Cavendum igitur, ne occaſionem vitiis noſtrâ intemperantiâ demus; ſed aſſueſcant invicem mores duorum, & jugum paribus animis ferant. Nos ipſos in altero cogitemus, Nam fere in hoc juſtitiæ ſumma conſiſtit, ut non facias alteri, quicquid ipſe ab altero pati non poſſis.*

The Nature of Adultery being thus unfolded, and ſhewn wherein it doth conſiſt; proceed we, in the next place, to ſhew *the Criminalneſs* thereof, which I ſhall do with reſpect to each of the Adulteries before ſpoken of.

And firſt of all, if the Queſtion be concerning that Adultery *which lies on the ſide of the Married Parties*, ſo we ſhall find Evils enough to ſowr all that Happineſs which the Adulterer or Adultereſs promiſe themſelves from it. For, is it nothing, nay, is it not a Crime of a very high nature, to violate the Inſtitution of the Divine Majeſty, and make a Separation there, where he hath enjoyn'd a ſtrict and indiſſoluble

diſſoluble Unity? Is it nothing to violate that Faith which they have given each to other, and without the obſervation whereof, not onely the Peace of Families, but even Humane Society, could not ſubſiſt? Is it nothing to rob each other of that Society which both the Divine Inſtitution, and their own Compact, have given them an undoubted Intereſt in, and which is ſo inſeparably theirs, that they cannot, even with conſent, transfer the Right thereof unto another? Is it nothing, where all the tenderneſs imaginable is due, yea, ſuch a one as a Man naturally hath for his own Fleſh; is it nothing there, I ſay, to give the higheſt occaſion of grief and diſtaſte, and fill each other with thoſe diſcontents which do not onely deſtroy the Peace of the injur'd Party, but prompt them to Malice and Revenge? Is it nothing, in ſtead of that Honour which they are oblig'd to exhibit to each other, to repay one another with Reproach, and make their Partner, as well as themſelves, the ſcorn of their Rival, and all contumelious Perſons? Is it nothing, on the Mans part, to derive his Eſtate from his Wife and legitimate Iſſue, toward the maintaining of a ſtrange Woman, and the Product of her Luſt? as, on the Womans part, to bring a Baſtard-brood to inherit the Eſtate of the Legitimate; and not onely ſo, but bring thoſe Legitimate ones into the ſame ſuſpicion of Baſtardy, and rob them of their Honour, as well as of their Subſtance? Laſtly, is it nothing to turn that which was deſign'd by God as a Figure of the Myſtical Union that is between *Chriſt* and his Church, into the unhallow'd Rites of *Venus*; and not onely profane the Divine Inſtitution of Marriage, but that much better Union which it was deſign'd to repreſent? But if any, or all of theſe be ſomething, as undoubtedly they are, yea, Crimes of a high Nature, I will leave you to gueſs, how foul that Falſhood is which is the unhappy Parent of them all. The Adultery of the Married Parties being thus diſpatch'd, paſs we to *that of thoſe by whom they are corrupted:* which, as it is equally criminal, where they themſelves are under the ſame Band of Marriage; ſo doth not fall much ſhort of it, where they are free from it. For, beſide that they give occaſion to all thoſe Evils which we have affirm'd to be the Conſequents of the Falſhood of the Married Parties, they are not themſelves without a ſhare of almoſt all thoſe Impieties which they tempt the Married Parties to. If we inquire concerning the Divine Inſtitution of Marriage, it is no leſs violated by them than by the other, becauſe ſeparating between thoſe whom God hath made one: if concerning the injur'd Party, they are in a great meaſure the Authors of his Sufferings, becauſe invading his Bed, and bringing his Perſon into reproach; in fine, becauſe robbing his Children of their Subſiſtence, and, which is more, oftentimes of their Father's Love and Care, as well as of the Honour of their Birth. Laſtly, If we inquire concerning that Sacred Myſtery which Marriage was deſign'd to repreſent, their Impurity offers an affront to it; and at the ſame time they ſollicite the Married Party to profane it, they profane it themſelves, by abuſing them to Luſt and Intemperance: All which, whoſoever ſhall conſider, will find Adultery to have ſomewhat more than the breach of one Commandment to make it odious, as being in truth an Affront to God and to Humane Nature, to the greateſt Myſtery of our Religion, and the chiefeſt Band of Humane Society. And accordingly, as among the Heathen * Adultery hath been ſometime

* Sharrock. *Judicia, ſeu legum cenſuræ de variis incontinentiæ ſpeciebus*, c. 1. art. 2.

time puniſhed with Death, and that too with ſuch Circumſtances as were more terrible than Death it ſelf; as moreover Liberty hath been given to the injur'd Party || to kill the Adultereſs in the Act of her Uncleanneſs, and not to ſtay for the Formalities of Juſtice to wreck his Revenge upon her; laſtly, as by the *Jewiſh* Law Capital Puniſhment was adjudg'd to it, and both the Adulterer and the Adultereſs commanded to be put to death, *Deut.* 22. 22. ſo *Chriſtianity*, though in another way, hath ſhew'd it ſelf as ſevere againſt it, and thoſe who are the Committers of it; St. *Paul* having in more places † than one reckon'd it among thoſe Sins *which they who do, ſhall not inherit the Kingdom of God.* Which however to the generality of Men it may appear a light Cenſure, becauſe they rarely conſider any thing which is not expos'd to their Eye or Touch; yet, as it cannot but be otherwiſe thought of by thoſe who have a Proſpect of the World to come, and that Eternity of Weal or Woe which it infers: ſo the Adulterer and the Adultereſs will be forced to confeſs it, when they ſhall not onely find themſelves ſhut out of that Kingdom, but, which follows neceſſarily upon the former, have their unhallow'd Fires puniſh'd with a more ſcorching and continual one.

|| *Agelli. Noct. Attic.* li. c. 10. c. 23.

† 1 *Cor.* 6. 9. *&c. Gal.* 5. 21.

PART

PART IV.

Of the Sins that are included in that which is here expreſly forbidden; which are ſhewn to be, All preternatural Luſts, as being alike or rather more contrary to the Inſtitution of Marriage; All Inceſtuous Mixtures, the unlawfulneſs whereof is further declar'd; The defiling of a Perſon betrothed, Simple Fornication and Concubinacy, the unlawfulneſs of the former whereof is evidenced from its contrariety to the Inſtitution of Marriage, and to the Poſitive Laws of God, both in the Old and New Teſtament: And, in fine, All Exceſſes even in Lawful Mixtures. The like unlawfulneſs, even by the force of this Commandment, evinced in leſſer Uncleanneſſes. and in the Incentives either to thoſe or greater ones: Of the former of which ſort are, The unclean Deſires of the Heart, All ſuch Looks, Geſtures, or Touches as reſult from them; as alſo, All unclean Communications: Where moreover is ſhewn, againſt Tully *and the* Stoicks, *that there are ſuch Expreſſions as are really diſhoneſt, and their Objection againſt it propos'd and anſwered. Of the latter ſort are Sloth and Eaſe, Luxury or Exceſs in Meat and Drink, Converſe with Perſons of looſe or immodeſt Behaviour; and, in fine, the reading of looſe Books, liſtning to impure Songs, or reſorting to offenſive Plays: Whereunto is ſubjoyn'd, as an Antidote againſt the emptations to Uncleanneſs, the rather fleeing from the conſideration of them, than going about to combate with them: and the ſetting before our Minds the excellency of the Pleaſures of the Mind, above thoſe of the Fleſh or Body.*

IT being impoſſible, on the one hand, to diſcharge that Duty we owe to God, without marking out all thoſe Sins which this, as well as the other Commandments, doth forbid; and it being little leſs than impoſſible, on the other, to enter into a juſt Diſcourſe concerning them, without leaving ſome kind of Pollution upon the Minds of thoſe to whom it is directed; I have thought it the moſt prudent, as well as moſt pious way of procedure, to hold a middle courſe, and neither be altogether ſilent concerning them, nor very particular in the handling of them. Which perſwaſion I am the more confirm'd in, as becauſe Men may with leſs danger to the Publick fetch the Reſolution of extraordinary Caſes from the Mouth of thoſe of whom they are commanded *to ſeek the Law*, ſo becauſe what is generally neceſſary to be known concerning the Vices here forbidden, may be eaſily inferr'd from what we have before ſaid concerning the Nature, Inſtitution, and Laws of Marriage. For, if the Divine Laws do not onely ſet Bounds to the Enjoyments of Marriage, but proſcribe all Enjoyments out of it; all thoſe muſt be look'd upon as unlawful, which ſhall be found to be without it, or to paſs thoſe Bounds in it which the Divine Majeſty hath ſet. Beſides, having not onely entreated at large of the Nature, Inſtitution, and Laws of Marriage; but, as occaſion offer'd it ſelf, pointed out alſo ſeveral of the Violations of them: I have left little elſe for my ſelf to do, than to make a more exact

exact and orderly enumeration, and to add ſuch farther Arguments againſt the Sins it forbids, as were not before taken notice of by me.

III. Having ſhewn at large, in my laſt, the Nature and Criminalneſs of Adultery; to which I know nothing to add, unleſs what was then alſo inſinuated, that Adultery hath place, not onely where the Marriage which is violated continues undiſſolv'd, but alſo where it is diſſolv'd for a leſs cauſe than Fornication: it remains that we inquire, *Whether any other Sins are included in the Prohibition of Adultery, and what thoſe Sins are.*

Of the former part of this *Quærie* much need not be ſaid, after what hath been produc'd to ſhew the Comprehenſiveneſs of the *Decalogue* in the general. For, it being evident from a former Diſcourſe, that the *Decalogue*, or Law of the Ten Commandments, was intended as a Summary of the ſeveral particular Laws ſet down in the Book of God (as *Philo* * alſo hath obſerv'd) we are in reaſon to underſtand the Prohibition of Adultery to include in it *all ſuch Sins* as are *of the ſame kind with it*, or *leading to it.* The onely thing which it will concern us to inquire, is, *What thoſe Sins are*; which therefore I come now to inveſtigate.

* *De Decalogo.* Χρὴ δ' μηδ' ἐκεῖνο ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι οἱ λοιπὰ λόγοι, κεφάλαια νόμων εἰσὶ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον παρ' ὅλων ἡ νομοθεσίαν ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς βίβλοις ἀναγεγραφότων.

1. And here, in the firſt place, I ſhall not doubt to reckon, as included, the prohibition of *all preternatural Luſts*; ſuch, I mean, as are tranſacted between a Man and a Beaſt, or between thoſe of the ſame Sex. For, beſide that God hath provided againſt theſe by ſpecial Laws, and not onely ſo, but condemn'd the reſpective Offenders to ſuffer death, as you may ſee *Lev.* 20. 30, *&c.* beſide that before the Law, he made *Sodom* and *Gomorrha* a deſolation, for thus following after *ſtrange fleſh*; and that too (as St. *Jude* hath obſerv'd) to deter us by their *example*, ver. 7. of that Epiſtle: the unlawfulneſs, or rather prodigiouſneſs thereof, is ſufficiently evident from *the Inſtitution of Marriage*, and *the prohibition of that violation of it*, which is now before us. For, God having not onely at firſt appointed Man and Woman to be Aſſociates to each other, but forbidden alſo the adhering to any other Perſon than thoſe which we have joyn'd our ſelves to in Marriage; he muſt conſequently be thought much more to forbid, becauſe more contrary to his own Inſtitution, the defiling of our ſelves either with other Creatures, or thoſe of our own Sex. But becauſe (God be thanked) how depraved ſoever we are in other Particulars, ſuch Crimes as theſe are rarely heard of among us, it ſhall ſuffice me to repreſent that of St. *Paul* to the *Romans*, where he cenſures ſuch Extravagances as theſe, as vile and unnatural, and ſuch as God ſuffered the *Heathen* to fall into, as a juſt Puniſhment of their Idolatry. For, *for this cauſe* (ſaith he) even becauſe they changed the Truth of God into a Lie, *God alſo gave them up unto vile affections: for even their Women did change the natural uſe into that which is againſt nature: and likewiſe alſo the Men, leaving the natural uſe of the Woman, burned in their luſt one towards another, Men with Men working that which is unſeemly, and receiving in themſelves that recompence of their errour which was meet*, *Rom.* 1. 26, 27.

2. But neither ſhall I ſay much of *Inceſtuous Mixtures*, that is to ſay, where Perſons aſſume to themſelves, though in the Band of Wedlock, ſuch as are too near of kin to them, and particularly thoſe that are to them in the place of Parents, or ſtand upon the ſame level with them.

them. For, beſide that (as was before obſerv'd) God hath provided againſt ſuch Uncleanneſſes by ſpecial Laws, and they therefore, by the Rule before laid down, to be reckon'd to this Prohibition; beſide that (as was before alſo obſerv'd) they pervert the Order of Nature, and deſtroy that Reverence which is due from Inferiours to Superiours, by the Law of Nature, and this of *Moſes*: that ſuch Mixtures are no leſs unlawful to *Chriſtians*, St. *Paul* evidently declares, in the Caſe of the Inceſtuous *Corinthian*; he, by vertue of *Chriſts* Power, and his own Apoſtolical one, commanding *to deliver him up unto Satan*, which undoubtedly he would not have done, if it had not been a Tranſgreſſion of the *Chriſtian* Law. And though it be true, that all that hath the Name of Inceſt, is not of the ſame Nature; as particularly, when the Man marries his own Siſter, or Brothers Wife: yet as there want not Inſtances among the *Heathen* * of the diſlike of ſuch Matches, and particularly of that of Brothers and Siſters; ſo they are ſufficiently prejudic'd by the Inconveniences they draw after them, and ſuch as the Light of Nature prompts us to avoid. For, beſide that if Marriage were permitted betwixt ſuch as are ſo near of kin, that free and continual Intercourſe that is between them, would, in all probability, take off that Shame which is the Guard of Chaſtity, and prompt them to unlawful Deſires and Enjoyments; it would alſo, as *Philo* || expreſſeth it, (from whom I have borrowed both the one and the other Reaſon) ſhut up within the Walls of a Private Family, that Charity and Communion, which might otherwiſe diffuſe it ſelf to Continents and Iſlands, and, in fine, to the whole World: Marriage with Strangers (as the ſame *Philo* goes on) producing new Relations and Kindred, and ſuch as fall not ſhort of that which nearneſs of Blood produceth.

* *Ocellus Luc. De naturâ Univerſi. parte pol. text.* 10. Δεῖ δὲ παιδεύειν τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ νομίμων ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς πόλεσι, τὸ μήτε μητρὶ συγγίνεσθαι, μηδὲ συναυλεῖ, μητ' ἀδελφῇ, &c. *Vid. not. Vizzanii ad locum.*

* *De ſpecial. legibus.* Τί γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς κάλλος αἰσχύνειν; τίς δ' ἀχρωματιεῖ καλασκυδάζειν παρθένους, ἃς ἐρυθριᾷν ἀναγκαῖον; τί δὲ τὰς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους κοινωνίας καὶ ὁμιλίας ἐπέχειν, εἰς βεβαιοῦ χωρεῖον τὸ τῆς ἑκάστης οἰκίας συνοδυνᾶσθαι μέγα καὶ λαμπρὸν ἔχειν, ἐκτεινούσας καὶ χαλώσας συναύλιον εἰς ἠπείρους καὶ νήσους καὶ τὴν οἰκουμένην πᾶσαν· αἱ γὰρ τῶν ἀθνείων ὁμιλίαι κοιναὶ ἀπεργάζονται συγγενείας, τῆς ἀφ' αἵματος οὐκ ὀλιγοστεύσας.

3. From Unnatural and Inceſtuous Mixtures, paſs we to that which is neither, but comes up more cloſe to the Crime that is expreſly forbidden; I mean, *the defiling of a Perſon*, which though not married, yet is *betrothed* to another. For, beſide that ſhe and her Paramour, no leſs than the Adulterer and Adultereſs, are commanded by God to be put to death, *Deut.* 22. 23, 24. which ſhews, that their Crimes are of near affinity with each other; the Reaſon there given of God's ſeverity to the Defiler, is, *becauſe he had humbled his Neighbours Wife*; plainly intimating, that as when Perſons are betrothed to each other, though they have not paſs'd the Solemnities of Marriage, yet they are in the account of God as Man and Wife; ſo being ſuch, both ſhe and her Paramour are by the ſame God look'd upon as Adulterers, and conſequently direct Tranſgreſſors of this Commandment. This onely would be added, (becauſe what Betrothing is, is not commonly underſtood, as being little uſed among us) that by Betrothing we underſtand not a Promiſe of future Marriage, according as it is vulgarly taken; but the actual paſſing over that Intereſt they have in themſelves, to thoſe to whom they are ſo betroth'd, and receiving back a Power over them: As if a Man ſhould ſay to the Woman, *I take thee for my lawful Wife*; and the Woman to the Man, *I take thee for my lawful Husband.* For though a promiſe of Marriage may oblige to the per-

formance, if it be not reſcinded by the joint conſent of both Parties, yet it doth not actually paſs over to the Party, to whom it is made, that Power which we have over our own Bodies, and conſequently neither makes the Parties promiſing to be in the Relation of Man and Wife, nor is that Betrothing which we ſpeak of.

4. How the ſins before mentioned are reducible to this Commandment, hath been at large declared, together with ſuch other Reaſons from the light of Reaſon and Nature, as ſhew them to be really criminal: Enquire we therefore in the next place what is to be thought of *ſimple Fornication*, that is to ſay, where the Offenders are both ſingle Perſons. Where firſt of all I ſhall take it for granted, that it is to be looked upon as here forbidden, if it can be otherwiſe made appear to be an unlawful Luſt, becauſe as was before ſaid, this, and other the Commandments of each Table, were intended as Summaries of the Law of God, and of its ſeveral both Precepts and Prohibitions. Now that ſimple Fornication is an unlawful Luſt, and as ſuch to be avoided and abhorred, will appear firſt, from what we have before ſaid concerning *the Inſtitution of Marriage.* For it appearing from thence, that God hath appointed that, as the means whereby both to prevent the evils of Solitude, and to propagate the World, all other Commerce muſt be look'd upon as forbidden, and particularly that which ſimple Fornication doth involve; this (as *Grotius* obſerves) not only being diſtinct from Marriage, but driving Men from it, becauſe promiſing them the ſame ſatisfaction at an eaſier rate. I obſerve ſecondly, that as ſimple Fornication is inconſiſtent with the Inſtitution of Marriage, and as ſuch therefore to be look'd upon as unlawful, ſo it is directly contrary to *the Laws of the ſame God*, by which the Decalogue was given; there being not only an expreſs prohibition that there ſhould be *no Whore* of the Daughters of *Iſrael*, *Deut.* 23. 17. but command given by God for *the ſtoning of that Damſel*, which ſhould be found to have been corrupted before Marriage; becauſe, as there follows, ſhe had wrought *folly in Iſrael to play the whore in her Fathers Houſe*, *Deut.* 22. 21. And though I know it hath been thought that there was not the like prohibition of the uſe of ſtranger Women, which, if true, would have abſolv'd the Men from the imputation of Fornication, where an *Iſraelitiſh* Woman was not their complice in it, yet as the Proverbs of *Solomon* ſet a Brand upon ſuch Perſons, and upon all communication with them, ſo that ſuch a Fornication was no leſs interdicted than that with *Iſraelitiſh* Women, St. *Paul* plainly ſhews, 1 *Cor.* 10. 8. he there aſcribing that ſlaughter which we read of in the 25th. of *Numbers*, to the *Iſraelites committing Fornication* with the Daughters of *Moab*, and exhorting thoſe he wrote to to take warning by their Example. But ſo that the more ſober *Jews* were alſo perſwaded, is evident from *Philo* * and || *Maimonides*, both the one and the other repreſenting all cohabitation as unlawful, which was not within the ſtate of Wedlock. Now though from the unlawfulneſs of ſimple Fornication among the *Jews*,

* *Philo. tractatu* περὶ Ἰωσὴφ, *ubi ſanctum illum virum introducit, ſic importunitati heræ ſuæ repugnantem.* Τί βιάζῃ; λέγων· ἐξαιρέτοις ἔθεσι καὶ νομίμοις χρώμεθα ἡμεῖς οἱ ἑβραίων ἀπόγονοι. τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις ἐφεῖται μετὰ τὸν τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτον ἡλικίαν πόρναις καὶ χαμαιτύποις, καὶ ταῖς ὅσαι μισθαρνοῦσιν ὅλαι τοῖς σώμασι, μετὰ πολλῆς ἀδείας χρῆσθαι· παρ' ἡμῖν δὲ οὐδ' ἑταίρᾳ ἔξεστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἑταιρούσης ὤφεισαι δίκη θανάτου. Περὶ δὲ συνόδων νομίμων ὁμιλίαν ἑτέρας γυναικὸς οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοὶ γάμων ἀγναῖς παρθένοις παρεσπόμεθα, πεπεδημένοι τέλῳ οὐχ ἡδονῇ, ἀλλὰ γνησίων παίδων σπορᾷ. || Maimonid. More Nevochim, part. 3. c. 49. *Ad impediendum itaq; iſta mala, & è contrà ut hoc bonum promoveatur, diſtinctio ſcil. familiarum, prohibitæ ſunt meretrices & meritorii vel cynædi, nec ullus concubitus permiſſus eſt, niſi cum propriâ uxore, quæ publicè in matrimonium ducitur.*

it

it be not difficult to collect that it is much more unlawful among *Chriſtians*, becauſe our Saviour came not to deſtroy the Law but to fulfil it, and particularly as you may ſee, *Mat.* 5. 27, 28. as to that Commandment we are now upon; yet becauſe there want not more direct proofs of the unlawfulneſs thereof among us, than any we have before produc'd, I think it not amiſs to add them unto the former, and ſo much the rather becauſe all we can alledge will be little enough in this licentious age to ſtop the progreſs of it. Now that there want not ſuch proofs of the unlawfulneſs of Fornication among *Chriſtians*, is evident from ſeveral places of the New Teſtament, ſuch as are that of 1 *Cor.* 6. 18. and *Heb.* 13. 4. in the former whereof St. *Paul* tells us, *that neither Fornicatours, nor Adulterers, ſhall inherit the Kingdom of God*: in the latter, the ſame St. *Paul*, or whoever was the Authour of that Epiſtle, *that Whoremongers and Adulterers God will judge:* For as the word which we render Fornicatours and Whoremonger, ſignifies properly the former, and is not therefore to be conſtru'd in any other ſenſe, where there is not ſomething in the Text to determine it otherwiſe; ſo, that it is to be taken in that ſenſe which our Tranſlatours affix to it, is evident in each of the places alledg'd; St. *Paul* both in the one and the other diſtinguiſhing it from Adultery, as in the latter oppoſing it to the ſtate of Marriage, and conſequently neither denoting any deviation from the worſhip of the True God, which is ſometimes, though Metaphorically, the ſenſe of the word Fornication, nor yet any irregularity in contracting Marriage, ſuch as is an Inceſtuous Match, which is at other times the ſignification of it. But neither is there leſs force in that of the ſame St. *Paul*, 1 *Cor.* 6. 18. where he doth not only command fleeing Fornication, which is in reaſon to be conſtru'd in the proper ſenſe of the word, becauſe he ſpeaks immediately before of a Mans joining himſelf to an Harlot; but moreover repreſents it as a defiling of the Temple of God, which whoſoever doth, God will be ſure to deſtroy. All which whoſoever ſhall conſider, will eaſily believe that ſimple Fornication is unlawful, as well as Adultery, or any other act of Uncleanneſs: For what other Fornication can be ſuppoſed to be intended, where an Harlot is made the object of it, and Men are moreover, in the beginning of the next Chapter, commanded to Marry to avoid it? And though it be true, that the Law of Nature affords not ſuch evident proofs of the unlawfulneſs thereof, as of Adultery; yet as they, who had no other light to guide them, ſaw enough in it to make them deteſt it, as the ſinners themſelves to oblige them to hide their wickedneſs; * *Chryſippus* giving us to underſtand, *that ſuch kind of cattle at firſt exercis'd their Trade out of Cities, and were wont to cover their Faces with a Veil, that in proceſs of time they threw away their Veils, but were not ſuffer'd to enter into Cities till after the World came to be more deprav'd:* ſo, that the Light of Nature is not without ſome proof of its unlawfulneſs, is evident from thoſe inconveniencies, which naturally ariſe from the permiſſion of it; the Children of ſuch mixtures through the uncertainty of their Father, being apt to be

* *Chryſipp.* Ἐν τῇ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν εἰσαγωγῇ. *Verba ſunt,* ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἔξω πόλεως καὶ περιωπὰς ἐκείμενα αἱ ἑταῖραι ἐξεμίδων ἐαυτὰς τοῖς βουλομένοις· εἶτ' ὕστερον καλαφρονήσασαι ἀπέθεντο τὰ περιωπία, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων μὴ ὅλως ἐκβαλλόμεναι εἰσέναι εἰς τὰς πόλεις, ἔξω ἦσαν αὐτῶν· πλείονος δὲ τῆς διαφθορᾶς γινομένης ὁσημέραι ἐτόλμησαν καὶ εἰς τὰς πόλεις εἰσελθεῖν. *Vid. Origen. adv. Celſum, li.* 4. *p.* 206.

rejected by all her Paramours, or at leaſt not to be provide d for by any, with that affection and care which is due from a Parent to a Child. Neither will it avail to ſay that that inconvenience may be avoided, by appropriating ſuch a ſinner to a Mans ſelf. For though I deny not that ſuch an one may be faithful to her Paramour, and thereby give no real cauſe of the uncertainty of his off-ſpring: yet as there is little reaſon for any Man to hope it of her, who hath ſo little conſideration of her own reputation, as to take up ſo infamous a Trade; ſo it cannot at all be hoped for, unleſs there be a Covenant between the Parties, which makes it little different from a Marriage, but however rather a Concubinacy than a Fornication. Which, that I may add that by the way, though it have not much from Nature to oppugn it, yet is contrary to the Inſtitution of the Almighty; that, as was before ſaid, not only requiring the union of the Man unto the Woman, but ſuch an union alſo as might procure her reſpect as well as fellowſhip, and a right of participation in all he had. The former whereof as Concubines could not lay claim to, who are made by the Civil Law * to differ from a Wife in Dignity, according as the Judicious *Hooker* ‖ hath alſo obſerv'd; ſo, that they were devoid of the latter, the ſmall Portions their Children were put off with ſhew; the Scripture telling us of *Abraham*, *Gen.* 25. 5, 6. that whereas he gave *all that he had* to *Iſaac* the Son of his lawful Wife, he gave only *gifts* to the Sons of his Concubines, and ſent them away from him.

* L. *Item legato, Sect. Parvi D. de legat.* 3. *Parvi autem refert, uxori an concubinæ quis leget, quæ ejus cauſa empta parata ſunt, ſane enim niſi dignitate nihil intereſt. Vid. & L. Donationes D. de donationibus.*

‖ *Eccl. Polity, li.* 5. *Sect.* 73.

5. Laſtly, (for Adultery is a fruitful crime, and comprehends not only all Deviations from the Inſtitution of Marriage, ſuch as Fornication and Concubinacy, but alſo all Exceſſes in it) he who is immoderate † in his love toward a lawful Conſort is no leſs an Offender againſt this Commandment than he who placeth it upon an unlawful one; both the one and the other ariſing from an intemperate * appetite, which converts even our Meat and Drink into a ſin, and taking us off from more ſpiritual pleaſures.

† *Adulter eſt uxoris amator acrior.*

* *Philo de ſpecial. leg. pag.* 600 Ἔχει μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ χρῆσις φύσιν ἡδονῆς πολλάκις μείζονα, ὅταν ἀμέτρως καὶ ἀκορέστως χρῆταί τις αὐτῇ, καθάπερ οἱ ἄπληστοι περὶ ἐδωδὴν, κἂν οἱ μηδὲν ἧσσον ἀπηρεμούντων προσφέρωνται, καὶ οἱ φιλογυναίοις συνουσίαις ὑπεμεμηνότες, καὶ λαγνίστερον προσομιλοῦντες γυναιξὶν ἢ κατὰ τροφὴν καὶ παιδοποιΐαν.

Of the groſſer ſort of Uncleanneſſes what hath been ſaid may ſuffice, and therefore ſo far of the Commandment that forbids them. But becauſe (as hath been more than once intimated) the leſſer ſort of ſins are forbidden in this Commandment, as well as the greater, and together with them, all Incentives to them either in our ſelves or others; therefore, to make my Diſcourſe compleat, I muſt make them alſo the ſubject of my enquiry, and both diſcover and cenſure them. And here in the firſt place I ſhall make no difficulty to repreſent, that the *Unclean deſires* of the Heart are no leſs forbidden by the Commandment, than any of the expreſſions of it; partly becauſe the conſent of the Heart is that which corrupts even our outward actions, but more eſpecially, becauſe our Saviour himſelf hath told us, that *he who looks upon a Woman to luſt after her, hath committed Adultery with her already in his heart*, *Mat.* 5. 28. But neither, ſecondly, ſhall I make any difficulty, upon the ſcore of the foreſaid affirmation,

to

to repreſent as forbidden all ſuch *looks, geſtures, and touches*, as reſult from ſuch irregular deſires. For if, as our Saviour there intimates, but St. *Peter* * doth expreſly affirm, the *Eyes* may be *full of Adultery*, there is no doubt the ſame charge may fall upon the Lips or Hand, if they be guided by the ſame inordinate paſſion. There is leſs doubt, thirdly, eſpecially after the Declaration of Chriſtianity, of the prohibition of *the Uncleanneſs of the Tongue*; St. *Paul* exhorting in one place to *lay aſide all filthy communication*, *Col.* 3. 8. as in another, to wit *Eph.* 5. 4. *All filthineſs, and fooliſh talking, and jeſting which are not convenient:* in fine, that they ſhould not ſuffer *any corrupt communication to proceed out of their mouth*, *Eph.* 4. 29. And though I know the *Stoicks*, who were otherwiſe a Grave and Sober Sect, made little, or rather no account of ſuch kind of expreſſions, they arguing (as *Tully* || tells us) that *if there were any expreſſions really diſhoneſt, they muſt become ſuch, either by the ſubject matter of them, or the words themſelves; the former whereof could not be, becauſe the ſame thing might be honeſtly enough expreſſed in other words, as neither the latter, becauſe the very ſame expreſſions might in another ſenſe commendably be uſed*, both which the ſame *Tully* doth at large exemplifie: though therefore I ſay, the *Stoicks* made no account at all of ſuch expreſſions, yea moreover repreſented the diſlike of them as fooliſh and unreaſonable; yet as they could not for all their ſubtilty draw the generality of Men into their opinion, nor I am perſwaded ſatisfie their own Conſciences; ſo, that that Argument of theirs was vain and fallacious, may appear from hence, that beſide the *principal Idea* † or *notion* of words, there is oftentimes *an acceſſary one*, which doth not only much vary the ſignification of them, but give them a different eſtimate in the World. Thus for example, though to ſay *you lie*, ſignifies no more in the principal Idea of it, than to ſay you know the contrary to what you ſpeak: yet inaſmuch as in the eſtimate of the World which gives Laws to Speech, it doth moreover connote the Speakers contempt of him he gives the lie to, it is juſtly look'd upon as a more reproachful expreſſion, and accordingly ſo reſented in the World. In like manner, though unclean expreſſions contain no more in their *principal Idea*, than what is or may be expreſs'd in more civil ones; yet inaſmuch as together with that they do alſo connote that pleaſure which they give to our corrupt Nature, the Idea whereof will be apt to excite irregular motions and deſires in the Hearers, they are juſtly look'd upon as vile and abominable, and as ſuch to be abhorr'd by all modeſt and civil Perſons. Which ſaid, I ſhall anſwer more directly to that Dilemma of the *Stoicks*, by which they ſeem to themſelves to have driven all Modeſty out of the World. For be it, which is the proof of their firſt allegation, that the thing couched under unclean words may be honeſtly enough expreſs'd in others; yet it will not thence follow (which is the thing they deſire to infer from it) that an expreſſion can receive no pollution from the ſubject matter of it, and conſequently, as to that particular, is not capable of being unclean. For though that which is the matter of unclean words, may be honeſtly enough expreſſed in other, if you conſider it as to the *ſubſtance* or *principal Idea* of it; yet can it not ſo, if you take in alſo the *modus* or *acceſſary Idea*, which is that which

* 2 Pet. 2. 14.

|| *In Epiſt. ad Papirium Patum. li. 9. Ep. 22*

† *Vid. La Logique, ou, L'Art de Penſer. 1 Partie. 13 Chap.*——

which makes an expreſſion to be unclean. Again, though it be alſo true, which is produced for the proof of the ſecond Allegation, that that expreſſion which is look'd upon as diſhoneſt in one ſenſe, may yet be commendably uſed in another; yet will not that at all avail to ſhew that no expreſſion can be diſhoneſt, which is the thing for which the dilemma is produc'd; becauſe we do not pretend to evince the diſhoneſty of an expreſſion from the ſound it gives, but from the ſenſe which is couched in it, which therefore where it is different, may give it a different eſtimate, and at the ſame time it makes it diſhoneſt in one ſenſe, make it to be look'd upon as commendable in another.

But not to inſiſt any longer upon the forementioned Argument of the *Stoicks*, becauſe however it may have amuſed ſome Perſons, yet it hath hardly convinc'd ſo much as themſelves, (ſo great a diſguſt is there in Nature againſt all impure and immodeſt expreſſions) I will chooſe rather to go on to ſhew *the incentives and occaſions* of Uncleanneſs, as which we are no leſs oblig'd to avoid. Of this nature is *Sloth and Eaſe*, becauſe diſpoſing the Body to it, and giving the Devil an opportunity to frame our Minds to the approbation of it: Of the ſame nature is *Luxury* or *Exceſs in Meat and Drink*, becauſe exciting, nouriſhing, and corroborating our Natural Propenſions to it. Of the ſame nature again is *converſe with Perſons of looſe or immodeſt behaviour*, as by whoſe Example or Communication it will be almoſt impoſſible not to be deprav'd: Of the like, *the reading of looſe Books, or liſtning to impure Songs, or reſorting to offenſive Plays:* The two latter, by how much the more grateful they are to our Senſe, and Paſſion, and Underſtanding, becoming ſo much the more pernicious, when inſtead of miniſtring to the ends of Virtue, and an innocent Pleaſure to which they are admirably fitted of themſelves, they are forced to ſerve the purpoſes of Ribaldry and Profaneneſs. And though that may perhaps be thought to be no furtherer of Uncleanneſs, but on the contrary the repreſſor of it; yet Reaſon as well as Experience ſhews, that *to combate an impure Temptation* when it is ſtrong and preſent, though with never ſo rational Arguments, *doth rather irritate than extinguiſh it*; becauſe we cannot frame our Minds to diſpute againſt it, but we muſt bring its allurements into our view, which under ſuch circumſtances will prevail above all our Reaſon and Reſolution. The moſt ſafe, as well as moſt eaſie method of Conqueſt is, to fight as the *Parthians* do fleeing, and either to run from them into Company or to other Thoughts; which if we do, we ſhall not only defeat theirs and the Devils purpoſes, but be thereby better qualified to look them afterwards in the face, and not only avoid but ſubdue them. Such are the Incentives to that Impurity which is here forbidden, and which therefore it will concern us as much as in us lies to avoid; as it will alſo to take care, leſt *we draw upon us the guilt of other Perſons, by miniſtring theſe or other ſuch like Incentives to them.* In which number, as there is no doubt *an immodeſt attire* is to be reckoned, as by which Women of ill Fame ſeek to train unweary Perſons into their Snares; ſo what is modeſt or immodeſt is to be judg'd of by the cuſtom of the place, and by the example of Religious Perſons in it.

I will conclude this Diſcourſe, and my explication of the Commandment, with an admonition to ſet before you the excellency of the pleaſures of the Mind above thoſe of the Senſe or Body. For as it is for want of this conſideration, that Men purſue the latter with ſo much earneſtneſs, as if there were not only no pleaſures comparable to them, but none beſide them; ſo they would be quickly taken off both from that conceit and purſuit, if they adverted only to the duration of the other. For whilſt the pleaſures of Senſe by being repeated become dull and inſipid, that I ſay not alſo irkſome and afflictive, the pleaſures of the Mind, and particularly that of Knowledge, encreaſe with their enjoyment, and do not only not ſatiate our appetite but intend it.

THE

THE EIGHTH
COMMANDMENT.

THE EIGHTH COMMANDMENT.

Thou ſhalt not ſteal.

PART I.

The Contents.

The Explication begins with a diſcourſe concerning Property, *which this Commandment both ſuppoſeth and profeſſeth to maintain. That defined to be ſuch a Right or Title, by which the thing enquired after doth ſo become one either Perſon's or Societies as to its uſe or emolument, as not to be common to them with others: And is either with a power of Alienation, as all plenary Properties are, or without, as the poſſeſſions of Uſufructuaries properly ſo called. Enquiry is next made what foundation it hath in* Nature, *which is ſhewn ſo far to enforce it as to perſwade the introducing where it is not, and the confirming and cheriſhing it where it is: As is made appear both as to thoſe things which are immediately inſtrumental to our ſupport, and thoſe which are only mediately, and by virtue of what they do produce; the former being wholly uſeleſs, where they are not impropriated, as the latter not likely to have their due cultivation otherwiſe, or be peaceably enjoy'd. Property more truly reſolv'd into the Divine Inſtitution, and particularly into that grant of Dominion which was made to* Adam *firſt, and then to* Noah *and his Sons. The Properties of Men as they now ſtand reſolv'd into thoſe original Grants, The diſpoſition of the Divine Providence, and, where they have been before fill'd, into the will alſo of the precedent Poſſeſſour. An Anſwer to ſuch Objections as are made, either againſt the being of Property, or our way of eſtabliſhing it. As to the former whereof is ſhewn, that the Community which was in the Primitive Church was neither of Divine Inſtitution as to it, nor induceth any Obligation upon the preſent: As to the latter, that Dominion is not founded either in Power or Grace. That Dominion is not founded in Power is evidenc'd from its ſuppoſing Men at liberty to ſeize upon what they pleaſe, without conſideration of thoſe who have the ſame Intereſt: Which is both contrary to that love which Men ought to have for one another, and deſtructive of that Community which it ſuppoſeth. That Hypotheſis which founds Dominion in Grace evidenced to be alike unſound, from the diſhonour it doth to God who*

profeſſeth himſelf to be kind to the unthankful and the evil; to our Religion, which is thereby made to ſerve to evil and covetous purpoſes; and (becauſe Grace is a thing not eaſily to be known, or made out) to uncertainty, contention, and confuſion; in fine, from Gods ſubjecting the believing Servant to the unbelieving Maſter, the believing Subject to the unbelieving Prince, yea, obliging him to pay Tribute to him out of his own. An Inquiry whether the Properties of Men are limited, and what thoſe Limitations are. That they are limited by God, is made appear, from that Original Grant of Dominion which God made to Adam *and* Noah, *and the Laws he hath ſince made concerning the Uſe and Diſpoſition of them: ſuch as are thoſe which enjoyn Sobriety, the honouring of God and his Prieſts with our Subſtance, and the being charitable to the Neceſſitous. The Properties of Men alike limitable by thoſe that are in Authority, ſo far as their own Neceſſities, and thoſe of the Publick do require; but not ſo by private Perſons, without their own conſent.*

THOUGH I am well aware I ſhall find work enough in explicating the Nature, and inveſtigating the Species of thoſe Sins which are forbidden in this Commandment; yet I foreſee it neceſſary, even to the right ſtating of thoſe, to premiſe ſomething concerning *Property*, which the Interdict of Stealing doth ſuppoſe. For, Stealing being nothing elſe but the clancular taking away of that which is another Mans, neither can we ſuppoſe ſuch a Sin as Stealing, unleſs there be ſuch a thing as Property; nor judge of the Quality of the Theft, without reſpect had to that Property which it is an interverſion of. Taking it therefore for granted, that to the due knowledge of the Nature of Stealing, it is neceſſary to have a competent one of Dominion or Property, I will allot this Diſcourſe to the Inveſtigation of it, and accordingly inquire,

1. What Property is.
2. What Foundation it hath in Nature.
3. By what means it was at firſt introduc'd.
4. By what ways Men do now come to attain it. To which I ſhall ſubjoyn, in the
5. Fifth place, The Examination of thoſe things which have been alledg'd either againſt the Being of Property, or for the eſtabliſhing it upon other Principles.
6. And laſtly, inquire, Whether the Properties of Men are ſubject to Limitations, and what thoſe Limitations are.

I. Of the *Nature* of *Property* much need not be ſaid, at leaſt as to that ſenſe wherein we are to take it in this whole Diſcourſe: It may ſuffice therefore to define it to be ſuch a Right or Title, by vertue whereof, the thing inquir'd after doth ſo become one, either Perſons, or Societies, as to its Uſe or Emolument, as not to be common to them with others; and is either with a Power of Alienation, as all plenary Dominions or Properties are; or without it, as the Poſſeſſions of Uſufructuaries, properly

properly ſo called, and other ſuch like imperfect Properties. The onely difficulty will be, as to the Foundation it hath in Nature, its Original, and the Means of acquiring of it, with other the things before propos'd.

2. For the reſolution of the *firſt* whereof, we muſt diſtinguiſh of ſuch things as are immediately inſtrumental to our Support, and ſuch as are onely mediately, and by vertue of thoſe things which they produce or maintain. If the Queſtion be concerning the former, of which ſort are Food, and Raiment, and the like; ſo, no doubt, Reaſon and Nature do ſo far enforce a Propertyin them, as the Neceſſities of Nature do require. For, the Life of Man being not to be ſupported, without ſuch an Application of them to our ſelves, as makes them perfectly uſeleſs to others; there will ariſe a neceſſity of appropriating ſuch a Portion of them to every Perſon, as may ſuffice to the ſupport of him. And though I will not affirm as much concerning thoſe things by which the former are produc'd or maintain'd, of which nature are Trees to the Fruit, and the Earth to thoſe and all other the Supports of Humane Nature; yet I ſhall not ſtick to maintain, that the ſame Nature dictates the expediency of a Property, and perſwades to the obſervation of it: Partly, becauſe if Men had not diſtinct proportion in the Earth, from whence all the Supports of Humane Life receive either their Being or Subſiſtence, they would not be over-forward to give it that Cultivation which it requires, as fearing leſt what they had ſo cultivated ſhould be reap'd by others; and partly, becauſe Mens Neceſſities and Deſires being in general the ſame, there would otherwiſe, eſpecially ſince the Peopling of the World, have ariſen among Men perpetual and irreconcileable Diſcords, concerning the enjoying of thoſe Benefits which it affords. But other Foundations in Nature, as it will be hard to find, ſo I think it extremely vain to ſeek; becauſe (as I ſhall by and by ſhew) Property had its Orignal from Divine Inſtitution, and becauſe thoſe Principles which I have alledg'd from Nature, may ſuffice to perſwade thoſe to whom the Divine Inſtitution is unknown, to introduce it where it is not already, and to confirm and cheriſh it where it is.

3. It being thus evident what Foundation Property hath in Nature, proceed we to inquire, *how it was at firſt introduc'd.* For the reſolution whereof, though it be commonly alledg'd out of the Ancient * *Heathen*, and particularly the Poets, that all things at firſt were common unto all, and continu'd ſo to be, till either the Prevalence of ſome had appropriated what they pleas'd to themſelves, or the general Conſent of Mankind, led thereto by the former Conſiderations, put them upon a diſtribution of them: yet, as † *Lactantius* hath well

* Juſtinus hiſtoricus, li. 43. ſtatim ab initio. *Italiæ cultores primi Aborigines fuere, quorum Rex Saturnus tantæ juſtitiæ fuiſſe traditur, ut neque ſervierit ſub illo quiſquam, neque quicquam privatæ rei habuerit, ſed omnia communia & indiviſa omnibus fuerint, veluti unum cunctis patrimonium eſſet.* Cicero de Officiis, lib. 1. *Sunt autem privata nulla naturâ: ſed aut veteri occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt: aut victoriâ, ut qui bello potiti ſunt: aut lege, aut pactione, conditione, ſorte.* Virgilius Georgicorum lib. 1.

Ante Jovem nulli ſubigebant arva coloni,
Nec ſignare quidem aut partiri limite campum
Fas erat; in medium quærebant———

De eodem ſæculo Seneca, in Octavia. Act. 2.

———Pervium cunctis iter,
Communis uſus omnium rerum fuit.

† Inſtit. Divin. li. 5. c. 5. *Quod Poetæ dictum* [illud nempe prius citatum ex *Virgilio*] *ſic accipi oportet, non ut exiſtimemus nihil omnino tum fuiſſe privati; ſed more Poetico figuratum, ut intelligamus tam liberales fuiſſe homines, ut natas ſibi fruges non includerent, nec ſoli abſconditis incubarent, ſed pauperes ad communionem proprii laboris admitterent.*

obſerv'd,

obſerv'd, that poſſibly nothing elſe was meant by that ancient Community, than that the Men of elder Times were ſo liberal, as to admit the Poorer ſort to a participation of their Poſſeſſions and Labours, all Expreſſions of Poets being not ſtrictly to be underſtood; ſo, that there was ſuch a thing as Property from the beginning, even by the Inſtitution of the Divine Majeſty, I doubt not to make appear from that firſt Grant of Dominion, from which it may ſeem more rational to infer a Community. 'Tis in *Geneſis* 1. 28. and the Words theſe. *And God bleſſed them, and God ſaid unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and repleniſh the earth, and ſubdue it, and have dominion over the fiſh of the ſea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth*, as well as over the Earth it ſelf. For, beſide that Man and Woman are by the Inſtitution of the Divine Majeſty but as one Perſon, and therefore that Dominion which God gave to *Adam* and *Eve* to be look'd upon rather as a Property, than a Community, (whence it is, that in the repetition of this Grant to *Noah* and his Sons, there is not the leaſt mention either of *Noah*'s Wife, or of theirs; which in all probability there would have been, if they had had an equal Intereſt in it with their Husbands, or were to be look'd upon as diſtinct Perſons from them) beſide this, I ſay, the Woman being by the condition of her Sex ſubjected to the Man, makes her rather an Uſufructuary, than a Proprietary ſtrictly ſo called, or as an inferiour Proprietary under a Chief, by means whereof there is not ſo much a Community, as diſtinct but ſubordinate Properties. Now, as that Property wherewith our firſt Parents, or rather the one of them, was inveſted, gave them Authority, under God, to diſpoſe of it to their Children, according as they themſelves ſhould judge expedient; ſo, that they did accordingly diſpoſe of it, and that too in diſtinct Properties, the Story of *Cain* and *Abel* ſhews; the former whereof, as the Book of *Geneſis* * informs us, had Cattel and Meadows for his Property; the latter, Tillage and Corn. For, that theſe were not onely their Employments under their Father, but their Properties, appears by their bringing of each for an Offering, and paſſing them away, as well as having an inſpection of them. Now, though what hath been ſaid concerning *Adam*, ſufficiently ſhews what the Original of Property was, and by whom and after what manner it was at firſt introduc'd; yet becauſe Humane Kind had as it were a ſecond Beginning in *Noah*, all but him and his Family being deſtroy'd by the Flood, I think it not amiſs to ſhew the ſame to have been the Original of Property, amidſt this ſecond Race of Mankind. To the evidencing whereof, though that of *Geneſis* may ſeem very repugnant, where renewing the forementioned Charter of Dominion, God directeth it to *Noah* and his Sons, *Gen.* 9. 1, 2. whereby this lower World may ſeem to have been given to them in common; yet as it is not eaſie to ſuppoſe God would make *Noah* and his Sons equal, becauſe that would have taken off from that Reverence which was due unto the Father; ſo, that *Noah* did not look upon himſelf as ſuch, the Bleſſing which he pronounc'd upon *Japhet* ſhews, *Gen.* 9. 27. For, the Bleſſings of Fathers being anciently with Authority, and conferring thoſe Advantages which they pronounc'd, *Noah* bleſſing *Japhet* with the enlarging of his Borders, ſhews him not to have been without Authority of enlarging or confining them. Whence it is, that though

* *Ch.* 4. 2. *&c. & Seld. Mare Clauſ. l.* 1. *c.* 4.

though in the Old Teſtament there be no mention of *Noah*'s intereſſing himſelf in that Diviſion of the Earth which was made between *Noah*'s Sons, in the tenth Chapter of *Geneſis*; yet a Tradition hath prevail'd, (as Mr. *Selden* * obſerves out of *Euſebius* and *Cedrenus*) that *Noah*, by direction from the Almighty, was the Author of it, and conſign'd it to them by his laſt Will and Teſtament; admoniſhing them moreover, that no one ſhould invade his Brothers Territories, nor do any injury to him. Which is the more probable, becauſe otherwiſe Diſſentions might have riſen among them, which it is not to be ſuppos'd but ſo good a Father as *Noah* would provide againſt; and much leſs is it to be ſuppos'd, but the God of Peace and Order would. This onely would be added, though more than once before inſinuated, that though God made thoſe two Heads of Mankind the Proprietors of this ſublunary World, yet not ſo as to licence them to confine it wholly to themſelves whilſt alive, or to make any other diſtribution of it after their Deaths, than the Laws of God and Reaſon ſhould allow. For, beſide that this Charter of Dominion is by God directed to *Noah* and his Sons, which cannot by any means be ſalv'd, unleſs they had a Title in him; both in that and the former Grant, premiſing the Admonition of *Increaſe and multiply, and repleniſh the earth*, to that Charter of Dominion which he gave them over it, he thereby plainly intimated an Obligation in thoſe two great Heads of Mankind, to impart of that Dominion to their Poſterity, and a Right in that Poſterity to enjoy it: As indeed without them neither could they have ſubdu'd the Earth, nor exercis'd that Dominion over it which they had. The Reſult of which Obſervation is, that all the Deſcendents of *Adam* and *Noah* have a natural Right in it, as being *given* not onely to them, but in and by them to their Deſcendents, or (as the *Pſalmiſt* hath expreſſed it, *Pſal.* 115. 16.) *to the children of men.*

* *Mar. Clauſ.* l. 1. c. 4.

4. But becauſe whatſoever Diſtribution was made in thoſe elder Times, it is certain that the Bounds of Mens Poſſeſſions have been often and greatly confounded, by that Avarice and Injuſtice which have ſince overſpread the whole Earth; but however, there are no Records extant of Donations and Succeſſions, whereby Men might be aſſur'd of the Legitimateneſs of their ſeveral Acquiſitions: therefore it will be neceſſary to inquire, in order to our own particular ſatisfactions, *by what means Men do now come to have a Property in their ſeveral Eſtates.* For the diſcovery whereof, not to tell you, becauſe that is ſufficiently apparent, that God being the Great Landlord of the World, Mens Proprieties, and the Modifications thereof, muſt receive their Being from his Will; as neither, becauſe that is alike evident from the Premiſes, that the diſtinction of Properties is of his own bleſſed Inſtitution: I ſhall chuſe rather to inquire, how this Will of his may appear, as to the ſeveral Properties we either do or may enjoy. In order whereunto, I will inquire, 1. Concerning ſuch Lands or Goods as are without any preſent Poſſeſſor; or, 2. Such as are already occupied. If the Queſtion be concerning ſuch Lands or Goods as are *without any preſent Poſſeſſor*, ſo the common Conſent of Mankind hath attributed the Right to thoſe who ſhould *firſt poſſeſs* themſelves of them: And not without reaſon, if we remember, that ſuch Impropriations are not onely not diſpleaſing to the Divine Majeſty, but of his own Bleſſed Inſtitution. For, being ſo, it is but reaſonable to think it

it to be the Will of God, that thoſe ſhould have the Property of it, to whom he by his Providence hath both made the firſt Diſcovery, and given the opportunity of poſſeſſing themſelves of them. Whence it is, that things left, or thrown away, do by the ſame general Conſent of Mankind become the Property of the Finder; as in like manner things caſually loſt; unleſs either the Owner thereof doth appear, in which caſe it doth not, becauſe (as the Lawyers ſpeak) there was in the Owner a Purpoſe of retaining it, which is by the ſame Law of Nations a kind of Poſſeſſion; or it be otherwiſe determined by the Laws of the Place we live in, by which, as I ſhall afterwards ſhew, Mens ſeveral Properties are tempered and bounded. But becauſe the World is already ſo fully Peopled, that there is little room for ſuch kind of Acquiſitions, eſpecially in that Part of the World in which we inhabite; therefore it may not be amiſs to inquire rather concerning Property in thoſe things which are *already poſſeſs'd*, both as to thoſe *that do poſſeſs* them, or *deſire the poſſeſſion* of them. Concerning *the former* whereof, as much need not be ſaid, after I have already ſhewn you, that the ſeiſing upon any thing that is free, becomes the Property of him that ſeiſeth it; ſo, much leſs of ſuch Poſſeſſions as are by the Lawyers call'd *Bonæ fidei*, or ſuch as do not appear to have been acquired by any evil Arts: It being to be preſum'd to be the Will of God, that thoſe ſhould have the Property of any thing, who are not onely without any evil Arts, but by the courſe of his Providence put into the Poſſeſſion of it. And though the ſame be not to be ſaid of ſuch Poſſeſſions as are acquir'd by evil Arts, becauſe, though the Providence of God may paſs for a Declaration of his Will and Approbation, where it is not contradicted; yet it cannot be look'd upon as ſuch, where it croſſeth his Revelations, becauſe thoſe are both the Primary and moſt direct Interpretations of it: yet there are two things which may and muſt be ſaid, as to the evidencing of that Property which we have ſaid to ariſe from them. 1. That Poſſeſſion, of what ſort ſoever, is to be eſteem'd good againſt him that is not able to ſhew a better; and conſequently, that the evil Arts whereby any Man hath attain'd it, cannot excuſe him from Sin who ſhall either fraudulently, or violently, endeavour to take it from him. 2. That Poſſeſſions which they call of *Evil faith*, if corroborated by the continuance of ſome Ages, (but how many, muſt be left to the Laws of the Place, or the Law of Nations, to determine) may give the Poſſeſſor a Right or Property in them: As becauſe otherwiſe there would be little Security to the Conſciences of Poſſeſſors, conſidering the great and violent Alterations that have hapned in all States and Kingdoms; (For,

Majorum primus quiſquis fuit ille tuorum,
Aut paſtor fuit, aut illud quod dicere nolo.)

ſo alſo becauſe there would otherwiſe ariſe endleſs Controverſies about Poſſeſſions: both which Inconveniences it is to be ſuppos'd the God of Peace and Order hath provided againſt. To all which we may adde, That as it is God who ſets up one and pulleth down another, ſo it is in reaſon to be preſum'd to be his Will to keep both the one and the other in their ſeveral Conditions, when he gives him whom

whom he hath advanc'd ſo long a continuance in his Station, and ſuffers not the other in all that while to be able to remove him from it.

From the Poſſeſſor of any thing, paſs we to *the Expectant* of it, and inquire by what means he may come to have the Property of it. In order whereunto, I ſay, firſt, That it muſt be ordinarily *by the Act of the preſent Poſſeſſor* of it. For, the Poſſeſſor of any Eſtate acquiring thereby a Property in it, that is to ſay, a Right whereby the thing poſſeſs'd is ſo his, as not to be common to him with others; it is neceſſary to its becoming the Right and Property of another, that he who hath the preſent Property, transfer that Property of his unto the other, whether it be by Gift, as all Deeds and Legacies; or by Contract, whether explicit or implicit; the former whereof is, when Men either ſell or mortgage their Property for a Valuable Conſideration; the latter, when they oblige themſelves to an Act, as for example, to the Payment of a certain Sum of Money, which is not to be attain'd without the Alienation of the other, either in whole or in part: he who ſo obligeth himſelf, becauſe otherwiſe the Obligation would be null, tacitely contracting to part with ſo much of his Property as will ſatisfie the Obligation he hath taken upon him. Ordinarily therefore no Man can acquire the Right and Property of another, without the Act of the Poſſeſſor of it. But, as it may ſometime happen, that the Party may paſs out of this World, without making any ſuch Act, in which caſe it doth not onely ceaſe to be his, but naturally falls to *the next of Kin*, it being to be preſum'd, that it was the will of the Perſon dying to have it ſo, as being moſt oblig'd to gratifie them; ſo it may alſo happen (as I ſhall afterwards ſhew) that the Party may by ſome Miſdemeanour forfeit that Property of his to the State, of which he is both a Member and a Subject. In which Caſe, though without, yea againſt his preſent will, the Property of the Delinquent may accrue *to the State*, and by it be either *preſerv'd in its own power*, or *paſs'd over to another*. This onely would be added, That even ſuch a Tranſlation cannot be ſaid to be altogether without the will of the Perſon that offends: For, every Man, either expreſly or tacitely, binding himſelf to ſubmit to the Penalty of the Laws of that State of which he profeſſeth himſelf to be a Subject, doth, *eo nomine*, where the Penalty is the Forfeiture of his Property, conſent to the transferring of it, and conſequently makes it the Property of another.

5. Having thus ſhewn as well that there is ſuch a thing as Property, as by what means it was at firſt Inſtituted, or comes now to be acquir'd; I think it not amiſs, for the clearing both of the one and the other, to examine *thoſe things* which have been alledg'd *againſt the Being of Property*, at leaſt under the Times of the Goſpel, or for the eſtabliſhing it *upon other Principles*.

There are who ſuperficially conſidering that place in the *Acts* of the *Apoſtles*, where it's ſaid, that *the multitude of thoſe that believ'd* were not onely *of one heart*, but *had all things common*, have from thence made bold to conclude, That the Law of *Chriſtianity* obligeth all Believers to have all things common among themſelves. In anſwer to which, not to tell you, that Example is no Law, and conſequently, that the Practice of thoſe firſt Believers doth not induce an Obligation; as neither (though I might) that what may be of force in a Society, which is but yet in its beginning, ought not to be drawn into

example in a ſetled one: I ſhall chuſe rather to alledge a Paſſage in the ſame place, which ſhews this Community of theirs to have been the Reſult of their own free will, and not of neceſſary Obligation: That, I mean, which was uttered by St. *Peter* to *Ananias*, who ſold his Poſſeſſions upon a pretence to make them common to other Believers. For St. *Peter* demanding, *Acts* 4. 5. *Whilſt it remained, was it not thine own? and after it was ſold, was it not in thine own power?* plainly ſhews, that *Chriſtianity* did not oblige them to renounce their Properties, but that they might, if they had ſo pleas'd, for any thing in *Chriſtianity* to the contrary, have kept their Lands as they were; or, after they had ſold them, kept the Prices of them.

But becauſe that Duſt which hath been rais'd in this Argument, doth not ariſe ſo much from the queſtioning of a Property, as from the proper Baſes upon which it ought to be eſtabliſhed; I will, without more ado, apply my ſelf to conſider of two *Hypotheſes*, which have been ſet up in oppoſition to my own; whereof the former founds Dominion *in Power*, the latter *in Grace and Piety*. As to *the former* of theſe, much need not be ſaid, becauſe it doth not onely proceed upon the ſuppoſition of ſuch a Community as never was, but doth farther ſuppoſe Men at liberty to ſeiſe upon what they pleaſe, without conſideration had of thoſe that have the ſame Intereſt: Which is not onely contrary to that Love and Affection which the Sons of Men ought to have for one another, as the Product of the ſame Common Stock; but deſtructive of that very Community which it ſuppoſes. For, if all Men have an equal Right to all Things, they are in reaſon to take ſuch a courſe for the accommodation of Affairs between them, that all Men may have their due proportion; which muſt be by permitting the Determination to the Judgment of the major part, or to the more impartial Arbitrement of a Lot. Otherwiſe, they do not onely challenge an equal Right with other Men, but ſuppoſe their own to be the beſt, which deſtroys that Community which they ſuppoſe. And though it ſhould ſo happen, as in ſuch a Community no doubt it may, that a Man ſhould be conſtrain'd by force to aſſert his own Proportion; yet as Reaſon and Nature forbids the uſe of ſuch a Remedy, till it do appear that more mild ones will not ſucceed; ſo it ought not to be employ'd to the vindicating of any thing which is above the Proportion of him that uſeth it. For, if all Men have an equal Right to every Thing, every Thing is to continue in its Community; or, if that cannot be done without prejudice to every one, they are of neceſſity to agree upon a Diſtribution, but however not to challenge above their Proportion in it. But becauſe this *Hypotheſis* is ſo wild and extravagant, that a Man muſt throw off his Reaſon, as well as his Religion, before he can aſſent to it; I will proceed forthwith to the conſideration of the other, which founds Dominion *in Grace and Piety*.

Now though this *Hypotheſis* looks more demurely than the other, becauſe clad in the Habit of that which of all others doth moſt deſerve our Reſpect; yet as it hath little countenance from that Religion which it diſſembles, ſo it is equally pernicious to it with the former, and particularly to the *Chriſtian* one. For the evidencing whereof, I will alledge, firſt, the diſhonour it doth to its Author, upon whoſe Honour the Reputation of Religion doth depend. For, whereas there is nothing

thing which God more challengeth to himſelf, or is indeed more worthy of him, than the being kind to the unthankful and to the evil, cauſing his Sun to ſhine upon the evil and the good, and ſending his Rain upon the juſt and the unjuſt; that *Hypotheſis* which founds Dominion in Grace, confines this Love of his to the Good and Juſt, and conſequently ſpoils him of that Noble Prerogative of his Nature, in being kind to the unthankful and rebellious. But neither is it leſs diſhonourable to that Religion which we profeſs, if we conſider either the Spirituality of its Motives, or the Peaceableneſs of its Principles. For, whereas our Religion profeſſeth to allure Men, not by the Bait of Earthly Pleaſures, but by the more noble Pleaſures of the Mind, and that Spiritual Happineſs which conſiſts in the Sight and Enjoyment of God; thereby removing all ſuſpicion from it ſelf, of ſeeking to promote it ſelf by mean Arts, or ſtanding in need of them: that *Hypotheſis* which founds Dominion in Grace, ſubjects the Purity of Religion to the mean Enjoyments of the World, and makes it look more like a Deſign upon Mens Eſtates, than upon their Souls. Again, Whereas our Religion profeſſeth nothing more than the procuring of Peace, as well of the Profeſſors thereof with one another, as with thoſe that are Strangers or Enemies to it; that *Hypotheſis* which founds Dominion in Grace, is ſo far from contributing to it, that it hardly leaves place for Peace even within our own Boſoms. For, *true Peace being ſo ſecret a thing, that we cannot certainly underſtand it in another, and not without difficulty in our ſelves; if* (as a Learned Prelate * doth well argue) *Grace ſhould give every one that pretends to it an Intereſt in that which is another Mans lawful Poſſeſſion, no Mans Title could be certain to another, ſcarcely to himſelf:* From whence muſt neceſſarily follow an incredible Confuſion, and an inevitable Perturbation in all Eſtates. To all which, if we add, that God hath expreſly ſubjected the believing Subject to an unbelieving Prince, and the believing Servant to the unbelieving Maſter; that he hath moreover enjoyn'd the former to pay Tribute to his unbelieving Prince, as an Acknowledgment of that Authority which God hath given him over him: ſo we ſhall not onely be fully convinc'd, that Dominion is not founded in Grace; but that ſomewhat elſe was intended in that, and ſuch like Texts, which aſſure us that *the meek ſhall inherit the earth*, which are the moſt plauſible Grounds of that *Hypotheſis*. And indeed, as ſuch like Promiſes are neceſſarily to be underſtood with ſubordination to God's Glory, and the eternal Welfare of our Souls, (both which are oftentimes more promoted by Poverty and Afflictions, than by the affluence of Temporal Benefits) partly, becauſe otherwiſe they would be rather a Curſe than a Bleſſing, and partly, becauſe, in the ſtrict underſtanding of them, they are but rarely fulfill'd to the Meek; which would undoubtedly not have hapned, if God, that cannot lie, had meant them in the literal notion of the Words: ſo, whatever be the ſenſe of them, they rather ſhew what the meek Perſon may promiſe himſelf from God's Providence, than any Right in him to challenge it from the World, and much leſs poſſeſs himſelf of by force. Such Actions as thoſe being very inconſiſtent with that Meekneſs to which the Inheritance of the Earth is promiſed.

* Bramhall's Vindication of himſelf and Epiſcopal Clergy, from Mr. B's Charge of Popery, c. 1.

6. But not to inſiſt any longer on the ſubverſion of an *Hypotheſis*, which will find little credit among any other than the Indigent and

Diſcontented; as neither among them, any longer than till thoſe Indigences and Diſcontents be remov'd; I will chuſe rather, following the Method before laid down, to inquire whether the Properties of Men are *ſubject to Limitations*, and *what thoſe Limitations* are.

It is a common Opinion, at leaſt amongſt the Vulgar ſort, that when they have acquir'd a Property in any thing, it becomes ſo intirely theirs, that they cannot at all be abridg'd in it without injury. Now, though I am willing to believe, that thoſe who are ſo perſwaded, underſtand this Abſoluteneſs of theirs with reference onely to Men; yet I think it not amiſs, and ſo much the rather, becauſe all juſt Limitations of Mens Properties are originally from God, to ſhew, firſt, that they *are limited by God*, and *how they are limited* by him.

That they are limited by God, needs no other Proof than that *Original Grant* of Dominion which God made to *Adam and Noah*, and *thoſe Laws* which he hath ſince given *concerning the uſe or diſpoſition of them*. For, inaſmuch as that Original Grant was not to the Perſons of *Adam* and *Noah* onely, but to all that deſcended from their Loyns, as appears from the *preceding Diſcourſe*; it will follow (as was there alſo ſhewn) that all the Sons of Men have a natural Right to a Portion of it, and conſequently, that particular Properties are limited by the Neceſſities of thoſe of the ſame Stock; whether it be by obliging the Owners to impart of them to thoſe their needy Brethren, or, as I ſhall afterwards ſhew, by warranting the Neceſſitous, in the faileur of all other Means, to extort ſo much from the other, as may ſerve to the Support of them. But neither is it leſs clear from the Laws which God hath ſince given, that Mens Properties are limited by the Almighty. For, a Law, where it is impos'd, retrenching Mens Liberty, as to that particular which it enjoyns; if God hath preſcrib'd Laws concerning the uſe or diſpoſition of them, our Property will be ſo far limited, as the Laws which are impoſed do direct. All therefore that will be requiſite to do, will be to inſtance in thoſe Laws, which will at the ſame time acquaint us *how they are limited* by him. Of this nature is, firſt, that Law which enjoyns Sobriety; a Law which is no leſs written in the Hearts of Men, than in the Divine Scriptures. For, Sobriety being nothing elſe than a Moderation in our Enjoyment of thoſe Good Things which he hath given us, he who preſcribes ſuch a Moderation, doth conſequently ſo far retrench our Property, which conſiſts in a Right to uſe and enjoy them. Of the ſame nature are thoſe Laws which require the honouring of God with our Subſtance; whether as in the Old Law, by offering part of it in Sacrifice; or as in the new, by imparting of them to thoſe who miniſter about Holy things: He who preſcribes ſuch a Law, ſo far impairing Mens Properties, as the Service of Religion doth require. Laſtly, Foraſmuch as the ſame Law of God doth enjoyn miniſtring to the Poor out of them, that Right which we have to uſe and enjoy them, muſt be ſo far retrench'd, as the Law of Charity doth exact.

But becauſe, how unwilling ſoever Men may be to have their Properties limited by the Divine Majeſty, yet they will be aſhamed to ſpeak it out; therefore proceed we to inquire, *whether or no*, and *how they may be limited by Men*; which is a Confinement Man can leſs patiently endure. In order whereunto, I will entreat firſt of all of *Princes*, and then of *leſs Publick* Perſons.

Of

Of the Authority of Princes in this Affair, no doubt can be made; as becauſe that Law of God which conſtitutes them, empowers them to lay *a Tribute* upon their Subjects; ſo becauſe every Man doth, either expreſly or tacitely, ſtipulate to contribute toward the Support of that State whereof he profeſſeth himſelf to be a Member: by means of which, though their Properties come to be limited, yet it is in effect by themſelves. Again, Foraſmuch as the Publick Weal, as well as Charity, requires the Support of thoſe who have not wherewithal to maintain themſelves, hence it comes to paſs, that it is in the power of thoſe to whom the Care of the Publick weal is committed, ſo far to abridge the Properties of Private Perſons, as *the Neceſſities of* thoſe *diſtreſſed* ones ſhall require, whether it be by permitting the looſe Ears of Corn to the gathering of the Poor, as the Cuſtom of all *Chriſtian* Nations doth preſcribe; or by exacting a Contribution from their Purſes, by means of which ſuch a part of their Properties paſſeth over to the Poor, and the Proprietary himſelf, and not they, becomes a Thief for detaining it. In fine, Whereſoever the Publick Good cannot be either procur'd or maintain'd as it ought, but by ſetting Limits to, or ſerving it ſelf of the Properties of particular Perſons, there, no doubt, it ſhall be lawful for thoſe who have care of it, both to ſet Bounds to, and ſerve themſelves ſo far forth of them: He who preſcribes any End, conſequently warranting the uſe of ſuch Means as ſhall be found to be conducing to it. Which ſaid, nothing remains to be inquir'd into, but whether the Properties of Men may receive a Limitation from more Private Perſons. To the Affirmative whereof, as no Man hath or can pretend, ſave where he who conferr'd them hath affix'd a Limitation, or the Proprietary himſelf hath conſented to it; ſo, in each of thoſe Caſes no doubt a Limitation by Private Perſons is not onely poſſible, but reaſonable: It being but juſt (becauſe the natural Conſequent of Property) that he who inveſts another Perſon with it, ſhould have the modelling of his own Grant; as, on the other ſide, that they who conſent to any ſuch, ſhould be bound up by it: He who conſents to any Limitation, making it his own Act, and conſequently receiving no Injury by it.

PART II.

Of the Negative *Part of the Commandment, which is ſhewn to import the not uſurping upon, or any way diminiſhing of our Neighbour's Property. This evidenced, not from the force of the Word* Steal, *which is acknowledg'd to ſignifie onely the clancular taking away of that which is anothers; but from the general Deſign of the* Decalogue, *the Comprehenſiveneſs of the two foregoing Precepts, and the Fundamental Reaſon of the Prohibition of Theft. An Addreſs to a Declaration of the Crimes that are included in it; which are ſuch as are diſtinguiſh'd from each other, either by the manner of their commiſſion, or by thoſe Objects about which they are converſant. Of the former ſort is, 1. The Theft of the Heart, or that Covetouſneſs whereby it is inclin'd to commit it; as is made appear, both by God's having a principal regard to the Heart, and the Analogie of the two former Commandments. 2. That Uſurpation which the Tongue is inſtrumental to, whether by its Silence in the concealing of Defects (where is ſhewn, what Defects may, or may not be conceal'd) or by its Expreſſions; ſuch as are thoſe who put too fair a Gloſs upon our own, or caſt a Diſparagement upon the Commodities of others. 3. The Theft of the outward Work, which again is made to conſiſt in the taking away, or detaining, or corrupting the Properties of our Neighbour. Under the firſt of theſe are ranked, all open and violent Rapines, the uſing unequal or deceitful Meaſures, the making uſe of falſe Lights, or other ſuch like Artifices; the wearying a Man out of his own with unjuſt Vexations, the exacting or taking of immoderate Uſe; where is ſhewn withal, that all Uſe is not unlawful: and, in fine, the monopolizing of Commodities. The detaining or corrupting the Properties of our Neighbour, ſhewn to be, in like manner, Thefts; and the ſeveral Species thereof enumerated.*

HAVING entreated at large in my laſt concerning Property, which this Commandment both ſuppoſeth, and (as I ſhall by and by ſhew) profeſſeth to maintain; it remains that we inquire, what it preſcribes concerning it: which may be reduc'd to two Heads.

1. The former whereof imports the *not uſurping upon*, or *any way diminiſhing* the Property of our Neighbour; which is the *Negative part* of the Commandment.
2. The latter, (which is *the Affirmative*)
   1. The *uſing of all due Means for the procuring and maintaining of our own*; and,
   2. The *contributing*, what in us lies, *to the procuring, defending, or enlarging the Property of our Neighbour.*

I. I begin with the former of theſe, even the Negative part of the Commandment, affirm'd by us to be the *not uſurping upon, or any way diminiſhing of our Neighbour's Property*: Where again theſe five things would be inquir'd into.

1. How it doth appear that the Negative part, or Prohibition, comprehends

comprehends in it all uſurping upon, or any way diminiſhing of our Neighbour's Property.

2. What particular Crimes are included in it.
3. What Actions are to be look'd upon as exempted.
4. Wherein the Criminalneſs of thoſe things which are included in it doth conſiſt. And,
5. And laſtly, What Puniſhments may be inflicted on them by the Civil Magiſtrate.

I. There being nothing more prejudicial to the ſtrength of any Aſſertion, than to ſuffer it to reſt at all upon weak or fallacious Principles; I ſhall not onely wave the arguing the generality of the Prohibition from the Latitude wherein the Word *Stealing* is ſometimes taken, but profeſs my ſelf to agree with thoſe who underſtand no other by Stealing, than the clancular taking away of that which is another Mans; that being the proper ſignification of the Word, and ſo underſtood by all the Tranſlators of the *Decalogue*. And indeed, as I ſhall by and by ſhew, that there is no neceſſity at all of underſtanding it in a more general ſenſe; ſo, that we ought to take it in a more reſtrained one, the Stile of the *Decalogue*, and particularly of the two foregoing Precepts, ſhews. For, making uſe of *Murther* and *Adultery*, which are onely particular Species of Injuriouſneſs and Uncleanneſs, to denote all thoſe which are of the ſame *Genus*; it is but reaſonable to think (eſpecially when the *Hebrew* phraſe inclines us to it) that the Commandment we are now upon, made uſe of one particular Crime in the matter of Injuſtice, to expreſs all thoſe that are of the ſame nature with it. Which Obſervation, as it eſtabliſheth the proper Notion of the Word *Steal*, for which it was primarily produc'd; ſo withal affords no contemptible Argument of Gods intention to forbid in it *all Uſurpations* whatſoever, *or diminutions of the Properties* of our Neighbours; eſpecially if we add thereto the general Deſign of the Precepts of the *Decalogue*, and the Agreement of others with that which is here expreſly forbidden. For, with what ſhadow of Reaſon can any Man think God intended no other Injuſtice than that which is expreſſed in the Commandment, when (beſide the general Deſign of the *Decalogue*, which I have ſhewn to have been intended as an Abſtract of the whole Duty of Man, and the Comprehenſiveneſs of the two foregoing Prohibitions) thoſe Injuſtices which are not mentioned are alike Uſurpations upon, or Diminutions of Mens Properties, which is the Fundamental Reaſon of the Prohibition. I will conclude this Particular with that of *Philo* *, in his Tract *De Decalogo*, where he makes this ſhort Remarque upon the preſent Precept. *The Third Commandment*, ſaith he, (for ſo it is, in his account, of thoſe of the Second Table) *is of not ſtealing, under which is to be rank'd whatſoever hath the eſtimate of defrauding of Creditors, or denying thoſe things that have been depoſited with us; of medling with thoſe things which belong to the Publick, and which conſequently ought not to be ſhar'd between Private Men; as alſo of ſhameleſs Rapines; in fine, of ſuch Covetouſneſſes whereby Men are induc'd, either openly or privily, to withdraw thoſe things which belong to others.*

* Τέτου ἓ, τὸ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ κλέπτειν, ὃ ἀπαιδεύσιαν τὰ ἐπὶ χρεωκοπίαις ἐπιδίκια, καὶ ὀξέσι παρακαλαθήκαις, καὶ ἀκοινωνήτῳ κοινωνία καὶ ἀναιχύντοις ἁρπαγαῖς, καὶ σωβλαις πλεονέξίαις, ὑφ' ἃν πολλοντάι τινες φανερῶς ἢ λάθρᾳ τ' ἀλλότρια ἀποζεῖδζ. prope finem.

II. Now though what hath been ſaid, may give us a competent underſtanding

derſtanding of thoſe things which are forbidden by the Commandment; it appearing from the Premiſes, that all ſuch are, whereby the Properties of our Neighbours are any way impair'd: yet becauſe Men are ſeldom ſo wiſe as to apply any general Direction to their own particular Concernments, or at leaſt are not over faithful in the doing of it, I think it not amiſs to draw it down to particular Inſtances, and ſhew *the ſeveral Crimes* which are here included: For my more orderly enumeration whereof, I will repreſent, firſt of all, ſuch Uſurpations or Diminutions of the Properties of Men, as are diſtinguiſh'd from each other by the manner of their commiſſion; and after that, proceed to thoſe which receive their *denomination and diſtinction* from *thoſe Objects about which they are converſant.*

And here, in

1. The firſt place, I ſhall not doubt to reckon, as included in the Prohibition, that Πλεονεξία, or *Covetouſneſs*, whereby (as *Philo* ſpeaks) the Heart of Man is inclin'd to uſurp upon the Property of his Neighbour. For, though the bare coveting of that which is another Mans be the Subject of another Commandment, and ſhall accordingly be there conſidered by us; yet when it includes in it a Deſire or Reſolution to get from another that which is his, by any fraudulent, oppreſſive, or any other unjuſt Proceeding, it is in reaſon to be reckon'd to that Commandment which we are now upon; as becauſe the Heart is that which God principally looks after, and which ſtrikes the greateſt ſtroke in abſolving or condemning our outward Actions; ſo becauſe our Saviour hath reckon'd to the Prohibitions of Murther and Adultery, thoſe injurious or unclean Purpoſes that are in it. For, by the ſame reaſon that a Man of malicious or unclean Deſires is to be look'd upon as a Murtherer or an Adulterer; he who hath either a deſire, or purpoſe, to defraud his Neighbour, is to be look'd upon as a Thief, and conſequently within the compaſs of the Commandment. But ſo that they who were Strangers, yea Enemies to the *Chriſtian* Faith, were alſo perſwaded, is evident from a Saying of *Julian*'s *, which is recorded by *Grotius* in his Firſt Book *de jure Belli ac Pacis.* *The ſecond Law* (ſaith he) *and* which is no leſs *Divine* than that which enjoyns the acknowledging and worſhipping of a God, *is that which commands wholly to abſtain from the Properties of other Men, and permits not to confound them either in Word, or Work, or in the ſecret Operations of the Heart.* Words worthy of a better Mouth than that from which they proceeded; but however not rendred unworthy of our regard by that blaſphemous one from which they came: there being nothing which the beſt of Religions, even our own, ſtands more commended for, than the reſtraining of the Heart of Man from all irregular Purpoſes or Deſires.

* Ὁ δεύτερος νόμος ἐστὶν, φύσει μὲν θεῶν, ὁ δὲ ἀλλοτρίων πάντῃ καὶ πάντως ἀπέχεσθαι κελεύων· καὶ μήτε ἐν λόγῳ μήτε ἐν ἔργῳ, μήτε ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς λανθανούσαις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνεργείαις τοῦτα ὅλως συγχεῖν. *Grot. d. l. Annot. ad c.* 1.

2. But becauſe (as *Julian* intimates in the place before-quoted) there is a Theft or Uſurpation which the *Tongue* is an Inſtrument in, therefore it may not be amiſs to ſhew by *what ways* and *means* this little Member prejudiceth the Properties of its Neighbour. For the more diſtinct explication whereof, I ſhall conſider,

1. Firſt of all, of its Silence; and then,
2. Of its Words or Expreſſions.

1. There

1. There is a famous Queſtion in *Tully*'s Book *de Officiis* *, a Book indeed read by Boys, but worthy, if we may believe the Learned, of the conſideration of the wiſeſt Men, yea of the graveſt Theologues, as being ſtil'd || by *Monſieur le Fevre*, Maſter to the late King of *France*, *His Caſuiſt*; and by *Monſieur de Hayes*, an eminent Advocate of that Kingdom, *The Goſpel of the Law of Nature*: But there, I ſay, there is a Queſtion whether a Man be bound *to reveal the Faults* of the thing he ſells. On the one ſide, there is Profit, and ſome ſhew of Reaſon alſo: *For what* (ſaith the ſame *Tully*) *can be ſo abſurd, as for the Maſter of any Houſe to make a publick Proclamation by the Cryer, that he ſells an infected one?* On the other ſide, there is a greater appearance of Ingenuity, and Clearneſs, and Simplicity, which are things not to be wanting in him that pretends to Juſtice and Honeſty, but however not to be wanting in thoſe who pretend to the Profeſſion of *Chriſtianity*. Where the Truth lies, is not poſſible to determine all at once, becauſe Circumſtances may alter the Caſe; and therefore I ſhall proceed to it by degrees, offering, firſt of all, as an undeniable Maxim of Juſtice, That it is not lawful for any Perſon by his *concealment* to ſcrew *more* out of the Perſon he ſells to, *than the thing is really worth*; he who ſo does, undoubtedly ſtealing from him ſo much as the things he ſells are over-rated. But neither, ſecondly, can it be deny'd, that it is equally unlawful to conceal *ſuch Defects* as make the thing ſold of *little uſe* * to him that buys it; becauſe ſuch a thing is really little worth to him, and conſequently the Buyer in a manner defrauded of the Money he paid. Upon which account, if a Man ſhould ſell a Horſe to him who buys him for this or that particular uſe, whether of Saddle or otherwiſe, for which he knows him to be unapt; in ſuch a caſe I no way doubt the Seller is a Thief, becauſe taking the Buyers Money for that which is unuſeful to him, and conſequently not worth to him what he gives for it. But as where the Defect neither makes the Thing worth leſs in it ſelf than it was ſold for, nor unuſeful to the Party that buys, I ſee not what Obligation can lie upon the Seller to reveal the defects of his Commodities; partly, becauſe there are few things that have not ſome defect or other, which makes it but reaſonable that the Buyer ſhould bear a ſhare with him; and partly becauſe a revelation of all Defects would, by the Scruples which it is apt to raiſe in the minds of Men, be an impediment to Commerce, eſpecially with conſcientious Men; which it is for the intereſt of the general Weal to keep up. This onely would be added, That though it may be lawful to conceal ſome Defects, yet it is not ſuch to deny any; this being an injury to Truth, as well as to our Neighbour; which (as I ſhall afterwards ſhew) ought to be preſerv'd inviolable.

* *Lib.* 3.

|| *Le Journal des Scavans, vol.* 1. *p.* 249.

* Tull. de Offic. lib. 3. *Neque enim id eſt celare, quicquid reticeas; ſed cum, quod tu ſcias, id ignorare emolumenti tui cauſa velis eos, quorum interſit id ſcire. Hoc autem celandi genus quale ſit, & cujus hominis, quis non videt! Certe non aperti, non ſimplicis eſt, non ingenui, non juſti, non viri boni: verſuti potius, obſcuri, aſtuti, fallacis, malitioſi, callidi, veteratoris, vafri.*

2. And here a fair opportunity is miniſtred to me, to enter upon thoſe Uſurpations or Thefts which are made by the mediation of *the Expreſſions of the Tongue*. Whereof, the firſt that I ſhall aſſign is, when Men by their Tongues ſet *a fairer gloſs* upon a thing, than it has *real worth* to deſerve. An Illuſtrious Inſtance hereof we have in the fore-quoted *Tully*, which it may not be amiſs to tranſcribe. *One* C. Canius, *a* Roman *Knight*, *having for his pleaſure retir'd to*

Syracuſe, *gave out that he would buy ſome Gardens, where he might recreate himſelf with his Friends.* Pythius, *a Banker of that Place, hearing of it, ſent him word, that he had no Gardens to ſell, but that thoſe he had were at* Canius *his ſervice, if he pleas'd to make uſe of them; and accordingly the next day invited him to Supper. Which Invitation as ſoon as he underſtood to have been accepted, he appointed the Fiſhermen of that Town to fiſh the next day before his Gardens.* Canius *comes at the time appointed, and is nobly entertain'd: The Fiſhermen alſo come with their Boats, and lay down what they had caught at* Pythius *his Feet. To him* Canius; *What, I pray, meaneth this, ſo many Fiſh about this place, and ſo many Boats? And what wonder, reply'd* Pythius? *hereabouts are moſt of the Fiſh that are in the River of* Syracuſe, *this Place the Fiſhermen cannot be without.* Canius *being taken with the ſuppos'd Commodity of the Place, importunes* Pythius *to ſell it. He at firſt ſeems unwilling, but at length ſells it him at his own Rate. The next day* Canius *invites his Friends, comes early himſelf to his Gardens, but ſees no Fiſher-boat. He inquires of his next Neighbour, whether it were any Holyday, that he ſaw no Fiſhermen there? Not, reply'd he, that I know of: but here none are wont to fiſh, and therefore yeſterday I wondred at what hapned.* Now who ſees not, that *Pythius* was as very a Thief with his Tongue, as thoſe who with their Hands take away their Neighbour's Goods? That Commendation which he gave to his Gardens, drawing that Money from *Canius*, which he would not otherwiſe have given, (Which what is it, in truth, but a Theft?) and that too, in all probability, which was above the real Value of the Thing. Again, For that of St. *James* is in nothing more true than in this, that the Tongue is a World of Iniquity; as the Tongue may play the Thief by putting too fair a Gloſs upon a Man's own Commodities, ſo it may do alſo *by caſting a diſparagement upon thoſe of other Mens.* A thing too uſual among the Men of Trade, but which cannot certainly eſcape the Cenſure of this Commandment: He who diſparageth his Neighbour's Commodities, hindring him in the ſale of them; which is in truth no better than a Theft, becauſe depriving him of that Advantage which he might make of them, in the Right whereunto Mens Propriety conſiſteth. What ſhould I tell you of raiſing falſe Accuſations againſt Men, whereby their Properties come to be forfeited; of giving falſe Teſtimonies in Judgment; and, which is of the ſame force, and is employ'd to ſupply the place of the Tongue, the forging of Deeds and Wills, or being by our Subſcriptions inſtrumental to the authoriſing of them? For, who ſees not, that theſe are not onely Thefts, becauſe depriving the true owners of their Properties; but generally of the fouleſt nature, becauſe ſtealing away whole Eſtates at once?

3. From the Uſurpation or Theft of the Heart or Tongue, paſs we to that of the *outward Work*, as which is the onely thing expreſſed in the Commandment: Where again theſe three Species of Thefts offer themſelves to our conſideration; ſuch as conſiſt in the *taking away*, or *detaining*, or *corrupting* the Properties of our Neighbours. Under the firſt of theſe Species I reckon,

1. Firſt, That Prejudice which is done to the Properties of Men by *open* and *violent* Rapines. For, though this be not Theft in the proper Notion of the Word, yet it agrees with it in that Injury which is

is offered to the Property of our Neighbour, and hath over and above the imputation of Impudence and Violence, which ſerves ſo much the more to enhance it. But neither,

2. Secondly, ſhall I ſtick to reckon, as included, that Theft which is made by *unequal* or *deceitful Weights* and *Meaſures*; as becauſe it is not onely a withdrawing of ſo much as thoſe Weights and Meaſures fall ſhort of their due Proportion, but alſo a clancular one; ſo becauſe ſuch Courſes as theſe are repreſented as abominable in the Eyes of that God with whom we have to do: Witneſs for the former that of *Prov.* 20. 10. That *divers weights and divers Meaſures are an abomination to the Lord*; meaning thereby, as *Moſes* * himſelf hath interpreted it, a bigger and a leſs; and (as a *Learned* † *Man* hath farther obſerv'd) a bigger to buy by, and a leſs to ſell by. By means of which, as there is not that equality in our Commerce, which that moſt excellent Rule of *Doing as we would be done by*, enjoyns; ſo there is, if not a prejudice to both Parties with whom we deal, yet at leaſt to him of whom we purchaſe; the bigger to be ſure being greater than the juſt Standard, and conſequently taking more from him, than either Juſtice or our own Contract doth allow. The ſame is much more to be ſaid of deceitful Weights and Meaſures, that is to ſay, of thoſe which are leſs than their due proportion: as becauſe they do manifeſtly withdraw as much from the Buyer, as the Weight or Meaſure which it wants amounts to; ſo becauſe the Scripture doth frequently and earneſtly expreſs its deteſtations of ſuch Practices: For beſide thoſe Places in the *Proverbs*, which though ſimply, yet roundly affirm, that *a falſe Balance is an abomination to the Lord*, we find God expreſſing a more than ordinary diſpleaſure againſt his own People, for ſuch like Injuſtices in their Dealings: For, *Hear this* (ſaith God, *Amos* 8. 4.) *O ye that ſwallow up the needy, even to make the poor of the land to fail; ſaying, When will the New-moon be gone, that we may ſell corn? and the Sabbath, that we may ſet forth wheat? making the Ephah ſmall, and the Shekel great, falſifying the Balances by deceit. The Lord hath ſworn by the excellency of Jacob, Surely I will never forget any of their works.* Agreeable hereunto is that of *Micah*, and cuts off from ſuch Perſons all pretences of Purity, which yet many of them have the hardineſs to lay claim to, *chap.* 6. 10. and ſo on, *Are there yet the treaſures of wickedneſs in the houſe of the wicked, and the ſcant Meaſure, which is abominable? Shall I count them pure with the wicked Balances, and with the bag of deceitful Weights?——Therefore alſo will I make thee ſick in ſmiting thee, in making thee deſolate becauſe of thy ſins.* Add hereunto,

* Deut. 25. 13, 14. *Thou ſhalt not have in thy bag divers weights, a great and a ſmall. Thou ſhalt not have in thine houſe divers meaſures, a great and a ſmall. But thou, &c.*
† *Baynus in Prov.* 20. 10.

3. Thirdly, for the affinity it hath with the former, the making uſe of *falſe Lights*, or *other ſuch like Artifices, to diſguiſe* the thing they ſell; they who do ſo, picking the Pockets of thoſe they deal with, becauſe taking Money of them for ſuch Commodities as, were it not for their Diſguiſes, they would not have bought at all, or at leaſt not have paid ſuch Rates as they demand, as being no way recompenc'd by their Purchaſes.

4. Of the ſame nature is, fourthly, though little conſider'd by thoſe that practiſe it, *The wearying a Man out of his own with unjuſt Vexations.* For, inaſmuch as Theft, conſidered in its due Latitude, is nothing elſe than the taking away of that which is anothers, without

his will or conſent; he that ſhall by any vexation put a Man upon a neceſſity of parting with that which is really his, is as verily a Thief, as he who ſliely nims any thing out of his Houſe; yea though (as *Ahab* was) he ſhould be diſpos'd to give him a Valuable Conſideration for it, which yet few ſuch Perſons are inclin'd to do: The taking of one thing for another, being then onely a lawful Contract, when it is with the free conſent of the Party from whom we take it; which is not to be ſuppos'd there, where a Man is compell'd to it by force and violence. But ſo alſo is,

5. Fifthly, The *exacting* or *taking of immoderate Uſe* for *Money lent:* For, I ſay not the ſame of taking Uſe in it ſelf, howſoever heretofore Men have been otherwiſe perſwaded. For, beſide that there is no more real Injuſtice in taking Money for the Uſe of Money, than there is in taking it for the Uſe of a Man's Houſe or Land, during the time wherein another enjoys it; Money, though it periſh not in the Uſe, as Houſe and Land does, yet, for ſo long time as it is out of the Owners hands, periſhing to him, who might otherwiſe have made an advantage of it: Beſide, ſecondly, that there appears not any the leaſt ſhadow of forbidding it in the Books of the New Teſtament, no not in thoſe Places where Avarice, and the like Crimes are cenſured: He that ſhall conſult the Law of *Moſes*, where Uſury is forbidden, and by the notion whereof we ought in reaſon to judge of the nature of it in other places, will find no other Uſury forbidden, than that which is taken of *a poor man*, and whom a Man ought therefore rather to give to, than take any thing from; as is evident from *Exod.* 22. 25. and *Lev.* 25. 36. For, as for that place in *Deut. ch.* 23. 19. where it is ſimply and plainly affirm'd, *Thou ſhalt not lend upon uſury to thy brother*; it is in reaſon, being onely a *Repetition* of the former Laws, as that whole Book of *Deuteronomy* is, to be limited by the former, and conſequently the Poor to be underſtood: He who repeats a thing, for the moſt part contenting himſelf with a rude and imperfect Account, as ſuppoſing ſuch an one enough to recall the thing into Mens minds; but however leaving no place for doubt, but that that which he models his Repetition by, eſpecially if more full, is to be the Interpreter of his Words. To ſay nothing at all at preſent, though it might be reaſonably enough inſiſted on, that our Caſe is not the ſame with that of the *Jews*, who were forbidden all Commerce with other Nations, which we are not onely no way forbidden, but in a manner under a neceſſity of. For, ſuch a Commerce being not to be maintain'd without a proportionable Purſe, which that of profeſſed Merchants cannot be ſuppoſed to be; there is a kind of neceſſity toward the carrying of it on, that they ſhould borrow of other Men; and of equity too, becauſe advantaging themſelves with their Money, to make them a reaſonable Compenſation for it. But as *immoderate Uſe* (which what it is, the Law of the Place is the beſt Judge) hath no ſuch thing to plead for it ſelf; ſo I doubt not to reckon it among thoſe Thefts which are forbidden by this Commandment: That Uſury which is above the due proportion, being the proper Right of the Borrower, and conſequently not to be taken by the Lender, without infringing of his Property, or, that I may ſpeak more intelligibly, without taking that which is another Mans. Add hereunto,

6. Sixthly, The engroſſing all the Commodities we can find of one kind,

kind, that ſo we may have the peculiar Privilege of ſelling them; he who ſo doth, not onely intending to rob all that have occaſion of them, but actually robbing thoſe of his own Profeſſion, of that Advantage which the Laws of the Land, and their common Profeſſion, give them an equal Intereſt in with himſelf. More, I doubt not, might be added; but theſe, I ſuppoſe, may ſuffice to judge even of the reſidue by: and therefore, in ſtead of heaping up any more, I ſhall content my ſelf with a place or two in St. *Paul*, where the Doctrine of this Commandment is clearly enough delivered. The former whereof * admoniſheth him *that ſtole to ſteal no more, but rather to work with his hands*, to procure the Supply of his own Neceſſities; which ſhews all kind of encroaching upon other Mens Poſſeſſions to be forbidden: the latter †, that we ſhould not *go beyond or defraud our brother in any matter*, thoſe ſecret, and therefore leſs underſtood Thefts; adding moreover, that *God is the avenger of all ſuch*, as he himſelf, when he was with them, had *forewarned them and teſtified.*

* *Epheſ.* 4. 28.

† 1 *Theſ.* 4. 6.

We have inſiſted hitherto upon ſuch Thefts as are moſt viſible, in the taking away of that which is another Mans: it follows that we inquire, whether there may not be a Theft *in detaining*, and *what the ſeveral ſorts* of ſuch kind of Thefts are. For the reſolution of *the former* whereof, we ſhall need onely to have recourſe to the fundamental Reaſon of the Prohibition of Theft, properly ſo called. For, that which makes Theft, properly ſo called, Criminal, being nothing elſe but the infringing the Properties of other Men; if that may be done by detaining, as well as taking away, there is no doubt it ought to be reckon'd to it, or at leaſt as equally condemned with it. Now, that ſo it may, will appear, if we conſider the ſeveral Species of them, the ſecond thing propos'd to be diſcours'd of. For, doth not he infringe the Property of another, who keeps that away from the Owner, which was by him onely *depoſited* for a time, and till he ſhould either call for, or ſatisfie that Obligation for which he depoſited it? Doth not he do the like, who detains in his Hands the *Wages of the Hireling*; and which the Promiſe of the Detainer, as well as the Labour of the Hireling, hath given him a Title to? Doth not he do ſo in part, who detains that, or any other Debt, *beyond the time* wherein it ought to be paid; when it is a Maxim of Reaſon, as well as of the Civil Law *, That he pays leſs than he ought, who pays not at his Day? Laſtly, Doth not he do ſo more apparently, who having taken away any thing from his Neighbour, either by fraud or violence, *refuſeth to make Reſtitution?* But if ſo, to be ſure they are to be accounted of as Thefts, or at leaſt of near affinity with, and under the like guilt and condemnation. And indeed, as the generality of *Caſuiſts* have look'd upon this Theft as ſo Criminal, that it is become a Maxim among them, That *the Theft is not remitted, unleſs the Thing taken away be reſtor'd*; as God hath moreover ſet a more than ordinary Brand upon it, by puniſhing thoſe Detainers who came to it onely by the Injuſtice of their Predeceſſors: ſo, if it be duely conſidered, there is no wonder at all in the Diſpenſation of God, or yet in the Reſolution of the Learned: He who reſtores not, when he can, continuing in and approving the former Theft, and conſequently making himſelf unmeet for the Divine Grace, which requires at leaſt the diſallowing of our former Wickedneſſes.

* Inſtit. lib. 4. tit. 6. de Actionibus. *Qua enim ratione qui tardius ſolvit quàm ſolvere deberet; minus ſolvere intelligitur, &c.*

One

One onely Species of the former Thefts remains, which conſiſts in *the deſtroying* or *any way prejudicing* the Things of our Neighbour; as when Men, out of malice or envy, ſet fire to their Neighbours Houſes or Corn, maim their Cattel, or, by not obſerving due Seaſons, wear out thoſe Grounds they hire. For, that this hath the nature of Theft, and that too not of the loweſt nature, needs no other evidence than the conſequence of our own Actions, as by means of which the Proprietary is either depriv'd of his Goods altogether, or of that Uſe and Advantage which might accrue to him, in the Right whereto (as hath been often ſaid) the Nature of Propriety doth conſiſt: It mattering not at all, toward the conſtituting a Man a Thief, whether he himſelf be benefited by thoſe things he ſteals; but whether he deprives his Neighbour of it. Otherwiſe St. *Auguſtine* had been no Thief, who, when a Boy, robb'd his Neighbour's Orchard; becauſe he threw away thoſe Apples which he ſtole.

PART III.

An enumeration of ſuch Thefts as are diſtinguiſh'd from each other by their Objects; where is ſhewn, 1. *Both from the Fundamental Reaſon of the Prohibition, and the Conſequences of ſuch kind of Uſurpations, That there may be a Theft of things immovable, as Lands and Houſes, as well as of thoſe that may be clancularly carried away.* 2. *Of Publick Goods, as well as of Private; the ſeveral ſorts whereof are alſo reckoned up.* 3. *Of Perſons, as well as of Things.* 4. *Of that which is not in our Neighbour's Poſſeſſion, as well as of that which is; as again, of the Uſe of a thing, as well as of the thing it ſelf. Inquiry is next made, what Actions are to be look'd upon as exempt from the preſent Prohibition; in which number are reckoned, the* Iſraelites *ſpoiling the* Egyptians, *thoſe Thefts which were permitted by the* Lacedemonians *to their Youths, and thoſe which extreme neceſſity prompts Men to; the due Limitations whereof are alſo carefully deſcribed. An Account of the Criminalneſs of the Things here forbidden; which is ſhewn to conſiſt, firſt, in their contrariety to the firſt Inſtitution of Property, and the preſent Diſpenſations of the Divine Providence: Secondly, in their being prejudicial to Humane Society: And, thirdly, in the diſcouragement they give to Virtue and Induſtry. The Negative part of the Commandment concluded with an Inquiry concerning the proper Puniſhment of Theft; where is ſhewn at large, That Capital Puniſhment is neither unjuſt nor inconvenient.*

THERE being nothing wanting to a juſt enumeration of the ſeveral Thefts that are here forbidden, but to reckon up thoſe which receive their *denomination* from, and are *diſtinguiſh'd* from each other, by thoſe *Objects* about which they are converſant; I purpoſe to begin this Diſcourſe with the Inveſtigation of them, and both ſhew *that* they do, and *how* they come *within the compaſs of this Commandment.* In

In order whereunto, I obſerve,

1. That Theft may be as well of Things *immoveable*, as Lands or Houſes; as of thoſe which, as *Gellius* ſpeaks, may be *clancularly carried away and withdrawn.* For, though Theft, in the vulgar Notion of it, extend onely to ſuch things as may be clancularly carried away and withdrawn; though that alſo be the Notion of Theft in the Civil Law * (as we now have it) as is evident from the Law *Verum eſt*, in the Title *De Furtis:* yet as there wanted not Men of Note, even in that Faculty, who had another Notion of it, as is evident from *Sabinus* || in *Gellius*; ſo, that in the Natural and Theological ſenſe there may be a Theft of immoveable as well as moveable Things, will be evident to any Man, who ſhall conſider either the formal Reaſon of this Sin, or the conſequence of Mens uſurping upon Things immoveable. For that which makes any Theft, properly ſo called, a Crime before God, being the Invaſion of anothers Property; it were extremity of Madneſs to think him a Thief, who ſhould rob a Man either of his Fruit, or Houſhold Goods; and not him who ſhould poſſeſs himſelf of that Ground from whence the Fruit ariſeth, or of that Houſe wherein the other are depoſited. Again, Foraſmuch as he who ſpoils a Man of his Land or Houſe, doth conſequently ſpoil him of the Fruit of the one, which is confeſſedly a thing moveable; and of the Uſe of the other, which, even in the Notion of the Civil Law *, may be the Object of Theft: he who doth ſo, muſt for that reaſon alſo be look'd upon as a Thief, and conſequently within the compaſs of the Commandment. Upon which account, as the late Learned Dr. || *Stuart* doth not undeſervedly deride that famous Lawyer, who at the ſame time he owned the taking away a Communion-Cup to be Sacrilege, did yet deny it to be ſuch to take away the Lands of the Church, becauſe they are not things moveable; ſo I know not with what better to ſilence ſuch frivolous Exceptions, than with the Inſtance which the ſame Learned Man makes in *Ahab*'s ſeiſing on *Naboth*'s Vineyard. For, by the ſame way of arguing, we might have concluded *Ahab* to have been a Thief, if he had robb'd *Naboth* of his Grapes; but *Elijah* was too harſh to that good King, for paſſing ſo ſevere a Cenſure on him, becauſe he onely took away his Vineyard.

* Dig. de Furtis, leg. *Verum eſt, quod pleriq; probant, fundi furti agi non poſſe.*

|| *In quo* [nempe Sabini libro, cui titulus eſt, De Furtis] *id quoque ſcriptum eſt, quod vulgo inopinatum eſt, non hominum tantùm neque rerum moventium, quæ efferri occulte & ſurripi poſſunt, ſed fundi quoque & ædium fieri furtum.* A. Gell. Noct. Attic. lib. 11. cap 18.

* Dig. de Furtis, leg. Furtum à Furvo, paragr. 3. *Furtum eſt contrectatio rei fraudulosa, lucri faciendi gratiâ, vel ipſius rei, vel etiam uſus ejus, &c.*

|| Anſwer to *Fountain*'s Letter.

2. Of the Theft of things moveable and immoveable, what hath been ſaid may ſuffice; and conſequently of the two firſt Species thereof: Proceed we therefore to conſider another pair, which are differenc'd from each other by the *publickneſs* or *privateneſs* of the Things taken away. For, inaſmuch as the Publick is capable of a Property, as well as Private Perſons; inaſmuch as it is not onely capable of a Property, but cannot ſubſiſt without it: hence it comes to paſs, that there may be a Theft of Publick Goods, as well as of Private; and conſequently, that, as well as the other, to be concluded within the force of the Prohibition. But from hence it will follow, that we are to reckon as ſuch *the denying of juſt Tribute*, or *converting that which is already gather'd to our own private Uſes*; the *taking away of thoſe Lands which were given for the Maintenance of Societies, clipping*

clipping, or any other way *impairing the Publick Money*: theſe being Entrenchments upon the Goods of the Publick, and conſequently proper Thefts of them. And though it be true, that all Thieves of this nature do not reap the due Reward of their Deſert; but, on the contrary, ſome of them bear themſelves high, even againſt that Publick upon which they do uſurp, (it being an ancient Complaint of *Cato**, That *whilſt the Thieves of private Mens Goods ſpend their days in Chains and Fetters, the Publick Thieves paſs away theirs in Gold and Purple:*) yet as the Miſchief which ariſeth from Publick Thefts, is much greater than that of Private ones, and conſequently renders them much more criminal; ſo they who found lower Puniſhments for other Thefts, look'd upon this as ſo hainous, as to pronounce || *Capital Puniſhment* upon its Authors or Abettors, if thoſe Authors were Judges; but if not, *Deportation*. I reckon not under this Head, though ſo reckon'd by the Civil Law †, as neither within any other of this Commandment, that Theft which is made of *Sacred* Things; partly becauſe the Property thereof is veſted in God, and conſequently He, and not Man, robbed in it, as God himſelf complains *Mal.* 3.8. and partly, becauſe St. *Paul*, *Rom.* 2. 22. couples *Sacrilege* with *Idolatry*, which ſhews it to be a Crime of a higher nature, as being an Uſurpation upon the Rights of the Divine Majeſty.

* *Fures privatorum furtorum in nervo atque in compedibus aetatem agunt: fures publici in auro atque in purpura.* A. Gell. loco pr. citato.

|| Inſtit. de publ. Judiciis, leg. *Item lex Julia peculatus.*

† Inſtit. ibid.

3. From thoſe ſecond ſort of Thefts, paſs we to another, becauſe the Injuſtice of Men hath done ſo; that, I mean, which brancheth it ſelf into a Theft of *Perſons* and *Things*. The former ſo much the Concernment of this Commandment, that many of the *Hebrews* (as *Munſter** tells us) have reckon'd it to be the onely Intendment of it. Wherein though I can by no means concur with them, becauſe the Tenth Commandment, to which they refer the Theft of our Neighbour's Goods, is not to be underſtood of Theft; or, if it were, were to be extended alſo to the Theft of Perſons, becauſe God forbids alike the coveting of our Neighbour's Servants and Goods: yet I think it but reaſonable to reckon it among thoſe Thefts which are forbidden in this Commandment; partly, becauſe God, in the very next Chapter to that which is the Subject of my preſent Theme, forbids the ſtealing of a Man, and that too under no leſs Penalty than that of Death, *Exod.* 21. 16. and partly, becauſe the Perſons of Men are no leſs a part of the Owners Property, than either his Lands or Goods; as both yielding him the ſame Advantage which Goods do, and among the *Jews* themſelves, when a Man became inſolvent, liable to a Sale*, to ſatisfie that Debt which he had contracted. Now foraſmuch as Men, no leſs than Things, may become a part of a Mans Property; foraſmuch as by thoſe, no leſs than by Things, Men may attain that *Uſusfructus*, in the Right whereto Propriety conſiſteth: it followeth, that the ſtealing of Mens either Children or Servants is to be look'd upon as one of thoſe Thefts which are by God forbidden in this Commandment. All which I ſay, not onely to obviate the evil Trade of *thoſe Men*, who by Toys, and other Artifices, *train Mens Children and Servants into Ships*, and, when they have done ſo, *ſell them for Slaves* in Foreign Parts; but their Practice alſo, who by fair Words and Promiſes *tempt Men from their Maſters*, to become in the ſame Condition to themſelves. For, what other is this, than to rob a Man of his Servant, and it may be too, if that Servant be

* *In Exod.* 20. 15.

* See *Exod.* 22. 3. 2 *Kings* 4. 1. *Mat.* 18. 25.

be an uſeful one, of one of the beſt parts of his poſſeſſions. Add hereunto, becauſe differing from the former only in circumſtance, *the Servants withdrawing from his Maſter*, whilſt he is with him, *that labour and ſervice* to which *his own Contract and the Maſters Wages bind him*; he who doth ſo, becoming a kind of Thief of himſelf, becauſe robbing his Maſter of that advantage which he might and ought to have by him.

4. Laſtly (which I ſhall only name, becauſe I have prevented my ſelf in them, and ſhewn them both to be Thefts, and ſuch as are forbidden in this Commandment) there may be a Theft of a thing *which is not in our Neighbours poſſeſſion*, as well as of that *which is*, as again *of the uſe* of a thing, as well as *of the thing it ſelf:* Upon the account of the former whereof, he is a Thief, who *detains* any thing in his hands which was either *committed to him to keep*, or is *otherwiſe due to his Neighbour from him*; as upon the account of the latter, he who *makes* the goods of his Neighbour *unſerviceable to him*, or *deprives him of the uſe of them*, whether it be by detaining them ſome time in his hands, or hindring him from making uſe of them. All which having before at large exemplified, I ſhall content my ſelf with ſubjoining this one general Remarque, which will ſerve as a κειτήριον to judge of theſe and all other Thefts by; to wit, That all that is to be looked upon as ſuch, which doth any way impair the property of our Neighbour, where it is truly ſuch, and not abridged by ſome of thoſe limitations which were before reckoned up by us: The properties of men, as to thoſe particulars wherein they are limited, being rather equivocally than properly ſuch, and conſequently the entrenchments on them not within the compaſs of this Commandment.

III. Now though that general Note might ſerve us for an anſwer to that third queſtion, which we before propoſed to diſcourſe of, that is to ſay, *What actions are to be looked upon as exempted from the prohibition now before us*; yet I think it not amiſs to inſtance in two or three of that nature, becauſe there may ſeem to be ſome difficulty in exempting them from the imputation of Thievery. I begin with that which is the moſt obvious to all, becauſe recorded in the Scripture, that I mean which the *Iſraelites* are found to have done, even by the command of God himſelf: For what other can we make of the Children of *Iſrael*'s *borrowing of the Egyptians* thoſe Jewels, which they did not only *not reſtore*, for ought as we can learn, but are by that act of theirs ſaid to have *ſpoiled* or *robbed* the *Egyptians*? *Exod.* 12. 36. But neither will this action of theirs be found to be a Theft, if we underſtand thereby, as we ought to do, an uſurpation upon anothers property, where it is free from any limitation or alienation: Becauſe though thoſe Jewels, which they borrowed, were the property of the *Egyptians*, both before and at the time of the *Iſraelites* borrowing them; yet were they, by the Command of God, to whom all mens properties are ſubject, paſſed over to the *Iſraelites*, and conſequently their detaining of them, though in ſemblance a Theft (for which cauſe it is called a *ſpoiling* by *Moſes*) yet really and formally none. Next to this act of the *Iſraelites*, conſider we another of the *Lacedemonians*, approved and encouraged by their Laws; it being recorded of them by *Gellius* out of Authors, neither few nor inconſiderable, that *their young men were allowed to ſteal certain things*, and particularly, *the*

* *A. Gell. ubi ſupra, cum notis Ant. Thyſii J. C.*

Fruit of their Orchards, and the Meſſes of their Feaſts: Not, as the aforeſaid Author admoniſheth, *to encourage them to the deſire of filthy lucre*, but *to make them crafty and watchful*, and thereby the more apt to ſerve them *in their Wars*, which was, upon the matter, that Common-wealths whole profeſſion. Now though for my own part I cannot approve of ſuch practices, as by which unwary Youths may be tempted to ſtealths of a more criminal nature, yet I am of opinion with the learned *Selden* *, that where ſuch practices are countenanced by Law, the perpetrators of them cannot in reaſon be charged with Theft properly ſo called, or uſurping upon the properties of their Neighbors; for the properties of particular men being limitable by the publick Laws, and more particularly by ſuch to which each Proprietor conſents, if the publick Laws make it lawful to withdraw certain things from the owners, thoſe things are ſo far common to thoſe that can withdraw them, and conſequently their withdrawing of them not ſo much an uſurpation upon the property of the owners, as a juſt and lawful acquiſition. And it ſeems to me not altogether unlike the gleaning of Corn in a field, the property whereof, as of the Fruit that ariſeth of it, though inveſted in a particular perſon, yet is not ſo entirely his, but that the looſe Corns which fall from the Reaper become the property of him that ſhall firſt ſeize upon them. But becauſe however ſuch kind of Thefts might be countenanced by the Laws of the *Lacedemonians*, yet they are not, that I know of, received in any Chriſtian Nation, nor it may be at preſent in any unconverted one, therefore, quitting the proſecution of that, I ſhall enquire into the nature of that Stealth which extreme neceſſity prompts men to. In order whereunto, I will put the caſe of a man travelling in a foreign Land, and there reduced to extremity of hunger; for the providing againſt which, though he hath not failed to uſe earneſt entreaties, nor yet to make a tender of his labour and ſervice, yet he hath not for all that been able to procure himſelf ſo much repaſt, as might ſatisfie the neceſſities of Nature. This ſuppoſed, I demand whether the taking away of ſo much, as may ſerve for the purpoſes before ſpecified, be to be looked upon as a Theft, and conſequently unlawful. Now though it be not to be doubted, but ſuch an act looks very like one, becauſe differing nothing in the matter from that which is really ſuch, yet that it is not formally ſuch, is evident from what was heretofore ſaid concerning Gods giving the Earth to *Adam* and *Noah*, and in them, to all the Children of men; for this general Grant of the Almighty being antecedent to any particular property, which any of the ſons of men is now poſſeſſed of, it is in reaſon ſo far to prevail above the preſent properties of particular men, as to make it lawful to the extremely neceſſitous, to withdraw ſo much from them, as may ſerve to ſatisfie theſe neceſſities. This only would be added, That as thoſe extremely neceſſitous ought to premiſe both entreaties, and the tender of their ſervice, partly becauſe the preſent properties of men ſtand by the divine Grant, and are not lightly therefore to be derogated from; and partly becauſe God obligeth men for the prevention of it, to *work with their own hands the thing that is good*, that they may have wherewithall to ſupport themſelves, as well as *to give* to others: ſo the caſe before remembred cannot lightly be ſuppoſed in any Chriſtian Nation, and much leſs in that wherein we live. As becauſe of the multitude of charitable perſons wherewith the Land

* *De jure Natur. & Gent. l. 6. c. 2.*

Land abounds, ſo becauſe the Laws of our Nation have made proviſion for thoſe, who are not able by their own endeavours to ſupport themſelves: They enjoining the Officers of the place, where they ſhall be found to be, to relieve them and ſend them back to the place of their laſt abode, as thoſe, who are within the Precincts of it, to contribute to the maintaining of them. Where therefore there is ſuch a proviſion as this, there cannot lightly be any place for ſuch a neceſſity as we ſpeak of, and conſequently neither for the ſerving of our ſelves, without the violation of the Divine Command. And indeed, as thoſe neceſſities, which we ſometimes fall under, do moſtly ariſe from ſloth and idleneſs, or a living above that condition wherein God hath placed us; ſo, that bare neceſſity can be no warrant to us to invade our Neighbours Goods, the Prayer of *Agur* doth abundantly declare, *Give me* (ſaith he) *neither poverty nor riches: feed me with food convenient for me, leſt I be full and deny thee, and ſay, who is the Lord? or leſt I be poor and ſteal, and take the name of my God in vain*; for grounding his requeſt againſt poverty, upon the fear he had leſt he ſhould thereby be tempted *to ſteal, and take the name of God in vain*, he thereby ſufficiently intimated, that ſimple poverty doth no more priviledge a man *to ſteal*, than the ſame poverty can *to take Gods name in vain*, or *ſwear falſly*, when examined upon Oath concerning the fact; or *fulneſs*, to *deny him*, and ſay, *Who is the Lord?*

IV. Having thus ſhewn the Prohibition now before us to comprehend in it all uſurping upon, or any way diminiſhing of our Neighbours property; having moreover ſhewn what particular Crimes are included in it, and what actions are to be looked upon as exempted; we are in the next place to enquire, *wherein the criminalneſs* of thoſe things which are included in it, *doth conſiſt*, which will coſt no great pains to reſolve. For, inaſmuch as the Crime here forbidden is nothing elſe than an interverſion of property, which I have ſhewn to ſtand both by the Divine Inſtitution at firſt, and the diſpoſition of the Divine Providence; he, who ſhall go about ſo to intervert it, muſt be thought to fight againſt God, by whoſe appointment it was both inſtituted and continued. And indeed, as there is no ſin againſt man, which is not in ſome ſenſe againſt God, becauſe forbidden by his Laws; ſo the ſin we have now before us, is more peculiarly ſuch, becauſe, over and above the violation of his Laws, deſtroying that order which he appointed from the beginning in the world, and hath approved ever ſince by the diſpoſition of his Divine Providence. But beſide the contrariety which this ſin of Theft carries in it to the inſtitution and diſpoſition of the Almighty, it is no leſs prejudicial to humane Society, which next to the Divine Majeſty ought to be accounted ſacred; partly becauſe it is an interverſion of thoſe properties, for the preſerving whereof it is that men have been ſo willing to enter into Societies; and partly becauſe it prompts the injured party to endeavour a recovery by force and violence, which puts all into confuſion and diſorder: The injurious, no leſs than the injured party, being not like to want partners in his quarrel, 'till at length the whole Society be of a flame. And though it may be ſome unjuſt perſons would not be of ſo exorbitant appetites, as to endeavour to attain a ſoveraignty over the poſſeſſions of all their fellows, and much leſs over their perſons, yet inaſmuch as the deſire of this worlds goods encreaſeth with the acquiſition

of them, as (becauſe that acquiſition is not otherwiſe to be maintained) a deſire of power alſo, it is not eaſie to be imagin'd, but that they who indulge themſelves in the invading of this or that particular mans property, would in fine, if they had ability*, invade the goods of all, and make even the Common-wealth their own; injuſtice, where it hath acquired a proportionable ſtrength, eaſily paſſing into tyranny, which is the bane of thoſe Societies which it invades. Laſtly, for that alſo would be conſidered, where there is any reſpect for virtue and induſtry; if either ſecret or open uſurpations were permitted, men would for the moſt part leave off to do virtuouſly, becauſe without hope of enjoying the rewards of it.

* *Grot. in Decal.*

V. Now as every thing that is criminal doth by its own nature, and the Decree of God, bind over the Author to puniſhment, and that too in this world, if it be prejudicial to humane ſociety, which I have ſhewn the Sin of Theft ſufficiently to be: ſo it may not be amiſs to enquire, and the rather becauſe it hath been a matter of controverſie, *what puniſhments may be inflicted on it by the Civil Magiſtrate.* For the reſolution whereof, becauſe there are different ſorts of Thefts, I will proceed by degrees, and conſider firſt of all of that Theft which is of *Children* or *Men.* Now though I know it be queſtionable, whether other Thefts may be puniſhed by death, and the rather, becauſe God in the old Law preſcribed a more eaſie puniſhment; yet as to this whereof we ſpeak, no doubt at all can be made, but it may be cenſured with *death*, becauſe God, who obſerves exact juſtice, commanded ſuch an one to be put to death, *Exod.* 21. 16. for *he that ſtealeth a man* (ſaith God) *and ſelleth him, or if he be found in his hand, he ſhall ſurely be put to death.* And not without reaſon, as becauſe of the great value of the thing ſtoln, as being no other than the Image of God, ſo becauſe of that ſlavery and hardſhip, which he, who ſteals a man, intends, which, as it is often managed, is not inferiour to death it ſelf. From the Theft of Perſons paſs we to that of *Things*, as which is moſt confeſſedly intended. Where again we are to diſtinguiſh of ſuch things or goods as belong *to the Publick*, or ſuch as belong *to Private perſons.* If the queſtion be concerning the former, eſpecially in any eminent inſtances, ſo I ſhould not doubt to affirm, that it may be juſtly ſentenced with *death*; as becauſe the *Roman* Law, which draws neareſt to that of Reaſon and Nature, inflicted capital puniſhment upon Judges that ſhould be found to do ſo, and upon all that were inſtrumental to them in it; ſo becauſe the publick weal, wherein all private mens is concerned, depends much upon the ſtock it hath to maintain it. The great matter of controverſie is concerning the ſtealing of the goods of *private perſons*, which therefore I ſhall addreſs my ſelf to reſolve. And here indeed hath been great variety, according to the inclinations or exigences of thoſe States wherein they have been committed, the quality of the Theft, or the condition of the perſons; ſome puniſhing Theft with *reſtitution of the thing ſtoln, and an overplus*, as the Law of *Moſes*, and that of *Solon*; ſome with *ſtripes* and *ſervitude*; and ſome, in fine, with *death*, as *Draco* did all Thefts whatſoever; which made *Demades* afterwards ſay, that *Draco wrote his Laws not with Ink, but with Blood.* My purpoſe is not at this time to give an exact account of that variety, which whoſoever liſt to be ſatisfied in may read an excellent Chapter in *Aulus Gellius*; as neither

to

to ſcan the propriety of thoſe ſeveral puniſhments, and the proportion they bore to the Crime of Theft, becauſe all of them may be reaſonable enough, according to the different exigences of circumſtances: the only thing which I pretend to enquire into, as which indeed is the principal controverſie, is, whether Theft may be puniſhed with death. For the reſolution whereof, we will conſider of ſuch Thefts, as are *openly* and *violently committed*, beſt known among us by the name of *Robberies*; and then of *clancular ones*, or *Thefts properly ſo called*. If the queſtion be concerning the former, ſo I know not what any reaſonable man can oppoſe againſt the puniſhing them with death, as becauſe of the boldneſs of the fact, which requires a more than ordinary ſeverity to repreſs it, ſo becauſe thoſe Thefts, by the violence wherewith they are attended, ſtrike no leſs at mens lives than fortunes, which it is but reaſonable to ſecure by the death of the Offendor. All the difficulty, to my ſeeming, is concerning clancular Thefts; where again we are to diſtinguiſh of *nocturnal* and *diurnal* ones; that is to ſay, of thoſe that are committed in the night, or thoſe that are committed in the day. That the former of theſe, even ſuch Thefts as are committed by night, may be puniſhed with death, will appear not to be unreaſonable, if we conſider with our ſelves, the leave that was given by the Law of God firſt*, and afterwards by that of the 12 *Tables* ||, to kill the Thief in the very act; for how ſhould not that be much more lawful to the Magiſtrate, upon a mature conſideration of the fact, than to the injured perſon in his heat? Neither will it avail to ſay, that that leave was given to the party robbed, upon preſumption of the Thiefs adding violence to his Theft, and the likelihood of ſecuring himſelf and purchaſe by the death of the injured party, which therefore where it is paſt all danger, the nocturnal Theft ought in reaſon to be otherwiſe chaſtiſed; for inaſmuch as in puniſhment conſideration ought to be had of what may probably happen hereafter by ſuch kind of Thieveries; if there be a juſt preſumption of ſuch perſons adding Murther to Theft, it is but reaſonable, for the ſecurity of innocent perſons lives, to put thoſe to death, who are likely to take away the lives of other men. Which ſaid, I will proceed to the conſideration of diurnal Thefts, or ſuch as are committed in the day: Now though ſimply conſidered a *fourfold reſtitution* may ſeem to be a proportionable puniſhment, becauſe laid upon it by the Law of God, who beſt underſtands the proportion of things; though, if that will not do, the bringing in of ſervitude poſſibly may; the abolition whereof (as I have elſewhere ſhewn) hath not been much for the conveniency of the world: yet I doubt not there may be inſtances wherein it may be both lawful and neceſſary to puniſh ſuch Offendors with death; as for example, when ſuch Thefts are frequently committed, and cannot lightly be reſtrained with milder puniſhments: The quality of a Theft being not to be judged of meerly by the prejudice it doth to the injured party, but by the harm it doth to humane ſociety, which it is both the Magiſtrates intereſt and duty to ſecure. Now foraſmuch as it may ſometime happen, that Humane Society cannot be maintained without inflicting a puniſhment, which is above the meaſure of the offence, if conſidered only as to that prejudice which it doth to the immediate object of it; in ſuch a caſe I ſee no reaſon why the Magiſtrate may not inflict it, and particularly the extreme puniſhment of death; that I ſay not alſo, that I cannot

* *Exod.* 22. 2, 3.

|| *Vide A. Gell. l.* 11. *c.* 18.

Explication of the Fifth Commandment, Part. 16.

I cannot ſee how he can avoid it, without a greater injury to that Society which he is appointed to defend. Upon which account as it is but reaſonable to judge favourably of our own Laws, by which death is ſo often made the puniſhment of Theft, reſpect and charity both obliging us to ſuppoſe, that the Makers of thoſe Laws, together with thoſe that have ſucceeded them in their Office, have found by experience, that a leſſer puniſhment will not ſerve the turn; ſo there is this farther inducement to make that ſuppoſition, that even that ſeverity which they have uſed hath not deterred men from the commiſſion of it. But be that as it will (for ſuch things as theſe muſt be left to the determination of Publick Perſons, and not to Private ones, who are rather to ſubmit than diſpute) moſt certain it is, that the matter of Theft is ſo criminal before God, that the committers of it are by S. *Paul** reckoned among *thoſe perſons*, who *ſhall not inherit the Kingdom of God.*

* 1 Cor. 6. 10.

PART IV.

Of the Affirmative *part of the Commandment, which is declared to be, Firſt, The uſing all due means for the procuring and conſerving to our ſelves a Property: Secondly, The contributing what in us lies to the procuring, defending, or inlarging the Properties of others. The* former *of theſe reſumed, and evidenced to be a part of the Commandment, from the neceſſity the omiſſion thereof puts us upon of invading the Propertie of our Neighbour. An addreſs to a more particular conſideration of it, in an enumeration of the means we are to uſe to procure or conſerve to our ſelves a Property.* Labour *aſſigned the principal place among them, and upon occaſion thereof enquiry made* I. *From whence our obligation thereto ariſeth, which is ſhewn to be that Command which God laid upon* Adam, *to dreſs that Garden into which he was firſt put, more eſpecially that both Curſe and Command, which was laid upon him after his fall, of* eating his bread in the ſweat of his brows, *and the neceſſity there is generally of it toward the procuring of a ſubſiſtence.* II. *To what Perſons the obligation of Labour doth extend; where is ſhewn from the former grounds, that it extends to all that are not unapt for it, and particularly to thoſe of the Female Sex.* III. *Whether the labour of the body be incumbent upon all, which is anſwered in the Negative, and evidenced both from Reaſon and Scripture.* IV. *About what things this labour of ours is to be converſant; which are ſhewn* in the general *to be ſuch as have no moral obliquity in them, nor are any way inſtrumental to thoſe that have; as moreover ſuch as are ſome way or other uſeful to our ſelves or others; where the Trade of Fidlers, and other ſuch like Perſons, is conſidered:* In particular, *ſuch things to which we have a call from the Almighty, where both the neceſſity of ſuch a call, and the means of knowing it, is alſo declared.*

II. OF the *Negative* part of the Precept what hath been ſaid may ſuffice, proceed we now to the conſideration of the *Affirmative*, which I have ſaid to conſiſt in theſe two things:

1. The

1. The uſing all due Means for the procuring and conſerving to our ſelves a Property.
2. The contributing, what in us lies, to the procuring, defending, or enlarging the Property of our Neighbour.

I. Touching *the former* of theſe, no doubt can be made of its being included in this Commandment; becauſe, without that, it would be morally impoſſible to keep Men from ſtealing, which the Commandment doth expreſly forbid: he who uſeth not all means requiſite for the procuring or conſerving to himſelf a Property, being under a neceſſity of invading that of others. The onely thing worth our inquiry is, what thoſe *due Means* are: which accordingly I come now to inveſtigate.

1. I begin with *Labour*, becauſe laid upon all Mankind for this very end and purpoſe, and becauſe expreſly preſcrib'd by St. *Paul*, to procure to our ſelves a Subſiſtence, and ſo keep us from the Sin here forbidden: At the ſame time he exhorts him that ſtole *to ſteal no more*, exhorting *rather to labour*, and *to work with his hands the thing that is good*, *Epheſ.* 4. 28. For what reaſon, think we, but that (as *Grotius* hath well explain'd it) *he may have wherewithal to live himſelf*, as well as *to give to him that needeth*? that being ill to be done, but however with little effect, as to the keeping of Men from ſtealing, where they themſelves are not firſt in ſome meaſure provided for. Now concerning Labour, I will inquire,

1. From whence our Obligation thereto ariſeth.
2. Whether the Obligation to it extend to all Perſons whatſoever.
3. Whether the Labour of the Body be incumbent upon all.
4. About what this Labour of ours is to be converſant.
5. And laſtly, Whether it admit of a Relaxation, and after what manner and proportion.

1. Now though in inveſtigating *the Grounds* of this *Obligation*, it might ſuffice to look no farther back, than that both *Curſe* and *Command* which was laid upon fallen *Adam*, of *eating his bread in the ſweat of his brows*, *Gen.* 3. 19. becauſe, as I have before ſhewn, that both Curſe and Command is to be look'd upon, as of Univerſal concernment; yet I think it not amiſs (to make the Obligation appear ſo much the ſtraiter) to look as far back as the time of Man's Innocency, and when neither any Curſe, nor any thing that could deſerve it, can be ſuppos'd. For, as it is evident from that ſhort Account we have of it, that that State of Pleaſure and Innocence was not without an admixture of Labour, he who put *Adam* into the Garden of *Eden*, obliging him to the *dreſſing* of it, *Gen.* 2. 15. ſo it is no leſs evident, that, if that State had continu'd, all that deſcended from his Loyns would have been under the ſame Tie; partly, becauſe *Adam* was the Repreſentative of all Mankind; and partly, becauſe ſuch a Cultivation would have been neceſſary for the preſervation of thoſe Fruits which were given to *Adam* and his Poſterity for their Support. But becauſe that Labour, whatſoever it was, would undoubtedly have been without that Toil which the preſent Condition of Mankind doth require; therefore quitting that firſt Ground of our Obligation to labour, we will ſeek out ſuch an one as is proportionable to that Labour which is eſtabliſh'd on it. Now for this we ſhall need look no farther

farther than that Saying of God to fallen *Adam*, Gen. 3. 19. *In the ſweat of thy face ſhalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground.* For, that Saying (as I have before * ſhewn) being no leſs a Precept than a Curſe, and ſuch a Precept too as comprehended in it *Adam*'s Poſterity, as well as himſelf; we are in reaſon to deduce from thence that obligation to Labour, which we have ſaid to be incumbent upon Mankind. Laſtly, Foraſmuch as Labour is more or leſs neceſſary to the procuring or conſerving to our ſelves the Means of our Support, hence there ariſeth another Tie, proportionable to that Supply which Mens reſpective Neceſſities do require.

* See the Diſcourſe concerning the Poſitive Laws of God.

2. It being thus evident what the Grounds of Mens Obligation to Labour are, inquire we, in the next place, *to what Perſons the Obligation doth extend:* A Queſtion which will receive an eaſie Solution, after the Solution of the former. For, it appearing from thence, that that Obligation hath no other Grounds, than either the common Neceſſities of Humane Nature, or ſuch Poſitive Laws of God as were laid upon *Adam* and his Poſterity; it is of neceſſity to be look'd upon as of equal extent, and conſequently no Child of *Adam* to be exempted from it. Onely becauſe it doth not appear how the Female Sex comes to be concern'd, as having another and no leſs heavy Burthen laid upon it, I think it not amiſs, before I proceed to any new Matter, both to ſhew how it comes to oblige them, and add farther Proofs for the confirmation of it. For, be it that thoſe of the Female Sex had another, and no leſs heavy Burthen bound upon them, for the Tranſgreſſion of her that was the Original of their Sex; yet will it not thence follow, that they are therefore to be exempted from that Burthen which was laid upon the other: partly, becauſe that Sex, both in its Original and Deſcendents, had its Being in part from the Man; and partly, becauſe the Tranſgreſſion of her, who was the Original of it, was greater than that of the Mans, as being both the firſt, and the Occaſioner of the others. Upon which account, as it is not to be wondred that God ſhould add that Burthen of Labour to the other, as being but proportionable to their own Extraction, and the Guilt of the Foundreſs of their Sex; ſo, much leſs, if we conſider, that this Burthen of Labour had not onely nothing in it peculiar to the Man (as that which was laid upon the Female Sex had) but is of equal neceſſity to the Support of both. And though they that ſhall but ſuperficially conſider the Character that *Solomon* gives of a Virtuous Woman, *Prov.* 31. 10. and ſo on, where, among other things, he deſcribeth her as one that *ſeeketh wooll and flax, and worketh willingly with her hands*; though they (I ſay) that ſhall but ſuperficially conſider theſe and the like Paſſages, may imagine they hear that grave King reading a Lecture of Oeconomicks, and rather admoniſhing what may make for their Husbands Profit, than for the Intereſt of Religion, and the Peace of their own Souls: yet as that Imagination will be in part remov'd, by conſidering, that the Book of *Proverbs* is no leſs a part of Scripture than any other; ſo alſo by adverting, that he pretends not to deſcribe a Thrifty, but a Virtuous Perſon, and, as it is in the thirtieth Verſe, *a woman that feareth the Lord.* For, if ſo, ſuch Works as thoſe muſt be Works of Duty and Religion, and concern the Conſciences, as well as the Profits of thoſe to whom they do belong. And indeed, ſo far is the Induſtriouſneſs

of

of that Sex from being a part of Oeconomicks onely, that St. *Paul*, who certainly never dream'd of any thing of that nature, inſiſts upon the ſame thing, calling upon thoſe whoſe Age gave them Ability for it, to intend their Houſhold Affairs; and reproving ſuch as were idle and negligent in it, 1 *Tim.* 5. 13, 14 Which with what reaſon he could do ſo earneſtly as he does, if it were not of Divine Obligation, I am not able to conjecture, and I ſuppoſe better Wits cannot. You will pardon me, you of the Female Sex, if I have, beſide my wont, thus ſeem'd to treſpaſs on your Affairs: For, as I knew not how to avoid it, without giving countenance to the Practice of thoſe Women, who, amidſt all their Pretenſions to Religion, ſeem to have little conſideration of this Affair; ſo I have inſiſted the rather on it, to encourage the Diligence, and eſtabliſh the Conſciences of thoſe who are more induſtrious in it. For, if St. *Paul* may be believ'd, it is not the *idle*, and *buſie-body*, and *wanderer from houſe to houſe* that is the Religious Perſon; but ſhe that diligently *guides her own:* and though there be other more immediate Acts of Religion, yet they ſerve God in theſe alſo, if they do them with reſpect to the Divine Command, and ſhall no doubt receive a Reward for them. This onely would be added, becauſe underſtood in all Laws, That the Obligation to Labour reacheth no farther to either Sex, than where there is an Ability to diſcharge it: Upon which account, all ſick, and impotent, and aged Perſons are to be look'd upon as exempted ſo far as their reſpective Indiſpoſitions make them unapt for it. Which laſt Reſtriction I do therefore ſubjoyn, becauſe even thoſe, though not apt for the ſeverer ſorts of Labour, are yet oftentimes well enough qualified for eaſier ones. And I cannot but upon this occaſion call to mind a Story which *Busbequius* * tells us of a certain *Spaniard*, who had been a Commander among thoſe of his own Nation, and was by himſelf redeem'd from a *Turkiſh* Maſter, to whom he was a Slave. For though, by reaſon of the Wounds he had receiv'd, he was miſerably impotent in all his Limbs, and one who therefore ſeem'd more proper for an Hoſpital than an Employment; yet his *Turkiſh* Maſter found a way to ſet him on work, and receiv'd a conſiderable Emolument by him. For, paſſing him over into *Aſia*, where great Flocks of Geeſe are kept, he made uſe of him (as the ſame *Busbequius* tells us) for the feeding of them, and receiv'd no contemptible Benefit by it. But be that as it will, becauſe I haſten to other Matter, and ſuch as will more deſerve our conſideration: as other Perſons than thoſe before remembred, it will be hard, or rather impoſſible to find, who can plead an Exemption from the common condition of Mankind; ſo the ſearch will be look'd upon as unprofitable by thoſe who conſider that of St. *Paul*, that *if any man would not labour, neither ſhould he eat*, 2 *Theſſ.* 3. 10.

* *Turcic. Epiſt.* 8.

3. From the Perſons therefore that are under this Obligation, paſs we to *the Kinds of Labour* to which they are oblig'd; or rather to inquire, *whether that of the Body be incumbent upon all.* A Queſtion which is not of ſo eaſie a reſolution as the former, if we conſider either the ſeveral States and Degrees of Men, or the Tenor of thoſe Precepts by which Labour is bound upon us. For, as on the one hand, to oblige all Men to the Labour of the Body, would overthrow thoſe ſeveral Orders which God hath ſet in the World,

and, which is more, take off the better ſort from intending the Labours of the Mind, which are of no leſs neceſſity to the Support of Humane Society; ſo, on the other, to exempt any from it, ſeems equally repugnant to that Primitive Law, by which we have ſaid Labour to be bound upon us, and the ſeveral Precepts of St. *Paul*: The former importing, *the eating of our bread in the ſweat of our face*; the latter, *working with our own hands* for it. But as it would be conſider'd, that it is no way unreaſonable for a Law to be expreſs'd in ſuch Terms as have a more peculiar Aſpect upon the *major* part (the *major* part as it is moſt to be conſider'd, ſo ſtanding in need of a more particular direction); ſo the Law of Labour, as it is worded both by God and St. *Paul*, though not holding in all Particulars, is yet accommodable to the greater part of Humane Kind: The common Supports of Nature being not to be procur'd, where the greater part of thoſe that are concern'd do not contribute to it with the Work of their own Hands. From whence as it will follow, that there is no neceſſity of underſtanding the Laws beforementioned in that ſtrictneſs of ſenſe wherein they ſeem to be delivered, ſo eſpecially, if either Reaſon or Scripture do perſwade an Enlargement of it. Which that they do, will appear, if we conſider them apart; and firſt of all, that which Reaſon offers to us. For, inaſmuch as all are not qualified by Nature for Bodily Labour, or at leaſt not ſo much as for the Labour of the Mind; and they who are, are not yet at leiſure to intend it, by means of much more important Concerns: inaſmuch as the Labour of the Mind is no leſs neceſſary to the Support of Humane Society, nor leſs an Inſtance of that Travel which God hath laid as a Burthen upon Humane Nature: it ſeems but reaſonable to infer, That the Command of God is no leſs ſatisfied with that kind of Labour, than it is by *the ſweat of our face*, or *working with our hands*. Foraſmuch, ſecondly, as even by God's appointment there are Men of High Degree, as well as Low, and ſuch whoſe Education and Birth ſeems not well to correſpond to thoſe meaner Labours to which the greater part of Mankind are oblig'd; it ſeems but reaſonable to allot them ſuch a Labour as is ſuitable to that better State in which the Almighty hath plac'd them. Laſtly, Foraſmuch as though both the Curſe and Precept of Labour be laid upon all Mankind, yet it is in the power of God to releaſe it; foraſmuch as thoſe Perſons to whom God hath given more liberal Fortunes, are in reaſon to be look'd upon as in part releas'd, becauſe without thoſe Neceſſities for the redreſs whereof Labour was principally enjoyn'd: it ſeems but reaſonable to infer, that they are neither oblig'd to the ſame degree of Labour with Perſons of meaner Fortune, nor to the ſame Species or Kind. And more than this, if thoſe whom the old *Saxon* Tongue ſtiles Eðle-men, but our preſent Dialect by a Name more ſuitable to their Quality, did not challenge, I know not what any reaſonable Man could oppoſe againſt their way of living, or endeavour to reduce them to the Condition of meaner Perſons; conſideration being always to be had of the Condition of the Perſons, in order to the adjuſtment of the Obligations that lie upon them. It is a known Obſervation, and therefore I ſhall not fear to have the truth of it call'd in Queſtion, That among the *Turks* Perſons * of the Nobleſt Quality

* *Busbeq. Turcic. Epiſt.*

Quality, and moſt ingenuous Education, are yet brought up to ſome Manual Art, in which they ever after employ ſome portion of their Time; the *Great Turk* himſelf, amidſt his moſt important Affairs, yet allotting ſome portion of his Time to the intending of it. I do not pretend to lay this Burthen upon any ingenious Perſon, and much leſs to repreſent him as unuſeful in the World, who ſhould not think fit to follow their example; but certainly it muſt be a great reproach to thoſe who are far better inſtructed, ſo far to forget either the Deſign of their Being, or Deſcent from *Adam*, as to think themſelves privileg'd to live in eaſe, and ſpend that Patrimony in Sloth and Luxury, which their Renowned Anceſtors acquir'd either by their Wits or by their Swords. It may be enough to ſuch, that they are freed from all ſervile Labours, that they have an Education and Parts anſwerable to thoſe glorious *Heroes*, from whom they derive both their Fortunes and their Blood. And certainly, where they are well employ'd, as they will be no leſs uſeful to the World, ſo neither leſs acceptable to God, than *the ſweat* of the others *brows*. But becauſe Scripture, no leſs than Reaſon, would be inquir'd into there, where the Obligation, whoſe Relaxation we ſeek, hath its principal Foundation in it; therefore it may not be amiſs, that I ſay not in ſome meaſure neceſſary, to inquire whether the Scripture affords any ground for the qualifying of that ſeverer Precept which God laid upon Mankind for its diſobedience. Now that it doth, will ſufficiently appear from that Queſtion which St. *Paul* put concerning himſelf and *Barnabas*, 1 *Cor.* 9. 6. For, demanding, as he does, whether *he and Barnabas onely had not power to forbear working, as well as other Apoſtles, and as the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas*, (for ſo the Word *onely*, and the connexion of that Demand with the former Words oblige us to ſupply it) he both ſuppoſeth that *other of the Apoſtles*, and *the brethren of the Lord*, and *Cephas*, abſtain'd from Manual Labours; and that it was alike in his power to do ſo, if he pleas'd to make uſe of it, that ſo he might the better intend that more noble Work of the Converſion of Souls. And indeed, as the Labour of the Brain, whereby that is to be done, is no leſs uſeful to Humane Society, nor (which makes it approach nearer to that Curſe upon which it is founded) leſs *weariſom to the fleſh*, if we may give credit to *Solomon**, who was more than ordinarily exercis'd in it; ſo they who would reduce us to that toilſom eſtate of St. *Paul*, and others, who ſtuck not to addict themſelves even to the meaneſt Artifices, muſt alſo bring back again into the World thoſe *miraculous Gifts* and *Graces* whereby St. *Paul*, and other ſuch like Perſons, were enabled to diſcharge their ſeveral Provinces; the Work of converting Souls (as it is now to be managed) requiring all that Labour and Induſtry which the Neceſſities of the World will ſuffer us to afford it. The ſame is to be ſaid, and upon the ſtrength of the forementioned Demand, concerning all thoſe whoſe Brains are employ'd in the management of State-affairs, or are any other way uſeful to the conſervation of Mens Perſons or Eſtates. For, St. *Paul* pleading his Exemption from Bodily Labour, from his diligence in his Apoſtleſhip, and the good he thereby did to thoſe Perſons who were under his inſpection, to which he thought it but juſt that at leaſt a Maintenance ſhould be allow'd; inſinuating moreover, in

* *Eccl.* 12. 12.

the ninth and tenth Verſes, by his comparing his Labour to *the oxes treading out the corn*, and to *plowing* and *reaping*, that it was not unfitly ſtil'd a Labour, and ſuch a Labour which privileg'd him to partake of carnal Things, no leſs than that which is attended with Sweat and Toil: he thereby gave us ſufficiently to underſtand, that as the Labours of the Mind are no leſs properly ſuch, than thoſe which are exerciſed by the Hands; ſo, where they are conducible to the Benefit of Humane Kind, they give a Man the ſame Privilege to the enjoyment of this Worlds Goods, and conſequently ſatisfie the intent of the Commandment.

4. Being now, according to my propoſed Method, to inquire *about what things this Labour of ours is to be converſant*, I ſhall propoſe, firſt, ſuch Directions as concern the Labours of Men in general, and then thoſe which relate to the Labours of particular Perſons.

As to the former of theſe, we ſhall need no other Inſtruction than that which St. *Paul* gives in the fore-quoted place to the *Epheſians*, to wit, that it be about *thoſe things that are good*. By which I mean, firſt, ſuch things as *have no moral obliquity in them*, nor *are inſtrumental to them*. Of the former ſort, in particular, is the Trade of *Harlots*, who proſtitute their Bodies to furniſh themſelves with a Support; the Arts of *Witches* and *Wizzards*, who inquire into things ſecret, and ſuch as are not onely knowable to God alone, but * challeng'd to himſelf: Of the latter, all thoſe which are inſtrumental to Uncleanneſs, or to any other Sin whatſoever; ſuch as are to the former, the Trade of *Bauds* and *Panders*; to Drunkenneſs, *the keeping of Houſes* not for the covenience of Travellers, or the moderate refreſhment of others, but *to invite and cheriſh intemperance*; in fine, to Idolatry, *the making of thoſe Images* which are to be *the Object* of it. Whence it is, that the Fathers inveigh ſo much againſt it, and (as I have before ſhewn †) reckon it little inferiour to that it miniſters to. But beſide that thoſe things about which our Labour is to be converſant, ought to be free from all Vice, or from being inſtrumental to it; I ſhall not doubt to reckon, in the ſecond place, that they ought to be *ſome way or other uſeful to our ſelves or others*; partly, becauſe this is the loweſt Notion the Word *Good*, in the proper acception of it, is capable of; and partly, becauſe we find Labour inſtituted for the Support of our ſelves and others. Among theſe I reckon firſt, becauſe undoubtedly Good, ſuch Labours or Arts as conduce to *the welfare* of Mens *Souls*, or *Bodies*, or *Eſtates*: ſuch as are the Labour of the Brain, or Tongue, or Pen, in converting or building Men up in Piety; the cure of their Bodies when diſtemper'd, or the defending of their Properties; as, in like manner, thoſe which conduce to the producing of Food and Raiment, the protecting Men from Hunger, or the injury of the Weather; in fine, all ſuch as are any way inſtrumental to them, or employ'd about the producing of them; and that too, not onely in ſuch Inſtances whereby the Neceſſities of Nature may be ſerv'd, but the diſtinction of Degrees preſerv'd and maintain'd. The onely difficulty, in my opinion, is concerning ſuch Arts or Labours as are converſant about Matters of Delight and Recreation; ſuch as are, the making of Cards or Dice, the Trade of Fidlers, Tumblers, Stage-players, and other ſuch like Perſons, whoſe Life conſiſts wholly in gratifying the Eyes and Ears of other Men. Concerning which,

* See *Deut.* 29. 29.

† Explicat. of the Second Commandm. Part.

which, though I ſhall not be forward to pronounce of them as devoid of all uſefulneſs, becauſe Recreation, to which they ſerve, is no leſs needful to Humane Nature, than Labour; yet I cannot forbear to ſay, that Men of ſuch Profeſſions, of all others, ought both to avoid the committing of any Sin in the Exerciſe of their ſeveral Trades, and endeavour, what in them lies, and ſo far as their own Neceſſities will permit, the doing of ſuch things alſo as are more uſeful to themſelves and others; becauſe, as if that about which their Labour is converſant be good, it is in the loweſt proportion ſuch; ſo they are very rarely managed without prejudice to their own Souls, or to theirs whom they are intended to procure the gratification of.

Having thus ſhewn, in the general, about what the Labours of Men are to be converſant; inquire we, in the next place, about what the Labours of *particular Men* are, and *what choice* they are to make to themſelves out of *the former* Heap. For the reſolution whereof, as it is neceſſary to premiſe, that that, and that onely, is to be look'd upon as the proper Subject of our Labour, to which the Divine Majeſty ſhall be pleas'd to *call* us; partly, becauſe St. *Paul*, in the ſeventh Chapter of his firſt Epiſtle to the *Corinthians*, preſuppoſeth * ſuch a *call* of God to every Man; and partly, becauſe it is not to be thought, that God, who ſuperintends over the World, and particularly over Men, will be wanting in directing them to ſuch Courſes as may make moſt for their good, and his own Glory: ſo a compendious way is thereby opened for Men to judge of that Subject about which their Labour is to be converſant: All that is left for Men to do (ſuppoſing a Call of God to every one) being no other than to inquire, which way the Divine Majeſty calleth them. For the inveſtigation whereof, foraſmuch as extraordinary Inſpirations are now ceas'd, but however are not lightly to be expected in Matters of this nature, and where, for the moſt part, if not always, lower Methods will ſerve the turn; recourſe muſt be had to what his Word, and our own Reaſon, (which is the Candle of the Lord) ſhall dictate to us. Which if we do, we ſhall find (as a † Learned Man hath largely prov'd) that the beſt way to judge of the Divine Calling, and conſequently of the proper Subject of our Labour, is by our *Education*, *Abilities*, and *Propenſion*; eſpecially when we find them all to concur. For, as we are to preſume in reaſon, that he who commands us to honour our Parents, doth thereby oblige us to the making that the Subject of our Labour, which they, out of their Prudence and Care, have train'd us up for (the detrecting of their Choice, being a queſtioning of their Wiſdom, but to be ſure a derogation to their Authority); ſo we can much leſs think that Choice any other than the Call of God, where a Man's own Inclination and Abilities do concur, becauſe both of them the Reſults of his Providence, and, where his Revelations do not contravene, the Interpreters of his Will. Whatſoever difficulty there is in this Affair, is undoubtedly where there is a contrariety between them, and where Men are train'd up to thoſe Courſes to which they have not onely a natural averſeneſs, but it may be too, little aptitude or ability. The reſolution of which, though I had much rather Men ſhould fetch from the fore-quoted || Learned Perſon, in whom it is diſtinct and full; yet I ſhall contribute ſo far toward it, by affirming, That as the firſt place ought in reaſon to be given to our Education, becauſe

* See ver. 20. of that chap. as alſo ver. 24. with the Sermon of Dr. *Sanderſon* upon the latter.

† *Sanderſon ibid.*

|| *Sanderſon ibid.*

becauſe the Act of thoſe whom God hath commanded us to obey; and next to that, (becauſe Parents may ſometime command things unfitting) to our Parts and Abilities, becauſe pointing out, as it were with the Finger, what Employments God deſigns us for: ſo that conſideration ought to be had, in ſome meaſure, of Mens Inclinations and Propenſions, becauſe both the Effects of the Creator's Power where they are purely Natural; and, where they are alſo ſtrong, difficult to be overcome: I do not ſay, ſo far as to yield a perfect compliance with them, where our Abilities and Education run counter to them; but a partial one, and ſuch as may make the Task impos'd more eaſie to be born. Thus, for example, if a Man's Abilities and Education ſhould prompt him to the Study of Sacred Things, at the ſame time his own Inclinations lead him to Humane Literature; if thoſe Inclinations cannot be overcome, though there is no doubt they often may, the moſt prudent courſe, as well as moſt acceptable to God, would be undoubtedly to apply a Man's ſelf to the ſtudy of the Civil Law, which is a rare Contexture of both. And more than this, as I ſhall not need to ſay concerning the choice of that Subject about which our Labour is to be converſant; ſo I ſhall conclude with an Exhortation, to be more than ordinarily diligent in it; but ſo, as neither to ſuffer our diligence about the Meat that periſheth, to tranſport us into any Injuſtice, or thruſt out our Endeavours after that Meat which endureth for ever. For, though it be not to be imagin'd, that an ordinary diligence can ſatisfie that Precept which requires the moulding our Bread with the Sweat of our own Brows; yet much leſs can it be ſuppos'd, that that diligence of ours can licenſe us in any Injuſtice, or the neglect of our Eternal Welfare: Becauſe, as Labour was impos'd to procure to our ſelves a Property, and thereby take away all temptation from entrenching upon the Properties of others, which a diligence that is attended with Injuſtice doth very ill comport with; ſo Reaſon, as well as Scripture, adviſeth the poſtpoſing of thoſe Commands which enjoyn the purſuit of Earthly Bleſſings, to thoſe which are infinitely above them.

PART

PART V.

The laſt queſtion concerning Labour is, whether it admit of a relaxation, and in what manner, and proportion. That it admits of a relaxation is made appear from the neceſſity there is of it, both to the ſupport of Humane Nature, and to diſpoſe men the better to continue it; as alſo, from the countenance that hath been given to it by Gods both Diſpenſations and Laws. That it admits of ſuch relaxations as have the name of Recreations, *is in like manner evidenced from the little refreſhment that accrues from a meer reſt from labour, & from the both leave and approbation God hath given to the other: From thence the Explication deſcends to entreat more particularly concerning the due manner, and proportion of our relaxation. In order whereunto, enquiry is made concerning ſuch Recreations as are converſant about* Lots, *as Cards and Dice,* the motion of the body, *as Dancing, and particularly that which they call mix'd;* and the imitation of other mens geſtures and ſpeeches, *as Stage-Plays. Touching the firſt whereof is ſhewn, that there is not that ſacredneſs in a Lot as is commonly deemed, and an anſwer returned to that of* Solomon, Prov. 16. 33. *Touching the ſecond, That Dancing hath both the leave and approbation of the Almighty; and that that which they call* mix'd *may not only be uſed inoffenſively by ſober perſons, but that there is more danger from the converſe of young perſons out of it, than in it: Touching the third, That Stage-Plays are but a kind of Picture of Mens behaviour and ſpeeches, and therefore no more unlawful than the depicting of their Faces. Conſideration is next had of the Time that may be employed in them, and of the Money that may be beſtowed upon them. In order to the former whereof is ſhewn, 1. That they ought to have no more of our Time, than may ſerve for a relief after labour, or to quicken us to future ones. 2. That they ought not to intrench upon that Time which the Duties of Religion, or thoſe of our Employments, call for. 3. That ordinarily they ought not to have the Morning at all, where they may be as well uſed at other times. As to the latter is made appear, that more Money ought not to be either expended or hazarded about them, than can well be ſpared from more important occaſions, ſuch as are thoſe of Charity, and the ſuſtentation of our ſelves and Families; and that it is much leſs lawful to acquire, or deſign to acquire, a livelihood by them. The whole concluded with an Admonition, not to play at ſuch Games, or for ſuch Sums of Money, under which men cannot ordinarily contain themſelves from heats of paſſion.*

5. OF the Queſtions before propoſed concerning Labour (which how it appertains to this Commandment, needs not again be told you) the laſt, and only one remaining to be reſolved, is, *whether it admit of a relaxation,* and *in what manner and proportion.* For the clearing whereof (how ſlight ſoever the matter of it may appear to be) yet I think my ſelf obliged to uſe as much care and circumſpection, as in matters of greater moment; Superſtition on the one hand having endeavoured

deavoured to abridge men of their lawful liberty, as Profaneneſs on the other hand to convert it into licentiouſneſs.

Now that our obligation to labour admits of a *relaxation*, (which is the firſt thing in order to be diſcuſſed) will appear, if we conſider *the neceſſity* there is of it, or *the countenance* which hath been given to it *by him, by whom the Obligation was impoſed:* For it being evident from Experience, that neither mens brains, nor bodies, are of ability to undergo an uninterrupted travel, there will ariſe from thence a neceſſity of remitting of our labour, as well as of intending and proſecuting it; he who acts beyond his ability offering an injury to his nature, and conſequently, whilſt he endeavours to keep one Commandment, engaging himſelf in the violation of a much more important one. But neither is there a leſs neceſſity of remitting ſome time of our labour, if we conſider it only with reference to that labour which is bound upon us; for the due performance of that depending upon the hability and promptneſs of him that laboureth, as that hability and promptneſs upon his giving himſelf, at due times, reſt and eaſe; he who would labour as he ought, muſt ſometime remit of it, and ſlacken his Bow as well as bend it. And it calls to my mind the fact of *Æſop*, who, when twitted with playing among Children, contented himſelf for his defence, to lay before him that did ſo, an unbended Bow. Of which, whilſt he and the ſpectators laboured to find the meaning, *Æſop* himſelf gave this rational account, as we learn from the moſt ingenious *Phædrus**; that *as a Bow if it be always kept bent will be quickly broken, but if ſometime ſlackened, will be more uſeful to him that uſeth it*; ſo, *he that ſometimes gives recreation to his mind, will find it afterwards better diſpoſed to exerciſe thoſe operations, which it is by God and Nature both fitted and intended for.* And well then may Labour, though impoſed upon man by the ſtraiteſt obligations, admit of a relaxation, if it rather gain than loſe ought by affording it. It being thus evident, that there is a neceſſity of a relaxation, as well as labour, yea to the undergoing of that labour which we are required to intend; proceed we to ſhew *what countenance* it hath *from him, by whom Labour was impoſed.* For the evidencing whereof, I will alledge in the firſt place, that relaxation which *ſleep* gives: for ſleep being manifeſtly the work of God and Nature, becauſe naturally flowing from that wearineſs which the exerciſe of our natural faculties produceth, and including moreover in it a relaxation from labour, becauſe binding up thoſe faculties by which it is to be intended; he who makes ſleep a neceſſary adjunct of Humane Nature, muſt conſequently be thought to give countenance to that relaxation, which is the natural and neceſſary effect of it. But neither hath the Divine Majeſty given leſs countenance to it by his *Laws*, as will appear from that known one of the obſervation of the Sabbath; for that day (as was before ſhewn*) being appointed for the reſt of the body, as well as for the intending of the more important actions of Religion; he, who gave leave to, yea impoſed ſuch a reſt, ſhews it to be no leſs acceptable to himſelf, than thoſe days of labour which he required. I conclude therefore with the Author to the *Hebrews*, though in another ſenſe, that *there remaineth a reſt to the People of God*, yea to all who have no other title to that name, than their original from him, upon whom the burthen of Labour was impoſed. But

* *Lib.* 3. *fab.* 14.
Cito rumpes arcum, ſemper ſi tenſum habueris.
At ſi laxâris, cum voles, erit utilis.
Sic luſus animo debet aliquando dari,
Ad cogitandum melior ut redeat tibi.

* See Explic. of the Fourth Com. Part.

But becauſe the queſtion is not ſo much, even amongſt the moſt ſcrupulous, Whether our obligation to labour admit of a relaxation; as whether it admit of ſuch relaxations, as are beſt known by the names of Recreations or Plays: therefore I think it not amiſs (before I proceed any further) to ſhew theſe to have the ſame Authority with thoſe other relaxations before ſpoken of. In the doing whereof, I will make uſe of the ſame Topicks, by which I before evinced the lawfulneſs of the other. To begin with Nature, becauſe that, which we ſpeak of, is but a refreſhment of it; where who is there that ſees not an equal neceſſity of Recreation, with thoſe other relaxations before ſpoken of? For, to ſay nothing at all of Sleep, becauſe what refreſhment ſoever it may give, yet it is perceived rather by its Effects, than by it ſelf; a meer Reſt from Labour being not without its tediouſneſs, conſidering the natural propenſion there is in men to be always exerciſing their reſpective Faculties: were not Humane Nature ſometime indulged the uſe of more buſie refreſhments, it is impoſſible to think but they would apply themſelves to their Labours with leſs vigour and chearfulneſs, than is requiſite to the due performance of them. And indeed, however ſome more ſcrupulous than wiſe, yea even in thoſe ſacred things, to the knowledge whereof they moſt pretend, though ſuch (I ſay) have by their practice and advice recommended a ſimple Reſt, before thoſe Refreſhments which Recreations give; yet hath that recommendation of theirs proved as little to the advantage of Religion, as to the encouragement of thoſe Labours which it was principally deſigned to promote: both themſelves, and others who follow their Example, employing the moſt part of their time of Reſt in uncharitable cenſures of other men, which are certainly more repugnant to Religion, than any Recreation whatſoever. Beſide, whilſt he, who is buſied about ſome innocent Recreation or other, hath his thoughts as well as hands employed, and conſequently is not obnoxious to thoſe evil ſuggeſtions, which the Devil is apt to inſtil into idle minds; he who contents himſelf with a ſimple Reſt, makes himſelf a prey to all thoſe evil thoughts, which the advantage of a mind not employed gives him the temptation to ſuggeſt. Thus whilſt men, out of a vain fear of thoſe inconveniences which do ſometime attend upon innocent Recreations, avoid wholly the uſe of them, they do not infrequently run into another, and a worſe extreme. With how little countenance from Scripture as well as Nature, that of *Solomon* in *Eccleſiaſtes*, as well as another of the Prophet *Zachary* ſhews: The latter whereof repreſents it as the conſequence of Gods intended reſtauration of *Jeruſalem*, that *the ſtreets of the City ſhould be full of young perſons*, of either Sex, *playing in the ſtreets thereof*, *Zach.* 8. 5. The former, that as there is a ſeaſon for more ſad and ſerious purpoſes, ſo there is a time to *laugh* and *dance* *; and conſequently, that ſuch like Recreations, where they are ſeparated from the abuſes thereof, are not without the leave, yea countenance of him, by whom times and ſeaſons are appointed. * Eccl. 3. 4.

Having thus returned an Anſwer to the firſt part of the Demand, and ſhewn our Obligation to Labour, not only to admit of a relaxation, but of ſuch relaxations in particular, as have the name of Recreations; we are in the next place to enquire, *in what manner and proportion* it admits of them, which will ſhew the ſeveral limitations

thereof. In order whereunto, I will firſt of all conſider of the *matter* of them, as without the due qualification of which they cannot by any means be accounted lawful.

Now though, if queſtion had not been made about the lawfulneſs of ſome Recreations that are much in uſe, it might ſuffice for the reſolution of the conſcience, to propoſe only ſome general Rules, ſuch as are, that *they be converſant about ſuch things, by which the mind or body or both may be better diſpoſed to Labour, and neither the one nor the other corrupted*; he who keeps within theſe bounds being out of danger of offending, as to the matter of his Recreations: yet in regard of the weakneſs of ſome, and the peeviſhneſs of others, I will proceed to more particular conſiderations, and enquire what is to be thought of ſuch Games as are converſant about *Lots*, as *Cards* or *Dice*; *the motion of the body*, as *Dancing*, and particularly that which they call *mix'd, and the imitation of other mens geſtures and ſpeeches*, as *Stage-Plays*: Intending afterwards (becauſe it is not to be denyed that all theſe both may and are often abuſed) to ſubjoin ſuch neceſſary Cautions, as may preſerve men from the ſeveral abuſes thereof.

Of all the Recreations, wherewith the minds or bodies of men have been exerciſed, I know of none which ſcrupulous perſons have both more avoided, and impugned, than thoſe which are converſant about *Lots*, as conceiving that there is ſomething ſo ſacred in a Lot, as not to be a proper matter of merriment. What ground they have ſo to opine ſhall be afterwards examined, when I come to conſider that Text on which they chiefly bottom their perſwaſion; give me leave only, before I proceed to that, to ſhew you the nature and uſe of a Lot, as which will conduce not a little to ſhew it a lawful matter of Recreation. Now a Lot (as Mr. *Gataker** hath ſhewn at large) is nothing elſe but a *caſual event applyed to the deciding of a doubt*, and hath place ‖ *not in things of moment* (for ſuch undoubtedly ought not to be put to that hazard, ſave where there is an expreſs command of God for it) *but in things indifferent*, and concerning which it matters not, whether they be done one way or another. But what is there in all this, that can hinder a Lot from being made matter of diſport, and conſequently from becoming an ingredient of thoſe Games to which it is commonly applyed? Is it the caſualty of the event? But who (as the ſame Mr. *Gataker** reaſons) is ſo exceſſively auſtere, or ſo extremely ſuperſtitious, as to deny, but that a man may make ſport with ſuch caſual events as do uſually occur? May not one lawfully take pleaſure in ſeeing a man ſhoot, or catch, at ought blindfold? Or may we not pleaſe our ſelves with our own or others tripping on the way, when no hurt enſueth, or in their treading in ſome unclean thing unawares? Laſtly, Is it not equally warrantable to make Game of a Hare that caſually croſſeth us, as of one that we adviſedly light upon? If with theſe and other the like Caſualties then we may lawfully ſport our ſelves, why not as well (as the ſame worthy perſon goes on) with the ſhuffling of Arrows, or the drawing of Tickets, the dealing of Cards, or the fall of a Dye? There being as much of caſualty in the one as the other, and therefore either both to be condemned, or neither. But it may be, the Crime lyes in applying of this caſualty to the deciding of a doubt; as for Example, who ſhall play or ſtay out,

* *Of the natural uſe of Lots. ch.* 1. ‖ *Ibid. c.* 5. *pag.* 125, *&c.*

* *Ibid. ch.* 6. *pag.* 170.

out, who begin or follow, or what Cards each perſon ſhall have to make advantage of. But neither in this can any the leaſt Crime be ſuppoſed, if it be duly adverted to: For Chriſtian liberty * imply-ing a free uſe of all Gods Creatures, to employ them unto ſuch purpoſes as they are by natural power enabled to; what ſhould hinder men, upon conſent, to employ a Lot to the determining of a doubt, which that Lot, by the conſent of men, is enabled to determine? eſpecially when, as it afterwards follows in the account before given of a Lot, the uſe of it is only in matters of indifferency, which are the proper ſubject of Recreation. All therefore that can in Reaſon be objected againſt the uſe of Lots in ſports, is that of *Solomon*, *Prov.* 16. 33. *The Lot is caſt into the lap, but the whole diſpoſing*, or (as it is in the *Hebrew*) *every judgment of it is of the Lord.* From whence though ſome have endeavoured to infer, that there is an immediate providence in every Lot, and conſequently, that he, who makes uſe of it in trifling matters, puts God upon exerting ſuch an immediate providence in them; yet, as all that can be neceſſarily inferred from thence is, that there is a Providence of God in *all things*, even in *the leaſt*, in *the moſt caſual things*, and among the reſt by name in a *Lot*, (what is here ſaid concerning a Lot, being elſewhere * affirmed of all mens *thoughts*, and *ways*, and *words*, and *works*, in all which certainly no man will affirm an immediate Providence to interpoſe) ſo, that we cannot with reaſon infer an immediate Providence in every Lot, is evident, partly || in that the lighting of the Lots in this or that manner ordinarily cometh immediately from the act of the Creature, whoſe motion determineth it to that manner after which it happeneth; and partly, that if there were any ſuch immediate Providence in * them, it ſhould be in the natural power of the Creature, becauſe in his natural power to caſt Lots at pleaſure, to put God upon the exerting of an immediate Providence, which it were little leſs than blaſphemy to affirm. Againſt ſuch Games therefore as are converſant about Lots no juſt exception can be made, unleſs where they are abuſed, which it is not only none of my deſign to defend, but, as I ſhall afterwards ſhew, to detect and condemn.

* See *Gatak.* of the nature, &c. of a lot. chap. 6. Sect 8

* Prov. 16. 1. 9. 19. 21. 20. 24. 21. 30. 31.

|| *Gatak. ibid.* ch. 7. Sect. 4.

* *Gatak. ibid.*

From ſuch Recreations therefore as are converſant about Lots, paſs we to thoſe that are converſant about *the motion of the body*, and particularly that of *Dancing*. A Recreation, which, however ſome zealous people have inveighed againſt, yet if uſed with ſobriety cannot in the leaſt be faulted; for beſide that it doth not appear, how it ſhould be more unlawful to Dance than Sing, Dancing being but a harmony in the motion of the Body, as Singing is in that of the Tongue; beſide that he, who affirms there is a time for every ſerious purpoſe, hath not ſtuck in like manner to affirm, that there is a time for ſporting ones, and particularly for that whereof we ſpeak, (which how he could reaſonably do, if Dancing were unlawful in it ſelf, will be found not eaſie to determine?) With what face can any man condemn that as unlawful, which is not only foretold by God as the joyful effect of his redeeming *Iſrael*, *Jer.* 31. 13. (for *then*, ſaith he, *ſhall the Virgin rejoice in the Dance, both young men and old together*) but is affirmed by the Scripture to have been the expreſſion of *Davids* joy, at the bringing up the Ark to *Jeruſalem*; and (which is more) *Pſal.* 149. 3. is recommended by the ſame *David* to others, to expreſs the praiſes of God by? And though it be true, that all Dancing is not equally innocent,

and thoſe which they call *mix'd* Dances, may adminiſter matter of temptation, where they, who are lewdly diſpoſed, are join'd together: yet as I doubt not there is a far greater danger of temptation from the converſe of young perſons out of it, as having nothing elſe but one anothers perſons to take up their thoughts, whilſt the others are diverted by intending of thoſe meaſures they are to tread; ſo neither can I imagine but where perſons of ſober education are mix'd, they may uſe it with the ſame innocency, wherewith they may do other Recreations which are leſs condemn'd.

One only Recreation remains, of thoſe which we before inſtanc'd in, to wit the Recreation of Stage-plays; concerning the unlawfulneſs whereof in themſelves, as I could never yet ſee any convincing Argument, with what clamour ſoever they have been decry'd, (for why ſhould it not be as lawful to repreſent the actions of men in our own, or behold them when repreſented by others, as it is to depict their Faces upon a Tablet, or pleaſe our ſelves with looking upon them when they are?) ſo I could heartily wiſh the enemies of Stage-plays had forborn the arguing againſt them from men or womens putting on the apparel of the other ſex; partly, becauſe if it have any weight in it ſelf, it is accidental to them, and partly, becauſe it may have in part occaſion'd the bringing of Women upon the Stage, which our own lamentable experience hath ſhewn to be rather for the worſe than for the better. If there be any thing offenſive adhering to ſome particular Plays (as it is too too apparent there are) that is nothing to the Recreation it ſelf, and perſwades only, as a Learned Man hath well obſerv'd, that the *Maſter* of the *Revels* (who according to the ancient conſtitution ought to ſee that nothing be ſpoken but what is fit to be heard) expunge out of them whatſoever is offenſive, and that, till that is done, all ſober perſons would forbear the ſight of ſuch, there being no doubt but in that and all other Recreations, men ought not only to take care that thoſe they uſe be innocent for their kind, but lawful for the particular, and ſuch as are free from that *immodeſty*, and *profaneneſs*, and *ſcurrility*, wherewith they ſay the compoſitions of this latter age abound.

But beſide that to make our Recreations lawful, they ought to be converſant about ſuch things, by which, either the Body, or Mind, or both, may be leſs indiſpos'd to labour, but neither corrupted or deprav'd; we are to take care that we uſe them *as Recreations*, becauſe otherwiſe we convert them to another uſe than what they were deſign'd to by God. The only thing of difficulty is, *what it is to uſe them as Recreations*, which may be comprehended in this general *Aphoriſme*. For then, and then only, do we uſe Recreations as ſuch, when we uſe them *as things on the by*, and *not as the main buſineſs of our life*, for *a moderate refreſhment*, and *not as the means of our ſupport*, and *much leſs to overthrow it*. For Recreations (as was before ſhewn) having no other end than to relieve us after Labour, or diſpoſe us for it, they muſt conſequently be look'd upon, and accordingly uſed, as things on the by, and not as the main; to procure to us a Refreſhment, and not a Livelihood (which God hath appointed Labour for) and much leſs to deſtroy it. The reſult of which obſervation will ſerve us for a direction both as to the Time which may be allotted to them, and the Money which may be either expended or acquir'd

quir'd at them. I begin with the former of these, even the Time which may be allotted to them; concerning which, these Three things are easie to be observ'd, because naturally flowing from the former observation.

1. That our Recreations are not to have either *the greatest*, or an *equal share of our time* with those *Employments* to which we are design'd; yea, on the contrary, that they ought to have *no more* of it, than may serve us *for a relief after labour*, or *to quicken us to our future ones*. A caution which I would to God I had no occasion to mention, amongst the other necessary ones which this debauched age calls for. But as it is too apparent that some mens lives are in a manner one continued Recreation, or if mix'd with any thing of business, yet as but a Parergon to the other; so those who are not so vain, nor it may be can afford to be so, yet spend whole days and nights in it; by that means converting that into their repast, which was intended only as Physick, or (if you had rather I should so express it, because Recreations were no doubt intended for a moderate delight) converting that into meat which was intended but as sauce to it. Which as it is apparently contrary to the design of Recreation, and consequently not without a great degree of guilt, yet hath this farther mischief attending it, that it engageth us in a second. He who hath thus wearied himself with Recreations, (for even these, if continu'd in, are not without a burden to those that use them) being of necessity to refresh himself by ease or sleep, before he can betake himself to his employments. And though I will not deny but sometimes one or more whole days may be borrowed from our employments, the general consent of Nations having indulg'd such a liberty, and the pains of the laborious person seeming not without reason to require it, (for what satisfaction could it be to men in perpetual travail to have Recreations only by snatches and in smaller portions?) yet I think it but a just consequent of the former observation, that ordinarily our Recreations should be meted by smaller portions; as because a less portion of time may generally suffice for the refreshment of Nature, so because it is but a πάρεργον, and therefore rather to have a share in so large a portion, than to devour it all.

2. It is to be observed Secondly, that as we are not to spend more of our time in Recreation than may serve for a relief after labour, or to quicken us to the following one; so neither to give way to our Recreations *at any time*, when either *the duties* of *Religion*, or those of *our several Employments*, call upon us to intend them; that which is but on the by being in reason to give place to the main, the πάρεργον to that which is Business and Employment. Upon which account, as all those must be look'd upon as Criminals, who can so easily suffer their Recreations to trespass upon the time of their devotions; so next to them such who can intend them, when the care of their several Families, or the business of their Employments call for their regard.

3. I observe Thirdly, and more than that I shall not need to observe

ſerve as to the Time, that our Recreations, where they may be as well uſed at another part of the day, ought not ordinarily to have the *morning* of it; partly, becauſe the reſt of the foregoing night ſuperſedes the uſe of them, and partly, becauſe that part of the day, through the Agility which the foregoing Reſt gives, is the moſt opportune for buſineſs, which is in reaſon to be preferr'd before the other.

From the matter of Time proceed we to that of Money, where again theſe two uſeful Cautions preſent themſelves: The former whereof reſpects the expence or hazard of it; the latter, the acquiring or deſigning it. For though I ſee no more reaſon to proſcribe all Play for Money, than for Glory and Reputation, which he muſt be an extraordinary perſon who ſhould be able perfectly to ſeparate from it; yet I cannot forbear to ſay, upon the ſtrength of the grounds before laid down, that it is utterly unlawful either to expend or hazard *more Money* about it, than can *well be ſpared from more important occaſions*, ſuch as are thoſe of *Charity*, or *the relief of our ſelves or families*: Partly, becauſe that which is only a thing on the by ought to yield to more important occaſions, and partly, becauſe ſuch expence or hazard engageth Men in that ſin which this Commandment expreſly forbids; he who thus entrencheth upon the occaſions before remembred, robbing the Poor of that charity which is due from him to them, as himſelf and family of that ſupport, which is no leſs incumbent on him, even by the force of this Commandment: He who forbids to ſteal, commanding alſo to take care that we may have wherewithal to miniſter to our own neceſſities and thoſe of others. Upon which account, as it will be neceſſary to look upon all thoſe as offenders, who play away *Manors*, *Eſtates*, yea and their own *Liberty*, being not unlike herein to thoſe Ancient *Germans*, whom * *Tacitus* ſpeaks of, who, *after they had play'd away all they had, were wont to ſtake their own perſons to become ſlaves to them they play'd with, if they ſhould happen to be overcome:* So we are to look upon ſuch alſo as offenders, who either hazard, or tempt others to hazard ſuch ſums of Money, as by the loſs whereof they may be either ſtraitned in their own or families ſupport, or diſabled in any meaſure from miniſtring to the neceſſities of the Poor. Again, as it is utterly unlawful either to expend or hazard more Money about our Recreations, than can well be ſpared from more important occaſions; ſo it is no leſs unlawful either *to acquire* or *deſign to acquire a livelyhood* or *any part thereof by it*, as becauſe by ſo doing we ſhall but entrench upon the Properties of others which this Commandment doth expreſly forbid; ſo becauſe God hath no leſs expreſly commanded *the working with our hand the thing that is good*, that we may have wherewithal to ſupport our ſelves. Whence it is || that Holy Men have not only repreſented ſuch acquiſitions as unlawful to be detain'd, but ſome Nations alſo confiſcated them to the publick. I will conclude this Affair and my Diſcourſe with an admonition not to play at ſuch Games, or for ſuch ſums of Money, under which we cannot ordinarily contain our ſelves from *heats of Paſſion* and thoſe *intemperances of Language* which do for the moſt part attend them. For as that, which is never ſo lawful in it ſelf, may yet become unlawful

* De moribus German. *Aleam, quod mirere, ſobrii inter ſeria exercent, tanta lucrandi perdendive temeritate ut cum omnia defecerunt, extremo ac noviſſimo jactu de libertate & de corpore contendunt. Victus voluntariam ſervitutem adit.*

|| See *Jer. Tayl. Ductor Dubit. li. 4. c. 1. p. 477.*

unlawful to us, if it prove to us an occaſion of falling, and particularly into contention and reproachful language; ſo there is no doubt ſuch recreations ought to be forborn by us, where, through the peeviſhneſs of our own nature, we cannot ſo far command our own paſſions, as to preſerve us from them. For though recreation be not only lawful, but in ſome ſort neceſſary, yet this or that particular one is not, and therefore in reaſon to be diſcarded, where we find upon obſervation that we cannot intend them with that *indifferency* and *diſpaſſionateneſs*, which the *levity* thereof requireth.

PART VI.

Frugality *or* Good-husbandry *as neceſſary for the conſerving of our Properties, as* Labour *is towards acquiring them, for which cauſe it is aſſigned a place here. That conſidered, either as to our own uſe of thoſe good things we are poſſeſſed of, or as to the imparting of them unto others. In the former of which ſenſes it requires the bounding of our expences ordinarily by our yearly income, the keeping in ſome good proportion within it, the reaſons of both which are declared; and in fine, the uſing of our ſeveral Properties with moderation and care. In the latter, the uſing of a moderation even in our Charity, the reaſons whereof are alſo aſſigned. An exhortation to the practice both of the one and the other Frugality from religious conſiderations. A tranſition to the conſideration of ſuch means, as are neceſſary to the defending or retrieving of our Properties, when either taken away or attempted, or to the ſupplying thereof when periſhed and come to nought. In order to the former whereof is repreſented, the appealing to the Magiſtrate by a* Suit, *and ſuch appeals both manifeſted to be lawful from Gods conſtituting of Magiſtrates for the redreſſing of injuries, and an anſwer returned to thoſe ſayings of our Saviour and St.* Paul, *which ſeem to forbid Suits at Law altogether, but do indeed proſcribe only ſcandalous, vexatious, and trifling ones. As to the latter is recommended and enjoined the uſing of entreaties to thoſe who are in a capacity to ſupply us.*

2. SINCE one and the ſame thing, under divers conſiderations, may become the ſubject matter of different Sciences (for thus *Heaven* it ſelf, though the proper concernment of the *Divine*, as it is the *Seat of the Bleſſed*, and *the Hope of the Religious*, may yet be the Province of the *Aſtronomer*, as to the *Revolution of it*, and of thoſe *Lucid Bodies* which it contains) I hope it will not be thought ſtrange, if I, who am a Preacher of Religion, and profeſs now to explain it, repreſent that *Good Husbandry*, which worldly wiſdom teacheth, as a part alſo of Heavenly one, yea of that Commandment which I have now choſen to illuſtrate. For inaſmuch as he who forbids the invading of others Properties, muſt be ſuppoſed alſo to command the intending and conſerving of our own, as without which we ſhall be under a neceſſity of invading thoſe of others; inaſmuch as Good Husbandry is

no

no leſs neceſſary to the conſerving of our ſeveral Properties, than that Labour, which we before inſiſted on, is to the procuring of them; he who is acknowledged to oblige to the one, muſt be confeſſed to oblige us to the other, and conſequently to look upon it as a duty that is hereby enjoined. Here only is the difference between our conſideration of Good Husbandry, and that of the worldly man, that whilſt the latter intends it only for the ſecuring to himſelf this worlds happineſs, we on the other ſide, recommend it as a duty laid upon us by the Almighty, and as a means to preſerve us from the temptation of invading others Properties; which the prodigal ſpending of that which is his own, doth not infrequently put the unwary Spendthrift on.

Now though wherein *Frugality* or *Good Husbandry* conſiſteth were not difficult for men to learn, if they would apply themſelves to the conſideration of it; yet becauſe men are ſlow of underſtanding, in all things of duty, and particularly in this whereof we ſpeak, I think it not amiſs, eſpecially having ſhewn it to be enjoined by this Commandment, to ſpend ſome time in the inveſtigation of it. For my more orderly effecting whereof, I will conſider Frugality or Good Huſbandry,

1. As to our own uſe of thoſe good things we are poſſeſſed of: And,
2. As to the imparting of them to others.

1. And here not to propoſe to you thoſe ſtrict meaſures whereby our Anceſtors proceeded, partly becauſe the recalling of them is rather to be wiſhed than hoped for, and partly becauſe they are not of abſolute neceſſity to be obſerved, I ſhall repreſent,

1. Firſt, as a neceſſary part of it, *the bounding our Expences ordinarily by that yearly income, which our ſeveral Properties do afford us*; he who exceeds thoſe limits, not only diminiſhing his Property, inſtead of conſerving it, but treaſuring up an arrear of debt, which will make him afterwards leſs able to ſupport himſelf. Upon which, as there will neceſſarily enſue a ſubſtraction in ſome meaſure of our Charity, which I have ſhewn heretofore, and ſhall more hereafter, to have the nature of a Theft; ſo alſo a temptation to ſupply our ſelves with invading the Properties of others, which is the very formality of one. It is true indeed (for, for that very reaſon I ſubjoined the word *ordinarily*, when I repreſented it as a neceſſary part of mens Frugality, not to exceed the bounds of their yearly income,) it is true, I ſay, the ſo doing is not always poſſible, nor yet where it is, of abſolute neceſſity to be obſerved, becauſe there may be a juſt expectation of an addition to our ſeveral Properties, the intuition whereof may make it reaſonable to exceed the preſent one. But as there is no repugnancy between affirming that there may be inſtances where the like meaſures either cannot or need not be obſerved, and that *ordinarily* they ought to be; ſo that *ordinarily* they ought to be ſo, the forementioned arguments ſufficiently evince, and the experience of the world doth abundantly confirm; it being rare to ſee any, who exceed thoſe bounds, not to make havock of their Eſtates, and at length to end in want and beggery. Laſtly, For though that be extrinſecal to the matter of Frugality, yet it hath the aſtipulation of that which is of greater neceſſity to be regarded; he who ſuffers his Expences ordinarily to exceed the bounds of his yearly income, ſhews

ſhews a diſſatisfaction with that portion which the Divine Majeſty hath allotted him; which though no violation of the Precept of Frugality, yet is of a more important one, even of that which enjoins ſubmiſſion to the Divine Will.

2. But let us riſe yet higher (for ſo, as I ſhall by and by ſhew, the Vertue we have now before us doth oblige) and enquire whether frugality do not as well tye us to *keep in ſome good proportion within the bounds of our yearly income*, as *not to exceed or ſurpaſs them*. For the evidencing the affirmative whereof, I ſhall deſire you to conſider the neceſſities that may happen to every man, whether it be by *caſualties*, which no man how fortunate ſoever is wholly exempt from, or by *changing his condition from ſingle life to marriage*, which moſt perſons either chuſe or find themſelves neceſſitated to, or by *the infirmities of old age*, which are in a manner an inevitable evil: For inaſmuch as all theſe bring their neceſſities along with them, and ſuch as that ſtate to which they appertain wants either ſtrength or revenue to provide ſufficiently againſt; it muſt be looked upon as a neceſſary piece of Frugality *ordinarily* to provide our ſelves before-hand, as without which neither our Properties, nor we our ſelves can well be conſerved. Upon which account, as all thoſe ſingle perſons muſt be looked upon as violators of it, who, however they deſign to enter into the ſtate of marriage, yet make not the leaſt proviſion againſt thoſe neceſſities which it brings (for which cauſe, if they ſucceed ill, as generally ſuch perſons do, they ought to thank their own want of Frugality, and not the diſpoſition of the Divine Providence:) So thoſe alſo are to be reckoned to the number, eſpecially if perſons of meaner fortune, who in the ſtrength and vigour of their years lay by nothing in ſtore to ſupport them under the infirmities of old age, as if it were a rare thing for men to fall under ſuch infirmities, or God were obliged to ſupport them by an immediate Providence. And indeed (for what ſhould hinder us from making profeſſion of a truth, which every days experience gives ſo clear an atteſtation to?) from hence for the moſt part proceeds that ſcantneſs of Fortune, which is ſuch a burthen to the needy perſon, and all that live near him: It rarely hapning that men, who are ſo frugal of their preſent Properties, as to keep in a good proportion within them, are reduced to that neceſſity in any ordinary condition of life, as not to find a competent means to ſupport themſelves under it. But of all the neceſſities which it is incumbent upon men to provide againſt, there is certainly none which doth more require the not living up to the height of our income, than that which Children bring; for inaſmuch as theſe do not only require a preſent ſubſiſtence but a foundation for their future ſupport, it will be little leſs than impoſſible for us to provide for them as we ought, where we do not only not exceed the bounds of our yearly income, but not keep at a good diſtance from them. The only difficulty is, *what diſtance we are to keep*; which muſt be left, in a great meaſure, to the judgment of every particular man to determine. This only would be ſaid, That as that diſtance we are to keep is to be proportioned by thoſe neceſſities we have cauſe to apprehend; ſo the greater the diſtance the better, eſpecially where the neceſſities are like to be preſſing. Provided firſt, that that which invites us to it be the command of God, and not any baſe covetouſneſs; and, ſecondly, that our way of living be anſwerable to that of ſober

perſons, which are of the ſame condition and fortune with our ſelves. Laſtly,

3. And more than that I ſhall not need to ſay, as to that frugality which reſpects our own uſe of thoſe good things which God hath beſtowed upon us, it is a neceſſary part of Frugality to uſe them with moderation and care, and neither ſpoil them by intemperance or neglect; he who ſo doth, deſtroying inſtead of conſerving his Property, and conſequently making himſelf leſs able to ſupport himſelf, if he ſhould fall into any diſtreſs, or miniſter to the neceſſities of others.

2. From that Frugality which reſpects our own uſe of the good things we are poſſeſſed of, paſs we to *that* which reſpects *the imparting of them to others*, and which is equally neceſſary to the conſervation of them. Where who is there that ſees not how conducible it is to the obſervation of this Commandment; whether we reſpect that charity which it does, though covertly, enjoin; or that ſtealth which it manifeſtly forbids? For as by immoderate largeſſes men do not only deſtroy their ſeveral Properties, but put themſelves out of a capacity of long continuing that beneficence in which they ſeem to take ſo much content, than which (as *Tully* * ſpeaks) what is there that can be more abſurd; ſo they put themſelves upon a temptation, ſhall I ſay, or rather inevitable neceſſity of invading the Properties of others. For, *when* (as the ſame *Tully* * ſpeaks) *they begin to want by giving, they are compelled*, for the ſupply of thoſe wants, *to lay hands on the goods of others*, and ſhew themſelves as greedy of theirs, as they were before prodigal of their own. All that I can obſerve to require any thing of a diſcuſſion, is, what kind of largeſſes the Frugality here ſpoken of extendeth to, and by what meaſures it is to be conducted. Neither the one nor other of which will be difficult to be ſolved by him who ſhall attentively conſider them. For though Frugality be moſtly conſtrued with relation to ſuch Largeſſes, as are the fruits rather of humour than beneficence, and conſequently rarely applyed to thoſe of Charity; yet that it extends to the moderation of thoſe alſo, needs no other Argument, than that prohibition we have now before us. For how is he any other than a Thief, who ſubſtracts from the neceſſary ſupport of himſelf and Family (for which all Properties were primarily beſtowed) to miniſter to the neceſſities of others? And though it be true that there are few ſuch kind of Thieves (for which cauſe that caution may ſeem the leſs neceſſary to have been inſerted) yet inaſmuch as vain-glory doth ſometime mix it ſelf with mens Charity, and tempt them to be profuſe, in giving above what the neceſſities of themſelves or Families will well permit, I thought it not amiſs to admoniſh, that Frugality ought to have the inſpection and moderation of them, as well as of thoſe Largeſſes which have no other Fountain, than either humour, or ſome other the like worldly motive. The only thing of which there can be any doubt, is, *by what meaſures* that Frugality is to proceed, which the grounds before laid will afford an eaſie ſolution of. For, inaſmuch as the end of Frugality is the conſervation of mens Properties, as the end of thoſe Properties primarily the miniſtring to our own and Families neceſſities; our Frugality in giving is to guide it ſelf by thoſe neceſſities of ours, for the ſupplying whereof mens ſeveral Properties

* De Officiis li. 2. *Nonnunquam tamen eſt largiendum, &c. Sed diligenter atq; moderatè. Multi enim patrimonia effuderunt inconſultè largiendo. Quid autem eſt ſtultius, quàm, quod libenter facias, curare ut id diutiùs facere non poſſis? Atq; etiam ſequuntur largitionem rapinæ. Cum enim dando egere cœperint, alienis bonis manus afferre cogunntur.*

Properties were primarily intended. Otherwiſe we become prodigal, rather than charitable, and in ſtead of being benevolent to others, prove unjuſt to our ſelves and ours. But becauſe it is not impoſſible, when I come to entreat of the Meaſures of our Charity, I may have occaſion to bring this Argument again before you, becauſe ſuggeſting a Limitation of it; therefore contenting my ſelf at preſent with what hath been already ſaid concerning it, I will employ the reſidue of my Diſcourſe in exhorting you to the Practice both of the one and the other Frugality.

Now though I am not ignorant, I might furniſh my ſelf with Motives for that purpoſe, from that Love which all Men naturally have for the conſervation of their own Being and Happineſs; yet I ſhall chuſe rather, eſpecially being ſo amply furniſh'd from the foregoing Diſcourſe, to recommend it to you upon the ſcore of that Religion which my Profeſſion, as well as preſent Task, obligeth me to diſplay. For, is it not a part of Religion, yea an important one, to acquieſce in the diſpoſition of the Divine Providence, and content our ſelves with ſuch a portion of this Worlds Goods as he is pleas'd to allot us? And if ſo, is it not of like importance to bound our Enjoyments by thoſe Portions, which is one main part of that Frugality which we commend? Is it not a part of Religion, in like manner, to provide againſt future Neceſſities, and particularly thoſe Neceſſities which Children bring? And muſt it not then be look'd upon as ſuch, to keep in a good proportion within the Bounds of our preſent Properties, which the ſame Frugality, as well as the providing againſt thoſe Neceſſities, doth command? Laſtly, Is it not a part of Religion, as well as Providence, to be temperate in all things, which the ſame Frugality, no leſs than the Precept of Sobriety, doth enjoyn? But what then can be look'd upon as a part of Religion, if this be not? or where ſhall we find any thing, of that nature at leaſt, that hath a juſter Foundation in it? Eſpecially, if we add to the former Conſiderations, that without Frugality we cannot well either be juſt to our ſelves, or contain our ſelves from doing Injuſtice unto others: Prodigality, though at firſt bluſh it look like an exceſs of Indulgence to our ſelves, yet being Cruelty and Injuſtice, becauſe both ſpoiling us for the future of the neceſſary Means of our Support, and, which is no leſs Injuſtice to our ſelves than others, putting us upon a neceſſity of invading the Properties of others, and ſo undoing our own Souls, as well as making havock of our Brothers Fortunes. From whence as it will unavoidably follow, that Frugality is a great part of Religion, becauſe diffuſing it ſelf into ſo many and ſo important Duties of it; ſo it cannot at any time ceaſe to be ſuch, unleſs where it degenerates into Sordidneſs, which is rather Covetouſneſs than Frugality, or is taken up upon purely prudential Conſiderations.

3. Of Labour and Frugality I have entreated hitherto; and I have entreated ſo much the more largely of them, becauſe they are the onely ordinary Means of procuring or conſerving our ſeveral Properties. But becauſe it may ſo happen, that our ſeveral Properties may be *taken away*, or at leaſt *attempted by others*, or *by ſome ſiniſter accident periſh and come to nought*; therefore it will be neceſſary for us to inquire, what *other Means* there are whereby *the former* may be either *retriv'd or defended*, and *thoſe which are periſh'd may be ſupply'd*.

Now though, if Magiſtrates had not been conſtituted, no doubt at all could be made, but we might even by forcible means defend or retrive our ſeveral Properties, no natural Reaſon forbidding the vindicating to our ſelves what God by his Providence hath made our proper Portion; yet the ſame is not to be ſaid after the Conſtitution of Magiſtrates, and that Power wherewith they are inveſted, of doing Right to the Injur'd Party: partly, becauſe he who conſtitutes ſuch a Power, muſt be ſuppos'd alſo, becauſe it would be otherwiſe in vain, to oblige private Perſons to ſeek their Remedy there; and partly, becauſe Force could not be lawful, were there no Magiſtrate to defend us, if more peaceable Means could be able to protect us. From whence, as it will follow, that we are not ordinarily to right our ſelves, and much leſs to do it by force of Arms; ſo, that it may be both lawful and neceſſary (becauſe neceſſary ſometimes to the conſerving of our ſeveral Properties) to appeal for redreſs to the Magiſtrate, and ſue the injurious Perſon at his Tribunal. For, if (as I have heretofore ſhewn, and ſhall hereafter more largely) Magiſtrates were appointed by God for the redreſs of Injuries, what ſhould hinder the injur'd Party to appeal to the Magiſtrate for it, eſpecially when there is no other way left to compaſs it? Which ſaid, I ſhall the more confidently apply my ſelf to the conſideration of what the Goſpel teacheth, as which is the onely Objection againſt this way of defending or retriving our ſeveral Properties. For, inaſmuch as the ſame Goſpel doth both approve and aſſert thoſe Powers which claim to themſelves the power of Redreſs; it is impoſſible to think it ſhould proſcribe all Appeals to them, and enjoyn Men rather to ſuffer any thing, than to do it: A power of Redreſs being in vain, where it is unlawful to be appeal'd to, by thoſe who are moſt concern'd to ſeek it. Taking it therefore for granted, that ſuch Appeals are both lawful, and ſometimes neceſſary; I will make it my buſineſs to inquire, what our Saviour meant, when he ſaid, *If any man will ſue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke alſo:* as alſo what St. *Paul* did, where he repreſents going to Law as *a fault*, and adviſes rather to *ſuffer our ſelves to be defrauded:* Both which Paſſages I will be ſo much the more particular in the conſideration of, becauſe they will diſcover to us the due Limitations of that which we have affirm'd to be lawful in it ſelf. I begin with that of our Saviour, becauſe no doubt the Foundation of the other, but however the moſt to be conſidered, for his ſake from whom it fell; toward the explication whereof I ſhall offer, firſt, That his meaning poſſibly was, not that we ſhould not ſeek a Redreſs of our Wrongs in any caſe, but that we ſhould not ſeek it with *a revengeful mind*, and with a deſign *more to puniſh others*, than *right our ſelves*. Which Notion is ſo much the more probable, becauſe it is urg'd as an Inſtance of our not reſiſting evil, after the ſame manner that the *Jews* are found to have done, when, by the permiſſion of God, they requir'd an Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth. For, ſuch reſiſting of evil as is there ſpoken of, ſerving onely for the puniſhment of thoſe from whom the evil proceeded, all that can juſtly be inferr'd from that Doctrine which is oppos'd by our Saviour to it, is, that we are not either to defend or retrive our ſeveral Properties with the ſame vindictive Mind which thoſe Perſons cheriſh'd, who requir'd ſuch a Retaliation

ation as ſerv'd to puniſh the injurious Perſon, but not at all to afford redreſs to themſelves. For, what advantage, ſave the ſatisfying of a vindictive Mind, could the plucking out another Mans Eye, or knocking out another's Tooth, procure to him that had loſt his own? But let us ſuppoſe, that this were no part of our Saviour's meaning, or at leaſt that it were but the leſs principal one; yet it will not thence follow, that he forbad abſolutely the defending or retriving our ſeveral Properties by a Suit of Law. For, his meaning poſſibly might be, yea undoubtedly was, that we ſhould not take ſuch a Courſe in *trifling Inſtances*, and when nothing but *a Coat* or *Cloke* is the foundation of it. For, what Patience or Meekneſs (which Graces the New Teſtament doth infinitely commend) what Patience or Meekneſs (I ſay) can that be, which will have ſatisfaction made it for every the leaſt Injury it ſuſtains? But as it is one thing to condemn the going to Law for trifling Matters; and another, the ſo doing for the conſervation of thoſe things which are neceſſary to our own Families Support, or at leaſt to the maintaining of us in that condition wherein he hath plac'd us: ſo, that it was not the intention of our Saviour to forbid the laſt, is ſufficiently evident, from the obligation his Goſpel lays upon us, to make proviſion *for our own*. For, being thereby oblig'd to make proviſion for our own, and that too under no leſs penalty than of being reputed *worſe than Infidels* if we do not; it muſt conſequently be thought lawful, where other means fail, to appeal to that which is but his own Ordinance, for the defending of that which is to maintain them. Laſtly, our Saviour might mean (for ſo largely oftentimes do the Penmen of the Scripture, and other Authors ſpeak, when the thing which they condemn is not intended to be wholly baniſhed) our Saviour (I ſay) might mean, that in regard of thoſe *heats* and other *inconveniences* which do commonly attend Suits of Law, we ſhould avoid them both *as long* and *as much as is poſſible for us*, chuſing rather to ſuffer ſomewhat, than to take ſuch a ſuſpicious courſe; but however reſolving to try all other ways, before we betake our ſelves to that. Which Advice, as it is no wonder our Saviour ſhould give to his Diſciples, when we find *Tully* *, who was an Advocate, adviſing to *abſtain from Suits of Law, as far as Men well can, or rather farther*; ſo neither that he ſhould expreſs it with ſuch Terms of diſlike, as if he meant to baniſh all: that which is for the moſt part bad, looking ſo like that which is ſimply and univerſally ſuch, that it may very well be expreſs'd in the ſame generall Terms of diſlike with the other. From that Paſſage of our *Saviour* concerning Suits of Law, paſs we to another of St. *Paul*, in which yet we ſhall find far leſs difficulty than in the other. For, beſide that that which he chiefly condemns, 1 *Cor.* 6. 1. was their going to Law before *Heathen* Tribunals, by means whereof *Chriſtian* Religion, pretending ſo much as it did to Peace, could not chuſe but hear ill among thoſe who were Enemies to it; he ſeems to me rather to approve than condemn going to Law, where that and other Inconveniences were ſeparated from it. For, not onely queſtioning with them, in the firſt Verſe, for going to Law *before the unjuſt, and not before the Saints*; but demanding of them, in the next Verſe, *whether thoſe Saints ſhould not judge*

* *De Officiis lib.* 2. Convenit autem tum in dando munificum eſſe, tum in exigendo non acerbum: in omnique re contrahendâ, &c. æquum & faciſem, multa multis de jure ſuo concedentem: *à litibus vero, quantum liceat, & neſcio an paulo plus etiam, quàm liceat, abhorrentem.*

judge the world, and if ſo, *whether they were not worthy to judge the ſmalleſt matters*, ſuch as all Earthly matters are, in compariſon of the other; he ſeems to me plainly to inſinuate, that, provided the ground of the Suit be a matter of moment as to this World, and ſuch the loſs whereof could not well be born, an Appeal might lawfully enough be made to *Chriſtian* Tribunals, for the redreſs of thoſe Injuries we ſuſtain. For, though there are, who have underſtood St. *Paul* to mean no other in this place, than the referring of their Debates to the *Arbitrations* of *Chriſtians* (which yet, that I may add that by the way, is not much different from going to Law before a Judge, a pious Judge (as * *Grotius* hath well obſerv'd) eſpecially if appeal'd to by the conſent of the Parties at variance, differing little from an Arbitrator, but that he is choſen to that Office by Publick Authority) yet as that Interpretation of theirs is not without violence to the Text, which repreſents thoſe ſuppos'd Arbitrators under the Title of Judges, and pleads their fitneſs for the Office, from thoſe Thrones of Judicature whereupon they ſhall be hereafter plac'd; ſo, with much more violence to the Command of *Chriſt* ||, who, in caſe of difference between Man and Man, commands *the telling of it the Church*, and *the practice of the Church* † upon it: Which, whilſt the Emperours continued *Heathen*, decided Differences in matters of Eſtate, between thoſe of their own Body; and after that, and when therefore there was not the like Reaſon of making the Church a Judge in matters of that nature, continu'd ſo to do, in ſome meaſure, by the Indulgence of *Chriſtian* Princes. All which things I have laid together, not to give countenance to Contentions, from which I know our Religion is moſt averſe; but to ſhew, that as Suits of Law may be ſometime neceſſary to the conſerving of our Properties; ſo, where they are ſo in any great meaſure, they are no way contrary to the Doctrine of the Goſpel, which however it may diſallow of *ſcandalous*, *vexatious*, and *trifling* Suits, yet doth not diſapprove *inoffenſive*, *charitable*, and *important* ones.

* *Annot. in Mat.* 5.40.

|| *Mat.* 18.15.

† *Thorndike of the Right of the Church in a Chriſtian State, cap.* 1. *pag.* 37. *&c.*

4. But becauſe the Properties of Men may not onely *periſh to the Owners*, but *in themſelves*, and conſequently put Men upon a neceſſity of ſeeking a new Supply; therefore it may not be amiſs to ſubjoyn the Means of *effecting that alſo*; which, where ordinary Means fail, is no other than that of *Asking*: our Saviour both ſuppoſing as much, when he requires us *to give to them that ask*; and that Order which God hath eſtabliſhed in the World, confirming it. For, though (as I before * obſerv'd) all Men have a Natural Right to ſuch a Portion of this Worlds Goods as is neceſſary to their Support, by means of that Grant of them which was made to *Adam* and his Poſterity; yet inaſmuch as particular Properties ſtand by the ſame Divine Will by which that general Charter did which was made to *Adam* and his Poſterity, no Man is ordinarily to ſupply his Wants, but by making ſuit to thoſe Perſons into whoſe Hands God hath by his Providence put the poſſeſſion of this Worlds Conveniences. But ſo that we are to proceed, the Scripture gives us ſufficiently to underſtand, even where it doth moſt ſtrongly aſſert the Right of the Poor to a Subſiſtence. For, though *Solomon*, where he requires the not withholding of good from the *neceſſitous*, as both the *Septuagint* Verſion *, and the following Words oblige us to explain it; though he, I ſay, *Prov.* 3. 27. calls

* See Explic. of this Commandment, Part 1.

* Μὴ ἀπόσχῃ τὰ ποιεῖν ὀφείλοντα—

calls thoſe *neceſſitous ones* ſuch to whom *that good is due*, or, as it is in the *Hebrew* †, *the Lords* or *Owners of it*: yet adviſing afterwards, as he does, that we ſhould not ſay to them, *Go, and come again, and to morrow I will give, when thou haſt it by thee*, he plainly ſhews, that that Right of the neceſſitous is to be ſu'd out by Entreaties, and not either clancularly withdrawn, or extorted: That which is properly a Gift, depending upon the good will of him that is to beſtow it, and conſequently not to be attain'd without the uſe of ſuch Means as may make that Will of his propitious to us.

† מבעליו

PART VII.

Concerning the contributing, what in us lies, to the procuring, conſerving, or enlarging our Neighbours Property, which is the Second Branch *of the* Affirmative *part of the Commandment. The Means of effecting that, the Liberality of our Endeavours, or of our Purſes: The former whereof is recommended upon the ſcore of its both general practicableneſs and uſe; the latter, for its immediate ſubſerviency to the advantaging of our Neighbour. The Liberality of the Purſe more particularly conſider'd, and ſhewn to imply the remitting of what is due, or at leaſt not exacting it with rigour; the giving of what we are actually poſſeſs'd, or lending; and, in fine, an Hoſpitable Entertainment. Inquiry is next made, whether the uſe of the forementioned Means be to be extended unto all, and in what order, and manner, and proportion. For the reſolution whereof, the Reader is in part remanded to the Affirmative part of the Sixth Commandment, and in part afforded Satisfaction here. In order thereunto, the ſeveral Liberalities before ſpoken of are reſum'd, and ſuch Remarques made upon each of them as were before omitted. Concerning the Liberality of Mens Endeavours, is noted, That inaſmuch as it takes little from our own Properties, we ought to be the more free of it; but yet not ſo free, as for the ſake of one, to offer any Injuſtice unto others. Concerning the remitting of what is due, which is the firſt Species of the other Liberality; That it cannot be omitted without a manifeſt reſiſtance of the Divine Will, where the Perſon concern'd becomes inſolvent by the ſole diſpoſition of his Providence; provided that the Remiſſion be not prejudicial to others, nor draw after it any intolerable prejudice to our ſelves. The Explication more particular in the Liberality of Giving, as obſerving concerning* the Objects *of it, that they are ſuch, and ſuch onely, who are under any need of it, and are beſide that in an incapacity to provide for themſelves; by which means all wealthy or ſlothful Perſons are excluded from any ſhare of it: concerning* the Order *which it ought to obſerve, that though thoſe of the Houſhold of Faith ought*, cæteris paribus, *to be preferr'd before other Men; yet not before thoſe of a Mans own Family and Kindred; as moreover, that, where the neceſſitous Perſons are many, the preference ought to be given to thoſe whoſe Neceſſities are moſt preſſing: concerning* the Proportion *this Liberality is to obſerve, that it ought*

to

to be according to Mens Ability, and that no one ought to value that at leſs than the Thirtieth part of his yearly Income; that where the Neceſſities of thoſe that are about us cannot otherwiſe be provided for, we ought to give above our Ability, if we underſtand thereby an Ability to provide for our ſelves according to that Condition wherein God hath placed us: concerning the Manner *of our Giving, that it ought to be without ſupercilíouſneſs and contempt, as alſo with chearfulneſs, ſpeed, and ſecrecie. A Tranſition to the Liberality of Lending, and of Hoſpitality; concerning* the former *whereof is obſerv'd, That though there be no neceſſity of lending* gratis *to ſuch as borrow onely for the Improvement of their Fortunes; yet that we ought ſo to do, where thoſe that borrow, borrow onely to procure or continue to themſelves a bare Subſiſtence: Concerning* the latter, *That it ought to be extended to Strangers, as well as to thoſe of our own Neighbourhood, yea to all whom we are in a capacity ſo to miniſter to; That, though it miniſter to Mens Neceſſities, yet it ought not to miniſter to their Intemperance: where alſo the means of retrenching that is deſcribed. The Concluſion of the whole, with the Promiſes that are made to the Charitable Man, and that his own Property is more likely to be improved, than any way diminiſhed by his Liberality.*

II. IT having been often ſaid, and largely prov'd, that every Negative in the *Decalogue* includes an Affirmative, and that that Affirmative is Love; it is eaſie to infer, That the Negative we are now upon, forbidding the invading of others Properties, the Affirmative doth principally ſuggeſt *the contributing what in us lies toward the procuring, conſerving, or enlarging them.* For then, and then onely, can we be ſaid to love our Neighbour in the Inſtance that is now before us, when we do not onely abſtain from the invading of his Property, but endeavour to procure him one if he wants, or to conſerve and add to it, if he hath. Taking it therefore for granted, that ſo to do, is in part the Affirmative of this Commandment, I will make it my Buſineſs to inquire,

1. By what means it may and ought to be effected.
2. Whether our Endeavours of thus doing good to others, ought to extend to all ſorts of Perſons; and in what Order, and Manner, and Proportion.

* *De Officiis, l.* 2.

1. Now there are *two ways* (as *Tully** well obſerves) whereby Men may become *uſeful to others, as to the procuring, or conſerving, or enlarging of their ſeveral Properties*; the Aſſiſtance of their *Endeavours*, or of their *Purſes:* Whereof, though the latter be moſt taken notice of, and ſo far as in a manner to appropriate to it ſelf the Name of Liberality; yet the other doth no doubt alike deſerve our conſideration and regard, that I ſay not alſo more importunately require it: As being, 1. in the power of the Poorer, as well as the Richer ſort; of thoſe whoſe Properties are as ſtrait, as theirs whom they deſire to enlarge or conſerve. For, though, as St. *Peter* ſometime ſpake concerning himſelf, *Gold and ſilver have they none*; yet they are not oftentimes without an Ability of giving that Advice, and Encouragement, and Aſſiſtance, which may be alike uſeful to the procuring, improving,

improving, or conſerving of others Properties: *Solomon* * having told us of a *poor man*, who, however he was not afterwards regarded for it, yet *by his wiſdom delivered the City wherein he dwelt* from the Power of a Great Monarch, who had us'd no contemptible means to make himſelf Maſter of it. But neither, 2. as was but now intimated, is the Liberality of our Perſons leſs to be conſidered, for the uſe it is of toward the forementioned purpoſes, as will appear, if we conſider it with reference to Mens Labours, or the conciliating the Favours of other Perſons towards them. For, Labour (as was before ſaid) being not onely appointed by God for the procuring of this Worlds Happineſs, but not without a natural aptitude to it; he muſt be look'd upon as no unuſeful Perſon, who ſhall either direct Men in the management of it, (which in all Employments is of great weight) or encourage and aſſiſt them in the performance of it. In like manner, when, as it often doth, the Properties of Men depend, either as to their being, or well-being, upon the Benevolence of others; it is eaſie to ſee, that he who is no Niggard of his Perſon and Endeavours, may by his Authority or Interceſſion procure the Favour of thoſe who have the collation of Benefits, or by his Wiſdom and Eloquence (if thoſe Properties Men have be attempted by others) defend them from their Rapine, or recommend them to thoſe by whom they may. All which Beneficences, as they are undoubtedly of great uſe toward the advantaging of our Brothers Properties; ſo they have this farther to commend them to us, that whilſt the Liberalities of the Purſe, as *Tully* * ſpeaks, *exhauſt the Fountain of it, and make Men leſs able to be liberal for the future*, that Liberality which exerts it ſelf in our Endeavours, doth not onely *ſuffer no detriment by its being often us'd*, but *gains ſo much the more by it*, becauſe making Men both more apt for the exerciſe thereof, and more ready to intend it.

* Eccl. 9. 14, 15.

* De Officiis, lib. 2.

From the Liberality of our Perſons and Endeavours, paſs we to that of our *Purſes*, as being more immediately ſubſervient to the advantaging of our Brothers Property, and therefore no doubt more eſpecially requir'd. Now there are four ways whereby we may be thus liberal; by *remitting of what is due*, or at leaſt *not exacting it with rigour*; by *giving of what we are actually poſſeſs'd of*, or *lending*; and laſtly, by *a Hoſpitable entertainment*. Of the *firſt* of theſe much need not be ſaid, whether we conſider it as a Duty, or as a Means to procure or conſerve our Neighbours Property. For, as the latter of theſe is ſo apparent, that it ſeems not to ſtand in need of any Proof, Men being often undone, where they who are their Creditors will neither remit ought of what is due to them, nor allow them a competent time to diſcharge the Debt; ſo the latter needs no other proof than that Love and Benevolence wherein our Saviour hath ſumm'd up this and other the Precepts of the Second Table. For, though the exacting of what is due in its full proportion, be no way contrary to the Precept of Juſtice; yet it may be ſufficiently repugnant to that of Love, eſpecially as urg'd upon us by the Goſpel: Love prompting Men to forgive, as well as give; to remit of what it may require, as well as to part with what it is poſſeſs'd of. And not without Reaſon; he who forgives, giving away what he doth ſo, becauſe it is in his power to exact it. To the Liberality of Remitting or Forgiving, ſubjoyn we that of *giving*; a Duty no leſs neceſſary to the foremen-

tioned purpoſes, nor leſs neceſſary to be obſerved, whether we do reſpect that ſubſerviency of it to the advantaging of our Neighbour's Properties, or that right we have often ſaid the neceſſitous perſon to have to ſuch a portion of this worlds goods, as may afford him a ſubſiſtence: for it being apparently the intention of God, and ſo declared in his firſt grant of Dominion, that each of the Sons of Men ſhould have a ſhare in them, it is of neceſſity to be looked upon as the duty of thoſe, into whoſe hands God hath put the poſſeſſion of them, to communicate them to ſuch as ſhall be found to ſtand in need of them; he, who refuſeth ſo to do, as much as in him lyes, defeating God of his intention, and men of that right which accrues to them by it. Whence it is no doubt that Almſgiving both ‖in the *Old* and *New* Teſtament hath ſo frequently the name of *Righteouſneſs*; that being not improperly ſtiled *Righteouſneſs*, which he, who is the Object of it, hath the original grant of Dominion to warrant his title to.

‖ See for the Old, *Deut.* 24. 13. *Where the Septuagint render the word righteouſneſs by* ἐλεημοσύνη, as alſo, *Pſal.* 112. 9.
For the New, *Mat.* 6. 1. *according to ſome Greek Copies.*

Thirdly, as there is a liberality in forgiving and giving, ſo there may be a liberality in *lending*; that no leſs than either of the other tending to the advantaging of Mens Properties, and oftentimes much more to the welfare of their Souls: For whereas giving many times relieves Mens idleneſs as well as wants, and makes them careleſs in the diſcharge of the Duties of their ſeveral Callings; lending puts the neceſſitous perſon upon a neceſſity of being induſtrious, if it were that he might be in a capacity to repay that which he hath borrowed of us. Laſtly, for though that be a ſpecies of giving, yet it deſerves a particular mention for the commendation is given to it by the Scripture; There is a liberality in *entertaining*, as well as in giving, or lending, and particularly in the *entertaining of Strangers*. To the practice whereof, though there be other inducements, and ſuch as are it may be of more affinity with that Commandment which I have now choſen to entreat of; yet it may ſuffice to mention that which is uſed by the *Author* to the *Hebrews* *, that thereby *ſome men have entertained Angels unawares*: that being to be looked upon as no contemptible piece of Liberality, to which God hath ſometime vouchſafed ſo excellent a reward.

* Heb. 13. 2.

2. It being thus evident what are the means of bringing that advantage to our Neighbours Property, which I have affirmed to be incumbent upon us by the affirmative part of this Commandment; my propoſed method obligeth me to enquire, whether the uſe of thoſe means be to be extended *unto all*, and *in what order*, and *manner*, and *proportion*. But becauſe in my account of the Affirmative part of the ſixth Commandment, I have in a great meaſure prevented my ſelf in moſt of the queries propoſed, and particularly ſo far as the liberality of our perſons or endeavours is concerned, I will only touch at ſuch things in each of them as were there wholly omitted, or obſcurely and imperfectly delivered. Now there are two things obſervable, beſide what were before noted, concerning that Liberality which exerts it ſelf in our endeavours: 1. That inaſmuch as it takes little from our own Properties, that Liberality eſpecially which conſiſts in giving good advice, we ought to be the more free in beſtowing it upon thoſe that need it; it being a ſtrange piece of niggardlineſs, that I ſay not of envy and maliciouſneſs, which will not impart of ſuch boons, as bring little or no prejudice to him that gives them. And though the reaſonableneſs

nableneſs of that which follows, ſeemed ſo evident to the great Maſter of Morality *, that *he hardly thought fit* to make it the matter of an *admonition*; yet inaſmuch as men are often peccant in it, I thought it not amiſs to obſerve, in the ſecond place, that we ſhould not *ſo endeavour to promote* ſome mens welfare, as *to offer any the leaſt injuſtice to others*; he, who forbids the doing injury to any man, conſequently preſcribing that Liberality, which cannot take effect without it. Upon which account, all thoſe muſt be looked upon as Offenders, who, to promote the welfare of ſome one or more perſons, by calumnies or other ſuch like courſes endeavour to obſtruct their riſe, who have the ſame pretenſions with their Favourites.

* Tull. de Officiis l. 2. *Jam illud non ſunt admonendi (eſt enim in promptu) ut animadvertant, cum alios juvari velint, ne quos offendant.*

From the Liberality of our Perſons or Endeavours, paſs we to that of the Purſe, and conſider the ſeveral ſpecies of them before ſet down. Where who is there that ſees not firſt, I do not ſay how neceſſary it is to remit ſometimes of our own right, but to remit of it eſpecially there, where the perſon concerned in it becomes unable for the ſatisfying of it, by the ſole diſpoſition of the Divine Providence? Extremity in ſuch caſes arguing as little regard of God, as conſideration of the calamities of our Brethren: For inaſmuch as inability puts a man out of a capacity of diſcharging that debt which he hath contracted; where the inability proceeds meerly from God, it muſt be a kind of reſiſtance of his Will to be over rigid in exacting it. I will not add, though pertinent enough, that how incumbent ſoever it may ſometime be to remit of our own right, yet it is to be underſtood where ſuch a remiſſion is not prejudicial to others, nor draws after it any intolerable prejudice to our ſelves: as becauſe, though we may part with our own right, yet we cannot do ſo with thoſe of others; ſo the parting with our own right is ever to be underſtood with ſubordination to our own neceſſities, to which, as I have before ſhewn, the Law of Reaſon as well as Charity obligeth us to have the firſt regard. Setting aſide therefore that Liberality which conſiſts in remitting of that which is our due, I will proceed to that of giving, as being more apparently ſubſervient to the welfare of other men. And here not to tell you, becauſe ſufficiently evident from the forequoted diſcourſe, that no qualification whatſoever can exclude thoſe from our Charity, whoſe condition makes them proper objects of it; it ſhall content me to obſerve, becauſe not before noted, that the condition of thoſe and of thoſe only is ſuch, who are under any need of it, and are beſide that in an incapacity to provide againſt it: by the former whereof are excluded all perſons of better or equal fortunes with our ſelves; by the latter, all idle or ſlothful ones. For as Reaſon and Charity both oblige us to give the firſt place to our ſelves, and conſequently not to part with that to others, which we are under a like neceſſity our ſelves; ſo the Command of God, and the Precept of S. *Paul*, debars thoſe of any relief, who will not contribute ought to their own ſubſiſtence. Upon which account as our Laws have ſpoken the ſame thing, and, which is more, made it penal to relieve them; ſo, that they are at any time relieved by conſiderate perſons, is only imputable to their importunity, and the neglect of thoſe in Authority who ſuffer them to uſe it. Which neglect is ſo much the more criminal, in that it doth not only encourage thoſe idle perſons in their ſloth, and many other wickedneſſes,

which ſlothfulneſs draws after it, but makes the charitable perſon leſs able to miniſter to thoſe neceſſitous ones, who are either wholly incapacitated for labour, or cannot by all their labour compaſs a tolerable ſubſiſtence. But becauſe, even of thoſe who are fit objects of Charity, all cannot be relieved by all, by means of the ſhortneſs of our Fortunes; therefore I propoſed alſo to enquire *in what order* we are to relieve them, and which of the many neceſſitous ones ought to be preferred. Which demand, though I have in part ſatisfied already, in the place ſo often referred to by me, yet there are two things of moment which were not there obſerved, and will therefore be fit to be taken notice of here: 1. That though thoſe of the Houſhold of Faith ought, *cæteris paribus*, to have the precedency of other men, yet not when the neceſſitous ones are of our own Family or Kindred, Juſtice as well as Charity obliging us to give to theſe, and conſequently to prefer them before ſuch, who, however better deſerving otherwiſe, yet have nothing but the Law of Charity to oblige us to the relief of them. Again, though all neceſſitous ones are fit objects of Charity, and conſequently, where our faculties will permit, to be relieved by us; yet Reaſon as well as Charity oblige that, where our Faculties will not permit the extending of it to all, we give the preference to thoſe perſons whoſe neceſſities are the moſt preſſing: For, if the neceſſities of men make them fit Objects of Charity, thoſe perſons muſt be looked upon as the fitteſt Objects, and conſequently they to be preferred, who labour under the moſt preſſing ones. And more than this, as I ſhall not need to ſay concerning that order which is to be obſerved by the charitable perſon in giving, ſo I ſhall therefore proceed to enquire *after what manner and proportion* we are to do it, the next things in order to be conſidered. For the reſolution of the *latter* whereof, as being the moſt important Query; the firſt thing I ſhall offer, is, That it be generally *according to our ability*, and not either *above* or *below* it; not only *Tully** ſo adviſing, where he requires the *referring of our bounty to our Faculties*, but he, whoſe judgment is more conſiderable, even S. *Paul*, he enjoining the *Corinthians*, 1 *Cor.* 16. 2. that every one ſhould *lay by him in ſtore for the ſupply of the neceſſitous, according as God had proſpered him.* By virtue of which Rule, as the Charity of wealthier perſons muſt be concluded to be in a greater proportion than thoſe of meaner ones; ſo, that the Charity of both the one and the other ought not either to fall below or exceed it: he who offends in the defect being unjuſt to the neceſſitous, to whom, as I have before ſhewn, God hath made our Charity due, as he who offends in the exceſs, unto himſelf. But becauſe, through that ſelf-love which prevails in the moſt of us, men will be apt enough to think they give according to their ability, when in truth they do nothing leſs, I will propoſe to your conſideration, in the ſecond place, what meaſures God preſcribed the *Jews* in the exerciſe of this great Duty of Charity; which was, that beſide the Tithe payable every year to the Prieſt, as you may ſee, *Deut.* 14. 22. they ſhould *every third year**, as it is in the 29. *v.* of that Chapter, ſet apart *another Tithe for the poor*, which being reſolved into a yearly rate will amount to the Thirtieth part of our yearly income: For though this Law do induce no direct Obligation upon us, as being a part of the Jewiſh Polity; yet inaſmuch as Charity is no leſs required of us than of the *Jews*, and our Saviour profeſſeth not to have come *to deſtroy*, but

* *De Officiis lib.* 2.

* *See Hammond's Serm. on Deut.* 26. 12, 13. *and Seldens Hiſtory of Tithes, c.* 2. *ſect.* 3.

but rather *to fulfil the Law and the Prophets*, we cannot in reaſon deem our ſelves obliged to ſet apart leſs for the poor than the Thirtieth part of our yearly income. Laſtly, as conſideration ought generally to be had of our ability, and of thoſe meaſures which God hath given us to judge both of that and our own duty by; ſo I ſee not how we can ſometime avoid the giving even beyond our ability, if we mean thereby an ability to provide for our ſelves according to that ſtate and condition wherein God hath placed us, and not an ability to ſerve our own neceſſities. For as we find that S. *Paul*, who doth generally refer men to their ability, yet mentions it with commendation that the *Corinthians*, whom he wrote to, gave not only *according to their ability, but above it*, 2 *Cor.* 8. 3. ſo I ſee not how we can avoid the abating of our own enjoyments, where the neceſſities of thoſe that are about us cannot be otherwiſe in any tolerable meaſure ſupplyed: he, who gave the Earth for the ſupport of all, conſequently obliging thoſe who are poſſeſſed of it, to communicate thereof to the neceſſitous; and therefore alſo, where the ſupport of thoſe is not otherwiſe to be procur'd, to abate of thoſe Enjoyments, which the place we hold in the World might otherwiſe warrant the enjoyment of. One only thing remains, relating to the liberality of giving, and that is the manner after which we are to do it; concerning which I ſay, firſt, That it ought not to be with that ſuperciliouſneſs and contempt of the poor, wherewith it is too often attended: Not only their deſcent from the ſame common Parent forbidding it, but the particular regard which God profeſſeth to have to all neceſſitous perſons, and that relation wherein our Saviour hath own'd them. For, what place can there be for ſuperciliouſneſs, where thoſe, to whom we give, are not only of our own blood, and the ſame common ſtock, but under the particular care of and relation to God and Chriſt, and that too in ſuch a proportion, that what is *done* or *not done* unto them, he interpreteth as either *done* or *not done unto himſelf?* But neither, ſecondly, are we to give with grudging and repining, as it is but too frequent with thoſe who are not otherwiſe peccant; as becauſe God, to whom we are obliged for being in a capacity of giving, profeſſeth to love * *a chearful giver*, and ſhould not therefore be ſo ill requited, as to find a grudging one; ſo becauſe (as hath been often ſaid, but can never be too much repeated) that Charity is no more than is due to the poor from us. For, what place can there be for grudging, where that, which we are to give, is but the right of thoſe to whom we are required to impart it? Thirdly, as we ought to diſcard from our giving all ſuperciliouſneſs and grudging, ſo alſo all ſlowneſs in the doing of it, not only *Solomon* ſo requiring, where he forbids us to ſay to the neceſſitous perſon, *Go, and come again, and to morrow I will give, when we have it by us*, but alſo the deſign and end of Charity; the deferring of a benefit making it of little uſe to him that craves it, and ſometimes alſo of none at all. I will conclude this head, and my diſcourſe concerning the Liberality of giving, with admoniſhing, in the fourth place, that it be done *ſecretly*, and ſo (as our Saviour ſpeaks) *that the left hand may not know what our right hand doth*; leſt that, which was intended for a benefit to our Neighbour, prove an exprobration to him, either of his neceſſities or obligation to us, and to our ſelves a temptation to pride and vanity. Which as it is enough to ſowre the moſt excellent Charity, and make it

* 2 *Cor.* 9. 7.

it diſguſtful both to God and Man; ſo hath this farther inconvenience attending it, that whilſt it ſeeks the praiſe of Men, it debars the charitable perſon of the praiſe and reward of God; he who forbids us to Mat. 6. 1. *do our Alms before men to be ſeen of them*, aſſigning for the Reaſon of it, that ſo doing, *we ſhall have no reward of our Father which is in Heaven.* And indeed, as to give ſecretly hath Reaſon as well as the Precept of our Saviour to oblige us to the obſervation of it; ſo there wanted not among the Heathen, who ſaw the reaſonableneſs of it, and inculcated it almoſt in the ſame terms; *Marcus Antoninus** not only inſinuating the ſo giving, that *we our ſelves may not know what we our ſelves have done*, but reſembling the beneficent perſon, among other things, to a *Vine*, which is *neither ſenſible of its own fruitfulneſs*, nor *makes any noiſe of it*, chuſing rather to *ſuperadd in their proper ſeaſon new cluſters* to its former, and to continue its fruitfulneſs, than to be eſteemed for it.

* Τῶν εἰς ἑαυτόν. li. 5. ſect. 6. —ὁ δέ τις τρόπον τινὰ ἐδὲ οἶδεν ὃ πεποίηκεν· ἀλλ' ὅμοιός ἐστιν ἀμπέλῳ βότρυν ἐνεγκούσῃ, καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο προσπιζήλουσῃ, μετὰ τὸ ἅπαξ τὸν ἴδιον καρπὸν ἐνηνοχέναι· ἵππῳ θρέμμων, κύων ἰχνεύσας, μέλισσα μέλι ποιήσασα, ἄνθρωπος δ' ἐυ ποιήσας, οὐκ ἐπιβοᾶται, ἀλλὰ μεταβαίνει ἐφ' ἕτερον ὡς ἄμπελος δὴ τὸ πάλιν ἐν τῇ ὥρᾳ τὴν βότρυν ἐνεγκεῖν.

Of the Liberality of giving, what hath been ſaid may ſuffice; proceed we to that of *lending*, a Liberality which I have already ſhewn to be no leſs neceſſary in its ſelf than the other, and might alſo be no leſs incumbent upon us, by the * Mat. 5. 42. Precept of our great Maſter Chriſt; in the very ſame breath * wherein he commands *the giving to every one that asks*, forbidding *to turn away from him that would borrow of us.* Now there are two things obſervable concerning this Liberality, proportionably to the two ſorts of perſons with whom we have to do: For either they may be ſuch who want it for the improving of their Fortunes, or ſuch as borrow it of us to procure or continue to themſelves a bare ſubſiſtence. Now though I doubt not (as hath been before declared) but that he who lends to the former perſons, may require what he does ſo with a valuable Conſideration for it, eſpecially where the money lent is needful enough to a Man's ſelf: yet as ſuch perſons may ſometime prove unfortunate in the management of it, in which caſe it may be but requiſite to remit ſomewhat of our own demands; ſo it cannot at all be accounted lawful, where we our ſelves can poſſibly be without it, to take the like Uſe of thoſe who borrow what they do, meerly to procure themſelves a ſubſiſtence, not only the Law of *Moſes* forbidding ſo to lend to *a poor Brother*, but the Law of Nature and Chriſt: He who lends to ſuch a perſon upon Uſe, being ſo far commonly from advantaging him, which is the end of Charity, that he only helps to plunge him ſo much the deeper in neceſſity and calamity. The ſame is to be ſaid of the taking of Gifts of ſuch perſons, or making any other advantages of them; it mattering not at all, under what notion it comes, ſo a Conſideration be paid, which changeth it from Liberality into a Contract, and, in the preſent caſe, an unmerciful one.

I am now arrived at the laſt ſpecies of Liberality, beſt known by the name of *Hoſpitality*; concerning which, as the Scripture hath not been * Gen. 18. 3. —19. 2. Judg. 19. 20. wanting in furniſhing us with Examples *, ſo neither in inculcating the Practice thereof upon us: S. *Paul* in his Exhortations joining *Hoſpitality* with *diſtributing to the Neceſſities of the Saints*, *Rom.* 12. 13. as S. † 1 Pet. 4. 9. *Peter* † with *that Charity which covers a multitude of ſins.* And not without Reaſon, if we conſider, I do not ſay how much it immediately conduceth to the conſerving of the Properties of meaner perſons, but

but to the encouraging of them to undergo that labour and travel which God hath been pleaſed to lay upon them. Now though even here that Caution is to have place, which refers the Benevolence of Men to the meaſure of their ſeveral abilities; yet I cannot forbear to ſay, that, provided it keeps within thoſe bounds, it ought not to content it ſelf with extending to a few, or indeed to thoſe of its own Neighbourhood; as becauſe the word, which we render Hoſpitality, imports the entertaining of *Strangers*, ſo becauſe it is a Vertue of thoſe whom God hath bleſſed with more liberal Fortunes, and from whom therefore he expects a more than ordinarily comprehenſive Charity. And I cannot but upon this occaſion call to mind the Story of *Henry* * *Wardlow*, ſometime *Archbiſhop* of *S. Andrews* in *Scotland*, who, agreeably to his own Function, and the Precept of the Apoſtle, employed that Revenue, which God had given him, in the entertainment of other perſons: For, being prevailed with for the eaſe of his Servants, to make a Bill of Houſhold, that they might know who were to be ſerved by them; when he was asked whom he would firſt name, he anſwered *Fife* and *Angus*, which are two large Countries in *Scotland*, containing many millions of People. By which anſwer of his, as he wiſely freed himſelf from their importunity, who would for their own eaſe have retrenched that good Man's Hoſpitality; ſo he gave an evident teſtimony of a truly Chriſtian and generous mind; and ſuch as it will concern thoſe of the richer ſort, but eſpecially of the Clergy, to ſhew themſelves diligent imitators of: That and no other being truly Chriſtian Charity, which, ſo far as in it lyes, extends it ſelf to all, I do not ſay that are the Children of the holy Jeſus, though that be a large Family, but the Deſcendants of our common Parent *Adam*. Care only would be taken (as being in a manner the only blemiſh which adheres to this moſt excellent Vertue) that that which is intended by the hoſpitable perſon for the refreſhment of Strangers and others, be not converted into luxury and intemperance; that, as it often happens, not only proving no Charity to their Bodies, but the deſtruction of their Souls, which is the greateſt cruelty we can be guilty of. And indeed, as thoſe times which were moſt famous for Hoſpitality, found a way both to prevent and retrench all ſuch intemperances; ſo if we could live to ſee the ſimplicity and plainneſs of thoſe ancient days recalled, there is no doubt we might live to ſee their Hoſpitality alſo recalled, without any of thoſe inconveniences which do now attend it; they ariſing for the moſt part from that, which hath been alſo the bane of Hoſpitality, even a deſire of gratifying our Palates with curious and coſtly Entertainments. For as thoſe things which are moſt plain are alſo procured at the eaſieſt rates, by which means men may be better fitted to be liberal towards other men; ſo, at the ſame time they gratifie the appetite, they do alſo ſatiate it, and not like the curioſities of latter time produce a thirſt which is equal to the other, and which nothing but intemperance can aſlake.

φιλοξενία.

* Spotiſwood's Hiſtory of the Ch. of Scotl. l. 2. p. 57.

Such are the means whereby we may contribute to the ſubſiſtence of others, and to the procuring or conſerving or improving of thoſe Properties from which they derive it: in which as I have often ſaid, and I hope ſufficiently proved, that the Affirmative part of the Commandment doth conſiſt; ſo they have this farther to commend them

to

to our conſideration and uſe, that they would if duly obſerved, not only not abridge our own Properties, but preſerve us from the temptation of invading thoſe of others, which the Negative part of the Commandment doth forbid. It being not to be thought, eſpecially after ſuch glorious Promiſes * as are made to the charitable man, that he ſhould be under any neceſſity of invading the Properties of others, who, in obedience to the Divine Command, hath been ſo liberal of his own.

* See Prov. 11. 25. —19. 17. —28.27.

THE

THE NINTH
COMMANDMENT.

PP9

THE NINTH COMMANDMENT.

Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.

PART I.

The Contents.

This Ninth Commandment both refers to, and supposeth Humane Judicatories; upon occasion whereof, inquiry is made, 1. *By what Divine Right they now stand.* 2. *What Persons intervene in them, and what their respective Duties are. The former of these evidenced from the necessity there is of determining Controversies, from the Precept given to* Noah *of shedding the Blood of the Murtherer, and from the Divine Right of Regal Power, of which the Power of Judicature is a part. The latter of the forementioned Questions brought under consideration, where both the Parties that intervene in them are enumerated, and their respective Duties described. Those of the* Plaintiff *shewn to be, not to raise a false Report, not to mix untrue Reports with true, nor prosecute even a true one in trifling Instances. Those of the* Defendent, *to own justly imputed Crimes, not to charge his Adversary with the same or the like Calumnies, nor shew himself morose in his Deportment to him. The Duties of the* Advocate, *not to espouse such Causes as are apparently evil, (though probable ones they may) nor yet to make choice of them meerly by the Purses of those that present them; as, after they have espous'd them, to manage them with all fidelity, and diligence, and dispatch: in fine, to content themselves with a simple Narration of the Cause, and neither to be lavish in the commendation of their own Clients, nor in the reproach of the Adversary. A more large Account concerning* Witnesses; *where, after a Declaration of the use of them in Judgment, their requisite Number, and necessary Qualifications, their Duty is shewn to be, not to deliver any thing that is false, not to conceal or transpose any thing that is true, as, in fine, not to deliver what they deem to be so, with any greater assurance than they themselves are perswaded of in their own Bosom. A Conclusion of the whole, with a Reflection upon the Duty of* Judges, *whether they be Judges of* Right, *or of* Fact:

where, among other things, is ſhewn, 1. *That they ought to paſs Sentence according to the Proofs that are made before them, whatſoever jealouſie or private knowledge they may have of the thing in controverſie.* 2. *That, in doubtful Caſes, they ought to incline to ſuch Determinations as are favourable to the Accuſed Party.*

THAT it may the better appear what that is which is here forbidden, what Crimes are compriſed under it, and what Duties enjoyned by it, I foreſee it neceſſary to premiſe ſomething concerning *Humane Judicatories*, which this Commandment doth both refer to, and ſuppoſe; not onely the uſe of *Witneſſes* ſo perſwading, which every one knows to have been introduc'd to decide Controverſies between Man and Man, before a competent Judge; but that Phraſe which the *Hebrew* makes uſe of to expreſs the *bearing* of falſe Witneſs, and *the manner of the Jews Procedure* in their ſeveral Courts of Judicature. For, it appearing from *Lev.* 5. 1. that Witneſſes were interrogated upon Oath, concerning that particular Affair which they were call'd to bear witneſs to; it is but reaſonable to think, eſpecially when the *Hebrew* Phraſe * imports *the not anſwering* falſly, that the intent of the Commandment was to forbid *the bearing of falſe witneſs before a Judge*, in any Controverſie that ſhould occur. Which, as it plainly ſuppoſeth the being of ſuch Judicatories among the *Jews*, and God's approbation of them; ſo makes it but neceſſary to inquire, becauſe otherwiſe the Prohibition would be null,

* לֹא־תַעֲנֶה

1. By what Divine Right they now ſtand.
2. What Perſons intervene in them, and what their reſpective Duties are.

1. For the evidencing the firſt whereof, even the *Divine Right* of Humane Judicatories, I ſhall alledge, in the firſt place, that which is antecedent to, and the Foundation of all other Laws, even the Law of Nature: For, that perſwading the determination of all Controverſies between Man and Man, as without which Humane Society could not ſubſiſt; it muſt conſequently be ſuppoſed to enjoyn, becauſe there is no other way of ending them, the conſtituting of ſome indifferent Perſons to do it; no Man being to be thought a competent Judge in his own Caſe, and much leſs likely to be thought ſo by him with whom he hath to do. Upon which, as there will follow a neceſſity of referring them to the determination of another, which is that for which Humane Judicatories were appointed; ſo alſo (which makes them properly ſuch) the furniſhing them with a Power to conſtrain the Parties at variance to ſubmit to their Determination and Sentence. Otherwiſe, among contentious Perſons at leaſt, the Controverſie would recur, and involve them in new and greater Heats. To the Law of Nature, and its Dictates, ſubjoyn we that which is call'd the Law of *Noah*, or rather that which was given by God to him and his Poſterity; concerning which, though, ſaving in the * *Tradition* of the *Jews*, there be no expreſs mention, as to any Precept which

* *Vid. Selden. de Jure Nat. & Gent. l. 7. c. 4.*

which imports the conſtituting of Humane Judicatories; yet as a Tradition ſo receiv'd as that, is not lightly to be deſpis'd, eſpecially when as to ſome Precepts it hath a certain Foundation in Scripture; ſo that it is not without ground, even there, as to this Precept whereof we ſpeak, may be competently evidenced from *Gen. chap. 9. verſ. 6. Whoſo ſheddeth mans blood, by man ſhall his blood be ſhed.* For, God not onely decrying there the ſhedding of Mans blood, but requiring the ſhedding of his that did it by another; he ſeems to me plainly to intimate the conſtituting of a Magiſtrate which ſhould both take cogniſance of, and puniſh it: as becauſe otherwiſe the Blood of Men might continue unreveng'd, if he who were the next of kin (whom *Grotius* * ſuppoſeth to have been impower'd) ſhould have wanted Courage or Ability to execute it; ſo becauſe, Murther being for the moſt part ſecretly committed, there was a kind of neceſſity of authorizing ſome to make inquiſition after it, and draw both the ſuſpected perſon and others to their Tribunal. Otherwiſe it ſhould have been lawful for the *avenger of blood* to have followed his own uncertain conjectures (which it is not very likely God would ever have permitted) or the Fact muſt have continued unreveng'd, which the Precept before mentioned was intended to provide againſt. Whence it is that the *Chaldee Paraphraſt* *, agreeably to the deſign of a *Paraphraſt*, and his own cuſtom elſewhere, explains thoſe words, *Whoſo ſheddeth mans blood, by man ſhall his blood be ſhed*, it ſhall be ſhed *by the Sentence of the Judges, upon the evidence of Witneſſes.* Laſtly (for againſt that to be ſure no exception can be made, whatſoever there may be ſuppoſed to be againſt either of the former Laws) the Law of Chriſt bearing witneſs to the Divine Inſtitution of Regal Power, of which I have heretofore * ſhewn the Power of Judicature to be a part, and moreover declaring thoſe, to whom that Power is committed, to have been appointed by God for the welfare and praiſe of the good, and the avenging of ſuch as do evil; it muſt alſo be ſuppoſed (becauſe that is not otherwiſe for the moſt part to be attained) to priviledge them to enquire into the cauſes both of the one and the other, and accordingly either to incourage or puniſh them. In conformity whereto, as we find all, whether Chriſtian or Heathen Magiſtrates, to have proceeded, with the general approbation of the World; ſo, which is more, S. *Paul* not only ſubmitting himſelf to the Tribunal of *Cæſar*, but profeſſing himſelf to be under an Obligation * to be judged by it. And more than this I ſhall not need to ſay of the Divine Right of Humane Judicatories, and may therefore have leave to go on to enquire,

* *In locum. & De jure belli, &c.* lib. 1. cap. 2. ſect. 5.

* *Per teſtes ex ſententiâ judicum ſanguis ejus fundetur.*

* Explicat. of the fifth Commandment, Part 5.

* *Acts* 25. 10.

2. What *Perſons intervene* in them, and what *their reſpective Duties* are. As to the former part of this Query little need to be ſaid, becauſe every mans own obſervation can inform him, that the Perſons principally concerned, are the *Plaintiff*, the *Defendant*, their *reſpective Advocates*, the *Witneſſes*, and the *Judge*. The only thing worthy an inveſtigation is, What their reſpective Duties are; which accordingly I come now to enquire into.

To begin with the *Plaintiff*, becauſe it is he that gives beginning to all that is done in Courts of Judicature; where, firſt of all, I ſhall recommend that of the Prophet *Moſes*, *Exod.* 23. 1. *Thou ſhalt not raiſe a falſe report.* A Caution extremely neceſſary, whether we conſider the

the Practice of the World, or the miſchiefs that accrue to our Neighbour by it: For, as it is too uſual with men, whether out of maliciouſneſs, or ſome ſuch ſiniſter end, to lay to their Neighbours charge things that they know not; ſo the iniquity thereof will eaſily appear, if we conſider the inconveniences that do naturally, and almoſt neceſſarily, flow from it: The Properties and Lives of Men being not ſeldom blaſted by it, but their Reputation always; he who boldly calumniates, though he attain no other end, yet ſeldom failing to leave a ſtain upon the good name of him he doth ſo. But neither, ſecondly, is it leſs neceſſary, even upon the ſcore of the fore-mentioned Caution, to proſcribe and condemn the mixing of *untrue* with *true* Accuſations, or making a worſe conſtruction of them than they deſerve: he who adds to, or perverts any Man's Words or Actions, being ſo far guilty of a falſe Report, as he does either add to, or pervert them. Laſtly, For though that have been intimated before, yet it may ſeem but neceſſary to repeat it, to obviate the too common Practice of it; As it will concern him who is the Plaintiff not to raiſe a falſe Report, either in whole or in part; ſo neither to take up and proſecute a true one, where the matter of the Complaint is onely in *trifling Inſtances*, and ſuch it may be which, though contrary to the Letter of the Law, yet are not ſo to the Intent of the Lawgiver, and are capable of a favourable Interpretation. For, where is that Meekneſs, and Kindneſs, and Forbearance which *Chriſtianity* ſo often and ſo earneſtly inculcates, if it may be lawful for him that makes profeſſion of it, to draw his Brother before a Tribunal for every petty Treſpaſs, or harſh Word, or for every the leaſt deviation from a Statute?

From the Plaintiff or Accuſer, paſs we to the *Defendant*; who is either rightly accuſed, or not. If the former, the Principles of Juſtice and Charity, as well as thoſe of Prudence, will perſwade him to agree with his Adverſary, whilſt he is in the way with him, leſt the Adverſary deliver him to the Judge, and the Judge to the Officer, and ſo he be caſt into Priſon. For, what Juſtice or Charity can it be, to put a Man to the vexation or charge of a Suit, to recover that which we our ſelves cannot but acknowledge to be his due? But let us ſuppoſe the Right either to lie, or at leaſt to be ſuppos'd to lie on the Defendants part (as who is there that is not willing to believe it to be on his own?) yet will not that exempt him from a poſſibility of offending, and therefore neither from the neceſſity of a Caution. Such as is, firſt, That that ſuppoſed Right of his do not tranſport him into the like Crime, and make him charge the adverſe Party with the ſame or the like Calumnies wherewith he himſelf is loaded. For, as it is but too uſual with Men, otherwiſe of good behaviour, to endeavour by falſe Accuſations to blaſt the Credit of thoſe by whom they think themſelves unjuſtly worried; ſo, beſide the imitation of the others Injuſtice and Falſhood, it is the reſult of Revenge, which our Religion hath no leſs ſeverely interdicted than the other. Alike criminal, and therefore alike neceſſary to be caution'd againſt, is the avoiding of all civil Converſe with thoſe by whom we are impleaded, or entertaining them when they come in our way, whether with rude Geſtures, or ruder Language. For, beſide that it is not impoſſible, but that he by whom we are impleaded may be in the right, or at leaſt may be as ſtrongly perſwaded of it; in which caſe the forementioned rudeneſs

rudeneſs will be unjuſt, as well as uncharitable, becauſe bottom'd either upon unſound or uncertain grounds: it is ill agreeable with that Kindneſs to an Enemy, which our Religion ſo much talks of, but which ſo few that make profeſſion of it give any tolerable proofs of.

But becauſe, though the Plaintiff and Defendant furniſh Work for Courts of Judicature, yet they commonly leave that Work to be managed by Men *Learned in the Law*, who may overſhoot themſelves, as well as thoſe whoſe Cauſes they eſpouſe; therefore I judge it but neceſſary, that theſe alſo ſhould have a ſhare in thoſe Inſtructions which concern the Regulations of Courts of Judicature. Now there are two things which ſuch Perſons are to intend, and to which therefore our Inſtructions ought to be adapted: the one, the Choice of thoſe Cauſes that come before them; the other, the Management thereof. Now though, as to the former of theſe, little ſcruple be generally made, where there is a probability of a proportionable Reward, to excite and encourage their Endeavours; yet I cannot forbear to ſay, that it can no way be deemed lawful to eſpouſe ſuch Cauſes as are apparently evil, and which tend more to uſurp upon other Mens lawful Right, than to vindicate the Clients own. For, beſide that by ſo doing Men ſhall ill requite the Divine Majeſty for that Ability and Eloquence which he hath furniſh'd them withal, they ſhall onely lend their aſſiſtance to the promoting of Contentiouſneſs and Injuſtice, and to the ſubverting of peaceable and juſt Poſſeſſions: which how it agrees with that Juſtice and Equity for which Courts of Judicature were appointed, but which to be ſure the Law of Nature and *Chriſtianity* have laid upon all Mankind, I dare venture to the judgment of the moſt prejudic'd *Advocate*, to give a ſatisfactory Account of. I ſay not the ſame, where the Cauſe that is preſented to them hath a fair and probable appearance, however it may prove when it comes more cloſely to be examin'd. For, as the Men of that Profeſſion have ſeldom the leiſure to look narrowly into the Merits of a Cauſe before-hand, and cannot therefore be thought to be oblig'd to refuſe any Cauſe that hath a fair and ſpecious appearance; ſo, if they ſhould be over-ſcrupulous in admitting ſuch, they might not onely prejudice themſelves in the exerciſe of their Profeſſion, which is a weighty Conſideration, but prejudice the Rights of that Perſon which addreſſeth himſelf to them, by refuſing him the aſſiſtance of their Endeavours. To ſay nothing at all, that to be too peremptory in judging of a Cauſe before-hand, would be to exceed the bounds of their Profeſſion, and aſſume the Perſon rather of a Judge, than of an Advocate. But as it is one thing to lend a Man's Aſſiſtance to a probable Cauſe, which (as *Tully** well obſerves out of *Panætius*) may be the part of an Advocate to defend; and another, to lend his Aſſiſtance to one that is apparently evil and unjuſt: ſo having caution'd Men againſt the latter, I ſhall onely add, that they would not chuſe their Cauſes meerly or moſtly by the Purſes of thoſe that preſent them, nor detrect thoſe of the Poor and Indigent: Charity, as it hath a tie upon the Learned in the Laws, as well as upon other Men, ſo having, as to them, no more proper Field †, or larger, to exerciſe it ſelf in, than a ready and gratuitous defending of the Poor from

* De Officiis lib. 2. *Judicis eſt, ſemper in cauſis verum ſequi: patroni nonnunquam veriſimile, etiamſi minus ſit verum, defendere: quod ſcribere, præſertim cum de Philoſophiâ ſcriberem, non auderem, niſi idem placeret graviſſimo Stoicorum Panætio.*

† Tull. de Offic. lib. 2. *Diſerti igitur hominis & facile laborantis, quodque in patriis eſt moribus, multorum cauſas & non gravatè & gratuito defendentis, beneficia & patrocinia latè patent.*

the

the Oppreſſions of the Wealthy, by that Reaſon and Eloquence which makes their Profeſſion to be had in Honour. From the Choice they are to make of Cauſes, paſs we to the Management of thoſe they chuſe; where again many uſeful Rules preſent themſelves: Such as are, thoſe that enjoyn Fidelity and Diligence in the Adminiſtration of what they undertake, Watchfulneſs againſt all Diſadvantages which may any way prejudice it, and Diſpatch. But becauſe theſe, how little regarded ſoever, are ſo apparently both the Duties of Juſtice, and of the Advocates Profeſſion, that he muſt be wilfully blind that doth not own their Obligation; I ſhall chuſe rather (having thus barely mention'd them) to caution the Men of that Profeſſion againſt a Practice, which, how common ſoever, yet is of too pernicious conſequence to be paſſed by: I mean, the paſſing from the Merits of the Cauſe, to the defaming of the adverſe Parties Perſon, and making him as odious or ridiculous, as it is in the power of Art to make him. For, though a wiſe and conſiderate Judge will not lightly be moved with Diſcourſes of that nature, or rather will uſe his Authority to repreſs them; yet as even they may be ſometime tempted by them, to preſs more hardly in their Sentence upon thoſe whom they have been inſtructed either to deſpiſe or abominate: ſo ſuch Diſcourſes may be of more force to pervert the Judgment of a Jury, who are not generally ſo much Maſters of Reaſon as Judges are, and much leſs of their Paſſions and Affections. And though I will not ſay, there is as much reaſon to forbear all Rhetorical Inſinuations, and particularly ſuch as ſpend themſelves in the commendation of that Perſon whoſe Cauſe they have undertaken to defend; yet as the grave Judges of *Areopagus* have been remembred with applauſe, for forbidding at their Tribunal any other than ſimple Narrations, and ſuch as ſerv'd rather to diſcover the Nature of the thing in queſtion, than to adorn or diſgrace it; ſo if other than ſuch ſimple Narrations were not lightly countenanced, the Truth of a Cauſe would more eaſily appear, and they to whom the Determination thereof is committed, would have no temptation to reſiſt the force of it, from the ſuggeſtions either of Love or Hatred.

Being now, by the Order of my Diſcourſe, to entreat of the Duty of *Witneſſes*, the onely Perſons directly concern'd in this Commandment, I ſuppoſe it will be neither unacceptable, nor unprofitable, to premiſe ſomething concerning *the uſe of them in Judgment*, their *requiſite Number*, and *neceſſary Qualifications*; the knowledge of theſe helping not a little to diſcover their Obligations, or to bind them ſo much the faſter on them. Of *the Uſe*, or rather *neceſſity* of Witneſſes, much need not be ſaid, as being apparent and obvious: For, it being not to be ſuppoſed, on the one hand, that Men will ordinarily confeſs that Fault, which they have not been careful to keep themſelves from the commiſſion of; and it being evident, on the other, that a Judge hath not Eyes enough to diſcover all, nor is well qualified to paſs Sentence upon them, though he had (it being eaſie for a Judge, if he were allow'd to witneſs as well as ſentence, to make whom he pleas'd Criminal) there will ariſe a neceſſity of determining the thing in controverſie, by the Teſtimony of ſome indifferent Perſons, who ſhall either be call'd to that Office, or voluntarily preſent themſelves. And accordingly, as all Nations, led thereto by the Light

of

of Reaſon and Nature, have both uſed and generally approved this way of procedure in Judgment; ſo I know none to rival it, but the *Ordeal Purgations* of our *Saxon Anceſtors* (which yet were not uſed but in the defect of other Proofs) and the *extorting a Confeſſion* from the accuſed party: The former whereof was no better than a preſumptuous temptation of the Divine Providence; the latter injurious to Humane Nature; and, beſide that, no way proper to produce the deſired effect: Few perſons, how innocent ſoever, being of ability to reſiſt the force of Torture; and thoſe that are of ability to reſiſt, being as likely to deny the Crimes, wherewith they are juſtly charged, as thoſe that are not, are ready enough to own falſly imputed ones. From the uſe or rather neceſſity of Witneſſes, paſs we to the *number*; which by the Law given to the *Iſraelites* ought to be no leſs than Two; eſpecially where the life of a Man is concerned. And not without Reaſon, if we conſider the weight of the thing in queſtion, and the danger of paſſing a wrong Judgment, where one Man's teſtimony may be admitted. Which as all wiſe people will be careful to prevent, leſt whilſt they ſeek to puniſh a ſuppoſed Malefactor, they make themſelves really ſuch; ſo eſpecially, if they conſider, that it is better to let a bad Man eſcape, than run the hazard of puniſhing a good; it being certainly and always an injury to puniſh a good Man, but not ſuch to let a bad go free. In the mean time, though I ſay that two Witneſſes ordinarily ought to paſs to the condemning of any perſon to death; yet as I will not affirm the ſame to hold in matters of Eſtate, eſpecially where the thing in Controverſie is of no very great concern; ſo neither univerſally in criminal matters, and particularly in the caſe of Treaſon. For, as the preſumptions many times may be ſuch, that they may well make the teſtimony of a ſingle Witneſs credible, eſpecially if that Witneſs be an unſtained one; as moreover it may ſo happen, that a ſingle Witneſs may be of ſo fair a reputation, that he may be looked upon of equal weight with two or more ordinary ones: So the life of a Prince, and the welfare of a State, are things of ſo infinite concern, that the machinations of Evil Perſons againſt them are not lightly to paſs unrevenged, where there is an apt proof of the contrivance of them. In caſes extraordinary therefore, or where the matter is of no great concern, there may be place for a ſingle Teſtimony; otherwiſe there is no doubt, the exacting of two is both more reaſonable and ſafe: As becauſe God himſelf did ſometime require it; ſo becauſe there is not that danger of the corrupting of two, which there may be of one; or, if there were, that corruption might more eaſily be diſcovered, by examining them apart, as we ſee in that famous inſtance of *Suſannah*. The only thing farther to be premiſed, is the *qualification* of the Witneſſes, concerning which I intended to be much more large, than I have upon ſecond thoughts reſolved to be. But conſidering with my ſelf, that I had all along avoided the inſtructing of Publick Perſons, whoſe it is to judge of the qualification of thoſe Witneſſes they will admit; and conſidering moreover, that things of this nature are better judged of by Men verſed in Judicial Proceedings, and the neceſſities of the World, than by one who converſeth only with Books, and his own Thoughts; I deem'd it but reaſonable to leave this head, with adverting only, that they ought to be perſons of *competent underſtanding*,

of *honeſt Fame*, and *without all ſuſpicion of love or hatred or corruption.* It being thus evident what uſe, or rather neceſſity, there is of Witneſſes in Judgment; what number of them is requiſite, and in general alſo how they ought to be qualified: it remains, that we enquire *to what Duties they are obliged*, which are theſe four eſpecially: 1. That they deliver nothing that is Falſe. 2. and 3. That they neither conceal nor tranſpoſe any thing that is true: And, 4. And laſtly, That what is true, or at leaſt deem'd by them to be ſo, be delivered with no other degree of aſſurance, than they themſelves are perſwaded of in their own boſoms. The firſt of theſe is the very thing which this Commandment doth inculcate, and will hereafter be more largely exemplified, when I come to ſhew the ſins that are forbidden by it. The ſecond and third (as I ſhall afterwards ſhew) are included in the former; and the fourth a neceſſary conſequent of it. For, inaſmuch as moral falſhood conſiſts not in the diſagreeableneſs of the thing we utter with that which it concerns, but with our own eſtimate of it; he muſt be looked upon as giving a falſe Teſtimony, who ſhall utter any thing with a greater degree of aſſurance, than he himſelf is perſwaded of it. And more than this I ſhall not need to ſay at preſent concerning the Duty of Witneſſes, becauſe I muſt reſume it in my following Diſcourſe; and may therefore with Reaſon go on to the Duty of *Judges*, the laſt thing propoſed to be diſcourſed of.

Now there are two ſorts of *Judges*, at leaſt in the moſt of our Courts of Judicature, and which therefore are to be conſidered apart; whereof the former are (if I may ſo ſpeak) *the Judges of Right*, the other the *Judges of Fact*. Judges of Right I call thoſe, who are commonly, and indeed only known among us by the Name of Judges, and to whom it belongs to enquire into the Fact that is brought before them, to declare the ſenſe of the Law, and to paſs Sentence upon Verdict given. Judges of Fact (for ſo indeed they are) thoſe which are beſt known by the Name of *Jurymen*, and to whom it belongs, upon the hearing of the whole matter, to umpire differences between Man and Man, and either to abſolve or condemn the perſon accuſed. An Inſtitution (as Dr. *Bates* * obſerves) for which we are beholden to our *Saxon* and *Norman* Kings, and which is indeed none of the leaſt commendations of the Government; none being more proper Judges of Men, than thoſe who are of the ſame rank and condition, and who may therefore be ſuppoſed to be equally eſtranged from hatred and envy. And though it be true that theſe alſo may not be without their affections, but however may ſeem leſs qualified for Judgment by their own unskilfulneſs; yet as the former inconvenience is in a great meaſure ſuperſeded, by that liberty which our Law allows to the perſon accuſed, to reject to a certain number, ſuch of them as he may ſuſpect to be ill affected towards him; ſo, the latter is perfectly removed by that account which they have from the Witneſſes of the manner of the Fact, as from the Judge of the nature of the Law; other things (as the ſame Learned Man obſerves) being more rightly ſcann'd by a ſimple and

* Elench motuum nuper. in Anglia, part. 2. p. 359. *Sed ſciant tam exteri quam poſteri, conſuetudinem hanc duodecimviralis inquiſitionis ex æquo & bono petitam ſingulari Regum tum Saxonicorum tum Normannorum indulgentiæ debitam, ab omni retro memoriâ ad nos traductam, hâc ætate, cum aliquantiſper intermitteretur, publicis deſideriis maximè comprobatam. Æquiſſimi Plebis æſtimatores Plebeii, Nobilitatis Nobiles; ſiquidem ejuſdem loci atq; ordinis hominibus ineſt charitas, abeſt invidia. Præterea, ſi quos Prætor ediderit tibi infenſos, licet etiam atq; etiam rejicias. Nec imprudentes appellare fas, facti rationem à teſtibus, rem omnem coràm allegantibus & probantibus, juris naturam à Judice Legum ſtudiis innutrito, edoctos. Cæteras partes ſimplex & incorrupta mens rectiùs examinat, quàm calliditas alienæ libidinis adminiſtra.*

and uncorrupt mind, than by craft, which is but too often the inſtrument of another's luſt. Of the Duty of the former Judges I will not ſay much, becauſe they do not ſtand ſo much in need of an Inſtructor, nor am I ſo proper for it, though they did. It ſhall ſuffice me therefore briefly to admoniſh, or rather pray, that inaſmuch as the deſign of their place is to adminiſter Juſtice, they would do what in them lyes to diſcover where the Right is, and not ſpare any pains or patience to inveſtigate it. That they would not receive Informations beforehand to foreſtall their judgments, and much leſs ſuffer them to be blinded by the interceſſion of Friends, the ſollicitations of great Perſons, or the receiving of Rewards. That they would reſtrain both the Litigants and their ſeveral Advocates from perſonal aſperſions, and ſuch as ſerve rather to hide, than diſcover the truth of the thing in queſtion. That they would examine ſuch Witneſſes, as ſhew themſelves crafty and reſerv'd, with all dexterity and accuracy; and help out and incourage ſuch, whom baſhfulneſs, and the awe of ſo great a preſence deters; that they would bear with the impertinences of thoſe of the meaner ſort, and who know not how to tell a ſtory, without interlacing things of little concernment to it; laſtly, that they would carefully and faithfully recapitulate the whole matter, and with all uprightneſs and perſpicuity deliver the ſenſe of that Law which reſpects it. So doing they ſhall not only fulfill their own parts, but help the Jury in a great meaſure to ſatisfie theirs. Who as they are in Reaſon and Law to receive the ſenſe of the Law from the Judge, and the knowledge of the Fact from the Depoſitions of the reſpective Witneſſes, ſo ſhall at leaſt free their own Souls; if, without favour, or hatred, or any ſuch corrupt affection, they ſhall ſet themſelves to conſider of all that hath been propoſed, and impartially deliver their own ſenſe: For though even thus they may ſometime happen to erre in Judgment, yet they ſhall not offend; becauſe governing themſelves by the beſt light, which the Evidence that hath been given, and the Dictates of their own Judgments have afforded them.

Theſe two things only ſeem neceſſary to be added, for the better explicating the Duty of theſe and all other Judges,

1. That they ought to paſs ſentence *according to the proofs that are made before them*, whatſoever jealouſie or private knowledge they themſelves may have of the falſhood of the thing atteſted to.
2. That *in doubtful caſes*, and where the truth doth not appear, *they ought to incline to ſuch determinations as are favourable to the accuſed party.*

1. Now though the former of theſe Aſſertions be generally allowed of, even when the Perſon who ought to paſs ſentence, hath a ſtrong ſuſpicion of the falſeneſs of the Witneſſes, for the Reaſons before given of the uſe and neceſſity of them in Judgment: yet as there hath not been the like accord, where (as it may ſometime happen) he who is to paſs ſentence knows the contrary to what hath been depoſed; ſo it may ſeem but neceſſary for that Reaſon to enquire, whether a Judge in that caſe ought to paſs ſentence according to what hath been atteſted? For the reſolution whereof, the firſt thing I ſhall offer is, That if he do paſs ſentence at all, he ought to paſs ſentence according to what hath been depoſed; yea though his own private knowledge do con-

tradict it. For, beſide that a Judge, as ſuch, exerciſeth a Publick Authority, and is therefore in Reaſon to guide himſelf in it by a Publick Knowledge, and ſuch as comes to him as a Judge, and not as a Private Perſon, (otherwiſe he who takes Cognizance, and he who paſſeth Sentence ſhall not be the ſame;) beſide that a Judge by the nature of his Office, and the Oath which is laid upon him, is indefinitely obliged to ſquare his Judgments by the Laws and Manners of the place, which do every where make it neceſſary to proceed according to what is made out to him in Judgment: That he ought ſo to proceed, may be abundantly evidenced from the force of thoſe proofs, which the Teſtimony of Witneſſes gives; for thoſe making the thing prov'd to be look'd upon as Truth, even in the opinion of * God himſelf, it is but reaſon that a Judge, who is obliged to judge according to truth, ſhould pronounce agreeably to them, and conſequently not according to his own Private Knowledge. Neither will it avail to ſay (which is one of the things that is uſually objected) that ſo doing he ſhall act againſt his own conſcience: For, beſide that there is a difference between acting againſt a Man's Knowledge, and acting againſt his Conſcience; the former importing only a ſpeculative Knowledge, which induceth no obligation of it ſelf; the latter connoting a practical one: there is no neceſſity at all that the Judge of whom we ſpeak, ſhould act againſt his own Conſcience. For the force of Conſcience ariſing from the perſwaſion of the Judgment, that ſuch or ſuch a thing ought to be done or omitted by us; he who can ſettle it in his mind, that he ought to proceed *ſecundùm allegata & probata*, as there is no doubt every Judge ought to do, may take the courſe before ſpoken of without any reproach from his own Conſcience. As little am I moved with what is further objected againſt this Aſſertion; that Poſitive Laws, and particularly thoſe of men, ought to yield to the Law of Nature, which requires of us, for inſtance, the abſolving of an innocent perſon, whatſoever Teſtimony may be made againſt him. For, beſide that it is the voice of Nature, no leſs than of Poſitive Laws, that *in the mouth of two or three Witneſſes every word ſhall be eſtabliſhed*, there being otherwiſe no end of Contentions, if what ſuch ſuggeſt may not be admitted to determine them; neither is he to be reputed as innocent *in foro humano*, who ſhall have ſuch Allegations atteſted againſt him, and ſhall not be able to wipe them off. I conclude therefore, That whatſoever a Judges Private Knowledge may inform him, he ought, if he paſs Sentence, to guide himſelf by what appears to him in Judgment. But neither, ſecondly, ſhall I ſtick to affirm, that he both may and ought to paſs Sentence, if the Prince ſhall oblige him to it. As becauſe there is really no iniquity on his part ſo to do, inaſmuch as he only condemns him whom the Law pronounceth nocent; ſo, becauſe it is a greater inconvenience than the condemning of an innocent Perſon, to detract the Commands of him, by whom he is conſtituted a Judge: He who ſo doth, beſide the ſcandal of his Example, opening a way for himſelf and others, to avoid the paſſing of a Sentence, whenſoever they ſhall pleaſe to pretend that they know the contrary to what hath been alledged and atteſted. It may be enough for ſuch perſons to endeavour the avoiding of it, if it may be with the Princes Will; or, if that cannot be done, to uſe their art to convict the Witneſſes of falſhood;

* Joh. 8. 17.

falſhood; which by ways beſt known to Men verſed in thoſe Affairs hath oftentimes been accompliſhed, when the Judge hath had only a ſuſpicion of their Treachery; or, if that cannot be done, after Sentence to ſignifie it to the Prince, in whom as the power of Pardoning is, ſo it is hardly to be imagined, but he will gladly make uſe of it upon ſuch an occaſion, which will abſolve both the Judges own Conſcience, and the accuſed party.

2. I will conclude this Affair and my Diſcourſe, with admoniſhing thoſe to whom the Power of Judging doth belong, That *in doubtful caſes they ought to incline to ſuch determinations as are favourable to the accuſed party.* For every one being in Reaſon to be preſumed to be innocent, till the contrary thereof be made appear; it is but juſt, where the Proofs are not very clear, that the Judgment ſhould be with favour towards him who hath been convented at their Tribunal.

PART

PART II.

An Addreſs to the Explication of the Negative *part of the Commandment; where the Errors of Witneſſes, and the Criminalneſs thereof, are firſt of all inquir'd into; as, after that, what Falſities are compriſed in them, whether in or out of Judicial Proceedings. The firſt Errour of Witneſſes, the bearing of a falſe one, whether as that imports ſuch a Teſtimony as diſagreeth with the Nature of the Thing atteſted to; but principally and chiefly as it imports ſuch a one as diſagrees with our own Opinion concerning it. The Criminalneſs thereof, the Prejudice it doth to him againſt whom it is alledg'd, the Aſſiſtance it lends to the Injuſtice of the Accuſer, its hindring thoſe from doing Juſtice who are otherwiſe diſpos'd to do it, and Perjury. The ſecond Errour of Witneſſes, the concealing of any thing that is true; the Criminalneſs whereof is evinced from the prejudice it may bring unto our Neighbour, and from its contrariety to that great Precept of Love, which commands us to advantage him, as well as no way injure him. The like Criminalneſs evinced in the tranſpoſing of that which is true, or affirming what we deem to be ſo, with any greater degre of aſſurance than we our ſelves are perſwaded of in our own Thoughts. An Inquiry into the Falſities and other Errours which are comprehended under thoſe of Witneſſes; which from the general Deſign of the* Decalogue, *as well as of the preſent Commandment, are ſhewn to be all Falſities in Judicial Proceedings. An enumeration thereupon of the ſeveral Falſities committed in them; and an Inquiry whether the Defendant may plead* Not guilty *to what he is juſtly charg'd with. Extrajudicial Falſities to be look'd upon as alike forbidden by this Commandment, where they are alſo* pernicious *ones.*

Negative part of the Commandment.

BEING now pretty well provided, by what I have premis'd concerning Courts of Judicature, to give an account of thoſe Sins which are by this Commandment forbidden in them; Reaſon would I ſhould give the firſt place to thoſe of Witneſſes, which the Commandment doth expreſly condemn: As becauſe what is ſo condemn'd, ought to be look'd upon as principally intended; ſo, becauſe whatſoever elſe may be ſuppos'd to be forbidden by it, muſt be upon the account of its affinity with that which it principally intends. Taking it therefore for granted, that the Errours of Witneſſes in Judgment are principally ſtruck at, I will inquire,

1. What thoſe Errours are, and wherein the Criminalneſs thereof conſiſteth.
2. What Falſities are compriſed under them, whether in or out of Judicial Proceedings.

I. Now there are four things (according as was before obſerv'd) which this Commandment doth either expreſly, or by conſequence, forbid in thoſe who are Witneſſes in Judgment.

1. The uttering of any thing that is falſe.
2. and 3. The concealing or tranſpoſing of that which is true.
4. The

4. The affirming of any thing which is deem'd by them to be ſo, with any greater degree of aſſurance than they themſelves are perſwaded of in their own Breaſts.

1. Of *the firſt* of theſe little need to be ſaid, I mean, as to ſhew it to be forbidden by this Commandment; the Letter of the Commandment forbidding the *bearing falſe witneſs againſt our neighbour*, which is to me the ſame in ſenſe with the uttering of any thing that is falſe. For though I deny not but a falſe Witneſs may be for the advantage of one Party, and therefore in that reſpect not a bearing falſe witneſs againſt our Neighbour; yet inaſmuch as what is for the advantage of one, is, *eo nomine*, to the prejudice of the other that contendeth with him in Judgment, he who gives a favourable, but falſe Teſtimony for the one, muſt be ſuppos'd to bear falſe witneſs againſt the other, which is the very thing forbidden by this Commandment. All therefore that will be requiſite for me to ſhew upon this firſt Head, is, *what a falſe Witneſs is*, and *wherein the Criminalneſs thereof conſiſteth*. Now there are two Notions whereof the word *Falſhood* is capable, as ſhall be more at large declar'd *, when I come to entreat *de induſtria* of the nature of Truth and Falſhood: that which importeth the diſagreement of our Words with the nature of the Thing whereof we ſpeak, and that which imports the diſagreement of them with our own Opinion of it. Both the one and other of theſe Falſhoods is intended in this Commandment; but the latter principally and chiefly. For, though a Man may be, and no doubt is, oblig'd to inform himſelf well of what he ſpeaks, becauſe Words were intended to expreſs the Natures of Things, as well as our own Conceptions of them; though he may alſo, for that reaſon, be chargeable with the Crime of Falſhood, if that whereof he ſpeaks have not been duly weigh'd beforehand by him: yet inaſmuch as it is not in the power of the Speaker to give other account of any thing, than according to that Opinion which he himſelf hath conceiv'd concerning it; that Falſhood is in reaſon to be look'd upon as chiefly forbidden, which conſiſts in the diſagreement of our Words with our Thoughts, as which alone we are intirely in a capacity to prevent. It being thus evident what we are to underſtand by Falſity, and particularly by that Falſity which cleaves to a Teſtimony in Judgment; proceed we to ſhew *wherein the Criminalneſs thereof conſiſteth*, and for which it is forbidden by this Commandment.

* *Vid.* Part 3. Explicat. of this Commandment.

And here not to alledge its contrariety to Truth, which, as I ſhall afterwards ſhew, ought to be preſerv'd inviolable, partly becauſe falſe witneſſing hath a farther Criminalneſs in it, and partly becauſe I ſhall have a more opportune place to entreat of that; I ſhall deſire you to conſider,

1. That which ſeems principally here intended, even *the prejudice it doth to that Perſon againſt whom it is alledg'd*. For, inaſmuch as neceſſity requires, that they to whom the Power of Judging doth belong, ſhould proceed in their Sentence according to what hath been atteſted; it cannot be but where the Witneſs is falſe, the Judge ſhould paſs Sentence againſt the accuſed Party, and deprive him of that, whether Eſtate or Life, which is call'd in queſtion by the Accuſer: The former whereof is, on the Witneſſes part, a Violation of the Eighth Commandment; the latter, a Violation of the Sixth. For, as it is by his Teſtimony

Teſtimony that the Judge does what he does, and therefore he, and not the Judge, chargeable with the Conſequence of the Sentence; ſo I know not whether I may not repreſent him as more chargeable with that Conſequence, than him by whom he is ſuborn'd: Becauſe, though the latter give beginning to the Accuſation, yet it is his Teſtimony, that gives occaſion to the Sentence, by which the Accuſation becomes effectual. Whence it was, that if the falſeneſs of a Witneſs hapned to be diſcovered, he who forbad the bearing of falſe witneſs, requir'd the retaliating upon him that did ſo, that miſchief, whatſoever it was, which he thought to do unto his Neighbour by it, *Deut.* 19. 18, 19.

2. But beſide the prejudice which a falſe Witneſs doth to the accuſed Party, which alone would ſuffice to render his ſo doing Criminal; it would alſo be conſidered, which is not without a Crime, that *he lends his Aſſiſtance to the Injuſtice of the Accuſer:* As becauſe he ſo far intereſts himſelf in the Guilt of that Fact to which he becomes ſo aſſiſtant; ſo becauſe he encourageth him, and other ſuch like Perſons, to the perpetration of new Injuſtices: He who proſpers by his Villany, being not likely to give it over, where there is ſo ready a means to give ſucceſs to it.

3. I obſerve, thirdly, That as he who bears falſe witneſs, gives aſſiſtance to the Injuſtice of the Accuſer, and promotes that Wickedneſs which he ought rather to diſcountenance; ſo *he hinders thoſe from doing Juſtice who are otherwiſe diſpos'd to do it*, yea *makes them inſtrumental to the contrary:* Which however no way prejudicial to the eternal Welfare of the Judge (becauſe no Man can become Criminal but by his own conſent) yet is prejudicial to his *Fame*, which by that means is often call'd in queſtion; to his *Office*, which it renders uſeleſs, yea pernicious; but much more to *Humane Society*, becauſe corrupting thoſe Judgments, upon the right proceeding whereof, the Safety of Mens Perſons and Fortunes doth depend.

4. Laſtly, Foraſmuch as Men are not any where admitted to bear witneſs, without adding the Oath of God to what they ſo bear witneſs; he who bears any falſe witneſs, adds *Impiety* to his *Injuſtice*, and profanes the Name of God, whom he doth ſo invoke, as well as his who is his Vicegerent, and whom he does by his falſe Teſtimony elude.

2. Of the firſt thing forbidden in a Witneſs, what hath been ſaid may ſuffice; where I have ſhewn what it is to bear falſe witneſs, and wherein Criminal: Proceed we now to ſhew the ſame concerning *the concealing of any thing that is true*, the ſecond thing affirm'd to be forbidden by the Commandment. For the evidencing whereof, though it might ſuffice, as to our Courts of Judicature, to alledge the Oath which the Witneſs takes to ſpeak the whole Truth, as well as nothing but the Truth; becauſe he who ſo promiſeth, makes himſelf a falſe Witneſs, if he conceal any part of it: yet I think it not amiſs, becauſe that will add more force to the Admonition, to evict it from the Commandment it ſelf. A thing which will be no way difficult for me or any Man to do, who ſhall conſider the End of the Commandment. For, the Deſign thereof being apparently to ſecure the Perſons and Eſtates of Men from receiving any prejudice by the Teſtimony of Witneſſes; if Men may be prejudic'd by a partial Witneſs, as well as by

by a falſe one, there is no doubt that alſo ought to be looked upon as forbidden, becauſe equally contrary to its deſign. Now that the Perſons and Eſtates of Men may no leſs ſuffer by the concealing of a Truth, than by giving atteſtation to a Falſhood, will appear if we conſider how much the concealing of a circumſtance may alter the nature of the thing in queſtion. Thus for Example, Though it be criminal, and ſo declared by our Laws, to take away the life of our Neighbour, yet it is not ſo, nor ought to be ſo reputed, to take away his life if it be only to defend our own; he who ſhall depoſe the killing of the party, but withal conceal that parties firſt invading him that ſlew him, ſhall make a murtherer of him who is perfectly innocent, and who ought rather to be defended than condemned. In like manner, he who ſhall depoſe the lending of ſuch a ſum of Money to the accuſed party, as the Plaintiff demands, but withal conceal, what he well knows, the paying of it back to him, ſhall make him obnoxious to the penalty of the Law, who ought rather to have the encouragement of it, as having diſcharg'd that obligation which he had contracted. And indeed as a bad cauſe may become ſpecious and plauſible by paring off thoſe things which ſhew it to be monſtrous and deformed, (for thus (as *Palavicino* * well reſembles it) *out of a miſhapen ſtone men frame a comely Statue, not by adding to it, but by taking away*) ſo there is as little doubt to be made, but a fair and plauſible Cauſe may become odious and deteſtable, by paring off any part of it; monſtroſity ariſing no leſs from the defect of a neceſſary Limb, than from the addition of a ſuperfluous one. But neither is this all which may be ſaid againſt the concealing of a Truth, though indeed it be the main, and what ought more eſpecially to be conſidered. For as though the Letter of the Law forbid only the prejudicing of our neighbour by our teſtimony, yet that love which is the ſpirit of it, and to which the whole is reduced by our Saviour, requires alſo the advantaging of him thereby; ſo he who ſhall omit ſo to do, (as he who conceals any part of it may) muſt be look'd upon as alike offending againſt the Commandment; he who conceals any part of the Truth * ſhewing as much unwillingneſs to profit, as he who utters that which is falſe doth a deſire to do harm. I will conclude this particular when I have ſaid, that, though when we affirm it to be criminal to conceal a Truth, we mean only ſuch Truths as are pertinent to the matter in debate; yet men ought to be very well ſatisfied, that what they do ſo conceal is no way pertinent to it: that which appears to us to be inconſiderable, being oftentimes of moment if it be judged of by more competent underſtandings.

* *Iſtoria del Concilio di Trento, li.* 1. *c.* 26.

* *Uterq; enim reus eſt, & qui veritatem occultat, & qui mendacium dicit: quia & ille proſdeſſe non vult, & iſte nocere deſiderat.*

3. From the concealing of a Truth, paſs we to the tranſpoſing of it, the third thing affirmed by us to be forbidden by the Commandment; and not without cauſe, if we conſider how much greater affinity it hath with that falſhood which it expreſly condemns for falſhood (as was before ſaid) conſiſting in the diſagreement of our words with the nature of the thing we ſpeak of, or at leaſt with our apprehenſion of it; he who ſhall give in an account of any Fact, in any other order than he knows the fact to have been committed, ſhall be as guilty of falſhood, as he who adds fictions of his own, and it may be too no leſs prejudicial to his Neighbour. *It may ſeem ludicrous, but it was a*

ſad truth of a noble Engliſh Gentleman ſent Ambaſſadour into Foreign Parts, and with him an honourable Eſpy under the notion of a Companion: By whom he was accuſed at his return to have ſpoken ſuch and ſuch things, and at ſuch and ſuch times. The Gentleman pleaded ingenionſly for himſelf, that it might be he had ſpoken ſome of thoſe things, or it might be all thoſe things, but never any of them in that order nor in that ſenſe. I have (ſaid he) *ſeveral ſuits of Apparel, of Purple Cloath, of Green Velvet, of White and Black Sattin. If one ſhould put my two Purple Sleeves to my Green Velvet Doublet, and make my Hoſe, the one of White Sattin, the other of Black, and then ſwear that it was my Apparel, they who did not know me would think me a ſtrange man.* I cannot tell how this Plea fitted the Perſon of whom we ſpeak, becauſe as his charge ſo his name is altogether unknown to me, having borrowed the forementioned ſtory, in the generality wherein I have delivered it, from Biſhop *Bramhal**, but certainly the Plea was reaſonable in it ſelf, and extremely pertinent to the caſe we ſpeak of. For it being notorious to all men, that the good or evil of any action depends much upon the circumſtances wherewith it is clad: he that ſhall go about in his teſtimony to confound the order wherein they came, may make as unſeemly an alteration, as he who ſhould ſo piece together the parts of different coloured Garments.

* Replication to the Biſhop of *Chalcedon* touching Schiſm, pag. 46

4. Laſtly, As it is unlawful by this Commandment to conceal or tranſpoſe any truth, as well as to utter that which is contrary to it; ſo it muſt be looked upon as alike forbidden by it, *to affirm* that which we deem to be ſo, *with any greater degree of aſſurance, than we our ſelves are perſwaded of it:* As becauſe by ſo doing we ſhall fall into the crime of falſhood, inaſmuch as the words we make uſe of exceed the meaſure of our own perſwaſions, in the diſagreement wherewith I have ſhewn falſhood to conſiſt; ſo becauſe by this means we may bring that condemnation upon our Neighbour, which otherwiſe neither would nor ought to be inflicted on him; confident aſſeverations leaving no place for preſumptions of the accuſed's innocency, which are of force under fainter ones. A familiar inſtance will clear my meaning, and ſhew the neceſſity of this caution. For ſuppoſe we (what doth not infrequently happen) that a company of honeſt men are ſet upon in the Road by Robbers, and one of them in the fray murder'd by them. And ſuppoſe we alſo, which is alike common, that though the Robbers eſcape for the preſent, yet ſome one or more perſons are taken upon ſuſpicion for them. In this caſe, I ſay, it will concern thoſe who were preſent at the fact, not to affirm thoſe ſuſpected perſons to be the men, with any greater degree of aſſurance, than they themſelves are perſwaded of in their own boſomes. For as by too confident an aſſeveration they may bring condemnation upon a perſon, who it may be is no way worthy of it; ſo they will undoubtedly cut off from the accuſed party, that which is the birthright of all men living who are not convicted of any Crime, even the alledging for himſelf the former orderlineſs of his life, and other ſuch like preſumptions of his innocency. For though theſe may be of force, where they who are produced as Witneſſes, do only atteſt their own ſuſpicion of thoſe being the criminal parties; yet they are of no force, nor ought to be, where the Witneſſes ſhall ſwear peremptorily, that they

they know them to be the men that ſet upon them. By which means as it hath ſometime happened, that perſons wholly innocent have undergone an unjuſt ſentence; ſo they who conſider how hainous a thing it is to take away the life of an Innocent, will beware by their example, how they affirm any thing in Judgment, with any greater degree of aſſurance, than they themſelves are perſwaded of in their own boſoms.

II. Having thus given an account of the Falſities and other Errours, which the Commandment we have now before us cautions Witneſſes againſt; my propoſed method obliges me to enquire, what Falſities are compriſed under them, whether in or out of Judicial Proceedings. The ground of which Queſtion, is that latitude which I have often ſhewn the Commandments we have now before us ought to be conſtrued in: For, inaſmuch as the Decalogue was intended as an Abſtract of the whole Duty of Man, or at leaſt of ſo much of it, as concerns the regulation of our Manners; inaſmuch as all the foregoing Precepts have been ſhewn to extend to the commanding or forbidding of ſeveral other things, beſide what they particularly expreſs: it is but reaſonable to think, that what we are now in the Explication of is of the ſame comprehenſive nature, and extends to the forbidding of other Falſities, beſide thoſe of Witneſſes; which what they are I come now to declare. In order whereunto,

1. The firſt thing that I ſhall offer is, That little doubt can be made, but *all other Falſities in Judicial Proceedings* are alike condemned with thoſe of Witneſſes: Partly becauſe it is uſual in the Decalogue to ſet one particular Species to denote all that are of the ſame Genus; and partly becauſe other Falſities in Judgment are alike prejudicial to our Neighbour, with thoſe that are expreſly forbidden. But from hence it will follow,

1. That it is alike forbidden to the *Plaintiff* by it, *to raiſe a falſe Report*, or *mix untrue Reports with true*; theſe as they are alike Falſities, and prejudicial ones, ſo giving occaſion, ſhall I ſay, or rather producing thoſe Falſities, which the Commandment doth expreſly condemn: For were it not for falſe Accuſers falſe Witneſſes could have no place, as being only abettors of what the other raiſe. Now foraſmuch as in Reaſon that is to be looked upon as forbidden by a Commandment, which is, if I may ſo ſpeak, the Cauſe of what it doth: if Falſe Witneſſes be forbidden by it, Falſe Accuſations muſt be ſo much more; becauſe not only alike prejudicial to our Neighbour, but the Parent of the other. It will follow,

2. That it is alike forbidden to the *Defendant*, to *deny that in Judgment which he is juſtly charged withall*; this as it is certainly a Falſity, ſo, if the Accuſation be in matters of Eſtate, alike prejudicial to our Neighbour; if in matters Criminal, to the State; that being thereby obſtructed, or at leaſt retarded in the Execution of Juſtice, upon which the welfare of it doth depend. Neither will it be of force to ſay, that no Man is bound to accuſe himſelf; which whether he be or no I will not at preſent concern my ſelf to enquire, having in another * place ſpoken ſufficiently to it. For, *in the preſent caſe* (as a learned † Man obſerves) *the Man is accuſed already, and he is not called to be his own Accuſer, but to defend himſelf if he be unjuſtly charged, but if not, to confeſs it.* Which particular I the rather add, becauſe

* Explic. of the Third Commandm. Part 3.

† Jer. Taylor *Duct. Dubit.* l. 3. c. 2. p. 91. 2.

becauſe the only pretence which hath been alledged for ſuch perſons pleading of *Not Guilty*, is, that the asking of *Guilty* or *Not Guilty* is a matter of formality, and intended only to uſher in the Judicial Proceedings. The contrary whereof, as it is to me ſufficiently evident, from the Law's paſſing Sentence upon the Criminals pleading *Guilty*, ſo will appear yet more reaſonable, from what we have before ſaid of the ground of Witneſſes in Judgment: For Witneſſes having no other foundation, than the ſuppoſition of the obſcurity of the Fact, or the accuſed Party's denying it, it is but juſt to ſuppoſe, that they who put the Queſtion of *Guilty* or *Not Guilty*, intend it not as a meer Formality, but as a thing in the order of Nature antecedent to the production of Witneſſes, and by which Sentence ought to paſs if the Fact be acknowledged. Otherwiſe (as the fore-quoted perſon remarks) *Tryals of Criminal Cauſes, between the Judge and the Thief, would be like a match at Fencing, and the accuſed party by that queſtion forewarned only to ſtand upon his guard*; which whether it be agreeable with the gravity of thoſe Tribunals, or the deſign of their Inſtitutions, I will leave to all ſober Men to judge. In the mean time, if they, who better underſtand our Law or the practice of it, look upon it only as a Formality, I will not gainſay them in it, or in the conſequence they deduce; provided that in matters of Eſtate they priviledge not the Defendant to deny that Uſurpation wherewith he is juſtly charged; that, as it is a continuance of the old injury, ſo producing a new prejudice to our Neighbour, becauſe putting him to a farther trouble and charge, to evict his own confeſſedly lawful demands.

3. The ſame is to be ſaid, thirdly, of *the Advocates defending of a falſe Cauſe, or making uſe of falſe Pretences to uphold it*; theſe as they are alike falſe, ſo tending equally to the prejudice of him, who is by their reſpective Clients injured in his Cauſe. But neither,

4. Fourthly, will it be at all difficult to infer from the prohibition of falſe Witneſſes, that the *Judge* is much more forbidden *to paſs a falſe Judgment*; a falſe Judgment as it is equally oppoſite to Truth, ſo tending more immediately and effectually to the prejudicing of the party concerned; inaſmuch as it is by his Sentence that the Controverſie is decided, and juſtice or injuſtice executed.

5. Laſtly, Foraſmuch as though the Judge paſſeth Sentence, yet that Sentence of his is oftentimes, through Bribery or otherwiſe, *miſrepreſented by thoſe into whoſe hands it is put to draw it up or record it*; they *alſo*, by what name ſoever they are known, are to be looked upon as *violators of the Commandment*, becauſe both alike Falſifiers and prejudicial to their Neighbours in Judgment.

2. From Judicial Falſities paſs we to *extrajudicial* ones, and enquire, whether *any of them are forbidden*, and *what*. For the reſolution of the former whereof, I ſhall lay for my ground that ſhort deſcant of *Philo* upon this Commandment; he in his ſo often quoted Tract *de Decalogo* affirming to be contained in this Commandment, *the prohibition of deceiving and of falſe accuſing, of being aſſiſtant to Malefactors, and an hypocritical perfidiouſneſs*; all but the ſecond whereof have place in other proceedings as

Philo *de Decalog. prope finem.* Τέταρτον δὲ, τὸ περὶ τῆς μὴ ψευδομαρτυρῶν, ᾧ πολλὰ ἐμφέρεται, τὸ μὴ ἀπατᾶν, τὸ μὴ συκοφαντῶν, τὸ μὴ τοῖς ἐξαμαρτάνουσι συμπεράτλειν, τὸ μὴ ποικίλῃ προκάλυμμα πίστιν ἀπιστίας, ἐφ' οἷς ἅπασι νόμοι προσήκοντες ἐτέθησαν.

as well as Judicial ones. Now though I do not intend to rely upon his Authority, as which alone will not ſuffice to ſhew the Commandment to be ſo comprehenſive: yet as I thought it not amiſs to alledge it to ſhew the opinion not to be novel, nor propugned only by ſuch as are of little eſteem among learned Men; ſo, having ſo done, I ſhall fortifie it by the Authority of Reaſon, which is an Authority Men cannot ſo eaſily gainſay. For is it not reaſonable to think, eſpecially in ſo comprehenſive a Law as I have ſhewn that of the Decalogue to be, that thoſe ſins are forbidden by a Commandment, which however not particularly mentioned, yet are of the ſame nature with that which is? And if ſo, may we not reaſonably reckon to this, at leaſt *all ſuch Falſities* as are *prejudicial* to our Neighbour, whether they be committed in Judgment or not? Eſpecially when (as the ſame *Philo* adds in the place before quoted) he who contents himſelf in this Commandment with the Prohibition of Falſe Witneſſing in Judgment, hath *in other places as expreſly interdicted the other.* But from hence it will follow, which is the ſecond thing to be ſpoken too, that we are to look upon as included in this Prohibition, all ſuch Falſities or Lyes, as have the name of *pernicious* ones; particularly thoſe which wound our Neighbours reputation, as *Calumnies* and the like; or prejudice him in his Eſtate, as *breach of Promiſes or Compacts.* I ſay not the ſame at preſent of ſuch Falſities or Lyes as have the name of officious or jeſting ones; partly becauſe the perniciouſneſs thereof is not ſo apparent, and partly becauſe I reſerve the diſcuſſion of them to another place. Only as if it do appear that thoſe Lyes no leſs than the former are condemned by the Law of God and Nature, little doubt can be made but they ought to be reckoned to this Commandment, becauſe they will not elſewhere find a more commodious place; ſo it will become more pardonable to enquire into them here, if we conſider their affinity with the other in the point of Falſhood, or the opinion of our own Church concerning them: That Catechiſm of its, which I have choſen to explain, bringing within the compaſs of it evil ſpeaking, lying, and ſlandering, without any exception or reſtriction. In the mean time, let it remain as certain, becauſe abundantly proved, that all Lyes whatſoever, which bring any prejudice to our Neighbour, are to be looked upon as forbidden by this Commandment, whether they be ſuch as are committed in Judgment, or ſuch whoſe ſubject matter hath no affinity with it. For though the former may be more Criminal, in reſpect of that Oath which is affixed to them, and the quality of thoſe Tribunals which they are intended to elude; yet the latter may be no leſs, if we conſider either their diſſonancy to Truth, which is one part of the others evil character; or their prejudicialneſs to our Neighbour, whoſe either Life, or Fame, or Fortune, the Commandment we have now before us was intended to ſecure.

PART III.

A Digreſſion concerning the Nature of Truth *and* Falſhood: *The ſeveral Species thereof, and our Obligation to purſue the one, and avoid the other. An Inquiry in the cloſe, whether the Truth be always to be profeſs'd; and, if not, how, and in what Caſes, it may be either ſuppreſſed, or concealed, even when we make a ſemblance of declaring it.*

THOUGH I had it ſometime in my thoughts to defer my Diſcourſe of *Truth* and *Falſhood*, till I came to entreat of thoſe Falſities which had nothing to make them criminal but their being ſuch; yet conſidering with my ſelf, that Falſhood is a part of the Character of thoſe Sins which this Commandment profeſſeth to condemn; as moreover, that I ſhould be thereby oblig'd, to make my Account of them compleat, to ſcatter here and there ſome Remarques concerning the Nature of them, which afterwards I ſhould be forc'd to repeat; conſidering, laſtly, that by a preſent diſcharging my ſelf of that Obligation, I might both free my ſelf from thoſe Remarques, and at the ſame time I explicated the nature of Truth and Falſhood, give light to all thoſe Falſities which have or ſhall be the matter of my Diſcourſe: I reſolv'd with my ſelf, not to defer any longer the paying of that Debt, which the Argument I have now before me, no leſs than my own Promiſe, hath bound upon me. Setting aſide therefore, for the preſent, the proſecution of thoſe Falſities, which I have ſaid to be forbidden by this Commandment, I will make it my buſineſs to inquire,

1. Wherein Truth and Falſhood do conſiſt: where I ſhall moreover enumerate the ſeveral Species of them.
2. What Obligation there is to purſue the one, and avoid the other.
3. And laſtly, Whether the Truth be always to be profeſs'd; and, if not, how, and in what Caſes it may be either ſuppreſs'd, or conceal'd.

1. Now Truth is nothing elſe than an Agreement of thoſe things to which it is attributed, with the Nature of thoſe things which they are deſign'd either to reſemble or expreſs; and is either intrinſecal, or extrinſecal. *Intrinſecal* I call that which reſideth in the Mind of Man, and conſiſteth in the agreement of its ſeveral Apprehenſions with the Nature of thoſe things which it pretends to judge of. But this, as well as the contrary thereof, even Errour, is no part of our Inquiry here, becauſe the Commandment we have now before us is of the number of thoſe which profeſs the regulation of our Deportment to our Neighbours, and not the right ordering of our own private Concerns. *Extrinſecal* I call that which either *reſides in our Words*, and other ſuch like Expreſſions of our own Mind or Things; or, *that which reſideth in our Actions.* Whereof the *former* conſiſts *in the agreement of them with the Mind of him that uſeth them*, and hath the name of *Ethical* or *Moral* Truth; or, *with the things about which our*

our mind and the expreſſions thereof are converſant, and hath the name of *Logical*. The former of theſe is again double, according to the different faculties of the Mind, which are either its *Underſtanding* or *Will*: In reſpect of *the former* whereof that Speech is ſaid to be true, which is *agreeable to our Thoughts and Apprehenſions*; as in reſpect of *the latter*, that Speech which is *agreeable to our purpoſe and reſolution*. Laſtly, Foraſmuch as our words may not only look backward to our apprehenſions or purpoſes, but forward to ſome particular action to be done by us; hence it comes to paſs (as was before noted) that there may be a truth *in our actions*, as well as *in our words*, or other the like notes of our thoughts or meaning, which is, when *we act agreeably to thoſe promiſes or compacts* which have proceeded out of our mouth, or been any other way declared. Which ſaid, it will be no way difficult to diſcover thoſe ſeveral falſities which are committed in the world, and which this Commandment was intended to diſcountenance. For inaſmuch as *Falſhood* is nothing elſe than *a contrariety to Truth*; hence it comes to paſs that if the queſtion be concerning that truth which reſides *in our words, or other the like expreſſions of our own mind or things*, that Speech is ſaid to be *falſe* reſpectively, which *agreeth not with our own conceptions*, or *with the nature of thoſe things which are the proper ſubject of them*. If the queſtion be yet more particularly put concerning that truth, which *conſiſts in the agreement of our words with our conceptions*; that Speech is to be looked upon as *falſe*, which either *agreeth not with our thoughts*, and hath for the moſt part the name of a *lye*, or *with our own purpoſes and reſolutions*, and may for diſtinction ſake be termed *treachery*. Laſtly, If reſpect be had to that truth which *reſides in mens actions*, and which conſiſts *in the agreement of them with their promiſes or compacts*; ſo that action ſhall be looked upon as *falſe*, which *doth not agree with the purport of thoſe promiſes or compacts*.

2. The nature of *Truth* and *Falſhood* being thus explained, proceed we, as our propoſed method obligeth us, to enquire into the *obligation* we have *to purſue the one*, and *avoid the other*. For my more advantageous reſolution whereof, I will reſume each of thoſe ſpecies of Truth and Falſhood, into which I have before divided them.

To begin with *that truth* which I have ſaid to conſiſt *in the agreement of our words or other ſuch like ſignificant notes, with thoſe things they are intended to expreſs*. Where again I ſhall ſhew, both that there is an Obligation to it, and what the meaſure of that Obligation is. That there is an Obligation upon men to intend this Truth, will need no other arguments than what I ſhall afterwards alledge, to ſhew the Obligation there is upon them to make their words agree with their conceptions. For the end of Speech being to convey by the means of our own Conceptions, the nature of thoſe things which we have taken cogniſance of; if there be a tie upon us to make our words agree with our thoughts, there will be alſo a tie upon us to make them agree with the nature of thoſe things for which thoſe our Conceptions are tranſmitted. Theſe two things only would be added to that aſſertion, becauſe but juſt limitations of that and our obligation. 1. That the obligation of making our words agree with the nature of the things we ſpeak of, is to be underſtood only ſo far, as it is in our power to make them ſo, by a previous information, or recollection

lection of our ſelves concerning it; As that too, 2. in ſuch things only which we are under an obligation to underſtand, whether from our Religion or Profeſſion, or the Office we take upon us: It ſufficing in other things to give ſuch an account concerning them, as our preſent thoughts ſhall ſuggeſt. For whereas, if we are obliged at all to make our words agree with our thoughts, it muſt be ſuppoſed to be abſolutely, becauſe no man of common underſtanding can be ignorant of his own thoughts, or want words to expreſs them; the obligation to make our words agreeable to the things we ſpeak of, can extend no farther than it is in our power to make them ſo, by a previous information or recollection of our ſelves; the weakneſs of Humane Nature making it impoſſible to conceive rightly of all things, and therefore alſo (becauſe our words muſt be regulated by our conceptions) to ſpeak with exact truth concerning them. From whence as it will follow, that it may be many times unavoidable, to ſpeak diſſonantly to thoſe things which are the ſubject of our Diſcourſe; ſo that that Falſhood can be no farther imputed to us for a crime, than it was in our power to have prevented it by a due information, or recollection of our ſelves. Again, foraſmuch as no man can be bound to enquire into the nature of any other things, than thoſe which he is under an obligation to underſtand; it will follow, that he is under no farther obligation to make his words agree with any other, than his preſent thoughts ſhall ſuggeſt; there being no need of any ſcrupulous diligence, where the thing we ſpeak of is not neceſſary to be known. Thus for inſtance, though it may concern a Divine to ſee that he deliver ſuch doctrines in Religion, as are agreeable to that word, which is or ought to be the rule of them; yet there is not the like tie upon him, to ſpeak with that care and conſideration concerning thoſe things which are perfectly extrinſecal to it. Upon which account, at the ſame time he ſhall be chargeable with Falſhood by reaſon of the former, if they be found to be diſſonant to the Scripture; yet he ſhall not be chargeable with the like Falſhood upon the ſcore of the erroneouſneſs of the latter, if he ſpeak what his preſent thoughts do ſuggeſt. In like manner, though it may concern a man, when ſummoned as a Witneſs, to inform himſelf well before-hand, or at leaſt to recollect himſelf, before he pretend to give a teſtimony in judgment, becauſe for want of that he may prejudice a man in his Cauſe; yet there cannot be the like tie in extrajudicial matters, and where there is not the ſame conſequence of what we ſpeak: It ſufficing in ſuch caſes, becauſe not concerning us to know them, *to ſpeak agreeably to our own Conceptions*, into the *obligation* whereof I am next in order to enquire. For the evidencing whereof, though (if that could be made appear) it would be the moſt compendious method to alledge, that words are naturally ſigns of mens conceptions, becauſe ſo (as *Aquinas* * hath argued) it muſt be looked upon as unnatural, to make ſhew of that in our words, which we have not in our minds; yet, becauſe how true ſoever that may be, there is no natural reaſon to make it appear, or at leaſt none which occurs to my obſervation, I ſhall take a farther way about to evince the obligation of it, and ſuch as ſhall be leſs liable to exception. In order whereunto, I will lay for my ground, what in a former Diſcourſe hath been ſufficiently proved, that God hath laid upon all Mankind an obligation to profit each other in thoſe

* 2. 2ᵉ. *queſt.* 110. *art.* 3.

ſeveral

ſeveral ways, whereby they are capacitated to contribute to it. For as from thence it may be eaſily inferred, that they are to communicate of their conceptions to each other, becauſe both a remedy of Solitude, which is extremely prejudicial to Humane Nature, and of neceſſary uſe to direct thoſe they have to do with in their Lives and Actions; ſo it will alſo follow that they are both to agree of certain external marks of notifying their own conceptions, and having ſo agreed of them, to abide by them, as without which, what they ſpeak would be uncertain to the hearers, and conſequently neither delight nor profit them. Now foraſmuch as men are not only fitted to communicate their conceptions to each other, but have alſo (whether led thereto by the Divine Spirit at firſt, which I for my own part believe, becauſe we find *Adam* making uſe of his tongue as ſoon as he had a being, or conducted thereto by the aptitude there is in the tongue ſo to do) agreed upon words as the declarers of their conceptions each to other; it will follow, that being thus agreed upon as the declarers of mens minds, they ſhould obſerve them as ſuch, and conſequently make them correſpond to thoſe ſeveral conceptions which they were inſtituted to declare. The ſame is to be ſaid, for the reaſon before mentioned, of the blots of the Pen or Printing Preſs, whether they be ſuch as were intended to repreſent words figured by the tongue, as the characters of moſt Nations in the world, or the ſenſe and importance of them as thoſe of the *Chineſes*. For theſe being no leſs uſeful to perſons at diſtance, than the other to thoſe that are preſent; and beſide that, by the ſame general conſent appointed declarers of mens conceptions; there is the ſame neceſſity of making them to correſpond with thoſe conceptions, which they were ſo agreed on to expreſs. And though Nods, Geſtures, and Habits, and other ſuch like things, are not with the ſame general conſent appointed to declare our thoughts: yet as theſe are alike expreſſive of them, and made uſe of oftentimes either out of neceſſity or choice, (for thus dumb men ſpeak to each other by ſigns, and thoſe who have the faculty of ſpeaking, do ſo too to them that have not the uſe of hearing) ſo there is no doubt where they are alike agreed on to notifie mens thoughts, there is the ſame obligation to make them correſpond to them. For the clearing whereof, I will inſtance firſt in a thing which is in uſe among the *Turks*, and after that deſcend to another which is of more general obſervation. From *Busbequius* we have it, an Author of good credit, and one who ſpent many years among them in an Embaſſy from the Emperour, that one of the cauſes of the *Turkiſh* Womens repudiating their Husbands, is their endeavouring to abuſe them contrary to the preſcript of Nature: A crime, which, however rare among other Nations, is yet it ſeems very familiar among them. Now foraſmuch, as St. *Paul* ſpeaks, that is a ſin not *fit to be named*, and much leſs by that Sex which hath modeſty for its particular ornament; inſtead of putting them to the bluſh of ſpeaking out ſo foul a fact, they are by a cuſtom among them inſtructed to pull off their Shoe, and turn it the inſide outſide. Upon the ſight whereof the Judge proceeds to a Divorce without any more particular Declaration. Now if any of thoſe Women ſhould without cauſe uſe the ſame Ceremony, when they were demanded a reaſon of their deſire of being Divorced; there is no doubt they would

Epiſtol. Turcic. 3.

be as much guilty of Falſhood in it, as thoſe who ſhould falſly charge their Conſort with their Tongues; becauſe that Ceremony is equally agreed on, as an expreſſion of their meanings, as words both with them, and all other Nations are. In like manner, where it is Cuſtomary, as I think it is with moſt Nations in War, to declare the deſire of a Parley by the hanging out of a White Flag upon the Walls of that Town which is beſieged; if, as ſome perfidious People have done, they ſhould uſe it only to entrap their Enemy, they ought to be looked upon as Falſifiers, and as ſuch to be ſeverely chaſtiſed: For words themſelves becoming ſigns of Mens thoughts, by that ſenſe which is put upon them by the conſent of thoſe by whom they are uſed; where there is the ſame conſent, there will be the like obligation to make them correſpond with the mind of the uſer; and therefore alſo the like Falſhood, if Men prevaricate in them.

Being now by my propoſed method to entreat of our obligation to that Truth, which is *converſant about Promiſes or Compacts*, I muſt deſire you to call to mind that there is a double Truth; whereof the former conſiſts in the agreement of Mens Promiſes with the Purpoſe and Will of them that make them; the latter, in the agreement of their Actions with the Promiſes they make. Our obligation both to the one and the other of which is founded in their neceſſity to the maintaining of Humane Society. For Humane Society being not to be maintained without a Commerce of benefits, becauſe no Man is ſo happy as not to ſtand in need of anothers help, and benefits being not always in our preſent power to beſtow, or not needful at the preſent time to the party that craves them; there will ariſe from thence a neceſſity of declaring our purpoſe to beſtow them afterwards, and of performing in due time what we have ſo declared we will; as without the former of which there can be no aſſurance, to the party we deal with, of enjoying what we contract for, no more than without the latter there can be an actual enjoyment of them. And more than this I will not ſay at preſent, concerning our obligation to make our Promiſes agree with our Purpoſes, as our Actions to agree with thoſe Promiſes; becauſe whatſoever will be farther neceſſary to be ſaid concerning them, will fall in pertinently enough afterwards, when I go on to ſhew what falſhoods are here condemned. Only becauſe there are ſome Promiſes which are *voluntarily made*, and to which there is no forcible inducement on the part of him to whom they are ſo; it may not be amiſs, becauſe theſe are different from the Promiſes before ſpoken of, to ſhew that they induce an obligation to performance, and how they come to induce ſuch an obligation. That they induce an obligation upon the party promiſing, is ſufficiently evident to all, who acknowledge the authority of the Scriptures, they * aſſuring us that God himſelf is bound by them to perform what he hath promiſed to us: For the Promiſes of God being perfectly voluntary, and ſo voluntary, that, if he pleaſed, he might inflict upon us thoſe evils which are contrary to them; it will unavoidably follow, that ſuch Promiſes, no leſs than others, will much more oblige us, who are much more capable of being obliged. The only difficulty is, how they come to oblige: which (though a queſtion rarely reſolved, or endeavoured ſo much as to be ſo) yet ſeems to me not uncapable of one. For inaſmuch as a voluntary Promiſe is an indication of a benevolent mind in him by whom it is ſo made, it cannot but give hopes to him to whom it is ſo,

* Vid Neh. 9. 8. Heb. 6. 18. ——10. 23. 2 Tim. 2. 13.

is ſo, of enjoying that boon which is ſo voluntarily promiſed him; from whence if there doth not enſue (though that often does) a neglect of ſupplying himſelf ſome other way; and conſequently, if the Promiſe be not performed, a want of what he needs; yet there will undoubtedly follow a grief and trouble of mind, upon the diſappointment of ſuch hopes. By which means, the party, to whom the Promiſe is made, is not only bereaved of the promiſed benefit, but ſuffers a real prejudice, which that Love which one Man owes to another doth forbid. Now foraſmuch as even a voluntary Promiſe cannot be violated, without prejudice to him to whom it is made; it will follow, becauſe we are obliged to avoid the prejudicing of our Neighbour, that we ought to perform thoſe Promiſes, as without the performance whereof the other cannot be done.

3. Having thus ſhewn wherein the nature of Truth and Falſhood do conſiſt, as alſo what obligation there is to purſue the one, and avoid the other; the next thing to be enquired into, is, *whether the Truth be always to be profeſſed*, or if not, *how and in what caſes it may be ſuppreſſed, or concealed.* That the Truth *is not always to be profeſſed*, needs no other evidence, than that men are not bound to diſcover all things to all perſons, as being oftentimes no way profitable to others, and not a little prejudicial to themſelves. In which caſe no man can doubt but they may be ſuppreſſed, or concealed by ſome Artifice or other. The only difficulty is, how and in what caſes the Truth may be concealed, which accordingly I come now to inveſtigate. In order whereunto, becauſe no doubt can be made but it may be lawful ſometime to hold our tongues, and ſo ſuppreſs that Truth which we are unwilling to diſcover, I will ſpend the main of my enquiry, in finding out thoſe ways whereby it may be concealed, even when we make a ſemblance of declaring it. Now there are two ways whereby this may be effected, proportionably to the two ways there are of declaring our minds to each other, Geſture and Speech. The former, when we make uſe of ſome Geſture, which though not agreed upon to have ſuch or ſuch a ſenſe, yet is apt to be interpreted as an indication of it. An Example hereof we have in our Saviour, and from whoſe practice therefore we may collect the lawfulneſs of the uſage; for meeting after his Reſurrection with two of his Diſciples going to *Emaus*, and to whom after he had adjoined himſelf, he diſcourſed at large of the Death and Reſurrection of the Meſſiah, and the evidence there was of them out of the Prophets, when they drew near to the Village, he made a ſhew * by his Geſture as if he would have gone farther, when no doubt his intention was (and ſo the Greek word προσεποιῶντο inſinuates) to ſtay ſome while with them, and reveal his own perſon to them: That which is ſaid to be feigned, or diſſembled, importing the abſence of that which it feigns, and conſequently that our Saviour did not intend at that time to proceed farther. In like manner, when *Joſhua* in order to the taking of *Ai* had laid an ambuſh behind the City, before he betook himſelf to an Aſſault, the Text tells us, *Joſh.* 8. 15. that the better to draw the Inhabitants out of the City, *Joſhua* and all *Iſrael*, immediately after their firſt onſet, made as if they were beaten by them, and, to continue them in that errour, fled by the way of the Wilderneſs; though, as it appeared afterwards, to return upon them with the greater force, and by the help of their Ambuſh to hem them in.

* προσεποιῶ-το πορρωτέρω πορεύεσθαι. Luc. 24. 28.

in. But what ſpeak I of ſuch kind of Diſſimulations being lawful in War, where according to that of the Poet, *Dolus an virtus quis in hoſte requirat?* when they may be of no ſmall uſe in the management of Religion, and are adopted by S. *Paul* into it? he both by his Practice and Exhortation recommending to us the becoming of *all things* to *all men*, that we may by any means *ſave ſome*; which is in other words (and accordingly S. *Chryſoſtom* * gloſſes it) that by making ſhew by our practice as if we were of their mind in ſome things of Religion, we ſhould procure our ſelves a good opinion among them, and by that means an opportunity to inſinuate our own Doctrines. This only would be added, though intimated before, That when we affirm it to be lawful, to make uſe of certain Geſtures, to conceal our Minds from other Men, we intend it only of ſuch Geſtures as are not by general conſent appointed to declare that which we make ſemblance of, thoſe that are (as was before noted) being not to be made uſe of, but where our Purpoſes agree with them. Thus, for inſtance, though it may be lawful by ſuch a diſſembled flight to draw our Enemy into a ſnare; yet it is not ſo, by the hanging out of a White Flag, or other ſuch like uſance, to make ſhew of a Parley, when we mean it not; this being by a general conſent appointed as an indication of it, and therefore not to be made uſe of, but where we are real in it.

* *Not. ad* 1 *Cor.* 9. 20. ἵνα τοὺς ὄντας ἀληθῶς ὑπ' αὐτῶν ταῦτα μιμήσηται, ἐγένετο τοιαῦτα ἐκ ἀληθῶς, ὑποδεικνύμενος μόνον, ἐκ ὢν δὲ, οὐδὲ ἐκ διαβολῆς ταῦτα πεῖσαι ὅτως ἐσχάτης.

From Geſtures, and other ſuch like indications of our Minds, paſs we to Words, and enquire how the Truth may be concealed in them: In order whereunto, two methods preſent themſelves, which, where they are uſed with diſcretion, contain nothing unlawful in them: To give in only ſome part of that Truth which is demanded; or cloath that we do in ambiguous terms. Thus to reſume the former method; If a Man ſhould be demanded an account of any Action, the chief Reaſon whereof he were unwilling to diſcover; I ſhould no way doubt, if he were moved to that Action by more Reaſons than one, but he might give in a leſs principal one, without taking any notice of the chief: He who ſo does, unleſs he give it in as the only, or principal one, offending not againſt Truth, becauſe ſuggeſting that which really mov'd him to it. Agreeably whereto, when *Jeremiah* the Prophet was queſtioned by the Princes of *Judah*, concerning a Diſcourſe that paſſed between him and King *Zedekiah*, the chief ſubject whereof had been by that King forbidden to him to reveal; *Jeremiah*, inſtructed before-hand by the King, told them, that he preſented his ſupplication before the King, that he would not cauſe him to return to *Jonathan*'s Houſe to dye there: Which, though true enough, yet was neither the only, nor the principal part of their Diſcourſe, *Jer.* 38. 24. and ſo on. As little doubt is to be made, but, where we are to deliver ſome unpleaſing Truth, it may be ſometimes lawful for us to wrap it up in ambiguous terms; and ſuch as in all probability will be conſtrued to another ſenſe than is by us intended. Becauſe there is nothing more frequent with holy Men in Scripture, yea even with our Saviour himſelf; who, to keep his Diſciples from being ſurpriſed with ſorrow, repreſented *Lazarus* * his death at firſt under the name of ſleep; as his own ‖ Body to the *Jews* under the notion of a Temple; telling them that if they deſtroyed that Temple, without yet ſpecifying what he meant, in three days he would raiſe it up. Of the ſame make are the ſeveral Parables delivered

* Joh. 11. 11.
‖ Joh. 2. 20.

delivered by our Saviour in the Goſpel; that of *Nathan* to *David* 2 *Sam.* 12. 1. and another of one of the Sons of the Prophets to *Ahab*, 1 *King.* 20. 39. The only difficulty is, how theſe latter ones may be ſaved from the imputation of a Lye: For *Nathan* telling the ſtory of a rich Man who took his poor Neighbours only Ewe-lamb, not as the cover of ſome concealed Truth, but as a thing really acted, which he himſelf knew not to be; he may ſeem thereby, inſtead of a Parable, to have told a falſe ſtory, and (as *Seneca* ſpeaks of an Hyperbole) *to come to the Truth by a Lye.* But becauſe, when I come to enumerate the ſeveral Falſities that are here forbidden, I ſhall have a more opportune place to return an Anſwer to that Objection, I will put an end to this Affair with an advertiſement of the *Hebrew* Maſters, that, *if any man know how to uſe ambiguous ſpeaking, he may be allowed ſo to do, but if not, he ought rather to hold his peace altogether*; he who uſeth words in ſuch a ſenſe in which they are not commonly conſtrued, making a Lye inſtead of an ambiguity; becauſe Cuſtom, which is the Maſter of Language, determines them to another ſenſe, and conſequently makes them diſagreeable to the conceptions of the Speaker. In the mean time, though I ſay that the Truth may innocently enough be either ſuppreſſed or concealed, by ſuch Artifices as have been before deſcribed; yet both the one and the other are to be underſtood, where they are no way prejudicial either to God, or our Superiors, or our Neighbours; for where the honour of God, the reverence we owe to our Superiors, or our Neighbours juſt profit is concerned, there no doubt it ſhall not only not be lawful for us to ſuppreſs any part of the Truth, but incumbent upon us to deliver it in the moſt clear and expreſſive terms, that our invention can ſuggeſt. The reſult of which obſervation will be, among many other things, that there ought to be no equivocation either in *Contracts* or *Judicial Proceedings*: As by the *former* whereof our Neighbours Rights may be impaired; by the *latter* moreover an injury offered both to God and our Superiors, whoſe thoſe Judgments are, which ambiguous ſpeeches endeavour to elude.

PART

PART IV.

The Account of Extrajudicial Falſities reſumed, and particularly of Pernicious *ones. Theſe laſt divided into ſuch as ſtrike more directly at our Neighbours Reputation, as Calumnies or Slanders; or at his Eſtate, as breach of Promiſes or Compacts. Of the ſeveral ſorts of Calumnies; and wherein the criminalneſs thereof conſiſteth: which is ſhewn to be,* 1. *In that they bring Grief to the Party that lyes under them.* 2. *That they are a bar to his Preferment and Advantage.* 3. *That they obſtruct him in doing good both to the Souls and Bodies of other Men. To which is added as a* cumulus *of their guilt, that the inconveniences they draw after them are in a manner irremediable. An Addreſs to the Explication of ſuch Falſities as ſtrike more directly at our Neighbours Eſtate; ſuch as is the breach of Promiſes or Compacts. In order whereunto, enquiry is made what is, or is not, to be looked upon as a valid Promiſe or Compact; and the breach of ſuch as are valid declared to be criminal, upon the account of that Grief which it brings upon the Party that is diſappointed, of that injury it doth to Humane Society, as which cannot ſubſiſt without a religious obſervation of them, and (becauſe the Oath of God is uſually affixed to them) of Perjury alſo.*

TO return now (from whence I have been for ſome time diverted by a Diſcourſe of the nature of Truth and Falſhood) to the conſideration of *Extrajudicial* Falſities, which I have ſaid to be of three ſorts, *Pernicious*, *Officious*, and *Jeſting ones*. The firſt whereof I have already ſhewn to come within the compaſs of the Prohibition, and ſhall therefore need only to enquire, what the *ſeveral ſpecies* thereof are, *what their nature* is, and *wherein criminal.*

Now Pernicious Falſities, or Lyes, may be reduced to two heads, according as was before inſinuated, ſuch as *ſtrike more directly at our Neighbours Reputation*, and have the name of *Calumnies* or *Slanders*; or at *his Eſtate*, as *breach of Promiſes or Compacts.*

I begin with the former of theſe, even *Calumnies*, or *Slanders*, which may be committed theſe two ways; by denying our Neighbour to have thoſe either Parts, or Vertues, or Endowments, which he really hath; or, by aſcribing to him ſuch Defects or Vices whereof he is no way guilty: the former whereof hath the name of Detraction; the latter, of Calumny or Slander properly ſo called. As for other the diviſions of Slander, they are either of no great moment, or eaſily apprehended; and therefore it ſhall ſuffice me to note, That they may be either ſecretly whiſpered, and have the name of Whiſperings and Backbitings; or, more openly, and in the very face of the Party concerned, and may for diſtinction ſake be termed open Slanders. If there be any thing farther to be remarked, concerning the nature of thoſe particular ſpecies, it will fall in more pertinently, after I have deſcribed to you the criminalneſs of Slanders in the general: To which therefore I ſhall now betake my ſelf, as being both the next thing in order to be diſcourſed of, and the moſt material part of our Enquiry.

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I have before obſerved, that Slanders in the nature of them ſtrike at the Reputation of him who is the Object of them: From whence as it will follow, that the criminalneſs thereof is founded in that prejudice which they bring to Mens Reputation; ſo, to attain the due importance of it, we muſt enquire into the evil Conſequences which do naturally ariſe from that prejudice: which are theſe three eſpecially.

1. That they bring Grief to the Party that lyes under them.
2. That they are a bar to his Preferment and Advantage in the World.
3. And laſtly, That they obſtruct him in the doing of good, both to the Souls and Bodies of other Men.

1. It is *Solomon's* Obſervation, and more than once inculcated, though under ſeveral modes of ſpeech, that a good name is better than the moſt deſirable of outward bleſſings; whether they be ſuch as do more immediately gratifie our Senſes, as pretious Oyntments * do, or procure thoſe things that gratifie them, as Riches ||. What ground *Solomon* had ſo to affirm, needs not to be enquired into, when every Man's own Experience can atteſt the Truth thereof to him; as neither, after that Experience, what ground there is to affirm, that *the loſs of a good name will bring Grief to the Party that ſuſtains it*; it being eaſie to collect, that the loſs of that cannot be without Grief, the preſence whereof we do ſo paſſionately deſire, and ſo carefully cheriſh when we have it. Agreeably whereunto, as there is nothing more uſual, than to ſee Men who labour under any Reproach to pine away in their Calamity, and even refuſe to enjoy thoſe other bleſſings they are poſſeſſed of; ſo oftentimes the ſmart of it hath been ſuch, that to deliver themſelves from the ſenſe of it, they have thought it worth their while to leave the World, and dye. For thus, when one *Petrus Oſſunius* * a Man of approved Valour, had by the ſurpriſe of ſome panick Fear loſt his Courage, and looking upon his Party as deſperate, retired himſelf from the Battel; he contracted ſo great a Grief of Mind from that ſhameful withdrawing of himſelf, that all the exhortations of his Friends and Commanders could not hinder him from ending of that life by a wilful abſtinence, which the ſhame of retiring himſelf made him think himſelf utterly unworthy of. It is true indeed, there is ſome difference between that Grief which ariſeth from a juſt reproach, and that which ariſeth from a falſly imputed one; becauſe under the latter a Man hath the comfort of his own Conſcience to ſupport him, which is wanting under the imputation of the other. But as the weakneſs of Humane Nature ſuffers not Men oftentimes to make the moſt of that advantage, which the comfort of a Man's own Conſcience gives; ſo it matters not, as to that good opinion which we ſeek, whether the Reproach we lye under be deſerved or no, provided it be but believed ſo to be: He who is unjuſtly reproached, provided it be alſo credibly, ſuffering equally the loſs of Men's good opinion, with thoſe who are not undeſervedly Reproached. Foraſmuch therefore, as loſs of Reputation cannot but bring great Grief to the Party that ſuſtains it; foraſmuch as that loſs is or may be occaſioned by Slanders as well as by the moſt juſt Reproaches: he who is guilty of affixing them muſt be looked upon as an Offender, becauſe procuring that undeſerved Evil to his Neighbour.

* Eccl. 7. 1.

|| Prov. 22. 1.

* *Thuan. Hiſt. ſui Temporis.* Tom. 2. l. 34. pag. 220.

2. But

2. But beſide the Grief which ariſeth from that, whether loſs or prejudice of Reputation, which Calumnies or Slanders give; it would alſo be obſerved, that it may no leſs *prejudice a Man in his Eſtate*, and ſo offend againſt the Eighth Commandment as well as the Ninth. For the evidencing whereof, we ſhall need only to conſider of thoſe Qualifications, which either advantage or diſadvantage Men, in the acquiſition of this worlds Conveniences: For doth it not contribute very much towards that to be accounted wiſe and knowing, and ſo fitted for the management of thoſe Affairs, which Wealth and Advantage wait upon, and without which they are not ordinarily to be attained? Doth it not contribute alike, or more to it, to be eſteemed faithful and diligent, and ſincere in all we undertake? Laſtly, Is it not a barr, and that juſtly, to have the fame of being ignorant and unfaithful? As by means of the former whereof Men are incapacitated to manage Affairs, no leſs than by the latter rendred unfit to be truſted with them. But how then can the Slanderer acquit himſelf from injuriouſneſs, yea from robbing the Party ſlandered, no leſs of his Livelihood, than of his Reputation? For though his Slanders ſtrike immediately at the others Reputation, yet they wound his Subſiſtence through the ſide of it, as which doth in a great meaſure depend upon the other.

3. But of all the inconveniences which ariſe from that loſs of Reputation which Calumnies or Slanders give, there is certainly none more conſiderable, than that *they obſtruct men in doing good, either to the temporal or eternal being of their Neighbour.* For though men ought not ſo much to conſider, who it is that ſpeaks, as what is ſpoken; as without which men ſhall be chargeable with *having the Faith of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt with reſpect of Perſons*: yet experience ſhews, the contrary method hath prevailed, and men conſider not ſo much *what*, as *who*; rejecting even wholſom advice, for the ill opinion they have of the party that gives it, and admitting as readily of pernicious ones, if proceeding from one that is better thought of. Of the former whereof, as the *Lacedemonians* were ſo ſenſible, that when at any time a bad Man happened to give good advice, they cauſed it, before it was followed, to be ſpoken over again by a good (and it is all one as to this affair, whether a Man be really bad, or reputed ſuch); ſo he muſt be a ſtranger to the World, and to the ſeveral Tranſactions of it, who hath not ſeen enough to confirm him in the latter. For what is there that gains Diſciples to the Extravagances of this latter Age, but the repute of thoſe that propugn them, for the piety and orderlineſs of their lives? Now foraſmuch as Men are more influenced by the Reputation of their Inſtructors, than by the Reaſonableneſs of their Doctrines; foraſmuch as even the moſt wholſom advice ſuffers by the ill Fame of thoſe that give it, as well as pernicious ones gain upon the world, by the good opinion is had of the Propugners; he who falſly brings up an ill Report upon any Perſon, ſhall be as injurious to that Truth, whatſoever it is, which he recommendeth, as to the Fame of the Perſon that diſſeminateth it. The Conſequence whereof, though it be viſible enough in the Things of the World, and particularly in matters of Publick Concern (for thus we have known a moſt excellent Prince, not only brought into contempt with his People, by the ſlanderous inſinuations of ambitious Men, but his moſt ſalutary Admonitions ſlighted and rejected, though to the ruine of thoſe that did ſo,

and

and of the State) yet is it no where more apparent than in things of Religion, and in thoſe who have the management thereof: For let thoſe once ſuffer in their good names by a ſlanderous tongue, and though they themſelves ſpeak with that of the moſt eloquent Man, or of an Angel; yet all they ſay ſhall be little regarded, and thoſe crimes, wherewith they are, though unjuſtly, charged, thought a ſufficient confutation of it.

Now though what hath been ſaid may be enough to ſhew the Criminalneſs of that Falſhood we have before us; yet I muſt not forget to add, that it becomes not more pernicious as to thoſe evil Conſequences it produceth, than as to *the irremediableneſs* thereof. For whereas other Loſſes may not only be repaired, but made up with advantage, to thoſe who have had the ill Fortune to ſuſtain them; the loſs of Reputation is ſuch, as though it may be in ſome meaſure ſalved, yet can rarely, if ever, be perfectly cured: Men being apt to believe, even after the Confutation of the Slander, that it was not altogether without ground, however it might be improved by the malice of him that raiſed it. For beſide that men are naturally inclinable to think evil of other perſons, becauſe by that means they may be incouraged to entertain a better opinion of themſelves, or at leaſt not obliged to entertain ſo ſevere a one; even they, who would not otherwiſe be overforward to think ill, find themſelves in a manner conſtrained to do ſo, through the fear of thinking too much ill of the Reporter. For who can lightly think Men ſo deſperately wicked, as to raiſe any groſs Calumny, for which there is not ſome ground in him that is aſperſed with it? It is poſſible indeed, ſuch a one may have repreſented the Crime far greater than it really was; it may alſo be that he might be moved to it, more out of a deſign of prejudicing his Neighbour, than out of any juſt reſentment of his miſcarriage: But who, that is not alike wicked, can be ſo ſtrangely uncharitable, as to think any Man would ſo calumniate, where there were not ſome real cauſe for it? Thus, I ſay, well meaning Men are apt to argue, even when they have nothing to betray them to it, but the fear of thinking too much ill of the Calumniator; how much more then, when, as for the moſt part, there is ſome colour in the calumniated perſons Actions, for that Reproach wherewith he is beſpattered? For though Men may be wicked enough to raiſe ill Reports, without any colour at all, yet they are not generally ſo fooliſh as to do it; as knowing that if they ſhould, they might loſe their end in it, becauſe ſo they would not eaſily be believed. To all which if we add, That the Slander oftentimes reacheth thither, whither the Confutation thereof never comes; ſo it will be no hard matter to believe, that a Slander is a thing which cannot eaſily be wiped off, and which therefore ought to be reckoned among Crimes of the higheſt nature. In the mean time we may ſee, what Reaſon there is for the Slanderer to do all that in him lyes, whether by open confeſſion, or otherwiſe, to make ſatisfaction to the injured Party: For well may he think himſelf obliged to do ſo, who cannot well, though he would, skin over that wound which his intemperate Tongue hath made. I will conclude this particular, when I have ſaid, That though all Slanders of what ſort ſoever are chargeable with thoſe inconveniences, which I have affirmed to ariſe from them; yet that which chargeth Men with any Defect, or Vice, is more apparently ſuch, than that which only

detracts from their real excellencies; becauſe whilſt the latter doth only leſſen Mens Reputation in the world, the other makes havock of it and deſtroys it. I am not well reſolved to affirm the ſame of open calumnies, in compariſon of thoſe which are ſecretly whiſpered. For though the former may beſpeak a greater boldneſs in him that diſperſeth them; yet the other may proceed from a more malitious heart, and prove more pernicious in the event: Inaſmuch as they ſpread their poyſon far and wide, before it comes to the notice of the party concerned, and when it doth ſo, leave him ignorant of the Author. By means of the former whereof, as they make the deeper impreſſion, and ſo become the more difficult to be rooted out; ſo the ſlandered perſons ignorance of the Author leaves him without a poſſibility of eaſing himſelf of his reproach, by detecting the depravedneſs of his accuſer. Such are the ſentiments which Reaſon and Nature ſuggeſt concerning the criminalneſs of ſlanders, and not unlike are thoſe which the Holy Scriptures prompt us to: St. *Paul*, *Rom.* 1. 29, and 30. reckoning *Whiſperers*, and *Backbiters*, or (as I ſhould rather with *Grotius* render the laſt word even καταλάλους) open *Calumniators*, among the moſt notorious offenders of the *Gentiles*, and ſuch whoſe offences were both the product of a *reprobate mind* *, and made the Committers thereof *worthy of death* † it ſelf. The conſideration whereof, as it ought in reaſon to deter us *from the ſin*; ſo *from partaking in any meaſure in it*: which we ſhall do, if either *we liſten eaſily to ſlanderous reports*, or *lightly give credit to them*, or *propagate the notice of them to others*: He who lends an Ear to ſuch, encouraging the Slanderer in his practiſe, whilſt he who lends him his Faith and Tongue goes along with him in it, becauſe robbing the party ſlandered of his own good opinion firſt, and after that of other mens.

* See verſ. 28.
† verſ. 30. ib.

Of ſuch Falſities or Lies as ſtrike more directly at Mens Reputation, what hath been ſaid may ſuffice; proceed we therefore to thoſe which *ſtrike at their Eſtates*, which are no other than *breach of Promiſes or Compacts*. Give me leave only (becauſe otherwiſe what is to be looked upon as ſuch cannot well appear) to premiſe ſomething concerning the *nature* and *qualifications* of a Promiſe, and ſhow *what is* or *is not* to be accounted a *valid* one. Now a Promiſe is nothing elſe than *a declaration of our conſent to that which is the matter of a Promiſe*; and is either *without any engagement on the part of him to whom the Promiſe is made*, and hath the name of *a Promiſe* more particularly; or *with one*, and is ſtiled *a Compact*. Both the one and the other of theſe is a part of our Enquiry, but eſpecially the latter, as which is both of more uſe and neceſſity. In deſcribing therefore the due qualifications of them, which is the next thing to be conſidered, though I will have reſpect to both, yet to the latter more particularly; which ſaid, I will now go on to the indagation of them. And here in the firſt place I ſhall deſire it may be conſidered, that foraſmuch as a Promiſe is nothing elſe than a declaration of our conſent; that only is to be looked upon as a valid one, *which is made by thoſe who are of ſufficient capacity to underſtand what they conſent to, and make a ſenſible declaration of it*. By which means, the affirmations or ſtipulations of thoſe who are not arrived to years of underſtanding, as thoſe of Children, or ſuch as are crazed in them, as thoſe of Mad-men, muſt be excluded from the number of valid ones. For Mad-

Mad-men and Children having not the free uſe of that reaſon, which is neceſſary both to the right determination of their Wills, and the due declaration of that determination unto others; neither can they be thought to be in a capacity to make any valid Promiſe or Compact, which requires the preſence of both. I obſerve Secondly, That foraſmuch as a Promiſe is nothing elſe than a declaration of our conſent; that and that only is to looked upon as a valid one, *where the matter of it is ſuch as we have a power to determine our Wills to.* By which means neither are thoſe affirmations or ſtipulations to be looked upon as ſuch, the matter whereof is contrary to the declared will of God, or the Magiſtrate, or other our Superiours, to all whom we are before obliged. For there being no place for the determination of the Will, where it is before determined by a Superiour power: neither is there any place for Conſent, which is nothing elſe than ſuch a determination, and conſequently neither for a Promiſe or Compact. It is to be obſerved Thirdly, and upon the ſcore of the former definition, that neither is that to be looked upon as a valid Promiſe or Compact, *which was founded in the errour of the party that made it.* For there being nothing more contrary to conſent than errour, becauſe rather ſurprizing the Will than leaving it to it ſelf, in the free determination whereof Conſent conſiſteth; neither is he to be looked upon as conſenting to what he declares, who is drawn ſo to do by his own miſtake, and would not have done ſo if he had not fallen into it. This only would be added, That when we ſay that that is not to be looked upon as a valid Promiſe or Compact, which was founded in the errour of the party that made it: we underſtand it of ſuch an errour, as it was not in his power to have prevented. For though (as the *Civil Law* * ſpeaks) *they who err do not ſeem to conſent*; yet cannot that in reaſon have any other interpretation, than where the errour could not have been prevented: there being no doubt a man may determine his Will precipitately as well as conſiderately, and therefore to be looked upon as having ſo determined it, where he was not careful to prevent it, and having ſo determined it, to abide by it: An errour, though it oblige not where it's perfectly involuntary, yet being of force where it is otherwiſe, becauſe the ſubject of the erring perſons choice. But as where the Promiſe or Compact was founded in the errour of the party that made it, and ſuch an errour alſo as was unavoidable, I ſee not with what reaſon it can be looked upon as ſuch, and much leſs as obligatory to the maker; ſo having ſaid ſo much, I ſhall proceed in the fourth place to thoſe Declarations *which are extorted from us by threats and violence*, and which may therefore ſeem to have leſs of the nature or obligation of Promiſes, than thoſe which are drawn from us by deceit. For how can he be ſaid to conſent, who is put upon the Declaration by ſuch a fear as may fall upon a conſtant man? Or what reaſon is there that Robbers and Pyrats ſhould reap any advantage by our promiſes, who break their own Faith both to God and Man? But neither will the one or other of theſe Conſiderations make the Promiſes to be improperly ſuch, or of no force and obligation. Not the former, becauſe though he who hath violence offered him, may ſeem not to conſent, yet he really doth: as becauſe the violence that is offered cannot reach unto his Will, which de-

* *L. Si per errorem. Dig. de Juriſdictione.*

ceit and errour does; ſo becauſe his conſent is full and abſolute, the preſent ſtate of things conſidered. For though, if the party ſet upon were free from his fears, he would not make a promiſe of paying a ſum of money to him that did ſo; yet he would not, if he were wiſe, conſidering the danger he is in, but make ſuch a promiſe to him; it being more eligible undoubtedly to redeem a mans life from danger than refuſe to bind himſelf by a Promiſe, which is only diſadvantageous to his Eſtate. But neither is it of any force as to the nulling of ſuch a Promiſe, that the party that exacts it, hath by his courſe of life violated his own Faith both to God and Man. For though by ſo doing he makes himſelf unworthy of any benefit; yet nothing hinders but we may beſtow one on him, and conſequently but that having promiſed it we actually ſhould. Beſide, though as a Malefactor he might be ſpoiled of what he is already poſſeſſed of, as having forfeited thoſe rights he ſometime had; yet inaſmuch as the party promiſing deals not with him as ſuch, but as a Contractor *bonæ fidei*, he doth thereby both remit of that advantage which he might otherwiſe have taken of him, and obliges himſelf to perform his own promiſe to him. Very appoſite to this purpoſe is that of *Nabis* in * *Livy*, when *Quinctius Flaminius* objected Tyranny to him, and by that means thought to free himſelf from the conſequence of that League which he had made with him. *Concerning the name of Tyrant* (ſaith he) *this I can anſwer, that whatever I now am, I am the ſame that I was when thou O Titus Quinctius enteredſt into a confederation with me. Then I remember you called me King, now I ſee I am called a Tyrant. If therefore I had changed the name of the Government, I ought to have been accountable for my inconſtancy, when you change* [both my name and your own behaviour to me] *there is the ſame reaſon you ſhould give an account of yours.*

Vid. Grot. de Jure Belli ac pacis, li. 2. c. 11. & li. 3. c. 19.

** Livi. Hiſt. li. 34. pag. 36. Edit. Lugd.*

It being thus evident what is or is not to be looked upon as a valid Promiſe or Compact, which I have inſiſted ſo much the longer on, leſt that, which is no breach of any valid Promiſe, ſhould either fall under the ſame cenſure with that which is, or give countenance to the admiſſion of it; proceed we to ſhew wherein the *criminalneſs* of that which is the breach of a valid Promiſe conſiſteth, which the grounds before * laid down will eaſily diſcover. For a ſimple Promiſe becoming obligatory, by the hopes it gives to the party concerned of enjoying what is promiſed; the diſappointment whereof cannot be received without grief of mind to the party diſappointed, and it may be too not without prejudice to his Affairs, through the neglect the Promiſe may occaſion in him of ſupplying himſelf ſome other way: the breach of ſuch a Promiſe will conſequently become criminal, by that *grief* and *prejudice which a diſappointment doth naturally produce.* Again, Foraſmuch as Humane Society cannot be maintained without a Commerce of Benefits, nor that Commerce often paſs but by Promiſes and Compacts; becauſe the benefits we deſire of each other are not always in our preſent power to beſtow, or not needful at the preſent time to the party that craves them: he that violates ſuch Promiſes or Compacts ſhall deſtroy that neceſſary means of Commerce, and conſequently alſo make a *breach upon Humane Society*, which cannot well be maintained without it. Whence it is, that though other falſities have ſometime met with excuſe or patronage, yet

* See Explic. of this Commandment. Part 3.

yet breach of Faith hath been always ſo exploded, that it hath not been allowed of even towards an Enemy, and from whom men were like to receive but a very ill requital for obſerving it. For thus when *Regulus* had plighted his Faith to the *Carthaginians*, that he would return to them again, if he did not obtain from the Senate of *Rome* the deliverance of their Captives: he not only diſſwaded the Senate from delivering them up, as conceiving the detaining of them to be of more advantage to his Country, than his own releaſe, who by reaſon of his old age was become unuſeful to it; but readily returned himſelf, though he could not well promiſe himſelf any other uſage than he afterwards met with. And though there was not the like Faith in thoſe Ten *Roman* Gentleman, who after the Battel at *Cannæ* were ſent by *Hannibal* to *Rome*, to procure the redemption of ſome Captives of his own; yet as it appears by the Story (though delivered with ſome variety) that ſeveral of them returned to the Camp of the *Carthaginians*, according as they had promiſed to do; ſo he of them who thought to have freed himſelf from that Obligation by returning back immediately after his departure, as if he had forgotten ſomething, was by the Decree of the Senate (as *Tully** tells the Story out of *Polybius*) remanded back to *Hannibal* bound. So hateful a thing was it always adjudged, either to violate the Faith men have once given, or uſe any colluſion in it; and not without cauſe, if we conſider the deſtructiveneſs of it to Humane Society, or *the Oath of God* which is commonly affixed to it: He who violateth a Faith which is ſo ſealed, offering no leſs deſpight to that God whom he invokes, than injury to thoſe men whom he deceives. I will ſhut up this Diſcourſe with a paſſage of St. *Paul*, which I alledge to ſhew the agreement there is in this particular as well as in all others, between the Scripture, and the light of Reaſon and Nature. 'Tis in the Firſt to the *Romans* and the 31. where among other the groſs Offenders of the *Gentiles*, and ſuch whom he afterwards pronounceth worthy of death, he reckons* *Covenant-breakers*, or ſuch as abide not by thoſe Compacts they have made.

*Tull. de Offic. li. 3.

* *Tull. de Officiis loco citato, & etiam li. 1. ej. tractat.*

* *Rom.* 1. 31. Ἀσυνθέτους (*i. e. exponente Heſychio*) μὴ ἐμμένοντας ταῖς συνθήκαις.

PART

PART V.

Concerning Officious *Falſities, and that meerly as ſuch they are not allowable; becauſe, however they may be profitable to thoſe perſons for whoſe advantage they are told, yet they may be pernicious to Humane Society, by rendring thoſe external marks uncertain, whereby we are to communicate our Thoughts each to other. An enquiry thereupon, whether there be any caſe in which they do not render thoſe external marks uncertain. This reſolved, by pointing at ſome particular caſes; ſuch as are, 1. Where Officious Falſhood is allowed of by the ſame general conſent, by which words are agreed upon as the declarers of Men's Minds. Of which number are thoſe Falſities that are told to Children, Mad-men, and ſick Perſons. 2. Where the Falſhood is both made uſe of to inſinuate an uſeful Truth, and detected by the Utterer, as ſoon as he finds it hath made way for the other. Evidences of the lawfulneſs of this out of Eccleſiaſtical Story, and from more authentick Examples in the Scripture. 3. Where the Officious Falſhood is made uſe of to ſave the life of an innocent Perſon. All other caſes condemned as utterly unlawful; and particularly where the Falſity that is told is prejudicial to any Man: as thoſe that are allowed, allowed only where a kind of neceſſity doth prompt Men to it. An objection out of* Job 13.7. *againſt Officious Falſities anſwered; together with a brief cenſure of Equivocations and mental Reſervations. Thoſe Falſities which have the name of* Jeſting *ones more univerſally condemned. A Concluſion of the whole; with a ſhort account of the* Affirmative part *of the Commandment.*

BEING now to give an account of the nature of *Officious Falſities*, the ſecond ſort of thoſe, which I have termed Extrajudicial ones; I muſt deſire you to call to mind, what hath been heretofore ſaid concerning our Obligation to that Truth, which conſiſts in the agreement of our Words, and other ſuch like notes, with thoſe Thoughts of ours which they were intended to expreſs. Now that Obligation (as you may remember) I founded in that more known one, which is incumbent upon all Men, to profit each other in thoſe ſeveral ways, whereby they are capacitated to contribute to it. For as from thence it may be eaſily inferred, that they are to communicate of their Conceptions each to other; becauſe both a remedy of Solitude, which is extremely prejudicial to Humane Society, and of neceſſary uſe to direct thoſe they have to do with in their Lives and Actions: ſo it will alſo follow, that they are both to agree of certain external marks to make known their Conceptions by; and, having ſo agreed of them, that they ſhould abide by them, as without which what they ſpeak would be uncertain to the Hearers, and conſequently, neither delight nor profit them. Which one thing, if diligently heeded, will void all that difficulty, which does or may occur in the nature of Officious Falſities. For from hence it will appear, Firſt, That the *bare officiouſneſs* of a Lye can be no juſt pretence for the deeming of it to be lawful: Becauſe though Officious Lyes are not only *not pernicious* but *profitable*, if conſidered

conſidered with reſpect to thoſe Perſons *for whoſe advantage they are told*; yet they may be *pernicious to Humane Society, by rendring thoſe external marks uncertain*, by which we are to communicate our Thoughts unto each other. If therefore ſuch Falſities, or Lyes, as have the name of Officious, be *in any caſe* allowable, it muſt be *where they do not render thoſe external marks uncertain:* which *in what caſes* it may happen, I come now to declare. And here,

1. In the firſt place, I ſhall no way doubt to repreſent as one, the telling of an Officious Falſhood, *where it is allowed of by the ſame general conſent, by which Words have been agreed upon as the declarers of Mens minds*; partly becauſe an exception ſo founded muſt be looked upon as a juſt abatement to that of which it is ſo; and partly, becauſe if any Officious Falſities be ſo allowed of, no Man can thence take any juſt occaſion to call in queſtion the meaning of thoſe who utter them, when they ſpeak upon other perfectly unlike occaſions (which is one way of rendring thoſe external marks uncertain) or think it any juſt Warrant to himſelf to confound thoſe external marks, when he is called to deliver his own mind in other matters. By which account we muſt firſt ſeparate from the number of Criminal Falſities, thoſe that are told to *Children* and *Mad-men*, to bring them to that peace and quiet, which is not for the moſt part otherwiſe to be attained. For it being allowed of by a general conſent, thus to impoſe upon Children and Mad-men for their good, I ſee not how it can derogate ought from the credit of thoſe that do ſo, where they ſpeak of other matters, or encourage other perſons to falſifie in them, which alone can render thoſe external marks uncertain. The ſame is to be ſaid of Phyſicians, and other Perſons, who have to do with *ſick* and *peeviſh* people, and whom therefore they muſt beguile into their own good, whether it be by alleviating of the Diſtemper they lye under, or repreſenting the Medicament they give under ſome other notion than appertains to it; or laſtly, (than which nothing is more common among Phyſicians) when they have to do with *Hypochondriacal* perſons, by complying with their Patients Fancies, and pretending a belief of thoſe very Whimſies, wherewith they find their Patients over-run; for the telling of ſuch kind of Falſities, and to ſuch perſons, being indulged by the ſame common conſent, by which Words, and other ſuch like notes, have been agreed upon for the declarers of Mens minds, neither can the uſe of ſuch Falſities be thought to invalidate their Authority in other matters, and where there is no ſuch conſent for the uſe of any colluſion in them. Not unlike I ſhould alſo think (for I will not be poſitive in things of this nature) is the caſe of thoſe falſe Stories, that are commonly given out in War, to incourage our own Party, and diſcourage the adverſe one; ſuch as is, for Example, that a Wing of the Enemies Army flyes; or that a part of our own, on this or that ſide of the main Body, hath had that ſucceſs which they really have not: Becauſe as ſuch Stories may be of uſe to thoſe Parties for whoſe advantage they are told; ſo they may ſeem to have been allowed of by the ſame general conſent, by which Words, and other ſuch like external notes, have been appointed declarers of our minds.

2. But beſide that an Officious Falſity, or Lye, cannot be thought to render thoſe marks uncertain, by which our Thoughts are to be declared, where the Falſity is allowed of by the ſame general conſent by which

which thoſe external marks, and particularly Words, have been agreed upon for the declarers of Mens minds: neither can they be thought to prejudice them, ſecondly, *where the Falſity is both made uſe of to inſinuate an uſeful Truth, and detected by the Utterer, as ſoon as he finds it hath made way for the other.* An Inſtance hereof we have in *Eccleſiaſtical Story*, and one or more in the *Sacred Scriptures*; and in ſuch Perſons moreover, and about ſuch Affairs, as will make the lawfulneſs unqueſtionable. The purport of the former*is, That when two *Eutychian* Biſhops, who, believing the two Natures in Chriſt made but one, did conſequently believe, that the Divinity or Godhead did dye as well as his Humane Nature; when theſe, I ſay, came to the Court of a *Sarazen Prince*, he, to undeceive them of their Errour, pretended great ſorrow at the receit of ſome Letters: Into the contents whereof when they had with ſome curioſity enquired, the Prince with a ſeeming great ſorrow told them, that he had received certain intelligence, that the Archangel *Gabriel* was dead. They to comfort him told him, that certainly it could not be true, and for their parts they did believe it to be impoſſible. *O Fathers*, replyed the Prince, *can you think it to be impoſſible for an Archangel to dye, when you affirm the Godhead of Chriſt did?* By that Fiction of his plainly convincing them of that Errour, which they had taken up concerning the Nature of our Saviour. But why do we look into *Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory*, which is leſs known, and leſs approved, when the like Inſtance occurs in the Sacred Scriptures, and that too both in divinely inſpired Men, and in the delivery of their Meſſage? That I mean, which it acquaints us with, concerning *Nathan*'s addreſs to *David*; and the addreſs of one of the Sons of the Prophets to King *Ahab*. For though a Parable, when delivered as ſuch, that is to ſay, as an Emblem of ſome concealed Truth, have not the nature of a Falſity; becauſe it delivers nothing diſagreeable to the mind of him that uſeth it, nor yet with the Cuſtom of the World by which ſuch forms of expreſſion are agreed upon as declarers of it, no leſs than ſimple and natural ones; yet the like cannot be ſaid of a Parable, when it is repreſented as a thing really acted, and as ſuch endeavoured to be impoſed upon the hearers: He, who ſo doth, ſpeaking diſſonantly both to Truth and his own Thoughts, becauſe convinced that that was not real which he ſuggeſts as ſuch. Which notwithſtanding we ſhall find, that even ſuch have been uſed, and upon ſuch occaſions alſo, as will put the lawfulneſs thereof paſt all queſtion. For did not *Nathan*, when ſent to *David* to make him ſenſible of his ſin in the matter of *Uriah*'s Wife; did not he (I ſay) upon that occaſion begin a Story to *David* of *two Men in one City, the one rich and the other poor?* The former whereof, *when a Traveller came to him, ſpared to take of his own Flocks, but took the others only Ewe-lamb, which lay in his boſom, and was unto him as a Daughter, and dreſſed it for the way-faring Man that was come unto him.* Nay did he not all along deliver it rather as a thing really acted, than as a Parable, and ſo that he convinced King *David* of the truth of it? he immediately ſubjoining, in agreement with *Nathan*'s Story, that *the Perſon, who had ſo done, ſhould reſtore the Lamb fourfold*, according to a Proviſion made in that behalf by the *Levitical Law*. And indeed otherwiſe the Prophet *Nathan*'s deſign might have been fruſtrated, in making *David* ſo ſenſible of his guilt: For if he had delivered it to him as a Parable, the

* See *Jer Taylor's Ductor Dubit.* Book 3. Chapt. 2. Rule 5.

the guilty conſcience of *David* might have been more ſhye in condemning the action of the rich Perſon, whom *Nathan* ſpoke of, leſt, as it after hapned, he ſhould be forced to condemn himſelf. But of all the inſtances, which either Sacred or Profane Story ſuggeſt, concerning the telling of Falſities, to inſinuate thereby ſome uſeful Truth, there is certainly none more plain, than that Story which was told by a young Prophet to *Ahab*, upon occaſion of letting go *Benhadad* King of *Syria*; the ſum of which, in ſhort, is this: One of the Sons of the Prophets, being ſo inſtructed by God, puts on the perſon and guiſe of a Man that had been ingaged in the Battel, and that he might the better appear ſo (for that in my opinion is the beſt account of that action) commands firſt *one*, and then *another*, *by the word of the Lord to ſmite him*, which accordingly that ſecond did, and *wounded him*, as you may ſee 1 *King.* 20. 35. That done (as the Story doth farther inſtruct us) the Prophet departeth, and having diſguiſed himſelf farther, *with aſhes upon his face*, waits for the King by the way. At length the King comes, and this concealed Prophet cryes out to him, and tells him that when he *went into the midſt of the Battel, behold a man turned aſide, and brought a Priſoner to him, and ſaid, keep this man: if by any means he be miſſing, then ſhall thy life be for his life, or elſe thou ſhalt pay a Talent of Silver. But it happened afterwards* (ſaith he) *that whilſt I was buſie here and there, the man was gone, and I thereby lyable to the Penalty.* Than which what more apparent inſtance can we deſire of the telling of a Falſity, thereby to inſinuate ſome uſeful Truth? It appearing both from the Antecedents and Conſequents, that this whole Story was not only a Fiction of the Prophets, which all Parables are; but, which makes it a perfect Falſity, repreſented not as the cover of ſome concealed Truth, but as a Truth in it ſelf, and all the art imaginable uſed to make it appear ſo to be. Neither will it avail to ſay, as I find it is by ſome Learned Men, that it ought not to be looked upon as ſuch, or at leaſt not as a Lye; becauſe the intention thereof was not to deceive, but to teach with the more elegancy and effectualneſs. For beſide that it is to me pretty apparent from a former Diſcourſe of the nature of Truth and Falſhood, that to deceive is no eſſential part of the definition of a Lye, though it be an inſeparable accident of it; even this Fiction of the Prophets can no more be acquitted from the deſign of deceiving, than any other Officious Falſities: For though the ultimate deſign of it was to bring the King to the ſenſe of his ſin, in letting *Benhadad* go, contrary to the Command of God; yet the intermediate deſign of it was to deceive the King, and make him believe what he told him to be a real Truth; as without which he could not ſo eaſily have brought him to condemn his own action, in that ſuppoſed action of the Prophet. But what ſhall we then ſay, to acquit this and the like actions from being to be looked upon as a ſin? Even that which was before ſaid to acquit ſome others, to wit, That it was neither pernicious to the party to whom it was told, which is one ground of the Prohibition of Falſities, nor any way deſtructive of the ſignificancy of thoſe external marks, which are agreed upon as the declarers of Mens minds. All pretence of that being taken away, by the Prophets immediately diſcovering it to be a Story, and that he had no other end in it, than to convince the King of his miſcarriage: He, who not only detects the falſeneſs of his own Story, but gives an ac-

count of the Reaſon he made uſe of it, leaving no pretence to Men to doubt of his ſincere ſpeaking in matters of another nature, nor giving any countenance to the inſincerity of theirs.

3. Laſtly, As an Officious Falſity cannot be thought to prejudice the Authority and ſignificancy of words, where it is both made uſe of to inſinuate an uſeful Truth, and detected almoſt as ſoon as delivered; ſo I ſhould think alſo, that neither will it, *where it is made uſe of to ſave the life of an innocent Perſon:* Partly becauſe the weightineſs of the occaſion may both plead its excuſe, and take away all pretence of violating the Truth upon leſs occaſions; and partly, becauſe I find the *Egyptian Mid-Wives* and *Rahab* both commended and rewarded for that good which they procured by an untruth. For though much account be not to be made of one of *Egypt* or *Jericho*, if conſidered meerly as ſuch; yet are they not to be deſpiſed where they have the commendation of the Almighty, and particularly where one of them, even *Rahab*, is magnified both for her *Faith* and *Works*.

Theſe three things only ſeem neceſſary to be added, to prevent all miſ-interpretation of what we have ſaid concerning ſome Officious Falſities. Firſt, That we are to underſtand it of ſuch Falſities as are *purely Officious*, and *no way prejudicial to any Man:* For though a Man may be allowed to advantage himſelf or Relations; yet not with the hurt or injury of another. By which means all thoſe Falſities will neceſſarily be condemned, which are committed in Commerce between Man and Man; whether it be that of private Men between one another, as in Contracts and Bargains; or of Princes and States in Leagues. He, who uſeth any Falſity in that, at the ſame time he advantageth himſelf, doing an injury to him he dealeth with. Upon which account, though in that ſenſe, wherein Sir *Henry Wotton* uſed it, it was a very allowable definition of an *Ambaſſador*, that he was a Perſon ſent abroad to *lye* for the benefit of his Prince; yet is there certainly nothing, which is more unbecoming their Employment, or more ſcandalous to their reſpective Princes and Religion. I admoniſh ſecondly, That when I ſay there may be caſes wherein an Officious Falſhood may be lawful, it will equally follow, and therefore alike to be obſerved, that *out of thoſe caſes all Falſhoods*, how officious ſoever, *muſt be concluded to be unlawful.* And indeed as thoſe caſes are not many, wherein an Officious Falſhood can be ſuppoſed to be lawful, ſo neither can they give Men any pretence to falſifie in other matters; the only caſes wherein they are lawful, being (as hath been at large declared) where they are allowed of by general conſent, where they are made uſe of to inſinuate ſome uſeful Truth, and detected as ſoon as it is; or to ſave the life of an innocent perſon. Laſtly, I ſhall deſire it may be conſidered, That as thoſe, who have ſpoken the moſt favourably of Officious Falſities, have repreſented them as ſuch things as have ſomething of *Hellebore* in them; ſo like that, and other things of the ſame dangerous nature, *they ought*, even in the moſt allowed inſtances, *to be uſed ſparingly*, and *with diſcretion*; and rather where there is a kind of neceſſity to prompt men to it, than when they may be avoided; eſpecially conſidering the ſevere and general condemnation of Falſities in the Doctrine of the * Scripture, and the prejudice that may thereby accrue unto Religion, and particularly to ſincerity and Truth: For though all Falſities are not criminal, yet they look ſo like thoſe that really are,

* See Prov. 13. 5. —30. 8. Pſal. 5. 6. Col. 3. 9.

are, that they may tempt unwary Men, either to make a mock of Truth, or run upon any Falſity of what nature ſoever, which may be of any advantage to themſelves.

I will conclude this head, when I have returned an anſwer to that which is objected out of *Job chap.* 13. 7. *Will you ſpeak wickedly for God, or talk deceitfully for him?* An Exception indeed ſpecious enough, and ſo much the more, for the Inference that ſeems naturally to flow from it: For if we may not talk deceitfully for God, and his Glory, as that Queſtion doth manifeſtly import; then certainly not for any inferiour end, and much leſs for the ſaving of a life. But beſide that he who ſhall conſider that Speech of *Zophar*'s, to which this is an Anſwer, will find the deceitful ſpeaking here meant to be no other, than the robbing of *Job* of his integrity, that ſo God might be juſtified in his proceedings againſt him, which is in the number of thoſe Pernicious Lyes, which I have ſhewn to be univerſally unlawful; though nothing elſe ſhould be meant thereby than an Officious Falſity, yet will it not thence follow, that becauſe we may not talk deceitfully for God, and for his Glory, therefore neither may we for the ſaving of an innocent perſon: He who talks deceitfully for any thing, tacitely inſinuating that it may ſtand in need of it; which though a Reproach to the Almighty (becauſe arguing ſomething of weakneſs in him) yet none at all to Man, becauſe naturally weak, and made much more ſo by the fall of our firſt Parents. Theſe things indeed (as *Grotius* * obſerves) do not pleaſe the *School* of latter Ages, as which hath choſen S. *Auguſtine* of all the Ancients to be followed by them in all things. But the *ſame School* hath admitted *tacite Interpretations* and *Reſervations*, ſo abhorring from all common ſenſe, that it may very well be doubted, whether it were not much better to admit of ſpeaking falſly in the caſes before mentioned, than ſo indiſcriminately to exempt them from it; as when they ſay *I know not*, underſtanding in their mind, *ſo as to tell you*; or I have not ſuch a thing, *meaning to give or lend to you*; and other ſuch like Reſervations, which common ſenſe rejects, and which if they be admitted, nothing hinders, but he, who affirms any thing, may be ſaid to deny it, and he who denys, to affirm it. The reſult of which Diſcourſe is, That by whatever ſofter name the Maſters of that Art may call thoſe their *Equivocations*, they are no other than Falſities, or Lyes, as expreſſing that in Words, which is no way agreeable to the Speakers Thoughts, and which therefore they are forced to piece out with interpretations in their minds. Neither will it avail to ſay, as it is by the Maſters of that Art, That an Addreſs to God may be no leſs true, which is made up in part by the expreſſions of the Tongue, and in part with the conceptions of the Mind; as for Example, if a rich Man ſhould ſay in any private Addreſs of his, *Thou knoweſt, O God, how poor and miſerable I am*, and underſtand in his mind, *as to the qualifications of his Soul.* For though in our Addreſſes to God it be all one as to Truth or Falſhood, whether we ſpeak out the whole, or a part only, becauſe our Thoughts are no leſs knowable to him than our Words; yet among Men, to whom the Thoughts of our hearts cannot be known, but as they are manifeſted by our Words, or other ſuch like notes, the Truth or Falſhood * of them is in Reaſon to be eſtimated by thoſe things only, which can declare our

* *De jure belli ac pacis.* l. 3. c. 1.

* *Sanderſon De Juramenti Obligatione.* Prælect. 6. Sect. 6.

conceptions to the Hearers. Which ſince thoſe Reſervations, which are in the Mind, cannot do; in judging of the Truth of any Speech, account is to be made of thoſe things only that are expreſſed, and not of mental Reſervations.

Of Pernicious and Officious Falſities, what hath been ſaid may ſuffice; proceed we therefore to ſuch as have the name of *Jeſting* ones: By which Title I mean not all Fictions of the brain, which are deviſed to delight; for ſo all Parables of the Scripture are, and though not invented for delight only, yet to delight as well as profit. But I mean ſuch Fictions, as are repreſented as real Truths, contrary to the mind and knowledge of the Utterer. Now concerning theſe much need not be ſaid, to ſhew them to be *generally* unlawful, and as ſuch to be eſchewed and avoided; as becauſe the obſervation of Truth is of much more concernment, than our delight; ſo becauſe the *Scriptures* of the *New Teſtament* have not only impoſed upon us the ſimplicity of *the Dove* *, that guileleſs Creature, but moreover forbidden to us the ſpeaking of a *vain* || or *idle* word. If there be any caſe wherein theſe kind of Falſities are allowable, it muſt be *where they are in a manner detected as ſoon as told, and neither our own ſincerity made lyable thereby to exception, nor the ſignification of thoſe external marks*, by which we are to communicate our Thoughts to each other, *brought into uncertainty with the World.* That of S. *Paul* ſhall put an end to this Argument, and the *Negative part* of the Commandment, *Epheſ.* 4. 25. *Wherefore putting away Lying, ſpeak every man Truth with his Neighbour, for we are members one of another.* All *Pernicious Lyes* being *ſimply and univerſally unlawful*; all *Officious* ones, *unleſs in thoſe few caſes before excepted*; and all *Jeſting* ones, *unleſs in the caſe but now mentioned*, if yet that may be excepted out of the number.

* Matt. 10. 16.
|| —12. 36.

Affirmative part of the Commandment.

And here a fair opportunity is miniſtred to me, of entring upon the *Affirmative part* of the Commandment, which I ſhall gladly embrace, though in the cloſe, as you ſee, of this Diſcourſe; becauſe I have in a great meaſure diſpatched it already, as knowing not well how to entreat of the other without it. Where, firſt of all, I ſhall repreſent, becauſe *Judicial* Matters are principally referred to, *the doing what in us lyes to advantage a juſt Cauſe*; which that love, in which our Saviour ſums up this and other the Precepts of the Second Table, doth manifeſtly require. Now this a *Witneſs* will do, yea cannot otherwiſe diſcharge himſelf of the tye of love, *if he voluntarily preſent himſelf to atteſt his knowledge, where either the matter in debate requires it, or he can think it will be acceptable to the party concerned:* If when thus preſenting himſelf, or called to it by others, *he ſhall duly recollect himſelf, that ſo he may omit no material part of his Evidence.* Laſtly, if, having thus recollected himſelf, *he clearly and fully declare it, and ſpeak the truth, and the whole truth, as well as nothing contrary to it.* The *Plaintiff* ſhall do his duty, *if he ſhall prefer only ſuch Enditements as are true and material, and proſecute them with candor and moderation*; as the *Defendant* his, *if he ſhall own juſtly imputed Crimes (particularly in matter of Eſtate) and fence only againſt ſuch as he is falſly aſperſed with.* The *Advocate* ſhall fulfil his part, if *he eſpouſe juſt*, or at leaſt *probable Cauſes, and proſecute them with that fairneſs and civility, which becomes men and Chriſtians*, and particularly *that awful Aſſembly before which he ſpeaks.* As the *Judge* his,

if

if *he lend a patient ear to the Evidence that is given, help out and encourage weak but honeſt Witneſſes, and narrowly ſift crafty and reſerved ones*: if, having ſo done, *he ſhall duly weigh all circumſtances, and*, if that be all he hath to do (as in our Common-Law Courts it is) *recapitulate the whole, and deliver his own ſenſe clearly and impartially.* The *Jury* ſhall do their part, if, after a like ſerious conſideration of the matter in debate, *they ſhall guide themſelves in their Verdict by the opinion of the Judge in matter of Law, and by the Evidence that is given as to matter of Fact.* In fine, *thoſe, to whom the power of Regiſtring is committed*, theirs, if *they ſhall faithfully record the Sentence, that is paſſed upon the whole by the Judge*; as *they, and all others to whom the power of the execution of it belongs*, if *they ſet their helping hand to a ſpeedy, and faithful, and full execution* of it. All which Duties I have thus ſhortly laid together, without the addition of their reſpective Proofs; partly becauſe they carry their own conviction in their foreheads; and partly becauſe thoſe that ſeem to ſtand in need of any, have already had them in the foregoing Diſcourſes; to which therefore it is but reaſonable to refer you.

From Judicial Matters paſs we to *Extrajudicial* ones, where agreeably to thoſe ſeveral Falſities, which I have ſhewn to be forbidden in the Negative, our *Duty*, as well as *the Affirmative part* of the Commandment, muſt be *to proſecute thoſe Truths that are contrary to them*; particularly, that whereas *Pernicious* Lyes *ſtrike at our Neighbours Reputation or Eſtate*, we, *on the contrary*, in compliance with that Truth which is oppoſite to them, *ſhould endeavour to advantage him in both*, as the Precept of Love doth manifeſtly enjoin. To advantage him in his Reputation, *by giving him his due commendation, by aſcribing to him thoſe Parts, or Vertues, or Endowments, which he is really poſſeſſed of*; and *remembring them*, where ere we come, *with all the expreſſions of reſpect and honour.* To advantage him again in his Reputation, *by taking off thoſe Calumnies wherewith he is aſperſed, and ſhewing the either falſneſs or improbability thereof.* To advantage him in his Eſtate, *by a religious obſervation of our own Promiſes or Compacts*; or, *by cauſing thoſe of others to be ſtrictly and faithfully obſerved.* To have a regard to Truth in our Diſcourſes with our Neighbour, even *when the contrary thereof may be advantageous to our ſelves and others*, unleſs it be in ſuch caſes, *where the common conſent of mankind, the ſaving of an innocent perſons life, or a ſpeedy detection of the falſhood licenſeth a departure from it.* But above all, that *we intend the proſecution of Truth above our own meer delight, and againſt the temptation of thoſe baits, which the pleaſure of impoſing upon others gives.* Truth, as it is *a Duty* which is owing to our Neighbours *Underſtanding*, no leſs than *Good-will* is to *his Will* from ours; ſo being *the foundation of all pleaſurable and uſeful Commerce*, the *band of Societies, and of thoſe ſeveral Compacts* by which they are *confederated*, and in fine, *the fulfilling* of this Commandment.

THE

THE TENTH
COMMANDMENT.

THE TENTH COMMANDMENT.

Thou ſhalt not covet thy neighbours houſe, thou ſhalt not covet thy neighbours wife, nor his ſervant, nor his maid, nor his ox, nor his aſs, nor any thing that is his.

PART I.

The Contents.

That the Commandment we have now before us is not two *but* one, *as alſo that it ſtrikes not at thoſe firſt ſtirrings or motions of Sin which we call Concupiſcence, but at the coveting of that which is the property of another. By which account the Negative part of the Commandment is reſolved to be,* The not coveting of that which is anothers, *as the Affirmative,* The contenting our ſelves with that which is our own. *An addreſs to a general explication of the former, where is ſhewn that the thing forbidden to be coveted, is any thing of our Neighbours, how ſmall or inconſiderable ſoever; as alſo that the Covetouſneſs which is prohibited, is not ſuch an one as includes in it a deſire or reſolution to uſe unlawful means to compaſs the object of it, but ſuch as abideth in the Mind, or at leaſt doth not prompt it to the other. An Objection out of* Mark 10. 19. *anſwered. A more particular explication of the Negative part of the Commandment, where is ſhewn that all coveting of that which is anothers is not forbidden, but either* 1. *Such as is peccant in the Object; of which nature are the coveting of ſuch things as are not lawful for the Proprietor to part with, as his Wife; or cannot be quitted by him without diſadvantage; or are the object of his affection no leſs than of ours. Or* 2. *Such covetings as are peccant in their quality. Of which number are thoſe Covetings that are not with ſubmiſſion to the will both of God and the Proprietor, that are not accompanied with a like deſire of gratifying our Neighbour, or breed perturbation in us. The criminalneſs of theſe and ſuch like Covetings their implying a diſſatisfaction with the Divine Providence which hath beſtowed what we covet upon another.*

IT being ſufficiently known, that, to blend the *Second* Commandment with the *Firſt*, the Patrons of Image-worſhip have divided this Commandment into *two*; I made it my buſineſs, in my entrance upon the *Second*, to ſhew the unreaſonableneſs of *this Diviſion*, as well as of *that conjunction* or *confuſion*. To which therefore all I ſhall now add is, that as they who divide this Commandment into two, might with as much reaſon divide it into more, even into as many as there are things which are forbidden in it to covet; the formal reaſon of the prohibition being one and the ſame in all, even the propriety thereof being veſted in another: ſo St. *Paul* in two places of his Epiſtle * to the *Romans* ſets it down in thoſe general terms of, *Thou ſhalt not covet*, and ſo makes it but one Commandment. If there be any force in the repeating of the word *covet*, which ſome it ſeems, though unadviſedly enough, have laid ſome ſtreſs upon; it might be rather to ſhew the earneſtneſs of the Lawgiver in forbidding them, than to prompt men to look upon the covetouſneſs there decryed, as diſtinct prohibitions of the Almighty.

* *Rom.* 7. 7. —13. 9.

The way being thus cleared to the Explication of the Commandment, proceed we to the ſubject matter of it; the purport whereof is commonly conceived to be *the prohibition of thoſe firſt motions or ſtirrings of ſin, which we call Concupiſcence, ariſing in the ſenſual appetite (corrupted by* Adam's *Fall, as all other the faculties of the Soul are) before any actual deliberation of the Underſtanding thereabout, or actual conſent of the Will thereunto.* But beſide, that there is no neceſſity (as Dr. *Sanderſon* * hath well obſerved) for the affixing of ſuch a ſenſe to it, becauſe thoſe motions or ſtirrings, ſuppoſing them ſinful, are aptly enough referrable, according to their reſpective objects, to thoſe ſeveral Commandments wherein they are forbidden; the general reaſon of the Commandment, and the place it hath in the Decalogue, oblige rather to underſtand it of the *not coveting of that, the property whereof is veſted in another.* For the Commandment being in the number of thoſe which regard our duty to our Neighbour, and moreover, as appears both by the whole contexture of it, and the laſt clauſe in it, deſinged by the Giver of it, to take men off from the deſire of that which is anothers; it is in reaſon to be conſtrued of ſuch irregular deſires, as become ſo rather upon the Object upon which they are fixed, than by that corrupt Fountain from which they flow. Upon which account (as the ſame Learned Man † hath obſerved) the words of the Authour to the *Hebrews*, *chap.* 13. 5. may ſerve for a ſhort, but full Commentary upon this laſt Commandment, both in the Negative and affirmative part thereof. *Let your converſation be without covetouſneſs*, the Negative, and *be content with ſuch things as you have*, the Affirmative. In the mean time, though I thus depart from the received explication of the Commandment, in obedience to a greater Authority, even that of Reaſon as well

* *Serm. on Phil.* 4. 11. *Part.* 1.

† *Sanderſon. ibid.*

well as of our own Church, which delivers * the ſelf-ſame explication; yet I ſhall not fail to conſider of the thing it ſelf, when I come to entreat of Original ſin, which will fall in pertinently enough in the Diſcourſe of that Sacrament, which was intended for its expiation and its cure.

* Church Catechiſm Anſwer to —— What is thy duty towards thy Neighbour —— —— Not to covet or deſire other mens goods, but to learn, &c.

Now there are two things in the *Negative* part of the Commandment, which will require a general explication before I deſcend to a more particular one; the due importance of *the object* which the Commandment forbids us to covet, and the general nature of that *Covetouſneſs* which it condemns. Of the firſt of theſe much need not be ſaid, if we conſider either that general clauſe in the end of the Commandment, or that account which is given of it in the parallel place of *Deuteronomy*. For though the Commandment we have now before us ſpecifie only our *Neighbours Houſe, Wife, Servant, Maid, Ox and Aſs*; yet, as that parallel place in *Deuteronomy* adds alſo the coveting of his *Field*, as well as of thoſe other things before mentioned; ſo both the one and the other annex the coveting of *any thing that is our Neighbours*, which will comprehend within the compaſs of it, the coveting of his Farm, his Office, his Honour, yea of the moſt inconſiderable things which appertain to him: Whether it be (as the *Ellipſis* * in the *Septuagint* verſion of this Commandment intimates) any portion of his Ox, Aſs, or other Cattel, or that which is yet more inconſiderable than they, according to that of the Greek Poet, Negative part.

* Οὐδὲ τῶν πανδίκων αὐτῶν, ἤτε τῶν βοῶν αὐτῶν, &c. *Intelligendum enim τί, ut maneat eadem conſtructio per Accuſativum— Grot. in Decalog.*

——— μηδ' ἐλόνης,
Ὦ φίλτατ', ἐπιθύμησον ἀλλοτρίας πόλεως,

Let not thy deſires extend themſelves even to the Needle of another; or as it is in the Greek Comedy, *to that thread which is in it*,

Μηδ' ἐλόνης ἔναμμ' ἐπιθυμῇς πάμφιλε, *Grot. ibid.*

The greatneſs or ſmalneſs of the thing coveted, making no more difference as to the nature of the deſire, than the ſame greatneſs or ſmalneſs of the thing ſtoln doth in the nature of the theft, but only as to the aggravation and puniſhment of it. Which laſt piece of Morality, as many others, is thus excellently expreſſed by *Horace* *,

* *Epiſt. li. 1. ep. 16.*

Nam de mille fabæ modiis, cum ſurripis unum,
Damnum eſt, non facinus, mihi pacto lenius iſto.

From the Object which we are here forbidden to covet, paſs we to the conſideration of the general nature of that *Covetouſneſs* which we are under an obligation to avoid. By which may be meant, either ſuch a Covetouſneſs as includes in it a deſire, and reſolution to get from another that which is his by any fraudulent or unjuſt courſes; or ſuch an one as proceeds no farther than a bare deſire, without any actual intention to make it ours by unlawful means. But as I have already ſhewn the former of theſe to appertain to the *Eighth Commandment*, by the ſame reaſon that Anger and a luſtful look or deſire are by our

Saviour reduced to those, wherein Murder and Adultery are forbidden, and consequently have determined the Covetousness which is here forbidden, to be no other than that which abideth in the mind, or at least doth not prompt the party to any violent or fraudulent courses; so I know nothing which can render that sense in any measure questionable, unless it be that of St. *Mark*, *chap.* 10. 19. where bringing in our Saviour repeating the Commandments of the Second Table, after the mention of *Do not commit Adultery*, *do not kill*, *do not steal*, *do not bear false witness*; he adds, *Defraud not* or *deprive not*, as if that, or at least the purpose of it, were the genuine sense of the *Tenth Commandment* in whose place it seems to be fixed. But beside that a single expression, so different from what this Commandment is commonly conceived in, ought not lightly to give Law to more usual expressions, and such as are agreed upon to be more suitable to the sense of the Commandment; beside that the words we render, *Defraud not*, are wanting in some Greek Copies, as is evident from the various readings in the end of the *Biblia Polyglotta*; I am apt to believe that the words *Defraud not*, however subjoyned to the Ninth Commandment, were not intended as an account of the Tenth, but rather as an additionary explication of the Ninth, or to comprehend within the compass of it all injuries not before expressed, but which are elsewhere plainly enough forbidden. And this I am the rather induced to think, first, because St. *Matthew* *, who repeats the same passage of our Saviour, takes no notice at all of the Tenth Commandment, and secondly, because that passage of St. *Mark* is no proper explication of it, as which is agreed upon both by *Jews* and *Christians* to strike at the desires of the heart, which may be inordinate enough, where no actual defrauding of our Neighbour follows. Neither will it avail to say, That he, who hath a desire and purpose to defraud, is in the construction of Christianity a Defrauder; by the same rule that he who looks upon a Woman to lust after her, is by our Saviour reputed an Adulterer. For the Question is not what is the Construction of Christianity, but what was the clear and declared purport of the Law, concerning which our Saviour is there speaking, and what is the most probable notion of the words, *Defraud not*, here. Now forasmuch as it doth not appear, that the Law, though it condemned inordinate desires, yet represented those inordinate desires under the same title with the act that commonly follows them, as it is plain Christianity doth; forasmuch as the most probable notion of the words *Defraud not*, is, do not actually do so; because both the proper notion of the words, and most agreeable with those other Prohibitions before mentioned, which strike only at inordinate actions: I conclude, that the words *Defraud not*, are not to be looked upon as an account of the Tenth Commandment, but either as an additionary Explication of the Ninth (Defrauding being one principal end of bearing False Witness,) or to comprehend within the compass of it, all Injuries not before expressed, but which are elsewhere plainly enough forbidden. Which notion will be rendred yet more probable, if (as *Grotius* observes in his Notes on *Mat.* 19. 16.) the Greek word ἀποστερεῖν comprehend all those Injustices, which come not properly under the names of Adultery, Murder, Stealing, and bearing False Witness: Even (as the same *Grotius* doth there remark) all those Crimes, which among the Latines have no proper name, are compre-

* *chap.* 19. 16.

comprehended under the title of *Stellionatus* and *dolus malus*. All which things I have inſiſted ſo much the longer on, becauſe that Text, to which they are intended as an Anſwer, ſeems to me to require one; and becauſe I have not had the fortune, to ſee any thing ſatisfactory returned to it, by the many Commentators of S. *Mark*. The reſult of the Premiſes is this, That though the Coveting of anothers Goods, with an intention of compaſſing them by unlawful means, be alſo a ſin, and much greater than that which reſts in the mind, or at leaſt doth not prompt the covetous perſon to the taking of any unlawful courſes; yet the latter of theſe is the thing forbidden by this Commandment, and therefore alone to be particularly conſidered by us.

For my more advantageous performance whereof, I will enquire,

1. Whether all Coveting, or Deſiring, of that which is anothers, is here forbidden. Or,
2. If not, what Coveting or Deſiring is: And,
3. Laſtly, Wherein the Criminalneſs thereof conſiſteth.

1. That *all coveting*, or *deſiring of that which is another Mans is not here forbidden*, will appear, if we conſider, firſt, the conſequences of ſuch a ſuppoſition, if it ſhould be indiſcriminately admitted. For is not all Commerce between Man and Man founded in the deſire of that which is anothers? And if ſo, muſt not all Commerce between Man and Man ceaſe, if all deſire of that which is anothers were forbidden? But how then can any Man in Reaſon think all Coveting forbidden, though it be of that which is the Property of another? For take away all Commerce, and neither ſhall he, who enjoys the deſired benefit, have wherewithall to make his life comfortable; nor he who deſires it his: No Man being generally ſo happy as to have all that his neceſſities require; that I ſay not, no Company of Men or Nation. The great Lord of the World having for the moſt part ſo ordered it, that that Land which abounds in ſome ſorts of uſeful things, ſhould be as much ſtraitned as to others; thereby both to engage them to ſeek each others profit, and give them an opportunity to procure it. Now foraſmuch as without Commerce, no Perſon or Nation could be happy, even by the diſpoſition of the Almighty; to exclude all deſire of that which is anothers, upon which all Commerce is founded, muſt needs be looked upon as very incongruous, and therefore much leſs forbidden by that God, who hath made Commerce neceſſary, and conſequently that deſire upon which it is founded. But neither, ſecondly, will the inconvenience be leſs, if we conſider this deſire with reſpect to thoſe Commands, which God hath laid upon us, to earn our living by the ſweat of our brows, or the exerciſe of our ſeveral more noble parts and abiliments. For are all Men who are thus enjoined to labour, furniſhed with ſuch a proportion of Ground, as will, if duly cultivated, afford them a ſubſiſtence? Or are even thoſe that are, furniſhed with all thoſe Inſtruments, which are neceſſary for the cultivation of it? But how then can they procure their own happineſs, without endeavouring to procure the things of others? Or how endeavour that, without deſiring them? All endeavours ariſing from the deſire and hope of that, which Men employ their endeavours to procure. In fine, take away all deſire of that which is anothers, and you muſt alſo take away, I do not ſay only, all deſire or endeavour to raiſe a Man's ſelf a Fortune (which yet no Man hath ever eſteemed unlawful) but

all

all desire or endeavour to do things noble and honourable; because as the Rewards of these are those which spur Men on to them, so they are for the most part in the Property of another. But beside the inconveniences that attend such a supposition, as makes all desire of that which is another's here forbidden; it would also be considered, that all desire of that which is anothers, is no way destructive of that advantage of our Neighbour, which this, as well as the other Commandments of the second Table, oblige us to procure: For what if I desire that of him, which however advantageous to my self, yet is, it may be, not only of no use to him, but prejudicial to him to retain? As if, for example, I should desire of him some of those Fish, wherewith I find his Ponds to be overstockt. Then certainly I shall be so far from desiring the prejudice of my Neighbour, that on the contrary I may do him a signal pleasure in it, were it only by giving him an opportunity of doing a beneficent action, and so advantaging him in the other World, even without any loss to him as to this. Again, what if I desire that, which, though not without all use to him, yet is it may be not of so much use, as the thing which I propose in exchange for it? Nay, what if I desire that of him, which is not only less useful to, but less desirable by him, than that boon which I propose in exchange for it? Here certainly, there is not only no shadow of prejudice in my desire, but the manifest footsteps of benevolence and advantage; and I do no less gratifie his desires, than satiate my own. And indeed, as *Tertullian* * spake not amiss, when, to comfort Men against the loss of this Worlds Conveniences, he told them, that *it was not so much a misfortune, as a traffick, when they only parted with this Worlds conveniences, to procure to themselves more noble and lasting ones*; so he did at the same time shew both the lawfulness and usefulness of Commerce, and of those desires of each others Properties, whereupon all Commerce is founded. For whilst Men do thus covet the Goods of each other, they procure each others happiness, and though both Losers in some sort, yet are both equally Gainers; and, which is more, with the good-will of each other.

* Ad Martyras. c. 2. *Et si aliqua amisistis vitæ gaudia, negotiatio est aliquid amittere, ut majora lucreris.*

2. It being thus evident, That all desire of that which is anothers, is not only not unlawful, but sometimes allowable, and consequently not within the compass of the Prohibition; proceed we to enquire *what coveting* or *desiring* is, which I shall judge of both by the *Object* and the *Desire* it self. In respect of the *former* whereof, that Covetousness or Desire must be looked upon as unlawful,

1. Which *extends it self to such things, as by the Laws of God or Man, are not permitted to the Proprietor to part with.* I instance for the former of these, in the Desire of another Man's Wife, which is one of those things which are expresly forbidden in this Commandment. For Man and Wife being bound to each other, not only by mutual Compact, but by the Institution of the Almighty, which hath so joined them together, as not to be divided, even with their own consent; there will arise from thence both an unlawfulness in the married parties, to part with their mutual right, and a like unlawfulness in another to desire it: He who so desires, either desiring the death of the other parry, which is contradictory to the Law of Love; or the reversing of the Divine Institution, which is a direct opposition to

to the Almighty. In like manner, if any ſhould Covet or Deſire that Houſe, or Land, which the Proprietor thereof, either by his Parents, or other Superiors is forbidden to part withall, he ſhall thereby fall into an inordinate Deſire; becauſe conſequently deſiring the violation of thoſe Commands, whereby he is forbidden to enjoy it.

2. But becauſe though the things before mentioned cannot lawfully be quitted by the Owners, and therefore neither reaſonably deſired, yet there are other things that may be; therefore I ſhall add in the ſecond place, That our Deſire of that which is anothers may alſo become unlawful, *if*, though it extend not it ſelf to ſuch things as are unlawful to be parted with, yet *it extend it ſelf to ſuch, as cannot be quitted by the owner, without diſadvantage:* He, who deſires any thing of that nature, conſequently deſiring the prejudice of his Neighbour, which is deſtructive of that love, which we are by the Laws of Nature, no leſs than thoſe of God, obliged to have for him. By which rule all thoſe deſires muſt be concluded to be unlawful, which are not attended with a deſire and reſolution of making a full compenſation for the object of them, unleſs it be in the matter of Alms; to which, as I have before ſhewn the neceſſitous perſon to have a right, ſo the giving thereof is not diſadvantageous, becauſe by the Divine Promiſe, both to the temporal and eternal advantage of the Giver. But neither,

3. Thirdly ſhall I ſtick to affirm, That all thoſe Covetings or Deſires are to be looked upon as alike unlawful, which *ſettle themſelves upon ſuch Properties of our Neighbour*; as, however not diſadvantageous to the owners thereof to part with, yet *are the object of his affection*, and it may be too more than of our own. For beſide that the Covetous perſon himſelf would not eaſily be induced to part with that which is the object of his own, of which he gives no ſlight indication in deſiring that which is thus the object of anothers: he, who deſires any thing which is thus the Object of his Neighbours affection, deſires the prejudice of the Owner; becauſe deſiring that, which he cannot part with without a prejudice to his content. And though I know the Owners themſelves may be peccant this way, in refuſing to procure a great and real advantage to their Neighbour, with the loſs of a fanciful one to themſelves; yet that hinders not the covetous perſon from being inordinate in his Deſires, by ſuffering them to fix themſelves upon it: As becauſe the thing he deſires is the Property of his Neighbour, ſo which being ſo cannot be transferred to him without the free conſent of the preſent Proprietor, which is not likely to be had where ſuch an affection precedes.

From thoſe Deſires which are peccant in the Object, paſs we to thoſe which are peccant *in themſelves*; ſuch as are,

1. Firſt, All thoſe that *are not with ſubmiſſion to the Will both of God and the Proprietor.* The *former*, becauſe they are a direct oppoſition to his Will, to whom all created Beings ought to be ſubject, by virtue of that Being which they receive from him: The *latter*, becauſe an intrenchment upon our Neighbours Property, ſo far as the Deſire of Man can be one. For that, which is the Property of our Neighbour, being ſo his as not to be transferred, without the Will of the Party in whom it is veſted; he who deſires any thing of his, without ſubmiſſion to his Will, muſt conſequently entrench upon it in his Deſires.

2. I place

2. I place in the ſame rank, even of ſuch Deſires as are peccant in themſelves, thoſe that *are not accompanied with a like Deſire of gratifying our Neighbour*, if he ſhould deſire the ſame or a like favour from us; ſuch a Deſire being apparently contrary to that moſt equitable Rule, which commands us to do to others as we would be done by our ſelves. But ſo alſo do I reckon,

3. Such Deſires of our Neighbours Goods, as *breed perturbation in us*, and will not ſuffer us to intend, as we ought, the Duties of Religion, or of our own Profeſſion, nor enjoy that repoſe and quiet which is neceſſary for us; theſe, beſide the prejudice they bring both to our ſpiritual and eternal welfare, arguing a diſſatisfaction with the Divine Providence for beſtowing thoſe bleſſings upon others, which we but in vain deſire. I place not under the ſame head, though Deſires far more inordinate, thoſe that prompt Men to make uſe of unlawful means to compaſs them; partly becauſe they are breaches of the Eighth Commandment; and partly becauſe I have there accounted for them already. This only would be added, That though inordinate Deſires may contain themſelves within, or at leaſt may not preſently put Men upon the uſe of unlawful means to compaſs them; yet they ſeldom fail, where they are cheriſhed, to ſpur the party on to uſe fraud or violence to compaſs them. Of which, if we wanted other Inſtances, that of *Ahab* might ſuffice, after he had taken a fanſie to *Naboth*'s Vineyard: For though at firſt that fanſie of his put him only upon Entreaties and Propoſals, and ſuch as were not only very reaſonable in themſelves, but in all probability would have prevailed, if they had met with a Man leſs obſtinate than *Naboth*; though after that, and *Naboth*'s flat denyal of his Requeſt, they went no further than a ſullen and melancholy behaviour, which however taken up to gratifie a diſcontented mind, yet ſerves only to add more affliction to the party that eſpouſeth it: yet when a malicious *Jezebel* had put him in mind of being a *King*, and of that liberty or licentiouſneſs which that glorious Name ſeems to challenge; then, I ſay, he could ſo far gratifie his own inordinate Deſires and *Jezebels* malicious mind, as to permit her to ſeal Letters in his Name, to the Elders of *Naboth*'s City, to accuſe him firſt of Blaſphemy againſt God and himſelf, and after that to ſtone him to death, that ſo his Vineyard might eſcheat to the Crown. All which whoſoever ſhall conſider, will ſee Reaſon enough to ſet bounds to his Deſires, though at firſt they proceed no farther; becauſe, as all Vice ſtands upon a precipice, ſo the inordinate Deſires of Men more particularly do ſeldom fail to hurry them into the uſe of the moſt unlawful means, to compaſs the Object of them. Which ſaid, nothing remains to do, but to ſhew,

3. In the third place, The *Criminalneſs* of thoſe Deſires, which I have affirmed to be forbidden by the Commandment. But as I knew not well how to point out thoſe inordinate Deſires, without ſhewing alſo wherein that inordinacy conſiſteth, by which means I have upon the matter prevented my ſelf in that Argument, which comes now in order to be diſcourſed of; ſo having ſo done, I ſhall only add, That the Criminalneſs thereof may be eaſily collected from what I have before ſaid, concerning the Criminalneſs of Stealth, and other the like ways of encroaching upon our Neighbours Property. For though he, who only Covets his Neighbour's Property, do not actually encroach upon

upon it, nor diſturb that order which I have ſhewn God to have inſtituted at firſt, and ever ſince to have approved both by his Providence and his Laws; yet he bewrays a manifeſt diſſatisfaction with it, and a Will no leſs oppoſite to it, than the Actions of the injurious perſon are. Which however in Humane Judicatories without the imputation of a crime, becauſe the motions of the Will are neither prejudicial to that outward policy which they are to maintain, nor knowable by them though they were; yet at the Bar of God and Nature they are alike, or more criminal than our outward Actions, if they are alſo alike oppoſite to the Laws of God. For whilſt the thieving Hand moves only as it is guided by the Will, and is rather the Inſtrument of anothers malice, than the Executioner of its own; the Will determines it ſelf to thoſe unlawful objects upon which it fixeth, and chooſeth thoſe inordinacies into which it falleth.

PART II.

The Affirmative part of the Commandment, The contenting our ſelves with that which is our own; *upon occaſion whereof enquiry is made into the nature of Contentment, which is defined to be an Acquieſcency of the Mind in that portion of outward things we are poſſeſſed of upon a perſwaſion of its being ſufficient for us. This definition allotted both a general and a particular explication, and evidenced to be true in every branch of it. An account of the grounds of our obligation to Contentment, which are ſhewn to be* 1. *The Will of the Almighty declared by the diſpoſition of his Providence.* 2. *Gods both knowing better than we our ſelves what condition is fitteſt for us, and his readineſs to allot it.* 3. *The ſufficiency of our own portion. The means whereby this excellent vertue may be attained. A ſober uſe of abundance at all times, and ſometimes a voluntary abſtinence. The conſideration of our own Vileneſs, and particularly of our paſt Exceſſes, as in like manner of our own portions being better than many others who are not otherwiſe inferiour to us. An enumeration of ſeveral other means which are alike conducible to it, and particularly of ſuch as are purely Religious. Of which nature are, The aſſurances God hath given us of ſupporting us under our condition, or delivering us out of it, or making it advantageous to us. The promiſes of a better life, and Prayer. The Concluſion.*

Affirmative part.

OF the negative part of the Commandment, what hath been ſaid may ſuffice; proceed we now to the *Affirmative* one, ſaid by us (and not without reaſon) to be no other than what the Authour to the *Hebrews* adviſeth, *chap.* 13. 15. *And be content with ſuch things as ye have:* This as it is directly oppoſite to the coveting of our Neighbours Goods, ſo being manifeſtly implyed in the prohibition of it; he who is forbidden to covet anothers goods, being *eo ipſo* obliged to be contented with his own, becauſe there is no Medium between them. Taking it therefore for granted, that to be contented with ſuch things as we have, is the thing enjoined in this Commandment, I will make it my buſineſs to ſhew,

1. Wherein the nature of Contentment doth conſiſt.
2. What the grounds of its obligation are. And
3. Laſtly, By what means it is to be attained.

1. Now though what *Contentment* is, be not difficult to define, even from the common acceptation of it in the world; though being ſo, it might therefore ſuffice to diſpatch our account of it in a few words, as which to men not willing to be deceived would ſerve to unfold the nature of it: Yet becauſe I have obſerved that they who ſeem well enough informed about the nature of it *in Theſi*, do yet *in Hypotheſi*, and when they come to make application of it to themſelves, willingly err in the apprehenſion of it; I purpoſe to be more particular in the unfolding of its nature, than otherwiſe I ſhould think my ſelf obliged. In order whereunto I will firſt give you a ſhort definition of it, and when I have done ſo, both explain it and draw it down to particulars. Now

Now *Contentment* is nothing else than *an acquiescency of the Mind in that portion of outward things we are possessed of, upon a perswasion of its being sufficient for us.* I call it *an acquiescency of the Mind*, because experience shews it so to be, both as to that Mind to which we have attributed it, and that acquiescency thereof, which we have affirmed it to import; Content by whatsoever it be occasioned, yet having its seat in the Mind, and quieting the desires of it. I call it an acquiescency of the Mind *in that portion of outward things we are possessed of*, partly to intimate that there must be generally some portion of outward things to beget it, and partly to shew that whatsoever that portion is, whether high or low, it is equally the object of it. For the proof of the former whereof we shall need to go no farther than that of St. *Paul*, 1 *Tim.* 6. 8. for exhorting men to contentment, though they have *no other than Food and Raiment*, he giveth us thereby to understand, * that those are generally necessary to the procuring of it; that destitution in them is such an evil as, till it be removed, suffereth not the mind of man to be at quiet. Again, though some portion of outward things be absolutely necessary to beget it, or at least is generally so; yet whether high or low is not material, because both are the object of it: As is evident, both from the former Text which commands us *having Food and Raiment therewith to be content:* and another place of the same Apostle, *Phil.* 4. 11, 12. where he not only affirms himself to have *learnt in whatsoever state he was therewith to be content*; but adds moreover, as a proof and illustration of the former, that he knew both *how to be abased*, as well as *how to abound*, to be *hungry*, as well as to be *full*, and in fine, *to suffer need*, as well as to enjoy the contrary affluence. I know not whether I should add, because sufficiently implyed in the former considerations; that Contentment, about whatsoever it is conversant, is still about that which is present; St. *Paul's* ἐν οἷς εἰμὶ in the place before quoted, and the Authour to the *Hebrews* exhorting to be content, τοῖς παροῦσι *chap.* 13. 5. being an abundant evidence thereof. Though were neither the one nor the other convictive, the necessity of being contented with our own, would infer the being contented also with the present, because nothing can be truly said to be our own but that which is so. Lastly, as Contentment is an acquiescency in that portion of outward things which is present to us; so it doth also include in it as the ground of that acquiescency, *a perswasion of its being sufficient for us:* this being manifestly implied in those phrases * of the New Testament, whereby Contentment is expressed.

* Hooker Eccl. Pol. li. 1. sect. 10.

* Αὐτάρκης, ἱκανός. Hesy. Idem sensus v. ἀρκεῖσθαι quod alibi usurpatur.

But because, even thus we cannot satisfie our selves perfectly concerning the nature of Contentment, there being place for enquiry how far that acquiescency we speak of is to be extended, and wherein limited; I will once more run over the definition of Contentment, and draw it down to more particular considerations. For be it that Contentment is *an acquiescency of the Mind*, according as was before defined; yet is it such an acquiescency as excludes all desires or endeavours of mending that mean condition we are in? If so, farewel to all Industry and Providence, which yet no man hath ever esteemed unlawful; yea farewel to those Divine Promises, which, to encourage men to be content with the present, give them hopes of Gods bringing them out of their streights: He who gives hopes of amend-

ing our Condition, forbidding us not to desire it, but on the contrary rather encouraging us both to desire and endeavour it. And yet if there be place for such desires and endeavours, how can the contented man of whom we speak, be said to acquiesce or rest in his present portion? for how can he be said to quiet his desires in the present, who is ever extending them beyond it? Both which Horns of this Dilemma are thus excellently expressed by *Horace* * in the person of the Cynick Philosopher,

* *Epist. li.* 1. —*Epist.* 17.

Si pranderet olus patienter, regibus uti
Nollet Aristippus. Si sciret regibus uti,
Fastidiret olus ———

If (saith he) *Aristippus* could content himself with a dinner of Herbs, he would not certainly endeavour to ingratiate himself with Princes, and thereby to amend his fortune: And if he could compass his ends upon them, no doubt he would despise his former fare, which shews he was not before very well satisfied with it. For the reconciling of which two together, and thereby the discovering yet more fully the nature of Contentment, I shall desire it may be considered, first, that inasmuch as Contentedness is nothing else than an Acquiescency in the present; nothing hinders but a man may be at the same time contented with the present, and yet desire an enlargement for the future, because that Acquiescency and Desire have respect to different times, which takes away all contradiction between them. The contented man of whom we speak, doth indeed desire an enlargement of his condition for the future; he prays to God for it, and is not wanting in his endeavours to procure it; but in the mean time he quiets himself with what he hath, and repines not in the least at the smalness of it. But because the present time in strictness of Speech reacherh no farther than the τὸ νῦν or present moment, within which to confine the duty of Contentment were to pen it up in a narrower room than I conceive Christianity and Nature intended it; and because the same Will of God which obligeth us to be content with the portion of the present minute, will equally oblige us to continue our Contentment to the next, if God be pleased to continue the other: for these Reasons, I say, as I deem it but just to understand by the present time, all that time, of what continuance soever, to which God shall be pleased to annex the same humble Fortune; so I conceive it alike necessary to shew, that those Desires and Endeavours, which we spake of, are no way inconsistent with that acquiescency which is commensurate to it. Now that so they are not, or at least need not to be, will appear, if these two Conditions be admitted, which no contented Man either did or can refuse. 1. That whilst the Will of God is yet unknown, he submit his Desires to it, and resolve to abide by the determination of it. And 2. That he lay aside all Desires of an enlargement, after it shall appear to him that it is the Will of God he should abide in that mean condition wherein he is. For acquiescency not so much importing an exclusion of our Desires, as the quieting of them, and bringing them into subjection to the Will of the Divine Majesty, which, as I shall afterwards shew, is the principal ground of Contentment; he may very well be said to acquiesce in his present Fortune, who submits

mits his Desires to the Will of God, whilst it is yet uncertain; and causeth them to cease utterly, where that Will of God is made known. The only difficulty in my opinion, (which though of no concernment as to the present Dispute to resolve, is yet to the understanding of the nature of Contentment) the only difficulty, I say, in my opinion, is how to come to understand whether it be the Will of God we should abide in that condition we are in. Now though nothing herein can certainly be defined without a Revelation from Heaven, partly because the Scripture (which is one way of knowing Gods Will) is silent in this particular; and partly because his Providence (which is the only one beside) is a mysterious Book, and not very easie to be unriddled: yet I think we may probably conjecture it to be his Will that we should so abide, or at least that we should do so till we have a very fair invitation from his Providence to stir; if, after many and various attempts to amend our condition, we do yet prove unsuccessful in it: It being not lightly to be thought (especially where our Desires are moderate, and Attempts honest) that God, by whose Providence they are frustrated, would so often do so, if it were not his Will we should at least for some time abide in the condition we are in. The result of the Premises is this; The contented Man, as such, acquiesceth in his present Fortune, and is willing, because it is God's Will, to be what he is: He is moreover as willing to continue so to be, so long as it shall please God to have him so. In conformity whereto, though he do desire, and it may be endeavour an amendment; yet as he doth not do so, even when the Will of God is uncertain, without a submission of his Will to God's, and a resolvedness to acquiesce in the determination of it; so those Desires and Endeavours of his cease altogether, where it either certainly, or probably, appears to him to be the Will of God, that he should abide in that condition wherein he is. I say nothing at all at present, of the entertaining of immoderate or anxious Desires, or using any unlawful means to compass them; these being so apparently inconsistent with that acquiescency of mind whereof we speak, and that Will of God which I shall afterwards shew to be the ground of it, that it may suffice to have mentioned them, without either Proof or Explication. For how can he be said to acquiesce in his present Portion, and much more in the Will of God concerning it; whose mind is not only like the troubled Sea in that it cannot rest, but is ever casting out mire and dirt, both in its speeches and actions; neither knowing how to express it self without murmuring and complaining, nor to prosecute the Object of its Desires, without violent or fraudulent actions, which that God, in whose Will they ought to acquiesce, hath distinctly and severely forbidden?

From that acquiescency, wherein we have said contentedness to consist, pass we to that *in which it obligeth us to acquiesce*; which I have said to be *that Portion of outward things we are possessed of:* Where again, we are to consider it, as it imports the presence of some portion of outward things; and as it imports that portion which we have, as well low as high, to be equally the Object of it. Now though (to begin with the first) it be generally necessary to Contentment, that a Man be furnished with such things as are ordinarily necessary for his support, and particularly with Food and Rayment; upon which account I have shewn it* to be lawful, in the case of extreme necessity,

* See Explic. of the Eighth Com. Part 3.

ceſſity, to withdraw ſo much from other Men as will ſerve to ſupply it; yet I muſt alſo add, that we both may and ought to be content, even when we are without thoſe neceſſary things, where it appears to be Gods Will that ſo we ſhould be; becauſe though Food and Rayment be generally neceſſary to Contentment, yet they are not abſolutely nor univerſally ſuch, *Man*, as our Saviour argues out of the Law, *living not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.* The only difficulty is, how we may diſcover that Will of God, which I ſuppoſe may be theſe two ways. 1. When he giveth us any aſſurance of an extraordinary ſupport: and 2. When he placeth us in ſuch a condition as we cannot compaſs an ordinary one. After either of which to repine or murmur, were as manifeſt a violation of the Duty of Contentment, as to do ſo when we have Food and Rayment. For contentedneſs (as I ſhall afterwards ſhew) having for the ground of its Obligation the Will of that God who is the framer of our Fortunes; if it be his Will (as certainly the caſes before ſpoken of are no obſcure indications of it) that we ſhould acquieſce in no Fortune as well as in a ſmall one, there is no doubt that alike ought to be the Object of it, and we to acquieſce or reſt in it. There is but little difficulty (and therefore I ſhall not inſiſt on the Explication of it) as to what I have before ſaid concerning low and high being alike the Object of Contentment; there being no Truth of which we have a greater Experience, than what is ſaid to have fallen from the mouth of *Epicurus**, that *to whom little is not enough, nothing* how great ſoever *is ſo*; Men's Deſires for the moſt part enlarging with their Fortunes, and creating to them thoſe wants which God and Nature never made.

* *Vid. Ælian. Vari. hiſt. l. 4. c. 13.*

Laſtly, As contentedneſs is an acquieſcency of the Mind, and an acquieſcency in that portion of outward things we are poſſeſſed of; ſo ſuch an acquieſcency in it, as ariſeth from, and includeth in it *a firm belief of that portion's being ſufficient for us.* This as it is the natural importance of thoſe Phraſes, whereby we have ſhewn the New Teſtament to expreſs it, ſo being eſſential to contentedneſs; it being impoſſible for the Will to quiet it ſelf, in that which the Underſtanding doth not apprehend to be ſufficient. The Will may indeed, by the impoſſibility of attaining more, be beaten off from deſiring it; it may be taken off from any perfect and efficacious volitions of it: but as ſome velleities will ever remain, and, what naturally flows from them, a repining at our portion; ſo it may rather be ſaid to be quieted, or to ſpeak more properly, to be mortified by, than to quiet it ſelf in it.

2. Of the nature of Contentment I have diſcourſed hitherto, proceed we in the next place to the *grounds of its obligation.* Amongſt which I reckon firſt, *the Will of Almighty God, declared by the diſpoſition of his Providence.* For inaſmuch as God, and not we our ſelves, is the framer of our Fortunes, inaſmuch as it is he that *maketh poor* as well as *maketh rich*; it is but a juſt compliance with his Will, by whoſe diſpoſition the ſeveral Conditions of Men are ſhaped, to acquieſce in it whatſoever it is, and bring our Minds to an approbation of it. Excellent to this purpoſe is that of *Epictetus* in his *Enchiridion*, or at leaſt may be eaſily adapted to it. *Remember* (ſaith he*) *that thou*

* c. 23. Μίμνησο, ὅτι ὑποκριτὴς εἶ δράματος, οἷον ἂν θέλῃ ὁ διδάσκαλος· ἂν βραχύ, βραχέος· ἂν μακρόν, μακροῦ· ἂν πλουτῆν ὑποκρίνεσθαί σε θέλῃ, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτον ὑφορῶς ὑποκρίνῃ· ἂν χωλόν, ἂν ἄρχοντα, ἂν ἰδιώτην. Σὸν γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ δοθὲν ὑποκρίνεσθαι πρόσωπον καλῶς, ἐκλέξασθαι δ' αὐτὸ ἄλλου.

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art the Actor of a part in a Play, and ſuch an one as it pleaſeth thy great Maſter to impoſe upon thee. If it be a ſhort one, that thou art the Actor of a ſhort; if a long one, of a long. If he will have thee to act the part of a poor man, remember that thou do handſomly diſcharge it: if a Lame Man, a Ruler, or a Private Perſon, that thou accordingly behave thy ſelf. To thee it belongs to repreſent as thou oughteſt the perſon which is given thee to act, to another to make choice of it. It is true indeed, if we were or might be chuſers of our own Fortunes; if, as we are willing enough to be, ſo we were actually exempted from ſubjection to any ſuperiour Power: ſo I could not with the ſame reaſonableneſs preſs upon you the being contented with that portion of outward things which ye are poſſeſſed of. For why ſhould I be contented with a mean and deſpicable Fortune, when there is no reſtraint upon me from proſecuting a better? But when we are not our own, but his by whom we were created and redeemed, when our Will is no leſs his ſervant, than any of our other Faculties or Powers; how unreaſonable muſt it be not to acquieſce in his, and that portion of outward things which he allots us? Eſpecially, if we add in the ſecond place, which may paſs for another ground of our obligation to it, that *God doth both know better than we our ſelves what condition is fitteſt for us; and*, becauſe he is alſo a merciful Father, *will be ſure to allot us that which is.* Diſcontentedneſs in this caſe being not only undutifulneſs, but ingratitude, and a reſiſting of his love, as well as of his Authority. Add hereunto, thirdly, (which may paſs for another ground of our obligation) *the ſufficiency of that portion which it hath pleaſed the Divine Majeſty to aſſign us.* For what can be more reaſonable, eſpecially when God impoſeth it on us, than to be contented with that which is ſufficient? The only difficulty is, how to make it appear that all allotments of the Divine Providence are ſuch, eſpecially when many of them are attended with great neceſſities, and ſuch as preſs upon the moſt importunate, as well as moſt reaſonable deſires of Nature. But as Mens Fortunes do more often become inſufficient by the exorbitancies of their deſires, than by the diſproportionableneſs thereof to juſt and moderate ones; ſo thoſe which are inſufficient in themſelves, may become ſufficient through the Divine Grace, yea undoubtedly ſhall to all thoſe that truly love and fear him: For God having diſtinctly promiſed, that, *together with the temptation, whatſoever it is, he will make a way for us to eſcape, that we may be able to bear it*, he hath thereby obliged himſelf, where he affords not the ordinary means of ſupport, to furniſh out an extraordinary and ſupernatural one. Leſs than that in the failure of ordinary means ſufficing not to bear the temptation, but being more than ſufficient for it where it is afforded; not only the infinity of God and his creating out of nothing the ordinary ſupports of Humane life ſo perſwading, but the aſſurance he hath given us of an eternal life after this, where Food and Rayment, and other ſuch like means of our ſupport, ſhall neither be wanted nor deſired.

Permittes ipſis expendere numinibus, quid
Conveniat nobis, rebuſq; ſit utile noſtris;
Nam pro jucundis aptiſſima quæq; dabunt dii,
Charior eſt illis homo quàm ſibi. —
Juv. Sat. 10. v. 347. &c.

3. From the grounds of our obligation to Contentment, paſs we to *the means whereby it may be acquired*, the third thing propoſed to be diſcourſed of. I do not mean to mention all, which were too large a task, and may with more Reaſon be expected from ſuch as entreat *de induſtriâ*

induſtriâ of that Argument, but to ſelect ſuch of them as ſeem to me to be moſt efficacious to produce that Contentment which I inculcate. In the number of which I reckon, firſt, *A ſober uſe of abundance at all times*, and *ſometimes a voluntary abſtinence.* For were Men careful, as they ought, to keep themſelves always within the bounds of temperance, and ſometimes alſo (which yet were no hard task) to abſtain wholly from the enjoyment of their plenty; they would not then find it ſo uneaſie to content themſelves with a more moderate Fortune, or repine and murmur at it when it befalls them: he who can be without theſe external things even when he hath them, being much more likely to bear the want of them when they are not to be had, and bring his mind to acquieſce in it. But when Men will not only not abſtain at any time from lawful Delights, but allow themſelves in ſuch as are exorbitant; when, inſtead of denying and mortifying their appetites, they will afford them the utmoſt ſatisfaction they are capable of, though with the hazard of their health, and, which is of much more conſideration, of their eternal welfare: then no wonder if a meaner Fortune appear ſtrange and irkſom, and the inconveniences wherewith it is attended inſupportable; the difference between their former enjoyments and their preſent ſtraits appearing ſo vaſtly great, that it may well ſtagger a reſolved Underſtanding, and make Men ſink under their Calamity, though they were otherwiſe well enough diſpoſed to bear it, and made uſe of all their Reaſon to reconcile themſelves to the undergoing of it. Whence it is, that where ſuch a change hath ſometime hapned, they, who have been the unhappy ſubjects thereof, have needed no other Malady to oblige them to quit the World, and exchange this miſerable life, I will not ſay for a better, but what may reaſonably enough be feared, for one that exceeds it as much in ſadneſs, as it doth in the duration of it.

But let us ſuppoſe (as God knows that opportunity of learning Contentment doth often paſs by us unobſerved,) let us ſuppoſe, I ſay, that we have not been careful to uſe our affluence with ſobriety, and much leſs to abridge our ſelves in the lawful uſe of it; yet even ſo there will not want means to bring us to a contented mind, if we will but be ſo wiſe as to make uſe of them. Such as is in the next place *the conſideration of our own vileneſs*, and, what our former plenty may well ſuggeſt to us, *our paſt riots and intemperances*: For how can he think much to ſtoop to a mean Fortune, who hath made ſo ill uſe of a more ſplendid one? yea who it may be hath been the Author of his own preſſures, and brought himſelf to penury by a prodigal waſting of his former Fortunes? It being but reaſonable, that every Man ſhould acquieſce in that, which hath been rather his choice than his misfortune. And though it be true, that all, who have thus fallen, are not conſcious to themſelves of the like Prodigality, nor it may be of any Crimes which may be looked upon as equal to them; yet is there none who will not find enough in himſelf to make him acknowledge his Calamity to have been deſerved, and accordingly to prompt him, rather to thank God for what he hath, than to repine that it is no greater than it is; eſpecially if he do alſo conſider, that there are many in the world who are more neceſſitous than himſelf, and, it may be too, who have in all things more approved themſelves to the Divine Majeſty, than he himſelf, if he judge impartially, will think himſelf to have done. And

though

though it were but an odd conſideration which *Diogenes* * ſolaced himſelf with in the extremity of his poverty, that *the Mice which plaid about him, pleaſed themſelves with thoſe crums, that did either fall from, or were wiped off by him*; yet it may ſuggeſt to us another which is more likely to be attended to, and, where it is ſo, to induce Men to Contentment. For certainly, notwithſtanding the murmurings of diſcontented Men, there are ſome in the world, who do not yet repine, *whoſe Fortunes* are as *diſproportionable* to *thoſe of the diſcontented perſon*, as *thoſe of the Mice* were to *the condition of the Cynick*.

* *Ælian. Var. hiſt. l.* 13. *c.* 26.

What ſhould I tell you, what Experience no leſs than the Scripture aſſures us, That *our life conſiſteth not in the abundance of the things that we poſſeſs?* That *Contentment is as rarely, yea more rarely, to be found in a ſplendid Fortune, than in a moderate or humble one?* That *thoſe gayeties, which we ſo much deſire, and without which it is ſo hard for us to be contented, are attended with a proportionable number of inconveniences?* That *more cares, and fears, and dangers wait upon the Scepter than upon the Spade?* That *thoſe pleaſures, which are the Concomitants of greater Fortunes, appear more amiable at a diſtance, than when they come to be enjoyed*; which no Man who hath ever taſted any earthly pleaſure, but will find himſelf obliged to confeſs? That *they are of no certain continuance, even when we think our ſelves moſt ſure of them?* That *we our ſelves may be taken from them, as well as they from us?* In fine, That *we may be taken from them even whilſt we continue in and with them?* It being no rare thing for Men to loſe the ſenſe of them, by ſtupidity or an exquiſite pain, and want them, even when they are poſſeſſed of them. All which things, whoſoever ſhall duly ponder in his mind, and allow them that weight which they deſerve, will, I doubt not, be eaſily induced to content himſelf with an humble Fortune, and not only ſuffer but embrace it.

But of all the means whereby Contentment may be procured, and which therefore it will concern us to make uſe of, becauſe there can be no happineſs without it; there are certainly *none* more efficacious, than ſuch as are *purely Religious*, and for which we are beholden rather to the Book of God than that of Nature. In the number of which I reckon, firſt, *Thoſe many aſſurances the Scripture hath given us of Gods ſupporting us under our humble Fortunes, or delivering us out of them, or making them advantageous to us.* Such as are thoſe that inform us, that *God will never leave us nor forſake us* (for ſo what was ſpoken to *Joſhua* in particular, is by the Author to the *Hebrews* extended unto all) that *his eyes are upon them that fear him, to deliver their ſouls from death, and to feed them in the time of dearth*; that *though the Lyons do lack and ſuffer hunger, yet they which ſeek the Lord ſhall want no manner of thing that is good*; and in fine, that *all things ſhall work together for good to them that love God, to them who are called according to his purpoſe.* For who can well be diſcontented with his outward condition, which he is aſſured ſhall be made ſupportable, or mended, and (which is more) rendered advantageous to him? The like is to be ſaid, yea with much more reaſon, of *the Promiſes of a better life*, of *being ſatisfied*, however we may now hunger, *when we awake with Gods likeneſs*, of *being advanced to an abiding City, and an incorruptible Crown*, to *the taſting of*, or rather

Pſal. 33. 18, 19. —34. 10. Rom. 8. 28. Heb. 13. 5.

immerſing our ſelves in Rivers of pleaſures, and *ſuch Rivers*, as, becauſe they are ſupplyed out of the Ocean of the Divine Goodneſs, *ſhall run for evermore*. For what peeviſhneſs muſt it be, during the ſhort time of our continuing here, not to content our ſelves with a mean allotment; when he, by whom we are allotted it, hath aſſured us of ſo large a portion in that better and more enduring world? To all which, if we add *our Prayers* to God, who is *the giver of every good and perfect gift*, and particularly of *that Contentment* whereof we ſpeak, it being he and he alone who *giveth his beloved reſt of body and mind*, whilſt *others riſe up early and ſit up late, and eat the bread of cares and ſorrows*; ſo (I ſay) we ſhall want nothing (becauſe he hath ſtyled himſelf a God *hearing Prayer*, as well as giving ſucceſs to our endeavours) which may both oblige and enable us, to content our ſelves with our allotment, as well as not to extend our Deſires to thoſe of others.

Such are the *Laws* of the *Jewiſh Code*, or at leaſt of that part of it, which contains the precepts of a vertuous life; ſuch too, becauſe tranſcribed, and confirmed, and enlarged, by our Bleſſed Saviour, are *the Laws* of the *Chriſtian* one. I wiſh I could alſo add, ſuch are the *lives of his Diſciples*; of thoſe who have been *baptized into his Faith and ſervice*, and particularly *into the obedience of this Royal Law*. But the careleſneſs of the better, and the debauchedneſs of the worſer ſort make the contrary too evident to be either disbelieved or denyed. In conſideration whereof, as it was not without great reaſon, that that *Church*, whoſe *Catechiſme* I have choſen to explain, hath taught us to ſubjoin, both to the whole and every precept of it, an acknowledgment of our own Errours, and a Prayer both for *mercy* and *a better mind*; ſo I ſhall conclude my Explication of it with praying in like manner, that God would be *merciful* in the pardoning of our ſeveral tranſgreſſions of theſe his moſt Holy Laws, and for the time to come *write them in our minds and in our hearts*, and incline us both more diligently and faithfully to keep them.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

In the Title over the Pages.

Pag. 25. and 27. for *add to and confirm*, read *fulfil and add to.*

In the Text.

Pag. 8. lin. 45. after *conſequently* add *that.* p.9.l.30. read 1 *Tim.* 2. p.10.l. penult. for *to* r. *ſo.* p. 12. l.32. for *be has* r. *having.* p.23.l.18. *entrance.* p.29.l.40. *extent.* p.39.l.5 *meaſures.* p.44.l.17. *For inaſmuch.* p.46.l.37. *ſpiritual.* p.55.l.4. for *that* r. *the.* p.64.l.2. *incentive.* p.70.l.36 for *lower* r. *low or.* p.88.l.33. for *him* r. *them.* p.123. l.2. for 4. r. 2. p.132.l.47. for 1. r. 12. p.155.l.13. for 12. r. 21. ib. l. ult. for 50. r. 15. p.166.l.7.for *guiltineſs* r. *guiltleſs.* ib. l. penu't. for 23 r. 24. p. 175. l.18. for *in* r. *of.* p.196.l 48. for *would* r. *may.* p.202.l.31. for 32.r.31. p.209.l antep. for 72.r.73. p.222. l.4. for *and obedience* r. *or obedience.* p.226.l.10. for *exalt the* r. *exact.* p.233. l. 15. after *forbids* add *the.* p.241. l.44. for *ſome* r. *a.* p.251.l.21. *ſtoxήων.* ib. l. 37. for *themſelves* r. *our ſelves.* p.256. l.13. *thoſe ſeveral.* ib.l.35. for *to* r. *ſo.* p.258.l.4.*ſtrongly.* p.271.l 32. *ἤδὲ.* p.275.l.12. for *doth* r. *do.* ib.37. for *power in* r. *power of.* p.276.l.32. *decreed.* p.278.l.7. *Example.* p.279 l.25. and 44. for *God* r *Good.* p.281.l.7. after *defend* add *it.* p.288. l.8. *to be appointed.* p.299.l.27. for *difference, there* r. *difference there,* p.301.l.42. *in things.* p.304.l.8. for *to* r. *ſo.* p.305.l 25. for *and.*r. *And.* p.315.l.21. for *ſo* r. *to.* ib.l.42.r. *half of.* p. 318.l.38. for 6. r. 16. p.323 l.2. for *happineſs* r. *unhappineſs.* ib. l. 12. after *a* add *great.* p.324.l. 34. *μινυνδάδ☉.* p.334.l.42. for *conceal* r. *cancel.* p.362.l 32. *Hæreſes* p.364 *l* 20. dele *as.* p.366.l.43. after *forbid* add *it.* p.368.l.35. *proſcribes.* p.369. l.23. *all calling.* p.370. l. 17. *χολύμεν☉.* p.384. l.25. *Contracts a.* p. 392. l. 46. *Amiableneſs.* p.393. l.44 *others.* p.394. l.22. for 15. r. 35. p.395.l.21. for 17. r. 7. p. 401. l. 40. *expreſs.* p. 402. l.1. for 33. r. 39. p. 410. l. 25. for 30. r. 13. p.413.l.11. for 18. r. 9. ib.l. 16.r. *Whoremongers.* p. 416. l. antep. *unwary.* p. 423. l. 21. for *proportion* r. *properties.* p. 428. l. 6. r. *Act.*5.4. p.429.l.22. *true Grace.* p 432. l.17. for *who* r. *which.* p. 435. l. 33. dele *as.* p. 471. l. 16. after *own* add *or.* p. 477. l. 8. *proſcribing.* p. 488. l.20. after *alſo* add *to.* p. 499. l. 46. r. *For.* p.503. l. 17. for *too* r. *to.* p.519. l.12. *Gentlemen.* p.520. l. 8. after *where* add *the.* p.532.l 20. *covetouſneſſes.* ib.l.40. for *upon* r. *by.* p.533.l.27. for 'Ο r. Ὃ. ib. ποτε

In the Margent.

Pag. 36. ** Verba ſunt, ἐν τύτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, &c. p. 49. for 27. r. 37. p. 71. for *Iſa.* r. *Exe.* p.116. l. 4. after *verba* dele 1. p. 203 l. 10. *παράκλησιν.* p.205. l. 23. *δὴ.* ib. l. 24. *συγγεάμμαλα* · p. 236. l.10. *ἀγώνισον.* l.11. *ζωοπλασῆν.* 21. *ἀρχονλα.* p 237. l. 1. *ποιήσουσιν.* p.265.l.ult. *ἡγεμόσιν.* p.267. l. antep. *διέφενλαι.* p. 273. l. 1. for 2. 3. r. 23. l. 6. *βιωτικοῖς-αὐτὸ-ἐποίησε-λέγων.* p. 278. l. antep. *caſtella.* ib. l. ult. *ſect.* 7. p. 303. l. pen. *clavum.* p. 331. l. 4. *ἐνδς.* p.332.l.5. *ἀνέξη.* ib.l.16. *κ τίνων.* ib. l.18. *τεθεωρηκὼς.* p.361.l.1.c.2. p. 365.l. 2. *ἴσμεν.* ib. l. 6. *αὐτὸς.* p.369.l.7. אנשים. p.374.l.2. for 14.r.1.4.p.399. l.2. *Col.* p.406.l.20. *vitiis.* p. 411.l.5. *μήτε.* ib.l.6. *μήτ'.* p.451.for 8. r. 3. p.460. for *natural uſe* r. *nature and uſe.* p.464. *contendant.* p.516.l.2.r.32.

ADDEND.

Pag. 267. in margine. Poſt illud *Straboni*s, adde aliud illuſtre teſtimonium ex *Dionis* Hiſt. Rom. l. 53. p.519. quod haud ita pridem inter legendum obſervavi—— Καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὁ γερουσία δήμαρχόν τε αὐτὸν διὰ βίυ εἶναι ἐψηφίσαλο, καὶ χρηματίζειν αὐτῷ ἐξεὶ ἐνδς * ὅτε ἂν ἐθελήσῃ καθ' ἑκάσην βολὴν, κἂν μὴ ὑπατεύῃ, ἔδοκε, τήν τε ἀρχὴν τὴν ἀνθύπαλον ἐσαεὶ καθάπαξ ἔχειν, ὡς τε μήτε ἐν τῇ οἰκόδῳ τῇ εἴσω τῦ πωμηρίυ κατατίθεδζ, μήτ' αὖθις ἀναιρεῖδζ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ὑπηκόῳ τὸ πλῆον τῶν ἐκασαχόθι ἀρχόνλων ἰχύειν ἐκέτρεψεν. Ἀφ' ἧ δὴ καὶ ἐκεῖν☉. καὶ ὁι μεῖ' αὐτὸν [Auguſtum nempe de quo ante dicta commemorat] αὐτοκράτορες ἐν ΝΟΜΩ δὴ τινὶ τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ τῇ ἐξυσίᾳ τῇ δημαρχικῇ ἐχρήσανλο. Addit autem idem Dion, quod ſententiam noſtram magis confirmat, Καί μοι δοκεῖ ταῦθ' ὕτω τότε ὐκ ἐκ ΚΟΛΑΚΕΙΑΣ ἀλλ' ἐπ' ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΣ τιμηθῆς λαβεῖν. * ἀεὶ ἐνδς ἐκάσν, ὅ,τι ἂν—

XUM